

# Amnesty and Peace-Building in Nigeria's Niger Delta: Problems and Prospects

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**Abstract:-** The Niger Delta is the major hub of the Nigerian economy, but the oil rich region continues to linger in violence occasioned by multifarious social, political & environmental issues. This study appraised Federal Government's amnesty programme and peace-building in Nigeria's Niger Delta. Three questions were addressed: How has amnesty contributed to peace-building in Niger Delta? What are the causes of the Niger Delta post-amnesty problem? And what are the prospect for sustainable peace in Niger Delta? Study adopts John Locke's social contract theory supported with peace-building theoretical proposition. Study depends on secondary data and content descriptive analysis was adopted. Study reveals that Amnesty contributed to peace-building under Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes. However, the Amnesty programme has not ended insurgency and violent activities in the region due to lingering socio-political, socio-economic and environmental challenges. Interestingly, it brings to light the prospects for a sustainable peace in Niger Delta; and argues that unless Amnesty programme is implemented base on best practices to systemically address the root cause of the Niger

Delta problem; the region would remain restive. Prospects and models suggested in this paper would enhance peace-building activities in the region.

**Keywords:** Amnesty, Disarmament, Niger Delta, Peace-Building

## I. INTRODUCTION

The Niger Delta is the major hub of the Nigerian economy, but continues to linger in violence occasioned by multifarious social, political and environmental issues. Dudu and Odalonu (2016) as well as Aniefiok, *et al* (2013) confirmed that the Niger Delta which is located in the southern part of Nigeria, at the apex of the Gulf of Guinea on the west coast of Africa remain the treasure base of Nigeria. It comprises the largest oil producing states which makes up the country's nine federating states out of thirty-six, namely: Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers.

Figure 1. Map of Nigeria showing locations of the oil producing states - Niger Delta



Source: Aniefiok, *et al* (2013).

Interestingly, Omuta cited in Omokhoa (2015) disclosed that; Niger Delta produce the vast majority of the oil and gas wealth of the country and accounts for 95 per cent of the foreign exchange earnings, about 83 per cent of the Federal Government revenue. As such, Egwu (2013) describes Niger Delta as the 'honey' land of the Nigerian state, but reveals that oil and gas resources have been the major source of acrimony between the Nigerian state and the indigenous population of the region. Why? because the Nigerian state as well as the World enjoying the 'honey' left the 'bees' to 'sting' the indigenes. He added that the crude oil which was discovered in commercial quantities in the region at Otagbagi, very close to Oloibiri in present day Bayelsa state in 1956 and followed by Nigerian independence in 1960, gave high aspirations as well as expectations of development in the Niger Delta. Their expectations however, was cut short. As Moshood (2016) acknowledges:

*In 1960s, the Federal Government created a special focus upon development through the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDDB) to manage the developmental challenges of the region, but little progress was achieved. Between 1979 and 1983, due to the developmental challenges of the region, the Nigerian Government also established a Presidential Task Force (PTF) to manage the allocation of 1.5 percent of the federation account to tackle the special developmental needs of the region but the project had little or no significance to the community. In 1992, Government set up the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) but in spite of the 3 percent of Federal revenue allocated to it, it failed due to institutional incapacity. Subsequently, since 2000, the Federal Government has also introduced various intervention efforts, which manifested in the creation of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the establishment of the Ministry of the Niger Delta (MND). None of these have had a significant impact on the development in the region and have failed to address the root causes of the problem. Due to Government incapacity and insincerity they have all failed.*

Consequently, amidst the interventions, Ojkorotu and Gilbert (2010) recalled that since 1990s, oil violence in the Niger Delta had constituted festering sore on the thumbs of the stakeholders: Nigerian state, the Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs), and the Niger Delta communities due to pervasive underdevelopment occasioned by blatant environmental pollution, despoliation and political marginalization. Oil related agitations commenced in the region in an attempt to compel the Nigerian state and MNOCs to remedy the injustices meted to the Niger Deltans since the discovery of crude oil. However, the mono-cultural, rentier Nigerian state in collaboration with the MNOCs, have consistently and persistently unleashed a reign of violence on the Niger Delta in a failed attempt to militarily suppress and crush legitimate

protests as well as to dissuade them from constituting a hindrance to the continuous flow of its rents from oil exploration, exploitation and appropriation.

However, Adeyemo and Olu-Adeyemi (2010) revealed that, a twist from military response to amnesty became an alternative response, when the Nigerian state realized that military response has done little to curtail the Niger Delta militants. In this consciousness, according Nwankpa (2014):

*The late President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN), Musa Yar'Adua, starts an Amnesty programme, granting unconditional pardon to the Niger Delta's militants. The pardon which was effective from June 25, 2009 to October 4, 2009 required the militants to surrender every weapon and ammunition in their possession as well as to publicly denounced militancy.*

Nevertheless, Dudu and Odalonu (2016) unfolded that the granting of amnesty to ex-militants initially reduced the spate of violence and invariably increased oil production in the region, as it helped to cut attacks on pipelines and restored oil production from 700,000 barrels per day between 2007 and mid-2009 to between 2.4 million and 2.6 million in late 2009. But the relative peace sustained at the onset of the Amnesty programme later dwindled. This study is set to appraise amnesty and peace-building in Nigeria's Niger Delta bearing in mind the problems and prospects. To achieve this, three fundamental questions were raised: *One*, how has amnesty contributed to peace-building in Niger Delta? *Two*, what are the causes of the post-amnesty problems? *Three*, what are the prospects for a sustainable peace in Nigeria's Niger Delta?

