

Factors Responsible For Youth Radicalization in Yobe State, Nigeria: Causes, Consequences and De-Radicalization Strategies

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Abstract: The objective of this research is to investigate the factors responsible for youth radicalization in Yobe State, Nigeria. The study adopted social structure and anomie theory. A sample size of 315 respondents was selected through multi-stage sampling which includes; cluster sampling, purposive sampling, simple random sampling technique for qualitative data, and quantitative data were collected through questionnaire and in-depth interview respectively. Thus, the analysis was mixed method. The study found out that the extent of youth radicalization in Yobe State is very high because more youths are being recruited. Illiteracy, ignorance, poverty, religious manipulation, globalisation, unemployment, injustice and political interests are some of the factors that motivated the youths to join radicalized groups. Consequences of youth radicalization include; destruction of lives, valuable properties, displacement of families and widespread public panic. To address youth radicalization in Yobe State, the study recommended that education, enlightenment, provision of employment, protecting the youths from extremist views spread by less knowledgeable preachers, community policing, guidance and counseling of arrested radicalized youths and use of intelligence gathering safeguard the border from foreign influences.

Keywords: Radicalization, Boko Haram, Factors responsible for youth radicalization, Causes, Consequences and De-radicalization strategies

I. INTRODUCTION

Radicalisation is a subject that has attracted the attention of the global communication, hence a subject of deliberation for government officials, media practitioners, scholars and security officials. This is because the problem has become pervasive around the world. Countries like Nigeria that used to only watch the rise of radicalization on other parts of the world are now witnessing the upsurge of some youth militant groups that became obvious source of threats to the Nigeria's collective security. Formation of radical militants, such as *Maitatsine*, in the 1982, and some recent movements like MEND (Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta), OPC (Odua People Congress), and MASSOB (Movement for the Actualizations of the Sovereign State of Biafra), in various regions of the country have already took place with their violent agitations, but the most active militant group in the present Yobe State North-east in particular and Nigeria in general is *Boko Haram*.

However, there had been several civil resistances that led to conflicts between powerful authorities and some segment of societies since colonial Nigeria. In the post-colonial era, there were some historic events that were predictably having tendency to lead to insurgency. For example, the security problems faced by the Nigerian Government shortly after Independence, like the Tiv riot in Benue Province, The Agbekoya Tax Riot in the South West, and Isaac Boro Revolt in the Niger Delta (Mohammed, 2003). Origin of security challenges in Nigeria. Shea (2003) also made similar claim, as he sees 1966 coup d'état against the First Republic of Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, and the deaths of the Prime Minister, the Premier of the Northern Region, and many other prominent political and military leaders which led to a terrible shock to the many of the Nigerians. In many ways the nation has not yet fully recovered from that terrible blow to the body politic and from the terrible Civil War which followed.

To provide solution to the problem of youth radicalisation, there should be an attempt at identifying the causes of the problem. This research intends to investigate the socio-economic factors that predispose *Boko Haram* in Yobe State, Nigeria in order to develop mechanisms for preventing menace of the youth radicalisation in the State. To achieve this, the study will also provide some de-radicalisation processes to ensure that further involvement of the youths in the insurgent groups do not happen again.

Solutions to *Boko Haram* shall not be confined to addressing the causal factors, but de-radicalization re-strategies may also be useful. The *Boko Haram* threatens the Nigeria's collective security, not only Yobe State. This is what prompted the conduct of this research in order to diagnose the phenomenon of youth radicalisation, examine its socio-economic causes, and to ultimately suggest some possible solutions to the involvement of youth in the *Boko Haram*. This is where the research will contribute to the body of knowledge. The objectives are:

1. To study the extent of youth radicalization in Yobe State, Nigeria;
2. To identify the factors responsible for youth radicalization in Yobe State, Nigeria;

3. To examine the consequences of youth radicalization in Yobe State, Nigeria; and
4. To provide some de-radicalization strategies for youth radicalization in Yobe State, Nigeria.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Youth Radicalisation in Nigeria

Youth radicalization is not the sole experience of Borno, Yobe or Adamawa. Various places in the country receive their fair share of sad experiences as a result of *Maitatsine*, *Boko Haram* insurgency and Niger Delta militancy. According to reports, multiple explosives went off one after the other in Kano, in the usual manners of similar attacks by the members of *Boko Haram* sect in Maiduguri, Damaturu, Potiskum, Gombe, Abuja, Jos and Madalla in Niger State (Okpaga, Chijioke & Innocent, 2012). Youth radicalization, especially one related to global Jihad is that they are not only sharing similarity, but usually linked (Kilcullen, 2004) with terrorism and insurgency. Hence, radicalised groups, including *Boko Haram* itself, are in many occasions enjoying financial support of other larger organizations (Schaefer, n.d.).

In addition, Campbell & Weitz (2006) observed that a comparison of the threats posed by Islamic terrorist groups today and those of the past insurgencies raises suggestive similarities. Being insufficiently powerful to defeat their opponents' conventional military forces, both rely on violent but asymmetric means. For this reason, both terrorism and guerrilla warfare have been described as "weapons of the weak." Similarly, they both pursue political power through bullets rather than ballot boxes—either because they lack the popularity to achieve success in free and fair elections, or because the established political authorities deny them this option.

Predisposing Factors for Youth Radicalisation in Nigeria

There are various views on the causal factors of youth radicalisation in Nigeria. Innocent & Ibeatan (2012) contend that, *Boko Haram* is associated to Nigeria's extreme inequality, a youth bulge, crumbling infrastructure, and high unemployment. They further suggested, attacks by *Boko Haram* highlight the challenges faced by Nigeria's government and an indication that the leadership class has to improve governance in order to reduce conflict, and promote economic development. In his own view, Adenrele (2012) said, *Boko Haram* sect is a sheer symptom of poverty and political alienation, while Edobor (2014) perceives terrorism in Nigeria as caused by the combination of political, economic and institutional factors. Nwaze (2004, cited in Robert-okah, 2014:4-5) identified sources of security threats in Nigeria to have emanated from militarism, and military experiences, ethnic/religious pluralism, unemployment, poverty and failure of governance, socio-economic inequalities and demographic factors, small arms and ammunition trafficking, migration and indigene question in Nigeria, Nigeria's socio-economic status

in Africa and the illegal alien issues, globalization, porous security heritage and external influence.

