

Pre-Election Violence a Case Study of Somalia.

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ABSTRACT

Somalia had experienced many crises as a result of power struggles and leadership elections amongst others that was one of the most challenging things that caused the Horn of Africa backwardness was due to election violence even though election violence was not a new thing because most of their African colleague's countries such as Uganda, Ghana, Ethiopia, Nigeria and so on had experienced same phenomena. however, Somalia's election violence was the main focus of this research that was being investigated the objective of this study was to examine the theoretical and practical aspects of the election and elaborate on the history of their election violence and their political system, and the causes of their pre-election violence and the possible way forward to prevent pre-election in post-conflict nations which was Somalia amongst others. The study used a historical approach, mainly focused on past events, and came to conclusions that predicate what would happen in the future.

The study's objectives were in line with the data from various sources used books, journals, papers, studies, policy documents, and other sources were used to acquire the data. The study used a case study approach to evaluate pre-election violence in the post-conflict nation. researchers reported that pre-election violence and competitiveness are inseparable, especially in most African countries (Kanyinga, 2009). That study also adopted a historical approach design method that will look into past events and conclusions that preempted future events. Most of the findings of those studies included clans and subclans fighting for political power in Somalia clans fighting for political power in Somalia. Somalia's election crisis started in 1960 after its independence. Some of the causes of pre-election violence included disagreement between parties, corruption, bribery of electoral officials, and so on. That study concluded that pre-election violence had demoralized the democratic system of Somalia. Those who had perceived malpractice of the election violence were less likely to support it, which was in contrast to those who perceived the integrity of the elections. The study recommended that the government of Somalia conducted a free and fair election within a framework of laws that guaranteed that effective exercise of voting rights and the Somalia authorities ensured that independence was credible and impartial investigations was promptly conducted into all attacks and acts of physical intimidation amongst others. The study had been carried out to fill the lacuna in the aspect of election violence research being conducted by prolific researchers to widen the horizon of knowledge creation of humans and other creatures.

As a result, analysis done by the research on corruption and bribery of electoral officials, hiring of individuals to cause harm and unrest on election day, and others included among the findings found in this research. These findings were supported by other researchers like Norris (2014), the system is linked to perceived electoral integrity. On the other hand, election fraud is found to be the main cause of pre-election violence in Somalia. The study proposes that the causes and effects of the electoral crisis in Somalia be investigated to reduce it completely. Also, the electoral violence and its challenges to democracy and governance in Somalia should be investigated.

Key Terms: Election, Violence, Democracy, Constitution, Clans.

INTRODUCTION

This case study evaluates the pre-election violence in Somalia. An election is defined as a democratic system of governance in which the people are allowed or given an opportunity to pick or choose those to lead them via voting. In a democracy, elections play a vital part by permitting the citizens to participate in choosing whom to lead or rule them and by so doing hold their leaders accountable. However, in some countries in Africa (Somalia) with a history of political conflict and with institutions whereby competitiveness is extremely high with do or die mentality before or during the election leading to election violence.

Also, the election poses a lot of challenges in a country that just recovered from the civil war and is yet to recuperate. Violent killings, destruction of lives and properties, tension, criminality, and corruption are the orders of the day. Most times, the main purpose of the election can be defeated rather than boost the democratic process as a result of being manipulated via different means by the existing regime.

Election violence or electoral violence can be described as a move or activity of some individuals via the destruction of lives and properties, arm-twisting, and exploitation targeting at manipulating electoral process outcome in order to achieve a favorable result that is different from the wishes of the voters or electorates. established studies have shown that election violence endangers democratic stability and process, especially in transitional democracies. The majority of countries in the whole world participated in an election today but the integrity and quality of the elections are still in doubt, especially in African Continent (V-DEM, 2020).

About one-third of national elections in the whole world are followed by pre-election violence (Birch and Muchlinski, 2017). African continents including Somalia have experienced non-specified, dictatorial, and tyrannical destruction of lives and properties at some point as a nation before the election (Straus and Taylor, 2012).

The majority of electorates in Africa dread election violence and it is very rampant in developing countries, especially countries with political crisis example, Somalia (Burchard, 2020).

Reports had it that a competitive election in which the outcome is not known is at extreme risk of pre-election violence compare with a less competitive election. Illicit exploitation and tactics, and pre-election violence are inevitable in a highly competitive election (Fjelde and Hoglund, 2016).

Researchers reported that pre-election violence and competitiveness are inseparable, especially in most African countries (Kanyinga, 2009). Pre-election violence has been reported to be capitalized on by the elites to narrow the political space against their opponents via antagonizing effective campaigns (Wahman, 2017).

Somalia as a country has suffered a lot of setbacks including insurgency, counterinsurgency, and armed violence that led to the civil war since 1998. Between 1991 and 2012, Somalia was without a functioning central government which many observers termed a failed state. It is reported that citizens of Somalia between the ages of 35 years alongside with about one-third of the total population were without any history of a functional government. Some observers have attributed the country's ordeals to warlords; ethnic cleansing and wanton killings disrupted by the failed peacekeeping operation organized by the United Nations between 1993 to 1995, Somalia tops the list of the post-conflict nation with no-go areas for election due to many issues including but not limited to the fact that southern Somalia was in direct control of the deadly terrorist which repeatedly attacks Mogadishu capital. So for the election to hold in the country the federal government of Somalia must come to a compromise with the federating member states by

negotiating with the state actors involved.

