

Effects of Poor Funding on the United Nations Security Council Humanitarian Intervention in Sudan (2003 - 2018)

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Abstract: The research was on effects of poor funding on United Nations Security Council humanitarian intervention in Sudan. The specific objective of the study was to determine the extent to which poor funding affected the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) humanitarian intervention in Sudan from 2003-2018. In line with this objective, the researcher sourced for data from relevant textbooks, previous research works, journals, newspapers and video clips obtained from institutions like office of the United Nations Organization in Nigeria, libraries, internet services and military formations in Nigeria. Relevant literature to this study were duly reviewed while the three Grotian theories of humanitarian intervention were found very suitable for the research. Based on the qualitative nature of the research, data collated for the study were duly tested and analyzed using textual presentation and analysis. The research confirmed that the dwindling financial contributions to the Sudan Humanitarian Fund (SHF) by donor countries and agencies from \$172.3million in 2006 to a paltry \$36.3 million in 2017 had been one of the major factors that undermined the success of the humanitarian mission in Sudan. The study therefore recommends that the UNSC should mobilize other critical stakeholders to make meaningful financial commitment to ensure the success of the humanitarian mission in Sudan.

Keywords: Funding, United Nations Security Council, humanitarian intervention, Grotian Theories, Sudan Humanitarian Fund.

I. INTRODUCTION

In 2003, some militias notably the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) engaged the Omar-al Bashir government of Sudan in an armed conflict over allegations of marginalization of southern Sudan in allocation of resources and political appointments. The government of Sudan, in attempt to repeal the insurgency, allegedly funded an Arab based militia, the Janjaweed, to fight on its behalf. The crisis resulted in the destruction of several lives and properties as well as displacements of millions of people. This attracted the attention of international community who, through African Union and United Nations Security Council, intervened in the crisis even from its onset to save lives and properties as well as prevent the escalation of the crisis.

Unfortunately, the humanitarian catastrophe in Sudan had continued unabated despite the United Nations Security

Council led humanitarian intervention. The catastrophe did not only threaten the continued existence of Sudan as a country but had also threatened the peace and security of the international community. According to Document 443 of the United Nations Security Council, there were several reports of war crimes and human rights abuses such as murder, rape, abduction, looting and displacement arising from the crisis. The persistence of the catastrophe created doubt in many quarters on the capability of the United Nations African Union Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) to deliver on its mandate.

Despite the financial commitment by the international community and several years of military campaign by UNAMIS, the root causes and negative impacts of the crisis remained largely unaddressed. Human rights violations and abuses such as sexual and gender-based violence as well as violation against children's rights were widely reported to have continued with impunity. In 2017, UNAMIS claimed that it had documented 152 cases of conflict related sexual violence, a decrease from 222 victims in 2016 (Sudan Tribune, 6 March, 2018).

A mortality survey conducted by the UN in 2006 indicated that not less than two hundred thousand persons had died either from combat, starvation or diseases attack while an estimated two million people were displaced by the crisis in Darfur before the UNSC humanitarian intervention. As noted by a former UN humanitarian chief, Jan Egeland, "additional tens of thousands more people have died from the crisis since the last UN mortality survey in 2006" (Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA, 2008).

According to Human Rights Watch report (2015), of the almost three million people displaced in Sudan, more than half of them were displaced between 2007 and 2015 while the UNSC humanitarian intervention was ongoing. The report further added that there were several cases of rape even with the Mission's presence in Sudan. For instance, UNDP Report (2016) noted that in October 2014, a mass rape of more than 200 girls and women were reported at Tabit, North Darfur.

Alarmed by the humanitarian catastrophe in Sudan, the United Nations Security Council in its sundry Resolutions 1564, 1706 and 1769. Conceptualized the Sudan crisis as a threat to international peace and security. This by implication imposed

a moral compulsion on the international community to unravel what could have delayed the actualization of the mandate of the United Nations-African Union Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS). Though the inability of UNAMIS to resolve the crisis had been generally blamed on a number of factors including the large size and difficult terrain of Sudan; lack of proper funding of the humanitarian intervention; as well as lack of cooperation by the United Nations Security Council, the Government of Sudan and some members of the international community, funding was considered very critical to the success of the humanitarian exercise. This study therefore was undertaken to specifically examine the extent to which poor funding had undermined the success of the UNSC humanitarian intervention in Sudan. In realization of this objective, a research question was formulated thus: To what extent has funding affected the impacts of the United Nations Humanitarian Intervention in Sudan? To answer this research question, the study was considered in seven (7) sections, namely: background to the study, review of related literature methodological issues, discussion of findings, conclusion and recommendations.

II. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

One of the determinant factors for success in any humanitarian intervention is fund. The 2016 world Humanitarian summit report noted that “there has never been enough funding for humanitarian intervention, needs have always gone unmet and there seems to be no solution to the situation”. In the words of Ottaway (2006), “The United Nations Security Council humanitarian intervention in Sudan has been a failure because commitment of resources has not matched the rhetoric of the UN Security Council and the intervention programme has only done a little to alleviate the plight of innocent civilians not to talk of bringing the conflict to an end. Ottaway argued that the United Nations Security Council humanitarian intervention in Sudan was based on unrealistic principles and predictions which did not only fuel the crisis but also erode public confidence in the ability of the security council of United Nations to handle the humanitarian crisis. Worried by the dwindling financial support for the United Nations humanitarian intervention in Sudan, the UNICEF representative in Sudan, Jonathan Veitch, lamented that “the situation has been getting bleaker on daily basis since the beginning of the crisis in Sudan in 2003. The only thing that exists in the country at the moment is humanitarian aid and that is being cut left, right and centre. Currently, we only receive 8% of funding needed for our humanitarian assistance plan and most of that goes towards food aid”. Similarly, Ashley Mchaughin, Media and Communications Officer, International Organization for Migration (IOM), Sudan, complained that donors in support of the humanitarian exercise in Sudan were not forthcoming, posing great challenge to the funding required to keep the programme going. He added that donors were generous in the past but got frustrated due to lack of progress in the peace process and as

such they became cautious in their commitment to the intervention programme (Poole, 2014).

It was generally reported that poor funding almost crippled the United Nations humanitarian programme in Sudan. On August 2, 2016, the Emergency Relief Coordinator for Sudan, Stephen O’Brien, noted again that the humanitarian programme in Sudan was becoming frustrating and expensive. According to him, in 2016 humanitarian workers expected better quality of service delivery than the previous years of the crisis. However, rather than improving, the funding dwindled on daily basis partly due to other dire humanitarian crises across the globe” (UNDP Report, 2016). O’Brien further asserted that the cost of service delivery became even more costly in rainy season due to the fact that 60% of Sudan was inaccessible by road during rainy season and that required adopting a more expensive option, air lifting of humanitarian aids and workers to different parts of the country (UNDP Report, 2016).

As the humanitarian situation in Sudan became more expensive and challenging to manage, experts called for a change from a short-term approach to a more sustainable and transformative one. Zlatko George, country director, Sudan noted that “while many refugees travel to Europe and great attention is paid to their plights (as it should be), the world seems to forget the millions of Sudanese IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) and refugees. Humanitarian managers have come to terms with the bitter reality and are trying to be realistic in managing the available funds rather than asking for money that is not forthcoming” (United Nations Report, April 2017). In the words of George “We have been lobbying the donor community to shift from short term reactive funding approach towards a more sustainable, proactive and transformative approach that will change the status quo.” He said luckily, some donors responded to the appeal. According to him, “the department for international development, for example, had moved towards a multi-year humanitarian funding model, which meant that aid agencies funded by it could be able to do more to support peoples need as well as strengthen their ability to absorb and adapt to ongoing and future shocks.” It was therefore a consensus opinion that, in order to avoid further escalation of humanitarian crisis in Sudan, the donor community must urgently, release fresh funds for the UN Security Council humanitarian intervention in Sudan, otherwise it might be too late for many. It was on this note that the Sudan Humanitarian Fund (SHF) was established as a cost-effective way to support humanitarian action in Sudan. The constraints in funding the Sudan humanitarian catastrophe called for concern among stakeholders. The United Nations News Centre in March 2017 reported that with the conflict in Sudan in its fifteenth year and its people facing dire humanitarian challenges, the United Nations Refugee Agency had revised upward its funding requirements for 2017 to address new needs for those who were displaced due to renewed fighting, increased violence and food insecurity since July 2016. The United Nations

News Centre also reported that the revised requirements amounted to \$781.8 million, including support cost (seven percent), some \$297.9 million (61 percent) higher than the earlier budget of \$483.9 million dollars per annum. The report added that by the supplementary appeal to arrest the Sudan humanitarian crisis launched by the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), over three million people were estimated to benefit from the agency's intervention by December 31, 2017. This number, according to the report, did not include local population in most communities who, themselves were suffering from food insecurity and limited access to basic social services, and infrastructure, and who were also in for humanitarian assistance under the agency's inclusive strategy.

