

Democratic Reversals: Examining the Role of the Armed Forces and Southern African Development Community in Lesotho

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Abstract: - This paper examines the impediments to democratic consolidation and the factors amounting to democratic reversals in Lesotho, especially those which implicate the armed forces. The paper also explores the efforts made by the South African Development Community (SADC) in restoring peace and safeguarding the democratic gains in the country. Drawing from the literature, the paper contends that the government of Lesotho has a tendency of using the state forces to achieve personal gains and by so doing sabotage the national interests. This problem is aggravated by the SADC whose frivolous envoys usually take its mandate for granted. Such tendencies reverse the democratic gains the country has accumulated over the decades. Notwithstanding, the paper posits that the challenges Lesotho is undergoing are but hiccups and are by no means necessarily pointing to democratic erosion and these problems could be addressed by entrusting the army to the King, depoliticising and restructuring the army and capacitating the SADC secretariat.

Keywords: Democratic Reversals, Democracy, Military, Southern African Development Community, Lesotho.

I. INTRODUCTION

Democratic consolidation is never a simple linear process without ups and downs. Even the consolidated democracies in Europe and America have experienced some reversals at some point. In Africa, good governance and democratic gains have in many cases been undermined by the involvement of the politicised military in state affairs. An epitome of these democratic rollbacks is exemplified by Guinea Bissau where on the 12 April 2012 and Mali where on the 21 March 2012 mutiny was witnessed when the armed forces meddled in politics (Okafor and Okafor, 2015:120). In this regard, Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) successfully intervened in both plights of democratic erosion in an attempt to restore democratic gains in the region.

On the other hand, the situation where the efforts to depoliticise the military proves to fail dismally is obvious in Burundi where the regime has been purging or misusing the soldiers to annihilate suspected rivals within its ranks. Also worrisome is that, in some countries the international bodies are unwittingly contributing to the catastrophe of countries experiencing turmoil. For instance, efforts to restore stability in Burundi only exposed disunity of international bodies particularly the clashes between African Union (AU) and Eastern African Community (EAC) which became very

pronounced when the EAC's mediation stalled and yet it was unwilling to allow the AU to engage further (Crisis Group, 2017:3). Sadly, it transpires that Lesotho is taking the same disapproved route trod by these aforementioned African countries.

In retrospect, in Lesotho, on the 15 January 1986 the military, led by General Justine Lekhanya, ousted the regime of Chief Leabua Jonathan who had assumed power since 1966 and the former was then toppled by Major-General Elias Phisoana Ramaema in April 1991 in a military coup. Later on, in 1993, Phisoana Ramaema established or arguably restored democracy rule in the country (EISA, 2007). Thenceforth, Lesotho enjoyed democratic gains until 1998 when there was a disputed election which involved the army, which tried to stage a military coup that was foiled by the intervention of South African Development Community (SADC) Organ for Politics Defence and Security (Thetela, 2001:348). Even thereafter, relative peace reigned in the country but not until the administration of Dr. Pakalitha Mosisili was replaced by that of Prime Minister Thomas Thabane after the 26 May 2012 national elections. The government of Thabane was composed of four political parties that formed a coalition and his deputy was Mothejoa Metsing. This government was short lived because of the corruption scandal that implicated Metsing (Lesotho Times, 2017). After the 28 February 2015 snap election Pakalitha Mosisili won with a slight victory and formed a coalition of seven parties and Metsing who had instigated the downfall and demise of the Thabane's administration became the Deputy Prime Minister (DPM). Similarly, Pakalitha's coalition collapsed within three years when his political party deputy broke away from the party to form another party owing to his refusal to implement SADC recommendations and the intra-party disputes. Subsequently, the country held another snap elections on 03 June 2017 which led to the reinstatement of Thomas Thabane as the Prime Minister with a coalition of four parties.

Since 1993 when the country became democratic SADC intervened on three occasions in order to restore peace and safeguard democracy in Lesotho. However, the leaders continue to politicise the armed forces and return the country to the quagmire of authoritarianism it was once redeemed from by Major-General Phisoana Ramaema with a heavy cost which involved the king being taken to exile and ripped off

his executive powers (EISA, 2007). The civil liberties, freedoms and peace that the country has gradually earned have recently been threatened. Bloodshed, brutality, torture of suspects and insecurity are increasingly becoming a commonplace recently.

