The Role of Socialisation in Shaping Internal and External Ascendancy of the Islamic Organisations in Iran

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Abstract: **This paper examines the role of socialisation and its impact on the Iranian armed organisations, especially Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Basij and Al-Quds Force. This paper also examines the role of the Iranian school as an agent of socialisation beneath the secularism rule prior to the collapse of the Shah and currently beneath Islamic Shia rule. Furthermore, the paper highlights the internal ascendancy of Iran clergy against the dissenters of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and externally against the Western and Israeli interests, besides the fight in Syria against the Sunnis. The paper argues that the reason for establishing the Iranian organisations, Basij, IRGC, and Al-Quds Force is not for exporting the Iranian revolution behind the Iranian borders, but to muzzle the voice of Iran dissenters on Iran soil, and overseas. For this reason, the crucial of socialisation on the Iranian soil had successfully established stalwart organisations that work beneath Wilayat Al Faqih**

Keywords: **Iran, Basij, Al-Quds Force, IRGC, Shia, Sunni**

I.INTRODUCTION

Background on Iran

In Arab accounts, Iran is recognised as a nemesis of Islamic Sunni and Arabs (Khalaf, 2020). Some Arabs still believe that Iran was the base of the Persian Emperor who fought against the Islamic expansion. However, after the collapse of the Persian Emperor, the Persians embraced Islam. Hence, some Persians adhered to the idea of Shia doctrine to support the family of Prophet Mohamed against his companions, who demolished the Persian Emperor as a method of vindictiveness. Consequently, the Persians were the main culprit of assassinating Omar Bin Khattab, the second caliphate of the Prophet. They successfully instigated the chaos during Uthman Bin Affan, the third caliphate after Prophet Mohamed (Ali & Post, 2015). Ever since the existence of the state of Shiites in Iran, the abomination took place between Shiites and Sunnis during the Iraq-Iran war. Ultimately, the Iranian armed Organisations on the Syrian soil fight the Syrian revolution alongside Bashar al-Assad, the current Syrian President, who belongs to a different doctrine of Shiites, Alawites (Goodazri, 2015). Hence, this paper examines the method of socialisation implemented by Iranian organisations to shape individuals to bear peremptory and able to fight beneath the name of Shiites by sociological perspective.

Historically, Iran is not considered an Islamic state. Neither a secularist state. The country came up with different political ideologies. In 1906, Iran established its first modern-secular educational system. Eventually, the collapse of the Shah that occurred in 1979, besides the new emergence of the Islamic rule on the Persian soil, had Forced all the schools to utilise the Islamic curriculum (Paivandi, 2012). Consequently, the Islamic curriculum shapes a constituent of Iranian society. It has – thusly – emerged the identity of Iranians as Muslim Shiites.

II. METHODOLOGY

This paper serves as a journal article that adds available information for the literature that ascertains the strategy of the Iranian armed Organisations, emphasising socialisation and its effect on the prospective individuals of each Organisation. For obtaining such information, the open resources have been acquired, including written and verbal materials such as journal articles, newspapers, books and reports (Richelson, 2008). This paper accentuates the socialsiation process of based on the literature and arguments the of the internal and external Islamic organisations in Iran.

The Dispute over Secularism and Religion

Secularism is the most controversial topic in the Middle East and Muslim countries. Hitherto, secularism has various definitions in Iran, but currently, the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) acknowledges its dissenters as secularists and liberalists who stand against the country. Furthermore, the Iranian Regime deems the secularists as traitors. The Regime demonstrates that those dissenters are profoundly influenced by the Western agenda in Iran (Al-Sayyad, 2019). Beneath the constrain of IRP, belonging to secularism has malignant consequences to political dissidents, as their political opinions might earn them their death (Al-Sayyad, 2019). However, secularism was not absent within the Iranian scene during the Pahlavi Regime. The school and public had been influenced by secularism modernisation teachings. During the Pahlavi aeon, the government implemented various policies on the

education system to ensure secularism is politicised in the students (Abrahamian, 1989). Schools, universities, and institutions were all under rigorous censorship of Pahlavi to ensure that the secular process of modernisation was well-functioning. In Qum, the religious city, the Shia clerics are active. They disdained the concept of modernisation at their schools and universities (Hamdhaidari, Agahi, & Papzan, 2008).

