

Revisiting the First Battle of Panipat: Logistics, Space and Strategy of Warfare

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Abstract: Knowledge of space helped royal elites to undertake new invasions to obtain and distribute resources among them. Since India was resourceful country as against the Central Asia, being dry and barren in nature, along with other invaders, Babur also invaded India for his political existence depended upon economic solvency and the way Babur followed to capture economic and political heartland was first battle of Panipat which brought forth several lacunas in administrative set up of Delhi Sultanate and downfall. The Mongal tradition of warfare that helped Babur for preparation including various strategy of warfare in medieval era became critical to the Sultanate and came to prove substandard military organisation of indigenous military system. Along with inferiority the prejudice that comatose them in crisis was largely responsible for their downfall. Therefore the style of warfare including role of space, logistics and strategies adopted for “death ground” military operation, to be analysed.

Keywords: Space, Resource, Logistics, Strategy, Warfare.

I. INTRODUCTION

Geographical knowledge plays a crucial role for an intelligent study and understanding of history of a country. It is hardly possible to track the course of events and its cause and effect relationship without accurate information about a location that obviously shades the narrative of the events of the concerned place. Knowledge of space, therefore, is indispensable for historical study. The geographical knowledge that enriched the rulers and scholars from ancient time for both offensive and defensive measure, transportation and building of power centre, came to be studied afresh at the beginning of Italian renaissance that opened a new arena for both geographers and explorers for new voyages and discoveries. Likewise, in Indian context, the indigenous and foreign geographers over a period of times explored the country to the foreigners in different purposes. Thus the knowledge of space accompanied with time motivated the foreigners to be attracted to this subcontinent.

II. METHODS

As our study is related with war logistics and military activities in relation with topography of Panipat, we must consider the nature of the decisive battle, fought in the year of 1526 in Panipat which is similar to Kurukshetra the legendary battle ground in the time of Mahabharata. This region lies in the topographically important region which situated 30-40 miles from Thanesar and stands on the high way leading from *Gangetic doab* to Upper Punjab via Meerut, Saharanpur and Ambala and commands the passage of the river *Jamuna*.

These territories have always enjoyed a unique strategic position. By this route Mahmud of Gazni, Timur and finally Babur advanced to conquer Delhi due to its commercial importance and productivity. From commercial point of view, Panipat always stands on the main trade route of North and Western part of India. It being extended from the sources of the *Sutlej*; the *Jamuna* and the *Ganga* to Mathura and Bairaja respectively and from East Punjab to Rohilkhand,¹ decided the fate of the then north Indian ruling elites and leaves a vast scope of historical study since there has been no attempt to discover the intrinsic relations among topography, war logistics and military activities in this region. Through the ages, it has been observed that the *Gangetic doab* in north India has become the targets for several invasions while the climatic conditions, together with ecological and environmental variation, accounts for the range of the settlement pattern in north India. This is related closely to agricultural production.² These regional diversities have either been determined by pre-existing landscape and later came to be demeaned by hydraulic works of Oriental despotism³ as we observe vividly in the reign of Firoz Tughlaq. Panipat and Delhi region being a part of geographical sub region located in the western part of *Indo-Gangetic* plains formed a part of Mughal *Subhah* in subsequent period.

The British administrator historians and particularly the military historians focused on this particular aspect less than it deserves. Rather, being motivated by western modernity, the British historians engaged themselves after their victory in Plassey to focus much on company's military strength and strategy. On the other hand, the traditional way of interpretation neglects its standard to look after some hidden facts of warfare and ultimately the governance. It will be pertinent to focus upon the factors that both to the Indian and foreign rulers, north and north-west India stand geopolitically important through the ages due to its connection with commercially important zones. These roads were accessed by the invaders also to run into the alluvial plains of northern India and what is interesting here is that the invaders who attacked from the northern side of the power centre, Delhi, defeated the Indian powers with a great massacre. Now the question is whether the invaders got any extra-locational advantage while proceeding from the North, or the sub

¹ R.C Agrwala, “Early History and Archeology of Kurukshetra and Ambala Division”, *IHQ*, (December, 1955): 237-39.

² Romila Thapar, *Early India*, (New Delhi, Penguin, 2001), p. 51.

³ Karl. A., Wittfogel *Oriental Despotism; A Comparative Study of Total Power*, (London, YUP, 1957): 26-27.

continental mentality responded adversely to the Indian ruling elites in time of crisis.

