

# Challenges of Diplomacy in Securing External Defense Arrangement in Nigeria (2007-2022)

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## ABSTRACT

Nigeria defense strategy has since combined soft and hard diplomacy to negotiate, persuade and induce both global and regional allies to support her counter terrorism fight. This study examined challenges of diplomacy in securing external defense arrangement in Nigeria between 2007 and 2022. The study adopted mixed research design using both qualitative and quantitative methods. The study relied heavily on secondary sources such as books, journals, articles, periodical, government reports and publications, magazines, unpublished manuscript, and conference papers; also, on primary sources such as interviews and questionnaires. It was found out that a lot still need to be done to improve the strategies and methods of securing diplomatic arrangements in a way that will favor Nigeria in dealing with the challenges encountered in diplomatic defense relations to combat the effect of terrorism both locally and regionally. The study recommended that Nigeria must intensify efforts at holding regional security summits for defense diplomats while intensifying joint military exercises for regional states in the Multi-national Joint TaskForce to promote unity, improve communication and information sharing; and that the state must improve defense budgeting while joining multiple counter terrorism coalition both regionally and globally.

**Keywords:** Diplomacy, Strategy, Security, Defense Arrangements.

## INTRODUCTION

While democratic norms are gradually taking roots in most African nations, the security outlook remains precarious for states such as Nigeria. The country continues to face oil-fueled militancy in the Niger Delta, widespread Boko Haram insurgency in the North East, Banditry and large-scale kidnappings in the North West and the South West. In the Middle Belt, there are waves of reprisal violence reverberating between farmers and Muslim pastoralists, as the Eastern Security Network (ESN) ravages its insurgency across the South-East (Bala and Ouédraogo, 2018). The violent activities of insurgent and separatist groups as the Boko Haram and Eastern Security network (ESN) terrorists have since, escalated beyond the Northern and Southern Nigeria borders into states that share common land borders with Nigeria. Since then, it is no longer a danger for Nigeria alone as there has been in and out flow of extremists into both Nigeria and neighboring states- Raising concerns for the huge destruction of lives and properties resulting in dire economic consequences for the states within the sub-region. With the evolving problems of terrorism in Nigeria and the formation of numerous new terrorist groups, insurgency in Nigeria has escalated, making the state one of the most terrorized countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

World over, the main goal of external defense is the co-formation and implementation of a state security policy and its task is to create stable and long-term international relations in the field of defense, strategic defense diplomacy happens to be a major channel of achieving this lofty goal of external defense (Drab, 2018). The challenge faced by the Nigerian state upon the discovery of these threats, was how to devise and

direct its defense diplomacy and international relations to address the surging national security issues. It made it imperative for Nigeria to review its defense policy which is the states' instrument of foreign policy statecraft for the preservation of sovereignty and independence (Omede, 2012).

In response to not only the worsening security threats against Nigeria, but also the threats before Nigeria's regional stability and the security of millions of people across the region- The country recognized that its ability to play this regional and continental role was largely dependent on its diplomatic relations with neighboring states and the global powers. Nigeria went into so many bilateral arrangements with the likes of the U.S and France to revitalize its counterterrorism strategy by increasing foreign military sales; enhancing the security forces assistance (SFA) mission to include aviation training and nonlethal effects focused on information, electronic warfare, and cyber support; and incentivizing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) efforts in Nigeria (Duncan, 2018). Similarly, Nigeria also went into multilateral defense arrangements to guarantee Nigeria's strategic national security interest- some of which were the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the U.S defense cooperation.

Over the past five years, the forces of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger with the backings of the United States and France- have made some gains in the fight against Boko Haram. While these successes have strengthened hopes of the elimination of the defense threat, the optimism is regularly tempered by persistent attacks, across the entire country by restive groups. Before the conception of the Multinational Joint Task Force, a number of steps were taken such as the signing of the memorandum of Understanding amongst member's states, holding of joint diplomatic conferences, contribution of forces, and supply of equipment amongst others. These diplomatic steps in securing external defense arrangements were however hampered by some identifiable challenges that this paper intends to examine.

### **Research Objectives**

1. To ascertain the challenges associated with the diplomatic strategies on external defense arrangements to address the security threats in Nigeria.
2. To examine the suggestions to address the challenges associated with Nigeria diplomatic strategy and external defense arrangements to end the security threats in Nigeria.

