

Universe War Strategy on the March 1, 1949 General Attack in Yogyakarta

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Abstract : The General Attack of March 1, 1949 in Yogyakarta has significance in the course of history to maintain Indonesia's independence from Dutch Aggression II. The purpose of this historical research seeks to examine and describe the events of the General Attack of March 1, 1949 and the application of the universal war strategy to the general attack in order to obtain victory and its impact for the international community. This paper is also expected for the younger generation to be an inspiration, foster nationalism and knowledge about the historical journey of the Struggle of the Indonesian nation in maintaining its independence. The methodology used in this writing is to use the approach of historical research methodology with the following four steps: Heuristics (attempts to find or find traces of history), Historical Criticism (selecting and testing traces / sources of history), Interpelasi (connecting and relating historical sources to each other), Historiography (writing or compiling historical stories). The results of this study showed that the universal war strategy used by the TNI in the General Attack of March 1, 1949 in seizing and controlling the city of Yogyakarta for 6 hours from Dutch hands, had succeeded in supporting the struggle of Indonesian polytk diplomacy at the UNITED NATIONS forum in maintaining independence, by breaking Dutch propaganda and providing evidence to the international community that the existence of the Indonesian and TNI governments still exists.

Keywords: Strategy, War, Universe, General Attack March 1, 1949

I. INTRODUCTION

The Universe War Strategy is a strategy born from the war used by the Indonesian nation since long ago starting the era of royal war, the era before and after the war diversity until now is still a war strategy used by the Indonesian National Army (TNI). So the strategy of universal war is the root of the Indonesian war culture that was born from the culture of the Indonesian nation with gotong royong. This can be proven from some of the history of Indonesian wars such as the Batak Sisingamangaraja War, Padri War, Diponegoro War, Battle of Surabaya November 10, 1945.

General Vo Nguyen Giap of Vietnam and Major General Carl Von Clausewitz of Prussia (Germany), mentioned that the war was universal. It was a people's war, while Mao Zedong of China called it a protracted people's war. Great General Dr. A.H Nasution defines the Universe War as a war effort not only an effort of the army, but also becomes the effort of the people of the universe in various sectors of his life, each of which becomes a participant in the entire business, which can not neglect anymore. The current war is no longer a war

between the army and the army, it is no longer just a military war, but now the war is the people, the whole people.

In the Indonesian State Defense Doctrine (2007) explained that the universal people's war is essentially a total war of all Indonesian people by mobilizing all national power and resources (SDA) to uphold state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and safety of the nation from other nations that threaten and occupy the territory of the Republic of Indonesia.

Universal people's war is populist, persimmon and territorial that can be interpreted to involve all the people, realized through the deployment of all forces and SDN and use the entire territory of the country as a fighting space.

Understanding the strategy of universal people's war more clearly by reviewing the events of the six-hour battle to capture the city of Yogyakarta or better known as the "General Attack of March 1, 1949". The battle has a very important meaning in the course of Indonesian history in an effort to maintain independence from Dutch aggression II in the early days of Indonesia's independence. General Attack 1 March 1949 in Yogyakarta. It was the culmination of a retaliatory attack carried out by the TNI, after the Dutch took control of the city of Yogyakarta through an attack on Maguwo Air Base (now Adi Sucipto Air Base), on December 19, 1948, the same day the city of Yogyakarta fell and was controlled by the Dutch, then President Sukarno and Vice President M. Hatta and several state officials were taken prisoner and exiled out of Java. The control of the capital Yogyakarta by the Dutch is a strategy that is carried out in order to regain control of Indonesia after Japan declared defeat of war. The fall of the capital of Yogyakarta by the Dutch was used as propaganda in the international world to get international support.

In an effort to break the propaganda, the Indonesian government and TNI planned a spectacular attack aimed at proving to the international community about the existence of sovereignty of the Indonesian Government and TNI. Commander-in-Chief General Sudirman up to Sri Sultan Hamengku Bowono IX as the head of The Republic of Indonesia in the city of Yogyakarta and its ranks think hard to realize the general attack strategy plan of March 1, 1949, with the *first goal*, the political field, strengthening the existence of Indonesian government sovereignty in the international world, *second*, in the military field, proving strength, existence and restoring the name of the TNI, *third*, restoring people's confidence in TNI capabilities.

