

# Re-Defining Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Nigeria: Towards Achieving Security in the North-East Region

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**Abstract:** - The proliferation of SALW and their central role in conflict have made Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) an essential component of peace building. In Nigeria, the nature of the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast of Nigeria has attracted series of efforts to respond and curb Boko Haram terrorists' activities and secure communities from sporadic attacks. This line of actions further demands more than rehabilitation and de-radicalization of ex-combatant but requires an intervention to include effective DDR strategies. Also, re-defining DDR strategies will further drive the stabilization and recovery processes that will restore security in the Northeast region.

**Key Words:** Boko Haram, DDR, Security, Insurgency and Terrorism

## I. INTRODUCTION

Nigeria's return to democratic rule in 1999 ushered in waves of insecurity virtually in every region and range of violent conflicts across the country. These include the militancy in the South-South (Niger-Delta Region) with kidnapping, cultism, communal clashes in other states in the Southern region, terrorism and insurgency in the North. The Northeast as part of the six (6) geo-political zones of the country have experienced waves of insurgency attacks from Boko Haram sect which also extended to other Northern states and across other neighbouring countries. In seeking solutions to these various security challenges, the Nigerian government offered the initiation of Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) as part of the strategies in the rehabilitation of the Northeast region.

The nature of the insurgency in the Northeast therefore, determines that government response should be able to curb Boko Haram terrorists' activities and secure communities from sporadic attacks of the insurgent. Unlike the Niger Delta which has been plagued by conflicts and violence as a result of the large deposit of crude oil and the environmental challenges experienced by communities in the region, Boko Haram's campaign of terror ends have become a matter of serious concern in Nigeria and beyond.

Subsequent governments of Nigeria have been committed to a series of efforts to contain Boko Haram's violence; yet, the urgent need for the government to develop an effective and

efficient population centric proactive counter-terrorism approach to combat the attacks remains paramount. Although, the escalating incidences of kidnapping, girls adoption from schools, cattle rustling and increasing clashes between pastoralists and farmers across the country surpasses the insurgency in the Northeast. In expanding its dominance, Boko Haram have continued to acquire sophisticated weapons to engage the Nigerian military thereby ravaging the entire Northeast with extreme violent and radical ideological objective extending from carrying out simple advocacy for Islamic puritanism in northern Nigeria to the creation of the Islamic State in West Africa and Lake Chad region in particular (Onuoha and Oyewole, 2018).

The Northeast still remains volatile following the quantum of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) used on one hand by the insurgents themselves and on the other hand by armed vigilantes and the Civilian Joint Task Force (JTF) who provided security for communities in the Northeast. The impact of violence in every locality across the Northeast created the physical and mental torture in the lives of the populace as majority of communities fled for safety after losing their homes and livelihoods. Still, the persisting sense of fear and insecurity still engulfs the region, even though many whom were Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have returned back to their communities. The Nigerian government and concern international bodies have mapped out various strategies and now implementing efforts to restructure the Northeast.

These line of activities have also provided opportunities for Boko Haram members who are willing to renounce their membership of the terror group and lay down their arms. It also includes re-integrating the insurgents, disarming, demobilizing them alongside other combatants like the vigilantes and Civilian JTF (Tangban and Audu, 2017). However, the situation in the Northeast differs from the conflicts in the Niger-Delta. This means that enrolling repented Boko Haram members as the case may be, will largely require that DDR is structured and mandated to occur in the shadow of on-going military operations and directed towards de-radicalization of violent extremists.

It is against this backdrop that the paper is structured into three sections: (1) Introduction (2) Conceptual Clarification (3) Security in the Northeast and Implication of the Changing Roles of DDR in Nigeria

## II. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

### *i. Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR)*

The Brahimi Report of 2000 emphasized on the essential role that disarmament plays in a process of peacekeeping and peace building. Officially called the '*Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*' named after the chairman (Algerian Diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi) as a follow up on the Agenda of Peace, the report took a critical view on how DDR provides building blocks for providing stability in complex security and political environment. Therefore, where security remains fragile, DDR becomes an integral part of post-conflict peace consolidation (Mbombo, 2015).

