

The Impact of Terrorism in Kenya

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Abstract: Interstate partnership is a new form of cooperation and problem solving technique for both small and larger powers alike for mutual benefit. This paper delves to investigate the impacts of terrorism attacks on Kenya. To effectively answer the objective of the study, the research was guided by the following objectives; to find out if terrorism is a threat to security in Kenya, and to examine the impact of terrorism on Kenya's economy. This paper made a critical analysis of the existing literature to arrive at a rational conclusion. The research found out that terrorism is a security threat in Kenya, terrorism has a negative impact on the following economic variables; tourism, security budget, foreign direct investment, religious profiling and youth employment. The paper recommends terrorism is a global security threat and all states should cooperate to thwart the menace.

Key words: terrorism, impact, Kenya, Security, Threat

I. INTRODUCTION

Global terrorism could be said to be one of the events which have threatened state interests in the contemporary era necessitating closer ties among states to safeguard vital interests for mutual benefit. Africa with a view to concluding it is more vulnerable to the threats from terrorism than any other continent. Its combination of; relatively weak states, ethnic and religious diversity, sometimes discrimination, its poverty, and in many places its "ungoverned space" all lend Africa a significant susceptibility to the growth of radical and sometimes internationally connected movements that employ terrorism. Some of these gaps as observed in this citation are aimed specifically at African governments, for example, the radical Islamic Maitatsine and "Taliban" in Nigeria, or the pseudo-Christian Lord's Resistance Army in northern Uganda; clearly have a more international agenda, for example, the al-Qaeda cells along the east coast of Africa and presumably the North Africans and Sudanese who have returned to their home countries from training and participating in the insurgency in Iraq (*International Crisis Group, 2006*).

The most devastating terrorist attacks witnessed by Kenya occurred on August 7, 1998, when terrorists attacked the American Embassy in Nairobi with a truck-bomb. The attack killed some 220 people and injured roughly 5,000 Embassy staff, passers-by and people in neighboring buildings (Oded, 2000). Al-Qaeda simultaneously attacked the U.S. Embassy in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, killing 11 and injuring another 70. An attempt to destroy the American Embassy in Kampala, Uganda, was reportedly foiled on this same date. All three

embassies were accessible and relatively unprotected, making them particularly attractive targets. The Kenyan attack also produced the first known al-Qaeda operative from Kenya, Sheikh Ahmad Salem Swedan, from Mombasa, as well as Abdullah Muhammad Fazul (henceforth 'Fazul'), a Comorian who reportedly holds a Kenyan passport, though his legal citizenship remains unclear (Shinn, 2004).

From the above foregoing, Kenya has been regarded as an anchor state to USA and in counterterrorism efforts no country is so strategic than it (Cursons, 2005).

II. METHODOLOGY

The research adopted a mixed approach method by corroborating the raw data from the respondents with the existing literature on the subject to arrive at a rational ending on the subject under the study.

II.1 Target Population

The study targeted embassies of the horn of Africa states in Nairobi, Ministry of foreign affairs and international trade-Kenya, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (GAD), and United Nations Environmental Program-Nairobi (UNEP).

II.2 Sample Size

Using the above target population in order to scientifically fine tune the likely research outcome, the application of sample size calculation formulae by Yamane became useful. Some scholars have indicated that, the sample size is an important feature of any empirical study in which the goal is to make inferences about a population from a sample. Determination of sample size depends on a number of factors including the purpose of the study, population size, sampling error permitted etc. The computation of the appropriate sample size is generally considered the most important step in statistical study. The sample size computation must be done appropriately because if the sample size is not appropriate for a particular study then the inference drawn from the sample will not be authentic and it might lead to some wrong conclusions (Sarmah and Hazarika, 2012). The researcher calculated the sample size using the formulae developed by Yamane (1967) which is a simplified formula for calculation of sample size from a finite population and the population being known.