### **Research Questions**

1. What are the challenges associated with the diplomatic strategies on external defense arrangements to address the security threats in Nigeria?
2. What are the suggestions to address the challenges associated with Nigeria diplomatic strategy and external defense arrangements to end the security threats in Nigeria?

## **REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE**

### **Conceptual Review**

#### **Diplomatic Security Arrangement Challenges**

Scholars generally identified two broad Challenges; one having to do with the Multinational Joint Task Force arrangement (MNJTF) and the other having to do with the cold shoulder Nigeria received from the U.S- its diplomatic defense partner by way of the Leahy Law. Scholars such as Albert (2009) have argued that at the root of the regional defense challenge we have in Nigeria is the drying up of the Lake Chad. The Lake is the sixth largest in the world with a hydrographic basin area of 2,381,631 square kilometers and an active basin of 966,955 square kilometers. It provides fresh water and agricultural resources such as fisheries and pasture to a huge population in Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Central African Republic,

Libya, Sudan and even Algeria. It is today under serious threat of drought occasioned by climate change. Its water body reduced from 25,000 square kilometers in 1963 to 2,000 square kilometers in 2010 creating problems of unemployment, water scarcity, environmental pollution, and threats to biodiversity survival, amongst several other livelihood issues (Albert, 2009). Gradually this is resulting to some of the people losing their source of livelihood and then deciding to join the Boko Haram movement, these categories of persons include the rural and urban peasants (from across Chad, Niger and Cameroon) retrenched from their farming, fishing and other agricultural vocations by the drying up of Lake Chad.

Similarly, Ifabiyi (2013) argues that the preceding situation has compounded the national security problems in the affected states and accentuated regional security of West and Central Africa. Many of the people retrenched from their vocations around Lake Chad came to join the Boko Haram sect. Some people happened to know Nigeria's borders with Cameroon, Chad and Niger so well that at the initial stage of Nigeria's counter-insurgency against Boko Haram, they facilitated the use of these neighboring countries as safe havens. This made it possible for Boko Haram members to fight in Nigeria in the daytime and run back to any of the LCB countries to hide in the evening (Musa, 2013).

The existence of radicalized members of Boko Haram in Nigeria's neighboring countries was at this time so significant that when President Olusegun Obasanjo visited the brother-in-law of Mohammed Yusuf, Alhaji Babakura Fuggu, on 15 September 2011 with a view to seeking peace with the group, he told the former Nigerian head of state that 'About 30 to 40 per cent of our members are scattered in neighboring countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroon' (Vanguard, 2012). To deal with this problem, the Multinational Joint Task Force was established through Nigeria diplomatic engagements with neighboring states in 1994 to deal with the rebels from its northern borders. It was expanded to include Chad and Niger in 1998, and further expanded in 2012 to address the escalating Boko Haram crisis. The Force was restructured and further expanded in 2015 to include Benin Republic.

According to the study conducted by William (2016) the most important of the challenges facing the MNJTF include a lack of joint definition of the security threat, lack of willingness to jointly solve the problem, and lack of 'trust' in each member state that makes up the MNJTF. For this author, at the initial stage of the Boko Haram crisis, Nigeria perceived it as an internal problem that did not require the intervention of outsiders. The member states of Lake Chad Basin (LCB) saw it from that perspective too. Though the MNJTF was established as far back as 1994, it did not start to play any active role in the management of Boko Haram crisis with the involvement of the other nations until 2012 – four years after the Boko Haram sect resorted to terrorist attacks.

In the same vein, Samu (2012) states that even then, the history of the security regimen, as described above suggests that the other member states of LCB were forced to join the missions by circumstances beyond their control. They would have ordinarily not had anything to do with Nigeria, just as Nigeria would have not wanted to have anything to do with Cameroon and Chad. In other words, the MNJTF lacks the attribute of trust between the member states.

For Isaac (2017) the African Peace and Security Architecture also appear to have found the MNJTF to be a strange system as it is not one of the regional economic communities recognized for peace and security tasks in the continent. It is simply a formation of the member states of LCB. But why would these countries bypass the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to establish their own system? Why did LCB countries fail to use the two core security communities around them? These are ECOWAS to which Nigeria, Niger and Benin Republic belong to and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS, in French, Communauté Économique des États de l'Afrique Centrale) to which Cameroon and Chad belong.