Although, most practitioners and scholars have argued that DDR programme should be part of an overall integrated recovery strategy that encompasses economic development, security sector reform, the integration of refugees and internally displaced persons, along with justice and reconciliation. However, disarmament merits attention in its own right and there is a growing literature on the topic that identifies essential benchmarks and guidelines for sustainable disarmament and points to some shortcomings in current practice.

### *ii. Disarmament*

Disarmament as a component of DDR in this context refers to activities designed to facilitate disbanding military fighters and easing their transition back into active social and economic life. This is usually the first stage of DDR. In its widest sense, disarmament refers to the complete removal of weapons from a military force. Although this is often elusive, the term is typically used to refer to any programme, movement or action to disarm in general, and specifically to disarm soldiers individually and systematically (UN Brahimi Report, 2000). However, it should be noted that in cases of internal conflict, disarmament covers all armed formations involved in the fighting, including irregular forces. It comprises the assembly of combatants, the collection and documentation of weapons, the verification and certification of disarmed soldiers so as to assess their eligibilities for further assistance and benefits (UNDPKO, 1999). The short-term aim is to enhance security by reducing the number of weapons owned by individuals and to restore trust among warring parties, while the long-term aim is to prevent the circulation of small arms in particular and their proliferation.

### *iii. Demobilization*

Demobilization on its own can be described as the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces. Demobilization programmes continue by preparing former combatants and helping with their re-entry into civil life. This

stage requires the separation and categorization of ex-combatants into different sites or camps (UN Brahimi Report, 2000). The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion. This includes all the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year.

### *iv. Reintegration*

Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance. Despite the logistical challenges of disarmament and demobilization, reintegration; the acquisition of civilian status and sustainable employment and income remains the most difficult phase of any DDR process.

Since the DDR component has direct bearing on the successful rehabilitation of armed youths in the region, a comprehensive DDR is required in returning the Northeast region into normalcy. This involves that the DDR process captures the demilitarization of official and unofficial armed groups by controlling and reducing the possession of arms, by disbanding non-state armed groups and rightsizing state security services and by assisting former combatants to reintegrate into civilian life. This process will be helpful in consolidating peace and achieving security in the Northeast region of Nigeria.

### *v. The Concept of Security*

Security is a fragile and significant issue which conveys different meanings to scholars, analysts, policy makers and organizations across the globe. Fundamentally, security has to do with the presence of peace, safety, gladness and the protection of human and physical resources or absence of crisis or threats to human dignity, all of which facilitate development and progress of any human society. The concept of security has become a preoccupation for the decades following the end of the Cold War which could also be referred to as landmark for diverse school of thought with security studies (Afolabi, 2016). Security, as a concept, has

diverse dimensions. It is aptly used in psychology, finance, information access, public safety, defense and military matters. The meaning of security is ambiguous as its scope continues to expand every day. The elastic nature of the concept of security attracts different meanings and different views. Security is an important concept that every human person desires and it has one or two meanings though it defies precise definition. This account for the position of Barry Buzan (1991) who describes security as an ambiguous and multidimensional concept in which military factors have attracted inappropriate attention.

The question of whether there is a generally accepted definition of the meaning of concept of security in theory is therefore regarded as an “essentially contested concept” as argued in international studies (Baldwin, 1997). Thus, in the contemporary literature on security, various terminologies such as “individual security, people security, national security, state security, human security, health security, economic security and environmental security, among others, are used to underscore the multiple domains of security. Security therefore in simple terms, entails the exercise of measures towards ensuring freedom from danger and promotion of development and the wellbeing of the people. Security should, therefore, be a primary concern of every nation, as it touches on the fundamental needs of individuals and groups, as well as the survival of the nation as a viable entity. Various terminologies such as “individual security, people security, national security, state security, human security, health security, economic security and environmental security, among others, are used in describing what security should be in any society (Fagbohun, 2011). The issue of security becomes one of the basic pre-occupations of every individual, community, or state. In this wise, it is common, therefore, to see references being made to other forms of security which embraces the establishment of proactive and defensive measures to safeguard all persons, materials and information from every form of danger in any society (Abiodun, 2012). Security has to do with the process connected with assuaging any kind of threat to people and their precious values. Buzan (1991) emphasized that security is about freedom from threat and ability of states to maintain independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile while its bottom line is survival (Bodunde, et.al., 2014).