According to Yamane, for a 95% confidence level and $p = 0.05$, size of the sample should be represented by;

$$n = N / 1+N (e^2)$$

Where, N is the target population and e is the level of precision. When this formula is used for this study; $N = 311$ with $\pm 5\%$ precision. In other words, what Yamane's formulae implies is that n is at times called corrected sample/ or real sample population (sample size); N stands for target population; e for Margin of Error (MoE) or Level of Precision (LoP). Most often the MoE and LoP are equivalent. Assuming now then that 95% confidence level (neither too high nor too low) is used, where $p = 0.05$, the sample size is obtained by substitution as follows;

$$n = \frac{311}{1 + 311(0.05)^2}$$

$$n \text{ (Sample Size)} = \frac{311}{1 + 311(.0025)}$$

$$\text{Sample Size} = \frac{311}{1 + .78}$$

$$\text{Sample Size} = \frac{311}{1.78}$$

$$\text{Sample Size} = 174.9$$

Thus, on the basis of the calculation, the derived Sample size is 175 respondents. The application of Yamane as used herein applies when study techniques used are viewed to be pre-planned and an expected assumed response rate of near 100% is to be achieved, in this case purposive sampling technique was used.

According to Cochran (1977), the error which arises due to only a sample being used to estimate the population parameters is termed as sampling error or sampling fluctuations. The sample size is to be determined according to some pre assigned degree of precision. The degree of precision can be specified in terms of two criteria. The margin of permissible error between the estimated value and the population value. In other words it is the measure of how close an estimate is to the actual characteristic in the population. The level of precision may be termed as sampling error, is the range in which the true value of the precision is estimated to be. The precision desired may be made by giving the amount of error that the study is willing to tolerate in the sample estimates. According to this study, it should be noted that sample size is an outcome of the following expectations for validity; accuracy, analysis, flexibility, and response rate.

III. SCOPE

The scope of the paper is Kenya, which is one of the countries in the Horn of Africa region which has been continuously in crisis: for instance, a civil war erupted in Somalia in 1977, resulting in the country having had no functioning national government since 1991. Sudan, with the Sudanese Civil War, represents another important source of instability for the whole region. Conflicts have also occurred in Djibouti and Eritrea. Kenya is a strategically located in the Eastern and the horn Africa, worst hit by terrorists attacks, host of majority of western nationals in the region, economic and commercial hub, host of the two UN offices-UNEP and UN-Habitat (USDS, 2020).

IV. IMPACT OF TERRORISM

This objective sets to examine the impact of partnership of counterterrorism efforts by Kenya and United States of America. Impact as defined by (Ox-ford dictionary) means the


action of one object coming forcibly into contact with one another causing a marked effect or influence.

Apart from the catastrophic human consequences of insecurity, the economic costs of are also enormous. Physical and human capital losses, infrastructure destruction, lower investment and trade disruptions are all examples of channels through which the economy is negatively affected (De Groot, 2010). What makes it worse is that seldom are the impacts of war on terror on a country's economy confined within the national boundaries. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find out that on average a neighbor to a country in conflict suffers a loss of 43% of initial GDP, and that the total economic costs to the neighboring countries actually exceed the costs suffered by the country involved in the conflict.

This section is significant as it gives insights on social – economic and political impacts resulting from Kenya-United States of America partnership on counterterrorism in the horn of Africa region. It is imperative to not that terrorism and terrorist's attacks are non-discriminative in nature, its human cost has been felt in virtually every corner of the globe, which has resulted to devastating consequences for the enjoyment of the right to life, liberty and physical integrity of victims. In addition to these individual costs, terrorism has destabilized Governments, undermine civil society, jeopardize peace and security, and threaten social and economic development. All of these also have a real impact on the enjoyment of human rights. The findings of this objective were discussed thematically in the following trajectory; first, the impact of terrorism on five variables namely; reduction on foreign direct investment, reduction on tourism, rise of unemployment, religious profiling, and increase of security expenditure. Secondly, the counterterrorism impact on geopolitics; regional economy, security and cooperation.

This section sets to unearth the impact of terrorists attacks on Kenya on the following variables; foreign direct investment, tourism, unemployment, security budget and religious profiling.

Bar graph 1: Showing the Impact of CT on Foreign Direct Investment, Tourism, Unemployment, Security budget and Religious profiling.



Source: Researcher, 2021

The question being addressed by the chart from the instrument was a likert based inquiry item concerned with the impact of terrorism on; reduction on foreign direct investment, reduction on terrorism, increase in security budget, increase on unemployment and religious profiling as it broadly answers the impact of Kenya – USA partnership in counterterrorism on the Horn of Africa security.