The simple answer to the above question according to Isaac (2017), was that the MNJTF was put together because of the perceived difficulties the countries would face in getting ECOWAS and ECCAS to jointly

give them a peacekeeping mission. The two RECs have different orientations and are probably not too interested in the Boko Haram crisis. It was therefore necessary to bypass these RECs and get the LCB countries to frame their own joint solutions to the problems posed by Boko Haram.

On his part, Thérroux-Bénoni (2015) asserts that Nigeria did a lot in the direction of bringing peace to the West African sub-region, as evidenced by its leadership role in the peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, the country was reluctant to allow foreign intervention on its territory; it aimed to retain ownership and exert its leadership in any attempt to combat Boko Haram. It would rather prefer collaboration with the other countries affected by the crisis to secure their borders against the terrorists. Further stating that it is also doubtful whether ECOWAS has the kind of financial resources for intervening in a big country such as Nigeria. On the other hand, ECCAS would not have been interested in being dragged into a Nigerian crisis which ECOWAS had not shown significant interest in helping to solve. The responsibility for dealing with the problem therefore fell on the Lake Chad Basin Commission to coordinate Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger in finding solutions to their mutual problem. However, it is easier to form this kind of security community than to make it work. The fact remains that the MNJTF would have performed better if some of the factors working against the group were not there.

For Thérroux-Bénoni (2015), these problems can be broken into two categories: the internal and external. The internal problems are the factors making it difficult for the member states of the MNJTF to work together peacefully. The external factors are the problems coming from outside the immediate environment of the security operation, but which the MNJTF cannot underestimate. The first internal Challenge is that of trust between Nigeria and Cameroon as well as between Nigeria and Chad. The relationship between Nigeria and Cameroon was anything but cordial over the 'Bakassi crisis' (Isaac, 2017).

Similarly, Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor (2006) as well as Tarlebba and Baroni (2010) agree alike that the historical relations between Nigeria and her neighboring states have always been tensed and this affected success of the diplomatic defense overtures between these states. The Bakassi peninsula was part of Nigeria but Cameroon contested its ownership with Nigeria leading to some military encounters between the two countries, as a result of which several lives were lost. In 1994, Cameroon approached the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with the plea of taking over the ownership of the oil-rich peninsula and some islands in Lake Chad. The country got a favorable judgment but the two countries are still struggling to enforce the decision of the court. The matter was slightly compounded by the resolution of the Nigerian Senate on 22<sup>nd</sup> November, 2007 rejecting the ceding of the territory to Cameroon. The decision of the ICJ was said by the Senate to be contrary to Section 12(1) of the 1999 Constitution.

On his part, Vogt (1987) argues that the serious border conflicts between Nigeria and Chad became a diplomatic defense challenge. Indeed, the relational conflict between Nigeria and Chad was worse than that of Nigeria/Cameroon. Almost all regimes in the country, including that of President Muhammadu Buhari, had some particular problems with Chad. Chad contests the ownership of some portion of Lake Chad with Nigeria in the context of the poor demarcation of the boundary between the two nations by the European colonial powers. Hence, elements in the border villages resort to different forms of self-help strategies to determine what belongs to Nigeria and Chad respectively. Some of the disputed villages have fishery and invaluable mineral resources.

In the same vein, Johnson (2014) asserts that the border disputes continued up to the present. The second conflict issue between Nigeria and Chad pertains to the expulsion of about 700,000 Chadians from Nigeria as a result of the Federal Government's deportation order of 17 January 1983. Chadian fishermen and soldiers responded to this event by denying Nigerians fishing rights in the LCB. To some of these Chadians the Lake Chad belongs exclusively to the Chad Republic and that was why it was named after their country. The frosty relationship between Nigeria and Chad assumed a military dimension from April to 25 May 1983, as a result of which deaths were recorded on both sides. This was the first time Nigeria was involved in a military clash with any of her neighbors (Vogt, 1992 and Tilde, 2014). There was another problem from

1978 to 1983, Chad fought an internal civil war that negatively affected Nigeria's trade with the country in addition to promoting the incursion of armed Chadian rebel groups and refugees into Nigeria. So profound was this problem that in 2002, the Governor of Borno State, Alhaji Mala Kachala complained to members of the Presidential Committee on Nigeria's National Security visiting his state that the Lake Chad region was plagued by an influx of armed rebels and large-scale trafficking in illicit arms and children. Some of these rebels, according to the Governor, use Sambisa Games Reserve as their hideouts. The rebels were blamed for the widespread banditry in the north-east region (IRIN, 2002). Sambisa forest has since then constituted a serious security threat to Nigeria.