## II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Generally speaking, the University of Colorado Conflict Information Consortium and the United Nations Peace-Building Support Office (cited in Harnessing Collective Action for Peace, HCAP 2013) conceived *peace-building* as the process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing root causes and effects of conflict through reconciliation, institution building, and political as well as economic transformation. This consists of a set of physical, social, and structural initiatives that are often an integral part of post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation. It represents the variety of strategy, processes and activities aimed at sustaining peace over a long-term with a clear focus on reducing chances for the relapse into conflict. It is useful to see peace-building as a broader policy framework that strengthens the synergy among the related efforts of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, recovery and development, as part of a collective and sustained effort to build lasting peace.

On the other hand, amnesty according to Azinge (2013) is a governmental act generally granted to the group of people who have committed crimes against the state, such as treason, rebellion, or desertion from the military. It suggests a

sovereign act of pardon for past acts, granted to persons who have been guilty of politically inclined crime. Traditionally, it is used as a political tool of compromise and reunion following a war. For Ntoubandi (2007) amnesty has always

been granted with the view of facilitating the transition from war to peace, and the motive differed according to the nature of the conflict.

**Figure 2:** A glimpse of the nature of Niger Delta problem and signing of Amnesty package



Furthermore, Dada (2017) points out that amnesty for Niger Delta militants was intended to restore sustainable peace and create enabling environment that will accelerate sustainable development. More importantly, Dudu and Odalonu (2016) conception of amnesty has a direct relevance to this study. According to them, amnesty is a strategy adopted to end the insurgency or militancy, to bring peace to the troubled

Nigeria's Niger Delta region in order to facilitate oil production and eventual development of the region. It was designed to ensure peace and reconciliation so as to facilitate uninterrupted oil exploration thereby boosting revenue that would be deployed towards tackling a wide range of problems of underdevelopment in the Niger Delta region. Amnesty in Niger Delta hinges on three major concepts: Disarmament,

Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). It is preceded by amnesty, to set a condition for confidence building among the people and the government, thereby preparing the ground for post-conflict peace-building. The DDR process came about with the declaration of amnesty for the militants, and it is

assumed that it comprises a prerequisite toward a homegrown peace-building effort in Nigeria. *Militancy* in the region originated as a defensive technique and coping strategy and it enhances the cooperation among various ethnic groups in the region who considered the Government as a common threat.

**Table 1:** Structure of the Niger Delta Amnesty programme at a glance.

<b>Disarmament</b>	<b>Demobilization/Rehabilitation</b>	<b>Reintegration</b>
Duration: 6th August to 4th October 2009	Duration: 6 to 12 months	Duration: Up to 5 years
Collection of arms, ammunition, explosives	Ex-militants report to camp	Knowledge and skills acquisition
Biometrics	Verification and documentation	Financial empowerment
		Placement programmes
		Microcredit
	Transformational training	Education
	Peace-building and conflict resolution	Reconciliation with local community
	Counseling	Conflict resolution Framework/ mechanism
	Career guidance	Monitoring and evaluation
	Wellness assessment	Exit from amnesty
	Reintegration classification	
	Education and vocational placement	
	Graduation and demobilization	
<b>Key enablers</b>		
Disarmament camps	Transformational training centres	Partnering Government Agencies, NGOs and Private Organizations
	Rehabilitation camps	Oil and Gas Institutions (OGIs)
		Tracking and support system
<b>Source: Ushie (2013).</b>		

According to the encyclopedia of the New American Nation (NAN, 2018) *disarmament* can be referred to as a concept that describe all efforts to limit, reduce, or control the implements of war. The United Nations and its subsidiary agencies use it as a generic term covering all measures, "from small steps to reduce tensions or build confidence, through regulation of armaments or arms control, up to general and complete disarmament." For National Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 2009), it refers to it as the "act of eliminating or abolishing weapons particularly offensive arms." More interestingly, Egwu (2013) conceptions of DDR relate more to this study. According to him: *Disarmament* is the surrender of arms and ammunition by ex-combatants at designated sites or camps which signifies an end to fighting. The success is determined first, by the quantity of arms surrendered in relation to the estimated stockpiles and available arms, secondly by ensuring inaccessibility of arms and arms flow which guarantees no possibility of rearmament. While disarmament controls the physical tools of violence, demobilization controls the human tools of violence. *Demobilization* is the first step of transition from combat and militarized life to civilian life. It involves dismantling and

disbandment of non-state fighting forces and paramilitary forces that are usually assembled in camps for a change of life orientation. The transition process is usually managed through pre-discharging and post-discharging orientations which includes counseling on non-violent life and life career (ibid., 2013). The overall success of disarmament and demobilization depends on the proper execution of each phase. *Reintegration* involves the absorption of ex-combatants into the society through gainful training and empowerment. It is geared towards economic independence and self-empowerment and peaceful and civil roles of ex-combatants in the society. Reintegration addresses the specific needs of ex-combatants by offering support in terms of skills development, education, professional training, microcredit and assistance to return to peaceful and sustainable livelihoods. It goes far beyond ex-combatants to include war veterans, families and communities of ex-combatants and veterans and disabled combatants. It takes years to achieve reintegration (ibid., 2013).

