

Darfur Conflict and Hybrid Operation: Challenges of a Pioneer Hybrid Peacekeeping Operation Model.

Daniel Adekera PhD

Chief, Strategic Communication and Public Information/Spokesperson, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), Sudan, Nigeria

Abstract: The African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) established on 31 July 2007 as the first truly joint peacekeeping mission was a very ambitious adventure in collective security management. For the first time in its 27 years of peacekeeping, the United Nations would be sharing command and control of a peacekeeping mission with a regional organization. It was an experiment whose success or otherwise would determine the way the United Nations, the body responsible for global peace and security, was going to do business. This article conducted a critical assessment of the mission using content analysis of UN Security Council Resolutions, Code Cables and Note Verbales as well as relevant African Union documents and in-depth interviews. The data collected was critically examined using the qualitative method. It found that the mission was confronted with numerous logistical and security constraints as it operated in a complex and hostile political environment. It also found that several structural and functional issues were not very clearly defined, giving rise to operational challenges. The study recommends that, given the perceived influence the hybrid operation appears to have on future UN peacekeeping operations, issues bordering on command and control and mandates should be clearly defined to avoid gaps and/or overlaps that were experienced in the Darfur operation.

Keywords: Darfur conflict, Peacekeeping, Hybrid operation, African Union, United Nations.

I. INTRODUCTION

The African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)¹ was established by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769 on July 31, 2007, to operate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The mission, with its headquarters in El Fasher, had the protection of civilians as its core mandate. Other mandated tasks included contributing to security for humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying the implementation of peace agreements, and assisting an inclusive political process. The hybrid mission was also tasked to contribute to the promotion of human rights and rule of law, and to monitor and report on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). (S/RES/1769, 2007). In terms of its structure, Resolution 1769 provided for a unified command

¹ A hybrid mission is a joint effort where a regional organization — in this case, the African Union (AU) — shares the political, financial, logistical and military burdens with the UN. In hybrid missions, the partners are theoretically equals and align their agendas to achieve the mandate. There is a single political representative and a single military commander.

and control while also allowing for command-and-control structures and backstopping to be provided by the United Nations. This essentially meant that the African Union would run the day-to-day operations while the UN would have the overall control of the mission. The mission's force would, as far as possible, be sourced from African countries. Consequently, the mission's command structure reflected a strong African presence, namely Mr. Rodophe Adada from the Republic of Congo as Joint Special Representative; Major Henry Anyidoho (rtd.) from Ghana as Deputy Joint Special Representative, General Martin Luther Agwai from Nigeria as Force Commander; and Michael Fryer from South Africa as Police Commissioner. According to Ban Ki Moon, the hybrid experiment represented the continuous efforts by the UN to reform peacekeeping operations to make it more rapid in response to conflicts, ease the UN of obvious challenges and fill the gap between demand and supply in peacekeeping operations based on comparative advantage. (Ki Moon:2007)

The establishment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) no doubt represents a major paradigm shift in global security management and a quick response to the complex and dynamic nature of modern conflicts. Jane Holl Lute, Assistant Secretary-General at the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), described UNAMID as an unprecedented operation never seen in the history of the United Nations (Lute:2007) However, Bah and Jones (2009) opined that hybrid operations, though treated as a new phenomenon, the 1990s have been replete with variations of hybrid operations. Aboagye (2007) refers to the hybrid concept as a political construct of conventional joint multinational operations.

Ambitious as the UNAMID experiment appeared, the model has also revealed several challenges in its concept, design, and implementation. Based on the data collected during interviews with some of the principal officers of the mission and other relevant documents, this study has carefully interrogated the mission's critical trajectories to properly contextualize the hybrid model and its role in global security management.