The United Nations News Centre (2016) report also had it that nearly 1.8 million people were internally displaced within Sudan alone (as at November, 2016). However, UNHCR budgeted to provide humanitarian assistance to only 240,000 most vulnerable internally displaced persons (as at 31st October, 2016). For 2017, UNHCR estimated to assist up to 830,000 displaced persons assessed to be most vulnerable among the local population of displaced persons. The opinion of the various authors were reflections of the reality on ground in the funding of the UNSC humanitarian crisis in Sudan.

III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The three Grotian theories of Humanitarian intervention were considered to be strategically relevant to this study. The theories can be traced to Hugo Grotius, a brilliant seventeenth-century Dutch Scholar and diplomat whose writings have left an indelible mark on international law. The first Grotian theory asserted that when states use force in response to human rights violations abroad, the primary purpose is to punish the violators of international norms in order to protect the integrity of international law as a normative order. Grotius famously argued that all states are entitled to punish violators of the law of nature (*ius naturale*) and the positive law of nations (*ius gentium*), irrespective of where or against whom the violation occurs, to vindicate the rule of law. Echoes of this theory can be discerned in contemporary practice, as some states continue to argue that they may use force without the UN Security Council's authorization to counter serious violations of international law. Yet, the idea that international law supports a universal right of punishment no longer commands widespread acceptance across the international community.

The second Grotian theory of humanitarian intervention appeared in a passage from the book, *The Laws of War and Peace* that has passed into relative obscurity. Addressing his attention to the "causes of undertaking war for others", Grotius asserted that the law of nature authorizes states to serve as temporary guardians for people who have suffered intolerable cruelties at the hands of their own states. Under Grotius's guardianship theory, states that use force to protect human rights abroad exercise a foreign people's natural right

to resist oppression on their behalf, and they accordingly bear fiduciary benefit of a foreign people. Unlike Grotius's theory of international punishment, this guardianship theory resonated with the contemporary practice of humanitarian intervention in important aspects; states that invoke humanitarianism as a basis for intervention end to justify their actions as a purely defensive measure undertaken for and on behalf of an oppressed people to prevent death and suffering.

Clarke (2014), argued that these two Grotian theories have fallen out of fashion based on their skepticism on natural law underpinning and concerns about how they have facilitated colonialism. As an alternative to the first two theories, a third Grotian theory on humanitarian intervention was developed. The theory known as 'fiduciary theory' draws inspiration from Grotius's guardianship theory. According to Criddle (2015), the third Grotian theory is considered as fiduciary in the sense that the intervening state(s) claim to intervene in the affairs of another state to protect human rights and exercise an oppressed people's right of self-defense on their behalf, which may warrant the use of force, solely for the people's benefit. As fiduciaries, the intervening states bear obligations to consult with and honour the preference of the people they seek to protect as well as respect international human rights governing the use of force within the affected state. Jackson and Sorensen (2003) stated that although Grotius could not have anticipated the UN charter on collective security regime, the juridical structure of humanitarian intervention as authorized by the UN Security Council bears the hallmarks of a fiduciary relationship akin to guardianship or trusteeship. The Grotian theories of humanitarian intervention particularly the fiduciary theory really fit into the ongoing UN Security Council humanitarian intervention in Sudan crisis and were considered relevant to this study. The fiduciary theory has clearly stated the intention of the UN intervention in humanitarian crises in Sudan.

IV. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

• *Method of Data Collection*

Secondary sources of data collection were used in order to actualize the objective of the research. Accordingly, the researcher visited some major establishments relevant to the study to gather necessary data. Some of the institutions visited included 6th Motorised Battalion, Nigerian Army, Wellington Basse Barracks, Ibagwa; and 2nd Brigade Garrison, Nigerian Army, Nung Uyo Idoro, Uyo, both in Akwa Ibom State as well as 9 Brigade, Nigerian Army, Ikeja, Lagos. Other places visited included 6th Division of Nigerian Army, Port Harcourt, as well as Rivers State and Akwa Ibom State chapters of Nigerian Legion.