### III. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNING

Generally, social contract theorists advance the view that the state or, more precisely, civil society is the product of a contract, a covenant, an agreement, or a compact. Its earliest recognizably modern form dates back to Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and others (Nbeta, 2012). However, *Lockean social contract theory* is adopted as the theoretical underpinning for the Nigeria's Niger Delta phenomenon but later supported with peace-building theoretical proposition. John Locke (1632-1704), as an English philosopher, titled his major political writing, "*Second Treatise of Government*" (1690) at the dawn of the English Glorious Revolution of 1688. Locke's was primarily concerned with providing a justification for government by consent (that is limited government) and a right to revolution where the government fails. As such, Locke posited that *men in a state of nature are capable of rational thought and of moderate, practical behavior even without a government* (Deutsch cited in Epelle, 2010). Since this state of nature was *social* but lacking in the *political*, it means that some persons will naturally infringe on the rights of others. Since covetousness was part of the nature of man, there was the *need to set up a civil-society* based on their *collective consent* to which they will voluntarily submit themselves. The civil society so established is for the greater assurance of the *preservation of their lives, liberty and property* (Sabine and Thorson, 1973). Having created a political society and government through their consent, *men then gained three things* which they lacked in the State of Nature: *laws, judges to adjudicate laws, and the executive power necessary to enforce these laws*. Each man therefore gives over the power to protect himself and punish transgressors of the Law of Nature to the Government that he has created through the contract. According to Locke, *the purpose of the Government and law* is to uphold and protect the natural rights of men. So long as the Government fulfils this purpose, the laws given by it are valid and binding, but when it ceases to fulfill it, then the laws would have no validity and the Government can be resisted. Hence, John advocated a state for the general good of people. He pleaded for a constitutionally limited government (Manzoor, 2013). In connection with Locke explanation, the amended 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) required the Nigeria state to respect and protect the fundamental human rights of her citizens including the protection of lives and property. The Government is expected to be guided and to govern based on the principle of the rule of law or rule of the constitution (CFRN, signed 2011). Hence, it follows from Locke's explanations that: *first*, the three tiers of government in Nigeria (Federal, State and Local) are set up by the citizenry and owe their continuous existence to the periodic mandate of the citizens. *Second*, these Governments are set up by the collective will of the citizens to protect their lives, liberty and property. Man's acquisitive tendencies in the state of nature are likely to make him infringe on other people's properties (whether God-given or laboriously acquired) and *government's main duty* is to

mediate amicably between the aggressor and the oppressor not to take sides. *Thirdly*, in light of the above, Locke's theory is unequivocal in its insistence that once a Government reneges in its duty to safeguard the interest of its citizens, the latter has the right to resist its tyrannical, biased, prejudicial or cavalier tendencies (Epelle, 2010).

Logically therefore, Niger Delta's agitation sprang out of discontent by the most vocal part of the Niger Delta population to draw Government's attention. As earlier noted, Egwu (2013) has made it known that despite the discovery of crude oil in commercial quantities in the Niger Delta region since 1956, the Niger Delta region remains poor, her people have remained unemployed and the region is underdeveloped due to blatant environmental pollution, despoliation and political marginalization while the post-colonial Government of the Nigerian state has failed to pay adequate attention to their expressed dissatisfaction that were communicated through several peaceful means. Hence, Ojajorotu and Gilbert (2010) pointed out that this act by the Nigerian state led to constant oil related violence in the Niger Delta in an attempt to compel the Nigerian state and MNOCs to remedy the injustices perpetrated in the region. It is no wonder, Epelle (2010) discloses that the post-colonial Nigerian state's failure to tame and ensure the MNOCs operate the policy of best business practices as it is obtainable globally; and to constantly exhibit Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Niger Delta states where they operate, bearing in mind that the oil minerals they are mining are properties of the inhabitants of the Niger Deltans who are morally justified to call them to order, in the event of any breach of the memorandum of understanding signed by both parties have all contributed to Niger Delta rebellion or revolution given credence to the Locke's social contract theory on the right to revolution when the Government fails to discharge its duty.

To support the above, amnesty introduced as a peace-building mechanism to curtail Niger Delta agitators, appears not to be taking care of the root cause as reveals by Adeyemo and Olu-Adeyemi (2010); Epelle (2010); Azinge (2013); Moshood (2016); Dudu and Odalonu (2016). The DDR process in connection with amnesty also constituted a peace agreement between Nigerian state and Niger Delta militants. Yet, if x-rayed or mirrored by extant *peace-building theoretical propositions* for transforming a violent-habituated system into a peace system, seems to fall below expectations which may have accounted for post-amnesty crisis in the region further gives credence to Locke's social contract theoretical foundation in all ramification. Hence, according to peace-building expert, Peek (2016) for peace-building to be truly successful, it must include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. It is believed that, to determine success or failure, one can distinguish three different standards. First of all: *a maximalist standard*: The maximalist standard is the most ambitious of peace-building practices. Its goals reach as far as addressing the actual root causes of the conflict. The

maximalist standard seeks to end conflict, keep the peace and address deeply rooted issues in a society. Secondly, the *minimalist standard*, this practice only seeks to end an immediate conflict and keep the peace. It does not delve deeper into the war-torn society trying to determine and solve grievances that could be pointed as a cause for the conflict. Lastly, the *moderate standard* entails that peace-building is assessed by determining the quality of post-war governance and the absence of a recurrence into conflict. All in all, the success of any post-conflict peace-building operations depends largely on the preceding expectations. However, this present study would not only help to understand and classify the peace-building programme in Niger Delta properly but to propose a new model that will help the Nigeria state to build a peace system.

#### IV. AMNESTY CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE-BUILDING IN NIGER DELTA

##### *Militants: Disarmed and Registered*

Disarmament is the surrendering of arms and ammunitions by ex-combatants at designated sites or camps which signifies an end to fighting. Study found that amnesty in Niger Delta has contributed in making good numbers of the militants to lay down their weapon and embrace peace. Figure 4, shows the pictorial outlook of one of the major arms collections centre during the disarmament exercise in Niger Delta, the case of Port Harcourt in River state of Nigeria.

