

Far-stretching Strategy of Myanmar Junta to Forcefully Displace the Rohingya: Bangladesh, Regional and International Responses.

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Abstract: The world continues to see large refugee flows, and the challenges comprising these population migrations are anticipated to become increasingly complicated as a result of rising social, economic, ethnic and especially religious conflicts. In the south-east Asia, this problem has become acute with Rohingya refugees. Northern Rakhine State in Myanmar is predominantly Buddhist and authoritarian despite a majority Arakan Muslim population and a minority Rakhine Buddhist population. Exclusionary citizenship laws and military actions against Arakanese Muslims, often known as Rohingyas, have forced them to depart Myanmar and seek refuge in Bangladesh. This circumstance pictured the inhuman role of the material world to the persecuted Rohingya refugees. The manuscript aimed at delineating Myanmar's long-term oppressive and illegal strategy of dislocating Rohingya, and the attitude of the host-state Bangladesh, the regional and global superpowers, and instruments in this respect. The short article is designed in accordance with the qualitative method where information has been collected from different sources predominantly from scholarly articles. The manuscript has also suggested that the buzzword "Rohingya issue" can be solved only if the Sino-Indian mutual understanding takes liberal steps with neutral support towards Bangladesh and Myanmar including asylum-seeker Rohingya refugees.

Keywords: Strategy of Myanmar Junta, Displacing Rohingya, Experience of Bangladesh, Regional and International Responses, Decadent of Humanity.

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the late 1970s, the Myanmar government's discriminatory practices toward the Rohingya ethnic minority (Bangladesh Stands: forcefully displaced Myanmar Personnel) have forced a large number of Muslim Rohingya to flee their homes in the largely Buddhist country. The majority of them entered Bangladesh by land, but some traveled by water to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. After Burma gained independence from the British, the violence against Rohingyas escalated, and ultimately, in 2017, the Myanmar Junta's savagery was exposed with reports of rape, murder, and burning, resulting in a major migration of Rohingyas (Bangladesh Stands: forcefully displaced Myanmar Personnel) to Bangladesh. There are strong grounds to investigate Bangladesh's refugee policies. First, when an estimated

750,000 Rohingya (Bangladesh Stands: forcefully displaced Myanmar Personnel) migrants from Myanmar's Rakhine province reached Bangladesh in 2017, the scale of the flow received unprecedented worldwide attention. (Ashraf, 2021).

The review article also contains four sections: the first section depicts an introduction including four questions on Rohingya crisis, the second section draws a short identity of Rohingya (Bangladesh Stands: forcefully displaced Myanmar Personnel) and Myanmar, the third section explains the mainstream covering the real and logical answers of the questions of section one and the final section depicts a brief conclusion. The manuscript has been designed with the logical answers of the following questions:

- a) Did the military junta in Myanmar make a long-term plan to forcefully displace hundreds and thousands of Rohingya's painful journey to Bangladesh since August 2017?
- b) Why did the military junta of Myanmar execute their plan?
- c) How did they (military junta of Myanmar) execute their plan?
- d) Were the Bangladeshi authorities able to detect Myanmar's plan?
- e) What could have been done to prevent the 2017 Rohingya (Bangladesh Stands: forcefully displaced Myanmar Personnel) influx?
- f) How can the world return back the rights of the Rohingya (Bangladesh Stands: forcefully displaced Myanmar Personnel)?

Rohingya In Arakan State

In Myanmar's Rakhine State, the Rohingya are an ethnic Muslim minority who follow Sunni Islam. They are spiritually, ethnically, and linguistically distinct from the majority of Buddhists. The Rohingya people have been in Myanmar for centuries and are descended from Muslim Arabs, Moors, Persians, Turks, Mughals, and Bengalis who arrived as traders, soldiers, and saints via land and water routes. (Kipgen, 2014). They have a rich history that teaches us about the Muslim Sultanate. Thousands of

Muslims arrived in the old Arakan Kingdom in the fifteenth century, giving rise to the Rohingya people. (**Eleanor Albert, 2020**). Locals and Myanmar's government, on the other hand, claim that the Rohingya are gradual migrants from Bangladesh. They never acknowledged them as Myanmar ethnic. According to **Chris Lewa**, though the name's etymological origin is debated, the most frequently recognized opinion is that Rohang comes from the Rohingya dialect word "Arakan," where ga or gya indicates "from." The ethnic Muslim community argues its ties to area that was previously under the rule of the Arakan Kingdom by identifying as Rohingya.