As asserted by Oladimeji & Olusegun (2012), the preponderance of radicalized movement acts are manifestations of unresolved conflicts and the inability of the government to overcome the challenges are reflections that the root cause(s) of the conflicts are not identified and therefore the correct mechanism could not be adopted to manage or resolve it. The notable factor that simplifies the spread of terrorism in the world today is globalization process. But the globalization alone shall not assume the role of sole agent of the formation of terrorist groups and perpetuation of radicalized movement in different parts of the globe. Politicians are at times adopting terrorizing tactic to subdue their opponents, or, in some cases, a government of a particular country can terrorize its subjects or suppress dissidence using terrorism for political objectives (Macionis, 2009).

In addition to state sponsored terrorism, people (especially youth) may wage a campaign for insurgency as a response to sheer injustice and as an expression of discomfort due to unemployment, inequality and poverty. This has been emphasized by a number of scholars, security experts and independent researchers. For instance, Adebayo (2013), Perouse de Montclos (2014), Mukhtar, Mukhtar & Mukhtar (2015) have studied the nexus between unemployment, poverty and crime of varying kinds, including youth radicalisation. In addition, multi-ethnicity, failed governance and injustice in resource control are considered as other causes of the youth radicalisation in Nigeria (Olateju, 2013).

It is necessary to distinguish between different causes as each may require different remedy. Like in other countries, the sources of insecurity in Nigeria can be traced to a number of factors. Beyond the external-internal dichotomy, sources of insecurity can equally be classified as either remote or proximate and immediate. In Nigeria, the challenge is not so much about external sources but rather that of internal sources.

Solution to Radicalization

The USG COIN Guide contains some instructions which if carefully used can assist to facilitate war on radicalization driven terror in some parts of the world, but this does not make the Guide a masterpiece for solving all types of radicalization. Looking at the context in which youth radicalisation is taking place in Yobe State northeastern Nigeria, Adewumi (2014) believes that, the *Boko Haram* defies military effort and he offers some counter-extremism re-strategies, in addition to the military containment, appropriate for Nigeria to tackle the activities of the group. These re-strategies include: dialogue re-strategy, counter-extremism re-strategy and transformation, de-radicalisation and development re-strategy, institutional strengthening, intensive psychological media campaign, culture of pro-active

alert system, and multi-lateral cooperation. Adewumi's (2014) counter-extremism re-strategies are highlighted as follows:

- i) *Dialogue re-strategy*: this re-strategy means that government shall genuinely retool the dialogue initiative for a consistent interface between the government and the religious, traditional, political and civil society community in the north is imperative. As this would help develop wider support and identify potential spoilers of effort to contain the problem, the significant process would have to cut across political divide for a collective objective. At least, if formal dialogues are difficult to reach, the effects of informal dialogues should be noticeable. Considering the increasing negative impacts of the youth radicalisation and the counter extremism campaign by the contending forces, the dialogue initiative may be strengthened and facilitated by a unilateral or multilateral body.

A mediatory effort could also be explored through a regional or international approach. It involves encouraging *Boko Haram* members to the dialogue table and provide a comprehensive long term framework for resolution; building the confidence of a group that lost confidence in most of the religious, traditional and political leaders in the region. In other words, formally or informally deliberation aimed at changing the dynamics of the process is essential. With the rhetoric of 'who does the government dialogue with', the successfully captured members and foot soldiers of the group by the Joint Task Force remain potential sources of reaching out to the radicals. This is without undermining the veritable channel of human and technical intelligence gathering to identify and locate members of the group.

- ii) *Counterinsurgency re-strategy and transformation*: this re-strategy involves transforming the way and manner the government responding to the radicalisation in term of security motivation. Bearing in mind the potency of the youth radicalisation or the terrorist acts, the military campaign is understandably required to provide security and deny the radicalised youths the ability to consolidate or entrench themselves. With the obvious challenges of the military campaign as enumerated earlier, superior and complementary counter measures are crucial as a priority.

Juxtaposing the growing terror onslaughts in the north with Nigeria's strategic influence in West Africa and Africa in general; some observers concluded that 'Boko Haram is a CIA covert operation and America's destabilization plot against Nigeria'. The report went further to highlight the role of the American Agency in covertly supporting radicalised youths in some parts of the world. The report however

failed to capture the indispensable role of the Nigerian government through its internal mechanisms to counter the claim. Considering the sustained terror campaign, it is inconceivable that the military and by extension the Nigerian government are covertly part of the CIA supposed scheme. The greater onus is on the government to ensure the counter-extremism strategies are indeed productive with long-term prospects.

- iii) *De-radicalisation and development re-strategy*: the process of de-radicalisation requires an aggressive campaign done collectively (not in isolation) by the religious leaders and scholars if determined to stem the radicalisation drive. The undiluted doctrines of Islam should not be limited to mosques only, but extended to homes, markets and organized gatherings. A decisive stand should be taken to include the sensitisation and mobilisation of youths across the north by the leaders on the commitment to short and long-term transformation rather than limited communiqués condemning the acts of terrorism.

A radical approach is required to revamp the educational, agricultural, and industrial sectors by the State governments. The complementary intervention efforts of the Federal Government in prioritizing the Infrastructures for Peace (I4P) for the region is critical in stemming the cycle of violence in the North. For a radicalized youth to abandon a supposed just cause, creating an alternative but attractive incentive could stimulate the process of change by the governments.