Turbulence and disharmony crippled the government with no good services to the citizens, atrocity, and fraud were the order of the day while most of the security forces of the government were intentionally loyal to militia leaders in some of the clans. A breakaway state or self-recognized state (Somaliland) with a population of about three million citizens vowed never to have anything with the country's election or the government (Menkhaus, 2017).

In late 2016 and early 2017, an indirect election was held in Somalia due to pressure from the Western and the donor Nations, a new president alongside upper and lower federal houses of parliament was formed, though it was reported that in the lower house of parliament, more than half of the elected members were newcomers because the majority of the post-transitional lower house of parliament lost their seats during the election.

Before the election, the process was messy with pre-election violence, atrocity, and fraud, massive repression was the order of the day including interferences from the external forces that have come to be in the political system of Somalia. The entire electoral process was left in the hand of non – non constitutional authority making the whole process marred with crises. The whole electoral process was termed unconstitutional by some of the presidential candidates but in the end, they were able to pull through with some level of success including the formation of a new government with no major armed conflict. According to Winston Churchill, the 2016 – 2017 indirect election in Somalia was the worst electoral process in democracy due to a lot of electoral impasses.

After the 2016 – 2017 indirect election in Somalia, a more difficult task was ahead in the 2020 general election. The signing of a new electoral law in 2020 which replaced indirect voting with the direct voting process as recommended by Western donors created yet another pre-election tension in the country between president Farmaajo and the opposition.

The hope of holding parliamentary elections in December 2020 was dashed because of the inability of the central and federating states to form the electoral commission coupled with the escalating disagreement between the Somali president and his neighboring country Kenya accusing them of inciting an uprising in one of Somalia's clan which led to the diplomatic breakdown between the two nations.

The Somali president was accused by the opposition of using the situation between the two nations to elongate his constitutional stipulated term of tenure, and they vowed never to recognize the incumbent at the expiration of his term. In late 2020 and early 2021, there was a pocket of pre-election demonstrations across the country even with restrictions in order to contain the spread of the deadly coronavirus, there was pre – an election crisis in the capital of Mogadishu between the government security forces and the supporters of the oppositions.

The long delay of the general election that was meant to be commended in 2021 generated a lot of controversies to the extent that even the international partners including the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union were worried over the long electoral impasse, they were afraid of the already tensed atmosphere escalating into full pre-electoral violence in Somalia.

Between 2020 and 2021, Somalia has been through a lot of pre-election violence experience that resulted in some level of instability in the country linked to the planned presidential and parliamentary elections.

This research aimed to evaluate pre-election violence, the economic implication of electoral instability, and the role of international partners in post-conflict Somalia.

This research will also take a look at the Clans political system of Somalia and its implication.

- To examine the Theoretic and the Practical Aspects of Election and Challenges to Democracy in Somalia.
- To elaborate on the History of Election Violence and the Political System in Somalia.
- To assess the Election Violence Implication on Post-conflict Nations.
- To evaluate the Pre-election Violence Impact on Somalia's Economic and Its Citizens.
- To outline a possible way forward to Prevent Pre-election Violence in Post-conflict nations.

We must first examine the idea of electoral violence. Because the word “electoral violence” lacks a clear meaning, it is still not well understood. IFES presented the first thorough definition and attempts to investigate electoral violence. “Election conflict and violence can be characterized as any random organized act or threat to intimidate, physically injure, blackmail, or abuse a political stakeholder in aiming to determine, postpone, or otherwise influence an electoral process,” said Fischer in his working paper (Fischer, 2002).

Numerous authors focused their work on electoral violence in 2009. Electoral violence, according to Collier, encompasses civil war, riots, and political strikes (Straus and Taylor 2009, 19).

While actors wish to “influence voter choices and torment by intimidation and instilling fear of vengeance, or when trying to enhance their position in talks to get a seat at the bargaining table,” according to Straus and Taylor, they resort to violence (Swain 2011, 32).

They contend that electoral violence primarily manifests in nations with a combination of an authoritarian system and mid-level fractionalizations when “both candidates’ strategies and local actors who want to change resource distributions during this advantageous time believe they will benefit from it (ethnic cleavages in which two or more ethnic groups can form a winning coalition).

In Africa’s new democracies that emerged during the third wave of democracy in the 1990s, conflicts, and tension have been frequent during elections. The way that these tensions are handled could determine whether or not an election is conducted peacefully or if it turns violent.

According to studies, between 19 and 25 percent of elections in Africa are impacted by election violence. Somalia and other African Nations including Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, Kenya, etc. have all suffered losses in one form or another. Ethnic marginalization, economic marginalization, and the weakening of democratization are the driving forces behind this violence.