The universal war strategy chosen in the General Offensive of March 1, 1949 proved effective in achieving the objective of the operation in capturing the capital of Yogyakarta for six hours.

The purpose of this historical research seeks to examine and describe the events of the General Attack of March 1, 1949 and the application of the universal war strategy on the General Attack in order to obtain victory and its impact for the international community. This paper is also expected for the younger generation to be an inspiration, foster nationalism and knowledge about the historical journey of the Struggle of the Indonesian nation in maintaining its independence.

There is a counterversion to previous writings and history books about who was the inspiration and initiator of the March 1, 1945 General Attack, but the universal war strategy was one that allowed anyone to be an inspiration, initiator and could be an important actor in a battle event.

II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

According to the methodological figure Leovold von Ranke (1795-1886), the task of history is to show what has really happened. History is national history and concerns events related to great men, statesmen, generals, clergy. According to Kuntowijoyo, (1995) although the history he wrote is limited to political aspects, diplomacy and war but accurate and avoids supernatural explanations.

The methodology in this writing is by approaching the methodology of historical research with the following four stages: Heuristics (attempts to find or find traces of history), Historical Criticism (selecting and testing traces / sources of history), Interpelasi (connecting and relating historical sources to each other), Historiography (writing or preparing historical stories). The data source used is a written source that includes books, documents, and journals related to the events of the March 1, 1949 General Attack in Yogyakarta. The data collection technique used is a literature study technique.

III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

In the Dutch efforts to control Indonesia through the results of the 1947 Renville agreement which was very detrimental to Indonesia because of the increasingly narrow territory of Indonesia, General Spoor implemented and launched the "Spearhead Strategy" by implementing "Operation Kraai" with the code "Pelikanan" whose goal was to seize the city of Yogyakarta as a source of resistance, while extinguishing the fire of the revolution and capturing and capturing the political leadership of the Republic of Indonesia and tni, at the same time destroying the concentration of tni armament power.

On December 19, 1948 at 05:30 the Dutch launched Operation Cross-Air which began by carrying out direct air strikes on Maguwo air base and fielding Dutch airborne forces led by Brigade T Commander Colonel Van Langen, successfully capturing the base. Then attack and capture the city of Yogyakarta in a short time. There was resistance from

the TNI at Maguwo air base and several places in the city of Yogyakarta, but the strength of the Dutch forces was larger and stronger, making tni forces successfully repulsed.

Commander-in-Chief Sudirman responded to the Dutch Aggression by issuing Lightning Order No. I/P.B./D/1948 dated December 19, 1949 at 08:00 to all TNI soldiers, which was broadcast through RRI (Radio Republic of Indonesia) which read: *First*, we have been attacked. *Second*, On December 19, 1948 the Dutch Army attacked the city of Yogyakarta and Maguwo airfield. *Third*, the Dutch government has cancelled the ceasefire agreement. *Fourth*, all the soldiers carried out the plan.

The Idea of a Common Attack Idea

After the city of Yogyakarta was captured, the Dutch captured and captured President Sukarno, Vice President M. Hatta and the Ministers, on December 22, 1948 exiled to Berastagi and moved to Parapat and Bangka, except Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX who remained in the palace of Yogyakarta. The act of seizing the city of Yogyakarta and capturing the Indonesian leadership by the Dutch is an action and propaganda agenda to deceive the eyes of the international community by reporting that the attack on RI is not an act of aggression but a police action and controls the center of government, capturing the Indonesian leader and destroying the TNI. The propaganda was also to strengthen the Dutch diplomatic position over Indonesia's stay at the United Nations, as the settlement of the Indonesia-Netherlands dispute was due to be heard at the UN Security Council in March 1949.