Similarly, the researchers also visited the Nigeria Office of United Nations Organization, Abuja; Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja; University of Uyo Library, Uyo; Department of Political Science Library, University of Uyo, Uyo; Postgraduate Library, University of Uyo, Uyo; Akwa Ibom State E-Library, Uyo and Akwa Ibom State Library

Board, Uyo, as well as Mcgiraff Cyber Café, Uyo, all in Akwa Ibom State. The study also took the researchers to Professor Festus Aghagbo Nwako Library and Department of Political Science Library both in Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Anambra State. Relevant textbooks, journals, dictionaries, previous research works, video clips and internet facilities were duly consulted

to obtain relevant data for proper interrogation of the major variables in this research.

- *Method of Data Analysis*

In view of the qualitative nature of the study, the researcher adopted descriptive tool of data analysis. Textual presentation and analysis were found most suitable for the analysis of data for this study.

V. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

- *Effects of Poor Funding on the UNSC Humanitarian Intervention in Sudan*

Available data from the United Nations and other relevant sources have confirmed that poor funding was one of the major factors militating against the success of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) humanitarian intervention in Sudan. A critical analysis of the funding pattern of the humanitarian intervention in Sudan as presented in table I below indicated that it had rather been cyclical with slight increase and sharp decline at some points especially from 2011. The decline in the total contributions to the Sudan Humanitarian Fund by donors from \$48million in 2016 to \$36 million in 2017 represents a 25 percent decline in contributions. While end-of-year contributions explained some differences in individual donor's contribution, there was

a clear declining trend of 10 percent in 2016, 7 percent in 2015 and 5 percent in 2014 as shown in table I below.

With such drastic decline in the funding of the humanitarian exercise, it became very difficult for the Mission to create any meaningful impact let alone bringing the crisis to an end. This ugly situation did not only dampen the morale of the troop members, but had also affected the quality of weapons and other equipment used by the Mission as well as the honorarium paid to the humanitarian workers.

Table I: Sudan Humanitarian Fund (2006-2018)

S/N	Years	Funding by Donors (US \$)
1	2006	172.3 million
2	2007	167.1 million
3	2008	154.3 million
4	2009	174.1 million
5	2010	71.2 million
6	2011	164.4 million
7	2012	79.8 million
8	2013	54.7 million
9	2014	57.5 million
10	2015	53.6 million
11	2016	48.3 million
12	2017	36.3 million
13	2018	N/A

Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs-UNOCHA (2018)

*N/A: Not Available

Table II: Humanitarian Needs and Catastrophe (2016)

	BY STATUS				Total	BY SEX & AGE*	
	IDPs	Refugees	Returnees	Residents		% female	% children, adult, older people ¹
Education	925,073	122,748	43,058	462,537	1,553,416	50%	100 0 0%
Shelter & household items	1,094,980	347,825	105,020	0	1,547,825	50%	60 33 7%
Food Security & Livelihoods	1,966,555	347,825	105,020	2,206,853	4,626,253	54%	0 0 0%
Health	2,225,557	347,025	105,020	1,194,443	3,072,045	49%	52 28 0%
Nutrition (Children < 5)	172,930	23,732	7,166	1,857,260	2,061,088	51%	100 0 0%
Protection	1,966,555	695,188	105,020	507,709	3,274,472	55%	60 33 7%
Water & Sanitation	2,015,619	347,825	105,020	679,361	3,147,825	55%	60 33 7%

Source: UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) 2016.

The 2016 Humanitarian Needs Overview as presented in table II estimated that there were more than 3.1 million persons affected by the crisis, including about 2 million registered IDPs living in various camps in Sudan. Recognizing that over the last decade, some IDPs had managed to re-establish their lives, the humanitarian community had attempted to better identify the most vulnerable IDPs. Needs assessments were therefore focused on identifying specific vulnerabilities, rather than assuming that all IDPs were automatically in need of the same thing because they were displaced. For the purpose of estimating the number of IDPs in need of any given humanitarian assistance, the approach had been to prioritize access to basic public services, rather than merely prioritizing displaced people living in camps and settlements. At a World Food Programme (WFP)-led comprehensive household-level economic census that took place in Sudan in 2017, it was estimated that at the *end of 2016 there were about 2.2 million IDPs in need of humanitarian assistance in Sudan. In sum, the tables presented in this chapter reflected the “IDPs in need” rather than the total population of IDPs in Sudan.








