

Reflecting on the prime hurdles and successes of the International Community's Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect in Central Africa Republic 2013-2021

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Abstract: The objective of this paper is to provide an analysis of the challenges and successes of the international community's implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Central Africa Republic (CAR) from 2013 to 2021. The introduction of the R2P doctrine in 2005 has activated debate among scholars on the efficacy of the R2P in mitigating war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. State sovereignty is arguably the major obstacle in implementing the R2P doctrine, but the 2013 coup in CAR has opened a Pandora box of the other challenges to its operability which are vested interests and sectarian cleavages. The structure and functions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) also affected the success of the R2P in CAR. The veto powers of the permanent five are inimical to the peace process in CAR. This paper also argues that although there are some problems in implementing the R2P in CAR, the international community was able to prevent the conflict from crystallising into genocide and averted a regional spill of the conflict. The study interrogates the evolution of the R2P as well as proffer recommendations on how the international community can improve the implementation of the R2P. The methodology employed in the study was qualitative desk research with emphasis on secondary sources of information such as books, journals, internet sources and newspapers.

Keywords; R2P, CAR, mass atrocity, ethnic cleansing, state fragility

I. INTRODUCTION

Since its inception, the responsibility to protect (R2P) has triggered an avalanche of debate about its implementation, success and challenges in the international system. The principal motive of the R2P has been to promote international peace and security through humanitarian intervention. The concept evolved in response to the failure of the international community to avert mass atrocities in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, (Bellamy and Lupel 2015). The former Secretary General of the United Nations (UN) Kofi Annan in his 2000 Millennium Report once affirmed that, "if the humanitarian intervention is an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violation of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?". The assumption of Anan was that state sovereignty is the major hurdle to the R2P, yet this study unravels that there are a myriad of factors that hinders the R2P

which are geopolitics, structure of the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) and inherent state failure inter alia.

Given the changing nature of conflicts were hybrid threats such as terrorism, military coups and climate change are now dominant it is now time to rethink and reconsider the R2P and other security instruments. CAR has become a serial coup state yet the response of the international community in CAR is lackadaisical and thereby affects the credibility of the R2P. The former Secretary General of the UN Ban Ki Moon, as quoted by Bellamy (2008: 2), points out that the challenges of the R2P emanates from translating R2P from words to deeds. CAR has exposed the strengths and challenges faced by the international community in implementing the R2P and avert human rights crisis. Superpower interest in CAR has retarded the progress of implementing the R2P and this shows that sometimes the R2P is a trojan horse used by the international community to advance its economic interest. CAR is a country that is strategic in the international system due to two major factors which are its geographical location and t its endowment with vast natural resources.

The 2013 coup in CAR triggered a humanitarian crisis and human rights watch tagged the impasse as a 'forgotten crisis'. In response the international community invoked the R2P and intervened in the crisis. The international community's decision was guided by the UN charter and the African Union (AU) Constitutive Act. According to the preamble of the UN, the people of the UN are determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war which twice in the history of mankind caused untold sorrow to mankind. Article 1 of the UN Charter states that, the objective of the UN is to maintain peace and security and to that end take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace. Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act articulates that, the principles of the AU is the right of the union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. The UNSC and the AU Peace and Security Council are the major enforcers of the R2P. Interestingly, the international community introduced the concept of the R2P ignoring the

UNSC reform. This paper argues that on balance the failure of the R2P in CAR outweighs its success.