Control of the city of Yogyakarta forced the TNI to retreat to pockets of defense bases on the edge of the city's borders by carrying out guerrilla resistance. According to General A.H. Nasution, guerrilla warfare is a universal people's war, is an impossibility of achieving victory in guerrilla warfare without gaining popular support. Guerrilla warfare is the war of the strong against the weak. This guerrilla resistance strategy is used by the TNI as a step change of strategy from experience at the time of Dutch aggression I, where the TNI uses a "Conventional Linear" survival strategy which means facing directly opponents who have the advantage of armament technology and mobile power, which causes the TNI to often experience defeat.

The TNI leadership changed the defense strategy in the Dutch Aggression II contained in commander-in-chief General Sudirman's Siasat Order No. 1 dated June 12, 1948 with Lightning Command No. 1/PB/D/1948 issued December 19, 1948 which contained: *first*, it will not carry out "Linear" defense, *second*, the task of slowing the progress of enemy incursion, total displacement duty and scorched earth, *Third*, the task of forming pockets in each section of the military district with the government, guerrillas in the totalitarian "wehrkreise" and having a task in several complexes in the mountains, fourth, the task of troops from the "federal area" to "wingate" (infiltrating back to their home areas) and form

pockets, so that the entire island of Java and later the archipelago will become a large guerrilla battlefield.

The order was the basis and general concept of operation in the face of Dutch aggression II with a system of total guerrilla resistance or total popular defense, by forming guerrilla enclaves called Wehrkreise/WK. Wehrkreise is a resistance compartment with a defense and resistance system that is based on a total defense system, which is now better known as the universal people's defense and security system (Sishankamrata) or universal war strategy.

Attack Planning

Responding to the command of the next TNI leadership on February 18, 1949 on the slopes of Mount Sumbing Commander of Division III Bambang Sugeng held the highest meeting of military and civilian affairs attended by Commander Wehrkreise II Lieutenant Colonel Sarbini Martodiharjo, Territorial Officer (personal doctor General Sudirman) Lieutenant Colonel dr. Wiliater Hutagalung and the head of civilian government namely civilian Governor Mr. K.M.R.T. Wongsonegoro, Resident Bayumas R. Budiono, Resident Kedu Salamun, Regent of Banjarnegara R. Sumitro Kolopaking and Regent of Sangiti. The meeting came up with the idea of a grand design: a General Attack Plan throughout the Third Division region, involving Wehrkreise I, II and III, by deploying all military and civilian potential. The attack must be spectacular, must be known internationally, coordinate with the Second Division in order to obtain greater effect.

The Commander of Division III issued with The Order of Tactics No. 4 / S / Cop I on January 1, 1949 which contained the determination of spectacular attacks in the city of Yogyakarta (as the capital of the country is very influential). The presence of foreign journalists, un delegations to Indonesia UNCI (United Nations Commission for Indonesia) and Three Countries Commission (Belgium, United States and Australia) at Tugu Yogyakarta Hotel. Then determine the purpose of the General Attack of March 1, 1949, namely: *Military Field*, Proving to the world that the TNI is still intact de jure and de facto. *Political Field*, Supporting the struggle of Indonesian representatives in the UN Security Council against the Dutch campaign with its police action. *The field of Psychology*, inflame the fighting spirit of the people and TNI and raise the people's trust towards the TNI.

In February 1949 Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX sent a letter to Commander-in-Chief Sudirman and advised the TNI to hold a General Attack during the Day. Commander Sudirman agreed to it and so that the Sultan was in contact with Lieutenant Colonel Suharto as commander of brigade 10, Wehrkreise (WK) III / Yogyakarta.

