Civil-Military Cooperation of African Mission in Somalia as Tool of Peace-building in Kismayo District, Lower Jubbaland, Somalia (2011-2020)

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Abstract: **The conflict in Somalia presents a typical example of crisis where sometimes the international response is at odd with the wishes of local administration and community. Whereas debate on the most appropriate and sustainable approach to resolving complex conflict like the one in Somalia continues, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) has emerged as a key determinant of successful peacekeeping operation. Whereas the scope of activities under the rubric of CIMIC is this article analyzed SSR carried out by AMISOM troops in Kismayo District of Somalia from year 2011 to 2020 as a thematic area of security enhancement. The study was anchored on liberal peacebuilding, state building and democratization theories. The target population of the study included residents of Kismayo district entailing community leaders, humanitarian workers, civil society, Jubbaland Security Forces (JSF) and AMISOM troops operating in the district. Onwuegbuzie and Collins (2007) typology of determining sample size in social science research was used to arrive at a sample size of 200 respondents. Primary data was collected using semi-structured questionnaires, interviews guide and Focused Group Discussions guide. Secondary data was sourced from published books, e-books, journals, reports, newsletters and conference papers. Collected data was grouped, corroborated, and presented using both quantitative and the qualitative research techniques in themes corresponding the objectives of the study. The study found out that 97% of Kismayo residents felt that AMISOM CIMIC program had reduced conflicts in the district, 83% felt that the security sector was effective in ensuring security and safety of the population. The study also found that demobilization, disarmament and reintegration CIMIC program had reduced chances of violent clashes in Kismayo by 89% chance. Al-Shabaab terror gang continued to threaten the peace efforts in Kismayo. The study recommends that more donor funding be channeled to Federal Governments of Somalia so that they develop strong security sector capable of defeating peace spoilers such as Al-Shabaab.**

Key Words: **Peace Support Operations (PSO), Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Security Sector Reforms (SSR), African Mission in Somalia, Peace Building.**

I. INTRODUCTION

United Nation (UN) peacekeeping concept came to inception at the onset of cold war when rivalry between Eastern bloc of countries led by Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Western bloc led by United States of America (USA) increased and often paralyzed the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decisions (Sunil, 2018). The concept was to have a neutral force intervening in resolving international conflicts rather than having the two superpowers directly intervening which could have led to a cataclysmic escalation of armed conflicts. The first-generation interventions also known as traditional peacekeeping took place during cold war era, where con

flicts were mainly interstate. UN deployed of lightly armed military contingents to create a buffer zone between the conflicting states. The mandate of these peacekeeping missions was monitoring and reporting violations to the peace agreement (Sunil, 2018).

The second generation of United Nations Peacekeepers Operations (UNPKO) came after the collapse of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The post-cold war era conflicts assumed a radical shift from interstate to intrastate conflicts driven by structural factors in a state. Conflicts were mostly pitching on ethnic group against another or state actors against non-state actors. This kind of conflicts attracted multi-functional Peace Support Operations (PSO) (Sunil, 2018).

The third and current generation peacekeeping emerged to deal with complex emergencies with additional challenges of containing organized and more militant adept groups who opposed peacekeepers and humanitarian agencies in doing their work (Huntington, 1993). Resurgence of Muslim fundamentalism created terror groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab who are increasingly taking advantage of existing conflicts to advance their agenda. The adoption of Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is one of such strategies available for peacekeeping contingents.

The purpose of CIMIC is to win the hearts and minds of the local community to support the peacekeepers to accomplish their mission. CIMIC concept was first employed in Bosnia-Herzegovina by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peacekeeping forces (Hans-Jürgen, 2012). NATO forces realized that they were increasingly depending on local populations for provision of resources, securing their freedom of movement and provision of mission critical information (Pugh, 2001).

Military personnel were tasked to manage CIMIC interface which faced a lot of cooperation challenges. In Kosovo, CIMIC was used as a tool to address a myriad of assigned civilian responsibilities and coordination tasks. UN CIMIC has liaison, support and conflict de-escalation lines of activities. CIMIC strategy has been employed by UN to address emerging complexities in Haiti, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Central Africa, Sudan and South Sudan. From this case studies CIMIC has readily been accepted as a means and end to facilitate execution of peacekeeping mandated tasks.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