II. CONCEPTUALISING AND CONTEXTUALISING R2P

The R2P is a political commitment to end the worst forms of persecution and violence. The dramatic change in the nature of conflicts from inter-state wars to intra-state wars ignited policy makers to reinitiate security strategies to fit the novel norms. Smith (2006) argues that, intra-state wars are on the rise and inter-state wars are on the decline. Huntington (1993) observed the tremendous change in the morphology of conflicts as he argued that, conflicts will be the future of world politics but would be fought not between countries but between civilisations. In Africa the trends of conflicts are also exacerbated by tribalism and regionalism. Alabi (2006) and Olaosebikan (2010) agree that, Africa accounts for more than 50% of the conflicts that have occurred in the international system since the end of the Cold War and this entails that the R2P is mainly applied in Africa. The intention of the R2P is to bridge the gap between member states pre-existing obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law and the reality faced by population at risk of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The R2P was unanimously adopted in 2005 at the UN world summit, the largest gathering of Head of States and Government in world history (Adam 2015). The concept is articulated in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the world summit outcome documents which culminated in the establishment of three pillars of the R2P (Broadhead 2020, Gallagher 2015 and Hehir 2015). According to pillar one, every state has the responsibility to protect its population from four mass atrocities namely, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Pillar number two states that, the wider international community has the responsibility to encourage and assist individual states in meeting that responsibility. The last pillar states that, if a state is manifestly failing to protect its population the international community must be prepared to take appropriate collective action in a timely and decisively manner and in accordance with the UN Charter. In the context of the AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is supposed to provide a timely advice on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security to enable the development of appropriate response strategies to prevent or resolve conflicts (International Peace Institute 2012:3). The 2013 coup in CAR has raised questions about the capacity of the AU CEWS to prevent conflicts in Africa.

The R2P is an emerging norm of collective international responsibility to protect exercisable by the UNSC authorising military intervention as a last resort. Kofi Anan addressing UN member states in March 2005 said that, ‘we must embrace the responsibility to protect and when necessary we must act on it’. An analysis of the implementation of the R2P shows that the norm is a paper tiger as the practice of implementing it has exacerbated conflicts rather than pacify conflicts. The Arab Revolution of 2011 has exposed the weakness and double standards in implementing the R2P. The Syrian

conflict 2011 and Libya Civil Wars undergird that the R2P is failing to promote global peace and security. The “Hobbesian nightmare” security conundrum that engulfed Libya and Syria after military intervention shows that the international community need to rethink the applicability of the R2P. The R2P appears to be a Trojan horse for the legitimisation of unilateral intervention. In CAR the R2P has made inroads in bringing peace and security though there are problems which must be addressed. Ban Ki-Moon observed that, the major challenge of the R2P is how to translate it from words to deeds. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a legal branch of the R2P and the success of international justice is pivotal in averting humanitarian crisis.

Hurd (2002) argues that, the UNSC is the security branch of the R2P and the criticism levelled on the UNSC is that the UN is a moribund institution and a 20th Century institution trying to solve 21st century problems. The composition and powers of the UNSC compromised the probity and legitimacy of the R2P. The geographical representation of permanent five (P5) members of the UNSC and veto powers of the permanent five makes it irrelevant and inefficacious in mitigating conflicts. What is cumbersome about the UNSC is that it is a club and the permanent five is another club within a club. Adam (2015) argues that, the UNSC response to the crisis in CAR in December 2013 was tardy; Syria, meanwhile, exposed a more fundamental debility in the UNSC namely the historic anachronism of five permanent members who can still veto any attempt by the international community. There is need for the creation of emergency UN peace service as key to rapid response capability to the UN, this mechanism should be buttressed by the operationalisation of the military intervention dimension of the R2P highlighting the process, opportunities and risks involved and the timeliness.

Gareth Evans who played a prominent role in developing the R2P argued that, the whole point of the R2P doctrine in the minds of those of us who conceived it was above all to change the way that the world’s policy makers and those who influence them, thought and acted in response to emerging imminent and actually occurring mass atrocity. The R2P was developed to solve the 21st Century “problems without passports” such as climate change, poverty and the persistence of deadly conflicts in which civilians are primary targets, (Anan 2005). The R2P purpose was to create a new norm of international law which states would feel ashamed to violate, compelled to observe, and to that end the R2P is a peremptory norm of international law. Bellamy (2008) argues that, the key innovation in 2001 was the reconceptualization of humanitarian intervention. This paper argues that, the implementation of the R2P in CAR has helped in mitigating the humanitarian catastrophe though there are variations and discrepancies. The R2P reconsiders the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of non-intervention in the internal and external affairs of other states.

III. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The study employed a qualitative methodology. The data collection instrument was secondary sources namely, books, journal articles, annual reports, conference papers, internet sources, media reports and civic society reports. The study period begins in 2013 and ends in 2021 because the current conflict started in 2013 as a result of the coup, hence this study did not reflect on how the R2P was implemented in CAR before 2013. The author is guided by ethical considerations and international academic best practices that encourage objectivity and respect for evidence in research.

IV. SUCCESSES OF THE R2P IN CAR

Despite an avalanche of challenges faced by the international community in implementing the R2P in CAR, the international community was able to foster peace in CAR through mediation, peacekeeping, diplomacy and negotiations. One of the greatest achievements of the R2P in CAR was preventing the conflict to crystallise into genocide as well as reducing the numbers of refugees and internally displaced population. This was achieved through disarmament, demobilisation and disintegration (DDR), community violence reduction programmes as well as deployment of state authorities to recently stabilised areas, (International Peace Institute 2018). It is pertinently clear that the volume of violence in CAR would have been significantly high if not MINUSCA and MISCA were present. According to the Effective Peace Operation Network (EPON) the actions of peacekeeping missions has a deterrent effect and has contributed in minimising large scale violent conflicts. CAR is traditionally the second poorest country in the world according to the Human Development Index and it was ranked last when MINUSCA was deployed and after the deployment there was a tremendous improvement in humanity. This paper noted that, for the first two years when MINUSCA mission with the Sangaris was deployed civilian death rates declined dramatically and internally displaced persons were returning home and the economy grew.

The international community also facilitated peace in CAR through negotiations. On 24 January 2019 the AU brokered peace talks in Khartoum aimed at ending the conflict in CAR, the dialogue brings together government representatives and fourteen armed groups. The peace talks resulted into the February 2019 Peace Accord between the Government and armed groups and it provided prospects for peace in CAR. The centrality of the Peace Accord was on transitional justice in CAR and it is clear that the R2P was not only a Trojan horse but helped to consolidate peace through pacific settlement of disputes spelled out under chapter 6 of the UN Charter. The dialogue with armed groups was the beginning of a pilot project of Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Reparation (DDRR). The respective project was implemented in Bambari, Bouar, Bangui, Paoua, Kaga and Bandoro and this marked the reduction of hostilities and cases of human catastrophe in the areas. Courtesy of negotiations, on 20 June 2017 a Political Agreement was

signed in SaintÉgidio in Rome paving the way for the pacification of CAR plagued by years of civil wars. According to the SaintÉgidio document (2017), the agreement provides for an immediate ceasefire and was achieved thanks to the mediation of the community of SaintÉgidio which for years has been working for the reconciliation of the country.

MINUSCA peacekeeping can be credited for facilitating CAR to return to constitutional order as the Mission assisted the country to hold its first free and fair election in 2016 as well as in 2020. The establishment of a legitimate government in CAR helps to facilitate the peace process. When Faustin-Archange Touadera was elected as the President in 2016 he launched the nationwide Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation Commission. This was significant considering that the country has been plagued by civil wars, hence the need for transitional justice to redress the impunity and injustice of the war. MINUSCA was deployed on the heels of several other regional and international interventions and in the absence of a functioning national army, police or gendamerine. The major founding principles of peacekeeping missions are consent, limited force and impartiality and despite the myriad of hurdles MINUSCA has unflinchingly helped to protect civilians and extend state authority. MINUSCA has co-deployed with the newly reconfigured Central Africa Armed Force (FACA). Howard states that, MINUSCA can be credited for capacitating and strengthening FACA through training more than 5000 police and civil servants. It is interesting to note that before the deployment of MINUSCA, FACA was too weak to fight armed groups. The international community through MINUSCA was able to rehabilitate schools, roads, community centres, health centres and prefecture buildings.