The conflict over the secular process of modernisation raised tension between the clerics and the Shah of Iran. Clerics rejoiced in upholding substantial domination over their students, who seized the streets to declare their acrimonious sentiments toward the Shah and his system (Vertigans, 2011). Secularism was not the core culprit of bringing hostility towards the Shah but the Iranian government. However, the Iranian government seemed to slug with the burgeoning. Therefore, the oil revenue was spent on the Iranian military, while education and public services were not in the government's account (Halliday, 1979; Nima, 1983).Arguably, the minorities of Iran prefer the secular system over the Shiite system. For instance, since the Shiite clerics and IRP took control of the country, the school curriculum was morphed from secular teachings that welcome all religions, credos, and beliefs into Shia teachings. The Sunni minority is extremely in despair beneath the Shia teachings since the Sunni students must study Shia history. In contrast, this becomes problematic as it contradicts their beliefs. Besides, the Shiites bend in non-religious books, such as history. This assuredly augment the abomination among the two groups, Sunnis and Shiites (Paivandi, 2012). The history of Shiites is built on the conflict between the two groups. Hence, for Sunnis, secularism is more beneficial than studying the history of Shia, which disgraces Sunni's credo and the companions of Prophet Mohamed. On the contrary, the terms of secularism during Reza Shah did not solely eradicate the beliefs of the Muslims as the definition of secularism is known to bifurcate the religion and aspects of life apart. But the process of secularist socialisation itself emphasises the disappearance of all manifestations of Islamic life. For instance, women in Iran have been debarred from wearing veils in the streets. The University students also debarred from praying publicly. Undoubtedly, the Shah was the antagonist for Islamic manifestation. He also denigrated the value and role of *Ulama* clerics (Keddia, Mattee, 2011), which translated to achieve secularism in Iran. During his leadership, the Shah initiated his plan from schools until the government institution, where the pupils learn the French curriculum. However, clerics averted to recognise Iran as a secular state. They initiated the first demonstration against the arbitrary system of Shah in 1977. Their acrimonious disputes shifted from utterances to revolution against the Regime. Though the leader of the clerics at this juncture, Ruhollah Khomeini, was required to abandon Iran, moving to Iraq then Turkey, ultimately ending up in France (Abrahamian, 1989). The demonstrations that commenced in 1977 never ceased, and around 154,000 university students took part in the Key Role

of the collapse of the Shah and his secularist system in 1979. Those students were not solely Islamic, nor all come from religious backgrounds. Most of them were secularists, liberalists, and Sunnis (Mallah, 1989).

With that being said, it is significant to note that the doctrine of Shia itself has debarred the participation and involvement of politics. Historically, prior to the emergence of IRP, the Shia clerics expelled the involvement of the political scene. The political issues had no place in their jurisprudence issues. The most influential clergy of Shia, Al-Tusi and Al-Murtada, dismissed the participation of politics until the emergence of the Mehdi, the Twelver Imam of Shiites. The new clergy in Iran argued with their big *Ulama* and doctrine. They formed the first Islamic government beneath the Twelver doctrine in Iran. Of course, many sociologists assume that the abnegation of political involvement is the main reason for spreading secularism. Thus, the clergy endorsed the decision by IPR to morph some factors of their ascription. However, the sole method to cease the dissemination of secularism is to get involved in politics and dominate the government authorities. Still, some Shiites believe that Imam Khamenei meets Imam Al-Mehdi regularly and obtains instructions from him. Whether this surmise is right or wrong, the Twelver Imam never emerged since his disappearance hitherto (Darwish, 2013).

Religious socialisation

The Islamic leap in the political arena in Iran, by the clerics, catered the opportunity to Khomeini, the soul of the Islamic revolution, to prepare for a religious generation by utilising various methods. Crucially, to disseminate the supremacy of the Islamic culture in all diameters in Iran. He emphasised the circumscribe of the Western culture in Iran. Ultimately, to entrench the religious socialisation for the Muslim individuals in Iran (Paivandi, 2006). The Islamic ideology of Iran, however, had met dissidents and supporters. The Islamic clerics seemed unhappy with the democracy claimed by their dissidents, and thus execution had a loud voice. In extremist ideology by the Iranian clerics, the definition of democracy, political organisation and political modern as elites are 'rebuffed' and the ascendancy of the country constrained by Khomeini and currently by Khamenei (Zubaida, 1989).