Political unrest and internal conflict have plagued Somalia for almost 30 years. President Siad Barre was ousted and ejected from the country in 1991, after holding the position for 22 years. The ensuing brutal civil war was marked by bitter clan rivalries and the rise, fall, and resurgence of radical militant Islamic extremist groups. A humanitarian emergency, including widespread population displacement, starvation, and the collapse of the Somali economy, was the final outcome.

In Somalia, numerous initiatives for peace and reconciliation have been carried out. Between 1992 and 1995, peacekeeping forces commanded by the United Nations and the United States were stationed in Somalia to establish the security requirements for the distribution of humanitarian aid. Nevertheless, all UN peacekeeping forces were withdrawn in 1995 as a result of the increase in violence, which included assaults on foreign forces.

After the 2007 launch of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), it will be more than ten years before another international peacekeeping mission is launched. One of the repercussions of the continued

bloodshed and instability has been the absence of a functioning administration for more than 20 years after president Siad Barre's toppling in 1991. While a Transitional Federal Government was established in 2004, Somalia lacked a Permanent Central Government. This government was reliant on external conflict and had little power or control over most of the nation. In actuality, the militant Islamist Organization Al-Shabaab had authority over the majority of Southern Somalia between 2009 and 2011, including the nation's capital, Mogadishu. As AMISOM and government forces with targeted assistance from the military began to reclaim territory from Al-Shabaab militants.

Since Somalia's descent into civil war in the 1990s, a Permanent Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was finally established in September 2012. A provisional constitution that called for a Federal Parliament was approved in the same year. With the creation of the FGS, a process of structural, legislative, and institutional reform was started, which included efforts to create district and regional control. In late 2016 and early 2017, Somalia held indirect legislative and presidential elections- the country's most extensive electoral process in decades.

Muhammed Abdullahi Muhammed, popularly known as Farmejo, who had previously led Somalia as Prime Minister from 2010 to 2011, won the presidential elections. A number of reforms have been implemented by the Somali Government since it came into power in 2007. The committee was informed by Marc-Andre Fredette, Director General, Southern and Eastern Africa Bureau, Global Affairs Canada, that the government of Somalia places a high priority on fighting corruption, thwarting the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, providing essential services, and addressing clan dynamics. The committee was informed that President Farmajo has given constitutional and electoral reforms a top priority.

Despite the Significant improvements under place, Somalia nevertheless faces formidable political obstacles. This involves conflict over the distribution of authority and resources between the Federal Government and the Sub-National States. Then there comes corruption occurrence. Ken Menkhaus, Professor, of Political Science, at Davidson College, remarked despite "some wonderful Somali's wasting in the government". Vanda Felbab Brown, Senior Fellow at Brookings, expressed a similar sentiment in a written brief, stating that corruption and clientelism are pervasive and infect every branch and level of government, industry, and society. According to Transparency International's 2018 ranking of the 180 nations polled, Somalia is rated 180th overall. Corruption perception index, which rates nations and territories according to how corrupt they are seen to be in the public sector.

Witnesses gave varying assessments of Somalia's current situation. Minister Hassan offered a viewpoint, noting the substantial advancements made in the war against Al-Shabaab. Compared to a few years ago, with the aid of AMISOM and the assistance of contributing nations.

Jay Bahadur of the UN Security Council's Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea provided another viewpoint, stating that Al-Shabaab is still capable of carrying out routine asymmetric strikes and sporadic conventional attacks against AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA). He told the committee that while AMISOM or the SNA now control the majorly of metropolitan areas, Al-Shabaab still retains control over a large portion of the hinterland and the primary supply channels that it utilizes to make money. Mr. Bahadur claims that AL-Shabaab operates as a "shadow government" throughout the entire nation and has established a productive system for collecting "taxes" from the local populace.

The twin luck bombs that AL-Shabaab carried out in October 2017 – which left 587 people dead and at least 300 more injured –illustrated both its continued capacity to attack security and government objectives and its readiness to cause massive civilian casualties. In all of Somalia's history, it was the bloodiest terrorist strike. Over the past year, Al-Shabaab has continued to carry out a wave of attacks. According to Georgette Gagnon, Director of the Field Operations and Technical Cooperation Division of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 1,010 civilians were murdered or injured in

Somalia alone in September 2008. Al-Shabaab is responsible for 55% of the fatalities, according to MS Gagnon.

Continual clan and political conflict, in the words of Felbab-Brown, “gives al-Shabaab a lease of life.” She stated that the systemic marginalization of some tribes and land seizures are two things that cause strife in Somalia. According to Professor Menkhaus, Somalia is “one of the most insecure regions in the world” due to the multifaceted challenges it faces. He claims that even though Somalia is not presently engaged in a protracted civil war, it is still racked by assassinations, terrorist attacks, clashes between neighbors, and other forms of violent crime. Overall, Professor Mekhaus informed the committee that there are dangerous fault lines that have increased the likelihood that Somalia may regress.