4.1 Failure of the R2P in CAR

Scholars on R2P agree that since the inception of the R2P in 2005 the international community has failed to apply the concept effectively thereby resulting into mass atrocities (Morris 2016, Gallagher 2013, Thakur (2016), Welsh (2019) and Blackford (2014). In CAR the international community failed to halt mass atrocities and this has been evidenced by the longevity of the conflict which resulted into the surge of the refugee crisis and the IDP. The conflict has resulted into more than 600 000 refugees and more than 630 000 IDP. The success of pillar 2 of the R2P is based on the political will and capabilities of states involved especially the permanent 5 of the UNSC. In the context of CAR, the conflict is indeed a forgotten crisis according to the Human Rights Watch (2013). The international community was lackadaisical in responding to the conflict ostensibly due to lack of exploitable resources and lack of any meaningful capacity. Bellamy (2008) referred the R2P as R2P lite, there is also an enigma about the relationship between R2P and non-consensual. In some cases the R2P is not a sufficient deterrent and preventive norm as the norm fails to provide peace in more than 67% of the areas in CAR. Bellamy and Lupel (2015) argue that, while the UN system has developed an extensive body of policies, principles

and institutions dedicated to mass atrocity crimes the killing of unarmed civilians remains a reality.

The R2P is a norm whose power is vested in the UNSC (Davies and Bellamy 2014 and Hehir 2017:335). The R2P is a Trojan horse used to fulfil nefarious political shenanigans and economic skulduggery. In the context of CAR, France which is one of the p5 members played a pivotal role in stabilising and destabilising the CAR and influenced the UNSC to respond to the crisis. The UN was criticised for responding too slowly and timidly to the onset of the atrocities in CAR in 2013. In Libya, in 2011 the international community responded swiftly because of the need to extract oil in the country. This paper argues that the R2P triggers the proliferation of opportunist in the international system. The withdrawal of peacekeepers in Zemio and Bangassou exposed the town to armed groups and halted the peace process. The success of the R2P in CAR was also hindered by the bickering between permanent 5 members and there were also widespread reports of sexual abuse scandals by the peacekeepers. An analysis of peacekeeping operations since the inception of the R2P demystify that they are not able to bring about an end to violent conflicts in the countries they are deployed. Lack of resources, peace process, spoilers to the peace process and failure to understand the root causes of the conflict are hindering the efficacy of the R2P not only in CAR but in almost all war ravaged countries.

The major constraint of MINUSCA is the limited capabilities that are available, mainly the capacity to gather and analyse accurate data. The UN response to the phenomenon of atrocity crimes is not people centred and is mainly ad hoc. The challenges were encapsulated by the UN Secretary General in 2009 report on R2P where he observed that, the principles relating to the R2P need to be integrated and mainstreamed in the ongoing work of the organisation. Impunity is till rife in CAR and this shows that the International Criminal Court is failing to facilitate transitional justice.

4.2 Failure of Preventive Diplomacy

Preventive diplomacy is one of the major pillars of the R2P, the success of the R2P depends on the ability of the international system to anticipate and prevent conflicts. In the context of CAR the AU Continental Early Warning System has the mandate to identify threats to peace and recommends appropriate actions. Article 12 of the Peace and Security Council Protocol states that, the Continental Early Warning System is established to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts in Africa. The continental early warning system is responsible for data collection and is mandated to collaborate with the UN and other relevant agencies on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommends the best course of action. This paper argues that, for preventive diplomacy to be effective it is prudent for the AU Peace and Security Council to also be part of the permanent members of the UNSC. In the case of CAR it was clear by the end of 2012 that the military coup was inevitable given that about five major rebel groups

have united to form the Seleka yet the Continental Early Warning System did not take an action to avoid the putsch. An analysis of the conflict in CAR shows that the UN, AU and other sub regional organisations are failing to appreciate the changing trends in conflicts hence they are responding with archaic strategies. The international system was ill prepared to prevent the conflict apparently due to lack of exploitable interest in CAR. Preventive diplomacy was successful in Macedonia in 1999 due to geo-strategic interests of super powers.