II. METHODOLOGY

Without any effort to belabour things that are too evident, the study examines the cases where the leaders have manipulated the armed forces in order to undermine the democratic gains the country has acquired since 1993. The paper also examines the rationale behind the interventions staged and or orchestrated by SADC towards peace restoration in Lesotho. The study is guided by the following two fundamental questions: In what ways have the politicised armed forces contributed to the democratic reversals in Lesotho? What role is SADC playing towards peace restoration in Lesotho? In an attempt to provide a logical analysis to the essential questions of this study, the paper has been segmented into two parts whereby the first part dwells on the attempts the leaders have made to cause democratic reversals in the country by politicising the armed forces while the second part scrutinises the rationale behind the SADC interventions in Lesotho. Methodologically, secondary data is used as the basis for the arguments of this paper.

III. THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRATIC REVERSALS

The concept of democratic reversals seems to be considered as self-explanatory, for it is scarcely defined. Indirect attempts to describe it often use concepts like ‘authoritarian regression’ and ‘democratic breakdowns’ (Schedler, 1998). The concept is employed when a democracy is relatively unable to move beyond instability, fragility, uncertainty, vulnerability and reversibility (Schedler, 1998). When using positive formulation, it can also be cited when a democracy’s survival, continuity, endurance, viability, irreversibility and sustainability are at risk. When a democracy is eroding because of the politicised military / police, corrupt leaders, unaccountable leaders, and antidemocratic tendencies, this paper refers to such activities as democratic reversals. The essay attempts to demonstrate that democracy in Lesotho is incrementally decaying because the armed forces are increasingly being compelled to meddle in politics.

IV. THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY IN LESOTHO

Prior to articulating the ways in which the armed forces have been re-politicised one would like to outline how Lesotho has evolved into the liberal democracy it is today. This shall be achieved by listing the phases without explicating or narrating their full account for they have been explicitly elaborated by other scholars (Matlosa, 2006:17; Pule and Thabane, 2002). To start with, from 1966-1970 the country was an embryonic democracy; from 1970-1986 Leabua Jonathan made the country a de facto one-party state until he was toppled by the military which seized power from 1986 to 1993 and thenceforth even up to 2002 a fragile democracy took place

(Matlosa, 2006; Pule and Thabane, 2002). It was heavily tested by the 1998 violent conflict that led to the change of the electoral model which was facilitated by the Interim Political Authority (IPA) upon the bloody intervention by SADC. From 2002 to the present, Lesotho’s democracy remained stable albeit it evolved into unstable coalition governments. Nonetheless a trend away from democratic consolidation to authoritarianism is now taking place and hence is worth examining.

V. A TURNING POINT: SHIFTING AWAY FROM A DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION PATH

The threats to democratic consolidation were reignited in 2014 when the Prime Minister Thomas Thabane sought to ensure full control over the military by replacing the Army Commander Tlali Kamoli with Brigadier Maaparankoe Mahao who apparently had a case in the military court and had been suspended from performing his duties (Aljazeera, 2014). The act eventually inflamed a fierce commotion in the country. On 30 August 2014, the military surrounded the government buildings, seized police headquarters and jammed radio stations and phones (Aljazeera, 2014). Thus civil liberties were violated.

This action according to Prime Minister Motsoahae Thomas Thabane amounted to a coup d’état. He alleged that the military attempted a coup d’état and had conspired against him and subsequently he prorogued the parliament and flee to South Africa seeking for a refugee (Aljazeera, 2014). Following this tragic event, a mediation process by SADC which was chaired by Cyril Ramaphosa (Who was the deputy president to President Jacob Zuma) was organised in the country which eventually called for a snap election in Lesotho (Aljazeera, 2014). Even though Lesotho desperately needed SADC to intervene in its conflicts in order to assist it not to revert to authoritarianism, SADC interventions failed to be immune from criticisms as we shall discern later. Apart from the failure on the part of SADC, the leadership of the country seems to be blindly leading the country to authoritarianism in many ways.