II. BROAD AND NEBULOUS MANDATE

Jibril, (2010) argues that the mandate of UNAMID was so comprehensive that it essentially overstretched the mission's peacekeeping effort beyond its operational capacity. In addition to its rather very broad mandate, UNAMID faced a

myriad set of operational, logistical, and administrative difficulties which severely hindered its efforts and rendered it practically ineffective. Obstacles placed by the government of Sudan (GoS) and delaying tactics caused UNAMID to lose precious time, enthusiasm, and momentum during the early stage of its deployment. For instance, Sudan's rejection of the deployment of Western European and Latin American troops in Darfur is behind the reluctance of some States to provide UNAMID with the necessary technical expertise and crucial equipment including means of transport, communication, logistics, and combat helicopters which are very necessary for an effective military operation. These operational challenges rendered UNAMID no different from the weak, underfunded, under-equipped, and understaffed AMIS it took over from, giving rise to loss of confidence by many stakeholders, especially the Darfuris.

According to Flint (2008) rarely in the annals of the UN has peacekeeping so much been spent, with such high expectations, for so few results, insinuating that the force was too big, too top-heavy, and too inflexible - and it had no peace to keep. Flint, it appears, deliberately downplayed the political and security dynamics UNAMID had been facing in its efforts to keep peace in a functional state where security primacy lies with the government. Apart from issues regarding legitimacy and the fact that Sudan is not a failed state, Flint appears to be completely oblivious of the logistical and operational challenges UNAMID had to put up with. It should be understood also, that even though Khartoum grudgingly accepted the UN's repeated requests to deploy a UN/AU hybrid force, it skillfully and deliberately employed the policy of obstructionism that not only emasculated UNAMID's force generation process but placed numerous restrictive measures to delay and complicate the deployment process and operations that undermined UNAMID's ability to fulfill its mandate. Many people are also of the opinion that UNAMID was not meant to succeed. This assertion is predicated on the fact that right from its inception, several interdependent factors combined to make it difficult, if not impossible for the mission to function. Coupled with these factors is the fact that there has not been any template for this model of hybrid operation. As a result, there was heightened skepticism from many quarters that Africa was once again left to its fate - to bear its burden.

Force Generation from Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs)

The problem of force generation is generally common for UN peacekeeping. It is not strange therefore that this issue posed one of the greatest challenges to UNAMID and negatively affected its growth and overall operational capability to fulfill its mandate. However, the restriction of troop's contribution to essentially African countries that were already overstretched in terms of contributing their troops to several peacekeeping missions further exacerbated the whole situation.

Resolution 1769 stated that "the Hybrid operation should have a predominantly African character and the troops should, as far as possible, be sourced from African countries" (UNSCR1769, 2007). In the list, agreed with the AU on October 2, 2007, some 16,000 troops came from African countries and fewer than 4,000 from non-African countries. During a high-level international meeting in September 2007 to approve the composition of the force, Sudan, supported by other AU members, objected to the deployment of an engineering unit from Norway as well as to infantry contingents from Uruguay and Thailand.

While it may be reasonable and important to accept that UNAMID had the necessary technical and logistic expertise, there were certainly a few vital areas such as military air support, military fixed-wing units, and engineering units which proved difficult to find enough expertise solely in Africa. Besides, the insistence by the GoS that the Hybrid operation maintained an African character no doubt had a deleterious effect on the mission in force generation. In an address to the Security Council, the African Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative for Darfur, Rodolphe Adada, made a passionate plea to the international community to provide the necessary support to UNAMID for it to accomplish its mission. It is disturbing that, even though Darfur was at the top of the international agenda, this attention and response did not in any way match with action to provide UNAMID with the wherewithal to accomplish the tasks assigned to it. (UNSCR, 2008)

Allen (2009) argues that, although UNAMID started its mission with 38 percent of its authorized strength by absorbing the African contingents from AMIS, it would take 23 months to reach 80 percent strength and 26 months to reach 88 percent. The insistence by the GoS that UNAMID is African constrained the availability and capability of the force. Additionally, the inability of troop-contributing countries to generate and deploy the essential engineering, logistics, and transport capacity delayed the preparation of camps and deployment, which in turn inhibited a rapid build-up of forces capable of long-range patrolling and other security tasks. The absence of military aviation limited UNAMID's operational reach and flexibility to quickly move forces and material, rapidly evacuate wounded peacekeepers, or provide fire support to troops in contact. Finally, the absence of fixed-wing reconnaissance made it virtually impossible to patrol gaps in and between sectors as well as the Chadian and Central African Republic borders.