The impact of terrorism on the above said variables are hereby discussed in detail individually;

4.1 Foreign Direct Investment

From the chart above it is evident that respondents demographically are in agreement that terrorism impact foreign investment. This justification derives from direction taken by respondents where most of them leaned towards strongly agree and agree. As noted earlier, (Sandler & Enders, 2008) affirm that the impacts of terrorism on developing states have more impact on the country's economy than terrorism that occurs in a developed country because of vulnerabilities associated with these states. Collier et al. (2003) contend that terrorist incidents have economic consequences by diverting FDI, destroying infrastructure, redirecting public investment funds to security, or limiting trade. Just as capital may take flight from a country plagued by a civil war, high incidence of terrorism may also reduce capital inflows. Investors are inclined to exclude Kenya in their FDI plans due to some shocks such as the direct destruction of infrastructure that raise operating costs due to an increasing need of security measures and the rise of recruiting costs due to missing incentives to work in terrorism-prone country. Terrorism also raises the costs of doing business in terms of raising the insurance premiums, increasing the costs for security precautions, and larger salaries to employees at-risk. An interview with one of the respondent in the ministry of foreign affairs and international trade pointed out that;

“Counterterrorism and terrorism attacks has scared foreign investors in Kenya, investors have resorted to invest in other secure countries where there are less risks and security for their investment. Some have closed their businesses and relocated to Rwanda and other African countries. As a result, most workers have lost employment.”

This implies that counterterrorism efforts in Kenya have real impact on economic growth. Kenya historically, was a prime choice for foreign investors seeking to establish a presence in not only East Africa but the entire HOA region during the 1960s and 1970s (Kinyanjui, 2014). Despite politically driven economic policies, rampant corruption, government malfeasance, poor infrastructure and substandard public services during the 1980s and 1990s, foreign direct investment (FDI) to Kenya decreased from the Western states including the USA. Kinyanjui further points that Net Foreign Direct Investment in US\$ in Kenya during the period 2010-2012 was affected as a result of terrorism activities. He observes a decline in the net FDI of 14% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In evaluating investment status, KNBS (2015) in a

recent report indicates that about 70% of investors perceived security to have deteriorated in the past 2 years.

Despite Kenya's relative peace in the entire Horn of Africa and based on the above literature, terrorism impact on foreign investment has spillover effects in a region (Li and Schaub, 2004) among neighboring countries. Terrorism in a neighboring state hampers capital inflows and losses of regional multiplier effects on economic activity (Sandler, 2004).

4.2 Impact on Tourism Sector

Tourism and tourism-related services such as aviation and transport, is one of the sectors of the economy that suffers the most from terrorism. Travel and tourism contributed US\$7.2 trillion to global GDP in 2015, or 9.8 per cent of the global total (Global Terrorism Index, 2016). The adverse economic effects of terrorism on the tourism sector are felt by all countries that suffer terrorist attacks, regardless of whether or not these incidents are targeted at tourists. An interview with

The direct costs of terrorism on the tourism sector include decreased tourist numbers, leading to decreased spending which consequently lowers GDP. Indirect costs include decreased employment in the tourism sector and reduced flow-on effects to other industries, such as food service and cleaning and maintenance businesses. Between 2008 and 2014, tourism and travel's average contribution to GDP growth was 3.6 per cent in countries that had no terrorist attacks targeting tourists.

Tourism is one of the six most significant sectors in Kenya's development blue print (Kenya Vision, 2030). It provides huge employment and foreign exchange earnings. A study carried out by Buigut and Amendah (2015) show that terrorism has indeed significantly affected tourist arrivals and earnings in Kenya. Their results show that a 1% increase in fatalities decreases the arrivals of tourists by about 0.132% which suggests an annual loss of about Ksh157.1 million in tourism revenues per unit increase in fatality for the country. In another study, Buigut (2015) used a dynamic panel model to compare the effect of terrorism on developed and emerging country demand for tourism in Kenya using quarterly data spanning 2010Q1 to 2013Q4. The estimated results showed that a 1% increase in fatality reduced arrivals from developed countries by 0.082%. This translated to 2,487 visitors per year, or roughly Ksh155.8 million lost annually from an increase of one fatality per quarter.