III. DISCUSSION

There are so many interpretations as regard to the downfall of the Delhi Sultanate including the interpretation of the hereditary position of the nobles in his *iqta* which challenged the sovereignty and smoothened the way for permanent disintegration. Notwithstanding, when Delhi had been cut off from the West and Central Asia, there was hardly a scope of recruiting the Turkish and other clan members as army staff. Therefore, the Sultanate had to depend upon indigenous clans for military recruitment, while the hereditary soldiers were inefficient and the slaves were selfish and disloyal. Along with hostility with each other, Erskine observes, the principal fief-holders looked upon their jagirs 'as their own of right, and purchased by their swords rather than as due to any bounty or liberality on the part of the sovereign.'⁴ Hence the Sultanate became puzzled internally while the frequent Mongol invasion ransacked them externally⁵.

The strength of the warden of the frontier marches was seriously considerable while we observe that after the accession of Ghiyas-ud-din to the throne, he made soon administrative appointments in the frontier *iqta's* for confirmation of the Samana, Multan and Sind remaining frontier *iqta* of Delhi Sultanate. Thus keeping in view the importance of these *iqta's*⁶, sultans appointed *muqtis*⁷ of great repute as governors who were responsible for guarding and maintaining peace and to check Mongol advance from the west of the Indus.⁸ Neither the Delhi Sultanate could establish a stable dynasty nor the stable monarchy beyond the reach of ambitious warlords belonging to competing ethnic factions. In case of collection of land revenue, the bulk of land revenue was farmed out to military officers and *jagirdars*⁹ who usually collected much more than the exact due to the state. It was a vicious system for, besides entailing loss of revenue, it increased the power of the *jagirdars* to the detriment of the sultan's authority. The turbulent process of the "state-formation" of the "provincial sultanates" ensued, which built on the local strength of the settler communities that had grown up in the previous century. According to the Islamic law to check upon despotism without any machinery to enforce to obey the *Quranic* law, the fourteenth century Persian historical narrator dreamt of an ideal public order as a

benchmark of good governance to the future generations. These social and intellectual pre commitments meant that the masters of Delhi could not be reported as frontiersmen or ex-servants of the despised Chinggisids. And this would have conveyed the sense of a Sultanate in crisis and decline."¹⁰

The successful existence of a centralised monarchy depends upon a standing army that requires a sound economic basis. But due to scarcity of precious metals; abundant harvest, shortage of metallic currency¹¹ and in the late fifteenth century, disappearance of the supply lines from Bengal and Gujrat for treasures, fragmented political condition at that time. Constant warfare and 'lawlessness along the roads' discouraged both the private and royal trading venture and ultimately paved the way for debasement of the coinage. All the incidents led the Sultanate to be financially bankrupt. The agrarian recovery during the reign of Firoz Shah Tughlaq does not seem to have brought a revival of military strength.¹² Alongside, the incessant sweep of armies all across the subcontinent was fatally disruptive of normal life in India and was ruinous to its economy.¹³ It is noteworthy that the Sultanate around fourteenth century AD lost his long cherished monopoly of the elephantry¹⁴ while the Mongol attack in this context obviously played a part along with extraneous factors operating on the supply of war horse. Government had to pay higher bill for inflation for purchase of essential war material.

However the Sultanate came to be disintegrated finally in 1526. As regards to the victory of Babur it is said that the use of firearms helped him a lot at Panipat in 1526. If firearms determined the fate in 1526, why did it not become helpful to the Afghan and the Maratha in late fifteenth and eighteenth century respectively? William Irvine speaks of outclassed war weapon and method of fighting; bad generalship and inefficiency to use of firearms and after all racial defects which prevented them from constructing vibrant military set up.¹⁵ Treachery, dishonesty and manoeuvrings were inherent in Asiatic characters which in the long run failed them, while Lane Pool classifies the superior military strategy of the Mongols.¹⁶ It has also been observed that exceptional wealth of this country kept her people away from practicing the art of warfare. Otherwise the people coming from different clans to the royal service dreamt of curving

⁴ Ishwari Prasad, *The Short History of Muslim Rule in India*, (Allahabad, The Indian Press, 1965): 240.

⁵ Henry George Keene, *History of India from the earliest times to the Twentieth Century*, (Edinburgh, John Grant, 1906): 139-41.

⁶ *Iqta* is a form of administrative grant and an Islamic practice of tax farming that became common in time of Delhi sultanate.