To critics, the Islamic clerics were not successfully prepared to govern the country, but they seemed to seek assistance from The National Front of Iran to be in the front line of managing the country (Hassan, 2007). At this juncture, Khamenei established his political party, the Islamic Republican Party (IRP). The party dominated and was speedily able to recruit students, workers and clerics. Furthermore, inside the Iranian society, after the collapse of Shah, a complicated issue emerged in the political field between Islamic clerics represented by IRP and the modern Islamic intelligentsia from the Liberation Movement. The clergy and Muslim intelligentsia argued on the terms of religious socialisation. Muslim Intelligentsias believed that the West was the main

culprit of consigning the country into retrograde. It was vividly exhausting to step on the same trajectory with them and concur regarding several issues. Crucially, on religious socialisation. Muslim intelligentsia had to deal with two kinds of people: the university students and common inhabitants. In fact, they had to go into profound and multifaceted discussions with the university students, who were secularists and communists. They used to ask the Muslim intelligentsia questions that birthed doubts, such as: why can't we eat pork? Why was Prophet Mohamed uplifted to heaven? Extraordinarily, the Muslim intelligentsia sought a worthy technique to justify their challenged beliefs. Of course, it was not through utilising the Koran, as communists do not believe in it, but through the writing of books and literature. On the contrary, the common inhabitants bear peremptory for the Muslim intelligentsia. The word of Allah is the word of Allah; they cannot relinquish or argue regarding this matter. Unlike the Muslim intelligentsia, IRP rebuffed the idea of political or social discourse. They solely believe that religious socialisation must be implemented for each individual, and those who are not Muslims have the right to follow their beliefs. But those with opposition towards the clergy must not take place. As a result, IRP became a revolutionary party, and the clergy of the party enhanced the idea of one-party rules, such as China and Vietnam. The clergy believed it was the sole method of implanting a coherent religious system that must be obeyed by all inhabitants (Hassan, 1984). This followed by the same trajectory as had existed during the Shah, who declared a single party of all Iranian, using rigorous rules against those who restrained from joining the party, such as rescinding their passport and banning them from travelling (Bakhash, 1985). Therefore, like the Shah, the IRP aggressively took control of the whole country and nominated Khomeini to be the leader of the country, who officially declared Iran's shift from a secular state to an Islamic state.

Ever since 1979 and hitherto, Iran is considered an Islamic state that implements the Shia doctrine in its school system. The actual concealed fact of Iran has emerged mind-boggling questions: how does Iran implement religious socialisation in its schools? What are the utilised methods of religious socialisation?

This paper will highlight a vital incident among Muslims, particularly Arabs. Khamenei succeeded in mobilising thousands of his cohorts to fight in Syria against the Syrian revolution. Sociologically, the IRP members who have been dispatched to Syria have been through a long process of extremist and armed socialisation. The extremist Islamic-Shia teachings that were inculcated into them brought their peremptory to fight in a foreign country with another doctrine, Sunnis. However, sociological scholars claim that an individual learns from four agents of socialisation: family, school, peers and media. Each agent of socialisation inculcates norms, beliefs and values upon individuals (Bassis, Richard & Ann, 1998). Undoubtedly, the IRP utilises a complex system of education during the process of socialisation to ensure the loyalty of its members is well established and continues in perpetuity.

However, the religious socialisation in Iran is palpable among all citizens, including the children at schools, because the curriculum itself was based on Islamic Shia teachings. In order to implement the agenda of IRP toward Islamisation, the party attempted to dispose of the teachers who stood against the party's ideologies. The veil was obligated to all-girl pupils, besides performing prayers at the school (Paivandi, 2012). These shifts were carried out despite not being good signs of the developed education. The system of Iran declared its plan towards reforming the educational system based on Islamic socialisation, contrary to the Shah. But several studies investigated that the internal system of Iran has faced failure in various methods. For instance, illiteracy in Iran has significantly been accelerating forward. It is stated that more than 10.7 million people are illiterate (Tavassoli et al., 2000).

III. THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS ROLE

It is evident that the schools of Iran are constrained beneath the Islamic socialisation. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) was established in April 1979 to protect the Islamic Revolution from its dissenters. The role of IRGC has brought the attention of scholars to investigate their existence and functions. But it is no longer concealed whether the main reason for establishing the IRGC was based on internal or external roles. Because of the political developments in Iran, the IRGC took the lead in the political scene. IRGC has a tangible influence over political decision-making (Alfoneh, 2008). However, it is crucial to clarify that the IRGC comprises five subunits: Navy, Ground Forces, Basij, Air Force and Al-Quds Force. Generally, this paper will focus on the most vital subunits, IRGC in general, Basij and Al-Quds Force in particular. According to the literature, those subunits instigated chaos and brought more attention worldwide and from sociological and political scholars. Still, there are heaps of blurriness that cover the legitimacy of the socialisation and roles of these subunits (Smith, 2007).