Rohingya In Myanmar

Myanmar is the largest Buddhist-dominated country at the meeting point of South and Southeast Asia. After his independence from the British on January 4, 1948, Aung San, the general of his national army took charge of the country's government. During the time of General Ne Win it became a one-party socialist state until 1988. The military junta was melted down authoritarian with a parliamentary election in 2010 and a nominally civilian government was formed.

A Muslim ethnic community from the western state of Arakan in Burma, the Rohingya, has long sought asylum in Bangladesh. Between 250,000 and 260,000 Rohingyas are among the most recent migrants, having left Burma in 1991–1992. One source reported in 2010 that there were 400,000 Burmese citizens in Bangladesh, mostly in the Cox's Bazaar region, coupled with some 28,000 Rohingya who are registered as refugees and are residing in a United Nations camp. The majority of these citizens are from the Rohingya ethnic group. According to another report, there were 220,000 Rohingya in Bangladesh in 2010 and another 700,000 were still living in Burma. The Rohingya's return has been aided by the UNHCR, the High Commissioner for Refugees of the United Nations. (**Vaughn, 2010**).

The government refuses to grant the Rohingya citizenship, and as a result most of the group's members have no legal documentation, effectively making them stateless (**Thevathasan, 2014**). Myanmar's 1948 citizenship law was already exclusively (**Swanson, 2021**), and the military junta, which seized power in 1962, introduced another law twenty years later that stripped the Rohingya of access to full citizenship. Until recently, the Rohingya had been able to register as temporary residents with identification cards, known as white cards, which the junta began issuing to many Muslims, both Rohingya and non-Rohingya, in the 1990s. The white cards conferred limited rights but were not recognized as proof of citizenship.

In 2014 the government held an UN-backed national census (**Holland, 2014**), its first in thirty years. The Muslim minority group was initially permitted to identify as Rohingya, but after Buddhist nationalists threatened to boycott the census, the government decided Rohingya could only register if they identified as Bengali instead.

Similarly, under pressure from Buddhist nationalists protesting the Rohingya's right to vote in a 2015 constitutional referendum, President Thein Sein canceled the temporary identity cards in February 2015, effectively revoking their newly gained right to vote. (White card holders were allowed to vote (**Vrieze, 2015**) in Myanmar's 2008 constitutional referendum and 2010 general elections.) In the 2015 elections, which were widely hailed by international monitors as free and fair, no parliamentary candidate was of the Muslim faith (**McPherson, 2015**).

According to a study by the advocacy organization Fortify Rights, the government has recently ordered the Rohingya to begin wearing national identification cards, which essentially identify them as foreigners and do not offer them citizenship. The cards, according to officials in Myanmar, are a first step toward citizenship, but opponents claim they deprive Rohingya of their identity and may make it easier for the government to continue repressing their rights. (**Ibrahim, 2019**).

The Rohingya may trace their ancestry to the fourteenth century, when tens of thousands of Muslims arrived in the area. The Muslim minority in Myanmar has been assaulted with impunity, denied the right to vote, and evicted from their homes. (**Editorial, J 2015**). Possible deterioration When Rakhine was controlled colonially as a part of British India in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, many more people migrated there. Since the country's declaration of independence in 1948, successive administrations in Burma, later renamed Myanmar, have disputed the Rohingya people's historical assertions and refused to recognize the group as one of the nation's 135 recognized official ethnic groups. Even though many of the Rohingya can trace their ancestry back to centuries in Myanmar, they are regarded as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.

The name "Rohingya," a self-identifying phrase that first appeared in the 1950s and which scholars argue gives the population a collective political identity, is not recognized by either the central government or Rakhine, the dominant ethnic Buddhist group in Rakhine. The most commonly recognized idea, despite disagreements over the name's etymology, is that Rohang comes from the word "Arakan" in the Rohingya dialect, where ga or gya denotes "from." According to Chris Lewa, the head of the Arakan Project, a Thailand-based advocacy organization, the ethnic Muslim community, known as the Rohingya, claims its connections to territory that was originally governed by the Arakan Kingdom by identifying as such. Political and religious tensions in Myanmar are gravely exacerbated by the exceedingly unstable situation in the country's Rakhine State. For the future of Rakhine State and the nation as a whole, long-term, gradual solutions are essential. (**ICG, 22 October 2014**).