⁷ *Muqtis* or *Iqtadars* were the holders of the land assigned to them by the donor.

⁸ Agha Hussain Hamadani, *The Delhi Sultans*, (New Delhi, Atalantic Publishers & Dristi, 1992): 139-41.

⁹ *Jagirdars* were donee same as *iqtdars*. This term has been used in subsequent period.

¹⁰ Sunil Kumar, "The Ignored Elites: Turks, Mongols and a Persian Secretarial Class in the Early Delhi Sultanate", *Modern Asian Studies* 43, no.1 (Jan., 2009): 49.

¹¹ Sir H. M Elliot, *History of India as told by Its Own Historian*, Vol. VIII, (London, Trubner & Co., 1877): 476.

¹² Peter Jackson, *The Delhi Sultanate: A Political and Military History*, (Reprint, Cambridge, 2000): 315.

¹³ Abraham Eraly, *The Age of Wrath: A History of the Delhi Sultanate*, (New Delhi, Penguin, 2014), chapter- Wars Forever.

¹⁴ I. H Siddiqi, *The composition of the nobility under the Lodi Sultans', Medieval India-A Miscellany* (Vol.4, Aligarh, CUP, 1977): 10-66.

¹⁵ William Irvine, *The Latter Mughals*, (Vol. I & II combined, reprint, Delhi, LPP, 2006):350-52.

¹⁶ Stanley Lane Pool, *Babur*, (Reprint, New Delhi, 2005):156-66.

new principalities of their own.¹⁷ In accordance with the post colonial discourse the cast system of Indian society played a crucial role to determine Indian society that shaded much to determine the military standard of state. Stephen Peter Rosen asserts that divisive loyalties within a society adversely affected military effectiveness of the army.¹⁸ Therefore, lack of technological innovation accompanied with new research on military strategy is obviously considerable in case of the Sultanate, the indigenous Afghans and finally in case of the eighteenth century Mughals and the Marathas. It is true that Indian social structure swallowed all the foreign military characteristics to fit with its own nature. But the socio-geographical diversity that may determine military logistics deserves historical analysis in relation with the first fate making battle of Panipat.

In our following discussion, the first battle of Panipat and the philosophy of war of Mongol ruling class along with the war logistics that developed in the Mongols' moving military administration in 13th century AD, the relation between geography and human race, response of time and space to human activities to form cultural hegemony will be studied in the light of available literary sources. The theoretical aspects of warfare and the practicability of military operation accepted by both the existing ruling class of Delhi and the Mongols should be analysed to have conceptual clarity of the intricate lacework of military functioning in medieval period.

As regards to Panipat, the question of relationship between man and geographical environment of that territory should be taken into consideration for proper understanding of historical trajectory. While union between state and territory was an organism¹⁹, the territory of north India appeared to be extremely important to the ruling elites since each and every period witnessed the growth of state as represented by its expansion and the north Indian alluvial plains has been recognised through the ages, at least historically, the heartland both to the indigenous ruling elites and the strangers where man power and bio-resources greatly helped to support a land army to redistribute resources among the ruling elites. But sometimes the process of efficient distribution of resources among the ruling elites appeared to be disrupted since beyond the natural boundary of the subcontinent, there were many ferocious central Asian tribal communities breathing in comparative barren and economically backward region.

The relation between geography and politics and their implication both in policy and theory of state formation in north India compelled the Indian rulers to prefer Panipat to check the foreign invaders who crossing the mountain passes and Punjab basin, appeared at this region, the land at the

mouth of the capital city of Delhi. This was the political necessities that led the political events of warfare at Panipat in every curve of pre-modern Indian history. Therefore geopolitics formulated the scientific foundation of the art of warfare, one of the political transactions, for both the defenders and the invaders in their struggle for existence. Since Panipat appears to be a gateway of huge resources of large alluvial plains of the north and the minerals of Chottanagpur region, gaining control over this region could be a serious danger to the political authority of north India. Therefore, the rulers of Delhi always advanced to check the invaders crossing Ambala. Besides, the indigenous forces felt easy to check the invaders since Panipat signifies no hilly terrain. Due to non-marshy and without containing forest, it was easy comparatively to the Indian rulers to head the army while there was no chance at all of surprise attack from the side of the invaders at least from traditional point of military operation.