In order to assess and monitor elections for the president, lower house, upper house, speakers and deputy speakers, and six conflict triggers, the Somalia civil society election Situation Room has been established. The UNDP’s 2009 guide on elections and conflict prevention claims that there is a clear association between how an election process is managed and executed and acts of violence. In each of the Federal member states where ESR conflict monitors were stationed, the conflict was triggered during election planning and execution.

Key factors contributing to, or mitigating violence in elections include:

- The legal system’s effectiveness in ensuring transparent, rule-based electoral competition is one of the main factors causing or mitigating election violence.
- The legitimacy of the organizations in charge of managing elections, as well as the stakeholders’ level of professionalism, openness, and trust in that process
- Respect for the law, consistency with the law, and uniformity in its application.
- Civil society has access.
- Levels of diversity, particularly for women.
- Anyone seeking to challenge an administrative judgment should have a free and accessible right to appeal.

There was a presidential election as well as elections for the speakers and deputy speakers of both houses of parliament in Somalia. After the NIEC announced in June 2020 that the one-person, one-vote elections scheduled for the end of 2021 would be postponed until 2021 and not be held as scheduled, an indirect election model similar to the one used in the 2016 elections would be used once again.

The study used a historical approach and mainly focused on past events and came to conclusions that predicate what would happen in the future. The study’s objectives were in line with the data from various sources used books, journals, papers, studies, policy documents, and other sources were used to acquire the data.

The reviews take into account not only what had been said or written about the subject but also what had been done in terms of the electoral process, human rights, and electoral-related difficulties in Somalia. Because it cannot function on the premise of manipulating cause and effect, historical research differs from other scientific studies. A systematic recovery of the nuanced details, characters, events, meanings, and even ideas from the past from influences and influences from the past that has formed the present is the goal of historical research or historiography. (Berge and Lure, 2012 p. 305).

The main aspect or quality of this technique involves reconstructing the past through the accurate portrayal of the past and illustration of inferences from which there is informed insight into the events coherently that contributed to the present developments involving political politics and their execution difficulties with the approved electoral system in Somalia. In order to respond to the preliminary research inquiries provided, it

was determined that documentary analysis was the best research approach to use.

Instability, intense conflict, and legitimate struggles have plagued Somalia for the past 25 years. These have included state collapse, the outbreak of Union Islamic Courts and civil war, and ultimately Al-Shabaab (Mahleasela, 2016). Numerous human casualties, countless internal displacements, significant economic losses, major infrastructure damage, and widespread mistrust among the populace have all been brought on by these protracted battles (Farah, 2011). Most significantly, this current youth has been raised lacking an established government that might offer public services like security, education, or healthcare. However, Somalia hasn't completely descended into chaos. The northern region of Somaliland has experienced peace for more than 21 years., and institutional complexity has increased (Hansen & Bradbury 2007; Johnson & Smaker 2014). Despite being profit-driven, doctor coverage is currently better than it was before the conflict, but there hasn't been fighting there since 2003.

On May 18, 1991, Somaliland rose to prominence in the global political system after the rest of Somalia. Burao hosted the Northern people's ground conference. Somaliland has an 850-kilometer coastline and a land area of 137,600 square kilometers. In 1997, there were roughly three million residents there. About 55% of the population is made up of pastoralists, with the remaining percentage being split between urban and rural residents. Northwest, Awdal, Sahil, Togdheer, Sanaag, and Sool are the six geographical regions that make up Somaliland.

Three prominent clans, the Isaaq, Dared/Harti (including the Warsengeli and Dhulba Hante), and Gadabursi, make up the majority of the population-representing 66 percent, 19 percent, and 15 percent, respectively.

According to David Farrel, electoral systems "define how votes are converted into seats during the election of politicians to offices. This is essential for nations recovering from civil wars brought on by rivalry for control of resources and power since the system offers peaceful means of acquiring authority. According to the aforementioned definition of voting procedures, Horowitz Donal outlined six criteria for those designing such systems: Minorities are well represented and the executive branch is stable, the ability to control the behavior of elected officials, and the ability to support the success of the candidate with the most support.

According to Benjamin Reilly, the system's capacity to control political behavior and principles of proportionality and accountability are crucial. For those creating an election system for a specific nation, Bernard Groforian and Arend Lijphart offer a more helpful framework. The dispute the electoral system's formula (plurality, majoritarianism, proportional, or mixed), the ballot's design (electing parties or individual candidates), the legislature's size, the requirement that parties satisfy, and the district (how many seats are in a district). The success of a particular election system is also greatly influenced by the Lijphart fairness integrated into the representation mechanism.

The study was feasible since there was unpublished data and information at government research institutions, as well as important topics that had not been explored in comparable or earlier studies. They were crucial materials that were used in this study since they include a wealth of information and data that are extremely relevant to it. The majority of the public records and similar archives from their previous administrations up to the present that was used as archival sources showed historical colonial perspectives on the Somalian election system and democracy.

Additionally, previous literature about the pre-election specifics, election problems, and obstacles in Somalia during the period of those years was explored and analyzed using documentary analysis.