A more recent study by Masinde, et, al. (2016) which used Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL), Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) techniques and Granger causality tests to empirically determine whether terrorism has an adverse effect on tourism between 1994 and 2014; found that there is no long-run relationship between terrorism and tourism in Kenya and that terrorism did not Granger cause tourism and vice versa. However, short-run effects showed terrorism had negative and significant effects on tourism. The lack of a long-run equilibrium relationship between the two

variables is a bit surprising although the authors explained their findings by arguing that terrorism activities have been less frequent in Kenya and have been a recent problem with a spike after 2011.

Kenya lost a quarter of its visitors in the first five months of 2015 – 284,313 down from 381,278 in 2014 (KTB, 2015). This was followed by a fall of 4.3% the year before. This resulted in a decline in tourist receipts of 16.7% in 2013, with about 10% decrease specifically in hotels and restaurants in Kenya, which continued in 2014 (CBK, 2015).

The decrease in tourism shows the effect that a spate of Islamist militant attacks has had on Kenya's tourism sector. Following dramatic kidnappings in 2014 that occurred at beachside resorts, operators were especially concerned with the security of the Kenyan coast, responsible for about 65% of the industry's tourist visits (Ongoma, et al, 2014). The reports on terrorist attacks and travel advisories, including travel bans to Kenya from the main source of tourist markets such as U.S.A and Europe led to reduced tourist numbers. For example, tourism businesses which have been bringing about US\$500 million annually were seriously affected by travel warnings since 2013. In 2014/15, the tourism sector has been losing at least US\$1 million everyday due to the decline in tourist numbers and activities. The losses have been attributed to the depressed performance of the tourism sector due to insecurity associated with terror attacks and adverse travel advisories (Economic Survey, 2015).

The decrease in tourist arrivals especially in 2013/14 had a ripple effect on all sectors of the economy. Kenya's reputation plummeted and this led to the loss of its tourism competitiveness. Kenya was no longer an option to be considered for vacation or investment.

The United States which is an important partner to Kenya has spent nearly \$3.1 million on anti-terrorism assistance since 1998, including training more than 500 Kenyan security personnel in the United States. These programs have been complemented by other initiatives such as the U.S. donation of \$1 million in airport security equipment under the "Safe Skies for Africa" program to improve aviation safety. Furthermore, as part of the multinational campaign, a special anti-terrorism squad, composed of the German Naval Air Wing, is currently based in Mombasa to monitor ships plying the Gulf of Aden and the Somali coast (USIP, 2008).

4.3 Terrorism Impact on Unemployment

From the demographics above, the majority of the respondents agree that terrorism have an impact on employment. The above variable may not be discussed in isolation from the already mentioned: impact on foreign direct investment, and tourism because of the inter-connectedness nature. The negative impact terrorism has on foreign direct investment and tourism ultimately leads to unemployment. Tourism sector as noted earlier (Kenya Economic Survey, 2017) employed over 500,000 Kenyans ranging from tour operators, tour guides, travel agencies, safari drivers, dancers, hoteliers,

restaurateurs, small businesses operators to airports and airline personnel. Consequently, there was a significant increase in unemployment as many Kenyans lost their jobs. Employees that were still employed received salary cuts. For instance, at the Carnivore restaurant; all the 330-staff had their salaries reduced, including Dunford the chairman (National Geographic, 2010).

4.4 Terrorism Impact on Security Expenditure

From the graph above, it is evident that majority respondents at 50.6% strongly agreeing while 48.9 agreeing and 0.6 not sure whether counter terrorism had religious profiling impact. It is evident that counterterrorism measures in Kenya had a religious profiling impact.

It imperative to note that counterterrorism effort have led religious profiling globally, Scheinin (2007) affirms that religious profiling has been increasingly used in the fight against terrorism since nine eleven: from the German data-mining initiatives to identify so-called terrorist "sleepers", to the United Kingdom's stop and searches under the Terrorism Act 2000, and beyond to EU policy. The fear of further terrorist attacks is creating a new form of "terrorist" profiling globally, where Muslims or people who appear to be of Middle-Eastern decent are being discriminated against in the name of national security.