While warfare is a part of socio-political activities of the ruling elites, there must be shorts of calculations which motivated the ruling class to study the philosophy of war and building the strategy in this respect. In each and every time, the foreign invaders including the army of Himu advanced from the north of Delhi achieved victory over the powers proceeded from the heartland. Hence, the factors which instrumented their victory give birth of curiosity among us. The Mughals of sixteenth century and Ahmed Shah Abdali had a clear notion of the art of warfare while the formers are the descendant of the Chinghiz Khan and Timurlong who had to depend upon constant warfare for their existence. But how the basic components of logistics such as supply, transportation, facility, services and efficient management of earlier four elements, worked under Babur in his advance towards Hindustan, while the Mongol developed an efficient logistics system in 13th century, deserves an analytical study.

In Mongolia, the Mongol empire, as a matter of fact, was the creation of military conquest which could sustain on military supremacy. Therefore, the army was the most essential imperial institution affecting the fiscal policy of the state. In fact the Mongols developed an efficient system of logistics based upon their cavalry armies and its uniqueness lied in discipline, austerity, planning and organisation. Normally the Mongol army was accompanied by trains of baggage carts, pack animals, and herds of cattle. Routes and campsites were selected to access good grazing and food crops; and food and forage were stored in advance. While they entered into the enemy country, the army for speedily mobilisation abandoned its baggage and herds, divided into widely separated columns, and came together upon the unprepared foe at great speed from several directions. Supply

¹⁷ Jos Gommans, *Mughal Warfare*, (New York, Routledge, 2002): 96.

¹⁸ Kaushik Roy, *War, culture, and society in early modern South Asia, 1740-1849*, (New York, Routledge, 2011): 2.

¹⁹ Charles B Hagan, "Geopolitics", *The Journal of Politics* 4, no. 4 (Nov., 1942): 478-490.

of foods, remount, and means of transportation were carefully organised along with standard equipment.²⁰

Supply is an important component while it functions to provide the material needs for military operation. Though in modern sense, the supply process comprised of all stages in the provision and servicing of military material, including those preceding its acquisition by the military, while transportation is a crucial link in this chain, it obviously worked under the Mughals, with its exact credibility, to advance against Ibrahim Lodi. In this regard Babur proved himself more than efficient in the process of framing the design–development–production and supply of military equipments and its distribution and after all the planning–administrative process of balancing supply and demand. Military supply has always had the basic aim of providing military forces the material needed to live, to communicate and to fight. While supply of food grain for food and forage seems to be one of the basic requirements for an army, Babur, in his preparation for future invasion to Hindustan, was advised to collect grain from the farmers for those accompanied him for raid. To assist Babur with adequate supply of livelihood, Muhammad Baqir along with some Kabulis advanced according to their proposal to capture the cattle, buffalos and corns found in Kohat. Besides, he obtained the treasure of in Afghanistan and by sudden raid the valuables of Bhira on his route to Hindustan. He obtained from Bhira in lieu of keeping peace, horses camels and 400,000 Shahrukhis²¹. The horde and corn of Yusufzai and Afridi was also captured by Babur's army. Since historically food and forage made up most of bulk and weight for supply, Babur collected food grain for their livelihood in his way to Hindustan as and when it was required. Babur's stronghold in Kabul helped him a lot to lay his control over excellent meadows which provided forage to have strong horses, one of the most essential elements of medieval warfare, both for war and transportation of war equipments. Thus he tried to find out the solution of livelihood of his moving administration. For strategic management of time and resources and to avoid unexpected hazards, the Mongols appointed local guide, Malik Bu Said Kamari along with the Ghazani tribe for their advance through Khyber Pass. Not only in time of his advance for Hindustan, had transportation system a role for dispatching the looted articles to his base of invasion, Kabul and Kandahar²² also.

Along with the reliable supply line, an effective information system that the Mongols developed since 13th century C.E. for their booming advance against enemies had

to depend on means of transportation. While the state in medieval period depended upon martial power and warfare, the Mongol developed an efficient espionage system and Babur incorporated this system in his administration, while he had to face the same difficulties of that period. By army patrolling they tracked the movement of enemies. Likewise, to have a bird's eye view on Ibrahim's march from the west of Delhi, he repeatedly sent his messengers for any type of news relating to his advance, topography and the demographic nature of Panipat, for systematic planning against the enemies. When Babur camped at Karnal and a place nearby Jhelum, Kitta Beg and Haider Quli were advised to collect news about Ibrahim's camp respectively. Mughal army remained always liberal in process of recruitment and appointed those who became willing to join army and sometime this recruitment was done by subjugating people like the people under Abdul Rahim at Kalda Konar. During Babur's stay at Peshawar, several household guards, army paymaster and finance officers were recruited to carry on the administrative work of his moving army.²³ Probably this recruitment was made locally to minimise burden and to carry on the process of localisation of Mongol administration to deal with human ecology and natural adversity.