- iv) *Institutional strengthening*: the strengthening of institutions is strategic to a government's primary objective of ensuring the protection of lives and properties of its citizenry and is critical to short and long-term transformation. While the Office of the National Security Adviser is saddled with the responsibility to co-ordinate all security and law enforcement antiterrorism activities, the Ministry of Interior whose mandate is 'to foster the maintenance of internal security and citizenship integrity for the promotion of good governance' could be complementary if strengthened.

Apart from overseeing paramilitary formations, the role of the Ministry of Interior could be reinforced to develop internal security strategies, regularly network with local communities, including civil society groups and house a long-term integrative mechanism for managing and preventing internal conflicts violent extremism. This will give visibility for some measure of internal control with regular briefings on threats and counter mechanisms in place for internal security rather than the apparently limited role of declaring public holidays in Nigeria.

- v) *Intensive psychological media campaign*: the media campaign tool is critical to escalating or de-escalating a radicalisation process. It is apparent that the media tool has not been strategically deployed or is underutilized. Effective coordination of the counter-extremism measures of the government requires a consistent media campaign for targeted local audiences to ensure the winning of minds in the psychological warfare process. Beyond the military conquests of the radicalised youths, the media campaign should strategically encapsulate the government's timeline de-radicalisation and critical transformation programs including the rehabilitation of internally displaced persons
- vi) *Culture of pro-active alert system*: one of the significant ways of building the confidence of a community in a government is to facilitate and sustain a culture of proactive alert system. Devoid of the inherent signal to create panic, it is a veritable tool to proactively sensitize, caution and protect the citizenry. Apart from reactive tools such as declaration of 'state of emergency' and 'curfew' often employed, intelligence on potential targets, movements, mobilisation and attacks among others could proactively protect lives, properties and reduce casualties. For instance, it is recalled that after the killing of Osama Bin Laden by the Americans, President Obama issued a security alert for all Americans and American installations. While the alert was ideal, it may have been wrongly timed considering the pattern of operations of Al-Qaeda that such network would likely strike with a surprise and not an indiscriminate direct or immediate response to the loss of their leader.
- vii) *Multi-lateral cooperation*: The networks of the radicalised youths in Nigeria are undoubtedly borderless coupled with the illegal and ineffectively controlled border links in the West African region. It is known that members of the group received trainings in places like Mauritania and Mali where Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb are threatening. The radicalised youths have also made inroads into bordering states like Cameroon, Niger and Chad to register their negative presence. The Multinational Joint Task Force comprising security personnel of the neighboring states and Nigeria, which has been largely rusty, appears to be reinforced recently. This was equally strengthened with the agreement between France, Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon to operate concertededly in tackling youth radicalisation in the region. Imperatively, the sustainability and consistency of the cooperation is critical to limit the campaign of terror and prevent further clustering of the [radicalised youths].

Furthermore, the involvement of the international community, channeling large funds into the region, but also assuring certain responsibilities in the post-conflict situation, made the Western Balkans a very particular case. This case is further characterized by the 'European perspective', which was offered to the countries of the region in exchange for the acceptance of numerous conditions aimed mainly at enhancing human security, although this concept, which is described in more detail by another contributor to this volume, was rarely mentioned explicitly. The reform of the security sector is of crucial importance. Not only the military and the secret services, but also the police forces have to be brought under democratic control and existing links with organized crime, or even terrorist groups, have to be severed decisively and completely. Of the same importance is the reform of the judiciary. Members of the judiciary who never enjoyed adequate training and were used to receiving political instructions need to become part of an independent body of judges and prosecutors who are able to deal with an increased workload and new laws based on international standards, such as the *European Convention of Human Right* (Benedek, 2010).

The reforms of basic state institutions would not be complete without a reform of the administration, which often lacks efficiency and professionalism and is affected by widespread corruption. The services are often provided as a favour to, and not as a right of citizens. Accordingly, these reforms are necessary for realizing basic civil and political rights, and, more generally, a level of personal human security preconditioned upon being able to enjoy these human rights. The reforms require a general transformation of the state towards a modern, post-national state serving all its citizens equally. In post-conflict situations the state will, however, hardly be able to serve as a 'welfare state', although it has to provide crucial educational, health, and other social services. It will have to focus first on re-establishing and strengthening the rule of law as a precondition for providing all services in a non-discriminatory way based on laws and respective merit and not 'connections'. This is also a precondition for re-establishing the trust of citizens who, due to a lack of trust in state institutions, hitherto prefer informal structures when pursuing their legitimate interests (Benedek, 2010).

In order to overcome vested interests there is also a need for strengthening institutions, like national, regional, and local parliaments or assemblies. While the role of the international community – through election monitoring and technical assistance – is important in this process, it is civil society that has a crucial role to play. However, civil society in the developing states does not have a long tradition and often depends on attracting funding from the outside, while it is considered as part of the opposition by the national and local governments inside and accordingly hardly supported. The humanitarian crisis during the conflict in many places and the post-conflict needs, together with funding opportunities, have resulted in a fast growth of NGOs, which, however, only

partly exercise a public role. Still, Benedek (2010) notes, there has been a significant development of local brain trusts and think tanks, which provide a domestic analytical capacity and, together with international NGOs or on their own, are increasingly able to fulfill civil society functions in the public space.

III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The study will adopt social structure and anomie theory to understand and explain youth radicalization in Yobe State, Nigeria. Social structure and anomie theory is the outcome of Durkheim's (1893, as cited in Omotor, 2009) research on anomie. *Anomie theory* asserts that when social regulations are weak or broken, the controlling influence of society on the individual to conform to rules and regulations equally becomes weak or ineffective (Iwarimie-Jaja, 2003). The theory tries to establish relationship between structural bottleneck and anomie, as well as criminal tendency. For Durkheim (1897, as cited in Iwarimie-Jaja, 2003), anomie is a morally deregulated condition, that is, a breakdown in either the rules of society or the amoral norms. As such, when there are no clear rules to guide members of the society, individuals find it difficult to adjust to the changing conditions of life. This in turn, leads to frustration, conflict, dissatisfaction and deviance. Durkheim concludes that, crime or deviance is inevitable in a period of rapid socioeconomic change.