The African Peer Review Mechanism is another significant arm in conflict forecasting yet the international community fared dismally in CAR and this exacerbates the refugee crisis. Preventive Diplomacy is manifestly failing in Africa due to lack of appetite among AU and UN members to invest in it and this affected the efficacy of the R2P. Gowan (2011) observed that, there is need to devote relative resources to preventing violent conflict rather than in investing in drastically more costly peacekeeping, humanitarian, stabilisation and reconstruction operations makes sense in a world facing a tumultuous economic meltdown. The above puzzle trigger one of the most basic question on why preventive diplomacy is underfunded yet peacekeeping, reconstruction and stabilisation and humanitarian operations are better funded? Bellamy and Lupel (2015: 2) argue that,

the lack of political will of states to fully invest in CAR can be identified by the reported failure of the UN and EU to respond to credible early warning system and implement effective prevention strategies in CAR and thus the R2P has failed to efficiently protect the country's population.

The timid response to the conflict by the international system in 2013 resulted into the escalation of ethnic cleansing and inter-communal violence. Medicines San Frontiers letter (2013) criticised the UN system for unacceptable performance as there was no evidence of an adequate humanitarian reaction to the needs generated by the repeated outbreak of violence. The lack of political and economic interest was proved when the UN ignored more than 15 000 internally displaced people in the vicinity of Bangui Airport and in Bassangoa. Broadhead (2019) and Cling-Mars (2015: 14) argue that, peacekeeping was hampered by lack of capacity and insufficient troops and MISCA was unable to effectively protect civilians in 2013. The UN failed to prevent the situation from deteriorating in December 2012. Given the history of CAR which has become a phantom state, serial coup, a coup addict events towards the end of 2012 were clear that the country was on the verge of plunging to conflict yet the UN did nothing to stop the putsch.

4.3 Constraints in Implementing the R2P in CAR

V. THE CONCEPT AS A CHALLENGE

The R2P has suffered from the challenge of acceptance among members of the UN, although the resolution which resulted into the introduction of the R2P was unanimously endorsed by member states, some country from the Global South perceive

the concept as too Western. Bellamy (2008) argues that, there is a common belief among members of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) that the R2P is simply a more sophisticated way of conceptualising and hence legitimising humanitarian intervention. Absolute sovereignty is inimical to the success of the R2P as states from the developing world pay much emphasis on the Westphalia sovereignty rather than the conditional sovereignty encapsulated by the R2P. On paper the AU, Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) appear to have embraced the conditional sovereignty, but the reality is that those institutions are formed on the background of non-interference and absolute sovereignty hence the R2P is not being extensively implemented in Africa. Adejo(2001: 136) states that, due to the old norm of absolute sovereignty, non-interference continue to exist within the institutional framework which has allowed state failing to obstruct AU intervention. Sovereignty is now a responsibility as developed by Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen in the 1990s. The AU principle of non-indifferent is embodied in the 2000 constitutive act. The AU legal framework allows the organisation to intervene in a member state following a decision by the Assembly of Heads of States in cases of international crimes or when members request intervention to restore peace and security.

Aning and Autobi (2011: 16) argue that, the R2P is flawed in its failure to accommodate for the unique states of Africa and lack of commitment. Regional and continental blocks work together with the UN to halt atrocities and at first MISCA deployed three thousand five hundred (3500) troops which were insufficient to end the conflict. One of the most daunting challenge of the R2P it is not clear under what circumstances military force is used and this has resulted into peacekeeping unwilling to use maximum force against armed groups in CAR. The R2P is guided by article 2(4) of the UN Charter which prohibits the use of force in the international system and the prohibition on the use of force is a peremptory norm. An analysis of peacekeeping mission shows that, sometimes peacekeepers must be allowed to use maximum force considering that the conflict in CAR is an intractable with belligerent actors involved. Authority dilemma is another feature that is hindering the success of the R2P, there is increasing assertiveness on the part of the AU, influential leaders and sub-regional organisations in responding to conflicts has in some instances relegated the UN to a supporting role.

The conflict in CAR was also affected by the lack of clarity about decision making between the AU heads of states, Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the UNSC. Lack of resources and the use of sanctions also militated against the success of the R2P. Cling-Mans (2015: 16) argues that, the UNSC members were divided on how to proceed, the United States (US) was unconvinced throughout 2013 that a UN peacekeeping was necessary. The changing nature of conflicts with emerging actors is also affecting the success of the R2P.