Firstly, with regards to IDPs, small and large scale displacements had taken place for over a decade in Sudan. Population movements were fluid and complex, with people being displaced for a few days, weeks, or months and then returning to their homes after a long time, while others settled permanently in new areas. The reality on ground was even more complex among long-term displaced people as many of them returned seasonally to their former places of residence.

Secondly, for the vulnerable resident population, shown in table II, different benchmarks were used. Although food insecurity was widespread across Sudan, only those people who fell within the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) categories 3 (Crisis) and 4 (Emergency) were regarded as been in need of Food Security and household items. Accordingly, 4.6 million foods insecure people, including IDPs and refugees, were thus considered to be in need of humanitarian aid.

Thirdly, 2 million children under the age of five (5) years suffering from malnutrition were considered under the 2016 humanitarian estimate to be in dire need of humanitarian aid. Although malnutrition in Sudan was said to be primarily driven by the crisis and required a multi-sectoral response, that of children under the age of 5 was considered a life-threatening condition. Under the Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) levels, children’s malnutrition in Sudan within the period under review had surpassed internationally accepted threshold.

Fourthly, all refugees were also considered to be in need of humanitarian assistance under the 2016 humanitarian overview presented in table II. While their types of needs varied widely, the fact that they had crossed an international border to seek assistance translated into an immediate need for legal protection at least, and possibly material assistance. Whether they were in an emergency situation or not, all refugees and asylum seekers in Sudan were thus considered in this overview as having some urgent humanitarian needs.

Table III: Humanitarian Needs in Sudan for 2017








	BY STATUS					BY SEX & AGE*	
	IDPs	Refugees	Returnees	Residents	Total	% female	% children, adult, older people ¹
 Education	948,141	121,839	85,758	548,257*	1,703,995	50%	100 0 0%
 Shelter & household items	932,326	341,062	209,231	0	1,482,619	60%	60 33 7%
 Food Security & Livelihoods	1,618,777	341,062	156,923	1,473,258	3,590,020	51%	40 55 5%
 Health	2,312,539	341,062	209,231	1,400,000	4,262,832	51%	53 42 5%
 Nutrition (Children < 5)	220,210	63,732	61,728	1,904,540	2,250,210	51%	100 0 0%
 Protection	1,618,777	793,738	209,231	612,156	3,233,902	55%	60 33 7%
 Water & Sanitation	2,162,769	341,062	209,231	828,000	3,541,062	51%	60 33 7%

Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) 2017

The total number of people estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance in 2017 according to UNOCHA was 4.2 million, a reduction of 1 million compared to 2016. This was attributed to improvement in food security which had been severely affected by El Nino and other factors in 2015. Despite this improvement, the number of IDPs and refugees in dire need of water and health services still remained high giving an indication that the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees were at the risk of exposure to outbreak of epidemic which could transcend the borders of Sudan. Moreover, it was also a confirmation that the United Nations Security Council was yet to create the desired impact in the lives of the people. Rather than reducing, the number of IDPs in need of education increased from 925,073 in 2016, to 948,141 in 2017. This was an indication that more children and youths within school ages were affected by the crisis. However, the significant improvement in food security and

livelihood of the people recorded in 2017 reduced the total number of people in need of food and livelihood from four million, six hundred and twenty-six thousand, two hundred and fifty-three (4,626,253) in 2016 estimate to three million, five hundred and ninety thousand, twenty people in 2017 estimate. The improvement in food security and livelihood of the people also resulted in an increase in the reproductive functions of the people. This was reflected in the increase in number of children within the age of 5 years in need of nutrition from two million, sixty-one thousand, eighty-eight children in 2016 estimate to two million, two hundred and fifty thousand, two hundred and ten children in 2017. By this estimate, the number of children under five years in need of nutrition increased by one hundred and eighty-nine thousand, one hundred and twenty-two (189,122) reflecting insufficient the funding of the basic needs of the people by the UNSC humanitarian intervention

Table IV: Humanitarian Needs in Sudan for 2018


	BY STATUS				Total	BY SEX & AGE	
	IDPs*	Refugees**	Returnees*	Residents		% female	% children, adult, older people ¹
 Education	818,779	481,240	158,360	240,081	1,698,480	50%	100 0 0%
 Shelter & household items	539,196	710,244	300,000	-	1,549,440	55%	60 33 7%
 Food Security & Livelihoods	1,880,034	775,669	212,626	1,951,881	4,820,201	51%	40 55 5%
 Health	1,997,022	906,075	300,000	2,040,000	5,243,097	51%	17 78 5%
 Nutrition (Children < 5)	339,206	178,058	17,751	2,253,051	2,788,066	51%	65 32 3%
 Protection	1,560,903	1,203,100	301,181	786,115	3,851,299	55%	60 33 7%
 Water & Sanitation	1,887,376	636,654	252,017	1,585,836	4,407,627	51%	60 33 7%

Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) 2018

The total number of people estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance in 2018 as presented in table IV above was over 4.4 million, an increase of 0.7 million compared to 2017. The increase in needs was said to be due to: Access to areas opened up in Jebel Marra, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, in line with the framework of the revised directives on humanitarian action published by the Sudanese Government's Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC) in December 2016. While agricultural production improved in 2017, food insecurity needs increment was mainly driven by increase in prices. Without an increase in income, a larger proportion of IDPs still found themselves with very limited economic access to food. The Acute Watery Diarrhoea (AWD) outbreak that started in 2016 was reported to have continued throughout 2017 due to lack of financial resources to manage the crisis.

The pattern of needs preference in Sudan in table IV above reflected the impact of the conflict on the people especially the thousands of people in protracted displacement. Table IV also showed an increase in the number of vulnerable refugees and asylum seekers as well as some host communities in need of humanitarian assistance, particularly access to education, shelter, food and other humanitarian aids. The humanitarian consequences of violence and livelihood loss were seen in the high levels of food insecurity, low levels of access to potable water, lack of access to livelihood opportunities, and increasing need for protection. Under table V, natural hazards exacerbated food insecurity and acute malnutrition, especially in Darfur and other conflict affected parts of the country. The extent of humanitarian needs depended on the concentration of victims of the humanitarian crisis in need across different sectors in a given area.

Table V: Targeted Population for Humanitarian Assistance



Source: United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2016)

Given the severity of the humanitarian catastrophe in Sudan and the number of victims in need of humanitarian assistance, the amount voted for the intervention was grossly inadequate. Table V above indicates that only \$972 million was budgeted to fund the needs of four million, six hundred thousand victims of the humanitarian catastrophe in 2016. Out of the targeted population, 57% were children between 1-18 years, adults between 18-59 years constituted 37% while 6% represented people between 59 years and above of the targeted population.


An analysis of the estimate indicated that fifty-six million dollars was budgeted to cushion the impact of El Niño; eighty-seven million dollars was estimated to check malnutrition while the welfare of internally displaced persons was targeted at five hundred and eighty-one million dollars.

The implementation of this estimate as presented in table V indicated that a total of three million, five hundred health workers were trained while three million out patients were given medical attention for various health challenges.

Similarly, fifty-four million, five hundred thousand new IDP families received emergency shelter and non-food items in addition to two million four hundred thousand of the IDPs in Darfur who benefitted from general and seasonal food distributions. According to the table, a total of two hundred and sixty-seven children under five years of age as well as pregnant and lactating women across Sudan had access to treatment for Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM) while nine hundred and fifty children only under the age of five received Vitamin A supplement.

Table VI: Sectoral Funding of Sudan Humanitarian Needs

Table VII: Sectoral Funding of Sudan Humanitarian Needs



Source: United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2016)

The implication of this sectoral allocation the UNSC humanitarian intervention is that some critical sectors of the humanitarian intervention programme suffered severe setback due to lack of funds thereby contributing to the inability of the Mission to deliver on its mandate in Sudan. For instance, the table above showed that only \$566.8 million representing 58.3% of the budget required for funding of the humanitarian intervention in Sudan was provided in 2016. Some key sectors of the programme like Logistics, Emergency and Telecommunications (LET); Recovery, Returns and Reintegration, (RRR); as well as Emergency Shelter/Non-

Food Items (ES/NF) just to mention a few constituted very negligible percentage of the budget.

The negligence or paltry budgetary allocation to these key sectors was an indication of the extent to which lack of funds negatively affected the performance of the Mission in Sudan. For instance, it could have been very difficult to fulfill the mandate of UNAMIS without making adequate arrangement for Recovery, Returns and Reintegration of victims of the humanitarian crisis and even the ethnic militias who carried out the rebellion. As indicated in table vi, these key sectors were either neglected or poorly budgeted for.