After a thorough evaluation of the study data throughout the selection process, the data were organized, verified, and validated, which was important to support those processes. The initial phase involved reading

through the text of the document and scanning the index for relevant keywords, after which notes on the pertinent chapters and citations were prepared. After classifying the data sources as primary or secondary, the computer citation end note was utilized to help the organization of the data in a number of concurrent ways, including chronologically and in accordance with major themes identified by the research inquiries.

These inquiries also offer a consistent framework for data collection and analysis to encourage objectivity, and they were crucial in determining the validity of the study. The framework inquiries have also been used to identify, analyze, and cite sources of information to support claims and offer counterarguments during these theses. Additionally, evaluations of the research's objective, methodology, and epistemology were required in order to accurately assess its value and use when compared to different data.

On July 1, 1960, Somalia formally reclaimed its sovereignty from UN trusteeship and Italian rule. The Legislative Assembly's President, Adan Abdullah Osman Dair, was chosen to serve as acting president. Abdi Rashid Ali Shirmarke was named prime minister on July 20, 1960, by President Adan Abdullah. On June 20, 1961, a new vote was taken.

The Somali Youth League (SYL) won 69 of the 123 National Assembly seats in the legislative elections that took place on March 30, 1964.

22 seats in the National Assembly were gained by the Socialist National Congress (SNC). On October 15, 1969, a government police officer shot and killed Abdi Rashed Ali Shirmarke in the northern Somalian town of Las Anod. A military coup led by General Muhammed Siad Barre removed Prime Minister Maxamed Xaaji Ibrahim Cignal from office. The 21st of October 1969. On October 25, 1969, the governments of Egypt and Italy offered the military government diplomatic support. On November 3, 1969, General Barre assumed control of the government.

Political parties were outlawed by General Barre, who also put on hold the constitution. The military support for the Somali government came from the governments of Cuba and the Soviet Union. On April 21, 1970, he put an uprising on hold. 20 government troops died when the Somali government put down a military uprising led by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf on April 9, 1978. 17 military members were put to death on October 26, 1978, for their participation in the military uprising.

The Garawe summits serve as a foundation for the Constitution, which clarifies several elements of the new democratic structures. It starts off with a list of practical guidelines for legislatures:

Article 3(5): All National Institutions, in notably all elected and appointed posts across the three levels of government and in the National Independence Commission, must effectively incorporate women.

A person who is a citizen of Somalia cannot lose that citizenship, even if they acquire citizenship in another nation, according to Article 8 (3).

Article 11 (1) states that all citizens have equal rights and obligations in front of the law, regardless of their sex, religion, social or economic level, political viewpoint, clan, disability, occupation, birth, or dialect.

Article 12 (2): The state must make sure that it does more than just make sure that its citizens' rights aren't being violated by others.

Every person has the right to associate with other people and groups, according to Article 16. This includes the freedom to create and join associations, such as political parties and trade unions.

Everyone has the right to partake in public affairs, according to Article 22 (1). Thus, rights comprise

1. The ability to run for any office inside a political party.

Section 42(2)(g): Every individual has a responsibility to try to cast a ballot in elections. Article 46 (2): Everyone must be given the chance to participate in the public representation system, which must be open. These participation tenets must be followed by any legislation regulating elections and political parties. Only the legislature will be chosen by popular vote among the three organs of government, however, all residents have the right to vote and to run for office. The upper house cannot exceed 54 members and the lower house has 275 members. These bodies have the authority to select the president and approve cabinet nominees submitted by the president. The people of Somalia will elect both legislative chambers in a “direct, secret, and free ballot,” albeit the precise electoral procedure has not yet been decided.

According to the constitution, the following criteria shall be used to elect representatives of the Senate:

- The 18 regions of Somalia that existed prior to 1991
- How many Federal Members States there are in the Federal Republic of Somalia?
- The requirement is that each federal member state has an equal number of representatives in the Federal parliament’s upper house.

Tribes and sub-clans currently compete for political dominance in Somalia instead of political parties. Prior to October 1969, Somalia had a multiparty system of government, with both the opposition parties and members of the dominant party being able to voice their opinions in the legislature. The main party, the Somalia Youth League (SYL), began as the Somali Youth Club in 1943. The program involves non-alignment in international affairs, social, political, and economic development, as well as the unity of all Somalis (including those in Kenya, Ethiopia, and French Somaliland).

It represented nearly all the government employees, business owners, and semi-skilled laborers in the region’s southern region, formerly known as Italian Somaliland. The SYL obtained to an absolute majority of 64 out of 123 parliamentary seats in the first national elections held following independence on March 30, 1964. Eleven parties split up the remaining seats. General elections were conducted in which 1969, and Muhammed Ibrahim Egal’s SYL, which had been in power, won again.

The election featured 64 political parties in total. Elections would be held in due course, according to the supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), which outlawed all political parties in October 1969. The SRC was disbanded in 1976, and its responsibilities were given to the newly created Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP), which was governed by the SRC’s former members. Siad Barre served as the SRSP’s general secretary, and the organization was the only one standing to sue him until his downfall in January 1991. The Somali National Movement (SNM), which was associated with clans and sub-clans and bargained to increase their dominance, then took over control of the north and created the autonomous state of “Somaliland.”