The theory of anomie is taken further by Merton (1938). Though Merton's (1938, as cited in Omotor, 2009) anomie theory did not focus on criminality, it emphasizes the fact that the existence of inequality, due to the way society is structured, may make it anomic. Merton begins by saying that society defines being successful in terms of certain goals (such as financial security) but does not always provide the means (including schooling and good jobs) to reach these cultural expectations. Merton locates two structurally inherent factors that occupy central importance for the sociological analysis of the relativity of deviant behavior: (1) "culturally defined goals," which are deemed by all and sundry, irrespective of status and position, as legitimate and highly desirable goals to pursue; and (2) the means the social structure condones as legitimate avenues for the pursuit of culturally prescribed ends (Bell, 2010).

Therefore, patterns of rule breaking depend on whether or not people accept society's goals and whether or not they have the opportunity to reach them. To this extent, five adaptations are bound to emerge (Iwarimie-Jaja, 2003). The modes of adaptations include: conformity, innovation, retreatism, ritualism, and rebellion. The first mode of adaptation, *conformity*, is non-deviant because the people that fell under its category accept both the culturally defined goals and the structurally condoned means of achieving the goals. All the other four are deviance or crimes. *Innovation* involves those individuals, who accept goals but reject the means, *retreatism* represents people who reject both goals and means, *ritualism* is for those who reject the goals but accept the means, and

rebellion is the act of those who try to change the entire system.

Sztompka (2003) also opines, Merton's structural analysis is understood as a condition of dissociation between uniform cultural demands of success and the differentiated opportunities for success. It is in such a condition that; anomie generates these various forms of deviant conduct.

The theory made a significant contribution towards explaining why criminal activities are becoming inevitable under social arrangements that design hard-earned values, a situation that drift some people to violence, for example youth radicalisation in Nigeria. In addition, using the Merton's mode of adaptation, the youth radicalisation is neatly classified under rebellion because the *Boko Haram* group and some other youth radicalization movement seeks to revolutionize the system from Western democratic governance to a government ruled by purely their version of Islamic constitution or any other interest that might trigger them to do so.

The theory is however criticized for many shortcomings. Among these critiques is that, the theory also assumes that all people share the same goals and values, which might not always be true. As Siegel (2010) notes, people pursue a number of different goals, including educational, athletic, and social success. Juveniles may be more interested in immediate goals, such as having an active social life or being a good athlete, than in long-term "ideal" achievements, such as monetary success. Achieving these goals is not a matter of social class alone; other factors, including athletic ability, intelligence, personality, and family life, can either hinder or assist goal attainment.


IV. METHODOLOGY

Brief History of Yobe State

Yobe State has a pluralistic population with rich and diverse historical and cultural heritage. The major ethnic groups in the state include the Kanuri/Manga, Fulani, Ngizim, Bolewa, Bade, Kare-Kare, Hausa, Ngamo, Babur/Maga and several other ethnic groups from different parts of the country. Most of the people are peasant farmers which the main reason why guinea corn, ground nuts, beans; maize, millet, wheat, and rice are produced in commercial quantities. A significant number of the inhabitants also engaged in trading, fishing, livestock and animal rearing. The state has the largest cattle market located at Potiskum town which makes it the supplier of livestock in the country. Traditionally, the people are known for the world famous durbar usually organized on important occasions like turbaning ceremonies of traditional rulers as well as honouring august visitors (Fartua, & Palmer, 1970). It is important to point out that, nature has endowed Yobe State with diverse economic potentials such as Diatomite, Limestone, Kaolin, Quartz, Gypsum, Gum-Arabic, and Potash. The capital of the Yobe State is positioned at Damaturu. The name Yobe was derived from River Yobe an

important geographical feature in the state. The State is strategically located in the far north eastern part of Nigeria carved out of the old Borno State in 27th August, 1991 by the then Military administration of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida. It has seventeen (17) Local Government Areas which all together covers an estimated area of 47,153 square kilometres. The state shares international boundary with the Republic of Niger to the North (YSG Diary, 2010; & YBS Gazette, 2013). Within the country, it shares borders with Jigawa and Bauchi States to the West, Borno State to the East as well as Gombe and Borno to the South. Based on the national head count, the population of the state stood at 2.5 million (CENSUS, 2006; & NPC, 2012). In the area of education, the state remained one of the educationally less developed in the federation (Unesco, 2012; 2013; Actionaid, 2013; & HDI, 2013). Specifically, girls' enrolment net stood at 15%. Government's efforts towards consolidating the educational system with a view to making it more adaptable to the realities and needs of the modern times leave much to be desired. Though, the situation may not be unconnected with the deep-rooted cultural values held by people.

Map of Yobe State Showing the Senatorial Districts



Research Design

This research was explanatory in nature for it identified the socio-economic reasons for the emergence of *Boko Haram* sect in the study area (Yobe State). The study therefore, determine whether unemployment, illiteracy, poverty, and other political reasons that predispose youth to involvement in radicalised groups, *Boko Haram* in particular. To generate the data, primary and secondary data sources were used. The research is thus survey, because questionnaire and interview were used as instruments of collecting the primary data. The secondary data are not more than library materials, text-books, journals, newspapers, available in libraries, etc. To tackle the menace of the youth radicalization, the study examines the

effectiveness of intelligence gathering for detection and prevention of victimization as a result radicalisation.

Population of the Study

As stated earlier, based on the national head count, the population of the state stood at 2.5 million (CENSUS, 2006; & NPC, 2012). The population of this study included; arrested and rehabilitated *Boko Haram* members, traditional leaders, law enforcement agents, politicians, members of the Civilian JTF (Kato da Gora), and representatives of the NGOs and CSOs of 18 years and above in Yobe State, Nigeria.