The IRC is specifically identified as the protector of the clerical Regime in Iran, internally and externally. With this, the IRGC has ample combatants to constrain the country, with 145,000 combatants (Hartwell, 2006). Undeniably, the number of IRGC has increased since Iran initiated the fight against the Syrian revolution in 2015. However, regarding mobilisation, the members of the IRGC follow extreme rigorous criteria that emphasise peremptory for Ayatollah Khomeini. Crucially, the opted member must be an Iranian-Shia citizen, bear peremptory to Ayatollah Al-Khamenei, work on exporting the Islamic-Iranian revolution to the Islamic countries and certainly bring atrocity towards the United States. Furthermore, the importance of religious socialisation in Iran shapes the characteristics of the IRGC. They contribute to the political scene by leading military politicisation; they also have a tangible influence on the

political elites (Forozan, 2015). IRGC members are not socialised solely based on religious socialisation. Their military socialisation distinguishes the organisation from others. Without discursiveness, IRGC is not the only armed organisation in Iran. Another organisation derived from IRGC – the Basij– was founded in 1980 to make the internal system of the country cohesion (Alfoneh, 2010). Basij members are distinguished with several prerogatives, although they are recognised as mercenaries in some people's accounts. Still, on Iran soil, the 10 million members of Basij are active in the political scene, besides forcible the domination of Khamenei among Iranians (Alfoneh, 2010).

For critics, the foundation of Basij brought attention worldwide to the method used for mobilisation in Iran. Particularly in the Iraq-Iran war, the role of Basij was extremely vivid when Iran mobilised and recruited pupils and kids to combat Iraq in 1980 until 1988.Basij members were not physically socialised. At this juncture, they were a utilised subject by the Iranian Regime to mobilise more individuals. Conclusively, the propaganda of the Iranian Regime had successfully procured 100,000 volunteers. They all joined the Basij organisation. Albeit the lack of physical socialisation experiences, the Basij were considered as martyrdom in the serious operations (Alfoneh, 2016). However, the internal system of IRGC and Basij has a deliberate blur by the clergy, who rebuff to indicate any single information regarding the organisation. Despite this, Iranian sociological scholars have categorised the internal system of Basij into three categories:

- Volunteer members who join Basij during peacetime are considered regular members, but during the wartime they are paid.
- Active members who have had ideological and political mutual-interest; they receive payment for their work.
- Special members who obtain placement in special socialisation program for protecting the country, Regime, Khamenei and the clergy.

The significance of Basij is in the professional recruitment established by the clergy, besides the religious socialisation program. The supervision of clergy refers to each volunteer of Basij to examine his background. The organisation ensures that the new member fits into the fulfilment of the organisation. Crucially, to assure the member bears peremptory to Khamenei and the clergy (Alfoneh, 2010).

The crux idea of IRGC and Basij is to extend religious influence over the Iranian people through two strategies:

Firstly, the Cultural Revolution, the comprehensive Islamisation, which means to promulgate the Islamic concept among all Muslims in Iran, includes secularists and random Muslims. The system in Iran professionally believes in the role of teachers and professors in making a change. Therefore, the clergy employ Basij to censor the teachings; those who fail to bestow disciplinary behaviour and follow the same trajectory of the Islamic revolution get purge from their position (Paivandi, 2012). Additionally, the Regime recruits the clerics to ingrain an Islamic curriculum for the students, crucially the university students. Alas, it seems gruelling to establish this theory among Iranians, who are open-minded with the West, and in a rigorous dispute with the Iranian Regime (Alhelaly, 2012). The clergy determined that utilising Forces by Basij to implement their agenda is considered elusive in their accounts; however, after the dense of this strategy, clerics assumed that they needed to remove the secularist books from the universities. They also believed that the role of Hauza, from which the students learn the doctrine of Shia, must have the main focus of the Regime to enhance the curriculum and to work on eliminating the Western thoughts among the students. Thus, Basij here is utilised as a persecution machine to constrain the university demonstrations from spreading political awareness (Intikhab, 2018).

Secondly, to seek vengeance against the liberalists and secularists. On the one hand, liberalists and secularists constantly criticised the rule of Wilayat Al-Faqih. Since the Iranian revolution up hitherto, the Iranian Regime utilises an abrogate approach against the secularists and liberalists to muzzle their voices and limit their steps by depriving them of political rights, dissolution of their political parties, incarcerating them and ultimately by assassinating them. Of course, the liberalists and secularists have accused quisling in the view of Khamenei and his cohorts, and thus Basij is the utilised tool of oppressing the dissenters of Khamenei (Al-Sayyad, 2019).