VI. DEMOCRATIC ROLLBACKS THROUGH CLAMPDOWN ON POLITICAL PLURALISM AND PARTICIPATION

To start with, one of the reversals beside the 1998 violent conflict is the 2014 conflict which Thomas Thabane called an attempted coup where the Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) Mothejoa Metsing allegedly manipulated the military to destabilise the country while on the other hand the Prime Minister Thomas Thabane allegedly used the police to deter the threat (Aljazeera, 2014). This can be equated to democratic rollbacks because Lesotho is a multiparty democracy where all political parties used to enjoy political freedoms but the 2014 crisis partly disrupted these democratic gains. This is so because the leader of All Basotho Convention Party who was the Prime Minister fled to South Africa

claiming that his DPM threatens to take his life (Aljazeera, 2014).

Furthermore, the political instability persisted. In February 2015, after the snap elections recommended by the SADC, Democratic Congress (DC) party led by Pakalitha Mosisili formed a coalition with other seven small parties while All Basotho Convention (ABC) which was led by Thomas Thabane became the main opposition party. However, in May 2015 Thomas Thabane and other two leaders (namely Keketso Rants'o and Thesele Maseribane) of the three respective opposition parties, notably All Basotho Convention, Reformed Congress of Lesotho and Basotho National Party, fled from the country and found refuge in the neighbouring country claiming that the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) which was still under the influence of the same former DPM (Mothejoa Metsing) sought to take their lives (Freedom House, 2017:397).

The crackdown of opposition by the regime of Dr. Pakalitha Mosisili under the influence of Mothejoa Metsing as the DPM signified a shift towards authoritarianism and undermined the democratic gains the country has been accumulating and safeguarding. While opposition parties used to be tolerated and dissent was just as acceptable as a right to life, the two administrations where Mothejoa Metsing was the DPM saw a dramatic change and a clear line of spectrum could no longer be drawn between politicians and the armed forces. The armed forces were ruthlessly and horribly re-politicised as in the 1986-1993.

VII. DEMOCRATIC REVERSALS THROUGH ACTS OF REPRESSION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Besides that, the press had been relatively enjoying freedoms in Lesotho to an extent that every radio station could criticize the government without fear of torture of journalists. However, in 2014 during the alleged attempted coup, radio stations were jammed. Moreover, in July 2015 some journalists fled from the country fearing for their lives and the LDF was again cited in relation to these threats (Freedom House, 2017:398). Furthermore, in February 2017, the government of Dr. Pakalitha Mosisili cut off the broadcasting signal of two radio stations, namely, People's Choice FM and Ts'enolo FM with the claim made by Ts'eliso Khomari (the then Minister of Communications, Science and Technology) that they are airing defamatory content about the Prime Minister (Media Institute of South Africa, 2017).

Similarly, in August 2017 the government of Thomas Thabane did not deviate from the practices of the previous regime. It closed down Moafrika FM claiming that it owes M100 000, nevertheless upon the interim court order the station was reopened (Hlongwane, 2017). The civil liberties that were once guaranteed have been under test and unfortunately the results could be equated to reversals from the democratic freedoms the country had been protecting.

Equally important, in recent years, reversals were also experienced when the country started violating human rights without fear of the consequences. The previous regime led by Pakalitha Mosisili and his deputy Mothejoa Metsing did little to refrain from human rights violations. On the 25 June 2015 the LDF members invaded the house of Army Commander Brigadier Maaparankoe Mahao and shot him to death claiming that they wanted to arrest him for alleged involvement in a mutiny plot within the army (Phumaphi report, 2016:6). A lot of human rights violations which involved members of the army occurred and were not accounted for until the new government took over and conducted investigations on the cases. Within two months of the change of regime, the new government arrested four police officers, namely, Superintendent Thabo Ts'ukulu, Inspector Mabitle Matona, Haleokoe Taasoane and Superintendent Mothibeli Mofolo for torturing and murdering Constable Mokalekale Khetheng- a case that was associated to high ranking politicians who often used the armed forces to destabilise the country (Moremoholo, 2017).

Recently, the former DPM Metsing fled to South Africa claiming the Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMPS) was plotting to assassinate him (Lesotho Times, 2017). This happened immediately after his political party deputy who was the former Minister of Defence and National Security (Ts'eliso Mokhosi) was incarcerated in relation to the death of Police Constable Mokalekale Khetheng who was tortured and killed by some members of the armed forces who were already in police custody when Ts'eliso Mokhosi was arrested. It is not clear whether Metsing fled because the police had connived to torture him to death once detained or was it because the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Offences had recently interrogated him about his corruption case in which he was accused of mishandling or embezzling part of the M120 million that was allocated for road construction while he was the DPM or if he was implicated in the case of Khetheng (Lesotho Times, 2017). These cases illustrate the degree at which civil liberties and human rights have increasingly been violated by recent governments in Lesotho. These instances manifest that Lesotho is not grappling with democratic consolidation yet but rather, democratic survival.

