

Understanding Kenyan Politics: The Case of Deputy Presidency from 1963 to 2022

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Abstract: According to Kenyan Constitution (2010, Section 147), the duties of the Deputy President (previously Vice President) include assisting the President with administrative tasks, representing the President in international forums, and filling any vacancies that may occur in the event that the current President passes away, is impeached, or is found guilty. The Deputy President is thus the second-highest political official in Kenya. Hence, the Vice President is Kenya's second-highest elected office. He or she is the President's assistant. Yet, since independence, there have consistently been disputes in Kenya between the State Presidents who have led the country successively and their deputies. This article attempts at finding the root that defines the disputes. The article also argues that while the Kenyans changed their constitution in 2010, the issue did not improve, instead, it became worse since the Deputy President is now being protected by the constitution from being dismissed by the President. Thus, continued friction has a serious impact on the lives of ordinary people. The article is hinged on desk review and some insights observed by the author as an "outsider" who resided in that country. The article is a modification of the essay developed and shared in public through the author's blog in 2022 as Kenya prepared for its general elections. The feedback received from the readers further shaped the article in its current form. The article takes a historical approach as it tracks the key events from 1963 to 2022 with regard to the two offices in Kenya. It concludes that the problem emanated from ambitious deputies but was also amplified by the insecurities felt by the successive Presidents. The article recommends a review of the constitution to allow members of the public to decide on the fate of a deputy president in extreme cases.

Key Words: Deputy, President, Ambitious, Insecurity, Kenyan Politics

I. Introduction

This article profiles the political history of all the Kenyan Vice (Deputy) Presidents from independence from the British colonialists in 1963 to 2022. It notes that this strategic office has been characterized by resignations, dismissals, deaths, friction, mistrust between the Presidents and Deputy Presidents, and succession dynamics within the office of the President. Two key questions guide this article: Did Kenya always produce over-ambitious Deputy Presidents? Or, did it always produce insecure Presidents who felt threatened by their deputies? The words "Deputy and Vice" President are used interchangeably in this article although the latter was dropped formally through the 2010 constitution. The main argument of the article is that Kenyan Presidents always felt uncomfortable with their deputies. The first two Presidents of the country (1964 to 2002) exhibited some dictatorial tendencies, hence they could easily dismiss their deputies at will while the constitution did not bar them from doing so. The third President (2002 to 2013) did not have notable issues with his deputies. The fourth (2013 to 2022), while he enjoyed the cover of a more democratic constitution (2010), he felt insecure in front of his deputy hence his tenure marked the climax of the conflicts between the two offices. On their party, the majority of the Deputy Presidents were victims of circumstances, while some of them held serious ambitions to become Presidents.

II. Methodology

Methodologically, this article was directly informed by a desk review of secondary sources and the author's observation of political developments in Kenya from 2017 to 2022. The author was a participant observer in some political processes in Kenya as the country was preparing for its 2017 and 2022 general elections. Furthermore, the author participated as part of an election observer mission during the 2022 elections. The author thus directly interacted with political activists and the general public. The researcher, therefore, applies an "outsider-insider" perspective in this article. One further reviewed online and hard copy materials such as Kenya's constitution, newspaper articles, television programs, journal articles, and other academic materials.

Historical Background

Kenyan political history has shown that the office of Vice (Deputy) President has remained a thorn in the flesh of successive Heads of State. From the first administration of President Jomo Kenyatta in 1964, to Uhuru Kenyatta in 2022, the office of the Deputy President remained a "challenge". The situation started on a high note when the country became independent and reached its climax within the Jubilee administration led by Uhuru and William Ruto (who subsequently became the fifth President) through the 9

August 2022 elections. Of the eleven Vice Presidents of Kenya, there was only one death, three resignations out of frustration, one became the State President to replace the deceased first President, two were dismissed by the President, and two resigned as they entered the Presidential race, one retired and one did not resign but formed his party while still in office and went on to become the fifth President of Kenya in 2022. The friction between the Deputy Presidents and Presidents had serious repercussions on the country's image and the general lives of the citizens. Resources were spent during that "cold war" at the expense of the development of the country. This situation raised accountability issues in successive administrations.