Realizing the burden of heavy duties for commander WK III / Yogyakarta, to carry out general attacks, Lieutenant Colonel Suharto set the strategy of resistance, with strategic measures by dividing Yogyakarta into several sectors. *The first step*,

gather all the scattered units around Yogyakarta due to the Dutch attack and hold its lead in every Sub Wehrkreise (SWK). *The second step*, launching attacks and guerrilla resistance against Dutch outposts inside the city. *Step three*, Prepare yourself to hold a counterattack. The composition of WK III Forces with SWK and Sector adapted to the General Attack Strategy plan consisting of:

- a. The Southern sector was changed to Sub Wehrkreise 102 (SWK 102) led by Major Sarjono (Commander of SWK). While the boundaries of the area of responsibility have not changed
- b. The Western sector became Sub Wehrkreise 103, because the area of this sector is too large, and less effective, then the sector is divided into two SWK with the aim that troops can be effectively concentrated.
- c. SWK 103, led by Lieutenant Colonel Suhud and his area of responsibility has been determined.
- d. SWK 103 A, led by Major H.N. Sumual whose area has been determined.
- e. The Northern sector changed to SWK 104 under the leadership of Captain Sukasno, while the area of responsibility was unchanged.
- f. The Eastern sector changed to SWK 105 under the leadership of Major J. Sujono whose area remained unchanged as specified.
- g. The inner-city sector is SWK 101 led by Lieutenant Marsudi. Kulon Progo area was named SWK 106 led by Lieutenant Colonel Sudarto of the XVII TP Brigade.



Figure 1 Dislocation of TNI Forces

The disposition of TNI troops in the picture above is determined based on intelligence information collected about the position and strength of Dutch troops in the city of Yogyakarta, as well as the possible assistance of Dutch troops from outside the city of Yogyakarta if a general attack is carried out.



Figure 2: Dislocation of Dutch Troops

The strength of the Dutch troops in Yogyakarta is 1st Infantry Brigade (Brigif T), with Para units, armored units (tanks and pansers), elements of combat assistance and elements of administrative assistance. Brigif T Komandan Headquarters at Tugu Hotel and consists of 3 infantry battalions. 2 Yonif is outside the city of Yogyakarta and 1 Yonif is inside the city of Yogyakarta. Strengthening dutch troops that can be deployed in a short time from 1 Brigif led by Colonel Van Zanten based in Magelang, strengthened by Tank units and Panzer. 1 Yonif reinforced with tank and panser units in Semarang. KNIL unit, recruiting forces, Dutch from some Indonesian people.

Furthermore, commander WK III drew up an administrative and logistical support plan that included: Preparation of weapons and ammunition needs relying on loot from Japan and the Netherlands, maximizing damaged weapons into homemade weapons, user systems of one weapon manned by 3 to 5 people in turn.

The means of communication prepared in support of General Attack are communication between Courier / caraka units, receiving Radio Aircraft, namely Radio Keraton and Radio Command WK III. Radio transmitter aircraft using RRI in Balong Surakarta, as well as Indonesia Air Force transportation led by Air Officer III Boediardjo, in Banaran, Wonosari. It has long-range transmitter capabilities.

WK III polyclinics in Segoroyoso were prepared to support the health of soldiers and treat wounds from war. PMI Yogyakarta, in addition, female fighters who have been trained for the task of headheads that strengthen health lines in the field and locations are spread in Yogyakarta.

Food supply support is prepared by the people spontaneously, providing logistical assistance in the form of food directly to TNI soldiers and guerrillas, by setting up a soup kitchen including the Sultan's involvement in supporting logistics supplies.

Further order the SWK Commanders to prepare their respective troops and draw up a movement plan approaching the target city of Yogya, clandestinely in small groups. Waiting for an attack, the guerrillas must "pocket" in the

homes of residents, acquaintances or relatives who are inside the city of Yogyakarta. Secrecy must be firmly held, as it determines the success of an attack.