VIII. FIGHTING AT THE VERGE OF DEMOCRATIC REVERSAL AND DEMOCRATIC SURVIVAL

Superficially, there are grounds to believe that the irregularities expatiated in this discourse signify that Lesotho is undergoing democratic reversals. Firstly, the politicised army allegedly plotted to topple Mosisili in 1998 and Thabane in 2014. Secondly, the military was used by Metsing to invade the police headquarters. Thirdly, the same army was used to murder Brigadier Maaparankoe Mahao. Fourthly, during the regime that collapsed earlier in 2017, the police was also manipulated to mercilessly torture and brutally annihilate Colonel Khetheng. Fifthly, the army was again misused to repress the press and shut down the radio stations.

On the contrary, ironic though, the same army and police are not submerged in politics but are somehow still apolitical, professional and maintain peace and security of the Mountain Kingdom. It is not the entire armed force that is meddling in politics but rather a clique and the rest are impartial in their daily conduct. Apart from that, some political leaders of Lesotho have played a significant role in depoliticising the armed forces by seeing to it that the victims face justice. It is only the leaders who were motivated by the desire to survive and tighten their grip on power who attempt to reverse the democratic gains of the country. However, this could be thwarted by demilitarising the country (which is totally landlocked by South Africa), especially because the country has no external threat to deter, except the giant neighbour South Africa which Lesotho cannot challenge because of its small population, and small military size.

Over and above, if we overlook the gist of democracy and scrutinise these blatant irregularities orchestrated by the political leaders we would mistakenly conclude that Lesotho has relapsed to authoritarianism. Lesotho's democracy has been tested, be it as it may, this paper asserts that Lesotho is grappling with democratic survival and not reversals. This is corroborated by the fact that for more than three election terms there has been a smooth transfer of power from one leader to another (Beetham, 2014:160). Of paramount importance is the fact that the transition has been from leaders of different political parties and elections have always been timely, free and fair.

Surprisingly, though the leaders are plainly ready to respect the rules of the game but once in power they resort to authoritarian strategies and forget about what would happen once they lose in the subsequent elections. Failure to discern these discrepancies in an electoral democracy like Lesotho would cloud a robust analysis and thereby condone even undemocratic regimes. Democracy is not limited to free and fair elections and a multiparty system. Though these basic components of an electoral democracy are respected in Lesotho, what is worrying is the accountability and responsiveness of the leaders. Democracy everywhere is unfinished process but it is not academically correct to conclude that a democracy has eroded even when leaders find it unthinkable to change leaders through other means other than competitive elections (Beetham, 1994). Lesotho presents a dilemma because it portrays a mixed picture of authoritarian tendencies and that of a stable democracy. Nonetheless, it is easier to discern that the leaders respect the verdict of the courts and regional community and pay for their crimes and thus they are accountable and so long as the system is still able to hold everyone accountable it is still responsive and therefore democracy is not eroded in Lesotho.

What needs to be comprehended from this dilemma is that the irregularities narrated in this discourse should suffice to prove to us that free and fair elections in the case of Lesotho, do not make a consolidated democracy. Basic as election are, they do not make countries more democratic. Nevertheless, elections

proved to be instrumental in making the likes of Ts'eliso Mokhosi and other leaders to account for the iniquities they committed while in power. Once leaders in Lesotho fortify their leadership with the power from the armed forces they become too powerful and too much power eventually exposes their natural inclinations and corrupt disposition. It would be wise therefore, to delimit their control and influence over the military. If the Lesotho Defence Force was to be controlled by the King then the leaders in Lesotho would have but sufficient power at their disposal. Just like self-interested leaders of Lesotho, some of the leaders of SADC are not ready to implement the mandate of the organ but would rather suppress it so that their personal or national interests thrive over that of the community.

