

The Impact of Changing the Status of Papua's Armed Criminal Group (KKB) Into The Terrorist Separatist Group (KST) on Handling

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Abstract: The Armed Criminal Group has been designated as a Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group by the Indonesian government. The group, which aims to separate from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, has carried out many acts of violence and murder against both civilians and security forces. The change in status has had an impact and consequence in its handling. In this paper the method used is a literature and literature study. The handling of insurgency and terrorism in Indonesia has historically undergone a change from the use of its strategy from military force to law enforcement. After the change in the status of the Armed Criminal Group to the Separatist Terrorism Group, the government must immediately prepare national readiness to carry out counter-terrorism with various policies and measures that are effective and efficient.

Keywords: Terorime, Status Change, Handling.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Indonesian government through the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs (Menko Polhukam) ensures that the government has categorized the Papuan Armed Criminal Groups (KKB), including those that support the KKB, as the Separatist Terrorist Group (KST). The status change was previously carried out by the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) after the Head of the Papua Regional Intelligence Agency, Brigadier General TNI I Gusti Putu Danny Karya Nugraha, was shot by KKB and died during a gunfight with KKB in the Kampung Dambet, Beoga District, Papua, on Sunday, April 25, 2021.

According to Mahfud MD (2021), that the Government considers organizations and people in Papua who commit massive violence to be designated as terrorists. The determination of this status is in line with the statements of a number of figures and organizations, such as the TNI, BIN, Polri and MPR. Several cases of violence and brutality perpetrated by the KKB in Papua often occur and not a few civilians are victims of the KKB violence.

The problems in Papua (formerly Irian Jaya) began with differences of opinion between Indonesia and the Netherlands during the Round Table Conference (KMB) at the end of 1949. In that KMB, Indonesia and the Netherlands did not succeed in reaching an agreement on Indonesia's sovereign territory. The delegation from Indonesia (Chairman Moh. Hatta) did not want to back down from the attitude that had been held before the proclamation, that the territory of

Indonesia was the entire territory of the Dutch East Indies. The Dutch rejection of Indonesia's desire to include Irian Jaya into Indonesian territory resulted in an agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands to postpone negotiations until a year later. The postponement of negotiations on the Irian Jaya issue was agreed by both parties to end the KMB (Nazarudin, 1989).

Any attempt to return West Irian to Indonesian territory through peaceful means is no longer possible. Indonesia is looking for another way by taking action outside the United Nations (Remarks on the rejection of the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Soebandrio to the UN General Assembly, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1971). Various negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands regarding the status of the New Guinea region never yielded results to Indonesia. The Dutch government still maintains New Guinea as its territory. In fact, the Netherlands established relations with Australia in developing a plan to separate the territory of New Guinea from Indonesia (Tuhana, 2001).

In dealing with Dutch politics, President Soekarno initiated the Tri Komando Rakyat (Trikorra) on December 19, 1961 in Yogyakarta. Trikorra consists of: 1) Failing to establish the state of Papua made by the colonial Dutch; 2) Raise the red and white in West Irian, the homeland of Indonesia; 3) Be prepared to mobilize the general public to defend the independence and unity of the homeland and the nation (Djopari, 1993). Trikorra became Indonesia's political momentum, because with Trikorra, the Dutch were forced to sign an agreement at the United Nations. The agreement is known as the New York Agreement (15 August 1962). Trikorra was also the venue for a limited military attack from Indonesia against the Dutch in West Irian at the end of 1961 and accelerated the achievement of the New York Agreement between the Indonesian government and the Dutch government regarding West Irian or Nieuw Guinea (Tuhana, 2001).

One of the contents of the New York agreement was that the Netherlands transferred West Irian to the United Nation Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) on October 1, 1962. After May 1, 1963, Indonesia and UNTEA ruled West Irian together. Then Indonesia conducted a People's Opinion (PEPERA) in West Irian from July to August 1969. The

results of the PEPERA were accepted by the United Nations General Assembly through Resolution Number: 2504 (XXIV) on November 19, 1969 with the results of 30 (abstained), 84 (agree) and 0 (against). The results of PEPERA under international law, since then West Irian has become Irian Jaya, which is officially an Indonesian territory (Samsudin, 1995).