Although the problem of force generation does not apply to UNAMID alone, however, UNAMID case happened at the most critical time when the conflict was at its peak and there was the urgent need to deploy a robust force that would prevent the killing of civilians and pave the way for a political solution to the conflict. The problem of force generation is indeed a recurring issue that has continued to hamper the operational capability of many UN peacekeeping operations and may continue to do so for some time.

Several factors were responsible for the challenges faced by UNAMID regarding force generation. Allen (2010:41) notes that one of the most significant factors that handicapped the force generation and limited the operational capability to implement its mandate was the GoS insistence on an African character for UNAMID, even though the AU had agreed to the requirement of non-African contingents. Following the Addis-Ababa conclusions and the 30 November 2006 communiqué of the AU Peace and Security Council, UNAMID would have a predominantly African character. This meant that troops were first and foremost to be sourced from African countries, and only in the event of African countries' inability to provide the required number of troops should the mission consider pledges from other troop contributors. The UN and AU would jointly agree upon the final choices after consultation with the GoS. However, the GoS reneged on this provision when there was a requirement for non-African forces. This stance was questionable considering that 76 percent of UNMIS was non-African in January 2007.

The first negative implication of the African character of UNAMID was that the GoS did not accept a critical Norwegian engineer unit. The GoS denial of this engineering company in January 2008 removed a capability to expand and construct camps and facilities to receive the deploying units of UNAMID. This seriously undermined the ability to deploy new units. Of note was that Norway already had a small contingent participating in UNMIS. According to Allen (2010), there was no other apparent reason for this denial beyond it being a deliberate choice by the GoS to delay or complicate UNAMID's deployment by handicapping the engineering capacity to prepare camps.

Another associated problem with the African character was the lack of capacity of the AU to generate the required numbers of sufficiently trained personnel. Aboagye (2007) posits that it was very doubtful in 2007 that the African defense and security capacity held enough well-trained and equipped personnel to maintain an African character to UNAMID. For both, the military and police, Africa's global peacekeeping commitments stood at about 28,725 uniformed personnel by May 2007. Based solely upon these numbers, Aboagye (2007) argued that generating the required numbers of troops, both initially and on a sustained basis, posed significant challenges to the AU. The AMIS experience demonstrated that the AU had difficulty generating the authorized military personnel and equipment for AMIS, let alone significantly more troops and equipment to meet the GoS desire for a predominantly African character of UNAMID (Aboagye, 2008).

Allen argues that, despite the African contributors having trouble in generating the necessary troops and equipment, there does not appear to have been an overwhelming non-African desire or availability to take their place. Additionally, the UNMIS case study demonstrated that other nations also experience force generation issues, such as the Pakistani and Russian aviation units. Not only would it prove difficult for

the AU to generate the necessary number of troops, but it would also mean that many of these forces would need training and equipment assistance to bring them to UN standards. This AU forces' lack of training or equipment to conduct long-range patrols and their inability to provide the necessary coverage for situational awareness and security in Darfur was, to say the least, frustration for a mission under intense pressure to perform wonders.

In the words of General Agwai, UNAMID was like 32 ink spots on a very large piece of blotting paper, each spot must grow and be connected to the others. This requires considerably longer patrols, ranging from base for several days at a stretch. Many of the troops deployed do not currently have the skills, discipline, and equipment required for this type of patrol. This, in turn, puts further strain on UNAMID to establish in-mission training units. (UNSC 6178th meeting, 5 August 2009)

The implication of this most taunted African character, Allen argues, was that many African troop contributors had insufficient and inadequate equipment, and lacked capabilities in self-sustainment, mobility, protection, logistics, medical, and maintenance. (UNSG Report 10 February 2008) This also meant that several AU contingents would not meet UN standards and require substantial assistance in training and equipment before they met the standards and level of expected readiness, especially for self-sustainment and ability to conduct long-range patrols.