State Building Theory

The end of cold war exposed a strong relationship between the stability of a nation and the method that was used in building that state. Explosion of conflicts in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Somalia and Iraq showed that the very way a state is built can be a source of conflict. It was clear also that conflict led to state underdevelopment. Contemporary proponent of state building such as Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) and Fukuyama (2004) are in agreement that states fail because of man-made political and economic institutions and not weather or geography. State-building is the establishment of a centralized administrative power, it is concerned with activities to create functional state institutions (OECD, 2008). Peacebuilding on the other hand are activities needed to create the social foundations for a durable peace. State-building theory is relevant to UN peacekeeping operations since peace-related operations such as establishment of governance, the rule of law, security sector reforms (SSR), rebuilding damaged economy and physical infrastructure, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and the protection of civilians reinforce efforts for state-building. Cohen, Brown & Organski (1981) argue that the more power is centralized the more a state becomes effective in conducting military operations. This creates a dilemma for peacebuilders because it increases propensity of such state to wage war with another state. Shinoda (2003) argue that state building is only peacebuilding when the government is strengthened but constrained by the social belief in the rule of law. According to Zoe (2007), most scholars agree that state-building is the interventionist strategies to restore institutions and apparatus of a failed state. Hippler (2004) argue that peacekeepers need to know the intricacies of state-building as they can make this process easier or harder. Fukuyama (2004) emphasizes the primacy of good governance to state building. By assisting democratization which breeds good governance, peacekeepers play a critical role in state building. The 9/11 terror attack in the USA exposed the threat posed to the wealthy state emanating from underdeveloped fragile states. Such states who have huge influence in the United Nations shaping policies made UN peacekeeping mandates more inclined to state building. This theory is relevant to this study since peacebuilding activities that peace actors engage in are aimed at rebuilding a failed state.

Statement of the Problem

Armed conflict has been a common phenomenon in Somalia since the fall of President Mohammed Siad Barre in 1991. International interventions and peace initiatives have brought little tangible gains in restoring peace. Insecurity in Somalia has created an ungoverned territory where global terror groups have taken advantage to establish themselves. Initial interventions sought to create conditions that would facilitate delivery of humanitarian relief. This did not materialize as expected. African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) was authorized by African Peace and Security Council and it was deployed in 2007. There was a hostile reception for AMISOM troops especially by Al-Shabaab. Due to this resistance AMISOM troops remained confined in the precincts of Mogadishu airport for quite some time. Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) intervened in Somalia in October 2011 to pursue Al-Shabaab who had encroached into Kenya. KDF operation gained success against Al-Shabaab group in Jubbaland. KDF later joined AMISOM in 2012.

With the re-hatting into AMISOM, KDF troops embarked on the pacification of the liberated areas and in doing so, CIMIC became a critical tool used in executing Peace-building projects within their deployment jurisdiction. AMISOM uses UN's doctrine which is underpinned on Western models of social, political, and economic organization. States such as Somalia who have some elements of Islamic fundamentalism are not receptive to these Western models which they perceive as intrusion to their way of life. It is therefore important that input from the local population be considered in the construction of peace. However due to AMISOM's lack of a localized CIMIC partnerships framework and working models between peace support actors and local community, local population's input in peace building projects is subsumed, sidelined or ignored.

The lack of a comprehensive framework for the conduct of CIMIC leads to situation where some actors develop peace projects that are not conflict sensitive thus exacerbating the situation. In correcting the prior flaws, iron out internal divisions among partner states and ensure wider participation and Somalia ownership of the peace process, AMISOM embarked on CIMIC seen as critical tool for winning local population's hearts, minds and countering peace process spoilers (Zaalberg, 2006). This not only leads to wastage of scarce resources but prolongs the peace process making the world unsafe. Thus, the need to assess Security Sector Reforms (SSR) under the auspices of AMISOM CIMIC framework in Kismayo District, lower Jubbaland Federal State of Somalia from year 2011 to 2020.

Aim of the Study

The major purpose of this study was to explore the conduct of AMISOM CIMIC programs and their contributions to the peacebuilding in Kismayo District in lower Jubbaland Federal state of Somalia between 2011-2020.

Research Question

How has SSR peacebuilding program been conducted by AMISOM forces in Kismayo District, lower Jubbaland State of Somalia from the year 2011 to 2020?

Specific Objective

To explore the application of SSR as a tool for peacebuilding by AMISOM forces in Kismayo District of lower Jubbaland, Somalia, 2011-2020.