Sample Size

Because the populations of Yobe State are too large to cover in this research work, a total of 315 sample size was selected. From this total sample, 309 represent respondents for quantitative data; they were distributed with a questionnaire. 6 respondents out of the total sample were respondents for qualitative data; 1 respondent from business owners, 1 from arrested *Boko Haram* members, 1 respondent from traditional/religious leaders, 1 to be selected from the law enforcement agents for the interview, 1 civil servant and 1 victim.

Sampling Methods

The sampling technique for selecting the respondents was multi-stage sampling. In the initial stage, probability sampling using cluster sampling used to divide the Yobe State into three (3); Yobe Zone A Senatorial district, Zone B Senatorial district and Zone C Senatorial district, each constituting a cluster. In the second stage, 1 Local Government Area, where activities of the *Boko Haram* took place was selected using purposive sampling from each Senatorial district; making a total of 3 LGAs. In the third stage, 3 political wards were selected from each LGA using simple random sampling technique. To do this, simple lottery method was employed, i.e. the names of the political wards of a LGA will be written in pieces of papers and be folded properly. The folded pieces of papers were inserted into a container (say a jug or a cap) and then shake it well to mix them up. 3 pieces of papers was picked randomly. This gave 9 political wards at hand. In the fourth stage, 1 location was also randomly selected from each area using similar procedure used in the third stage (simple random sampling). This gave 9 locations. In the fifth stage, one street also selected from each location using the same method used in the third and fourth stages. In the sixth stage, 34 households, from which 1 respondent was given questionnaire, was selected from each street using simple random sampling. Lastly, purposive sampling technique was used and selected 6 respondents. That is, 309 out of the selected sample gave quantitative data, while qualitative data was generated from the other 6 subjects, the total of which is 315.

Instrument(s) of Data Collection

Two instruments of data collection were used, questionnaire guide and interview schedule was employed in the study, for complementarities. Questionnaire is instrumental in providing statistical or quantitative representation of the opinions of the subjects, hence positive outcome is guaranteed, whereas interview will provide an insight into the in-depth or feelings of the respondents, i.e. qualitative data. This will be relevant in order to increase the validity of the research finding because methodological triangulation (or at least mixed method) is encouraged in the current trend of social scientific research endeavors. In addition, secondary data was used throughout the study, especially in literature review and review of relevant literatures.

V. METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS

The method of data analysis was mixed one. Quantitative data analysis was employed to analyze data generated through questionnaires and conveniently achieved this using statistical tool; Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The outcome of this quantitative analysis is the vivid description of the socioeconomic causes of youth radicalisation in the study area and other opinions of the respondents. In addition, qualitative method of data analysis was also used in the analysis of data generated through interview sessions with the respondents: traditional/religious leaders, IDPs, business owners, law enforcement agents etc.

VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

This section deals with the presentation of the results and discussion. However, out of the 315 questionnaires distributed, only 292 were retrieved. Thus, the analysis would be based on the retrieved questionnaires (N=292).

Section A: Socio-Economic and Demographic Information of the Respondents

Table 1.1: Gender Distribution of the Respondents (N=292)

S/N	Gender	Frequency	Percentage (%)
A	Male	231	79.1
B	Female	61	20.9
C	No Response	0	0
	Total	292	100

Source: Survey, 2021

Table 1.1 presents data on the gender distribution of the respondents, where majority of the total respondents 231(79.1%) constitutes males and the minority 61(20.9%) represents the female respondents. This indicates that female population is under-represented in the study area.

Table 1.2: Age Distribution of the Respondents (N=292)

S/N	Age of the Respondents	Frequency	Percentage (%)
A	18-27	69	23.6

B	28-37	61	20.9
C	38-47	84	28.8
D	48-57	56	19.2
E	58-above	22	7.5
	Total	292	100

Source: Survey, 2021

Table 1.2 shows the age distribution of the respondents. Out of the total sample, respondents of 38-47 years are the majority which constitutes 84(28.8%), followed by respondents of 18-27 years of age who constitute 69(23.6%), those respondents of 28-37 years accounted for 61(20.9%) and then 48-57 years being 56(19.2%), Those from 58 years and above were the minority with 22 (7.5%) only.

Table 1.3: Marital Status of the Respondents (N=292)

S/N	Marital Status	Frequency	Percentage (%)
A	Single	67	22.9
B	Married	206	79.4
C	Divorced	14	2.1
D	Widowed	3	1.1
E	No answer	2	0.7
	Total	292	100

Source: Survey, 2021

Table 1.3 presents data on the marital status of the respondents, in which married persons represents the majority with 206(79.4%), while widowed persons represent the minority with 3(1.1%) in the total sample.

Table 1.4: Educational attainment of the Respondents (N=292)

S/N	Educational Attainment	Frequency	Percentage (%)
A	Primary	21	7.2
B	Secondary	89	30.5
C	Tertiary	128	43.8
D	Others	54	18.5
	Total	292	100

Source: Survey, 2021

Table 1.4 presents data on the educational attainment of the respondents. Respondents with tertiary education form the majority 128 (43.8%), while respondents with primary education were the minority with 21 (7.2%). Some significant percentage 89 (30.5%) acquired secondary school education. This indicates that majority of the sampled respondents are not only literate, but well educated.

Table 1.5: Occupation of the Respondents (N=292)

S/N	Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
A	Farming	25	8.6
B	Civil servant	102	34.9

C	Business men/women	107	36.6
D	Student	50	17.2
E	Others	08	2.7
	Total	292	100

Source: Survey, 2021

Table 1.5 presents data on the occupation of the respondents, in which business man/woman constitute the majority with 107(36.6%), followed by civil servants 102(34.9%) and other occupations (such as NGOs, banking and crafts work) were the minority with 8(2.7%), far less than farmers who constituted 25(8.6%). Therefore, there is slightly equal occupational distribution between civil service and business men/women in the study area.