The operational planning guidelines are arranged, WK III with all its forces attacked the Dutch position in the city of Yogya on March 1, 1949 at 06:00 with the following attack points:

- a) The southern sector, SWK 102 struck with dutch headquarters targeted at the Post Office, State Building, Vredeborg fortress, Watson factory, Kotabaru, Lempuyangan station, and Aniem Wirobrajan factory, getting the help of strengthening troops adjusted dutch forces at the target point.
- b) The western sector, SWK 103A attacked with Dutch positions targeted at Pingit, Tugu station, Tugu Hotel, and Dutch posts along northern Malioboro street with reinforced side troops.
- c) The northern sector, SWK 104 attacked with the target of dutch outposts and concentrations around Kotabaru, Tugu Hotel, Gondokusuman, Pingit, Jetis, and Merdeka Hotel, in addition SWK 104 must also bind Dutch outposts in Tempel, Medari, Beran, Kalasan, and Prambanan with the help of strengthening troops adjusted dutch forces at the target point.
- d) Eastern sector, SWK 105 attacked with the target of Dutch positions in Tanjungtirto, Maguwo, Kalasan, and Prambanan, assisted by yon soedjono power element, Youth Fighters.
- e) SWK 103 deployed its elements to help SWK 103A. SWK 101 helped SWK invaders by deploying its sectors..
- f) SWK 106 bound and suppressed dutch positions, especially around the Bantar bridge, preventing Dutch aid to Yogyakarta, assisted by strengthening troops from side units.

The position of Dutch troops targeted by the attack was matched by the strength of tni forces and the division of the attack sector. To finalize the plan to strengthen the situation in the city, Commander Wehrkreise III held a final meeting with the SWK Commander.




Figure 3: General Concept Sketch of the Operation Plan

on February 21 and 26, 1949 attended by representatives of the township government, joint representatives of Rukun Kampung, and swk commanders, the sector was located in the Secretariat of the Lor Duchy Road Defense Council in the area in Kepatihan Danurejan.

Prior to the general strike, Commander WK III traveled around to check the final readiness of the troops and gather intelligence in the area of operation about the final conditions of the enemy's strengths and weaknesses, the streets are short of the target of full support from the people..

Intelligence information is used as the basis of Lieutenant Colonel Suharto issuing instructions containing: 1. The implementation of dislocation of troops in the Sub Wehrkreise area, from the "Base Area" to the "Combat Operations Area" with posts that are always cars. 2. Determination of the stages of attack starts from the movement in the base area (preparation area), the base of the attack, the assault area and the consolidation area. 3. Maneuvering troops that include advancing towards the enemy by infiltrating pockets in enemy territory, through short roads, waterways, and so on. These pockets are at once the base of TNI attacks.. 4. Determine the target and plot of the attack. 5. Determine the starting line to be crossed at the time of the "J" clock. 6. Determine signs of coordination for the attacking unit and communication through means. All troops must move in their respective sectors, while movements outside the sector must be authorized by Commander WK III and coordinate with the commander of the troops whose sectors are passed. From the results of the final examination, Commander Lieutenant Colonel Suharto held a meeting with the Commander of Division III / Military Governor III Colonel Bambang Sugeng to report on the readiness of the General Attack on March 1, 1949.

Neighboring forces carrying out operations to offset the general attack of WK III are GM II troops who carry out operations in surakarta area and WK II from Division III who carry out operations in Kedu / Magelang area. In addition, the organic forces of the 10th Brigade that carried out the operation hampered dutch aid troops from Purworejo, kebumen, Magelang, Solo and Semarang are Sruharodo Battalion, Sudarmo Battalion and Daryatmo Battalion.

Implementation of Operation Attack

The General Attack Strategy of March 1, 1949 carried out by the TNI was the culmination of a general preliminary attack by guerrilla means, 4 times on December 29, 1948, January 7, 1949, January 11, 1949 and February 4, 1949 through a siasat order from commander WK III / Yogyakarta. The purpose of the 1st to 4th general attack is: Destroying the enemy's strength as much as possible, seizing as many enemy weapons as possible, grounding the scorched places that are considered important. So the real purpose is to prepare the TNI in strengthening weaponry to carry out a real General Attack, a guerrilla strategy to weaken enemy forces, a shifting of the Dutch focus that TNI attacks will always be carried out at

night, as a training exercise for TNI forces in controlling the battlefield and carrying out combat strategies and increasing TNI confidence in the face of actual general attacks. On February 28, 1949, all WK III troops under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Suharto were occupied respectively.