The inability of UNAMID to generate adequate forces to meet its operational capability was closely linked to the fact that the United Nations peacekeeping was overstretched almost to breaking point. The rapid expansion for peacekeeping operations caused severe strain on the UN and by extension heavy demands on troops contributing countries. Between 11 and 23 August 2006, the UN Security Council adopted three new resolutions for Lebanon, East Timor, and Darfur, which would increase UN peacekeeping commitments by over 50 percent. Besides, Resolution 1706 on Darfur, adopted on 31 August 2006, expanded the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) by 17,300 troops, 3,300 civilian police, and 16 formed police units comprising an additional 2,000 police. Numerous western troop-contributing countries had large police and military deployments in Afghanistan and similar missions, which limited their ability to pledge troops and material or lead other UN peacekeeping missions. (UNSC Report, 8 September 2006)

As of July 2006, the UN had 72,822 uniformed personnel deployed. Resolution 1701, 1704 and, 1706 would bring this total to approximately 115,655.64. This represented a 43 percent increase in military personnel. In 2007, as UNAMID began to deploy to Darfur, the UN had approximately 83,326 troops deployed from 117 countries, with 75 percent of them conducting operations in Africa. (Pelz and Lehmann: 2007) Almost one-third of these forces were from Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh. In 2006, force generation for peacekeeping operations was nearly 6,000 deficits in troops and police of

the authorized strengths. UNAMID would continue to suffer from problematic force generation in the overall context of what UN leaders in 2009 thought to be a crisis in peacekeeping.

No Peace to Keep (No Peace Agreement)

UNAMID was a novel UN peacekeeping operation in many respects: it operated without a ceasefire or prospects of a viable peace agreement; it was a hybrid UN/AU structure with expected command and control challenges; it was to be comprised of predominantly African troops; it operated in extreme climate conditions, and it faced significant logistical challenges. (Segel,2006) According to Abdelbagi (2010), UNAMID works against many odds in Darfur. It operates in difficult conditions in a hostile, dangerous, and insecure environment that lacks sufficient infrastructure. UNAMID has also been left without a choice but to collaborate with unwilling and intransigent local stakeholders some of them manifestly have no interest to see the peacekeeping operation come to a successful conclusion.

UNAMID soldiers had been subject to frequent attacks and cold-blooded killings since the beginning of their mission in Darfur. Only one week after its inauguration in January 2008, UNAMID soldiers were attacked by the GoS army while they were traveling in a supply convoy between Umm Baru and Tine in Northern Darfur State. The deadliest attack against UNAMID forces took place on 8th July 2008 during which 7 soldiers were killed and 22 others wounded when a UNAMID's joint police and the military patrol was ambushed by about 200 unidentified attackers near Um Hakibah village, Wadah, 100 km, southeast of El-Fasher, Northern Darfur State. (Abdelbagi, 2010)

Attacks against mobile UNAMID forces were premeditated, well planned, and punctual. Such attacks also appeared to be facilitated by prior knowledge of the timing and routes used by UNAMID troops in their movement, which is information usually shared by UNAMID with the parties to the conflict in Darfur in advance. It was also observed that most of the deadly attacks against UNAMID were committed in areas under the control of GoS or in areas that witness the active presence of GoS's Janjaweed allies or Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) factions that signed peace agreements with GoS. Some of these attacks were even committed inside the major cities in Darfur including El-Fasher, which is the seat of UNAMID Headquarters.

UNAMID Force Commander, General Martin Luther Agwai, lamented that the mission's forces were being targeted and pulled in as part of the conflict. A situation he said sadly resulted in many peacekeepers paying the supreme sacrifice of losing their lives adding that there was at that moment no peace in Darfur to keep. (Agwai, 2009). The spike in insecurity was clearly to the fact that not all the actors, or the stakeholders signed the Peace Agreement. This made it very difficult for the peacekeepers on the ground to enforce peace or the peace agreement. It was quite evident that without a new peace deal, even with the increase in the troops in the

Darfur conflict theatre it would still be a big task trying to keep the peace. Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the then UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, stated very clearly that Sudan's demands created serious uncertainty concerning the government's commitment to the deployment of UNAMID and asked if the UN should move ahead with the deployment of a force that will not make a difference, that will not have the capability to defend itself and that carried the risk of humiliation of the Security Council and the United Nations and tragic failure for the people of Darfur. (BBC:2007)