West Irian became part of the Republic of Indonesia through the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch Government on May 1, 1963 through UNTEA. The implementation of development in West Irian encountered various problems, including integration activities in West Irian (Djopari, 1993). In the early days of integrating with Indonesia, the Irian Jaya Special Operations Agency (Opsus) carried out the mobilization and development of the tools needed to strengthen integration. On the other hand, Papuan nationalist cadres, who previously needed the Dutch, persuaded associations and organizations in West Irian by gathering strength with the underground movement (stealth). This illegal organization aims to fight for the independence of Papua (Irian Jaya) or be separated from the Dutch government and the Indonesian government (Tuhana, 2001).

On July 26, 1965, the Free Papua Movement (OPM) rebellion began, led by Sergeant Major Permanes Ferry Awom (former member of the Papuan volunteer battalion/Papua Vrijwilligers Korp). OPM started in Manokwari and then spread to all regions in West Irian such as Sorong, Fakfak, Paniai, Biak Numfor, Japen-Waropen, Jayawijaya and Merauke and Jayapura (Djopari, 1993). OPM is an organizational movement under the leadership of the sons of Irian Jaya pro West Papua which aims to separate themselves from the Republic of Indonesia (Tuhana, 2001). The OPM since the 1960s has carried out many guerrilla actions in demanding secession from the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. OPM was formed as an expression of disappointment because of the injustice experienced by the people of Irian Jaya (Herdi et al., 2000).

The OPM is also seeking the support of the people of Irian Jaya, especially those who are anti-Indonesian. Communities involved in OPM provide support in the form of food, equipment, medicines and funding to OPM. In addition, the OPM in achieving its goals, namely separation from the Republic of Indonesia, seeks foreign political support as has been done by the OPM since 1951, seeking support for weapons assistance (Tuhana, 2001).

The OPM has carried out many actions, such as killing TNI and Polri officers, killing civilians, raping residents, burning schools and places of worship and ambushing both TNI and Polri officers. According to data from the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Gadjah Mada University, in the period 2010-2020 there have been 146 cases of violence in Papua. About 80 percent of them are carried out by KKB. Based on the same research, the number of civilians who became victims of violence in Papua reached 356. This includes victims from the military and police (93%) and the rest from

the KKB (7%). Some records of acts of violence and killings that occurred throughout 2021 as conveyed by the Head of Public Relations of the Papua Regional Police, Police Commissioner AM Kamal, are the murder of a motorcycle taxi driver in Kampung Ilambet, Ilaga on February 9, 2021; The stabbing of women in Kampung Juguloma, Beoga on February 18, 2021; The murder of 2 elementary and Junior High School teachers in Kampung Juguloma, on April 8 and 9, 2021; Burning helicopter belonging to PT. Arsa Air at Aminggaru Airport, Ilaga on April 11, 2021; Burning of the house of the Head of Junior High School and members of the Regional House of Representatives in Kampung Juguloma, Beoga on April 13, 2021; The murder of a motorcycle taxi driver in Kampung Eromaga, Omukia District on April 14, 2021; The murder of a High School student at Ilaga in Kampung Ulomi on April 15, 2021; The burning of the house of the tribal chief and teacher in kampung Dambet, Beoga on April 17, 2021 and the shooting of the head of the Papuan Regional Intelligence Agency Brigadier General TNI I Gusti Putu Danny Karya Nugraha, in Kampung Dambet, Beoga on April 25, 2021.

So far, the OPM has been referred to as the Armed Criminal Group (KKB). The KKB status was considered by the government to be upgraded to a terrorist movement. The OPM is considered to have often carried out acts of terror that undermine the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia. Rebellions carried out by the KKB are always repeated and have caused many victims, both civilians and the military. The government has confirmed that it has categorized the KKB in Papua as a terrorist group. With the change in status from KKB to KST, the questions that need to be answered are:

1. How is the handling of insurgency and terrorism in Indonesia today?
2. What is the impact of changing the status of KKB to KST on the handling?

II. RESEARCH METHODS

In this paper, the method used is literature (literature Study) and interviews as well as discussions with resource persons who are expected to understand and master the substance in writing, and are willing to provide data and information expected by researchers. The results of the literature review and interviews will be summarized, analyzed and synthesized in depth from the interviews and literature reviewed and reviewed. Literature review is a method used to collect data/sources related to topics obtained from various sources such as books, journals, internet, and other libraries. Meanwhile, interviews and discussions were conducted with competent resource persons according to the topic of writing.