III. Theoretical Framework

Theoretically, the article argues that the strengthening of constitutional democracy in Kenya did not translate into an improved relationship between the Vice Presidents and their superiors. Thus, constitutional democracy does not always lead to improved institutional frameworks within the governments. While a country may be a constitutional democracy, its leadership may not be enjoying social and political cohesion leading to continued friction that affects the general lives of citizens. The article zooms on aspects of Kenya's historical efforts to strengthen constitutional democracy. The efforts put in fighting for multi-party democracy and the new constitution in Kenya did not lead to improved cohesion in the office of the Presidency. The constitution stands for the advancement of the "good" and the suppression of "evil" (Plessis, 2015). This was not realized in Kenya as the same constitution did not manage to resolve a long-standing challenge in Kenyan Presidency. Plessis reminds the world that constitutionalism can easily lose its footing on the slippery slopes of maladministration. This can easily be confirmed by the discord that manifested in the Kenyan Presidency over the years. Yet, the commitment to substantial constitutionalism saw Kenya seen as a champion for constitutional democracy after 2010. The successive regimes with the climax being noted during Uhuru's time generously contributed to blemishing of Kenya's favorable constitutional reputation due to the manner the Presidents and their Deputies related.

Claassens and Budlender (n.d.) cite Pius Langa as having argued that the constitution is located in a history that involves a transition from a society based on division, injustice, and exclusion from democratic processes. The historical developments in the Kenyan Presidency do not seem to resonate well with such a definition of constitutionalism as divisions characterized the life of that office. Pildes (2010) confirms that constitutional democracy empowers institutional structures and frameworks of governments. Yet, one can argue that the situation in Kenyan Presidency was not strengthened by the prevailing country's democracy, thereby, leading to a weakened relationship between the Presidents and Deputy Presidents. The concept of transformative constitutionalism in Kenya failed to protect the fundamental rights of the citizens who were always affected by developments in the Presidency. Kibet and Fombad (2017) noticed similar failures of constitutionalism in the context of South African politics at one point.

IV. Constitutionalism did not breed Transformational Leaders in Kenya

The article argues that constitutional democracy in Kenya did not lead to transformational leadership hence continued friction between the Presidents and their deputies. The situation can be understood within the transformational leadership theory. The term transformational leadership was first pronounced by James V Downton in 1993 and further developed in 1978 by James MacGregor Burns. There are many leadership theories that can be applied to the Kenyan situation under study. However, this article argues that Kenyan leadership failed to apply transformational leadership styles despite the existence of a democratic constitution.

Transformational leadership theory indicates that leaders align themselves with their followers for the common and greater good. Thus, followers or subordinates are directly involved in the institutional processes. The leaders tend to raise the motivation and morality of their followers (House and Shamir, 1993, in Khan *et al*, 2016). The interaction between the leaders and their subordinates is based on common values, beliefs, and goals leading to the achievement of the set aims. The most important characteristic of such a leadership style is that leaders and followers set aside their personal interests for the sake of the common good. House and Aditya (1997) indicate that transformational leaders focus on their followers' needs and input in order to transform the latter into leaders. The followers are empowered and motivated to perform better in their tasks.

Transformational leaders identify the need for change and gain consensus and commitment among the group members. They then create a vision that guides change and embeds the change (MacGregor Burns, 2003, in Khan *et al*, 2016). The leaders pursue developing the subordinates' consciousness, morals, and skills through the provision of significance to the latter's work and challenges (Khan *et al*, 2016). Therefore, transformational leaders are visionaries who easily appeal to their followers. One will not expect any friction between the leaders and their followers. Citing Northouse (2016), Campos (2020) argues that such leaders are known for possessing the highest ethical and moral standards.

In assessing the friction that existed between the Kenyan Presidents and their deputies, one needs to have an appreciation of the context at each particular moment. To understand the Kenyan leadership styles during the period under review, one needs to note that there are some specific factors that promote transformational leadership that may have not been present in that country. Transformational leadership is hinged on the existence of idealized influence (charismatic influence); inspirational motivational

leadership and intellectual stimulation that allows creativity and innovation. The sections below trace the developments that characterized the relationship between the successive Presidents and their deputies.

The Story of the Kenyan Vice Presidency

The following sections track the political history of Kenya with a particular focus on the circumstances surrounding the friction that characterized the relationships between the successive Presidents and their Deputies. It is noted that the two offices never enjoyed political cohesion. The situation had serious implications for the national politics of Kenya at each particular moment. Each Vice President had his own specific issues with the particular President.