From the foregoing, security is generally agreed to be about feeling of being safe from harm, fear, anxiety, oppression, danger, poverty, defence, protection and preservation of core values and threat to those values. William (2008) equally submits that security is most commonly associated with the alleviation of threats to cherish values, especially those threats which threaten the survival of a particular reference object.

#### *vi. Insurgency and Terrorism: The Boko Haram Sect*

Insurgency as an organized movement that uses armed violence to overthrow a country’s government while often

hiding within the civilian population and using civilians to perform combat support functions. The use of civilian population differentiates insurgency from the regular warfare where such an exploitation of civilians would constitute a war crime. Similarly, a rebellion where anti-government forces do not disguise themselves as civilians and fight as a regular, identifiable military is different from insurgency. The significant involvement of civilian population also distinguishes insurgency from a purely terrorist movement, which relies primarily on a tight network of professional terrorists. Although this definition as presented by Kott and Skarin (2016), leaves room for gray areas, it serves to emphasize the key feature of insurgency—its reliance upon, and exploitation of civilian population.

The ongoing eleven-year Boko Haram insurgency is one of the most violent, destructive, and debilitating of the nation’s internal security challenges since independence. The sect, which calls itself Jama’atuAhl as-Sunnah li-Da’awatiwal-Jihad, or Group of the Sunni People for the Calling and Jihad, is commonly known as Boko Haram—which loosely translates as “Western education is forbidden.” It emerged in the early 2000s in northeastern Nigeria among the Kanuri ethnic group and its neighbors. The Kanuri, ethnic elite, ruled a powerful, Muslim multiethnic state known as the Kanem-Bornu Empire for about nine hundred years as various ethno-political forces competed for power and influence. The present insurgency needs to be understood within this historical context.

The group’s violent campaign commenced in 2002 as it was perceived to possess minimum sophistication, but by 2015 it emerged as the “world’s deadliest terrorist organisation” (Global Terrorism Index, 2015). Following its obstinate nature of Boko Haram, Kott and Skarin (2016) further explained that insurgency forces may include a combination of the following: a) an ideology-based movement that fights to overthrow the current form of the country’s government and to establish a different regime; b) a personality-based movement driven to install its leader as the ruler of the country; c) a religious movement that wishes to defend its religious freedoms or to establish a religionbased regime in the country; d) an ethnic minority demanding greater rights or independence; e) a regional movement demanding secession or a greater share of the country’s resources; f) an ethnic majority fighting against the rule of an ethnic minority or a colonial power.

It is in this plight, that terrorism becomes the tool used to hold ransomed a perceived object of violence which is usually an institution of the state or the entire state. Merari (1994) describes terrorism as a tool of violence used by sub-national groups or clandestine state agents to obtain political, social and religious goals especially when the violence is intended to intimidate or otherwise affect the emotions, attitude and behaviour of the targeted audience, considerably larger than the actual victims. Terrorism thrives on what Okoli and Iortyer (2014) described as ‘hit-and-run-cumbantancy’. This

can be categorised as brutal militancy involving specific strategies. Terrorists globally have adopted the following as means of executing their attacks through: arson, mass killing by gun fire, suicide bombing, use of improvised explosives, media propaganda and advocacy, piracy, jail break, and forced enlistment/recruitments among other tactics. This opinion exemplifies the reality of the operations of most terrorist groups around the world including Boko Haram in the Northeast of Nigeria.

### III. SECURITY IN THE NORTHEAST AND IMPLICATION OF THE CHANGING ROLES OF DDR IN NIGERIA

The Northeast region of Nigeria comprises of six (6) States; Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe. Among these States, the impact of Boko Haram largely affected Borno and Adamawa, even though attacks on the other States still have large human and economic consequences on the lives and properties of the people and the government in general. The pressure on the Nigerian government and security forces to secure towns and communities across the vast north-eastern region affected by the Boko Haram insurgency or within militants' striking range is clearly an enormous challenge (Fafowora, 2012). Also, the weak institutional capacity of the Nigerian state in providing public goods and lack of governance are at the root of Boko Haram's emergence, transformation, and sustenance. The deep level of underdevelopment in northern Nigeria and the associated dichotomy between Westernization and Islamism also stimulated the crisis. Thus, Boko Haram emerged as a non-conformist group under the leadership of Muhammed Yusuf in 2002. In addition to proselytization and anti-state mobilization, the group engaged in series of confrontations with the security forces between 2002 and 2009, which climaxed in the short-lived July 2009 uprising under President Umaru Musa YarAdua's administration (Onuoha and Oyewole, 2018).