Literature study does not only mean reading the literature, but more towards an in-depth evaluation of previous research on a topic being discussed. Literature study is a critical and in depth evaluation of previous research (Shuttleworth, 2009). The literature study method used in this paper uses empirical findings that are described in detail and are clearer and more

accurate, especially various matters relating to the impacts of changing the status of the KKB to terrorists. Through this writing, the author hopes that the literature study collected can help the author in thinking and developing concepts, can imagine abstractly related to the impacts that arise with the change in the status of the KKB to become a terrorist.

III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The government has officially declared the KKB a terrorist group. As stated by Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Mahfud Md that the decision is the government's attitude towards a series of KKB attacks in Papua, including the TNI, Polri and civil society. The government considers the KKB in Papua that commits massive violence to be categorized as terrorists. This assumption is in accordance with Law Number 5 of 2018 concerning Amendments to Law Number 15 of 2003 concerning Stipulation of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2002 concerning Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism into Law, namely Article 1 point 2 which "Terrorism is an act that uses violence or threats of violence that creates an atmosphere of terror or widespread fear, which can cause mass casualties, and/or cause damage or destruction to strategic vital objects, the environment, public facilities, or facilities. international organizations with ideological, political or security motives. Based on this definition, all KKB actions are terrorist acts.

Since its establishment in 1965, KKB has used two ways to achieve its goals, namely political resources and violence. Political resources are shown by forming organizations/groups (OPM) or networks that are used in recruitment, propaganda, training and various other diplomatic and political means to seek support from both the local community and the international community. According to a report by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) with the title "The Current Status of the Papuan Pro Independence Movement" (2015), it is stated that many fragments of the OPM group are based abroad, such as in Europe, America and the Pacific. Fractions of the OPM groups such as the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) and the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation (WPNC) are trying to gather international support for Papuan independence.

Meanwhile, violence can take the form of guerrilla, terrorism and conventional war. Guerrilla warfare is carried out against combatants (TNI-Polri), terrorism is carried out against civilians (non combatants) in their territory and conventional war is carried out when strength has grown (Tito Karnavian, 2013). According to Louis Richardson (2007) there are other considerations for dealing with insurgency. Richardson's research that has been carried out on dozens of terrorism groups and insurgents in the world states that there are 3 causes of the emergence of terrorism and insurgency, namely disaffected persons, enabling groups and legitimizing ideology (Richardson, 2007). Efforts are needed to resolve the

dissatisfaction of these people, stop their groups and organizations and neutralize the ideology that encourages and allows these people to carry out acts of violence.

Handling Insurgency In Indonesia.

Insurgency can be defined as the struggle of the powerless group against the ruling government by using political resources and violence to achieve political goals (Colin S., 1999). Insurgency is part of asymmetrical (non-conventional) forms of war. War is called conventional if both parties use the same methods and tools of war (tends to involve state actors). Meanwhile, war is asymmetric if both parties do not use the same methods and tools. According to Liddlehart, asymmetric warfare occurs because one party realizes that its strength is weaker, so that in dealing with the opponent it does not use the same method and chooses a method by not facing the opponent's strength directly (indirect approach).

The insurgents will take advantage of time by making the war protracted and without having to control territory or expand its power. With high mobility (mobility) and a wide network of organizations to be able to win public support both at home and abroad, the existence of this organization is everywhere so it has reasons to legitimize their resistance (John Baylis, 2007). With a protracted war, insurgency can weaken stronger opponents due to reduced resources, troop frustration due to insurgent disturbances and reduced public confidence in the opponent's ability to provide security guarantees and resolve problems in conflict areas.

Handling insurgency in Indonesia in the pre-reform period was using military force strategy. The handling was quite effective (era 1945-1980) where military forces were able to handle several rebellions such as RMS, PKI Madiun, DI/TII, PRRI/Permesta and other rebellions. However, after 1980, the government failed to deal with two insurgents, namely the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and Fretilin in East Timor. The two insurgents involved the government in a protracted armed conflict. In the case of East Timor, Fretilin was able to win the support of the East Timorese community and international support which brought East Timor to independence (1999). In the case of the Free Aceh Movement, the government has not succeeded in stabilizing the security situation in Aceh. The GAM group was actually able to increase local community support. The high level of violence in the Aceh region and the diplomatic steps of GAM leaders were also able to grab the attention of the international community. The government finally took a diplomatic step by negotiating with GAM through international facilitators.

