

# Streamlining Corporate Governance in the Digital Age: Re-evaluating Notice Periods for Meetings in Zambia

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## ABSTRACT

The rapid rise of technological advancements challenges traditional corporate governance practices, particularly minimum notice periods for company meetings. This article investigates the effectiveness of current notice periods (14-21 days) stipulated in the *Zambian Companies Act No. 10 of 2017* (Section 63) in facilitating shareholder participation in the digital age. We analyse whether advancements like electronic meeting platforms, secure online document sharing, and e-voting can enable effective participation even with shorter notice periods. The article proposes a nuanced approach, suggesting potential adjustments to notice periods based on meeting type (Annual General Meetings vs. Extraordinary General Meetings) and technology utilization. We acknowledge challenges such as the digital divide and cybersecurity concerns, proposing solutions to ensure inclusive participation and mitigate risks. This research advocates for a future-oriented approach to corporate governance in Zambia, leveraging technology to streamline communication and empower shareholders.

**Keywords:** Corporate Governance, Digital Divide, E-voting, Notice Periods, Shareholder Participation, Zambia

## INTRODUCTION

Effective communication is the cornerstone of good corporate governance. It fosters transparency, builds trust between stakeholders, and empowers shareholders to participate meaningfully in decision-making processes (Baysari & Özkan, 2019; Garcia-Blandon & Larranz-Wartel, 2018). Shareholder participation, in turn, plays a crucial role in ensuring the long-term sustainability and profitability of a company (Adams & Ferreira, 2017). One key aspect of effective communication in this context is the timely dissemination of information and ensuring adequate notice for company meetings.

However, a tension exists between facilitating timely decision-making and guaranteeing shareholders sufficient time to prepare for and participate in meetings. Traditionally, minimum notice periods for company meetings have been established to allow shareholders time to receive meeting materials, travel to physical meeting locations (if applicable), and analyse proposals (KPMG, 2017). These justifications, rooted in the constraints of pre-digital communication methods, are increasingly called into question in the digital age.

Technological advancements have fundamentally transformed the way companies communicate with stakeholders. The rise of electronic meeting platforms, secure online document sharing, and e-voting systems has significantly streamlined information dissemination and facilitated real-time participation, regardless of geographical location (Agyekum & Dartey-Baah, 2021; Pérez-Corona et al., 2018). This raises the question of whether current minimum notice periods, often stipulated in national company laws, are still optimal in the digital age.

This article examines the effectiveness of minimum notice periods for company meetings in facilitating informed shareholder participation. We focus on the *Zambian context*, specifically Section 63 of the *Companies Act No. 10 of 2017*, which mandates a minimum notice period of 14-21 days for company

meetings. We analyse whether this stipulated timeframe remains adequate considering the communication efficiencies offered by technological advancements.

Our research explores the rationale behind minimum notice periods, considering both historical justifications and their contemporary relevance in the digital age. We then delve into the functionalities of relevant technologies and their potential to address concerns traditionally associated with inadequate notice. The article proposes a nuanced approach, suggesting the possibility of adjusting notice periods based on meeting type (e.g., Annual General Meetings vs. Extraordinary General Meetings) and the level of technological adoption. We acknowledge potential challenges such as the digital divide and cybersecurity concerns, proposing solutions to ensure inclusive and secure participation for all shareholders.

Finally, we formulate policy recommendations for policymakers in Zambia, advocating for a future-oriented approach to corporate governance. This includes potentially amending the Companies Act to introduce a more flexible framework for notice periods, one that acknowledges the transformative power of technology and prioritizes effective shareholder participation in the digital age.

By critically examining the effectiveness of minimum notice periods in the Zambian context, this research contributes to the broader dialogue on modernizing corporate governance practices globally. As technology continues to reshape communication landscapes, this article underscores the need for flexible legal frameworks that can balance the imperative for timely decision-making with the fundamental right of shareholders to informed participation.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

### The Role and Importance of Shareholder Participation in Decision-Making

Effective corporate governance hinges on the active participation of shareholders in decision-making processes (Baysari & Özkan, 2019). This participation fosters transparency and accountability within companies, leading to improved performance and long-term value creation (Adams & Ferreira, 2017). Shareholders can act as a crucial check on managerial discretion, ensuring that decisions align with the company's best interests and shareholder value (Garcia-Blandon & Larranz-Wartel, 2018).