The Special socialisation of Al-Quds force

The external agenda of Iran to export the Islamic revolution to the world, particularly the Islamic countries, have been ceased and disavowed by several steps, considerably by the United States who recognised the precariousness of exporting the Islamic revolution to the Arab world. Iran has a tumult of terror hassles in Syria and Iraq. It searched for legitimacy to join Bashar al-Asad to cease the extent of Sunni militias in Syria. With a common catchphrase "*Hayhatminna al-dhilla*", never to humiliation, the famous quotation of Imam Al-Hussein prior to his killing in Iraq, Iran declared the war in Syria to dandle with Bashar al-Asad. Al-Quds Force, the special militia of IRGC, were mobilised and dispatched to Syria (Winggiton; Burton; Jensen; McElreath; Mallory; Doss, 2015). Today it is still concealed for some interested groups to know more about Al-Quds Force. While the talk about Al-Quds Force is uttered in sotto voce inside Iran, the existence of Al-Quds has been studied widely due to the extremist attacks by the organisation and being the main culprit of promulgating terrorism.

According to Bruno, Bajoria and Masters (2013), the concealed emergence of IRGC was to defend the Iranian Islamic Revolution. Besides, to hurl the antagonists of the Regime into incarcerates. Additionally, to purchase IRGC members to protect Al-Khomeini and currently Al-Khamenei.

This has undoubtedly remarked the current concealed roles of IRGC. Of course, their method of socialisation is the main focus of the organisation's framework. It is obscure what type of curriculum IRGC inculcate to their cohorts to become stalwart individuals for their leaders. However, in late 1990, Ahmadi Nejad, the former president of Iran from 2005 to 2013, believed in exporting the Iranian Islamic revolution to the Arab world after the Iraq-Iran war, establishing a subunit of IRGC, Al Quds Force (Katz & Hendel, 2009). Nevertheless, the American Intelligence seemed to consider Al-Quds Force scornfully as a terrorist organisation, especially after unveiling the concealed agenda of the special group that emphasises the abomination against the United States and Israel (Bruno et al., 2013). The role of the Al-Quds Force is to imbue the jihad for those who were passionately religious to join the organisation. It also trains other organisations on physical and military socialisation. According to the Shia clerics, Sunnis are not considered Muslim. However, those who do not bear an Oath of Allegiance to the twelve Imam of Shia as well to Wilayat Al faqih are not Muslims (Al-Himdani, 1996). Al-Quds Force welcomed and sheltered Musab al-Zarqawi, the former leader of Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is known as a terror Sunni extremist organisation that fights against the American interests in the Middle East. He was also granted refuge in Iran, where he initiated mobilising and recruiting for Al-Qaeda (Berman, 2007). Also, Hamas, the Sunni-Islamic fundamentalist militant organisation, is a truly welcomed guest in Iran. The cooperation between Hamas and Al-Quds Force is known as a brotherhood relation, although both organisations have different ideological backgrounds. Undoubtedly, Hezbollah in Lebanon and its vigorous constitute of foundation that emphasises resistance to the United States and Israel. Still, Iran supportively pursues to assist those who share mutual interest against the United States and Israel (Katzman, 2010; Frick 2008).

The relationship with the extremist organisations has not ceased Al-Quds Force to conduct such terrorist attacks behind the Iranian borders. Adequately, to do so, the prospective member of Al-Quds goes through aggressive socialisation to understand his role that might end his life defending the Organisation and its extremist ideologies (Wigginton et al., 2015). For instance, Thailand witnessed the extremism of the Al-Quds Force when a nexus of men instigated several explosions in the heart of the Thai capital Bangkok against the Israeli diplomats. Alas for them, their mission has witnessed dereliction, and thus they were charged terrorist attacks by the Thai authority (Wongruang, 2012). With such a reckless mission like this, Iran destabilised the Middle East through Al-Quds Force members placed on the Arab soil. For instance, in Jordan 2015, the Jordanian authorities captured 45 kilograms of explosives carried by Iranian citizens. They were targeting Israeli on Jordan soil (Florance, 2015). Of course, Iran has abnegated its responsibilities as the previous failed missions. Yet, the strategy of Iran has become clear among Arabs, who took rigorous decisions to stand alongside

America and its punishment over Iran. Unlike Arabs, Iraq has declared its willingness to become an ally for Iran. At this point, Al-Quds Forces have entered Iraq to fight against ISIS, who seized half of the country and were close enough to enter the holy city of Shiites, Karbala (Rosen, 2015).