The East Timor referendum and the GAM negotiations were logical political steps. The government was successful in stabilizing the security situation in Aceh, but from a strategic point of view, this step was a success for Fretilin and GAM, who were able to survive the government's forces and succeeded in strengthening support to achieve their agenda and interests.

Entering the reformation era, major changes occurred in the world that affected changes in the Indonesian government's strategy in dealing with insurgency cases. The cold war, which was won by the American-led Western Bloc, made the world's great powers under American rule with the ideology of liberal democracy and prioritizing the protection of human rights. The emergence of many non-state actors brings international rules that must be followed by all actors.

The handling of insurgency by the state cannot be carried out arbitrarily with a conventional approach (military force). Many western countries as well as international institutions with various constructive rules become world watchdogs. How to handle a country's conflict, if the government is not in accordance with the handling of their country's conflict with the new Western version of the rules, they do not hesitate to intervene in the country. Including Indonesia can not be separated from these changes, which so far the military has been the main player in every counter-insurgency operation, began to be careful in handling insurgents for fear of being accused of human rights violations. Several military cases that began to be questioned in the handling of insurgency in the past, such as the Tanjung Priok case, Talangsari Lampung and after the East Timor referendum, made the military a passive player (Tito Karnavian, 2013).

The emergence of a civilian government makes the role of the military sidelined in various lines, including the field of domestic security where insurgency is in it. The role of the military is limited to defense, while internal security is entirely left to the National Police. Political changes and a democratic system have made the role of the National Police to be prominent in handling insurgency and conflicts of domestic violence. It's just that there is an unpreparedness of the Polri institution in carrying out this new role. The unpreparedness of the National Police in handling insurgency is due to the system and resources owned by the Police are still scarce and the attitude of the military tends to be passive. In its previous role, the military had intelligence data when handling domestic insurgencies, making various insurgency cases and violent conflicts in the country protracted in their handling. The long duration of handling cases such as Poso, Ambon, the strengthening of GAM's influence and the victory of Fretilin are evidence of the weakness of this political change. In this case, the government places more emphasis on law enforcement strategies where the perpetrators of insurgency or violent conflict are processed regularly. This government strategy is in accordance with democratic conditions in emphasizing the protection of human rights.

Handling Terrorism in Indonesia.

According to Lacquer (1979), terrorism is rooted in the existence of wide socio-economic inequality in society. Efforts to define terrorism cannot be separated from moral problems. This moral problem is related to the reality that in defining terrorism it cannot be separated from an assessment that there are violent incidents that are justified on the one

hand, and there are incidents of violence that are not justified on the other. Therefore, efforts to define terrorism cannot be separated from controversy (Wardlaw, 1989). Basically the term terrorism is a concept that has a sensitive connotation because terrorism results in the emergence of innocent civilian victims.

In Indonesia, the definition of terrorism is guided by Law Number 5 of 2018 concerning the Crime of Terrorism. According to the law, terrorism is defined as the act of a person who intentionally uses violence or threats of violence that creates an atmosphere of terror or fear in people widely or causes mass casualties, by depriving people of their freedom or taking the lives and property of others or cause damage or destruction to strategic vital objects or the environment or public facilities or international facilities.

There are many programs in Countering terrorism. Fink and Hearne (2008) quoted Audrey Cronin, saying that one of the counter-terrorism measures carried out is by decapitation (separating the leadership), thus causing the group's inability to pass on values to the next generation, weakening group participation in the political process or negotiations, loss of support. society, the low achievement felt by the group.

Indonesia has many records of acts of terror that have occurred, even since the beginning of Indonesia's independence. The resistance movement against the government or formal law, begins with dissatisfaction with the government. Counter-terrorism efforts have been carried out since before the reform era. At that time, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) was the spearhead in counter-terrorism actions. Along with the reform process in Indonesia, the government decided to separate the functions of the TNI and Polri through TAP MPR/VII/2000. The separation of these institutions then gave a significant change to the counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia. Since then, the government has established a new counter-terrorism organization under the National Police, known as Densus 88, which aims to deal with domestic terrorism. In terms of handling terrorism, the TNI plays a supporting role, as regulated in Article 7 of Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning the TNI in the context of Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP).