Religious and ethnic has been used synonymously by police, security, immigration or customs officials of generalizations based on race, ethnicity, religion or national origin - rather than individual behavior or objective evidence - as the basis for suspicion in directing discretionary law enforcement actions. It is most often manifest in police officers' decisions about whom to stop for identity checks, questioning, and searches and sometimes arrest. Religious profiling can also be used to "mine" (or undertake computerized searches of) databases for potential terrorist suspects or in targeting surveillance and anti-radicalization policies.

Religious profiling violates the principle of equal treatment under the law and is a form of race discrimination that is prohibited under international law. Indeed, it is a form of discrimination that undermines the commitment to non-discrimination as a fundamental value of the both regional and municipal laws. It is also ineffective and counter-productive in that it alienates the very communities whose support is necessary for fighting crime and terrorism.

In Kenya's counterterrorism efforts, religious profiling was and is practiced by law enforcement official to target Islamist extremism and the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) who according to security agents lure individuals to join al-Shabaab (Botha, 2014). Majority of Kenyans population are Christians 84%, Muslims 11% others 6% (*world fact book-Kenya*). Islamic religion and population of Arabic descent and terrorist groups/ organizations associated with them (Al Qaida, Al-Shabaab and associates) have claimed responsibility of terrorists attacks in Kenya (Anderson, and McKnight, 2014).

In 2013 Kenya’s Anti-Terrorist Police Unit (ATPU) has led the government’s response at home to al-Shabaab. It is alleged that the unit was responsible for extra-judicial killings and the disappearance of suspected militants as well as Islamic activists in Kenya. In addition, security forces are suspected of involvement in the killing of Sheikh Aboud Rogo Mohamed, an extremist preacher in Mombasa who originated from Lamu and who was linked to al-Hijra. His death provoked riots at Kenya’s coast.

Shortly thereafter, killings of suspected supporters of al-Shabaab and its Kenyan branches became most concentrated at the coastal towns and cities. One human rights organization estimated that at least 21 Muslim clerics were killed by security agencies between April 2012 and July 2014 (The New Humanitarian, 2014). In retaliation, militants have also been accused of killing moderate preachers and Imams seeking to counter radical ideology in tit-for-tat attacks (Anderson, and McKnight, 2014). By the end of 2014, this cycle of murders and counter-murders, demonstrations and harsh policing, had generated a climate of widespread suspicion and tension at the coast.

Table 1: Showing Responses specifically addressing impacts of Kenya – USA Partnership on CT on the HOA Security

Impacts	Response Types	Multiple Responses	
		F	F in %
Reduction on Foreign Investment (ROFI)	Scaring foreign investors from USA leaning states (allies).	165	94.8%
	Scaring foreign investors from terrorists’ tagged states.	112	64.3%
	Stringent clearance at Ports of Entry in Kenya.	100	57.4%
Reduction in Tourism (RIT)	Fewer movements to Coastal tourists’ sites.	168	96.5%
	USA Government Travel Advisory to their citizens & allied states.	90	51.7%
Unemployment	Closure of many tourist related hotels.	150	86.2%
	ii. Flight cancellations.	148	85%
	Drastic reduction of foreign investors.	118	67.8%
Increased in security budget (IISB)	Reference was made to existing government security budgets	80	45.9%
Religious profiling	Raiding of mosques	70	40.2%

Source: Researcher, 2021

This table 1 above captures the multiple specific responses that were observed by responses on the impacts of Kenya-USA partnership in CT in the HOA security. The following security variables were under inquiry; Reduction on Foreign Investment, Reduction in Tourism, Unemployment, Increased in security budget and religious profiling.

The findings observed on responses specifically addressing impacts of Kenya – USA Partnership on CT on the HOA security that highly recorded multiple responses indicate that there was reduction on foreign investment (94.8%), reduction in tourism (96.5%), and unemployment (86.2%). This is an indication of an existence of correlation among the impact variables (Scaring foreign investors from USA leaning states /allies, Fewer movements to Coastal tourists’ sites, and Closure of many tourist related hotels) on Kenya-USA partnership on CT which from the likert scale analysis on each impact variable a great leaning to “strongly agree” and “agree” was evidenced.