Similarly, Isaac (2017) notes that the third challenge MNJTF arrangement had was the animosity that existed between Nigeria and Chad, its arrow heads- Nigeria bears animosity on how the Chadian war facilitated massive entry of arms and ammunition into Chad, most especially from France and the US. Nigeria is not comfortable with any of its neighbours being so armed. This made Nigeria suspicious of Chad all the time. But the most disturbing problem to Nigeria was the support that Chad received from Mohammad Ghadafi's Libya. In February 2015, the Institute for Security Studies reviewed efforts towards operationalizing the MNJTF. It observed that while the arrangement for the approval of the draft concept of operations (CONOPS) for the MNJTF was ready for the approval of the Peace and Security Council of the AU, funding remained the core outstanding issue to be addressed by the mission. To this extent, the AU was planning to have a funding conference to address the problem in March 2015 (Institute for Security Studies 2015).

### **Diplomatic Defense Arrangements**

Also, another major challenge hindering Nigeria's diplomatic defense arrangements with countries like the U.S according to Eric (2016) is on the Leahy Law which focuses on gross human right abuses on the part of Nigerian Soldiers. This author stated that broader international assistance to Nigeria in the fight against Boko Haram has largely been fruitless; the United States particularly has cited human right violations as inhibiting military assistance in the war against insurgency. According to Section 620M of the U.S Foreign Assistance Act, the Department of State and Department of Defense are prohibited from providing military assistance to foreign security force units that violate human rights with impunity. The law is named after its principal sponsor, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont). Gates (2010) states that to implement this law, U.S. embassies, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and the appropriate regional bureau of the U.S. Department of State vet potential recipients of security assistance. If a unit is found to have been credibly implicated in a serious abuse of human rights, assistance is denied until the host nation government takes effective steps to bring the responsible persons within the unit to justice. While the U.S. Government does not publicly report on foreign armed forces units it has cut off from receiving assistance, press reports have indicated that security force and national defense force units in Bangladesh, Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Nigeria, Turkey, Indonesia, Lebanon, and Saint Lucia have been denied assistance due to the Leahy Law.

Senator Leahy first introduced this law in 1997 as part of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. It initially referred only to counter-narcotics assistance for one year. The next year, with his leadership, Congress expanded it to cover all State Department funded assistance. This provision was included in all annual Foreign Operations budget laws until 2008. At that time Congress made the law permanent by amending it into the Foreign Assistance Act. In 2011, Congress revised the law substantially, seeking to enhance its implementation.

The United States government has long been a major, if not the largest, provider of assistance funding, training, non-lethal equipment, and/or weaponry to foreign military and other security forces like Nigeria. In 2012 it spent \$25 billion on training and equipping foreign militaries and law enforcement agencies of more than 100 countries around the world (ISAB report, 2013). Security assistance is driven by overriding U.S.

national security objectives, including a desire to challenge/overtake communist regimes during the Cold War, counter drug trafficking in the 1990s, or counter anti-Western terrorism in the 2000s. Throughout the United States' long history of providing assistance to foreign armed forces, some portion of this assistance has been provided to forces that repress and abuse their own populations. Before 1997, the primary U.S. legislation constraining aid to countries with poor human rights records was Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act, which prohibited security assistance to "any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. This law was seen as too vague to be effective in cases where the U.S. government had an overriding interest. According to Senator Leahy, his law "makes it clear that when credible evidence of human rights violations exists, U.S aid must stop. But, it provides the necessary flexibility to allow the U.S. to advance its foreign policy objectives in these countries.