There are two approaches in dealing with terrorism, namely the criminal justice model and the war model. Both have different foundations and views in tackling acts of terror. The criminal justice model places counter-terrorism efforts within the framework or paradigm of law enforcement, while the war model places it in the framework or paradigm of war (weapons). The criminal justice model approach is widely adopted by liberal democratic countries. This approach considers terrorism as a violation of the law, so that efforts to overcome it are through law enforcement. In democratic countries, it is more important to enforce the law because this is the basis of a democratic constitution. The government of a country can lose its legitimacy if it violates this. The legal

approach seeks to tackle terrorism in a peaceful, accountable manner, has legitimacy from the community, and upholds human rights principles. This is in line with the position of the United Nations (UN) in terms of drafting a counter-terrorism strategy as seen in Kofi Annan's statement in his speech at the Security Council's Counterterrorism Committee on March 6, 2003 "...as terrorism involves the calculated use of violence in violation of the law, our response to terrorism should aim to ensure the rule of law..."

As a democratic country, in dealing with terrorism, the Indonesian government uses a criminal justice model approach without overriding the war model. The deradicalization program implemented by the National Police is a realization of the Criminal justice model approach. Deradicalization is an effort that is considered to play a role in handling and preventing terrorism. To carry out the deradicalization strategy in Indonesia, a special agency has been formed, namely the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT).

However, the deradicalization strategy is also considered to have not succeeded in preventing acts of terrorism as evidenced by the many acts of terrorism that have occurred even though many terrorist figures have been arrested and rehabilitated against terrorists. When the deradicalization strategy has not been successful, there is a discourse on dealing with acts of terrorism with new methods and strategies, namely disengagement. The disengagement strategy is considered better and more important than the more extreme deradicalization approach. Deradicalization places more emphasis on changing the ideology of terrorist actors, while disengagement seeks to change terrorist actors to be able to hate acts of violence without abandoning the ideology they believe in.

Deradicalization and disengagement are part of the strategy of counter-terrorism policies used by the Indonesian government. In contrast to deradicalization, disengagement is more defined as breaking ties or pulling out terrorist actors by changing perpetrators to abandon use and abandon violence. According to Hochschild (1975), this theory was first put forward by Cumming in 1960 in "Growing Old" in an article by Elaine Cumming and William Henry who used a psychological approach, trying to explain the phenomenon of a person changing into aloof (separate) from the group. Then this theory developed, one of which was put forward by Albert Bandura with his theory of moral disengagement. Bandura developed this theory to analyze individual behavior. According to Bandura (1990), as quoted by Crenshaw, that the principal source of destructive action is an uncontrollable impulse. Bandura proves that psychological processes in a person can be disengaged in internal regulatory mechanisms to control violence (Crenshaw 2000). Finally, this theory was also developed and used to formulate counter-terrorism policies. According to Horgan (2005), acts of terrorism are the result of the interaction process within a terror group and can provide new enthusiasm for group members and a special

attraction for prospective members to build commitment and be more tightly bound, so that acts of terrorism must be prevented by pulling out terrorists. of what it will do, as used by the Indonesian government in countering terrorism.

Impact of Changes in Status of Papuan Armed Criminal Groups (KKB) to Separatist Terrorist Groups (KST).

In general, terrorists have the characteristics of using violence illegally (against the law), planned, measured, against civilians (non combatants), carried out by groups, professionals as part of the state, or individuals, publication of their actions to achieve goals (change) political, ideological or religious, intimidate individuals, groups or countries and create feelings of fear or insecurity (Whittaker, 2002). Not obeying the laws and regulations of war, indiscriminate use of violence which later became the difference between terrorist acts and freedom fighters, revolutionaries, members of the democratic opposition, or nationalist liberation soldiers (Lutz, 2004).

The government's decision to declare KKB as KST Papua because KST has been proven to be the mastermind behind terrorist acts in various regions of Papua. In addition to attacking the TNI-Polri, the group also terrorized and shot dead people, resulting in many victims for their actions. The action of the Papuan KKB which disturbs the security of residents by burning, looting, disrupting security and even murdering heinous crimes has earned it the label of a terrorist group. The government made the decision based on Law Number 5 of 2018 concerning Amendments to Law Number 15 of 2003 concerning Stipulation of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2002 concerning Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism into Law.

The government's decision to change KKB to KST has gone through a process of discussion and study by the government. The decision has considered all aspects, both legal and social risks that will be faced. The change in the status of KKB to KST also shows that there is a serious government effort in dealing with security disturbances caused by KKB. As stated by President Joko Widodo, in an online press release on April 26, 2021, which stated that "I emphasize that there is no place for armed criminal groups, both in Papua and in all corners of the country". In order for government decisions to be carried out effectively, efficiently and in accordance with the objectives, they must be supported by all parties.