Under Babur, the provision of military facilities, though not becoming a large and complex sphere of activities, acted as per the demand of that age. Possible infrastructure for lodging and amusement of troops were developed in Mongal army. Immediately before the battle was commenced, a party was called for entertainment of his soldiers. Service was also provided to the forces to perform more effectively while Ibrahim failed to satisfy his soldiers. Since fate of warlord depends on an effective strategy building capacity, the Mongols were much advanced in this regard and proved themselves to be sincere. For preparation against the mighty force of Ibrahim, Babur called experienced warriors to a General Council and all including safety and protection of the army; the offensive measures to be taken, local population and topography, were thoroughly scrutinised. The Council reached a consensus that as the crowded city of Panipat stands on right side of the Mongal army, the other side is to be protected after Ottoman fashion. Probably being influenced by Salim the Grim, the soldiers were ordered to collect carts, used for baggage of army, and join together using rope of raw hide.²⁴ It was ordered to fix five or six portable bulletproof shelter between every two carts behind which matchlock men were to stand to fire. Though, according to Rushbrook Williams, the front line of the Mughal army was not strong enough, this line was contrivance of aggression rather than of defence. Unless Babur was attentive to present a front equal in length to the effective front displayed by the enemy, his cavalry would be

²⁰ David Morgan, *The Mongols*, (Reprint, London: 1996): 84-88. He obtained the information from 'The Mongol Army' of H.D. Martin published in the *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*, 1943/1-2, pp. 46-85.

²¹ Babur, *Baburnama*, ed. and trans. A.S. Beveridge, (Reprint, New Delhi, 2006): 212-13.

²² The abortive result of the third attempt convinced Babur that without securing his base in Kandahar, no invasion in Hindustan could be fruitful. Therefore he spent two or three years to secure his stronghold in that region.

²³ Babur, *Baburnama*, Ed. and trans. A.S. Beveridge, (New Delhi, Penguin, 2006), 211-258.

²⁴ L. F. Rushbrook William, *An Empire Builder of the Sixteenth Century: A Summary Account of the Political Career of Zahir-Ud-Din Muhammad, Surnamed Babur*, (London and New York, Longmans, Green, and Company, 1918):128

unable to implement the flanking strategy by which he made the opposition into huddled mass upon which his army could discharge ordnance with advantage.²⁵ While left and front of the army was protected, for protection of the right, a ditch full of branches was dug. Babur followed the Mongol art of warfare and divided his army after that fashion. At the extreme end his camp was situated to monitor all the forces and just ahead left and right wings of his army were posted. The middle was divided among centre, right centre and left centre. All the divisions were put under efficient commanders. For the turning party at the point of right and left wings, care for effective operation was taken and trusted people were posted with responsibility to wheel round the enemies and attack from rear when they advanced and got nearer. Notwithstanding, a reserve force at the vanguard was posted under the commander of Abdul Aziz to reinforce the right wing. The centre, right and left wing along with the turning parties surrounded the enemies in such a way that they could not move ahead or got any exit. In this manner Babur diverted Ibrahim's attention to the front and attacked them from the rear where they hardly expected it. When this was the situation, canon shot was discharged by Mustafa Rumi and thus the strength of the large army was doomed and seconded the fall of the Sultanate.

To the Mongols, life is endless battle and conflict and they learnt to spot the enemies by the signs and patterns so as to reveal enmity and thus obtained their purpose and direction. Babur had to make several attempts for his final achievement in 1526 AD. In his last expedition, it was the largest army including twelve thousand men only, Babur had ever commanded in India.²⁶ In each and every attempt he gathered experience and prepared himself intelligently. Sometimes he proved defensive but the measure followed by him was dynamic rather than of static line of defence. In spite of paucity of favouring circumstances, he kept his mental power intact and following the counter balance strategy he founded his tent in the extreme north of his army posted and thus keeping himself detach from the chaos of the battlefield. Since the central Asian political situation was not appropriate to him, he followed in Panipat the "death ground" strategy and transformed the battle into crusade. To develop the sense of participation among soldiers, collective decision making mechanism was indulged and he divided them among subdivisions under an effective chain of commands. Speed and flexibility, the essential elements for successful military operation, were adopted perfectly by the Mongals against the so-called mighty forces of Ibrahim. He enabled his forces to be unstoppable by instilling them with the spirit of campaign

until the victory was in their bag. Even in sixteenth century, the method of counter-attack that Babur adopted should be praised from modern point of warfare. His strategy of night attack instigated Ibrahim to advance and thus he made the situation favourable to attack them from rear angle, the weak point of his army, since it was hardly possible to him to cause any harm to Ibrahim's gigantic elephantry in frontal attack by cavalry.