The security situation in the Northeast region of Nigeria since the eruption of Boko Haram insurgency further created serious of huge humanitarian crisis with global implication (Tangban and Audu, 2017). The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) which is the Nigerian institution responsible for emergencies and disaster response declared in September 2014 that displaced persons were officially 743,062 in the Northeast due to the activities of Boko Haram. The impact of such activities became a threat to trans-border security as the growing number of Boko Haram induced refugees Fled to Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The region which enjoyed strong border community relations in terms of trans-border trade and commerce had because of the state of insecurity suffered a decline in the movement of people and goods, thus, impacting negatively on the socio-economic and social life of the entire people.

The implication is the high rate and increase in poverty level which the region now suffers further derives individuals to

criminality since the activities of the terror group is still ongoing in the region. The Nigerian government has employed various strategies ranging from amnesty negotiations to declaration of state of emergency, among others as counter-terrorism measures to stem the activities of the Boko Haram group in the country. On 24th April 2013, after sustained pressure from the Northern elders, former President Goodluck Jonathan inaugurated the Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North. This move was applauded by those who viewed it as an important step forward in addressing the Boko Haram menace with diplomacy. However, the committee submitted its report to the federal government without evidence of dialogue with the Boko Haram group. It is instructive to note that the stance of the International Community that 'no nation should dialogue or negotiate with terrorists' which has put a stop to any further pressure on the federal government to grant amnesty to Boko Haram is belated as the terrorist group refused to accept the olive branch extended to them by the federal government from April to May 2013 through the Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North-eastern region of Nigeria (Agbibo and Maiangwa, 2014).

Subsequently, the issue of the terrorist activities of Boko Haram has grown beyond the question of whether amnesty should be granted or not. Boko Haram's leader, AbubakarShekau, responded to the amnesty entreaties by saying that his group had done no wrong, and that an amnesty would not be applicable to them (Bamidele, 2016). The Nigerian government has employed various strategies as counter-terrorism measures to stem the atrocities of the group. These strategies include amnesty negotiations, implementation of emergency law in the northeast, increase in security spending to the deployment of military force. In the midst of these security measures, the civilian Joint Task Force (JTF) emerged, first as a community effort, and later as a joint effort with the security forces to help fight Boko Haram. In the bid of government to address the harm caused in the Northeast, the Nigerian security agencies led by the military suffered a series of setback due to its harsh approach, trans-border nature of the crisis, weak cooperation of the neighbouring countries, inconsistency in policy response and politicisation. Concerted efforts in addressing some of these concerns and unprecedented troop surge turned the tide against Boko Haram from 2015 as President Muhammadu Buhari was voted into power in Nigeria with the launching of the "*Operation Lafia Dole*" by the Nigerian Army in July 2015 as a new code name for a fresh impetus by the military to tackle the activities of Boko Haram.

Noticeable, the decline in violence started under President Muhammadu Buhari, as improvement in the counterinsurgency(COIN) operations of the Nigerian military, efforts by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a combined multinational formation, comprising units, mostly military, from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria as

countries affected by Boko Haram insurgency with its headquarter in N'Djamena and is mandated bring to end the Boko Haram insurgency. However, the group has proven resilient despite repeated claims by President Buhari's administration that Boko Haram is "technically defeated, "terribly degraded" and "completely decimated".