Research highlights the positive impact of shareholder participation on various aspects of a company's performance. Studies by Jiraporn et al. (2016) and Fahlenbrach & Prigge (2015) demonstrate a link between greater shareholder activism and improved financial performance metrics like profitability and return on equity. Additionally, shareholder engagement can lead to better corporate social responsibility practices and adherence to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards (Eccles et al., 2014).

Several mechanisms facilitate shareholder participation. These include voting on resolutions at general meetings, submitting proposals for consideration by the board, and engaging in constructive dialogue with management (Agyekum & Dartey-Baah, 2021). However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms relies heavily on ensuring shareholders have access to timely and accurate information, as well as sufficient notice to analyse proposals and make informed decisions (KPMG, 2017).

### Historical and Contemporary Justifications for Minimum Notice Periods

Traditionally, minimum notice periods for company meetings have been established to address logistical challenges and ensure fair and informed participation by shareholders. These justifications stemmed from limitations in pre-digital communication methods.

Historically, notice periods allowed shareholders sufficient time for the following:

- Physical mail delivery: Prior to the widespread adoption of electronic communication, companies relied on postal mail to disseminate meeting materials and notices. This process could take several

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days, necessitating longer notice periods to ensure shareholders received the information in time.

- **Travel arrangements:** For physical meetings, shareholders geographically distant from the meeting location required time to make travel arrangements.
- **Review of materials:** Adequate notice allowed shareholders time to carefully review complex meeting materials, such as financial reports and proposed resolutions, before making informed voting decisions (KPMG, 2017).

These justifications remain relevant for a portion of the shareholder population, particularly those without access to reliable internet or residing in geographically remote locations. However, the digital revolution has significantly transformed communication landscapes, raising questions about the continued necessity of lengthy notice periods.

### **The Growing Role of Technology in Corporate Governance Practices**

Technological advancements have fundamentally reshaped corporate governance practices, particularly in facilitating information dissemination and shareholder participation (Agyekum & Dartey-Baah, 2021; Pérez-Corona et al., 2018). Here are some key technologies impacting notice periods:

- **Electronic Meeting Platforms:** Platforms like Zoom and Microsoft Teams enable virtual attendance at meetings, eliminating the need for travel and physical presence, geographically dispersed shareholders can now participate actively in real-time.
- **Secure Online Document Sharing:** Platforms like Dropbox and Google Drive allow companies to securely share meeting materials electronically, ensuring immediate access for all shareholders regardless of location.
- **E-voting Systems:** Secure online voting systems facilitate efficient voting on resolutions during meetings, even with shorter notice periods (Agyekum & Dartey-Baah, 2021).

These technologies offer significant benefits:

- **Increased Efficiency:** Shorter notice periods can expedite the convening and completion of meetings, leading to faster decision-making processes within companies (Baysari & Özkan, 2019).
- **Enhanced Accessibility:** Technology facilitates participation for geographically dispersed or time-constrained shareholders who might struggle to attend physical meetings.
- **Improved Transparency:** Online platforms and document sharing promote greater accessibility to information for shareholders, fostering transparency and accountability within companies (Garcia-Blandon & Larranz-Wartel, 2018).

However, challenges remain. The digital divide, where some shareholders lack reliable internet access or technological literacy, can hinder their ability to participate effectively (Agyekum & Dartey-Baah, 2021). Additionally, cybersecurity concerns surrounding online platforms and e-voting systems require careful consideration and robust security measures (Pérez-Corona et al., 2018).

### **Research Objectives**

This research investigates the role of minimum notice periods for company meetings in the digital age, focusing on the Zambian context. Our specific objectives are:

- a) To critically analyse the rationale behind minimum notice periods stipulated in Section 63 of the Zambian Companies Act No. 10 of 2017.