**Figure 4:** Weapons surrendered by Niger Delta ex-militants at arms collection centre.



Arms collection centre at Tourist Beach in the oil hub of Port Harcourt October 2009.  
Sources: Oluwaniyi (2011) and <https://www.google.com/search> (2018).

In support of the above, Table 2 shows that a total of 30,000 persons who were members of various militant groups across the nine (9) oil producing states which constituted the Niger Delta surrendered their arms and ammunition in agreement with the amnesty granted and were registered at the various arms collection centres for demobilization process. Specifically, it further shows that in *First phase* (20,049 militants were disarmed and registered) in the *Second phase*

(6166 militants were disarmed and registered) and in *Third phase* (3,642 militants were disarmed and registered, although, specific figures on the militants across the Niger Delta states are not provided, literature captured the total which is adopted for third phase accordingly). Showing that the Bayelsa, Rivers and Delta state have the highest numbers of militants disarmed among others at the end of the third stage.

**Table 2:** Evidence on militants' disarmed and registered across Niger Delta states.

S/No	State	First Phase	Second Phase	Third Phase	Total
1	Abia	Not provided	18	Not provided	18
2	Akwa Ibom	163	178	Not provided	341
3	Bayelsa	6,963	2,649	Not provided	9,612
4	Cross River	160	210	Not provided	370
5	Delta	3,509	1,916	Not provided	5,425
6	Edo	300	82	Not provided	382
7	Imo	300	45	Not provided	345
8	Ondo	1,200	360	Not provided	1,560
9	Rivers	6,997	708	Not provided	7,705
	**NDDC	600	0	Not provided	600
	Total	20,192	6166	3,642 (copied)	30,000

**Source:** Ushie (2013); Adebowale in Omokhoa (2015); OSAPND in Moshood (2014).

### *Ex-militants were Demobilized and Reintegrated*

As earlier noted by Egwu (2013), demobilization is the transition from combat and militarized life to civilian life. It involves dismantling and disbandment of non-state fighting forces and paramilitary forces that are usually assembled in camps for a change of life orientation which includes counseling on non-violent life and life career. While reintegration involves the absorption of ex-militants or ex-combatants into the society through gainful training and empowerment geared towards economic independence and self-empowerment as well as peaceful and civil roles of ex-combatants in the society. Reintegration addresses the specific needs of ex-combatants by offering support in terms of skills development, education, professional training, microcredit and assistance to return to peaceful and sustainable livelihoods as well as meeting the need their families and

communities of ex-combatants and veterans and disabled combatants. Study found that another major area in which Amnesty programme has contributed to peace-building in Niger Delta was demobilization (transformational training and counseling in various camps) and reintegration of the ex-militants by addressing specific needs and that non-combatants in the region. For example, Table 3 shows the summary on demobilization and reintegration under the Amnesty programme, revealing that: between June 2010-May 2011, about 15,434 were transformed as part of the peace-building effect towards reintegration of ex-militants into a civilian life. Between 2013 and 2014, 6,067 were transformed ex-militants were reintegration through formal education; 2,500 attended higher institutions; 13,000 participated in skills acquisition in local and foreign training centres; 113 were employed in maritime, welding fabrication; and others in some agencies at home and abroad.

**Table 3:** Evidence on DDR Programme for Niger Delta 2009-2014

S/N	DDR	Number of persons involved	Time
1.	Accepted Amnesty	20,192	First Phase October 4,2009 Second Phase Third Phase 2012
		6,166	
	Total	30,000	
2.	Demobilization: Transformational Training	15,434	June 2010-May 2011
3.	Reintegration:	6,067 transformed ex-militants being processed for reintegration.	2014
	Formal Education	2,500 in higher institutions.	
	Vocational Training Centre	13,000 in local and foreign training centres	
4.	Facilitating employment	113 employed in maritime, welding fabrication. Others in some agencies at home and abroad	2013-2014
5	Economic empowerment	Pilot scheme of start up funds for specialized businesses for trained ex-militants	2014

**Sources:** Ikelegbe and Umukoro (2016); Goodnews and Bartholomew (2014).

Nevertheless, further details on the *reintegration aspect* of the Amnesty programmed are provided as captured in Table 4 and Table 5, which are evidences on specialized training and vocational training for Niger Delta ex-militants and non-

combatants beneficiaries as well as the various international institutions used as the human infrastructure building aspect of the scheme.

**Table 4.** Evidence on specialized training for Niger Delta Amnesty programme beneficiaries.

S/N	Institution	Course	Number of Delegates	Location	Status
1	Schlumberger Technologies	Drilling Engineering	29	Melon, France	Graduated
2	Lufthansa Aviation Academy	Instrument Rating, Type Rating and Fixed Wings	21	Frankfurt, Germany	In Training
3	CAE Oxford Aviation Academy	Airline Transport Instrument rating, Type rating	9	Kinglington, United Kingdom	In Training
4	Schneider Electric	Power Generation & Management, process and machine management	29	France	Graduated
5	Institute of French Petroleum (IFP)	Geoscience, Reservoir Engineering, Gas Exploration, Production, Refining, Engines and hydrocarbon Utilizations	40	France	In Training
6	Airstar Flight School	Helicopter	9	Italy	In Training
7	Comair	Type Rating	11	South Africa	In Training
8	Flight Simulation Company	Type Rating	4	Netherlands	In Training
		<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>		

