Ludwig Wittgenstein remains one of the most influential figures in twentieth-century philosophy, particularly in

the field of linguistic philosophy. His early and later works — Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical

Investigations — represent two distinct yet interrelated approaches to the nature and function of language. The

early Wittgenstein conceived language as a logical picture of reality, emphasizing semantic structure and the

isomorphic correspondence between propositions and the world. The later Wittgenstein, in contrast, regarded

language as a human practice grounded in social activity, introducing the concept of “language-games” to

logical analysis of early analytic philosophy and the later movement of ordinary language philosophy. His

reflections reveal a deep concern with how language operates—not merely as a tool for representing facts, but

as the living medium through which human beings think, communicate, and act. Wittgenstein’s intellectual

journey signifies a profound transformation in both philosophical outlook and method.

In his early work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), Wittgenstein sought to define the limits of meaningful

language through what he called the “picture theory of meaning.” According to this view, propositions are

meaningful only insofar as they picture possible states of affairs in the world, sharing a logical form with what

they describe. The Tractatus aimed to draw a clear boundary between what can be meaningfully said and what

must remain beyond the limits of expression. For the early Wittgenstein, philosophy’s role was to clarify thought

by analyzing language logically, revealing the structure of reality mirrored within it. However, Wittgenstein later

This transition from the picture theory to the use theory represents more than a theoretical shift—it is a

redefinition of philosophy’s purpose. Rather than constructing systems or explaining the world, philosophy

should dissolve the confusions that arise when language is misused or abstracted from its natural context.

Wittgenstein came to view philosophical problems as linguistic misunderstandings, and philosophical activity

as a form of therapy, restoring language to its ordinary use. Through this transformation, Wittgenstein reshaped

analytic philosophy, replacing the search for an ideal logical language with an appreciation of the complexity of

ordinary discourse. His later thought shows that language is not a static structure but a dynamic social practice,

inseparable from human life itself.

The central problem this research addresses is the philosophical transformation in Wittgenstein’s conception of

• How does this new conception of language affect the nature of philosophy itself?

By exploring these questions, this paper seeks to illuminate the movement “from picture to practice” and to

demonstrate how Wittgenstein’s later thought dissolves traditional metaphysical problems by reorienting

philosophy toward the ordinary use of language.

In this early work, Wittgenstein sought to determine the relationship between language, thought, and reality by

identifying the conditions under which language can meaningfully represent the world. His ambition was not

merely theoretical but methodological—he aimed to show that the limits of thought coincide with the limits of

language, and that clarity in language would dissolve philosophical confusion. This conception of language as a

“logical picture of the world” defines what is often referred to as the “early Wittgenstein.” The Tractatus presents

At the heart of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy lies the picture theory of meaning. He opens the Tractatus with

the declaration that “the world is the totality of facts, not of things.” This deceptively simple statement

encapsulates a revolutionary shift in metaphysical and linguistic perspective. For Wittgenstein, the world is not

merely a collection of isolated objects, but rather the sum of all existing states of affairs—combinations of objects

related in specific ways. Objects are the simplest constituents of reality, but it is only when they are structured

within facts that they form the world.

Propositions, according to Wittgenstein, correspond to these facts. A meaningful proposition functions as a

picture of a possible state of affairs: it represents how things could be in the world. Just as a geographical map

or a scale model captures the structural relations among elements of what it depicts, so too does a proposition

of the world but show the form that any possible proposition must have if it is to make sense. Anything that

cannot be represented within this logical framework is, by definition, nonsensical.

This conception places logic at the very heart of meaning. Wittgenstein viewed logic not as a set of empirical

truths but as the scaffolding that underlies all possible descriptions of the world. Logic does not say anything

about reality; rather, it shows the structure of all meaningful propositions. In his words, “Logic pervades the

world: the limits of the world are also its limits.”The function of philosophy, therefore, is to clarify the boundaries

of meaningful language by revealing its logical form. Wittgenstein’s picture theory thus transforms the

understanding of language from a vehicle of expression to a mirror of reality. Language, in this view, is a

symbolic reflection of the world’s structure, and philosophy’s task is to make that reflection clear. Yet, as the

Tractatus unfolds, it becomes evident that this clarity comes at a cost: vast regions of human experience—values,

ethics, aesthetics—are declared inexpressible.