The hybrid mission thus entered the Darfur conflict theatre with no peace to keep and no capacity to enforce peace, thus inheriting the same mistakes from its predecessor AMIS. It was very clear that neither the Governments of Sudan nor the rebel factions were willing to allow UNAMID space to implement its mandate and ensure the return of sustainable peace to the troubled region. Considerable energy, time, and resources were dissipated by the mission either on trying to unify the different factional groups for a negotiated peace or trying to free itself from Khartoum's firm grip through its obstructionist strategy.

III. LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES

Most United Nations peacekeeping missions thrive on an adequate supply of required logistics. Logistical challenges for the Darfur hybrid operation constituted one of the greatest challenges UNAMID had to grapple with right from its inception. This no doubt grossly impeded the mission's operational capability and mandate implementation. Much of the challenges were perhaps a carry-over from AMIS. The dilapidated and inadequate facilities at Port Sudan, insufficient material-handling equipment, and the local market's lack of capacity to fulfill the cargo transport requirements of UNAMID were significant logistical obstacles. Additionally, the poor condition of transportation infrastructure, which became even more restrictive during the rainy season, complicated UNAMID's build-up of forces in Darfur. Not only did UNAMID face huge logistical challenges, but it also had to navigate an incredibly complex and volatile security environment of Darfur. (Allen,2010)

Lack of up-to-date and functional equipment from some African countries exacerbated UNAMID's logistical nightmare. Peacekeepers from many African countries brought to the mission obsolete and unserviceable equipment that did not meet the operational standard for a UN peacekeeping mission. Some contingent-owned equipment (COE) came without spares which meant that each time they broke down - and that happened quite often - they could not easily be replaced. This situation combined to frustrate the efforts of commanders in ensuring operational readiness and at the same time put peacekeepers at very high risk. There were several instances where peacekeepers on patrols were outgunned, outnumbered, and overpowered by rebel groups who had more modern arms, leading to the peacekeepers

abandoning their equipment and/or surrendering to the rebel groups.

Other African countries that managed to secure modern equipment lacked the professional and tactical experience to handle or operate them. Much time was lost in trying to organize specialized training for personnel to handle such equipment. The situation in the Darfur conflict theatre dictated that peacekeepers deployed to the region are operationally ready to hit the ground running, and not to start training to handle weapons while in the conflict theatre. The mission recorded several accidents arising from peacekeepers' inability to handle their Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) which goes a long way to give credence to the speculation that many if not most of them arrive Darfur not just ill-equipped but also ill-trained and ill-prepared.

Perhaps more worrisome is the psychology brought into the peacekeeping area by some peacekeepers which are antithetical to the peacekeeping philosophy. Driven by poverty and bad governance in their countries, most African and other developing countries see peacekeeping operations as a quick means of getting money to be able to meet the basic needs of life. Investigations by this researcher proved a very sad development whereby some peacekeepers pledge half of their allowances to their superiors in their home countries to secure the opportunity to be included on the list to be deployed in peacekeeping areas. Such peacekeepers are not willing to die in the theatre of conflict but would rather try to maximize the 'God-given opportunity' to get money to meet the necessities of life. It is not uncommon to hear peacekeepers confessing 'I am here on 50-50' or 60-40', meaning that he is sharing his allowances in that ratio with his superior or sponsor back home in his unit who sponsored him as it were to the mission. When peacekeepers quickly surrender their weapons to attacking armed elements, no matter how few, the chances are that they want to avoid any encounter that would be inimical to the opportunity they have so much sacrificed to secure.

Khartoum's Obstructionist Policy.