Jaramogi Oginga Odinga (1963 - 1966)

From the late 1940s, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga (thereafter Jaramogi) was a close associate of Kenyatta in the campaign for Kenya's independence. He was instrumental in the recruitment of the Luo support for the struggle. From 1952 to 1957 Jaramogi was President of the Luo Union, a political and social organization, and in 1957 he was elected to the Legislative Council as a member of Central Nyanza. In 1960 Jaramogi became Vice President of the newly formed Kenya African National Union (KANU) (Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d). In 1962, Kenyatta was still in prison and it is indicated in history that Kenyans wished Jaramogi to be the first President of the country. By then he was the most spiritual, God-fearing, and only leader from Kenya who used to talk to God (Ngome, 2021). It is further indicated that the people insisted that Jaramogi be given the sword in 1963 but unfortunately, he declined as he argued that 'I cannot be a leader before Kenyatta is released from the prison' (Ngome). Kenyatta was finally released in 1963 and Kenya became an independent state then. When it subsequently became a republic in 1964, Kenyatta ascended to become its first President and Jaramogi the Vice President who also doubled as the Minister for Home Affairs. Kenyatta was the father to the fourth Kenyan President, Uhuru Kenyatta who had been in office from 2013 to 2022 while Jaramogi was the father to Raila Odinga who held the Prime Minister Position from 2008 to 2013.

Ideological Clash between the President and his Deputy

The rift between Kenyatta and Jaramogi started right on the spot (Ngome, 2021) as the latter did not support the former's leadership from the start. The feud between the two leaders became serious and Verini (2013) argues that it was one of the greatest "forgotten power struggles of the Cold War in Africa which continue to shape Kenya to this day". In the context of the Cold War, the West supported Kenyatta while the East favored Jaramogi. This, therefore, characterized their ideological and open warfare while leading the same government. Kenyatta believed in market liberalism while Jaramogi pushed for more socialist approaches. Thus, the politics of the Cold War, that is, the friction between the Soviet Union and the United States had direct ramifications on Kenyan politics (Verini, 2013).

To American intelligence, Jaramogi was a "power-hungry politician who was working behind the back of the country's founding President, Kenyatta, to gain power and there was a real possibility that he could have toppled Kenyatta, possibly in a coup" (The Standard, 2017). At some point, Kenyatta suspected that Jaramogi was actually working with the Soviet Union to bring into Kenya some weapons to overthrow the government. The military went on to raid the basement of Jaramogi's office and carted away a cache of arms that had been stored there (The Standard). However, Jaramogi later refuted that in his famous book "Not Yet Uhuru" of 1967. He insists in that book, that Kenyatta knew about the cache. In the same book, Jaramogi dismisses many "rumors" about his suspicious links with the Soviet Union and China, as meant to grab power. He argues that in fact, he was driven more by curiosity and when he got to these countries, he was impressed. Jaramogi thus, refutes that he was a communist as claimed by his foes.

Open Political Rivalry

By 1965, Jaramogi had already declared that "Kenyatta must go". He continued to sing that song until Kenyatta became tired and arrested him in 1969 (Ngome, 2021). In 1966 Jaramogi resigned as the Vice President and formed the Kenya People's Union (KPU). However, the party was later barred from holding meetings and the media was restricted from covering it which facilitated the win for Kenyatta. The Jaramogi letter of resignation is historically significant. Ohito (2006) indicates that when Jaramogi resigned in 1966, he issued a terse press statement that argued that:

"You have not given any consideration to me as your number two in State matters. I have a conscience and this in fact does prick me when I earn public money but with no job to do. I consider this a waste of public money and am worried lest the future generation questions my sincerity I cannot continue to hold this position any longer and I hereby resign. (n.p)"

Thus, the relationship between Kenyatta and Jaramogi prepared a fertile ground for successive administrations in Kenya up to 2022.

Joseph Zuzarte Murumbi (1966-1967)

Murumbi (1911-1990) was initially Kenya's Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1964 and 1966. He later replaced Jaramogi as the country's Vice President in 1966. It is indicated that he had strongly declined the offer to become the first Vice President as he

thought it would sideline Jaramogi whom he thought was the rightful person for the post (Bushsnob, n.d). When Jaramogi was finally removed from office, Murumbi did accept the Vice President post and held that position for over a year before he resigned, giving poor health as the excuse although the apparent real reason was his deepening disappointment with politics (Bushsnob, n.d.). He was particularly disappointed by the level of corruption which was beginning to build up in Kenya under Kenyatta. Therefore, the politics of resignations continued.

Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi (1967-1978)

Popularly known as a "professor of politics" (Nyaberi, 2019), Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi became Kenya's third Vice President for eleven years. He was Kenya's Vice President up to 1978 when Kenyatta died. As per the country's Constitution, he ascended to power becoming the first Vice President to become Head of State in Kenya from 1978 to 2002 when he was replaced by Mwai Kibaki. Unlike Jaramogi, Moi remained politically loyal to Kenyatta. He respected the President even in death by committing to fulfill all the latter's policies. He later died in 2020 at the age of 95 years.

Mwai Kibaki (1978-1988)

Mwai Kibaki served as the fourth Vice President of Kenya from 1978 to 1988 under President Moi. He also held some cabinet positions in both the Kenyatta and Moi administrations. Kibaki was Minister of Finance (1969–1981) and Minister of Home Affairs (1982–1988). He also held the position of Minister of Health (1988–1991) after he had been demoted from the post of Vice President by Moi over ideological differences (Mito, 2022). In 1992, Kibaki entered full-time opposition politics. He unsuccessfully challenged Moi in the presidential elections of 1992 and 1997, though in 1998 he became the official head of the opposition (Encyclopedia, n.d.). Again, the Vice President did not complete his term as he was first demoted and subsequently resigned.

Kibaki's National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) went on to defeat, Moi-preferred successor, Uhuru in the 2002 elections. He also became the President of the Grand Coalition Government following the negotiations that took place after the 2007 election violence (Ahere, 2012). In 2013, he could not contest according to the new constitution and he later died in 2022 at the age of 90 years.

Josephat Karanja (1988-1989)

Josephat Karanja (1931-1994) became the fifth Vice President of Kenya between 1988 and 1989 after replacing Kibaki. He is believed to have been driven by western ideologies and had a complicated network of friends from the United States and Britain. Karanja too did not complete his term as he resigned to avoid a possible vote of no confidence that was being pushed through David Mwenje, the legislator of Embakasi Constituency. Mwenje was claiming that Karanja was working to overthrow President Moi's government by soliciting help from foreign nations. Therefore, Karanja's role in the office of the Vice Presidency, in his own words, "ended ignominiously when common decency was thrown out of the window and replaced with political thuggery" (Kareithi, 2020).

George Saitoti (1989-1998)

George Saitoti became Kenya's longest-serving Vice President and had been in office for thirteen years under President Moi between May 1989 and January 1998 and again between April 1999 and August 2002 (Agutu, 2020). The Vice Presidency was thus vacant for about fifteen months. Saitoti was also serving as the Minister of Finance at the time. The hallmarks of Saitoti's tenure as Vice President were efficiency, sobriety, and loyalty as President Moi's most trusted lieutenant. Even when President Moi dithered in naming a new deputy after the 1997 elections, Saitoti was still his favored choice fifteen months down the line (Agutu, 2020).

Later on, the same attributes of Saitoti would make him one of Kibaki's trusted Ministers, according to Agutu (2020). Yet, this long-time and loyal Vice President was fired by Moi, again. His duties as Home Affairs Minister were handed to Ruto. He had shown interest in contesting for the Presidency in 2002 to replace Moi, against the wishes of the latter who preferred Uhuru. Saitoti would later say: "I have never known in the history of the world, and much more so in a country that professes democracy, where the Vice President has to be fired, merely because he seeks nomination from his party. But, I must also say, it is a worthwhile price to pay for democracy" (VOA, 2009). Saitoti later died on 10 June 2012 in a "helicopter crash".

Wycliffe Musalia Mudavadi (2002)

In late 2002, Wycliffe Musalia Mudavadi was the last and shortest-serving (4 November to 30 December 2002) Vice-President of Kenya under Moi (Agutu, 2020). Mudavadi served as the seventh Vice President in 2002 and as Deputy Prime Minister from 2008 to 2012. It is generally argued that his appointment was to try and secure Western Province votes into the camp of KANU, but this was not successful (Agutu, 2020). Mudavadi ran for Vice-President as Uhuru's running mate in the 2002 election hence he had to resign from his Vice Presidency, the development which repeated itself in 2012 when he also joined the Presidential race. In 2007, he was Raila Odinga's running mate.