what lies beyond empirical facts. Ethical and aesthetic judgments, for instance, do not describe how the world is

but express attitudes toward it. They belong to a realm that transcends representation. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein

insists that these domains are not meaningless in the trivial sense; rather, they are inexpressible. They belong to

what he calls the “mystical,” which “shows itself” but cannot be said. The mystical, for Wittgenstein, includes

everything that gives life meaning but eludes propositional form—values, purpose, and the sense of the world

as a whole. This insight marks a profound tension in his philosophy. While his logical framework rigorously

defines the boundaries of sense, it also acknowledges what lies beyond as essential to human existence. Thus,

even as Wittgenstein claims that philosophy must “pass over in silence” the ethical and aesthetic, he treats these

as the most significant aspects of life.

In this way, the Tractatus anticipates the later Wittgenstein’s realization that meaning cannot be reduced to

delimit sharply the bounds of what can be thought.” The philosopher does not advance propositions but

elucidates the logical structure underlying those that can be meaningfully stated. Philosophical confusion arises,

according to Wittgenstein, when language is misused—when we attempt to speak about what cannot be said.

The role of philosophy, then, is to expose such misuse by showing the logical limits of sense. Once these limits

are recognized, philosophical problems dissolve. “Most of the propositions and questions to be found in

philosophical works are not false but nonsensical,” Wittgenstein writes. The solution lies not in constructing

theories but in demonstrating the logical grammar of language, thereby revealing where language runs up against

its own boundaries.

This conception of philosophy as an activity of clarification rather than a system of doctrine would profoundly

influence Wittgenstein’s later thought. In the Philosophical Investigations (1953), he would transform this notion

boundary that would lead him from the rigidity of logical form to the fluidity of linguistic practice.

Although the Tractatus presents language as a static mirror of reality, its conclusion points toward the later \

Wittgenstein’s dynamic, practice-oriented view. The famous metaphor of the ladder—“He must so to speak

throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it”symbolizes this transition. Wittgenstein recognized that the

logical framework of the Tractatus could not account for the full richness of linguistic life. Once the logical

limits of sense are understood, the philosopher must abandon the very theory that led to that understanding.

rules. The seeds of this realization lie hidden within the Tractatus, in its acknowledgment that the most

meaningful aspects of life are those that cannot be said but are shown in our practices. Thus, the early

Wittgenstein’s philosophy is not an isolated doctrine but the foundation for his later insights. His logical picture

of the world laid the groundwork for a new understanding of philosophy—not as theory-building but as a

continuous effort to clarify how language shapes our engagement with reality. In moving from logical

representation to practical use, Wittgenstein transformed both the philosophy of language and the nature of

philosophical inquiry itself.

and practical contexts in which it is used.

governed and activity-based nature of linguistic communication. Each language-game operates according to

specific conventions that define how words can be meaningfully used. These rules, however, are not formalized

or theoretical; they are practical, learned through participation in communal life. Wittgenstein introduces the

notion of forms of life to describe the broader social and cultural contexts that make language-games possible.

“To imagine a languag e means to imagine a form of life.” A form of life encompasses the shared human

activities, customs, and behaviors that give words their sense. Understanding a language, therefore, is not merely

This insight represents a radical break from the notion that meaning originates in private mental experiences.

Saul Kripke, in his influential work Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982), interprets this argument

as a form of “sceptical paradox,” suggesting that rule-following itself depends on communal agreement rather

than individual interpretation. Whether one accepts Kripke’s sceptical reading or not, the private language

argument remains a cornerstone of the later Wittgenstein’s thought, emphasizing the public, social, and

normative dimensions of meaning.

is to achieve clarity by observing how words are used in everyday life, rather than by postulating hidden essences

Wittgenstein’s later method reflects a deep humility about the scope of philosophical inquiry. It shifts the

philosopher’s role from theorist to therapist, from builder of systems to guide of understanding. In this sense, his

later philosophy is not merely an intellectual position but an ethical stance—a call for simplicity, attentiveness,

and honesty in thought.

interaction, showing that thought, meaning, and communication are inherently social. Ultimately, Wittgenstein’s

later philosophy invites us to view language not as a passive medium but as the living foundation of human

understanding. It is through participation in shared linguistic practices that individuals create meaning,

knowledge, and community. The movement from representation to practice thus reveals philosophy’s true

purpose: to illuminate the ordinary, dissolve illusion, and bring thought back to the realm of life itself.