III. RESEARCH METHODS

This study used two types of research designs. First, the study utilized several case studies of CIMIC lessons learnt from other war-torn areas like the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, Liberia, Sierra Leone to provide the study with normative criterion of carrying out CIMIC activities. The study also used descriptive survey design. This study sought to describe activities undertaken under the rubric of CIMIC activities in Kismayo District, Southern Jubbaland State in Somalia. It also helped in describing the extent of community participation and their attitudes (Mugenda & Mugenda, 1999). A combination of these two study designs was best suited to achieve the objectives of this study. The study location was Kismayo District of South Jubbaland, Somalia. The state of Jubbaland in Somalia is located on the Southeastern part of Somalia neighboring Kenya to the Southwest and Ethiopia to the Northeast. It is divided into Gedo region, middle Jubba and lower Juba. This is the most significant state in Somalia as it has fertile soils along the Juba valley where most of agricultural production in the country takes place. Consequently, this state holds majority of Somalia population estimated at 2.5 million. Kismayo district is strategic in this state.

Kismayo coastal city serves as the headquarters for Lower Juba Province. It has a seaport, an airport and is connected to Mogadishu via a paved road. The target population of this study included: Members of the local community, clan and community leaders, humanitarian aid workers and members of the civil society members of the Jubbaland Security Forces (JSF) and AMISOM troops who have been deployed in AMISOM duties in Somalia from the year 2011 to 2020. The study utilized both probability and non-probability sampling techniques. In the probability methods, the study applied stratified sampling techniques where strata were subgroups of the target population which included two main categories: the civilians and security agencies. The specific sub-groups of citizens had the following: Members of the local community, clan and community leaders, aid workers and members of the civil society. Security agencies' strata was composed of JSF members and AMISOM troops. Purposive sampling was used to identify key informants among these categories. Random sampling was used in seeking views of the local community on the success and role of the AMISOM CIMIC programs.

Thus, the study interviewed three key informants in each category. In data collection procedure, Onwuegbuzie &

Collins, (2007) assert that 12 participants are sufficient for interviews, while 3-6 participants are sufficient for Focused Group discussions. The study utilized both probability and non-probability sampling techniques. In the probability methods, the study applied stratified sampling techniques where strata were subgroups of the target population which included two main categories: the civilians and security agencies (see table 1). The specific sub-groups of citizens had the following: Members of the local community, clan and community leaders, aid workers and members of the civil society. Security agencies' strata was composed of Jubbaland Security Forces (JSF) members and AMISOM troops. Purposive sampling was used to identify key informants among these categories. Random sampling was used in seeking views of the local community on the success and role of the AMISOM CIMIC programs.

Table 1: Study Sample

Strata	Sub-group	Percentage	No. of participants
Civilians	Members of the Community	30	60
	Clan and Community elders	15	30
	Humanitarian Aid Workers	10	20
	Civil Society	15	30
Security Agencies	AMISOM/KDF troops	15	30
	Members of JSF	15	30
Total		100	200

This study employed a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods. Primary data was collected using unstructured and semi-structured questionnaires, interviews and Focused Group Discussions. Questionnaires were administered to respondents who were purposively chosen based on their literate skills. Oral interviews were used to gather data from semi-illiterate and illiterate informants and those who could not be accessed physically. Key informant interviews were also used to gather data from clan elders, civil society, humanitarian aid workers, elements of AMISOM troops' command structure and CIMIC officers. Focused Group Discussion was also employed for collecting data from homogeneous groups like residents of Kismayo, members of JSF and KDF.

Collected data was transcribed, grouped and collated in themes before qualitative analysis. The collected data was examined in the following typologies corresponding the objectives of the study: to explore CIMIC programs conducted by AMISOM forces, to examine the types of partnerships used by peace actors in executing CIMIC programs and to assess the outcomes of the AMISOM CIMIC programs in fostering peacebuilding in Kismayo District of South Jubbaland, Somalia, 2011-2020. Data collected was analyzed in three analytical frameworks. These include theoretical reflections, documentary reviews, and content analysis. Content analysis was employed in analyzing

qualitative data whereas descriptive statistics were employed in analyzing quantitative data.

<h2 style="text-align:center">IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS</h2>

AMISOM CIMIC Security Sector Reforms (SSR) in Kismayo District, Somalia

Post conflict situations cannot be truly overcome until security sector reform is achieved (Hänggi, 2005). This study sought to evaluate the status of the Security Sector Reforms (SSR) that have been implemented by the Jubbaland Administration under the mentorship of AMISOM and other stakeholders. To achieve this, redacted tool developed by Simon and Duncan (2009)was used. The tool employs nine (9) criteria of evaluation: Relevance or Appropriateness, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact, Sustainability and ownership, Coherence, Coordination or linkages and Consistency with values of SSR program (Simon & Hiscock, 2017). A questionnaire with structured and unstructured questions was administered to collect data from respondents. The finding was as follows:

SSR Relevance/ Appropriateness

To evaluate appropriateness and relevance of SSR program, respondents were asked if the SSR was technically adequate solution to the security and justice problems facing the population in Kismayo. The results are as shown in Fig 1.