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- b) To evaluate the effectiveness of the current 14–21day notice period in facilitating informed shareholder participation in Zambia.
  - c) To propose a nuanced approach to minimum notice periods.

## METHODOLOGY

This research employed a multi-method approach to investigate the effectiveness of minimum notice periods for company meetings in Zambia's digital age.

### Comparative Analysis

A comparative analysis of notice periods for company meetings in various jurisdictions was conducted. This involved reviewing relevant company laws and regulations from a selection of developed and developing countries with established technological infrastructure (OECD, 2023). The analysis focused on:

- The timeframe stipulated for minimum notice periods in different jurisdictions.
- Whether the notice period varies based on meeting type (e.g., AGM vs. EGM).
- Any specific requirements regarding information dissemination or technology utilization accompanying shorter notice periods.

Examples of jurisdictions included in the comparative analysis encompassed the United Kingdom (Companies Act 2006), Singapore (Companies Act 2017), and Kenya (Companies Act 2015). This selection provided a mix of developed economies with strong digital infrastructure and developing economies with growing technological adoption (World Bank, 2023).

### Legal and Scholarly Analysis

A comprehensive analysis of relevant legal documents and scholarly articles was conducted. This included:

- **Legal Analysis:** A thorough examination of the *Zambian Companies Act No. 10 of 2017*, with a specific focus on Section 63, which prescribes the minimum notice period for company meetings (14-21 days). This analysis explored the historical context and rationale behind these stipulated notice periods.
- **Scholarly Review:** Academic research on corporate governance, focusing on the importance of shareholder participation and the impact of technology on communication practices within companies (Baysari & Özkan, 2019; Garcia-Blandon & Larranz-Wartel, 2018) was reviewed. Additionally, existing literature on the effectiveness of minimum notice periods in the digital age (Agyekum & Dartey-Baah, 2021; Pérez-Corona et al., 2018) was examined.

### Data Analysis

Data collected from the comparative analysis, and legal and scholarly review was subjected to thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This involved identifying recurring themes and patterns in the data to build a comprehensive understanding of:

- The historical and contemporary justifications for minimum notice periods in the Zambian context.
- The effectiveness of the current 14-21day notice period in facilitating shareholder participation.
- The potential impact of technological advancements on shareholder participation with shorter notice periods.

By employing this multi-method approach, this research contributed a nuanced understanding of how technological advancements can reshape corporate governance practices in Zambia, specifically regarding the role of minimum notice periods in facilitating informed shareholder participation.

## **TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS AND THEIR RELEVANCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE**

Minimum notice periods for company meetings have historically served as a safeguard for informed shareholder participation. These requirements were established in a pre-digital era where communication limitations necessitated longer timeframes for information dissemination and preparation. Here, we explore the historical context and traditional justifications for minimum notice periods, followed by an analysis of their relevance in the digital age.

### **Historical Context and Traditional Justifications**

Prior to advancements in communication technologies, several factors contributed to the need for lengthy notice periods for company meetings:

- **Physical Mail Delivery:** Dissemination of meeting notices and materials primarily relied on postal mail. This process could take several days, necessitating a buffer period to ensure shareholders received them in time (KPMG, 2017).
- **Travel Arrangements:** For physical meetings, shareholders geographically distant from the meeting location required time to make travel arrangements. This justification was particularly relevant for large shareholder bases with geographically dispersed ownership structures.
- **Review of Materials:** The complexity of meeting materials, such as financial reports and proposed resolutions, necessitated adequate notice to allow shareholders time for careful review and analysis before forming informed voting decisions.

These justifications aimed to ensure fairness and inclusivity in the corporate governance process by addressing logistical challenges and fostering informed participation for all shareholders.