There is sufficient evidence to prove that the African Union Mission in Sudan floundered partly because the Sudanese government was obstructionist and perfected ways of neutralizing the mission's efforts to stem the tide of violence and bring peace to the troubled region. As stated by Tim Murithi (2008) the government of Sudan was quite adept at maneuverings against the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force on its territory and used the same obstructionist strategy to destabilize the mission when it was finally established after diplomatic arm-twisting. UNAMID continued to experience several obstructions and restrictions from both the GoS and rebel factions which grossly affected the mission's efforts in carrying out its mandate. Allens argues that the GoS use of delaying tactics, such as protracted authorizations for UN requests, lengthy customs procedures, protracted or restrictive land clearance, and denial or withholding of Visas for UNAMID personnel, complicated and delayed UNAMID's

growth in capacity and capability. Furthermore, GoS and rebel movements also detracted UNAMID's efforts to fulfill its mandate by continuously interfering with its freedom of movement during patrols and aviation operations. In reaction to this, the Secretary-General once came out with a categorical statement indicating that UNAMID's success was dependent on GoS cooperation.

The effectiveness of UNAMID hinges on the Government's cooperation to ensure its freedom of movement in compliance with the Status-of-Forces Agreement; provide customs clearance, visas, security, and convoy protection; and facilitate UNAMID deployment and resupply by air, rail, and road. I welcome the agreement reached in these areas on 7 October 2008 in Khartoum by the Tripartite Committee on UNAMID. I count on the Government of Sudan to ensure its implementation at all levels of government, both local and national. (Allen:2010)

The reaction of the Secretary-General is a clear acceptance that all is not well and that UNAMID's mandate was in jeopardy. GoS national intelligence appears to be operating under specific instructions to frustrate UNAMID's efforts in reaching communities in dire need of humanitarian assistance or to block peacekeepers who are detailed to assess or verify incidents of security violations. In Darfur, the fear of national intelligence is said to be the beginning of wisdom because of the notoriety they have gained in intimidating and harassing peacekeepers on assignment.

Specific mention must be made of GoS's restriction on UNAMID's rotary-wing assets. The movement of UNAMID's military and civilian aviation assets was also restricted by GoS. UNAMID was made to provide the GoS authorities with a request 48 hours before flights, which unnecessarily limited the planning horizon for flight operations as well as crippled UNAMID's flexibility to react to unforeseen requirements. The GoS restricted the number and type of flights for the five Ethiopian tactical helicopters to 94 flights between April and July 2010. Overall, flight cancellations due to GoS restrictions rose from 21 percent in May 2010 to 77 percent in June 2010. Additionally, as of July 2010, the GoS had not yet provided authorization for the Ethiopian helicopters to operate with weapons. But of more concern than restrictions on planned missions was the denial or delay of emergency use of helicopters which resulted in the death of wounded peacekeepers. In a similar incident, after an attack on UNAMID troops on 21 June 2010, the GoS local authorities at Nyala and El Fasher would not grant flight clearances, consequently preventing UNAMID from pursuing the attackers and search for the missing vehicle. When such restrictions happen, the immediate and logical deduction is to place responsibility on the government of Sudan.

IV. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Issues relating to command and control of the hybrid operation were at the core of all discussions concerning the mission. Critical issues bordering on the appointment of senior management, troop generation, and deployment as well

as the establishment of clear reporting lines including the decisions as to whether the mission flies the UN or AU flag, or both were very critical to the success of the hybrid mission. Aboagye, (2007) argues that the framework for the mission arrived at in Addis Ababa in November 2006 fundamentally revolved around four key principles namely, That the force generation, included determining the allocation of senior command and staff appointment at force and sector levels, would be handled by UN headquarters: the need for a joint support and coordination mechanism between the AU and the UN. A combined AU-UN task force was proposed in January 2007, following the existing integrated support services, to facilitate unity of efforts. The proposed option revolved around the deployment of additional UN liaison officers and information technology resources, pending a detailed assessment of the actual resources (military, police, logistics, etc); the need for clarity on the designation of the mission, including either flying the AU and UN flags or a specially designed hybrid flag. This would also apply to vehicles/aircraft. Headgear and medals; and the development of framework hybrid documents to address the inconsistencies and challenges resulting from the application of the concept on the ground. (Aboagye:2007)