The other impact variables (increase in security budget and religious profiling) received fewer multiple responses yet significant to the bilateral partnership because they tend towards the 50% mark. Key to lower response on increase of security budget is their secrecy to the public. In as much as security budgets in Kenya may be scanty, the available data point towards increased budgets in some specific periods when terrorist activities heightened. In the table below, there is an increase in Kenya government Defense/National Security Intelligence Services (NSIS) budget 2008/09-2009/10 an indication that there were activities related to terrorism and in this instance, there was a preparation for military incursion into Somalia.

It is good to note according Republic of Kenya (ROK) 2010 that the set of policies outlined in this Budget Outlook Paper (BOPA) are consistent with the national strategic objectives in Budget Strategic Paper (BSP) pursued by the Government as a basis of allocation of public resources. This therefore means BSP and BOPA represent projection and the actual expenditure respectively. In the table, both the BSP’10 and BOPA’11 represent when the estimates were done. It will be realized that the Defense/NSIS budget increased overtime (BOPA’11) except slight decrease by trend in 2011/12, the interpretation would generally imply that Kenya Government War on Terror (KGWT) kept on increasing by support of partners due to incessant terrorism within her territories. The percentages somehow indicate an inverse relation to the rise in expenditure since they were calculated on the basis of the aggregate total national revenue.

Table 2: Annex Table 1 - Central Government Operations 2008/09 - 2013/14 (in billions of Kenya Shillings)

	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14
			Budget	BOPA’11	BSP’10	BOPA’11
Defense/NSIS Expenditure	48.5	56.9	56.7	63.7	55.9	57.7
Defense/NSIS Expenditure in Percentage (%)	2.2%	2.4%	2.0%	2.3%	1.8%	1.9%
					BSP’10	BOPA’11
					54.5	58.8
					1.6%	1.7%
						60.0
						1.5%

Source: ROK, 2010

The budgeting trends towards CT by single states and interstate relations expose existence of partnership. Aronson (Undated) affirm that the FBI and the Kenya Criminal Investigation Division (CID) worked in cohesion and exchanged expertise to mark an extensive operation that continues into present day, serving as a prime example for international law enforcement cooperation.

In support of this (Whitaker 2008), observes that in a matter of months following the 1998 attack, The National Security Intelligence Service was established by the Kenyan government and the country was formally added to the U.S. Anti-terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program. The American government also contributed \$42 million towards health care for injured victims, building reconstruction, and business recovery. This money was a necessary humanitarian step to mitigate the anger and hardship felt by many Kenyan people at that time. Aside from this emergency relief, little changed in the monetary assistance Kenya received from the United States. The addition to the ATA program was largely a formality, intended to make a statement that America would amplify its security abroad.

This research would quickly point that in the partnership between Kenya and USA in the CT there were symbiotic relations in form of technical/financial support and action implementation agency/state (that is for USA and Kenya respectively). The financiers' fiscal supports normally are channeled as grants hence may not appear in government budget projections.

The United States (Lind & Howell 2010), after the War on Terror began, exponentially increased its resources and presence around the world, especially in countries deemed critical to the success of the mission. The role of international development assistance quickly became "an instrument by which [America] pursued [its] political and security interests to defeat terrorist networks...". The existence of humanitarian aid often had security undertones. For example, it became a presumed belief that several main factors affecting Islamic radicalization are under development, poverty, and high levels of youth unemployment. Kenya possesses all of the above characteristics to a large degree.

The changes in American intelligence and law enforcement practices (Franken, 2003) also had profound effects overseas. The creation of task forces and an expansion of the Intelligence Community thinned the line between law enforcement and military entities. For example, the U.S. Defense Department began considerably closer relationships with non-military actors. As a result, the fight against terrorism became a joint battle by all government agencies. The program offers (Aronson, Undated) free education at military institutions in the United States, giving foreign countries [in this case, Kenya] access to valuable and comprehensive training.

The largest increase in military assistance was part of the Foreign Military Financing program (FMF), which directed most of its funding towards counterterrorism. In the year

immediately following 9/11, the FMF aid package to Kenya increased roughly 15 times its previous value. The country was also added as a beneficiary to the Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship, which according to the Defense Department, is an initiative targeted towards "key countries in the war on terrorism" (Franken, 2003).