According to terrorism and intelligence observer Ridlwan Habib, there are consequences for changing the status of KKB to KST, namely first, that the main player in handling KST is coordinated by the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), law enforcement is the Police in this case Densus 88 and the perpetrators will be punished. using the basis of Law Number 5 of 2018. In this case, the National Police can request assistance from the TNI in law enforcement operations against terrorism, so the government needs to immediately issue a Government Regulation (Perpres) as a legal umbrella. Second, the government must specifically

mention terrorism groups in Papua based on group leaders, because calling them a Papuan terrorist group will make the Papuan people angry and will not get support from the Papuan people. Third, Densus 88 can arrest anyone who supports and agrees with armed actions in Papua, including activists who are outside Papua and abroad, including supporters of funding KST activities.

Meanwhile, according to Prof. Hikmahanto Juwana SH, LL.M., Ph.D., Professor of International Law at UI and Chancellor of the University General A. Yani in the Webinar of the Center for Humanitarian and Development Studies on Friday, May 07, 2021, that the settlement of separatists in Papua will not be resolved peacefully comprehensive because first, the problem of separatism is not a problem only faced by Indonesia. In some countries (even developed countries) there are still many problems of separatism and people's desire for independence. Second, a number of Pacific countries have political lines to support Papuan independence. As Vanuatu stated by the Father of Vanuatu Independence, Father Walter Lini in 1980: "Vanuatu would not be completely free until the Pacific's remaining colonized peoples of West Papua, Kanaky and Tahiti were free". Then in 2020 a law called the Wantok Blong Yumi Bill was passed which recognized the independence of West Papua. Then the third, for a small part of the Papuan people, the independence of West Papua has become an ideology.

There is still disagreement about the limits of a terrorist movement. Terror reactions by individuals or groups and even governments will be different and subjective. There are still many forms of terror, such as political terror and criminal terror. Political terror does not choose victims and is always ready to kill civilians (non combatants). While criminal terror is only for personal gain. What is certain is that terrorism is judged by acts of violence carried out to attack civilian targets or other parties, it is not always associated with symbols of the state and power such as the political elite, the military and so on. Violent acts committed against innocent civilians are used to achieve certain goals as a form of resistance to the existing system. There are indications of cooperation between groups with different ideological backgrounds, but have the same interests, namely to carry out a frontal and uncompromising resistance to the ruling power system.

According to Irfan Idris (2021), Director of Deradicalization of BNPT, said that so far the terrorist label has always been aimed at groups with religious symbols. Whereas the variants of radicalism in Indonesia can be categorized into three things, namely politics, beliefs, and actions. KKB is included in the act of terror in the political category. Not only voicing separatism, but also brutal resistance to the death of civilians. The terrorist acts carried out by the KKB will be very difficult to handle considering the geographical conditions in the Papua region. The KKB terror acts that operate on a geographical aspect are more dangerous than terror acts that have occurred in other regions in Indonesia. So that acts of terror that continue to occur in Papua must be resolved

immediately so as not to harm Indonesia. The application of the Terrorism Law in Papua is not a form of revenge by the Indonesian government against armed groups that have claimed victims both among civilians, among the apparatus and most recently the death of the Head of Regional BIN (Kabinda) Papua Brigadier General TNI I Gusti Putu Danny Karya Nugraha, but is the government's effort to maximize the rule of law of the Republic of Indonesia against various acts of terror that occur and is an effort to increase security for the people of Papua.

In handling KST Papua, the government must immediately prepare national readiness in implementing counter-radicalization and deradicalization as a form of the mandate of Law number 5 of 2018 especially article 43. Steps that can be taken by the government as conveyed by the Police Commissioner Dr. Firman Fadillah, M.H. (2021) The head of the Center of Terrorism and Radicalism Studies (CTRS-PTIK) is the first to identify or clearly identify Papuan terrorist groups. Naming OPM, KKB or KST, is not the right name because the name was given by the Indonesian government, besides that separatist groups also often change their names as they please. Use the right name by using the name of the group leader. Second, issuing documents such as political decisions that can be used as a basis for carrying out counter-terrorism operations, the Letter of the Head of BNPT (political) or the Letter of the Head of Densus 88 (Pro-Justitia) as the basis for issuing Court Decisions which will later be used for registration of the group in the anti-regime mechanism. international terrorism, because every country has the right to declare its own list of terrorists in its country (UN Security Council Resolution No. 1373). Third, is registration with the international anti-terror regime, in this case The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and The Financial of Terrorism & Proliferation. This registration is important in the context of countering terrorism financing. Fourth, registration with the UN Security Council to be included in the Consolidated United Nation Security Council Sanctions List of Suspected Terrorist Organizations and Individuals. This registration serves as the basis for further operations and removes propaganda from terrorist networks around the world. Fifth, the Indonesian government is conducting international cooperation in the pursuit and legal proceedings against networks and supporters of Papuan terrorist groups, including the revocation of political asylum for terrorists around the world. Sixth, activating anti-terror forces and their technology in Papua.