Right from the onset, it was obvious that certain structural and functional issues had to be dealt with if the hybrid experiment was going to achieve the desired results. Firstly, the troops, though predominantly African, had different military orientations and lacked the coherence of a unified force. Most owed their allegiance to their home countries and refused to take command and instructions from the Force Commander if such commands run counter to their countries' strategic interests. This was quite noticeable in the sphere of deployment during the early days of the mission where Contingent Commanders resisted deployment into areas, they considered too dangerous for their contingents. On the other hand, there was a near repeat of a situation that existed during the ECOMOG operation in Sierra Leone between 1997 and 1999 before the establishment of the UN mission. Individual contingents were assigned sectors to conquer, and even though instructions came from the Field Commander, he was not actually in control of the operations of these contingents as their loyalty was first and foremost to their contingent commander. In other instances, after operations were planned, some contingent turned around to report that their countries did not approve their participation in the said operations. The heterogeneous nature of African countries made the passing on of instructions rather very difficult. A victim of the 1885 Berlin Conference that Balkanized African nations under different colonial masters

Lack of respect for Ceasefire arrangements.

The government of Sudan was very notorious for violation of ceasefire agreements since the establishment of the Humanitarian ceasefire agreement in 2004. The rebel groups have not fared any better in this regard. The implication is that UNAMID has found it extremely difficult to function in an atmosphere of continuous fighting. Although the government

agreed to negotiate due to regional and international pressure, it never lived up to its promises; rather, it has continuously violated the 2003 and 2004 ceasefire agreements and has never neutralized its proxy militia-the Janjaweed-and has never stopped attacking civilians. (ICG:2007) After the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of May 2006, the government partnered with Minni Minawi's SLM/A, the only rebel group that signed the DPA. In mid-September 2006, government forces and Minawi's forces launched a coordinated offensive to crush the rebel groups who did not sign the DPA and also targeted communities who supported those rebels. (Nathan: 2009). Even while negotiations were being held in Doha in 2010, the government of Sudan was busy bombarding some rebel positions in Darfur. It is this double standard stance by GoS that destroyed the rebel groups' confidence in the government's sincerity and ability to respect any form of agreement. They repeatedly argued there was no need to sign a peace agreement with somebody who has signed over twenty agreements but has not honored even one. For any meaningful peace negotiations to take place, all the parties involved must demonstrate 'good faith' and sincerity and the willingness to take ownership of whatever peace agreement reached at the end of the negotiations.

A skewed political process

The success or failure of any UN peacekeeping is determined not by the number of troops deployed in the conflict theatre but by the progress on the political front. Unfortunately, the political process in UNAMID was handled by a different entity called the Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) which reported directly to New York and Addis Ababa. The JMST was mandated to spearhead the mediation efforts with the responsibility to bring together the various rebel factions and the government of Sudan for a negotiated solution to the conflict. The Chief Joint Mediator was appointed at the level of an Under-Secretary-General (USG), the same status as the Joint Special Representative. This was like a mission within a mission and an avenue for confusion. Both structurally and functionally, the JMST was not answerable to UNAMID but practically depended largely on the mission logistically, financially, and even in terms of human resources. One of the main problems with the conflict in Darfur is that there are too many actors on the stage; sometimes with contradictory initiatives and strategies targeting the same actors. Some of these initiatives have proved counterproductive and have helped only in prolonging the conflict. Conventional wisdom suggests that the JSR who bears the responsibility for what happens in the mission as the Head of Mission (HoM) should handle both the diplomatic and overall running of the mission. Presently the HoM has been designated the JSR and JCM ad interim with the responsibility for the overall management of the mission. Whichever experiment succeeds in getting the different rebel groups and the government to settle for a negotiated solution to the Darfur conflict may serve as lessons learned which would be applied in a similar situation elsewhere.

Lack of political will from the government and the rebels

Both the GoS and rebel factions did not show the political will to engage in a negotiated solution to the conflict. Each appeared to favor a military solution. Instead of honest negotiations to end the conflict and bring peace to the region, the Sudanese government and the Darfur rebels showed little interest in serious negotiations and used the talks only for tactical maneuvering.