IX. THE ROLE OF SADC IN LESOTHO: A QUEST FOR WATER AND/ OR PEACE

The South African development Community first tested its powers which are enshrined in the 1996 Gaborone Protocol on the 22 September 1998 when it was requested to resolve the bloody conflict in Lesotho (Thetela, 2001:348). The riots erupted after the 23 May 1998 general elections which the opposition parties believed they were rigged despite the fact that SADC investigators found no evidence of fraud. The opposition parties rejected the SADC commission of enquiry (known as the Langa Commission) verdict and connived with the military to topple the government of Pakalitha Mosisili. Once peaceful solutions proved futile the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) entered the country followed by the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) in the name of 'SADC' peacekeeping mission to lead a military intervention.

The military intervention strategy was marred with fierce controversy for it was improper and inconsistent. The logic of the intervention strategy stimulated suspicion for a number of reasons. First, South Africa was the first SADC country to intervene in Lesotho. This measure is concomitant with the South African national interest because it has a vested interest in the resources particularly water in Lesotho (Likoti, 2007). The rationale was apparently to safeguard the water which Lesotho supplies to Johannesburg and not mainly to restore peace in the Mountain Kingdom of Lesotho. Second, the intervention was improper because it respects neither the SADC treaty nor the United Nations Charter. The corroborating evidence to this is that when the intervention commenced, pertinent proposals had not yet been ratified by the SADC Summit (Likoti, 2007:251). Lastly, the Langa Commission report was dubious and triggered contention because it was mishandled. The expectation was that Thabo Mbeki who was the then President of the Republic of South Africa (RSA), spearheading the Commission which was chaired by Justice Pius Langa, should present the report before contending parties, however he instead decided to present it before the SADC Summit in Mauritius on 13 September 1998 so that some suspected that the report was meddled with in Mauritius (Likoti, 2007:252).

Though the report acknowledged finding serious discrepancies and irregularities which were done during the elections, it concluded that the results still reflected the will of the electorate and this logic reinvigorated the dispute. Over and above that, reports say that Mosisili edited the report before publicly announcing its results (Likoti, 2007). Above all, the intervention was susceptible to criticism for one main reason, the Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili had written to Mozambique, South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe requesting for the military intervention but South Africa which has vested interest in the resources of Lesotho was the first country to intervene. Most importantly, the necessary procedures were not followed to permit the SADC commission to authorise military action. Eventually, the natives were of the opinion that RSA intervened in Lesotho under the auspices of SADC (Likoti, 2007:252).

The intervention lacked legitimacy for several reasons. One of the reasons is that the Prime Minister was supposed to consult the king regarding the dispute before deciding to request for the military intervention but he did not on grounds that he suspected the King to be part of the protesters (Likoti, 2007). The other reason why the legitimacy of the intervention was also questionable is because it was not done for humanitarian purposes such as the need to rescue people from peril but rather it was done for national interest or driven by realist imperatives particularly those of South Africa. It's not surprising that once the SANDF encroached in the land of the Basotho, they went straight to Katse Dam to secure and safeguard the water by wiping out the LDF members who were guarding the dam (Likoti, 2007:252). It goes without saying that safety of the water was paramount to South Africa and the peace of the nation in question was not the principal concern. This is so because the water is Lesotho / South Africa joint project worth US \$7.5 million (Likoti, 2007:252). The SANDF did not just debilitate the LDF; even after raining bullets on them using helicopters they landed to massacre the survivors (Likoti, 2007:252). Over and above, the intervention had failed to secure authorization stipulated on Chapter VIII of the United Nation Security Council and was contrary to Article 4(a) of the Southern African Development Community Treaty which bestows on states the principle of sovereignty and equality (Likoti, 2007:253). Despite the obvious flaws of the intervention it brought a sustainable solution and relative peace in Lesotho.

Nonetheless, starting from the year 2014 this well-earned peace was threatened as sporadic democratic reversals in Lesotho began to manifest. All the problems started with the court going after DPM Mothejoa Metsing who was accused of allegedly embezzling government funds. His reaction to the case eventually disrupted the peace of the country. In an attempt to combat the deteriorating situation which signified democratic reversals in Lesotho, SADC Commission of Enquiry chaired by Justice Mpaphi Passevil Phumaphi was deployed (Phumaphi report, 2016).