These lines of achievement on the part of the government led to the Nigerian authorities announcing an amnesty offer to Boko Haram members. The government's penchant for negotiation with the insurgents has attracted criticism, cynicism and suspicion from the public. In April 2016, the Defence headquarters of Nigeria announced the establishment of a rehabilitation camp in an exercise code named "*Operation Safe Corridor*" for repentant members of Boko Haram, who lay down their arms and seek rehabilitation and reintegration into the society. The process entails that repentant and surrendered Boko Haram members in the camp would be taken through various vocational training so that they could be useful to themselves and be empowered to contribute meaningfully economically and socially in the society. Apart from the de-radicalization, rehabilitation and reintegration of repentant terrorists, the Federal Government of Nigeria is also rebuilding parts of the North East that has been ravaged by conflicts. Consequently, Nigeria's military forces have been successful in the fight against the group, killing its members, destroying insurgent bases, disrupting their logistic networks, and freeing captives. Nevertheless, the federal government resorted to dialogue, ransom payment, and prisoner swap to secure the release of 103 abducted Chibok school-girls in 2017 and 104 Dapchi school-girls in 2018. Furthermore, the Federal Government of Nigeria also launched a de-radicalization programme targeting wives of Boko Haram members. Most of these women were appended by the military during raid of camps where the insurgents were hiding (Kwaja, 2017).

In response to the shifting anatomy of armed conflicts, the DDR concept has increasingly been reconfigured towards dealing with armed groups while conflict is still ongoing and without a negotiated peace agreement. Also, the structure accommodates dealing with situations of armed conflict that involve hybrid forms of violence as well as a range of armed actors that controls or influence significantly, the populations and territories, without being part of peace negotiations or under direct state control.

The devastating impact of Boko Haram insurgency made it necessary to evolve frameworks and modalities that will aim at de-radicalization. This is strategic because it is hinged on the fact that rehabilitation and reintegration cannot take place, until insurgents have successfully passed through the entire process. Tangban and Audu, (2017) clearly expressed that since DDR coincided not only with counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, such contexts heighten many traditional challenges for DDR efforts and also create new ones. DDR cannot be described as merely an activity to address security threats and dilemmas and to codify agreed-

upon post-war security and power arrangements; for it actively changes power dynamics on the battlefield, particularly if DDR programming also involves de-radicalization processes with other related efforts to counter violent extremism (CVE).

Over the past few decades a sizeable number of African countries, drawn from across all the African Union (AU) regions, have undertaken some form of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process. Effective DDR can be a crucial element of stabilization and recovery interventions and DDR processes are often amongst the fundamental preconditions for establishing stability. Conversely, poorly conceptualised and delivered DDR may undermine stabilization efforts and even be a cause of further conflict and insecurity. It is important that every effort is made to ensure that DDR interventions are well designed, effectively delivered and properly coordinated with other activities such as Security Sector Reform (SSR) and stabilization, recovery and development frameworks. AU mandates towards addressing security threat that emerges when ex-combatants are left without livelihoods and support networks following armed conflicts. In consolidating these efforts, the AU provided frameworks with series of Operational Guidance Notes (OGNs) inter-linking DDR with broader context in complex security situations. These include; DDR and Children, DDR and Women, DDR and National Frameworks, DDR and Detention, DDR and Reintegration, DDR and Foreign fighters, DDR and SALW, DDR and Security Sector Reform and DDR and CVE (African Union, 2018). The OGN's aim to provide African stakeholders with practical guidance to assist in the planning and implementation of individual DDR programs in various African countries. They are also compliant with international best practice and complementary to existing DDR frameworks including the UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS).

In the field of DDR the stakes are incredibly high, not only for individual combatants, but also for countries and regions as a whole. For DDR to be successful, clear and consistent political messaging must be followed up by operational coherence, which demonstrates that the international community is willing to help and also able to project its capabilities on multiple fronts, rather than relying on military action alone. Armed groups are not monolithic, criminal actors often work alongside and in concert with rebel fighters. This means that for some the threat of force may be an appropriate and legitimate response; for others, law enforcement or even a humanitarian approach may be required. However, when so many thousands are mobilized in armed groups, often the majority will enter some sort of DDR programme.

However, people's perceptions of the Niger Delta DDR program are largely negative, due to the fact that they are primarily based on the affluent lifestyle attained by some ex-militant leaders, and emphasized in the media. In addition to the regular DDR benefits, the government engaged some ex-

militant leaders to provide security for oil industry infrastructure in the Niger Delta, and oil companies in the region allowed them to earn additional money as contractors. Some of these ex-warlords also gained political influence after participating in the amnesty program, as an outcome of their role in the political process in the Niger Delta. This perceived affluence and political influence has strengthened popular opposition to the idea of amnesty and DDR for Boko Haram.