In Somalia, attempts to move to democracy have been met with arduous protests, invalid or fraudulent elections, and acts of violence in several parts of the country. Both the states of Somalia and its political parties have, on various occasions, contested the status quo of the political party system, leading to the adoption of a constitution that includes the formation of true democracy and the patriotic government of the Somali people. These include, among other things, political change, political involvement, political party structures, difficulties with implementing the chosen electoral system, and the way forward.

Following almost two decades of state collapse marked by civil war, fractions, clannish behavior, religious extremism, and a succession of unsuccessful central governments Somalia occupies a special place in the world. The dictatorship of Siad Berre, a form of scientific socialism that tried to dismantle Somalia’s most

lasting social institution, the clan, while also causing a string of expensive wars with Ethiopia, is where their political and security problems have their roots. Sub-clans struggled for control in the ensuing political vacuum as Somalia descended into a bloody civil war, forcing the UN to launch two of its most ambitious peacekeeping operations, United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) I and II. As part of the stability operation, the US also provided military forces, starting with the United Task Force (UNITAF), which was UNISOM II. However, international intervention troops steadily reduced their engagement and completely withdrew by 1995 after 18 United States Army Rangers were killed in an incident that sparked outrage and called into doubt the efficacy of the peacekeeping mission.

Nearly 20 attempts at political reconciliation were made in the ensuing ten years. There were other conferences and summits held both domestically and overseas, each bringing together a similar group of clan representatives, local politicians, and militia leaders to work toward a new arrangement of the central government. Although some agreement was achieved, there was no national Somali leadership that was seen as genuine. The Transitional Federal Charter was approved by the interim Somali government in 2004, and Abdullahi Yusuf was chosen as the new Transitional Federal president in a vote held in Nairobi, Kenya. This power was ineffective, and

their attempts to solidify political control were thwarted by the Islamic Court Union (ICU), a rising Islamic movement that established viral systems of government and judicial administration throughout Mogadishu. In 2006, Ethiopian troops intervened to assist in re-establishing the TFG's authority by expelling the Islamists from Mogadishu out of concern for religious extremism and sensitivity to the claims of larger Somalia made by more radical elements within ICU. The insurgent movement, however, continues to pose a severe threat to the transitional process.

The clan serves as the basis for the social, political, and economic organizations of an individual based on agnatic patrilineal systems. Clan affiliations existed both before and after colonization, but until 1969, when Major Siad Barre took power in a military coup, they were not a significant cause of bloodshed (Kaptenjis 2013, p.3). The president enforced communist values on society with the support of the Soviet Union. Self-declared communist President Barre curiously supported members of his own sub-clan while publicly opposing clan favoritism and nepotism (Seereo, 2003). During his rule, Barre supported the nation of comradeship and thought of clan groupings as ancient and archaic (Seereo, 2003).

The clan benefited greatly from the Siad Barre government, and this led to societal differentiation and rivalry among Somalis, which sparked the civil war in 1991. Siad Barre also prevented the development of civil society, which contributed to Somalia's complete failure (Harvey, 2003), (Elmi, 2004), and (Farah, 2002). President Barre was forced into exile after the USC (United Small Congress), and SPM (Somali Patriotic Movement), overthrew his destructive and polarizing clan politics and took control of Mogadishu in December 1990 and January 1991. But USC officials developed a stance that equated all Somalis with Darood (Lyons and Samatar, 1995, p.7). The clan structure, which president Barre saw as a barrier to growth, was excluded by the Somali state after it gained independence, leading it to view itself as a liberated democratic state. Since clan politics are incomplete with the modern state's liberal democratic norms, the state forbade their use among its citizens and those of other states. Nevertheless, when civil conflict broke out in 1991, Somalis turned to their tribe, which provided natural security. The clan reappears as an institution of the rule of law, offering its Somali clan members services akin to those of the state (Elmi, 2014).

Ever since the state's dissolution in 1991, Somalia has been subject to global governance principles (Menchaus, 2014). The United Kingdom (UK) government called a meeting in May 2012 in London, UK, to ask the Somali transitional federal government (TGF) to conclude its term and be ready for elections after extensive failed peace negotiations and the establishment of a transitional administration. The next step was a civil society gathering in Istanbul, Turkey, when representatives from various Somalia sectors gathered to

debate the role of civil society in the country's reconstruction. Dealing with the concept of "many governments within a government" presents the electoral team with a significant conundrum. This is due to the fact that each federal state runs on its own. Additionally, the element of the clan and sub-clan power politics is added by the nomadic model of hierarchical leadership, which places a clan elder in a position of leadership.

By incorporating the elders, it is hoped to encourage a sense of power-sharing between the rival clans. However, this procedure accentuates favoritism and clan loyalty. There are worries that traditional leaders or federal presidents could sway election results by abusing their position of influence. There is also worry that corruption is encouraged by the absence of accountability and openness in the nomination of traditional elders. In fact, reports of certain presidential candidates buying their way to office have already surfaced.