Ceasefire agreements were grossly violated by both entities with impunity. Oftentimes while negotiations were ongoing, GoS was busy bombarding areas controlled by non-signatory factions and in some instances even the faction that signed the Darfur Peace Agreement with it.

For a negotiation process to be successful, all parties must have an intention to achieve a settlement and believe that resolving conflict through negotiations is the best option available. Anstey: 2006). While Abuja, instead of negotiating and trying to understand each other's perspectives and views, the parties kept "reiterating their demands, rejecting the positions of their opponents, trading accusations and recriminations, grandstanding for the benefit of the international observers, and attempting to win support for their positions from the mediators". Nathan 2006a) In the view of Laurie Nathan, an advisor during the negotiations in Abuja, one of the main reasons for the lack of serious negotiations was the fact that the government of Sudan did not take the Darfur rebels seriously. The government claimed that the rebels "were not representative of the people of Darfur, posed little military threat, and were too divided to achieve a unified negotiating posture." (Nathan:2006). On the other hand, leaders of the rebel factions "viewed the government as an 'evil' regime that had repeatedly broken its promises." Alex de Waal, also an advisor to the African Union during the talks, believes that the Abuja negotiations "served mostly as a forum in which each side could rehearse its condemnations of the other." (de Waal:2006). As explained by Nathan, the parties made no effort to accommodate each other's positions and forge common ground. There was no bargaining, let alone collaborative problem-solving. (Nathan:2006). For months on end, the parties simply reiterated their demands, rejected their opponents' positions, traded accusations, and attempted to gain a military advantage in the field. Instead of honest negotiations to end the conflict and bring peace to the region, the Sudanese government and the Darfur rebels viewed "the battlefield as the strategic arena of conflict" and the negotiations in Abuja as a tactical arena. (Brickhill:2007). The result is that the conflict continued to rage on with people killed and women raped almost daily.

Despite the above challenges and given the circumstances under which the hybrid mission evolved as the first purely hybrid mission, the conceptualization, design, planning, and implementation of UNAMID tilts very heavily and positively towards a paradigm shift in peacekeeping. According to Abubakar Rufai (2008), there is currently a movement towards a kind of hybrid operation in Syria where we see Kofi

Annan representing the League of the Arab States and the UN as Joint Special Envoy. Moreover, Rufai points to the collaboration between UN and NATO in Afghanistan, the situation where the EU deployed troops in Chad for the UN to follow up, and what is happening in Somalia where the AU has deployed in the first instance and heavily supported by the UN as a clear indication that hybrid operation will drive future peacekeeping operations. In his opinion, the UNAMID experience will certainly be useful, and we would be seeing that kind of cooperation whether under the name of hybrid or regional cooperation with a global body. In his opinion, Rufai (2009) strongly believes that UNAMID's experience will be applied especially in a case where an organization with no strong capacity is deployed to be taken over by the UN so that the as was the case with the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). This would guarantee that the operation does not suffer abrupt shifts or gaps. He concluded that the experience of UNAMID would always be a reference point and would also help to build the capacity of the regional organization to bring it to the UN standard in peacekeeping.

V. CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur was well-intentioned by the UN Security Council and its partner the African Union Peace Commission, as the best form of collaborative arrangement and a direct response to the complex nature of Post-Cold War conflicts. The inter-institutional partnership also reflected the sudden tenacity of the African regional organization, the African Union, to be more actively engaged in security management within the region under the concept of African solutions to African problems. However, the joint multinational operation experienced several challenges which reflected the fact that the mission was too ambitious in concept and design but deficient in logistical support and defective structurally. Some of these challenges were anticipated by the mission planners being that UNAMID was the first truly hybrid peacekeeping operation. A stronger mandate, clearly defined command and control structures will go a long way in strengthening future inter-institutional framework in security management. These challenges notwithstanding, UNAMID is undoubtedly a breakthrough in the collaborative efforts in conflict management and global response to the changing dynamics of the 21st century conflicts. There is no doubt that UNAMID's experience will influence future UN peacekeeping operations. The UN missions in Mali and Somalia clearly exhibit all the qualities of hybrid missions after the order of UNAMID.

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