Table 1.6: Monthly Income of the Respondents (N=292)

S/N	Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
A	Less than N10,000	03	1.0
B	N10,000-N19,999	14	4.8
C	N20,000-N29,999	25	8.6
D	N30,000-N39, 999	56	19.2
E	N40,000-above	194	66.4
	Total	292	100

Source: Survey, 2021

Table 1.6 presents the monthly income of the respondents. Majority of the respondents 194(66.4%) earns N 40,000 and above per month. Minority of the respondents 3(1.0%) earns less than N 10,000. This indicates that although there is high rate of poverty in Yobe State, the composition of the respondents does not represent the larger population because majority of the respondents were literates.

Section B: The Extent of Youth Radicalization in Yobe State

Table 2.1: Whether Respondents Were Aware of Youth Radicalization in Yobe State (N=292)

S/N	Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
A	Yes	291	99.7
B	No	01	0.3
	Total	292	100

Source: Survey, 2021

Table 2.1 presents data on whether the respondents were aware of youth radicalization in Yobe State. The majority of the respondents 291(99.7%) were aware of youth radicalization in Yobe State.

Table 2.2: The Extent of Youth Radicalization in Yobe State (N=292)

S/N	Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
A	Very high	108	37.0

B	High	144	49.3
C	Undecided	04	1.4
D	Low	23	7.9
E	Very low	13	4.4
	Total	292	100

Source: Survey, 2021

Table 2.2 presents data on the extent of youth radicalization in Yobe State. Those respondents who reported that the extent of youth radicalization in Yobe State is very high constituted 108(37.0%); High 144(49.3%), Undecided 4(1.4%), low accounted for 23(7.9%) while 13(4.4%) reported that the extent of youth radicalization is very low. Minority (1.4%) did not decide the extent of youth radicalization in the State. Therefore, majority of the respondents are of the view that radicalization is high in the State. One of the IDI respondents stated that:

It is obvious that more youths are being recruited especially in the neighbouring local governments of Geidam and Dogon Gida. Poverty and unemployment are some of the factors that motivated the youths to join Boko Haram. (A Male IDI respondent 1, 2021).

The finding is in concord with the findings of Oladimeji& Olusegun (2012) who observed that there is preponderance of radicalized movement acts which are manifestations of unresolved conflicts and the inability of the government to overcome the challenges are reflections that the root cause(s) of the conflicts are not identified.

Table 2.3: Youth radicalization is one of the Major Social Problems in the Yobe State.

S/N	Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
A	Strongly agree	121	41.4
B	Agree	136	46.6
C	Undecided	02	0.7
D	Disagree	21	7.2
E	Strongly disagree	12	4.1
	Total	292	100

Source: Survey, 2021

Table 2.3 presents data about the respondents' views on whether youth radicalization is one of the major social problems in Yobe State. Majority of the respondents 136(46.6%) agree that youth radicalization is one of the major social problems in the State; minority of the sampled respondents 12(4.1%) strongly disagree that youth radicalization is one of the major social problems in the State. This indicates that youth radicalization is one of the major social problems in Yobe State. According to one of the IDI respondents:

Indeed, youth radicalization is one of the major social problems in the Yobe State because it was the reason for setback in various social, economic and political sectors. Government offices and schools were shut down because of youth radicalization; families were disintegrated, people were forced to stay at home in the name curfew like COVID-19; we could not come market and do our everyday life activities because of youth radicalization. (A Male IDI respondent 2, 2021).

Section C: The Factors Responsible for Youth Radicalization in Yobe State

This section deals with the factors responsible for youth radicalization in the study area (Yobe State).

Table 3.1: The Factors Responsible for Youth Radicalization in Yobe State

S/N	Factors Responsible for Youth Radicalization	Yes	No
A.	Injustice	281(96.2%)	11(3.8%)
B.	Illiteracy/Ignorance	275(94.2%)	17(5.8%)
C.	Poverty/unemployment	289(99.0%)	3(1.0%)
D.	Political interest	251(86.0%)	41(14.0%)

Source: Survey, 2021

Table 3.1 presents data on the factors responsible for youth radicalization in Yobe State. Majority of the respondents 281(96.2%) reported that injustice is one of the factors responsible for youth radicalization in Yobe State, while minority 11(3.8%) do not believe injustice is a factor for the problem. Majority of the respondents 275(94.2%) reported that illiteracy or ignorance is one of the factors responsible for youth radicalization in Yobe State, while minority 17(5.8%) do not believe that illiteracy or ignorance is a factor for the problem. Majority of the respondents 289(99.0%) reported that poverty and unemployment are factors responsible for youth radicalization in Yobe State, while minority 3(1.0%) do not believe that poverty and unemployment are factors responsible for the problem. Majority of the respondents 251(86.0%) reported that political interest is one of the factors responsible for youth radicalization in Yobe State, while minority 41(14.0%) do not believe that political interest is a factor for the problem. One of the female IDI respondents also mentioned that:

Joblessness, high rate of poverty, illiteracy and lack of good parental upbringing are amongst the major reasons why youths are attracted to these violent movements, because if a youth has a better alternative like decent employment opportunities he/she will hardly be convinced that joining Boko Haram is the best option for them. (A Female IDI respondent 3, 2021).

As seen in the above table that, Majority of the respondents 289(99.0%) reported that poverty and unemployment are factors responsible for youth radicalization in Yobe State, the

finding is in agreement with the findings of Adenrele (2012) who linked youth radicalization in the northeastern Nigeria to poverty and political alienation.