Figure 1: SSR adequacy as a solution to the security and justice problem

Source: Field work, 2021

In Fig 1 above, 68% of the surveyed participants agreed that the SSR was technically adequate solution to the security and justice problems facing the people of Kismayo. This finding is corroborated the position that a capable intelligence and security capacity in Kismayo have limited criminality and the penetration of Al-Shabaab, enabling reforms in the justice sector to take place (Majid & Abdirahman, 2021). This is an indication that under the mentorship of AMISOM and other stakeholders, the Jubbaland security forces were acquiring right technical skills that enabled them to fulfill the security needs of the people. A follow-on question was posed to participants to say if SSR was accepted by different groups, particularly the poor and vulnerable. The results are as shown in Fig 2.

Figure 2 SSR acceptability by different groups

Source: Field work, 2021

In Fig 2 above, 81 % of the respondents agreed that SSR was accepted by different groups, particularly the poor and vulnerable. Further, 90% of the population in Kismayo supported Jubbaland Administration (Crouch & Chevreau, 2016). To achieve such a high approval by the people, it means that the SSR had gained community ownership which implies that this program will be sustainable even after AMISOM withdraws from Somalia. The participants in the study were further asked if the SSR was in tune with the policies of international partners in the areas of development, security and peacebuilding. The results are as presented in Fig 3 below. Survey respondents were further asked if the SSR was in tune with the policies of international partners in the areas of development, security and peacebuilding. The results are as presented in Fig 3 below.

Figure 3: SSR alignment with the policies of international counterparts

Source: Field work, 2021

From Fig 3 above, the finding showed that 77.80% of the respondents agreed that the program was aligned with the policies of international counterparts. An interview with AMISOM Police Commissioner explained the role of AMISOM police in support for election by stating that,

> AMISOM has been supporting the Somalia Police Force (SPF) to provide security during elections. We have been by their side, guiding and advising them. They have the key role to police the elections so that the process is credible(A. Kailie.Personal interview. Mogadishu, February 24,2021).

During a focus group discussion, AMISOM Contingent Commanders confirmed this finding by asserting that they were monitoring the actions of the security officers that they had trained and operated along to ensure that they observe human rights when executing their duties. From these statements, it was clear that AMISOM is hands-on to ensure that JSF work within the stipulated international laws as obligated by United Nations Policy on Human Rights Due Diligence (HRDD) where a deployed peacekeepers contingent is required to ensure that the local forces operating under them observe human rights. When asked what considerations they had for long-term capacity-building of JSF, AMISOM sector six commanders explained this,

> AMISON has a Transition Plan that would enable Somalia Security Organs gradually assume responsibility for security. The plan includes gradual transfer of responsibilities from AMISOM to Somalia forces. It also covers those parts of the country where AMISOM has never had a presence but where security institutions and capacity need to be built. Previously, JSF could not hold defensive positions without support from AMISOM but now they can do so. The goal for this plan is to progressively transfer security ownership of key towns, roads and national infrastructure to Somalia security agents, enabling them take lead in operations as AMISOM scales back its presence. (Brig Gen. P Njema. Personal interview. Kismayo. January 23, 2021).

This statement shows clearly that AMISOM was committed to long term capacity building of the Jubbaland security sector to facilitate them take over responsibility of managing the security function in Somalia. Overall, the study found that the SRR program was relevant for JSF as they were preparing to assume the management of security function in Jubbaland by the end of year 2022 when AMISOM drawdown from Somalia. To evaluate effectiveness of the SSR, respondents were asked if its area of coverage matched the intended outputs, purpose and goal. The results are as presented in Fig 4 below.

Figure 4: SSR marching with intended outputs purpose and goal

Source: Field work, 2021

According to the findings presented in Fig 4 above, 83% respondents said that SSR coverage matched the intended outputs, purpose and goal. This was in line with the sentiments expressed by clan elders from Abdale Birole during an interview by asserting that, since the Jubbaland battalion was deployed in the area, their wealth in livestock had increased. He said that before the deployment, Al-Shabaab used to raid them at will, kill them, rape women, kidnap youth and drive away their camel, goats and cattle.