Michael Wamalwa Kijana (2003)

Michael Wamalwa Kijana (1944 – 2003) was the eighth Kenyan Vice President and served in the Kibaki administration (3 January to 23 August 2003) following the defeat of Uhuru and his KANU party in 2002. He was the first of three Vice Presidents who served in Kibaki's two-term Presidency. His charisma transcended tribal boundaries and ethnic chauvinism, and in him, many saw Kibaki's automatic successor (Collins, 2022). Wamalwa had once defeated Odinga for the FORD-Kenya Chairmanship in 1995, leading to Odinga's resignation from that party to form his National Development Party (NDP). Wamalwa became the first Vice President to die in office in 2003, but he had remained a trusted cadre of the President. At least, he did not resign and was not fired, but he died in office.

Moody Awori (2003 - 2008)

Moody Awori, also known as "Uncle Moody", served as the ninth Vice President of Kenya from 25 September 2003 to 9 January 2008. He is also the author of "Riding on a Tiger", an autobiography about his life in politics. The soft-spoken politician is one of the few public figures who have gone out of the public domain since his retirement from active politics (Arogo, 2021). Awori became Minister of Home Affairs under Kibaki and in 2003 he was appointed as the Vice President following the death of Vice President Wamalwa. To show that his working relationship with Kibaki was good, Awori, had this to say after the death of his former boss, "A remarkable person, a likable, social and humorous person. I was older than him but he remained my boss. I was his elder brother and our chemistry worked well" (Kihaki, 2022). Awori and Kibaki had been schoolmates at Mang'u High School (Arogo, 2021). At least no resignation, no dismissal but retirement from active politics by a former Vice President.

Kalonzo Stephen Musyoka (2008-2013)

Kalonzo Stephen Musyoka was the tenth Vice President between 2008 and 2013 under Kibaki during the Grand Coalition Government (Brookings, 2012). He was the last to use the title "Vice" as the new constitution adopted "Deputy" President. Musyoka had previously been under Moi as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1993 to 1998; under Kibaki as the Minister of Foreign Affairs again from 2003 to 2004, then Minister of the Environment from 2004 to 2005. In 2007, he contested for Presidency but was not successful, subsequently becoming the Vice President in 2008. Trying to promote Musyoka for the 2022 Presidency, Yalo (2021) presented him as someone who is not corrupt, non-tribal, democratic and a good legal expert who was likely going to receive support from the country's Law Society. As fate now has it, he was not on the ballot on 9 August 2022. He was not even a running mate to any of the candidates. However, as Vice President, there were no major issues with his superiors.

The Climax: Ruto-Uhuru Drama

From 2013 to 2022, Kenya was under the Uhuru administration which was being "assisted" by Ruto as the Deputy President. When the history of the Jubilee administration's ten-year reign is finally written, "a number of chapters will inevitably be dedicated to Deputy President William Ruto; essentially for all the wrong reasons" (Kai Eli, 2022), but also for "positive and good" reasons for others. Uhuru and Ruto's political history locate them as buddies, allies, sons of KANU, and administrators of Kenya from 2013 to 2022. However, there seemed to be a "Cold War" that just emerged between the two.

As of now, the media, politicians, the clergy, and ordinary citizens of Kenya are still trying to understand the reasons why these two office bearers who were supposed to be assisting each other and had been politically close, became political enemies. Indeed, Uhuru officially chose Odinga as his successor and Ruto did not take that lightly. This did manifest itself after the 9 March 2018 Handshake. Odinga and Uhuru literally began to run the government together thereby excluding Ruto, the official Deputy President. Ruto did not abandon his office though. He used or abused the Vice Presidency for his personal political life and it paid off in 2022 when he won the Presidency.

Some analysts argue that Ruto started to campaign for the 2022 Presidency as early as 2013. He went on to form his party, away from the Jubilee home, United Democratic Alliance (UDA) which sponsored him into the Kenya Kwanza Alliance for the 2022 elections. On his party, Uhuru joined the Azimio La Umoja coalition led by Odinga but was not subsequently successful. In early 2022, Uhuru publicly announced that he was now joining the "politics" implying that his team under Azimio La Umoja, was going to campaign for the Presidency. He argued that "some started to campaign long back and we are getting onto the ground now", literally referring to his Deputy President whom he regularly and publicly labeled as "an over-ambitious" person.

The Citizen (2020) notes that Ruto had been acting like an injured tiger, he had been angry and cornered. He was willing to fight those determined to eclipse his political goals. However, his only solace had been that his position as Deputy President was protected by the constitution, although he had already lost his place within President Uhuru's inner circle. The constitution protected him as Uhuru could not dismiss him.