According to Carothers, when promoting democracy abroad, proponents use tools, theories, and templates (Carothers, 1999). In Somalia, these interventions have succeeded in re-creating dependent entities that are answerable to the donors. Civil society and the phantom state, which are created as prerequisites to democracy, have a paradoxical relationship in which they are more answerable to their sponsors than to their constituents (Chandler, 2006). Moreover, it is believed that a democratic society must have citizen engagement, free and fair elections, and an open administration (Carothers, 1991).

The Somalia political election system's SWOT analysis includes its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. The fact that Somalia has persevered through these difficulties, which are essential to the African nation's success, must also be noted.

There have been several parliaments and governments in Somalia. Each of these required three seats of the 18 pre-1991 regions, an equal number for each state (including the five, six, or seven seats each for Somaliland and Banadir), and a maximum of 54 seats in the upper house. The first assembly, the territorial council, was created in 1951 and served as a trustee for the Somali region. The Italian governor randomly and legally selected the representatives, who eventually numbered 35 as needed. Continually using closed lists and proportional representation, the election system. In 1959, elections for the second generation were held. Women and males over the age of 18 were granted universal suffrage and better electoral regulations, and they cast secret ballots to choose their representatives. Additionally, chiefs were no longer permitted to cast ballots on behalf of clan members. Closed-list elections and proportional representation were required under the new electoral legislation. The law included specific provisions to ensure that voters in a rural areas could cast ballots because the majority of Somalis were nomads. According to Millman, "rural and urban constituencies were developed as envisioned."

A significant political turning point occurred in Somalia on August 20, 2012, with the establishment of a permanent federal administration replacing the interim Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The Somali Federal Government (SFG) created its Vision 2016 political roadmap, outlining a number of tasks to be accomplished in four years, most notably finishing and translating the federal constitution and establishing a multi-party political system with national elections (one man/one vote) by 2016. (Bryden & Thomas, 2015). Following discussions and meeting with regional states including Puntland, Jubaland, and Galmudug, it was decided that this vision would be achieved in 2020 and that the 4.5 system would be implemented in this election (FP, 2016).

The clan-based power-sharing system known as system 4.5 gives Somalia's four largest clans Darood, Hawiye, Digil/Mrifle, and Dir (4) equal opportunity in terms of political representation, with the remaining minor clans receiving half representation. (0.5) 51 electors from each MP's clan must be chosen. Then select a federal president through the two legislatures (Onyulo, 2016).

Thus, the 2016 election was a step toward democracy. The 275 seats were to be decided by an electoral

college made up of 51 members of each elder's clan (New African, 2016).

Clan elder participation caused rational politics to interact with local political processes. Politicians and clan elders suggested potential members of parliament, and the people backed them based on their political, economic, and military influence. Since Farmajo had a solid reputation for enacting anti-corruption measures while serving as Prime Minister, many in the diaspora and urban Somalis interpreted the outcome as a nationalistic vote against Ethiopia's participation in Somalia and as an anti-corruption (Aglionby, 2017).

For the lower house, the electoral statute establishes 275 political districts on clans and another 54 based on the 18 administrative regions that the military government abandoned. Many towns disagree with how the districts and regions are organized, and there are disagreements in the Senate on the interpretation of the relevant constitutional clauses. Politically, the government of Somalia will face a Pandora's Box of problems with the introduction of 275 clan-based political districts.

The electors' rule not only made it impossible to allocate seats to places, but it also made the exclusion of five categories acceptable. First off, because male-line tribal societies are biased towards women, it will end or drastically diminish the representation of women in parliament. The order of elections is another important factor. Unlike in the past, particularly during the trusteeship administration from 1954 to 1958, when council elections were held prior to the national elections. Since this is no longer the case, it has unintentionally legitimized the practice of executive authority appointing mayors and governors.

Contrarily, the Law governing political parties is founded on a group of constitutional clauses that support a model for integration based on citizenship. In this instance, it is important to note that the political party system as a whole places importance on choosing candidates via a party-based voting method. The aforementioned indicates that these actions have caused a crisis in politics and elections in many regions. Various suggestions have also been offered for their HIPS-outlined electoral alternatives for 2020, including:

- The Baidabo idea
- Kismayo's suggestion
- MELP (Modified Enhanced Legitimacy Proposal)
- CCP (Clan Constituency Proposal).

The entire aforementioned proposal has merit and offers a number of models for political parties to use when choosing their stakeholder candidates ahead of or during elections. It also identifies the type of sharing formula that should be applied by and allocated to participants in political districts. There are, however, many mistakes that go wrong, some of which are given below:

- Absent gradualism
- Party system's shortcomings
- Does not address unresolved problems in other areas, such as Mogadishu and Somaliland
- Increases corruption's likelihood or frequency
- Not possible because there isn't a political consensus among political-party players.
- It does not keep gender quotas in place.