While Prof. Hikmahanto Juwana SH, LL.M., Ph.D., proposes government policies in handling terrorist separatists through five approaches, namely first, Although various separatist movements and support from a number of countries must be wary of West Papuan Independence, they should not be the main concern. for the Government in resolving the Papua issue. Second, the welfare gap in Papua with other parts of Indonesia must continue to be pursued. Third, the use of

violence carried out by Armed Criminal Groups or Armed Separatism must be faced by the Police and the TNI, if necessary by using the Terrorism Law. Fourth, provide understanding to the Indonesian public regarding the government's handling of the Papua issue and fifth, provide understanding to the international community on the Indonesian government's efforts to deal with the Papuan issue that do not violate human rights.

Terrorism is one of the methods used by Papuan separatist groups. The use of the term "terrorist group" is actually intended for insurgent groups that have political networks and use terrorism, namely using violence or threats of violence against civilian targets (non-combatant), as the main tactic in their struggle. Thus the handling of armed groups in Papua is counter-terrorism which applies Law Number 5 of 2018 concerning Terrorism because it is no longer about the context of the separatist conflict. The terrorist label for armed groups in Papua is given to narrow the space for movement and funding of these groups.

The handling carried out by the government (TNI-Polri apparatus) must remain careful in making policies, so that the response developed by the government is not used by the KKB. Learn from the experience of the East Timor case, that the offensive operations carried out by the military were exploited by intellectual actors by bringing up the issue of gross human rights violations in international politics, thus creating solidarity from the international community. Law enforcement is presented in the community to protect and take legal action against terrorist actors, so that people feel the presence of the government and feel protected by security forces. The need for the involvement of external supervisory parties such as the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) in supervising the activities of the TNI-Polri troops in taking action against KKB which will foster public trust in the government. The presence of the TNI-Polri has become proof that the Government guarantees the security of the people, especially the Papuan people.

IV. CONCLUSION

In the history of handling insurgency in Indonesia, there have been changes in accordance with the existing political dynamics. The emergence of a civilian government in the reform era made the role of the military sidelined in various lines, including the field of domestic security where insurgency is in it. The role of the military is limited to defense, while internal security is entirely left to the National Police. The handling of insurgency no longer uses military strategy and power, but emphasizes the protection of human rights in accordance with democratic conditions in the country.

The record of terror acts that have occurred since the beginning of Indonesia's independence, counter-terrorism efforts have been carried out by the Indonesian government. The military is the spearhead in counter-terrorism operations. The existence of reforms in Indonesia, made the government

decide to separate the functions of the TNI-Polri which gave a significant change to the counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia. The legal approach used in counter terrorism seeks to tackle terrorism in a peaceful, accountable manner, has legitimacy from the community, and upholds the principles of Human Rights (HAM).

Terror acts and security disturbances caused by Armed Criminal Groups in Papua are still common. They actively fought to separate themselves from the State of Indonesia and carried out acts of terror and violent crimes. The change in the status of the Armed Criminal Group to the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group has had an impact on the handling of the group. After changing the status of the Armed Criminal Group to the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group, the government must immediately prepare national readiness to implement counter-radicalization and deradicalization as a manifestation of the mandate of Law number 5 of 2018 as a consequence of the change in status.

Several steps that can be taken as presented by several experts and observers are by clearly identifying terrorist groups, making documents as the basis and basis for handling Papuan terrorists, registering Papuan terrorist groups to international anti-terrorism and cooperating in handling terrorism so that counter terrorism can be implemented effectively and efficiently. Handling must still be careful with law enforcement and uphold human rights principles so that the Papuan people will feel protected by the presence of security forces and can foster trust in the government in fighting terrorism in Papua.

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