V. Discussion

Open friction between the Presidents and their Deputies had serious social, economic, and political implications for the people of Kenya. The rivalry between Kenyatta and Jaramogi set the wrong precedence for Kenya's successive administration. The treatment of Jaramogi by Kenyatta was purely political, yet, it affected the economic performance of the country. Kenyatta failed to embrace transformational leadership qualities. In fact, he pursued the Great man's approach and this became the template for his successor who developed into a fully-fledged dictator.

The Cold War politics seriously affected the cotton industry which had been the pillar of the Kenyan economy. Disagreement between Kenyatta and Jaramogi led to the collapse of the cotton industry. Thus, in 1979, Moi tried to rehabilitate Jaramogi by making him the Board Chairman of Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing. Some analysts argue that this was not a genuine political rehabilitation but Moi actually wanted Jaramogi to revive the industry in question. Jaramogi himself argues in "Not Yet Uhuru" that he did well in this role to revive the industry (Kahura and Oduo, 2019). Nevertheless, at one of the fundraising meetings in 1981, it is said that Jaramogi's tongue "slipped" when he said that he had disagreed with Kenyatta because his boss was a "land grabber". This did not go well with Moi who had publicly declared that he would follow all of his predecessor's (Kenyatta's) policies. Thus, by implication, Jaramogi was labeling Moi as a photocopy of Kenyatta hence he was relieved of his position. It can therefore be noted that the historical political feud between Kenyatta and Jaramogi continued to affect the economic performance of Kenya besides. It also further led to the political fragmentation of the country in 2022. Moi also failed to develop into a transformational leader.

The resignation of Kibaki from the Vice Presidency after his initial demotion became a blessing in disguise as he became an automatic leader of the opposition that eventually influenced the adoption of multi-party democracy in Kenya in 1991. Kibaki later became the State President following his defeat of Uhuru in 2002 to replace Moi. Yet, Kibaki nearly promoted transformational leadership in comparison with his predecessor.

The subsequent activism around the need for a new constitution led by Odinga and others, finally paid off when the country adopted a new constitution in 2010. Yet, the new constitution did not help to improve the relationship between the President and Deputy President. In fact, the constitution protected the Deputy Presidency even where the officeholder was no longer serving the interests of the people as per the provisions of Section 129(2). Ruto went on to form his political party and started to campaign for Presidency while still in the Deputy Presidency, using public resources. Uhuru went on to join hands with Odinga to the extent that the two now almost ran the government together in 2018. This development had serious constitutional implications as Odinga was not an official player in government. It can be argued that Uhuru had decided to prepare Odinga for Presidency in 2022 at the expense of Ruto.

VI. Conclusion and Recommendations

The article has discussed the historical developments in the office of Kenya's Vice Presidency. It was noted that generally Kenyatta, Moi, and Uhuru did not trust their Vice Presidency. They viewed them as overambitious such that they could topple them. Nevertheless, ideological differences also influenced the relationship between the Presidents and their Deputy Presidents. This was particularly clear during the Cold War period hence affecting Kenyatta-Jaramogi and Moi-Kibaki as well as the Moi-Karanja relationship. The relationship between Moi and Saitoti was hugely political as the former favored Uhuru more than the latter to become his successor. It is argued that every deputy in any organization is entitled to be ambitious. Thus, it is possible that all the Deputy Presidents were ambitious, which is legitimate anyway. The case of Kibaki and his Deputy Presidents did not generate much friction because he presided over administrations that were characterized by coalition politics, from 2002 to 2013. Thus, his administration did not experience much drama with regard to the relationships between Presidents and Deputy Presidents. The Uhuru administration became the climax of the friction mainly because the Deputy President was now being protected by the constitution and he could not be fired. Yet, Ruto was also very ambitious to the extent of using public resources for personal interests. The struggle for a new constitution in Kenya did not resolve the issue of the Presidency and Deputy Presidents. Thus, constitutional democracy at the national level did not guarantee social and political cohesion between the two offices. The democratic constitution did not also lead to the emergence of transformational leadership in Kenya.

It can be recommended that Kenya should work on improving the relationship between the President and Deputy Presidents. The bad working relationship has continued to affect the smooth running of the Presidency thereby further affecting the national political life of the country. There is a need to adjust the constitution to allow the citizens to intervene in cases where the President and Deputy President are not working together for the benefit of the public. As it stands, the Constitution does not allow citizens to be active in cases where the two offices do not work together.

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