For Schmitt (2013), Nigeria faced the challenge of withheld diplomatic defense assistance. The U.S. government rarely publicizes decisions to deny cease assistance under the Leahy Law. The vast majority of requests for assistance are cleared immediately; in 2011, only 1,766 units and individuals out of approximately 200,000 were barred from receiving aid because of gross violations of human rights. In 1998, financing from the Export-Import Bank was denied for thirty-nine of 140 armored police vehicles being bought by Turkey because those vehicles were destined for 11 provinces where police had been implicated in abuses of human rights. The manufacturer, General Dynamics, ultimately provided the financing for the thirty-nine vehicles (Priest, 1998). A 2013 report by Freedom House described the Leahy Law as "an invaluable tool in preventing U.S. assistance to military or police units that commit human rights abuses" and added that "it is invoked sparingly and only in egregious cases of specific violence" (Trister, 2013).

## METHODOLOGY

The study adopted mixed research design using qualitative and quantitative methods. The total population covered by this study was 11,535 staff of the following institutions: the U.S embassy Abuja, the Embassy of the Republic of Chad, Nigerian embassy, The Cameroonian Embassy, Nigeria Ministry of Defense Abuja, Office of the National Security Adviser, Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Abuja, and Multinational Joint task Force. The study used the Yammane (1967) determination formula to resize and achieve a manageable target population of 400 at  $(0.05)^2$  level of precision, using the stratified sampling technique to consider the diverse characteristics of the population.

The study collected data from the targeted population using both Secondary and primary sources of data collection. Secondary method was aided by use of secondary materials such as textbooks and published materials such as diplomatic defense records from the Nigeria defense ministry, the reports from the embassies and consulates of Chad, Niger and Cameroon. As well as the reports from the office of the NSA and the MNJTF as contained in official documents as released by these institutions and missions. Whereas, Primary data were collected through the aid of first, interviews- where 18 persons were interviewed, 1 each from the Embassies of Niger, Chad and Cameroon in Abuja, and 4 from the Nigeria Ministry of Defense Abuja, 3 from the Office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) Abuja, 4 from the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 4 from the MNJTF out of which 1 each shall be drawn to cover each of the 4 sectors in the Multinational Joint task Force units respectively. Secondly, questionnaires were used, about 400 copies were produced and distributed after which completed copies were retrieved and analyzed. Analysis was carried out using tables and percentages.

## DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

### Data Presentation and Analysis

Data Presentation and Analysis on Diplomatic Strategies on External Defense Arrangements to Address Security Threats in Nigeria

**Table 1: Challenges of The Diplomatic Strategies Used In Nigeria**

S/ N	Challenges Associated with the Strategic External Defense Arrangements in Nigeria	Strongly Agreed		Agreed		Disagreed		Strongly Disagreed		Undecided	
		f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
1	Excessive reliance on hard power diplomacy to address security threats than internally addressing the root causes of security threats has become a problem to the diplomatic strategy of securing external defense arrangement	89	22.25	163	40.75	55	13.75	80	20	13	3.25
2	Weak diplomatic Cooperation to trace and clamp down on terrorist financing networks and communication system	104	26	271	67.75	16	4	9	2.25	0	0
3	The lack of willingness on the part of Lake Chad Basin group of States to jointly solve the problem of terrorism	110	27.5	143	35.75	100	25	47	11.75	0	0
4	The lack of 'trust' in each member state that makes up the MNJTF	127	31.75	149	37.25	84	21	40	10	0	0
5	Human right abuses on the part of Nigerian soldiers and the U.S Leahy Law vetting process led to weak defense assistance and covert blocking of assistance to Nigeria from regional allies	113	28.25	265	66.25	18	4.5	4	1	0	0

**Source: Field Survey (2022)**

Table 1 reveals a majority of positive opinions from question 1 to 5 with a huge percentage value of 63%, 94%, 64%, 69% and 65% as against respondents who held other views who were predominantly in the minority. This shows that the assertions across the respective questions on the challenges of diplomacy were considered valid and significant during the survey. The broad analysis of these issues reveals the challenges that have overtime hampered extensive use of diplomatic strategic measures directly by state envoys or through external arrangements like the Multinational Joint Task Force at resolving the regional defense/security threats in and around Nigeria.