Though Babur was kind enough in nature; to convey the message of his rudeness, he punished some disloyal people rigorously and that obviously created panic among enemies through chain reaction that created a chaotic situation among Ibrahim's forces and pushed into desperate overreaction. An outstanding feature of Babur's character was to read innermost thoughts of his people and that greatly helped him to control and lead them in crisis. When Babur followed the Mongol tradition of 'wheel round' strategy to attack the enemies from rear by his flanking parties along with frontal canon operation, he offered his enemies to attack no particular target. On the contrary, in Panipat elephantry was used in order to disorganise enemies' rank, but when their drivers were shot down, they wheeled round and became a terror to their own side.²⁷ But on the other side, in Sultanate army there were several gaps which left the opportunity for Babur to envelop his opponents to create ruthless pressure from all sides and block off their exit to annihilate them. Even an extreme callousness on the part of Ibrahim's generalship may be observed when Babur's army suffered a lot to go on entrenching themselves at Panipat for over a week without molestation. It proved the incompetence and timidity of Sultan.²⁸ All the sensory inputs put the Sultanate at stake and ultimately bound them to be slain and flee from the ground along with their master's death and to carve a new principality under the Indian Mughals.

IV. CONCLUSION

Therefore, The important pillars of a successful military operation including perception of space, equipments, tactics, operational strategy, military administration and logistics that worked more efficiently under the Mughals, could not appear favourably to the Delhi Sultanate. It is expected that the Mughals having a reputed tradition of warfare, could easily overwhelm the Sultanate army. But the military forces of a settled ruling class offering no resistance may signify the question raised by Madhab Rao, while topography of north India was completely unknown to the Mughals. The Delhi Sultanate could not grip the advantages probably due to callous generalship of Ibrahim and the degeneration of Sultanate nobility discussed earlier. Besides, in lieu of gripping the reality, Ibrahim's dependence upon astrology which predicted his victory, proves his soldierly

²⁵ Ibid., 130.

²⁶ But according to H.C. Kar, Babur entered into the Punjab with a force of twelve thousand men and the Begg of Punjab provided another twelve or thirteen thousand men and hence he had roughly a force of twenty five thousand men. On the other hand, regarding the number of Ibrahim's forces of one lakh men is an overstatement. He thinks that the machinery of Delhi Sultanate could hardly allow Ibrahim to maintain the huge forces and command them properly. Ahmad Yadgar states that Ibrahim's army included only 5000 men and 2000 elephants.

²⁷ Lt. Col. H. C. Kar, *Military History of India*, (Calcutta, Firma KLM, 1980): 165.

²⁸ Stanley Lane Pool, (Reprint, Delhi, 2003):163.

attitude by no means.²⁹ Our hypothesis came to be appeared true when Babur described Ibrahim Lodi as an inexperienced young man, careless in his movements, who marched without order, halted and retired without method, and engaged without foresight. This statement came to be asserted when the forces of Ibrahim and Hamid Khan moved from Delhi and Hissar Firuza respectively against the forces of Babur. In this time due to leisurely advance of Ibrahim, Babur led his right wing to destroy the forces of Hamid Khan before they joined Ibrahim's army. In another occurrence, when Mahmud Khan advised Sultan to fly from the desperate battle field for their future preparation, Ibrahim denied him and with emotional state of mind he rushed into the thickness of fight and obtained martyrdom. But from the side of Babur, war logistics along with sub-sections and strategies espoused by him obviously helped him in an adverse situation to win over. Therefore it is to justify our present discussion to be the original source and linchpin of Babur's victory and downfall of the Sultanate.

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²⁹ Ahmad Yadgar, "Tarikh-i-Salatin-i-Afghana", in *The History of India as told by Its' Own Historians*, tr. & ed. Sir H.M. Elliot & John Dowson, (Vol. 5, London, Turbner & Co., 1873): 27.