The battle, one of the most important wars since World War II, has caused the displacement of tens of thousands of soldiers, disrupted vital infrastructure, and disrupted the economic production base of more than 10 million people. In both countries, it has mercilessly rolled back recent milestones in political, social, and economic development. In this regard, the religious leaders suggested that in order to find lasting solutions to the issue, it is necessary to pinpoint the conflict's underlying origins, rather than just its outward manifestations. Some of the actions that required discussion during the meeting include the following: Creating organizational, conceptual, and analytical components to examine and resolve the conflict's

underlying causes in order to promote long-term peacemaking and the effective use of conflict resolution techniques; identifying the underlying causes of the violence will help in the development of frameworks for lasting peace in Somalia. Removing barriers to the parties' ability to communicate effectively locating potential peacemakers, establishing a reasonable mediation schedule, and assessing the achievements and failures of mediation.

The best way for both countries to organize their people for peace and foster an atmosphere of tranquility and coexistence must be discussed. To achieve this, religious leaders must engage in discourse about the best approaches to Educate the people about the need for wisdom in dialogue relating to the dispute; Encourage citizens to refrain from using haughty propaganda that denigrates and demonizes racial groups; bolster abilities to combat disrespects for all occasions of civilizations, religious, and human ties; Create a methodology for the psychosocial rehabilitation of refugees, returnees, and former service members.

The Horn of Africa's Somalia is a country with Mogadishu as its capital. It is also referred to as the Federal Republic of Somalia. A fairly well-liked party system is used in Somalia, which has a federal parliamentary republic government. One of the members of the easternmost region of Africa, Somalia holds a significant geopolitical location between sub-Saharan Africa and the nations of Arabia and Southern Asia. The nation has faced challenges and battled on numerous occasions, and because of this, it has a great chance of avoiding disintegration and division in the wake of numerous election crises and political conflicts over the years. As a result, regional nations and other African Nations have gotten involved in these issues to find amicable and long-lasting solutions to the Somalia crisis. A secure environment for its citizens, rule of law, equal participation chances for all areas, and other factors have made effective governance necessary and contributed to the government's political reform.

Political disagreements surrounding the elections in Somalia pose a threat to the countries and the Horn of Africa's overall peace and stability. On September 17, 2020, all parties agreed to use an indirect (delegate model) electoral system; nevertheless, the agreement ultimately fell through and created serious problems, as evidenced by the events of February 19, 2021. The supervision of polling places in Jubaland, one of the regional regions has recently been the subject of a particularly delicate argument in Somalia involving the division of responsibilities between the Federal and Regional governments.

Other dangers to Somalia's system of government and elections include delegate selection and election officials' concerns over potential bias. Due to Al-Shabaab's continued presence in some regions of Somalia, the country is still at risk from the threats of terrorism. Violent clashes are also more likely when numerous security personnel and militias are present, each of which has varying allegiances. The international community has contributed significantly to the election preparations in Somalia, but both their efforts and those of Somali individuals are currently thwarted by the current impasse.

CONCLUSION

According to academic research, that takes a methodical approach, electoral violence frequently discourages Africans from voting (Bratton, 2013; Burchard, 2015). Also from the foregoing, it is inferred based on the finding that incumbent parties, among other things, discourage supporters of the opposition from voting on election day (Hafner-Burten *et al.*, 2014). As a result, pro-election violence in Somalia serves as the motivation for these studies. Although pro-election violence is common in African nations, it is particularly prevalent in Somalia due to a number of crises that an opposition party orchestrates, including corruption and bribery of electoral officials, hiring of individuals to cause harm and unrest on election day, and others. This study also emphasizes how using electoral violence to motivate voters is a bad strategy for establishing a stable democracy. According to a study by Norris (2014), system supports is linked to perceived electoral integrity. On the other side, election fraud is found to be adversely correlated with system support by Norris

(2014). This study supports these findings since it shows that those who believe that electoral violence is malpractice are less likely to support it, but people who believe that elections are fair and honest are more likely to support it and be happy with it. The Somali government should:

- Hold an election that is free from fraud and within the bounds of legal provisions that ensure that the right to vote is effectively exercised.
- Putting in place a system of representations for upcoming elections that includes all citizens, including internally displaced people, minority populations, young people, and women.
- Encourage the use of risk-reduction strategies to lessen the likelihood of electoral violence, such as instructing law enforcement personnel and security personnel in the right way to handle a peaceful protest.

Somali Authorities:

- Ascertain that swift investigations into all assaults and instances of physical intimidation are conducted by independent, trustworthy, and unbiased parties.
- Make sure that any new legislation makes special provisions to encourage access for women, members of underrepresented groups, and young people to run for office and to protect them from discrimination.
- Maintain the essential liberties and rights guaranteed by the Somali constitution, international law, and treaties to which Somalia is a party, including the freedoms of speech and association.
- Make ensuring that non-discrimination and equality are incorporated in national legislation and put into practice.
- Government and political party reforms should promote inclusion, effective involvement, and universal representation.

The study proposes that the causes and effects of the electoral crisis in Somalia be investigated to know the harm it has caused and the measures that can be taken to reduce it completely. Also, the electoral violence and its challenges to democracy and governance in Somalia should be investigated.

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