On February 28, 1949 there were 2 incidents that almost thwarted all general attack plans due to misreading the date of the general attack. First, the attack was carried out by Lieutenant Komaruddin who at 06.00 when sirens sounded directly carried out an attack on the Dutch post at the large post office and the square of Kota Gede. Second, the attack in the village of Giwangan at 06.00 pm at the Dutch post had carried out sabotage by cutting off the Dutch telephone network. The two incidents did not raise Dutch suspicions so did not affect the general attack plan.

The "H" day was set for Tuesday March 1, 1949 and the "J" clock at 6:00 a.m. coincided with the sirens of the end of the curfew. The Yellow Janur sign is used to distinguish TNI troops and know each other between fellow soldiers who enter the city. Troops moving in the city, in addition to the core battalions of Brigade 10 / WK III followed by other units. The movement of troops in formation must be able to occupy strategic places at an effective firing range against predetermined targets, and a few hours in advance must already be inside the city.

After the preparation of a general attack is considered complete, according to the plan then precisely with the day "H" hour "J" on March 1, 1949 at exactly 06:00, along with the sound of siren signs ending the curfew, launched simultaneous attacks from all majors namely: SWK 102 troops attacked from the south, SWK 103 and SWK 103A troops attacked from the west, 104 forces attacked from the north and 105 troops attacked from the east. An estimated 2,000 guerrilla and TNI forces were out of position to carry out an impromptu attack on a strategic Dutch target in the city of Yogyakarta.

Brigade X/WK III commander Lieutenant Colonel Suharto on the general raid placed a Command Post in the western sector, tactical command posts were around Patuk and Malioboro, and controlled the direct course of the battle. The war raged almost all parts of the city of Yogyakarta, with the spirit of blazing and full of confidence tni guerrillas will succeed in capturing the city of Yogyakarta although many of the soldiers armed only with pointed bamboo, machetes, knives and sickles to facing modern armed Dutch troops in the form of automatic long rifles, mortars, tank vehicles, pansers and so on.



Figure 4: General Attack Execution Sketch

The special purpose of the attack on the target of dutch positions in the city of Yogyakarta was to isolate and bind the Dutch troops to remain in their residence and not join the main force and this was the command and tactics of the strategy of Komandaan WK III.

A Dutch writer Pierre Heijboer described the atmosphere of Yogyakarta on March 1, 1949 "... When on March 1, 1949 the Indonesians launched an attack, for Colonel Van Langen it was indeed surprising that in the southern part of the city, the Republican forces were able to quickly break through to the North Square and Post Office in the west, the fighting forces led by Suharto, after passing through the battle for an hour had managed to reach the main road in the middle of the city, Malioboro. Captain Rakido and his group managed to take control of the Watson ironworks, where a large amount of ammunition belonging to the Dutch army was stored..."

All WK III troops and SWK ranks managed to carry out the operation mission well, supported by the role of SWK 101 as a tactical car SWK under the leadership of Lettu Marsudi who served in addition to invaders by providing information, preparing local youth as pointers and coordinating administrative assistance including logistics, deploying information collection agencies in the form of reconnaissance patrols, female fighters, students and militant youth to seek information about positions, strength, and activities of the Dutch army in the city of Yogyakarta.

In a short time almost every corner of the city was controlled by the TNI. Malioboro Street to Tugu is filled with guerrilla forces. In some homes people fly red and white flags. The people welcomed the victory with joy. They provide food and drinks in front of their homes. Many mothers and women carrying baskets containing food to share with guerrillas including relatives of the Yogyakarta palace also helped provide information, protection and food drinks. Almost

everyone is out of the house. They mingled with the TNI, filling the main street of Yogyakarta city. They are proud, TNI able to show its strength even in a state of deficiency. It was March 1, 1949. TNI fighters and the people gained great victory.




Figure 5: TNI Setback Sketch

Seeing almost all dutch troops who are in the city of Yogyakarta desperate and most have been controlled by the TNI. This condition forced the Commander of the Dutch T Brigade to ask for the help of troops outside the city of Yogyakarta who came from Semarang, Magelang, Solo, Purworejo and Kebumen.