### **Relevancy of Traditional Justifications in the Digital Age**

The digital revolution has fundamentally transformed communication landscapes, impacting the validity of some traditional justifications for minimum notice periods. Here's a breakdown of each justification and its relevance today:

- **Physical Mail Delivery:** The widespread adoption of electronic communication technologies like email and online document sharing platforms has significantly reduced reliance on physical mail. Meeting notices and materials can be disseminated instantaneously, eliminating time delays associated with postal delivery.
- **Travel Arrangements:** The emergence of virtual meeting platforms like Zoom and Microsoft Teams has revolutionized meeting attendance. Shareholders can now participate actively in real-time regardless of geographical location, negating the need for lengthy notice periods to facilitate travel arrangements.

However, the relevance of travel arrangements remains partially applicable for situations where voting rights are not exercised electronically and require physical presence at the meeting location.

- **Review of Materials:** While digital documents allow for immediate access to meeting materials, the argument for adequate review time retains some validity. The complexity of certain proposals or

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reports might still necessitate a reasonable notice period to facilitate thorough analysis, particularly for shareholders with limited technological proficiency.

### **A Nuanced Approach**

The digital revolution has undoubtedly weakened the traditional justifications for lengthy minimum notice periods. However, a complete abandonment of these requirements might not be optimal. Here's why:

- **Digital Divide:** While technology has significantly improved communication accessibility, the digital divide remains a concern. Not all shareholders have reliable internet access or possess the necessary technological skills to navigate online platforms effectively (Agyekum & Dartey-Baah, 2021). Shorter notice periods could exacerbate this divide, potentially disenfranchising a portion of the shareholder base.
- **Complexity of Proposals:** For complex issues requiring in-depth analysis (e.g., mergers and acquisitions), even with readily available electronic materials, a reasonable notice period might still be necessary to ensure shareholders have sufficient time to understand the implications and make informed voting decisions.

## **THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENTS ON NOTICE PERIODS**

The digital revolution has fundamentally reshaped corporate communication practices, with advancements significantly impacting the way companies convene meetings and interact with shareholders. These advancements offer compelling arguments for reevaluating traditional minimum notice periods for company meetings. Here, we explore how specific technologies are transforming communication landscapes and their potential to address concerns associated with shorter notice periods.

### **Electronic Meeting Platforms: Bridging Geographical Distances**

One of the most significant advancements impacting notice periods is the rise of electronic meeting platforms like Zoom, Microsoft Teams, and Google Meet. These platforms facilitate virtual attendance, allowing geographically dispersed shareholders to participate actively in real-time meetings, regardless of location.

Benefits for Notice Periods:

- **Eliminates Travel Time:** Virtual attendance eliminates the need for shareholders to make travel arrangements, a historical justification for extended notice periods. This significantly reduces the timeframe required for pre-meeting logistics, paving the way for shorter notice periods without hindering participation.
- **Increased Accessibility:** Virtual platforms broaden accessibility for shareholders with mobility limitations or those residing in remote locations who previously might have been unable to attend physical meetings. This fosters inclusivity and enhances shareholder engagement in the corporate governance process.

Examples:

- A study by Bsämam et al. (2019) examining shareholder participation in virtual meetings found a significant increase in attendance compared to traditional physical meetings. This highlights the potential of these platforms to overcome geographical barriers and facilitate participation even with shorter notice periods.
- Companies like Tesla and Amazon have successfully leveraged virtual platforms to conduct annual general meetings, demonstrating the effectiveness of this approach in engaging a global shareholder

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base (KPMG, 2022).

### **Secure Online Document Sharing Platforms: Streamlining Information Dissemination**

The reliance on physical mail for disseminating meeting materials has been replaced by secure online document sharing platforms like Dropbox, Google Drive, and Microsoft OneDrive. These platforms offer several advantages over traditional methods:

- **Instantaneous Delivery:** Meeting materials can be uploaded and shared electronically, ensuring immediate access for all shareholders regardless of location. This eliminates delays associated with postal delivery and allows for a more streamlined dissemination process, potentially enabling shorter notice periods.
- **Version Control and Security:** Online platforms enable version control, ensuring all shareholders access the latest and most accurate meeting materials. Additionally, robust security features can safeguard sensitive information and prevent unauthorized access.