Aside from the fellowship creation and FMF increase in 2003, the East African Counterterrorism Initiative was also put into effect, giving a grant of \$100 million dollars to Kenya and other surrounding countries. The specific distribution of the funds is not publicly available; however, multiple governmental entities were formed immediately following the grant (Whitaker, 2008).

Retrogressively, criticisms exist that corroborate earlier discussion about impact of CT arising from Kenya-USA partnership. On this Aronson (Undated) posits that a significant population in Kenya resents the United States for its involvement in counterterrorism and security. Many dissenting Kenyans believe that their terrorism woes are due largely to the extended presence of the United States within their country and not a result of any inherent problems created by Kenya. A common perception is that they are "caught up in the crossfire" and are "collateral damage" in America's War on Terror. Besides the overt actions taken by the U.S. in the fight against terrorism, a number of Kenyans accuse the American government of, whether arbitrarily or not, inhibiting the largest service industry in Kenya. Tourism in Kenya is a huge part of the national economy and Americans have historically comprised much of the clientele. The U.S. State Department has issued numerous travel warnings about Kenya since 2002 that expose possible dangers within the country. In addition, it has had effects on foreign investment, affecting tourism, and creating unemployment in the end.

Discussing terrorism and Kenya in the HOA dates back to sporadic deadly incidences in the years up to 1998 (Norfolk 1980 Hotel bombing and USA Embassy bombing in 1998). However, the escalation of terrorism in the post 2000 became immense thus necessitating counterterrorism partnerships to secure Kenya as a strategic partner in the HOA and by the extension the interests of the partner states.

The actual terrorism incidences include; 2002 Kikambala Hotel bombing where 13 were killed and 80 injured. The hotel blast occurred after 60 visitors from Israel had checked in (BBC News, 2002). In October 2011 (MFA, 2013), Kenya's Defense Force entry into Somalia through a coordinated operation with the Somali military was launched against the al-Shabaab insurgents in Southern Somalia.

Sustained terrorism (Mutiga, 2013) attacks led to an incident of 21st September 2013 when al-Shabaab associated gunmen targeted Nairobi's Westgate Shopping Mall where at least 67 people were killed. According to Kashmira Gander in 2014 about 50 masked gunmen hijacked a van on 15 June 2014 and raided a police station in the predominantly Christian town of Mpeketoni. Another incident that followed closely was in April 2015, where gun wielding men stormed the Garissa

University College in the wee hours, killing almost 150 people and wounding several others (BBC News, 2015).

Other numerous several incidences making counterterrorism possible as in Kenya-USA partnership arose from such attacks as in the table below;

Table 7: Showing Lesser Terrorism Incidences in Kenya

Date	Incident	Location	Source
30 th Sep. 2012	Grenade attack	Nairobi, Juja road	BBC News
14 th Dec 2013	Bus Park attack	Nairobi, Eastleigh	Aljazeera
14 th Mar 2014	Arrest of 2 Terrorists	Mombasa	BBC News
23 rd Apr 2014	Police Station bombing	Nairobi, Pangani	BBC News
3 rd May 2014	Twin Bus Park bombing	Nairobi, Thika Highway	BBC News
28 th Nov 2014	Bus attack	Mandera-Nairobi road	Sunday Nation
2 nd Dec 2014	Kenya Bus attack	Mandera Quarry	BBC News

Source: Researcher, 2021

V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This study recommends that; since terrorism impact transcends territorial boundaries, concerted efforts are called for by not only from the neighbourhood but also other partners from outside the region to combat the menace.

In conclusion, terrorism in Kenya has led to immense impact on all economic variables within Kenya and the entire horn of Africa region. In this study, the negative impact of terrorism are on; reduced foreign direct investment, reduced tourists in kenya, unemployment, religious profiling, and increased security expenditure. Reduced foreign investment has negatively reduced countries GDP hence affecting other economic variable negatively. In tourists sector, terrorism has led to un employment as those who worked in tourism sector were rendered jobless. Religious profiling is yet another impact which has seen Muslims especially in the coastal parts of Kenya been targeted by security personnel as not only sympathetic to terrorism but as associates. This has led to raiding of Mosques and disappearance of Muslim clerics. There is also a negative impact on security budget as resources from other sectors of the economy are channeled to security sector. On top of that the loss of security personnel in line of duty and innocent civilians who have become casualties in this war.

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