Table 3.2: Whether Terrorist Organizations Are Reasons for Youth Radicalization in Yobe State (N=292)

S/N	Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
A	Yes	287	98.3
B	No	05	1.7
	Total	292	100

Source: Survey, 2021

Table 3.2 presents respondents' views on whether terrorist organizations are the reasons for youth radicalization in Yobe State. Majority of the respondents 287(98.3%) affirmed that terrorist organizations are the reasons for youth radicalization in Yobe State, while 5(1.7%) did not believe that terrorist organizations are the reasons for youth radicalization in Yobe State. In line with the above responses, respondent also stated that:

There is strong relationship between youth radicalization in the northeastern Nigeria and other terrorist organizations.... In many instances, the Boko Haram has been associating itself with other international terrorist groups like Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM). The groups have also been financing the terrorist activities of the Nigeria's domestic terrorist group (Boko Haram). (A Male IDI Respondent 4, 2021).

The findings of this work clearly shows that, majority of the respondents 287(98.3%) affirmed that terrorist organizations are the reasons for youth radicalization in Yobe State. In line with the above finding, Robert-okah (2014) has associated youth radicalization in the northeastern with other terrorist organizations because of their contacts through migration, globalisation and porous security heritage.

Table 3.3: Religious Manipulation is One of the Major Factors Responsible for Youth Radicalization in Yobe State (N=292)

S/N	Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
A	Strongly agree	262	89.7
B	Agree	22	7.6
C	Undecided	01	0.3
D	Disagree	05	1.7
E	Strongly disagree	02	0.7
	Total	292	100

Source: Survey, 2021

Table 3.3 presents respondents' views on whether religious manipulation is one of the major factors responsible for youth radicalization in Yobe State. Majority of the respondents 262(89.7%) strongly agree that religious manipulation is one

of the major factors responsible for youth radicalization in the State. A Female IDI respondent 5, stated that:

Most of the youths were indeed manipulated by some selfish Muslim priests, who seemed to be working on contract to create violence. The youths are religiously manipulated because they do not understand the religion, as Islamic religion. ... (A Female IDI respondent 5, 2021).

Section D: The Consequences of Youth Radicalization in Yobe State

This section deals with issues surrounding the consequences of youth radicalization in Yobe State.

Table 4.1: Youth Radicalization has Consequences in Yobe State (N=292)

S/N	Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
A	Yes	292	100.0
B	No	00	0.0
	Total	292	100

Source: Survey, 2021

Table 4.1 presents respondents’ opinions on whether youth radicalization has certain consequences in Yobe State. The entire sampled respondents (100.0%) suggested that youth radicalization has certain consequences in Yobe State.

Table 4.2: The Consequences of Youth Radicalization in Yobe State (N=292)

S/N	Consequences of Youth Radicalization	Yes	No	Total
A.	Destruction of lives	290(99.3%)	02(0.7%)	292(100%)
B.	Destruction of valuable properties	289(99.0%)	03(1.0%)	292(100%)
C.	Displacement of people	291(99.7%)	01(0.3%)	292(100%)
D.	Widespread public panic	277(94.9%)	15(5.1%)	292(100%)

Source: Survey, 2021

Table 4.2 presents data on the specific consequences of youth radicalization in Yobe State. Majority of the respondents 290(99.3%) reported that destruction of lives is one of the consequences of youth radicalization in the State, while 2(0.7%) do not believe that destruction of lives is a consequence of youth radicalization. Majority of the respondents 289(99.0%) reported that destruction of valuable properties is one of the consequences of youth radicalization in the State, while minority 3(1.0%) do not believe that it is a consequence of youth radicalization. Majority of the respondents 291(99.7%) reported that displacement of people is one of the consequences of youth radicalization in the State, while 1(0.3%) do not believe it is a consequence of youth radicalization. Majority of the respondents 277(94.9%) reported that widespread public panic is one of the consequences of youth radicalization in the State, while 15(5.1%) do not believe that it is a consequence of youth

radicalization. In line with the above data, a female IDI respondent made the following remark, thus:

I cannot exhaustively give account of the consequences of youth radicalization in Yobe State. Many men, especially the youths have deserted their families and joined Boko Haram. Some of the youths from Boko Haram and from the communities have been killed. Old and young people were killed, too. That is why we have many widows and orphans all around, not to talk of displacement of families, destruction of farmlands, lives and other valuable properties... (A Female IDI respondent 6, 2021)

Table 4.3: Youth radicalization has affected the commercial activities in Yobe State (N=292)

S/N	Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
A	Strongly agree	173	59.2
B	Agree	114	39.1
C	Undecided	01	0.3
D	Disagree	3	1.1
E	Strongly disagree	01	0.3
	Total	292	100

Source: Survey, 2021

Table 4.3 presents respondents’ views on whether youth radicalization has affected the commercial activities in Yobe State. Out of the total sample, 292(59.2%) strongly agree that radicalization has affected the commercial activities in the State, while 114(39.4%) agree that radicalization has affected the commercial activities in the State.

Section E: De-radicalization Strategies for Youth Radicalization in Yobe state, Nigeria

This section deals with de-radicalization strategies for youth radicalization in Yobe State, Nigeria.

Table 5.1: Respondents Views on What Can Be Done to Reduce the Tendency for Youth Radicalization (N=292)

S/N	Response	Yes	No	Total
A	Provision of employment	288(98.6%)	04(1.4%)	292(100%)
B	Poverty reduction	291(99.7%)	01(0.3%)	292(100%)
C	Education and enlightenment	292(100.0%)	00(0.0%)	292(100%)
D	Moderate preaching by religious leaders	291(99.7%)	01(0.3%)	292(100%)

Source: Survey, 2021

Table 5.1: shows the respondents’ views on what can be done to reduce the tendency for youth radicalization. Out of the sample, 288(98.6%) reported that provision of employment can reduce the tendency for youth radicalization, while 4(1.4%) did not believe that provision of employment can reduce the tendency for youth radicalization. Majority of the respondents 291(99.7%) reported that poverty reduction can reduce youth radicalization, while 1(0.3%) do not believe that

it can reduce youth radicalization. The entire respondents reported that education and enlightenment can reduce youth radicalization. Finally, majority of the respondents 291(99.7%) reported that moderate preaching by religious leaders can reduce youth radicalization, while 1(0.3%) does not believe that can reduce youth radicalization.