According to the High-Level Panel on Peace Operations (2015: 7) the spread of violent extremism overlaid onto long simmering local or regional conflicts and the growing aspirations of population for change is placing pressure on government and the international system to respond. The legitimacy of the UNSC also compromised the success of the R2P given that the UNSC is outdated and does not reflect the current multi polar system.

5.1 Geopolitical Interest

The paper also observed that, the success of the R2P is also stifled by geo-political interests. Geopolitics is the power struggle over strategic territories for the purpose of political control over space. The geopolitical interests of countries like France, Chad, Libya, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Cameroon is jeopardising the peace process and fuelling mass atrocities in CAR. In the context of CAR, the collision of resource geopolitics, regional geopolitics and continental geopolitics threatened the future of peace and prolong conflicts. This paper further argues that, the longevity of the skirmishes in CAR is as a result of the scramble for natural resources. From the onset of the conflict p5 members of the UNSC appear to have no exploitable interests in CAR but this research demystifies that the super powers have clandestine interests. China is looking beyond the traditional pursuit of economic interests and spread of its influence in CAR. The interest of China in CAR can be analysed through the lens of China-Africa relations. It can be observed that, geo-economic interest of super powers in Africa had a detrimental effect not only on Africa's economy but also on the peace process. In most cases where the superpowers invoke the responsibility to protect it is accompanied by massive exploitation of resources.

Regional geopolitics is also at play in CAR and Chad has been involved in the politics of CAR for quite some time. Chad is interested in CAR because of regional security and there have been an avalanche of activities pursued by the Chadian rancorous rebel groups that affected the peace process. Chad considered CAR as its backyard and Chad has been pulling the string militarily and politically. There has been unconfirmed reports that, Chad supported the Seleka rebels through training them, provides them with arms and financial assistance and this is detrimental to the R2P. Chad is currently a non-permanent member of the UNSC and during the negotiations Chad argued against sending a UN peacekeeping mission to the CAR, as it preferred an African solution to African problems (Dickow). Chad is relatively stable and has military prowess, it has used its military might to secure the southern border. Kam Kah (2014) noted that, the southern border is used by Chad for oil exploitation. Scholars agree that, Chad is threatened by the existence of peace in CAR as this increases the chances of instability in Chad.

France is also aiding to the failure of the implementation of the R2P in CAR, since independence France has been accused of meddling in the politics of CAR. Forje (2005: 228) posits that, French policy of assimilation was regarded as a betrayal

of national sovereignty which was imitated by Government's elites once they took over control of the country. France failed to prevent the crisis in CAR and this is buttressed by its failure to help FACA to fight off rebel forces. France wanted the Seleka to oust Bozize and this is the reason it did not intervene. Kam Kah (2014:26) argues that, even when the Seleka made successful advances and finally overran Bangui, the French sent in additional troops not to assist Government but to secure the Bangui Airport for possible evacuation of foreign nationals. This was not only pejorative but also double standards considering that Bozize had relied on the French troops for survival. Kam Kah (2014: 26) argues that, to have remained indifferent at the time was being attacked by a coalition of armed groups showed that the French were consistently inconsistent in their policy in CAR. The role of France in CAR also affected the response of the UNSC which was tardy and timid because they perceive the crisis in CAR as a French problem hence the need for a French solution.

5.3 State Fragility and Spoilers

The implementation of the R2P is hindered by the inherent phenomenon of state fragility. CAR is marred by endemic poverty which triggers coups and obstruct the peace process. The country relies on official development assistance and humanitarian aid for survival. Most of the infrastructure in CAR is debilitated, roads are impassable and this resulted into humanitarian assistance not reaching most parts of the country. MISCA, MINUSCA peacekeepers also failed to reach most parts of the country and this heightened mass atrocities. The visibility and mobility of humanitarian aid agencies, peacekeepers are constrained due to the fact that CAR is a phantom state. Herbert et al (2013: 4) argues that, the weakness of state capacity and authority in many core state functions have been a root cause of military mutinies and unconstitutional change of government in CAR.