During another interview one AMISOM contingent commanders averred that,

> Jubbaland intelligence service has provided the Security Forces a capability for penetrating Al-Shabaab. Through cooperation with the local population, they have been able to detect Al-Shabaab agents before they commence any harmful act within the district (Major K Onyango. Personal interview. Kismayo, January 23, 2021)

Intelligence and security in Kismayo had acquired capacity to limit criminality in the area (Majid & Abdirahman, 2021). From these sentiments, it can be deduced that the SSR program was effective in enhancing peace building initiatives. A follow-on question asked respondents what extent were observed changes the result of the SSR rather than other factors. Their responses are as presented in Fig 5 below. A follow-on question asked respondents what extent were observed changes the result of the SSR rather than other factors. Their responses are as presented in Fig 5 below

Figure 5: Extent to which SSR is attributed to changes in security sector

Source: Field work, 2021

From Fig 5 above, 96% of the respondents attributed changes experienced in Jubbaland security sector to SSR program. Further, good security in Kismayo is mainly attributed to the effectiveness of the Jubbaland State's security sector (Menkhaus, 2006). Where the SSR did not deliver on its objectives, respondents were asked to explain why. The responses are as presented in Fig 6 below.

Figure 6: Reasons for SSR failure to deliver on its objectives

Source: Research Data (2021)

From the findings presented in Fig 6 above, clan dynamics contributed 50% of the failures of SSR to meeting its objective. The finding is corroborating the fact that majoritarian clan identity plays the biggest role in influencing Somalia's government employment of the monopoly of violence (Abdeta, 2020). It has been reported that Clannism was a key driver of political problems in Jubbaland and beyond. 30% of the respondents said that lack of ideal security system contributed to SSR failure (Crouch & Chevreau, 2016). This can be attributed the fact that JSF security agencies are at their formative stage. The institution is yet to mature and hone operation procedures and processes. The training that JSF receives from different stakeholders also creates confusion because of differences in doctrine.

It can also be seen that the SSR had substantive political will. Only 1% of the failures of the program was attributed by lack of political will. This can be attributed to the fact that the security agents had full support from the political class since majority were recruited from friendly clans that are trusted by the Jubbaland regime. Participants were asked what can be done to make the SSR more effective. They responded as presented in Fig 7 below


Figure 7: Making SSR more effective

Source: Research Data (2021)

From the data presented in Fig 7 above, 60% of the respondents were emphatic that SSR could be more effective with good security sector governance. The finding is in line with the position that security sector should be subject to the same standards of efficiency, equity and accountability as any other service (Annan, 1999). UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) developed the principles of good governance. For security sector to be effective it should ensure equal participation of all the constituents of a community.

It should ensure that the rule of law is enforced impartially while fully protecting human rights, especially the minorities. The decisions taken and their enforcement should follow rules and regulations. All stakeholders should be given equal service within a reasonable time frame. Consensus should be sought while serving different interests in society. All members of the community must feel that they have a stake in it through equity and inclusiveness during recruitment. It should produce results that meet the needs of society while making the best use of resources. Finally, it should be accountable to the people it serves.

SSR Efficiency

To evaluate efficiency of the SSR program, respondents were asked to give their opinions as to whether the program was managed with reasonable regard for efficiency. They were also asked to say if the program was economically worth. The results are as presented in Fig 8 & Fig 9.


Figure 8: SSR efficiency

Source: Research Data (2021)

From Fig 8, 80% of the respondents said that the SSR program was efficient while 20% said it was not efficient. The respondents highlighted that JSF could deliver security professionally, at a reasonable cost, and in a way that helps to ensure the rule of law. This is the criteria set by DCAF (Simon & Hiscock, 2017). Information from a key informant indicated that JSF strength stood at 5000 soldiers, 1500 policemen, and 100 prison officers. This is a relatively small force charged to man a vast area, which they had done with relative success. With these facts, it can be concluded that the program was being run efficiently.

Figure 9: SSR economic worthiness

Source: Research Data (2021)

Analysis from Fig 9 above shows that 75% believed the SSR program was economically worth. 25% said it didn't have any economic value. Respondents looked at the economic aspect of SSR from effect it had brought to their day-to-day undertakings. During an interview, clan elders from Abdale Birole asserted that:

The security deployment in their area had seen them increase their livestock wealth. Prior to AMISOM capturing Kismayo, there was no civil police in the district. Businessmen explained how their businesses had collapsed due to frequent raids by khat chewing militias who controlled the town, there was no rule of law. The strong were stealing from us and we could do nothing to them(Mr. A Gabobe .Personal interview. Kismayo, January 23, 2021)

Reflecting on these sentiments and the security situation at the time of this study, it can be concluded that the tranquility brought about by the professionalization of JSF had created a conducive environment that had enabled the population to rebuild their economic activities.