**Source:** OSAPND in Moshood (2016).

**Table 5:** Evidence on vocational training for Niger Delta Amnesty programme beneficiaries

S/N	Course Category	No.	Graduated
1	Agriculture	716	
2	Automobile Mechanics	601	79
3	Welding & Fabrication	4837	300
4	Entrepreneurship	2074	
5	Carpentry, Plumbing & Pipefitting	398	
6	Electrical Installation/Maintenance	562	100
7	Information & Communication Technology	331	
8	Crane/Heavy Duty Operations	1426	
9	Health Safety & Environment (HSE)	249	
10	Music/ Fashion/ Entertainment/ Catering	1334	50
11	Others	377	
12	Oil & Gas/ Maritime	2019	72
13	Aviation	46	
14	Boat Building	152	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>15, 122</b>	

**Source:** OSAPND in Moshood (2016).

Table 6 below showcase the spread of ex-militants and non-combatants in formal education (B.Sc., M.A, M.Sc., MBA, M.Engr., and LLM courses). Majorly postgraduate degree programmes in different academic disciplines of foreign universities. The hosts countries of training include: United

Kingdom (UK), United States of America (USA), Sweden, Cyprus, Dubai, Malaysia and Belarus respectively. However, UK and Malaysia based Universities hosted the highest number of the Niger Delta beneficiaries under the Amnesty scheme.



**Table 6.** Evidence on formal education for Niger Delta Amnesty programme beneficiaries.

S/No.	Institution	No.	Country	Degree awarded
1	Coventry University	61	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree (M.Sc. MBA, M.Engr., LLM) B.Sc.(1)
2	Portsmouth University	3	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree (M.Sc. M.Engr.)
3	Cranfield University	7	United Kingdom	Postgraduate(M.sc Thermal Power)
4	BPP University	7	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree (M.Sc. Management& Finance)
5	Salford University	5	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree (M.Sc. in HSE, M.sc Finance)
6	Bradford	2	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree (M.Sc. Sustainable Operations Mgt)
7	University of Liverpool	2	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree (M.A. Intl Relations)
8	University of Manchester	1	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree (M.Sc. Asset Management)
9	University of Reading	1	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree (M.Sc. Asset Development Planning & Research)
10	University of Newcastle	1	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree (M.Sc. Offshore Engineering)
11	University of Swansea	16	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree (M.Sc., LLM, M.A)
12	Anglia Ruskin University	4	United Kingdom	M.Sc. Intl Business Information System, M.Sc. Engr.
13	Murdoch University	6	Dubai	Postgraduate Degree (MBA., M.A., MHRM)
14	Linton University College	53	Malaysia	Graduate Degree (B.Sc., B.A. & B.Sc. (Hons)
15	The City University	1	USA	Postgraduate Degree
16	Limkokwing University of Creative Technology	2	Malaysia	Postgraduate Degree
17	Belarusian State University	3	Belarus	Postgraduate Degree
18	University of Dundee	2	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree
19	University of Kent	3	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree
20	Bedfordshire University	8	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree
21	City University	2	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree
22	Kingston University	3	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree
23	University of Aberdeen	2	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree
24	Huddersfield University	1	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree
25	Leeds University	7	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree
26	Oxford Brooks University	1	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree
27	Leicester University	1	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree
28	University of Derby	1	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree
29	Herriot Watt University	2	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree
30	Kings College	1	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree
31	University of Alstom	1	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree
32	Prifysgol Bangor University	2	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree
33	University of Cardiff	2	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree
34	Greenwich University	1	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree
35	University of West of London	1	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree
36	Abertay University	1	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree
37	Portland State University	1	USA	Postgraduate Degree
38	World Maritime University	1	Sweden	Postgraduate Degree
39	European University, Lefke	1	Cyprus	Postgraduate Degree
40	University of Westminster	1	United Kingdom	Postgraduate Degree
	<b>Total</b>	<b>221</b>		

**Source:** OSAPND in Moshood (2016).

*Government Financial Contributions for Reintegration of Transformed Ex-militants.*

There is a consensus that the Federal Government of Nigeria in the effort to build peace in Niger Delta has through the annual budget spanning from 2009 to 2018 contributed billions amount of money to the Amnesty programme to see

that the DDR scheme brings about sustainable peace in the region. As empirically shown in Table 7, the budgetary allocations and contributions to the programme significantly indicated that the Federal Government was considerably committed to peace-building in the Niger Delta region in terms of funding.

**Table 7:** Evidence of budgetary contributions by Federal Government to Amnesty programme

Year	Purpose	Budget receipt (N)	USDS
2009	Program take-off grant	<b>3 billion</b>	Not provided
2010	Feeding, stipends and reintegration for ex-militants	<b>30 billion</b>	Not provided
2011	Feeding, stipends and reintegration for ex-militants	<b>90 billion</b>	Not provided
2012	Amnesty programme for ex-militants	<b>74 billion</b>	Not provided
2013a	Stipends & allowances of 30,000 ex-agitators	23,625,000,000	\$ 144,098,813.25
2013b	Operational Cost	3,699,933,814	\$ 22,567,452.77
2013c	Reintegration of Transformed ex-agitators	35,409,859,972	\$ 215,979,631.72
2013d	Reinsertion/Transition Safety Allowances for 3,642 ex-agitators (Third Phase)	546,300,000	\$ 3,332,113.51
2013e	Total	<b>63,281,093,786</b>	\$ 385,978,011.25
2014	Presidential Amnesty Programme	<b>63,281,093,786</b>	Not provided
2015	Presidential Amnesty Programme	<b>64 billion</b>	Not provided
2016a	Stipends and allowances of 30,000 Niger Delta ex-militants	7,875,000,000	Not provided
2016b	Operational cost	1,834,149,261	Not provided
2016c	Reintegration of Transformed Ex-Militants	10,290,850,739	Not provided
2016d	Total	<b>20 billion</b>	Not provided
2017	Presidential Amnesty Programme	<b>65 billion</b>	Not provided
2018	Presidential Amnesty Programme	<b>65 billion</b>	Not provided