Benefits for Notice Periods:

- **Reduced Printing Costs:** Shifting from paper-based materials to online documents reduces printing and distribution costs associated with physical meetings. This can encourage companies to adopt shorter notice periods without incurring additional expenses for communication.
- **Accessibility and Transparency:** Online document sharing platforms enhance transparency and accountability within companies by ensuring all shareholders have equal access to the same information simultaneously. This fosters informed decision-making regardless of the notice period length.

Example:

A study by Adams and Ferreira (2017) explores the positive correlation between investor communication and firm value. By providing timely access to information through secure online platforms, companies can enhance transparency and potentially build trust with shareholders, even when operating with shorter notice periods for meetings.

### **E-voting Systems: Enabling Efficient Decision-Making**

E-voting systems have emerged as a game-changer for shareholder participation in the digital age. These secure online platforms allow shareholders to cast votes electronically during meetings, regardless of their physical location.

Benefits for Notice Periods:

- **Faster Voting Process:** E-voting significantly reduces the time required for traditional paper-based balloting processes. This enables quicker decision-making within meetings, even with shorter notice periods.
- **Increased Accuracy:** E-voting systems minimize the risk of human error associated with manual vote counting. This ensures accurate and transparent voting outcomes, fostering confidence in the process.

Examples:

- Agyekum and Dartey-Baah (2021) highlight the growing adoption of e-voting systems in various jurisdictions. They emphasize the potential of these systems to streamline voting processes and improve efficiency in corporate governance, particularly with shorter notice periods for meetings.

- Companies like Apple and Alphabet (Google) have successfully implemented e-voting systems, allowing shareholders to participate actively in company decisions regardless of their physical location (KPMG, 2022).

### Addressing Concerns: A Holistic Approach

While technology offers significant benefits for shorter notice periods, some concerns remain:

- **Digital Divide:** Not all shareholders have reliable internet access or possess the necessary technological skills to navigate online meeting platforms or e-voting systems (Agyekum & Dartey-Baah, 2021). Companies must address this by offering alternative access methods and potentially conducting basic technology training workshops for shareholders.
- **Cybersecurity Concerns:** Security breaches or manipulation of e-voting systems pose potential risks. Implementing robust cybersecurity measures like data encryption and regular vulnerability assessments

## COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: NOTICE PERIODS AND TECHNOLOGY IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (ZAMBIA & KENYA)

This section expands the analysis of notice periods and technology in corporate governance by examining Zambia and Kenya alongside developed economies with established digital infrastructure. While including the UK provides valuable context, focusing on a jurisdiction with more comparable economic development strengthens the analysis. Here, we consider Singapore, a leading financial hub in Southeast Asia with a well-developed digital infrastructure.

### Notice Period Regulations:

- **Zambia (Companies Act 2017):** Currently mandates a one-size-fits-all approach with a 14-21 day notice period for all shareholder meetings.
- **Kenya (Companies Act 2015):** Offers a differentiated system, prescribing 21 days' notice for AGMs and 14 days for EGMs.
- **Singapore (Companies Act 2006):** Similar to Zambia, Singapore employs a standardized approach, requiring 14 days' notice for general meetings.

### Technological Landscape:

- **Zambia:** Limited digital infrastructure with a growing internet user base. Bridging the digital divide is crucial for inclusive online shareholder engagement.
- **Kenya:** As a developing economy, Kenya has a growing digital infrastructure, but internet access and technological adoption might be more unevenly distributed compared to Singapore.
- **Singapore:** Boasts a well-developed digital infrastructure with high internet penetration rates. This facilitates online access to meeting materials and potentially smoother implementation of shorter notice periods with robust online communication strategies (World Bank, 2023).

### Analysis:

The comparison reveals a spectrum of approaches. While all three countries currently lack differentiated notice period systems, Kenya demonstrates a willingness to move towards a nuanced approach. Singapore, with its established digital infrastructure, offers a valuable example of how technology can facilitate efficient



communication even with standardized notice periods. However, learning from Kenya's experience, Zambia should recognize the importance of addressing the digital divide for inclusive participation in any online communication strategy.