II. MAINSTREAM OF THE MANUSCRIPT

Myanmar's military junta may have made a long-term or short-term plan to forcefully displace hundreds and thousands

of Rohingya men and women ahead of their painful journey to Bangladesh since August 2017. The strategy the junta took to displace Rohingya from home to the host country Bangladesh is vividly drawn in this part.

Long-Term Plans of Military Junta to Displace Rohingya

It is inevitable to realize that the plan of the Myanmar military junta to displace Rohingya from home is a long-term plan that was implemented chronologically from the independence of Myanmar from the British up to 2017. Myanmar's dominant Buddhists and the government of Myanmar did not accept the Rohingya as their own nation. So, they effectively institutionalized discrimination against the Rohingya ethnic group through unlawful restrictions on marriage, education, family planning, and freedom of movement. Eliminating the Rohingya from the citizenship law in 1982 proves their long-term plan to cleansing the Rohingya.

Strategies of Executing Plans to Displace Rohingya

As the dominant Buddhists along with the government are the perpetual enemies of Rakhine Muslim, they have positively confirmed the power of anti-Islamism to kill and displace Rohingya. Sino-Indian anti-Islamism has played a silently significant role that is in favour of Myanmar military Junta. Although there exists informed understanding of great power competition between these two countries, the responses made to the Rohingya refugee crisis render any such analytical lens inadequate in their explanatory capacity. (Robayt Khondoker, 2020).

Actually, attacking the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) was not only an eye-wash but also a clue for breaking out a clash in Rakhine in August 2017, and killing with displacing the Rohingya towards Bangladesh. Myanmar government announced ARSA as a militant terrorist organization and the military junta executed a ruthless campaign that devastated thousands of Rohingya homes, villages and farmlands along with killing about 6700 Rohingya between 25 August and 24 September 2017 so that the Rohingya could be compelled to fly away abroad.



Picture-1: Burning Rohingya Colony

Bitter Experience of Bangladesh

Refugees of the Rohingya ethnic group who left Myanmar wait to be allowed through by Bangladeshi border guards in Palang Khali, Bangladesh. Document Image: Reuters (Reuters, 2018).



Picture-2: Rohingya leaving Rakhine

Bangladeshi authorities were able to detect Myanmar's plan as its plan is nothing but an obvious, long-term and continuous strategy to displace the Rohingya. The following statistical analysis shows that Myanmar's Rohingya displacement from home to Bangladesh is not a new or puzzling matter for Bangladesh.




Figure 1. Five waves of Rohingya influx in Bangladesh 1978–2018. (Ashraf, 2021).

Actually, Bangladesh is more liberalistic than any other South-East Asian country. So, it did not try to create any chaos with the brutal Myanmar. It firstly expected the concern of the regional and international superpowers and subsequently did not get any support to counter Myanmar inhuman action of displacing the Rohingya ethnic group. Besides, when Bangladesh saw that if Bangladesh closed the boarder to stop Rohingya (forcefully displaced Myanmar Personnel) entrance into Bangladesh, all Rohingya (forcefully displaced Myanmar Personnel) would be killed by the military

Junta of Myanmar, then BGB disclosed the boarders. It's a historical liberalism of Bangladesh. Bangladesh's bad luck and diplomatic puzzle is that Bangladesh did not get active response from two friendly countries like China and India to mitigate Rohingya (forcefully displaced Myanmar Personnel) issue.




Figure 1. The waves of Rohingya influx in Bangladesh 1991–2017

Inflows of Rohingya refugees (Bangladesh Stands: forcefully displaced Myanmar Personnel) into Bangladesh between 1991 and 2017 (cumulative number of refugees including pre-influx population). United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) provided statistics for the years 1991 through 2016 [35], and Inter Sector Coordination Group provided data for the year 2017 on the number of refugees (ISCG) (Mohammad Mehedy Hassan, Katherine Walker, , 2018).

III. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

To prevent the 2017 Rohingya (Bangladesh Stands: forcefully displaced Myanmar Personnel) influx in Bangladesh, humanitarian perceptions and emergency actions were inevitably needed from the regional and international sides rather than from the Bangladesh side. Therefore, European policymakers should continue to engage with Myanmar's political regime on finding sustainable solutions for the Rohingya crisis. (Hossain, 2020). Besides, any problem in the region of south east Asia especially the Rohingya issue creating the Bangladesh-Myanmar conflict cannot be mitigated without the participation of China and India, the superpowers in this region and that of the ASEAN. Furthermore, the responsibility of the United Nation, the USA and Russia is predominantly needed to make China and India responsible for mitigating the chaos as the Western superpowers handle in South-East Asia with counting India and China.

The USA is also silent for its recent friend country India, and Russia specially for China and also for India. China and India have always opposed UN intervention in the Rohingya persecution in Myanmar, and are in favour of Myanmar. India wants to change its strategic position to draw Myanmar closer because the importance of Myanmar to New Delhi is increasing India's geographical link with ASEAN countries. Present ruling government of India also thinks that India's bilateral relations with Yangon need to be further

strengthened to implement the Look East policy for North-East India as per their national interest.

To protest the death and persecution of Rohingya, protesters have occasionally convened in cities in Pakistan, India, Thailand, Indonesia, and Bangladesh (Editorial, Independent, 2016). In September 2017, the foreign minister of Bangladesh referred to the violence in Rakhine as "genocide," while Indonesia and Malaysia urged the Myanmar government to cease its campaign and put an end to the bloodshed (Agency, 2017). The efforts to repatriate Rohingya refugees (Bangladeshi Stands: forcefully displaced Myanmar Personnel) from Bangladesh and Myanmar have failed thus far, despite consultations between the two countries' authorities. Several thousand refugees (Bangladesh Stands: forcefully displaced Myanmar Personnel) were supposed to be repatriated by the end of 2019, but none of the chosen group wanted to go back to Myanmar. The Rohingya community's (Bangladesh Stands: forcefully displaced Myanmar Personnel) leaders have said that they won't come back unless their citizenship rights are secured (Liaison, 2019).

The United Nations, however, has opposed the plans for repatriation, claiming that the Rohingya community still faces danger in Myanmar. As bad as things are for Rohingya refugees (Bangladesh Stands: forcefully displaced Myanmar Personnel) in Bangladesh, Joshua Kurlantzick of CFR warns that things are considerably worse for them when they return to Myanmar. According to experts, the Bangladeshi government must choose between continuing its fight to offer sanctuary for so many migrants and risking the wrath of Western governments and aid groups and expelling them. (Kurlantzick, 2019)

The 10 nations that make up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have not coordinated a response to the escalating crisis, and other Southeast Asian countries largely lack established legal frameworks to safeguard refugees' rights. All ASEAN states save for Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Thailand have not ratified either the UN refugee convention or its protocol. Due in large part to its members' adherence to the principle of noninterference in each other's domestic affairs, ASEAN has been relatively mute on the plight of the Rohingya and the rising number of asylum seekers in member nations. With Myanmar as one of its members, they won't take collective action against Myanmar, said Kurlantzick (Muslimin, 2017).

In November 2019, Gambia launched the first international case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice, accusing the nation of breaking the UN Genocide Convention on behalf of the fifty-seven-member Organization of Islamic Cooperation. (Amnesty, 2017). The Security Council should impose an arms embargo and other penalties on Myanmar and senior military figures, according to the UN fact-finding mission. However, because to their belief that the Myanmar government is

attempting to reestablish stability, other Security Council members, such as Russia and China, have avoided applying more pressure on it. In addition, a report ordered by Secretary-General Guterres revealed "systematic failure" on the part of UN organizations to stop the violence in Myanmar between 2010 and 2018 (**Guterres, 2017**).

Barack Obama, the president of the United States, eased sanctions against Myanmar in December 2016 after noting the country's progress in advancing human rights. Some thought the action was premature as it occurred at a time when the Rohingya were being persecuted. A Myanmar general was subject to further U.S. sanctions for his alleged involvement in the military's attacks in Rakhine a year later, during the administration of President Donald J. Trump. In 2018 and 2019, as evidence of the military's crimes grew, the Trump administration proceeded to broaden its sanctions regime against Myanmar's military leaders. Sanctions on military leaders have also been imposed by Australia, Canada, and the European Union (**David Brunnstrom, 2019**).