SSR Impact

To evaluate SSR impact, respondents were asked to give their views on varied statements. Where (1= strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4= Agree, 5=strongly agree). The results are as presented in Table 1 below.

Table 2: SSR Impact

N=136	1	2	3	4	5
SSR have affected well-being of people, institutions, groups and stakeholders	2 (1.47%)	7 (5.15%)	12 (8.82%)	50 (36.76%)	64 (47.05%)
SSR has contributed to the strengthening capacity and accountability of institutions	4 (2.94%)	6 (4.41%)	14 (10.29%)	73 (53.68%)	39 (28.68%)
SSR has led to the development and improvement of security policies	2 (1.47%)	10 (7.35%)	58 (42.62%)	50 (36.76%)	10 (7.35%)
Tremendous insecurity would have occurred without the SSR	3 (2.21%)	16 (11.76%)	17 (12.50%)	90 (66.18%)	10 (7.35%)

Source: Field work, 2021

According to Table 1, 47.05% of the respondents strongly agreed and 36.76% agreed that JSF SSR had positively affected well-being of people, institutions, groups, and stakeholders. 8.82% were neutral and 6.63% disagreed. Positive impact of individuals is reflected on survey respondent's sentiments during interviews. When asked to comment about SSR training he attended one JSF respondent said,

The SSR training would enable the troops to improve the conduct of military operations. We will share the knowledge and experiences shared with our colleagues who did not benefit from the training (Lt A Adhan .Personal interview. Kismayo, January 23, 2021)

During an interview, one community elder explained, that the police are helping them in dealing with criminal elements. Whenever such characters are detected amongst them, they call the police who arrest them. During focus group discussion correction Officers in Kismayo prison said, they got their training in Mogadishu AMISOM camp. They said they were now 100 Officers in Kismayu prison administering 500 prisoners. Special Representative of the African Union for Somalia reported to the Peace and security Commission in 2020 as follows.

AMISOM will continue to support the government in its efforts to build up the capacity of the Somali National Security Forces and to rid the country of the Al-Shabaab menace(Amb. F Madeira. Personal communication.November 23 2021)

He added that with AMISOM's support, the Somali national forces have pushed the Al-Shabaab out most major urban centers in southern Somalia, including the capital Mogadishu and the port cities of Marka and Kismayo, as well as many other towns and centers, creating "the best chance Somalia has had in a generation to achieve a lasting peace and to establish legitimate and representative institutions." It has been noted that Federal States' security institutions increased professional capacity to exercise oversight and deliver security services in accordance with their mandates and in compliance with human rights standards (UNDP, 2020). From these sentiments, it can be concluded that JSF SSR have positive impact to individual's practitioners in the form of

increasing their professionalism. Security sector institutions have also grown out of this professionalism.

Before, deployment of AMISOM, there was no prisons. Criminals who were caught were executed summarily without any trial. To the general population, the peace that was brought about by these security professionals have created a conducive environment for growing their economic activities. When asked if SSR had contributed to the strengthening capacity and accountability of institutions, 82.28% said yes and 7.35% no. Jubbaland Intelligence Agency participating an AMISOM SSR training said,

> The training was helpful. It made me understand my obligations of protecting civilians during conflict, and how to handle captured combatants or those who surrender during counterterrorism operations (Mr F Roble .Personal interview. Kismayo, January 23, 2021)

This indicates that SSR was building both individual and institution's capacity and accountability in executing security mandate. Asked whether SSR had led to the development and improvement of security policies, 42.62% of the respondents were neutral, 8.82% disagree and 7.35% agree. From this finding, is clear that SSR had no tangible impact on the policy front. Asked what the security situation would have been like without SSR, 73.53% said that tremendous insecurity would have occurred,13.97% said that no change to the situation and 12.50% were neutral. This finding indicates that majority of the respondents 73.53% had experience positive impact of the SRR program.

SSR Sustainability and Ownership

To evaluate SSR Sustainability and ownership, respondents were asked to give their views on varied, statements. Where 1= Disagree, 2=Neutral, 4= Agree,). The results are as presented in Table 2.

Table 3: SSR Sustainability and ownership.