**Source:** Generated from credible scholarly materials, government documentations and news media, namely: *Dailypost.ng* (2018); *Vanguardng.com* (2017); *Budget Office of the Federation (BOF, 2016)* *Humphrey-Abazie in Moshood* (2016); *Infographics* (2014); *Ubhenin* (2013); *BOF* (2013). [Materials accessed August 2018]:

Apart from the fact that government has shown budgetary commitment to Amnesty programme, information reveals in connection with finance, that in response to the complaints or fears that the Government want to stop the monthly payment in 2015 and coupled with the low allocation to the scheme in 2015 sprang up protest by ex-militants, However, the increase in the allocation in 2017 made the Amnesty Office to be able to pay up all ex-militants backlog of their stipends up to the end of 2016. Besides the monthly payment of about N65,000 to N66,000 to the ex-militants, there have been consistent provision for reintegration activities under the Amnesty programme (Premium Time, Wednesday, August 22, 2018). It is obvious therefore, that the stoppage of the payment of stipends to ex-militants' beneficiaries may have motivated the post-amnesty militia resurgence and violence attacks. Though other factors responsible shall be identify later. Let us look at evidences on the post-amnesty militia insurgency. To do this, the following fundamental question is raised.

#### V. HAS AMNESTY PROGRAMME END MILITIA INSURGENCY AND VIOLENCE IN NIGER DELTA?

Evidence abound to show that despite the huge contributions and successes recorded by the Amnesty programme, there are still incidences of violent attacks on Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) between October 2010 and 2016 which largely represent the post-amnesty period. There is copious evidence that the Amnesty programme was mixed with the problems of resurgence and violent attacks linked with the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) in Bayelsa state, Delta state and also Abuja the capital city of the Nigeria. Even as it was recorded that Bayelsa and Delta state have the highest beneficiaries in the programme. The re-convergence of militant groups under the umbrella of MEND and the activities as showcase in Table 8 and Table 9 are indications that Amnesty programme could not prevent violent or build a peace system in Niger Delta

**Table 8:** Evidence of Militia resurgence and violent attacks 2010-2016

S/N	Date	Militia attacks/Militant Organisation	Target	Outcome
1.	October 1, 2010	Nigeria's 50th independence Celebration. Allegedly MEND	Abuja Federal Capital Territory	Detonation and blast of 2 car bombs killing 2 persons and wounding 36 others
2.	October, 2010	Agip Pipeline in Bayelsa. MEND	Agip Pipeline in Bayelsa.	Explosion
3.	March 5, 2010	Post Amnesty Conference at Warri, Delta State. MEND	Warri, Delta State.	Car bombing near event. 1 person killed and 11 injured
4.	November 8, 2010	Raid on Oil rig and kidnapping of seven foreign staff. MEND	Oil rig	Kidnapping of seven staff
5.	November 15, 2010	Attack on Exxon Mobil Oil platform. MEND	Oil platform	Kidnapping of seven Nigerian workers.
6.	February 4, 2012	Attack/ bombing of Agip trunk pipeline. Allegedly MEND	Brass, Bayelsa State	Bombing of Agip trunk Pipeline
7.	March 20, 2013	Attack on Oil Pipeline. Allegedly MEND	Chevron facility, near Warri	Bombing and Destruction
8.	April 13, 2013	Attack on Shell oil well in Nembe L.G.A, Bayelsa State. Allegedly MEND	Nembe L.G.A, Bayelsa State	Bombing and destruction
9.	July 4, 2013	Attack on oil pipeline. Allegedly Militants affiliated to MEND	Rivers State	Bombing and Destruction
10.	December 20, 2013	Attack on Oil	Plant Oil Plant	Kidnapping of 4 South Korean Oil workers
11.	January 15, 2014.	Agip facility in Nembe-Brassanbiri, Bayelsa. Allegedly New group of MEND trainee fighters	Nembe-Brassanbiri, Bayelsa	Kidnapping of vessel staff. Hostages released (Ransom allegedly paid)
12.	January 25, 2014	Police gun boats in Azuzuama Waterways, Southern Ijaw L.G.A, Bayelsa State. Allegedly MEND	Peremabiri Southern Ijaw, Bayelsa	Attack on 2 Police gun boats and escorts of former militant leader at Peremabiri
13.	July 8, 2016	Attacks on pipeline Niger Delta Avenger (NDA)	Bayelsa	Bombing and Destruction
14.	September 24, 2016	Attacks on pipeline Niger Delta Militants	Oil Pipeline	Bombing and Destruction
15.	October 14, 2016	Attacks on pipeline Niger Delta Avenger (NDA)	Chevron facility, near Warri	Bombing and Destruction
16.	October 25, 2016	Attacks on pipeline Niger Delta Avenger (NDA)	Chevron facility, near Warri	Bombing and Destruction
17.	November 16, 2016	Attacks on pipeline Niger Delta Avenger (NDA)	Oil Pipeline	Bombing and Destruction

**Source:** Chinuwokwu and Adaka (2017); Ikelegbe and Umukoro (2016).

Worse still, information from Ikelegbe and Umukoro (2016) revealed that apart from violent activities carried out by MEND, there has been sporadic emergence of new and resurgent militia activities such as those of John Togo in the western Delta in 2011, Keiti Sese's camp at Foropa in Bayelsa state in 2010, and Coastal Revolutionary Forces, and the Idiot Family in Bayelsa state in 2014. Moreover, it was also discovered from study that the same MEND was responsible for other criminal activities such as piracy, oil thief and kidnapping of sailor between 2011 and 2014, the period which could be describe as a new face of militancy. Though

maritime and waterways piracy declined after the Amnesty in 2009, there was a sharp rise since 2011. There were attacks on 39 vessels and coastal crafts in Nigerian waters with about 7 deaths and 33 hostages taken between December 2012 and March 2013, and 29 piracy incidents on Nigerian waters with two hijackings, boarding of 11 ships and attacks on 13 vessels and attempted attacks on three others in 2013. In 2016, the Niger Delta Avengers (NDAs) also carried out attacks by bombing and destroying oil pipelines and Chevron facilities at Warri.