TNI forces that had been prepared to stem or at least slow down dutch aid troops from outside the city of Yogyakarta by Commander WK III assisted by troops from devisi II and TNI units from Solo had managed to slow down so that the Dutch aid force only arrived at 11:00 in the city of Yogyakarta, about an hour after arriving in Yogya the relief forces named Dog NICA and Red Elephant drove and chased TNI troops.

After 13:00 according to the orders of Commander WK III, TNI guerrilla forces immediately left the city of Yogyakarta according to the predetermined path while fighting. The withdrawal of TNI troops was carried out in a dispersed manner to make it difficult for the Dutch in their pursuit, due to the strengthening of Dutch aid forces in the city of Yogyakarta as well as the help of aerial fire from Dutch aircraft trying to prevent TNI troops from leaving the city..

In the next phase after the general attack, the TNI along with the people continued the struggle by attacking Dutch outposts. The Dutch launched clearance operations as a counter-attack to separate the TNI and the people, until a large operation was launched in the Wonosari area which was allegedly TNI headquarters.

The Task of General Attack on March 1, 1949 by the TNI has been successfully implemented, the objectives militarily, politically and psychologically achieved with the sacrifice of the nation's heroes who died in battle were recorded at 353 people, while the number of people who became victims could not be calculated with certainty, from the Dutch side according to de Wapen Boer magazine published in 1949 numbering 200 people. The key to tni victory in the General Attack of March 1, 1949 was the war strategy used by combining between tni forces, local governments and people who were entirely integrated in the universe of resistance. The key figures behind the success of the March 1 General Attack according to General A.H. Nasution were Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, General Besar Sudirman, Colonel Bambang Sugeng and Lieutenant Colonel Suharto.

The Impact of the General Attack of March 1, 1949

News of the General Attack of March 1, 1949 against the capital of Yogyakarta carried out by the TNI and managed to control the city for 6 hours immediately disseminated at home and abroad this will have a major effect on political diplomacy. As per the initial scenario on general attack planning, news will soon be disseminated through the RRI and AURI radio networks, at the instructions of Colonel T.B Simatupang, traveling to spread the news of general attacks to PDRI jungle radio in the interior of Sumatra and then forwarded to Rangoon, through Indonesian representative Dr. Sudarsono in New Delhi India until it spread throughout the world and finally the news reached the United Nations in New York United States.

The news became very important and opened the eyes of the international community because it managed to break the Dutch politics of diplomacy and propaganda in spreading false news to the world that the Indonesian Government and TNI no longer exist. With the news of the general attack the international community realized that the Indonesian people are struggling to gain recognition and defend its sovereignty.

The general attack succeeded in providing support to the struggle of Indonesian diplomacy at the United Nations to get the recognition of sovereignty and Independence of The Republic of Indonesia as a whole. On March 23, 1949, the UN Security Council passed a new resolution on resolving the Indonesia-Netherlands conflict. The new resolution initiated the Rum Royen Agreement on June 22, 1949 which resulted in the return of the Indonesian government to Yogyakarta on July 1, 1949, then on August 4, 1949 held a Round Table Conference (KMB) in The Hague Netherlands, and the handover of Indonesian sovereignty to the Indonesian government from the Netherlands in December 1949.

IV. CONCLUSION

General Attack march 1, 1949 is a battle that describes the universal people's defense system, the integration of the participation of TNI leaders, with the support of the Sultan of Yogyakarta, the support of the people and the praja pamong

throughout the districts of Yogyakarta Special Region, carrying royong, shoulder to shoulder in carrying out a war strategy for the spectacular purpose of: defending the sovereignty of The Republic of Indonesia as an ideal and fighting together.

The General Attack of March 1, 1949 has succeeded in providing support to the struggle for Indonesian diplomacy at the UN forum and breaking the Dutch propaganda that states that RI and TNI are gone. In addition, the General Attack of March 1, 1949 also had a positive impact in the country militarily and psychologically.

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