N=136	1	2	3
Steps have been taken to create processes, structures and institutions and ownership through which the population can access justice and security over the long term.	7 (5.15%)	10 (7.35%)	119 (87.5%)
Jubbaland SSR has plans to adequately build human as well as institutional capacity for JSF.	5 (3.68%)	6 (4.41%)	125 (91.91%)
Jubbaland SSR is supported by local institutions and well-integrated with local social and cultural conditions.	6(4.41%)	9(6.62%)	117 (82.35%)
AMISOM has a credible exit strategy envisaged or in place.	4 (2.94%)	3 (2.20%)	129 (94.85%)

Source: Field work, 2021

Respondents were asked if JSF SSR had taken steps to create processes, structures, institutions and fostered requisite ownership through which the population can access justice and security over the long term. A majority, 87.5% agreed, 7.35% were neutral and 5.15% disagreed that there was creation of processes, structures and institutions of ownership.

During interviews, sentiments corroborating this finding were captured. AMISOM sector six commanders reported that AMISOM has assisted in training approximately 1500 policemen and rehabilitation of six police posts within Kismayo District. This had entrenched rule of law in the district. Community elders explained that the created police service was helping them in dealing with criminal elements. Whenever such characters are detected amongst them, they called the call the police who arrested them.

The police also said that they were using the community elders to help them vet any suspicious characters. The elders were also helping them during recruitment where they were used in vetting potential recruits. This had reduced cases of recruiting Al-Shabaab sympathizers within the service. The study established that Kismayo prison had been put back to use through the efforts of AMISOM and other stakeholders. 100 prison warders trained, and they were manning approximately 500 prisoners. In a focus group discussion, JSF commanders indicated that three military garrisons had been established. They also indicated that with the help of AMISOM, they had established recruitment procedures for troops. The local elders were being consulted in vetting recruits to ensure that those who joined the forces were not linked to terror groups. They further said that they had procedures in place for administering troops. From these sentiments there is clear indication that the JSF SSR program was creating institutions, processes and procedures.

When answering a question on whether Jubbaland SSR had plans to adequately build human as well as institutional capacity for JSF, 91.91% of the participants agreed, 4.41% were neutral and 3.68% disagreed. This was confirmed by the fact that in all AMISOM forward operating bases, JSF were deployed along those localities. In an interview, AMISOM contingent commanders confirmed that they conducted all their operations together with JSF. This was done to train and mentor them. On whether the SSR was supported by local institutions and well-integrated with local social and cultural conditions, 82.35% agreed, 6.62% were neutral and 4.41% disagreed. Similar findings were reported by Crouch & Chevreau (2016) when they noted that 90% of the population supported the Jubbaland administration. The study noted that most of the security agencies were working hand in hand with the clan elders a fact that demonstrated that the SSR program was integrated with the local culture which predominantly recognize the elders as decision makers.

On the question of if AMISOM had a credible exit strategy envisaged or in place, 94.85% agreed, 2.20% were neutral and 2.94% disagreed. In an interview with AMISOM sector six commanders asserted that,

> AMISON has a Transition Plan that would enable Somalia to gradually assume responsibility for security. The plan includes the gradual transfer of responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali forces. It also covers those parts of the country where AMISOM has never had a presence but where security institutions and capacity need to be built.

Previously, JSF could not hold defensive positions without support from AMISOM but now they can do so. The goal for this plan is to progressively transfer security ownership of key towns, roads and national infrastructure to JSF, enabling them take lead in operations as AMISOM scale back its presence.(Brig Gen. P Njema. Personal interview. Kismayo, January 23, 2021).

These sentiments were in line with African Peace and Security's Somalia transitional plan of 2018 which anticipated that AMISOM exit from Somalia by end of year 2021.

SSR Coherence

To evaluate SSR Coherence, respondents were asked if they were aware of mechanisms put in place for 'whole-of-government' support to SSR. The results are as presented in Fig 10.


Figure 10: SSR coherence

Source: Field work, 2021

According to data presented in Fig 10, 89% of the respondents said that there were mechanisms put in the whole government to support SSR. 11% said the SSR did not have government support. Similar findings were recorded by Safer world (2016), where 68 % of surveyed participants attributed security improvement in 2013 directly to the Jubbaland Administration. The remarkable success of JSF in securing the Kismayo District demonstrates that the security forces are fully supported by the government.

SSR Coordination and Linkages

To evaluate SSR Coordination and linkages, respondents were asked to state whether SSR had forged links with other relevant programs and frameworks, including peace support operations, post-conflict recovery and Peace-building strategies and frameworks, and national development frameworks. The results are as presented in Fig 11


Figure 11: SSR Coordination and linkages.