While the played role by Al- Quds Force in Syria had hindered Bashar al-Assad from the collapse: it has also augmented a value for Iranians over the Syrian Regime. Profoundly, the existence of Iran on Syria soul had shaped the circle's decision-making after the Regime became weakened due to the armed revolution that took place in 2011 (Sherlock, 2014).

Moreover, Qasem Soleimani, the leader of the Al-Quds Force, mobilised mercenaries from Iraq and Afghanistan to fight alongside the Al-Quds Force in Syria (Winggiton et al., 2015). Alas for Shiites, Qasem, who is known as the soldier of God fighting in the holy Syrian war, was assassinated by American Forces in Baghdad (BBC, 2020). The death of Soleimani did not morph the battle on Syria soil, yet the existence of Al-Quds Force remains there, which raises concern for Israel, lest the attack of Al-Quds Force. In fact, the relationship between Iran and Israel has been problematic for decades, especially after the collapse of Shah and IRGC had clandestine attacks against Israel around the world (Winggiton et al., 2015).

IV. DISCUSSION

Socialisation is interminable process where individuals learn new values, norms and beliefs. In the case of Iran, the country established several organisations that favoured its interests. Besides, it had successfully and extremely socialised the organisations' members based on the country's agenda. For instance, IRGC, Basij and Al-Quds Force have stalwart members able to fight in the name of their organisations. Those members have been dispatched to fight in Syria to cease the Syria revolutions. They have been utilised in the Iraqi- Irani war. Crucially, the members of the organisation are not socialised on the fight beneath the religious agenda. However, they have been socialised based on abomination towards the dissenters of the Iranian Revolution. Besides, the physical socialisation qualifies them to become religious soldiers.

According to the literature, it is reasonable to state that Iran seeks ascendancy and supremacy over its own people. The context of secularism and liberalism ideology has demurred in Iran clergy accounts. However, by implementing such a rigorous rule to cease the influence of the West on the Iranian secularists and liberalists; the country has instigated those who have a relationship with secularism to be labelled traitorous. Political deprivation and incarcerating are commonly used tools in Iran. Nevertheless, the Iranian Regime emphasises the Islamic Shia socialisation, and even those lecturers and teachers with undoubted thoughts toward the Regime face oppression by the authorities as to the socialisation process in the schools, requiring teachers to

promote the values, norms, and beliefs of the Iranian Islamic revolution into the pupils.

Internally, the Iranian armed organisations exist to muzzle the opinions of the dissenters, not to spread prosperity or to develop the country. Externally, the Iranian armed Organisations are established to engage with the antagonists of the Iranian Islamic revolution. Thus, Khomeini has divided the IRGC into various groups, each with a specific role. The Al-Quds Force, for example, has intelligence and secret planes against the United States and Israel. Furthermore, the individuals of the special organisation, the Al-Quds Force, must bear peremptory to Ali Khamenei, the current supreme leader of Iran. Their roles are also agonistic towards the Sunnis, particularly in Syria. They played a vital role in muzzling the voices of the Syrian revolution, which resulted in socialising an armed fight that led Syrian inhabitants to escape to seek refuge in other safe countries.

V. CONCLUSION

Iran has haphazardly scattered its political agenda toward the dissenters of the Iranian Islamic revolution by utilising an extremist method of political deprivation against secularists, communists, and liberalists, since their immersion of the Iranian revolution in 1997. The continuum of suppression against the dissenters gave the ascendancy to clergy to establish an agreement with Shia Islamic socialisation to be implemented in all the schools in Iran. Thus, the clergy are able to obtain a religious generation that believes in Shiite doctrines and become a combatant for the sake of the Regime.

The political alterations in the Middle East brought Iran to unveil its concealed agenda toward the Arabs, particularly, the Sunnis on Syrian soil. When Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian president was teetering on the brink of collapse, Iran extended its hand and consigned the special Al-Quds Force to fight with al-Assad against the Syrian Sunni revolution. Iran has also been involved in extremist attacks in Thailand, Jordan, and Egypt. The extremist attacks of Iran are heavily due to the extremist socialisation and abomination taught to the prospective members of Basij, IRGC, and Al-Quds Force members.

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