## VI. CAUSES OF POST-AMNESTY PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE

The cause of post-amnesty problems are concurrently highlighted in Table 10 below with the prospects for sustainable peace in Nigeria's Niger Delta.

Table 9


S/N	Cause of Militia Resurgence and Violence Despite Amnesty and Peace-Building Programme in Niger Delta.	Prospects for a Sustainable Peace in Nigeria's Niger Delta.
<b>A.</b>	<b>Socio-Political issues</b>	
i.	Failure to engage other community actors in the peace process.	Inclusion of community stakeholders in the peace building process.
ii.	Federal government was reluctant to dialogue and address issues at the root of the crisis.	All encompass dialogue between the Federal government and stakeholders to address issues at the root cause of militancy is significant in peace-building activities.
iii.	Some ethnic nationality politically marginalized (politics of favouritism). For example: Slots meant for ex-militants were allegedly given to non ex-militants and relatives of big politicians for oversea training.	Creating equal opportunity for all segments of society in the implementation of the Amnesty programme irrespective of ethnic affiliation or identity is required to building a peace system.
iv.	'Our Rights Syndrome': Quite a number of the ex-militants, and the Niger Delta youths in general believe that the oil belongs to them. Hence, they should have absolute rights over it.	Governments at all level (Local, State and Federal) need to fulfill obligations toward citizens as it will help to change the absolute rights clamor by Niger Deltans.
v.	Crisis in the Northern Nigeria (Bush Fire Effect),	Federal Government and its National Security Agencies (NSAs) should address insecurity and proliferation of arms accordingly across the country. Else, peace-building would remain problematic.
vi.	Most of the terms of agreement reached before the boys lay down arms, not met by the Federal Government.	Keeping to terms of amnesty agreement with ex-militants by Government and all other authorities involve in the implementation is required to achieve the desire stability in Niger Delta.
vii.	The ex-militants skepticism about the existing DDR structure been able to build the desire trust that will satisfy their demands without engaging the International Organizations drives the early resurgence.	The presence of international conflict transformers or experts are key in post-conflict peace-building activities for building trust across communities in multi-ethnic segmented society like Nigeria's Niger Delta.
viii.	Amnesty programme neglected basic tenets of international good practice in conflict resolution. It was marketed as a 'comprehensive' DDR exercise, yet reintegration was scarcely addressed. There was no provision for mediation, dialogue, reconciliation or institutional reform. Local-level disputes within and between communities over natural resources were not addressed by the amnesty, and thus remained as open sores and a breeding ground for re-radicalization.	Amnesty programme should recognized and take advantage of the basic tenets of international good practice and diplomatic instrument in conflict resolution including provision for mediation, dialogue, reconciliation or institutional reform to address local-level disputes within and between communities.
ix.	Lack of synergy between the Government and regional stakeholders in the Niger Delta (i.e. traditional rulers, regional politicians and ex-militant leaders).	Adequate synergy between the Government and regional stakeholders in the Niger Delta (i.e. traditional rulers, regional politicians and militant leaders) should be part of the peace-building activities.
x.	Dissatisfaction with the action of Federal Government to terminate some security contracts awarded to ex-militant leaders without dialogue.	Federal Government should dialogue on issues before taken actions that will lead to distrust.
<b>B.</b>	<b>Socio-Economic Issues</b>	
i.	Channeling state support through ex-militant leaders within the political economy of the oil industry is motivating resurgence.	Financial supports from Government or Oil companies should be transferred directly into individual Niger Delta states treasury account for tracking and accountability purposes.
ii.	Communities are not develop. No good roads, schools, electricity and health care facilities.	Infrastructural and living conditions are major activities in any peace-building programme and should be given serious priority by the Niger Delta peace-builders.
iii.	Conflict affected communities, families, victims and those who lost their properties, not compensated by Federal Government.	Government should ensure amnesty programme covers compensation of conflict affected communities, families victims and those who lost properties accordingly and the activities should be handled with high level of integrity and accountability.