The task of the commission was to investigate the alleged killings, alleged mutiny, and kidnappings of members of the opposition, former LDF members and the death of the Brigadier Maaparankoe Mahao and other issues pertinent to the inquiry (Phumaphi report, 2016). The Commission discovered that the alleged mutiny was just a fabrication; there was no evidence to prove that the decision to kill opposition members was politically motivated; the murder of Brigadier Mahao was illegal. The commission discovered that after the government of Thomas Thabane's demotion of Lieutenant Tlali Kamoli, Pakalitha's regime reappointed him and subsequently parliamentary boycotts manifested instability in the country as the lieutenant plotted to divide the army (Phumaphi report, 2016). The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security made recommendations to the Government which unfortunately proved reluctant to implement them. Pakalitha Mosisili as the Prime Minister boldly claimed that those recommendations are not binding orders (SABC, 2016). Apart from the fact that the government hesitated before complying with the SADC verdict, the intervention, unlike the previous one, was by no means a fiasco. In fact, it was effective and the rationale was purely for peace restoration and to safeguard democratic gains in the Mountain Kingdom.

In a nutshell SADC's approach to conflict cases which involved politicised army officials in Lesotho has been shrouded with controversy. A peculiar case to this contention is the 1998 intervention which was spearheaded by South Africa which apparently had an interest in the resources of Lesotho which only served to perpetuate the notion that self-help is the only option states should resort to because all states are motivated by interests. So South Africa was acting in line with the realists' expectation. In this regard, the SADC leaders were not taking their mandate seriously because they allowed the national whims and interests to supersede the community's mission. Nonetheless, in spite of this anomaly SADC demonstrated that it serves to protect and promote democracy within the region. This is so mainly because the 1998 intervention finally led to relative peace in the country.

Furthermore, in spite of its flaws SADC is committed to restoring democracy and peace in Lesotho. The Commission led by Cyril Ramaphosa which called for snap elections and that of Justice Phumaphi which called for removal of army commander proved that the South African Development Community may not be a perfect body. Nevertheless, it is committed to building the dams against democratic reversals and can by no means sit back and watch Lesotho return to authoritarianism and undermine the democracy the people have fought hard to establish. Nonetheless, Cyril Ramaphosa's resolution was not a perfect one because instead of helping the country to solve its security issues, he advised it to hold snap elections. In the aftermath of the instability, more crimes were committed and insecurity intensified. In particular, the issue of politicised army has been underestimated and remains a volcano ready to erupt.

X. CONCLUSION

Political elites in Lesotho have a tendency of manipulating the armed forces and politicising the military and the police. Often than not, they have used these forces to commit crimes, however some eventually paid for their iniquities as soon as transfer of power occurred. In spite of the tendency to misuse the state forces by Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and some Ministers, the country has often seen a smooth transfer of power from one hand to another- the elections being declared free and fair by international bodies. Owing to this paradox, the conclusion is that Lesotho is grappling with democratic survival, fighting against democratic erosion and is not necessarily not undergoing democratic reversals. It is rather fair to maintain that Lesotho is encountering democratic difficulties, for the overall aspects of democracy are not deteriorating. Democracy is simply not a linear process and so Lesotho is undergoing some hiccups and if it handles its democratic challenges well, its democracy will consolidate soon.

XI. RECOMMENDATIONS

Nevertheless, for democracy to consolidate in Lesotho, the government of Lesotho and SADC should take into consideration some policy suggestions raised below. Since all the aspects pointing to democratic decay in Lesotho involve misuse of the armed forces by political elites, it is necessary therefore for the government to circumscribe and demarcate its influence and sway over the military. This could be done by entrusting the army to the King and not the Prime Minister as it is the case. Besides the traditional duty of the army is to deter threat from abroad and not to be used by politicians to further their evil course. So they need not the army in their daily conduct but the police.

Again, the government should consider redefining the role of the army or even reforming the army. Since the soldiers are just around 3000 and cannot stand against South Africa which is the only neighbour of Lesotho; this renders the traditional role of the military as expounded by realism redundant. The soldiers' role can be shifted to policing, agriculture and humanitarian services.

On the part of SADC, the leaders ought to understand that it is no longer the era of realism. States are no longer driven solely by national interest but the world is now one big village where the states are interconnected and interdependent such that the plight in one country is inevitably the burden to the other. If the SADC organ can instil this mentality in its secretariat, countries like South Africa will start taking their mission seriously. Mosisili was reluctant to implement the SADC recommendations because he plainly stated that they are not binding. So in order to prevent this mistake from repeating itself, SADC has to capacitate itself and be able to prove that it can impose at least economic sanctions on rogue member states.

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