As stated by one of the male, IDI respondents 7:

Some of the things to be done to reduce youth radicalization are provision of employment, protecting the youths from extremist views spread by these illiterate preachers, changing the whole almajiri system and the government to be extra-vigilant with foreign influences. This is because the factors responsible for youth radicalization are not shortfall of these problems that should be addressed. ... (A Male IDI Respondent 7, 2021).

Adewumi (2014), on the other hand observes that it is a veritable tool to proactively sensitize, caution and protect the citizenry, such as declaration of 'state of emergency' and 'curfew', intelligence on potential targets, movements, mobilisation and attacks among others could protect lives properties and reduce casualties in the moment of violence due to radicalization.

Table 5.2: Strategies for Fighting Youth Radicalization (N=292)

S/ N	Strategy	Yes	No	Total
a.	Community policing/ Community participation	210(71.9%)	82(28.1%)	292(100%)
b.	Excessive use of force by the JTF	81(27.7%)	211(72.3%)	292(100%)
c.	Intelligence gathering	287(98.3%)	5(1.3%)	292(100%)
d.	Human, wireless and electronic surveillance	101(34.6%)	191(65.4%)	292(100%)
e.	Guidance and counseling of arrested radicalized youths	290(99.3%)	02(07%)	292(100%)

Source: Survey, 2021

Table 5.2: presents data on the strategies appropriate for fighting youth radicalization in Yobe State. Out of the total sample, 210(71.9%) reported that community policing or community participation is the appropriate strategy for fighting youth radicalization in the study area, while 82(28.1%) did not believe that community policing or community participation is the appropriate strategy for fighting youth radicalization. Minority of the respondents 81(27.7%) reported that excessive use of force by the JTF is the appropriate strategy for fighting youth radicalization, while majority of the respondents 211(72.3%) reported that excessive use of force by the JTF is not the appropriate strategy for fighting youth radicalization. Majority of the respondents 287(98.3%) reported that intelligence gathering is the appropriate strategy for fighting youth radicalization; while 5(1.3%) does not believe that it is appropriate for fighting the problem. Minority of the respondents 101(34.6%) reported that human, wireless and electronic surveillance is

the appropriate strategy for fighting youth radicalization, while majority of the respondents 191(65.4%) reported that human, wireless and electronic surveillance is not the appropriate strategy for fighting youth radicalization. Almost all of the respondents 290(99.3%) reported that guidance and counseling of arrested radicalized youths is the appropriate strategy for fighting youth radicalization, while 02(0.7%) reported that it is not appropriate for fighting the problem.

The anomy theory employed for this study has clearly interpret the result of this work, as it is stated above, the theory tries to establish relationship between structural bottleneck and anomie, as well as criminal tendency. For Durkheim (1897, as cited in Iwarimie-Jaja, 2003), anomie is a morally deregulated condition, that is, a breakdown in either the rules of society or the amoral norms. As such, when there are no clear rules to guide members of the society, individuals find it difficult to adjust to the changing conditions of life. This in turn, leads to frustration, conflict, dissatisfaction and deviance. Durkheim concludes that, crime or deviance is inevitable in a period of rapid socioeconomic change. This shows that, the issue of youth radicalization in Yobe state as found in this research work specifically the causes make the youth to adopt *rebellion* (a mode of adaptation in anomy) which is the act of those who try to change the entire system. Though, the work findings showcase the Consequences of Youth Radicalization in Yobe State and What Can Be Done to Reduce the Tendency for Youth Radicalization as well as some recommendations.

VII. CONCLUSION

This research investigated factors responsible for youth radicalization in Yobe State, Nigeria. In conclusion, the extent of youth radicalization in Yobe State is very high because more youths are being recruited especially in the local governments like Geidam and Babbangida. The findings of this work classified the factors into: Educational factor which include; Illiteracy, ignorance. Economic factor; poverty, unemployment. Religious factor; such as religious manipulation. Social factor; globalisation, injustice and Political factor; which is basically political interests are some of the factors that motivated the youths to join radicalized groups in the State. Many consequences of youth radicalization have been identified, such as destruction of lives, valuable properties, displacement of families and widespread public panic. Many youths have deserted their families and joined Boko Haram and died as a result. Old and young people were killed, too; hence the increasing number of widows and orphans all around. To address youth radicalization in Yobe State, education and enlightenment, deliberate effort is needed at providing employment, protecting the youths from extremist views spread by less knowledgeable preachers, community policing, guidance and counseling of arrested radicalized youths, changing the whole *almajiri* system and the government to be extra-vigilant with foreign influences through intelligence gathering.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings of the study, the following recommendations are suggested in order to address youth radicalization in Yobe State:

1. As stated in table 3:1, Majority of the respondents 275 (94.2%) reported that illiteracy or ignorance is one of the factors responsible for youth radicalization in Yobe State, therefore, the government should make deliberate effort for providing free and quality education for children of the indigene.
2. Government and Non-Governmental Organisations should collaborate and introduce special programmes for youths' enlightenment on their vulnerability and malleability as they are easily always the targets of advocates of violence radicalization;
3. There should be deliberate effort for creating more decent employment opportunities for the youths;
4. More poverty reduction schemes are needed to prevent the involvement of youths into radicalized groups;
5. Community policing, guidance and counseling of arrested radicalized youths will prevent recidivism;
6. The problem of youth radicalization in the northeastern Nigeria is associated with *almajiri* system, because children were taken away from their parent right from childhood. Even if it cannot be banned, the whole *almajiri* system should be overhauled;
7. There are several evidences that youth radicalization in Yobe and other parts of the country are also influenced by some clandestine foreign forces. Thus, government should be extra-vigilant with foreign influences through intelligence gathering.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The authors acknowledged the generosity of Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TET Fund) for funding the research.

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