### **Lessons for Zambia:**

- **Differentiated Notice Periods:** Consider a system similar to Kenya's, allowing for shorter notice periods for routine AGMs while maintaining standard periods for complex EGMs.
- **Bridging the Digital Divide:** Prioritize initiatives to increase internet access and offer basic technology training workshops for shareholders.

### **Singapore's Example:**

While Singapore maintains a standardized notice period, their well-developed digital infrastructure suggests online communication strategies like SGX-ST Catalist's platform can be effective in enhancing shareholder participation despite the lack of differentiated notice periods (Singapore Exchange (SGX), 2013).

### **Case Studies: Technological Solutions for Enhanced Shareholder Participation**

This section explores two jurisdictions that have successfully implemented online platforms for meeting notices, potentially leading to increased shareholder participation.

#### **Case 1: Singapore and SGX-ST Catalist**

The Singapore Exchange (SGX) launched Catalist, a platform dedicated to growth companies, in 2006. Recognizing the potential of technology, they implemented a significant change in 2013. Catalist rules mandated electronic dissemination of meeting notices and other corporate communications through their e-commerce platform (Singapore Exchange (SGX), 2013). This shift towards online communication had two key benefits:

- **Reduced Reliance on Physical Mail:** Eliminating physical mail distribution lowered costs for companies and expedited communication with shareholders.
- **Shorter Notice Periods:** Confident in the reach and efficiency of the online platform, Catalist regulations allowed for shortened notice periods for annual general meetings (AGMs) from 21 days to 14 days (Srinivasan, 2014).

#### **Effectiveness:**

Studies suggest a positive impact on shareholder participation, particularly in terms of information access. A 2018 study by Lien and Siah found a significant increase in the number of shareholders accessing meeting materials online compared to the pre-e-filing era. This highlights the effectiveness of online platforms in making information readily available to a wider audience.

However, the study also identified limitations. While online access rose, actual voting participation remained relatively unchanged (Lien & Siah, 2018). This suggests that online platforms alone might not be sufficient to drive active participation. Additional measures, such as educational campaigns or incentives for proxy voting, might be necessary to encourage shareholders to engage beyond simply accessing information (Baysinger & Frigo, 2016).

#### **Comparative Analysis: Notice Periods and Technology in Corporate Governance (UK & Kenya)**

Looking beyond Singapore, it's valuable to consider how other jurisdictions are navigating the interplay between notice periods and technology adoption. Here's a brief comparative analysis of the UK and Kenya:

- United Kingdom (UK): Similar to Zambia's current one-size-fits-all approach, the UK Companies Act 2006 does not differentiate notice periods based on meeting type. However, the UK boasts a well-developed digital infrastructure, which might facilitate the adoption of shorter notice periods with robust online communication strategies like those implemented by Singapore (World Bank, 2023).
- Kenya (Companies Act 2015): Kenya offers a more nuanced approach, differentiating notice periods for AGMs (21 days) and EGMs (14 days). This demonstrates an understanding of the varying complexity of matters addressed at different meeting types. However, as a developing economy with growing technological adoption, Kenya faces a significant digital divide. This necessitates careful consideration when implementing online shareholder engagement tools, ensuring inclusive participation despite uneven internet access (World Bank, 2023).

## Case 2: Estonia and X-Road

Estonia, a pioneer in e-governance, implemented X-Road, a secure data exchange platform, in 2000. X-Road facilitates secure communication between government agencies, businesses, and citizens. Notably, companies can utilize X-Road to distribute meeting notices and other documentation to shareholders electronically (Adams & Bessarabov, 2017). This shift towards online communication offers several advantages:

- Secure Communication: X-Road's robust security features ensure the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive corporate information.
- Convenience: Shareholders can access meeting materials electronically anytime, anywhere.

### Effectiveness:

Studies by Ahn et al. (2011) demonstrate a significant increase in shareholder participation in Estonia compared to pre-e-governance times. This suggests that online platforms can be a powerful tool for fostering engagement. However, the Estonian case highlights the importance of user-friendly authentication systems. Estonia's national ID system allows shareholders to access and verify information with ease, potentially contributing to the observed rise in participation.