Data Presentation and Analysis on Suggestions to Address the Challenges Associated with Nigeria Diplomatic Strategy and External Defense Arrangements to End the Security Threats in Nigeria

**Table 2: Possible Strategies Of Resolving Diplomatic Defense Challenges In Nigeria**

S/ N	Possible Strategies to Resolve some of these Challenges	Strongly Agreed		Agreed		Disagreed		Strongly Disagreed		Undecided	
		f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
1	Increased funding available for security purposes in Nigeria.	127	31.75	149	37.25	84	21	40	10	0	0
2	Embarking on diplomatic visit by diplomatic partners to Nigeria to learn first-hand the damage the Boko Haram Insurgents had wrecked in the country.	112	28	242	60.5	32	8	8	2	6	1.5
3	Human rights trainings should be included in basic training for new recruits and promotional courses for existing soldiers in Nigeria.	104	26	271	67.75	16	4	9	2.25	0	0
4	Human rights training should be carried out on the Multinational Joint Task Force consisting of security forces from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin.	89	22.25	163	40.75	55	13.75	80	20	13	3.25

**Source: Field Survey (2022)**

Table 2 unveils majority of positive opinions from question 1 to 4 with a huge percentage value of 69%, 89%, 94% and 63% as against respondents who held other views who were predominantly in the minority. This shows that the assertions across the respective questions on the possible strategies of resolving the diplomatic defense challenges were considered valid and significant during the survey. Data from key Interview sources made some vital suggestions toward resolving some of these challenges. Anthony (2021) argues that the expanded scope of global relations has stretched diplomatic practice and functions beyond its original limits, vibrating issues that were formerly thought to be domestic, unreasonable and irrelevant. Today domestic issues such as poverty and unemployment, corruption, weak governance institution, illiteracy and porous borders are globally admitted as root promoting factors of terrorism that needs to be addressed domestically in nations without which terrorism will spiral into a regional challenge. Blinken reiterated the effectiveness of the multilateral/diplomatic strategy of global bounding or joining coalitions to deal with some of the challenges that have gradually spiraled out of control where states are unable to deal with the issue working alone- such as the counter terrorism campaign in the Lake Chad Basin. On his part, Kingibe in a related interview (2021) states that the subject matter of diplomacy, under a competitive social relation should move from the realism of high politics of war and peace to include health, environment, development, education, technology and law among others. This will naturally address some of the challenges affecting regional defense arrangements and the diplomacy defense strategizing itself. Consequently, Nigerian diplomats should vigorously engage in increasing diplomatic function such as negotiation, communication, consular, representation, and reporting observation, merchandise trade and services promotion, cultural exchange and public relations. At the same time, with more works come greater



amounts of bureaucratization, where routine, precedence and standard operating procedure dominate diplomatic tasks.

## DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

1. The Study found multiple challenges like weak diplomatic Cooperation, lack of ‘trust’ in each member state that makes up the MNJTF and Human right abuses on the part of Nigerian soldiers to be the frontline challenges affecting the strategies adopted to secure support for the counter terrorism arrangement. This finding is in line with that of Isaac (2017), Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor (2006), Tarlebba and Baroni (2010) and Duncan (2018) on the challenges associated with the diplomatic strategies on external defense arrangements to address the security threats in Nigeria.
2. Also, the study found out the need for improvement in the strategies and methods of securing diplomatic arrangements in a way that will favor Nigeria in dealing with the effect of terrorism both locally and regionally. The finding supports the submissions of William, Jeannine, Abatan and Wendyam (2016), Drab (2018), Bala and Ouédraogo, (2018), Albert (2017), Johnson (2014) and Anthony (2021) on the suggestions to address the challenges associated with Nigeria diplomatic strategy and external defense arrangements to end the security threats in Nigeria.

## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Conclusion

Nigeria have been involved in diplomatic balancing and rebalancing of negotiations with countries of the world, sometimes requiring persuasion and inducement strategies to secure defense support from neighboring states sometimes through the arrangement of the Multinational Joint Task Force. At othertimes, Nigeria have used the summitry approach to deepen opportunities to joint U.S led defense coalitions and signed defense MoUs with the likes of China, UK and Turkey. Typically, hard and soft diplomacy has been one of the few tools used in the conduct of Nigerian defense policy aside direct use of military force over the years. However, a disconcerting trend in this practice is that often times most of her chosen diplomatic engagements were been limited by some challenges resulting in failure to achieving defense policy objectives.

### Recommendations

Based on the findings of the study and review of relevant literature, the following recommendations are offered:

1. Nigeria government must intensify efforts at holding regional security summits for defense diplomats
2. Intensifying joint military exercises for regional states in the Multi-national Joint Task Force to promote unity, improve communication and information sharing must also be prioritized

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