Boko Haram and the militant groups in the Niger Delta are two similar but completely distinct types of violent groups. Applying the same policy solution to both would be to neglect the complexities that set them apart. For instance, as the amnesty program for the Niger Delta derived from the recommendations of the Presidential Panel on Amnesty and Disarmament of Militants in the Niger Delta, the Presidential Committee on the Northeast Initiative (PCNI) that is providing leadership and coordination of all intervention/recovery efforts in the Northeast should be structured to accommodate the changing roles that DDR should play in the ongoing intervention in the Northeast.

These indicate that the government should also shape different state responses to the conflicts. The inclusion of women and children in newer DDR programs further points to the willingness among international groups to adopt lessons learned from earlier DDR programs and develop more effective interventions. The Nigerian government has to offer communities and fighting groups in the northeast a genuine democratic alternative to violence. But instead of following an old model, it should propose a peace building process that includes a context-specific DDR program. This program should be developed in consultation with the civil society (religious leaders and Islamic scholars, women's groups, traditional rulers, youth groups, and local politicians) in places impacted by Boko Haram. Such a model should include communities in the peace building process, an aspect that has been missing in all state-led peace building efforts in Nigeria. The government should also work with communities to understand the character and structure of the non-state armed groups in the northeast. A well-informed mapping of non-state armed groups in the northeast should guide the DDR program for the region. In addition, the government should work with communities to facilitate a transitional justice program.

Disarmament in the Northeast should also extend to the CJTF, Vigilante groups as well as the hunters who assist the Nigerian Military against insurgents. These complexities should not be neglected because DDR context similarly will need to be tailored to the local and regional drivers of extremism and conflict, and ensure that the engagement is in tune with local culture, laws, and practices. Programmes need to reflect the resources available in different contexts. In Nigeria, government resources may not be expansive, partnerships can be developed with charities, NGOs, and the private sector, whose contributions have enriched a number of programmes.

According to Ibrahim and Bala (2018), A DDR process requires intensive steps, such as analyzing the strengths and potential roles of these groups, identifying key personnel, establishing mechanisms to accomplish each stage, and providing administrative oversight with the goal of subsuming the CJTF and other vigilantes into the Plan for Public Protection Service Commission (PPSC) was recommended as a transitory framework with a ten-year lifespan. Its work in northeastern Nigeria could be a pilot for potential expansion to other parts of the country. It would address the challenges common to early stages of peacebuilding as well as Nigeria's particular challenges in law enforcement and justice. It would also serve as a unified but flexible interagency cooperation mechanism for the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), and the Nigeria Immigration Service to establish a single coordinated service for community stabilization and policing. The CJTF and any other vigilante units operating in the northeast would be subordinated to the PPSC, injecting much-needed accountability for those groups and helping members get the support they need—such as training—to engage productively with society and the regional economy.

In conclusion, while DDR in the Northeast is to be conducted in ways that are less likely to jeopardize the security in the region, it is also necessary to understand that a long-term solution requires more than military action as the Nigerian government is taking a multi-sectorial approach involving state, non-state, and international actors. As the conclusion of counterinsurgency operations comes into sight, Nigerian authorities and the Lake Chad regional alliance must through the comprehensive strategy provided adopt the overall strategic direction needed to shape the “Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRRR)” pillar of the Regional Stabilization Strategy for Lake Chad Basin countries affected by Boko Haram

It is also important for the Nigerian government to understand that de-radicalization alone will limit the attainment of the ultimate result rather an extension to the comprehensive CVE will better provide the platform for DDR to strive in the accommodating ex-combatants of Boko Haram in the Northeast. Again, the military still providing substantial urban and rural security in liberated areas and conducts operations to continue degrading the capabilities of the insurgents who, since June 2017, have the burden of securing liberated areas overstretches the military and impeding its primary responsibility of guaranteeing territorial integrity. The lack of focus on serving civilians means that most residents of the northeast have, over the decades, seen little genuine state security or any real government services, including development projects. This means that the laid down foundation for the adoption of non-military measures in engaging Boko Haram remains vital towards achieving DDR in the Northeast. The Nigerian government clearly should note that DDR efforts may at times engage in exactly the same

programming regardless of whether they spell the R as reintegration or reinsertion, but in the reinsertion case, limit the timeline in an attempt to achieve comparable results as quick as possible.

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