Table VII: Annual Cumulative Funding of SHF (Excluding USA)

S/N	COUNTERS/DONORS/PARTNERS	2006 \$	2007 \$	2008 \$	2009 \$	2010 \$	2011 \$	2012 \$	2013 \$	2014 \$	2015 \$	2016 \$	2017 \$	2018 \$
1	DEPT for Int'l Development (DFID)	88,556,900	167,648,380	247,171,243	354,040,843	354,040,843	432,295,843	465,765,118	503,004,318	525,351,270	542,651,170	562,284,470	583,142,920	606,462,320
2	Government of Netherlands	51,330,000	88,367,000	114,043,054	137,866,583	148,076,368	162,451,368	167,451,368	169,701,368	172,856,118	175,074,852	181,899,852	181,899,852	181,899,852
3	Swedish Int'l Dev. Cooperation	15,796,000	35,771,767	56,453,050	71,195,150	85,103,150	113,481,950	128,588,550	143,104,899	153,664,399	160,000,674	169,324,506	177,030,426	184,070,412
4	Government of Norway	14,162,925	31,674,368	48,708,853	64,723,845	84,804,498	107,827,662	118,563,035	128,891,302	138,752,721	145,375,152	147,780,154	149,034,812	150,269,533
5	Irish Aid	2,541,600	6,476,700	12,796,700	16,790,100	21,822,971	25,837,001	28,752,901	31,968,971	35,180,821	37,893,691	41,172,661	44,659,747	44,659,747

6	Ag. Espanola De Cooperation Int.	-	9,510,800	9,510,800	18,196,440	35,329,140	44,679,390	44,679,390	44,679,390	44,679,390	44,679,390	44,679,390	44,679,390	44,679,390
7	Government of Denmark	-	-	392,434	392,434	5,271,911	8,227,661	14,938,689	18,514,587	20,383,187	25,654,862	28,551,649	30,919,278	34,957,397
8	Australian Agency for Int'l Development	-	-	-	-	-	4,062,400	6,184,000	6,184,000	6,184,000	6,184,000	6,184,000	6,184,000	6,184,000
9	Government of Spain	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,883,100	3,833,100	3,833,100	3,833,100	3,833,100	3,833,100	3,833,100
10	Government of Switzerland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,087,687	2,135,466	2,631,694	3,797,877	4,792,209
11	Government of Germany	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,091,600	2,214,500	3,296,600	7,853,800
12	Government of Republic of Korea	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	700,000	700,000
13	UN Foundation/UN Partnership Office	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,491
14	Government of Ireland,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,635,376

Source: United Nations Development Group (2019)

Online Address: [mptf.undp.org>factsheet>fund>HSD20](https://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/HSD20)

The annual cumulative funding of Sudan Humanitarian Funds (SHF) by donor countries and agencies as presented in table VII above clearly highlighted the funding problem of UNAMIS. Five out of the fourteen donors had, for some years, not contributed any additional fund to the Mission in Sudan. Espanola De Cooperation International made her last donation to SHF in 2011; the Australian Agency for International Development and the Government of Spain made their last donations to the SHF in 2012 while Netherlands and Norway last donated in 2016. Some of the donors of the Sudan humanitarian funds joined the scheme lately. Ireland, for instance, joined in 2018, Korea, 2017, Germany, 2015 while Switzerland joined in 2014. Though these late entrants helped to sustain the fund, but their entries could not redeem the monumental loss suffered by both UNAMIS and the people of Sudan due to poor funding of the UNSC humanitarian intervention since the inception of the crisis and did not really make any difference in the performance of UNAMIS.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The study established that poor funding had negatively affected the operation of the Mission in Sudan. This had also affected the number and quality of equipment, personnel and allowances needed for the operation. While the humanitarian challenges were increasing on daily basis, the funding of the Mission was rather dwindling at almost the same ratio and sabotaged by different interest groups.

Based on the findings of this study, it is hereby recommended that:

- i. The United Nations Security Council should mobilize other members of the international community to contribute meaningfully to the humanitarian intervention in Sudan.
- ii. Effort should also be made to ensure that funds are disbursed based on approved budgetary provisions.

- iii. Funds should be provided for replacement of obsolete weapons and other facilities used in the humanitarian intervention for effective service delivery. Apart from funding the humanitarian intervention, the UNSC should adopt necessary measures to ensure that the root causes of the crisis, which bothered on control of resources and marginalization of some sections of the country in sharing of political offices, are addressed by the Sudanese government for peace to reign.
- iv. The UNSC should liaise with other members of the international community to invest in employment yielding ventures so that job opportunities can be created for the teaming youths.

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