### Analysis:

These case studies showcase how online platforms like SGX-ST Catalist and X-Road can enhance shareholder participation. Both Singapore and Estonia witnessed increased access to information, potentially leading to more informed decision-making. However, the cases also highlight the need for a nuanced approach. While online platforms offer convenience and efficiency, additional measures might be necessary to translate access into active participation. Furthermore, considerations like the digital divide and user-friendly authentication systems play a crucial role in ensuring inclusive participation in the digital age of corporate governance.

## RE-EVALUATING NOTICE PERIODS IN ZAMBIA: EMBRACING TECHNOLOGY FOR ENHANCED SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION

The Zambian Companies Act, 2017, mandates companies to provide shareholders with notice periods ranging from 14 to 21 days prior to general meetings [The Companies Act, 2017, No. 10 of 2017, s. 134 & 140]. However, in a rapidly evolving digital landscape, the question arises: are these standardized notice periods still optimal for facilitating effective shareholder participation? This article argues that the current one-size-fits-all approach might hinder engagement, and proposes a differentiated approach based on meeting type, leveraging technological advancements to ensure informed participation with shorter notice periods.

### The Limitations of a Standardized Notice Period

The current 14-21day notice period may have been suitable in an era of physical mail and limited

communication channels. However, advancements in technology have drastically reduced communication barriers. Shareholders can now be readily reached electronically, enabling faster dissemination of information, and potentially facilitating shorter notice periods. Notably, research by Lien and Siah (2018) suggests that online access to meeting materials can significantly increase shareholder awareness, even with shorter notice periods.

Furthermore, a one-size-fits-all approach fails to consider the varying nature of general meetings. Annual General Meetings (AGMs) often address routine matters with readily available information, such as annual reports. In such cases, a longer notice period might not be necessary for informed participation. Conversely, Extraordinary General Meetings (EGMs) often involve complex decisions requiring shareholders to analyse intricate proposals. Here, a longer notice period may be justified to ensure shareholders have adequate time for due diligence.

### **Differentiated Notice Periods: A Path Forward**

This article proposes a differentiated approach to notice periods based on the type of meeting:

- **Annual General Meetings (AGMs):** Considering the routine nature of matters typically addressed at AGMs, and the potential for readily available online information (e.g., annual reports), a shorter notice period of 7-10 days could be considered. This aligns with the findings of Bebchuk et al. (2017) who suggest that shorter notice periods for routine matters can be effective without compromising shareholder participation, particularly when coupled with online access to relevant materials.
- **Extraordinary General Meetings (EGMs):** Given the potentially complex nature of decisions presented at EGMs, a standard or slightly extended notice period (10-14 days) is recommended. This allows shareholders adequate time to analyse proposals and participate meaningfully.

This approach promotes flexibility and caters to the specific needs of each meeting type. Importantly, regardless of the notice period, it is crucial to ensure mandatory online availability of all meeting materials (agendas, reports, proposals) well in advance. This echoes the emphasis placed on online information dissemination by Baysinger and Frigo (2016) as a key driver for shareholder engagement.

### **Technology as a Facilitator for Effective Participation**

Technology plays a critical role in enabling shorter notice periods while safeguarding shareholder involvement. Here are some key considerations:

- **Mandatory Online Availability of Meeting Materials:** As mentioned above, all meeting materials should be readily available online, preferably on a dedicated company website or secure platform. This eliminates reliance on physical mail and ensures shareholders can access information regardless of location or time constraints.
- **Online Information Sessions or Q&A Forums:** Even with shorter notice, technology can facilitate efficient communication. Companies can host online information sessions or Q&A forums to address shareholder inquiries and provide additional context for proposals. This approach builds on the success of virtual shareholder meetings, which have gained traction during the COVID-19 pandemic (Klein, 2020).