Many nations, notably the US, Canada, Norway, and South Korea, as well as global contributors, have increased their humanitarian aid in the interim. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Arakan Project, and Fortify Rights are just a few of the advocacy organizations that continue to call for international pressure on Myanmar's government. For instance, Amnesty International revoked Suu Kyi's Ambassador of Conscience Award in November 2018 after giving it to her during her fifteen-year house detention (**Al-Jazeera, 2018**).

IV. RESPONSES OF UNITED NATION

UNHCR says that we are assisting the Bangladeshi government in meeting the enormous humanitarian needs by working with our partners. More than 1,500 metric tons of essential life-saving goods, including blankets, plastic sheets, sleeping mats, family tents, plastic rolls, kitchen sets, jerry cans, and buckets, were airlifted to Bangladesh in the early days, weeks, and months of the disaster by UNHCR. Along with our collaborators, we are also assisting the government in creating new locations that can securely house refugees. Building latrines and wells, enhancing the water and sanitation infrastructure, providing shelter supplies, and helping site design are all included in this. Funding a road to facilitate construction and refugee access is also included.

They also expressed that we have constructed countless latrines and water stations for the refugees in an effort to enhance cleanliness and availability to drinkable water, hence reducing the chances of health issues like acute watery diarrhea. In all refugee settlements, UNHCR is aiming to integrate refugee protection. It is creating safe places and a referral mechanism for victims of gender-based violence with the help of its partners. Additionally, we are stepping up our efforts to spot at-risk kids and direct them to the right help.

UNHCR has boosted its field presence by sending out emergency teams and humanitarian experts to several industries. In Bangladesh, we employ 300 people, including 208 local employees. In order to meet the scope and complexity of this still-evolving and fluid refugee situation, we will continue to expand our presence and activities. In order to continue providing life-saving aid from March to December 2018, the UN and its partners announced a Joint Response Plan (JRP) for the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis on March 16. Early in August 2018, just 32% of the JRP's funding had been allocated. As part of its Supplementary Appeal for 2018, UNHCR is requesting US\$238.8 million to continue meeting the needs of hundreds of thousands of refugees. Please visit our Data Portal to get the most recent papers and statistics about the Rohingya crisis. The UNHCR offers the Operational Data Portal as a partner coordination tool for refugee situations.

In order to prepare refugees and host communities for the monsoon rains, which occur between May and September and raise the danger of floods and landslides, UNHCR hurriedly sent more supplies to Bangladesh. In one of the wettest regions of the country, the Cox's Bazar district, hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees have taken safety. Up to 200,000 Rohingya refugees might be in danger during the monsoon season, according to humanitarian partners. Many people who live on rough, sloping ground that is vulnerable to landslides and flooding need to be relocated immediately. Among them, 41,000 refugees reside in places considered to have the highest landslide risk. By the middle of August 2018, UNHCR has transferred more than 24,000 of them to safer locations.

More than 80,000 refugee families have also received updated shelter kits from UNHCR, which come with bamboo poles, ropes, tarpaulins made for shelter, sandbags, and tools. With the help of UNHCR and its partners, the Bangladeshi government has built 45 kilometers of stairs, 32 kilometers of brick roads and sidewalks, and 91 kilometers of drainage pipes. A total of 63 kilometers of retaining walls and other buildings have been constructed. 2,324 meters of bridges have been put together, and 94 kilometers of drainage have been finished or maintained. In the host villages in Bangladesh, UNHCR has also strategically placed 116 storage containers filled with emergency aid and refurbished 20

V. CONCLUSION

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that the military junta in Myanmar made a long-term plan to forcefully displace hundreds and thousands of Rohingya's painful journey to Bangladesh since August 2017. They (military junta of Myanmar) executed their plan with the silently active support of the two superpowers: China and India, and it was obvious and clear to Bangladesh. So, there is no question whether Bangladeshi authorities fail to detect Myanmar's plan. What could have been done to prevent the 2017 Rohingya influx (Bangladesh Stands: forcefully displaced Myanmar Personnel) were expected from the responsibility of

regional and international organizations and superpowers. Finally, it is commented that Sino-Indian liberal determined action can mitigate this Rohingya (Bangladesh Stands: forcefully displaced Myanmar Personnel) crisis that is generating conflict between Bangladesh and Myanmar. In final statement, the manuscript has also suggested that the buzzword "Rohingya issue" can be solved only if the Sino-Indian mutual understanding takes liberal steps with neutral support towards Bangladesh and Myanmar including asylum-seeker Rohingya refugees.

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