iv.	Corruption pervaded the reintegration programme as Amnesty office contracted the training of the ex-militants at the training centres to private agencies.	Government should ensure that Amnesty office disengage such corrupt private agencies and reengage reputable, transparent agencies/ or institutions in the training of ex-militants.
v.	The money meant for these ex-militants are not directly paid to them, and in most cases they are short-charged. Corrupt practices by ex-militants leaders. Former war-lords collect money and pay their foot soldiers paltry amounts and their boys angry.	Government should ensure stipends are paid directly to beneficiaries to cut off corrupt individuals or leaders sabotaging the peace-building activities in Niger Delta region.
vi.	The problem of economic reintegration. Failure of some ex-militants and non-combatants to find gainful employment after training.	Government need to economically empower the trained Niger Deltans with micro-credits to practice what they have been trained for.
vii.	The money budgeted for the reintegration programme is being embezzled by government officials and contractors.	There is need for Government officials and contractors to exhibit transparent and accountable as duty holders or duty givers.
viii.	No people-centred development	Government at all level should engage in people-centred development. Development that will affect lives positively across communities. In doing this, public opinion should be allowed in all policy stages/processes - formulation, execution, to monitoring.
ix.	Nigerian Government attempted termination amnesty programme and to stop the monthly payments to ex-militants.	Termination of Amnesty programme should not be sole decision of the Government, all stakeholders need to be involved and reach a consensus.
x.	Many youths are not been trained, they need training and entrepreneurial skills.	Empowerment training should organized for Niger Deltans and should be extended to all jobless Nigerian youths.
<b>C.</b>	<b>Environmental Issues</b>	
	Oil pollution rate in the region and the damage to biodiversities has to be addressed (i.e. Water pollution, Air pollution and land pollution).	<p>The Federal Government Agencies on environmental regulatory matters should ensure the operation or activity of MNOCs are environmentally friendly and should comply with extant environmental laws, guidelines and regulations.</p> <p>MNOCs should also carry out their CSR regularly in the region where they operate in accordance with International Best-Practices to avoid further grievances.</p> <p>Environmental concerns that are hazardous and can damage the ecosystem should be prevented. All affected spots by pollution should be remediated in-line with environmental standards by the polluters.</p>
	<b>Source:</b> Ebiede (2017); Ikelegbe and Umukoro (2016); Nwajiaku-Dahou (2014).	<b>Source:</b> Author.

It must be noted that none of the above issues are less significant to address. However, in connection with prospects as enumerated, the Federal Government of Nigeria need to borrow clues from peace-building experts like Boutros Boutros-Ghali cited in Notter and Diamond (1996) as well as in Adekanye (2007) Boutros-Ghali, a former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, used the term peace-building in his 1992 *Agenda for Peace* which also covers post-conflict peace-building. Boutros-Ghali believe that *conflict transformation* is the outcome of peace-building and it is ultimately *the job of*

*the conflicting parties*. His framework focus on *social systems and not just on armed factions* or official governments, *peace-building activities are not restricted to certain points along a range of violence*. Peace-building, means creating the tangible and intangible conditions to enable a conflict-habituated system become a peace system. To *build peace* therefore, there is *need for a viable infrastructure or foundation* on which to build it, thus the activities of peace-building are about creating infrastructures (see Figure 5).

**Figure 5:** Peace-building activities necessary for transforming a violent conflict-habituated system into a peace system.



**Source:** Designed by Authors with the inspiration from Notter and Diamond (1996); Peek (2016).

As an outcome of peace-building, conflict transformation implies a qualitative change from a condition of violence to a condition of peace with little or no opportunities for reversal. It is a change system that transforms: (a) the conflict itself; (b) some aspects of the socio-historical and political system in which the conflict occurs; (c) the persons involved in the conflict; and (d) the relationships between adversaries (Notter and Diamond, 1996). According to Foran cited in Ebiede (2017), it is transformation at these multiple levels that ultimately produces peace. Therefore, it is obvious that the present oppressive socio-political structures, inequality, lack of legitimate economic access, pollution, grinding poverty, illegal oil bunkering, and class and ethnic disparities in human development has constitute threat in Niger Delta and requires a more serious peace-building activities to transform the necessary infrastructures to achieve a relatively successful

peace system. These issues are not only particular to Niger Delta region but the entire country, hence, a systemic peace-building in all the six geopolitical zone of Nigeria is not a bad idea.

## VI. CONCLUSION

Niger Delta is the major hub of Nigeria's economy but remains poor, underdeveloped, polluted and violent-habituated amidst oil wells. Amnesty for Niger Delta militants was intended to restore sustainable peace; create enabling environment that will accelerate sustainable development. In this paper, we have appraised and discussed the amnesty contributions to peace-building in Niger Delta, particularly how about 30,000 militants across Niger Delta region were disarmed and registered; how good numbers of ex-militants were demobilized and reintegrated through specialized

training, vocational training and formal education as well as the huge financial commitment by the Federal Government of Nigeria through various budgetary contributions to Amnesty programme since 2009 till date. However, despite the money committed to Amnesty programme, evidence between 2010-2016 showed that the programme did not stop insurgency and violent attacks including piracy, oil theft as well as kidnapping in Niger Delta. Interestingly, the causes of this renewed threat were identified and grouped into socio-political, socio-economic, environmental issues, this grouping to a large extent revealed that the DDR peace-building activities lacks the structure to address the root cause of the problems. Hence, Amnesty programme in Niger Delta clearly represents short-term victory in crisis management but it is yet to resolve the Niger Delta conflict. The programme neglected basic tenets of international good practices in conflict resolution and peace-building. It was marketed as a 'comprehensive' DDR exercise, yet reintegration was scarcely addressed. there was no provision for mediation, dialogue, reconciliation or institutional reform. local-level disputes within and between communities not addressed, and thus remained as open sores and a breeding ground for re-radicalisation, resurgence and violent attacks.

Presently, the existing peace-building activities or practices in Niger Delta has failed the maximalist standard which emphasizes addressing root cause of violent conflict. Hence, except the present structure of the Amnesty programme is overhauled to address same, militia insurgency would thrive in Niger Delta with the negative effects on multinationals; human rights, democracy, federalism, security of lives and property, foreign exchange earnings, development as well as international reputation of Nigeria. This paper become significant to the policymakers, as it did not only identifies problem of resurgence, it also highlighted causes and the prospects/remedies for a sustainable peace in Niger Delta. It recommended in addition to the prospects a peace-building model which identifies the various activities required to transform Niger Delta from a violent-habituated region to a peace-habituated system.

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