The success of the implementation of the R2P in CAR is further stifled by the existence of perennial weak Police and Army. During peacekeeping local security apparatus are supposed to compliment and work hand in hand with the AU and UN peacekeeping Missions but in CAR this is different as the Army and Police have manifestly failed to consolidate the peace process. State fragility in CAR also affected the mobility and visibility of humanitarian agencies. During the reign of Bozize FACA and the police were deliberately kept weak in fear of mutinies and coups. The proportion of national budget allocated to security decreased, the result was that the military decreased especially in rural areas. The weakness of FACA resulted into the sprouting of armed groups in CAR and this marked the rapid increase of mass atrocities. Rotberg (2003: 4) argues that, nation states fizzle because they are tormented by internal skirmishes and can no longer deliver consummate political goods to their citizens. Herbert et al (2013: 17) argue that, CAR army exhibited its weakness in protecting its territory from the intrusion of foreign warlords and rebel groups and this leaves the state rife with bandits,

rebels and poachers. This paper argues that, the ragtag armed groups in CAR are the major threats to the peace process.

CAR is located in one of the most volatile regions in Africa and this is another hurdle to the peace process and the success of the R2P. Kam Kah (2014: 19) argues that, CAR is surrounded by several countries, some of which are themselves very unstable politically and they have in one way or another has influenced politics and governance in CAR. Firstly, the North of the country is under the control of the Chadian rebel groups, secondly the east borders the Sudan province of Darfur and finally to the south of the country is the Democratic Republic of Congo and its rebels, to the south-east of the country the notorious LRA is in control and these compounds the situation considerably. Given the geographical dynamics of a country which is also a landlocked country surrounded by several conflict prone countries it is evident that CAR neighbours have the history of "spoiling" the peace process.

VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND THE FUTURE OF THE R2P

The adoption of the R2P in 2005 has mitigated mass atrocities thereby consolidating peace. Humanitarian catastrophe would have been worse without the R2P. The R2P succeed in enhancing peace in Madagascar in 2009, Kenya in 2007, Ivory Coast in 2011 and had reduced the effects of conflicts in DRC, CAR, Burundi. In CAR the international community employed diplomatic ways such as negotiations, mediation and peacekeeping. Without peacekeeping and mediation the security stalemate would have been worse than it is. The International Community also facilitated DDRR in some parts of CAR, this helped to reduce the number of refugees and internally displaced population.

This paper noted that there is an avalanche of factors that are inimical to the success of the R2P in CAR and other countries. The first factor is the weaponisation of the R2P by super powers in particular permanent members of the UNSC. The R2P is used as a weapon to advance national interests this was more prevalent in Libya 2011 and CAR 2013. The future of the R2P appear to be bleak as super powers are ignoring tremendous UNSC reforms advanced by countries from the Global South. The issues of veto powers and permanent five are major obstacles of the R2P considering that the UNSC is one of the most influential branch of the R2P. This paper argues that, the R2P is an aggrandising of the weaker by the stronger.

The success and future of the R2P is determined by the success of preventive diplomacy. The Macedonia conflict of 1995 proved that preventive diplomacy can be utilised to support humanitarian intervention. Macedonia is a model of the success of preventive diplomacy. In CAR, Syria, Yemen and Myanmar mass atrocities were fuelled by the lackadaisical approach taken by the international community. The response in CAR was dilatory, this paper suggests that the international community should have proper mechanisms that

support preventive diplomacy because it is the fulcrum of the R2P.

The paper also observed that, the success of the R2P is hindered by the inherent problems of state failure, spoilers and geopolitics. The probability of success of the R2P in stronger and weaker state is higher than in failed and collapsed state. This hypothesis is supported by Kenya 2007, Ivory Coast 2011 were the R2P excelled ostensibly because there are weaker states. In Syria 2011, Yemen 2011 and CAR the implementation was dismal because these are failed and collapsed states. The problem of state failure is compounded by geopolitics, in the context of CAR, Syria and Yemen it is clear that these countries are located in volatile regions with ragtag warlords which spoil the peace process thereby stifling the R2P.

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