Source: Field work, 2021

According to Fig 11, 93% of the respondents the SSR had forged links with other relevant programs and frameworks. From the interviews conducted, survey participants particularly AMISOM and JSF demonstrated that they had very close operational links. Other national development frameworks were riding on the stability brought about by the security agencies. It was also noted that security agencies were cooperating with the local population. It was noted that the local elders were critical points that linked the security agencies and the community. Whenever the security agencies wanted to disseminate information to the public, they used community-based organizations such as women groups which afforded a wider reach.

Consistency with the Values

To evaluate SSR Consistency with the values, respondents were asked to give their views on varied, statements. The results are as presented in Table 3

Table 4: SSR Consistency with the values

N=136	Disagree	Agree
SSR promotes norms of good and democratic governance, values respect for human rights and the rule of law.	47(34.56%)	89(65.44%)
SSR is designed and carried out in accordance with basic governance principles of transparency and accountability	57(49.91%)	79(58.09%)
SSR promotes equitable access to justice and security for populations, including the poor and vulnerable	46(33.82%)	90(66.18%)

Source: Field work, 2021

From Table 3 above, 65.44% of respondents agreed that JSF SSR was promoting norms of good and democratic governance values respect for human rights and the rule of law. Similar findings were recorded by UNDP (2020) reports which asserted that Somali federal security institutions had recorded an increase professional capacity to exercise civilian and political oversight, deliver security services and coordinate approach to security in accordance with assigned mandates and ensuring human rights compliance. A

significant number of respondents, 34.56% disagreed. This could be as result of clan rivalry. Abdeta (2020) had similar observation when he noted that establishment of Kismayo administration facing challenges between two contesting clans, the Darood and Hawiye. The two clans work to mutually exclude each other in the admiration. The clan that is left out of the administration feel marginalized.

When asked if JSF SSR was designed and carried out in accordance with basic governance principles of transparency and accountability, 58.09% of the respondents agreed that this was happening and 49.91% disagreed. In an interview, members of Bajuuni minority clan complained, the security men were from only one clan and that they were harassing them when going about their fishing. Members of other clans that do not have powerful representation in the government such as the minority Bantus expressed the same sentiments indicating that the recruitment into the security sector was mired with nepotism.

On the question of if SSR promote equitable access to justice and security for populations, including the poor and vulnerable, 66.18% of the respondents said yes and 33.82% said no. It is important to note that there were deliberate efforts to marginalize people who had no representation in the government (Webersik, 2004). This could be the reason that has led the minority Bajuuni, and Bantu tribes are left out of JSF.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The study findings did indicate that there was widespread acknowledgement that the conflict situation was coming under control in Kismayo district. Majority of the respondents 97% of the respondents said that the conflict situation in Kismayo had improved tremendously. 81.15% of the respondents said that clan elder's institution through their effective dialogue and negotiations was responsible for the reduced conflicts in the district. Formal Judicial was not preferred by local population due to its ineffectiveness. On enhancement of security, 68% said that JSF SSR was effective solution to the security and justice problems facing the people of Kismayo. However, 60% of the respondents were emphatic that SSR could be more effective with good security sector governance. 87.5% said that SSR had taken steps to create processes, structures, institutions and fostered requisite ownership through which the population can access justice and security over the long term.

Respondents indicated that SSR program had reduced the risk of civil war recurrence in the Kismayo District by 89.11%. CIMIC has helped Jubbaland administration create an efficient and effective security function. Sustained cooperation between peace actors and the local community has yielded the peace dividend that is being enjoyed in Kismayo.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

To produce a more capable security forces, a common Somalia security forces' training doctrine need to be developed and disseminated to all troops contributing countries who are training and mentoring Somalia forces. This will ensure that the operation practices of troops trained by different contingents are in harmony.

Somalia security forces continue to face challenges on equipment especially arms due to existing arms embargo. It is for this reason that the Somalia security forces have not been able to defeat Al-Shabaab completely. It is recommended that the Federal Government be allowed to arm its forces adequately to enable it defeat Al-Shabaab once and for all. On the same breath, more donor funds are required to enable the government to employ more security agents who will adequately manage the security function in the vast country.

On state building theory, it is recommended that the state of Somalia be rebuild by first stabilizing local governing structures, then scale it to federal governments and eventually bring the stable federal governments together to form the central government of Somalia. It is further recommended that civil-military reconstruction teams (CMRTs) be created and decentralized from the major centers. This will widen the reach of the reconstruction efforts into remote areas. The experiences in Kosovo and Afghanistan have demonstrated the importance and effectiveness of these decentralized reconstruction teams.

Further research areas

It is suggested that more studies be done on the efficacy of bottom-up state building model which seem to be having some potential in stabilizing Somalia.

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