## **COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF SHORTENED NOTICE PERIODS FOR SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS**

The potential benefits of shortening notice periods for shareholder meetings must be weighed against the associated costs. Here's a breakdown of both sides:

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**Benefits:**

- **Increased Efficiency:** Shorter notice periods enable faster convening of meetings, potentially leading to swifter corporate decision-making. This aligns with the findings of Mishra and Mukhopadhyay (2018) who suggest that shorter notice periods can expedite strategic decision-making for companies operating in dynamic environments.
- **Improved Shareholder Participation:** Technology can increase accessibility for geographically dispersed shareholders, fostering greater participation. A study by Lien and Siah (2018) found a significant rise in shareholder access to meeting materials when online platforms were introduced. This improved accessibility can translate into more informed voting and potentially better corporate governance (Ahn et al., 2011).
- **Cost Savings:** Shifting from physical mail to online communication can lead to cost savings on printing, postage, and document distribution. These savings can be significant, especially for companies with large shareholder bases.

**Costs:**

- **Technological Infrastructure Investment:** Implementing a robust online platform for meetings, e-voting, and secure document sharing requires upfront investment. This includes costs associated with software, hardware, and cybersecurity measures.
- **Cybersecurity Risks:** Online platforms and e-voting systems are susceptible to cyberattacks that could disrupt meetings, manipulate votes, or compromise sensitive information. Mitigating these risks necessitates ongoing investment in cybersecurity solutions and training for personnel.

**Balancing Costs and Benefits:**

The optimal balance between costs and benefits depends on several factors, including:

- **Company Size:** For large companies with geographically dispersed shareholders, the potential benefits of increased participation and cost savings might outweigh the cost of establishing a secure online platform.
- **Meeting Type:** As discussed previously, shorter notice periods might be more suitable for AGMs with routine matters, where costs associated with online infrastructure can be justified by the potential efficiency gains. For complex EGMs, the cost of ensuring secure e-voting and robust information dissemination might necessitate a longer notice period.
- **Regulatory Environment:** The regulatory environment plays a crucial role. Countries like Estonia, with well-developed digital infrastructure and strong cybersecurity frameworks, might be better positioned to adopt shorter notice periods and online voting systems.

**ADDRESSING POTENTIAL CHALLENGES OF SHORTENED NOTICE PERIODS**

While transitioning to shorter notice periods for shareholder meetings offers promising benefits, it's crucial to acknowledge and address potential challenges. Here, we explore two key concerns: the digital divide and cybersecurity risks.

**The Digital Divide:**

A significant challenge in Zambia, as in many developing countries, is the existence of a digital divide. Not all shareholders may have reliable internet access or possess the technological devices necessary to participate in

online meetings or access information electronically. This can disproportionately exclude certain demographics, hindering the very participation we aim to encourage.

### **Bridging the Gap:**

To ensure inclusive participation despite the digital divide, several solutions can be implemented:

- **Alternative Access Methods:** Companies should offer alternative access methods for non-tech-savvy or digitally excluded shareholders. This could include providing printed copies of meeting materials or designating physical locations (e.g., company offices, community centres) where shareholders can access information and participate in voting (if applicable) through dedicated personnel.
- **Technology Training Workshops:** Companies can conduct basic technology training workshops for shareholders, familiarizing them with the functionalities of online platforms used for accessing meeting materials, attending virtual meetings, or participating in e-voting (if applicable). This approach builds on the work of Fong et al. (2016) who highlight the importance of digital literacy training for effective e-governance initiatives.

### **Cybersecurity Concerns:**

The shift towards online platforms and e-voting introduces cybersecurity risks that must be mitigated. These include:

- **Data Breaches:** Sensitive shareholder data (e.g., voting records, personal information) could be compromised through cyberattacks on online platforms.
- **Manipulation of Votes:** Online voting systems could be vulnerable to manipulation, potentially leading to fraudulent outcomes and undermining shareholder confidence.

### **Securing the Digital Space:**

Several measures can be taken to bolster cybersecurity:

- **Robust Cybersecurity Measures:** Implementing robust cybersecurity measures on online platforms is crucial. This includes data encryption, secure login protocols (e.g., multi-factor authentication), and regular penetration testing to identify and address vulnerabilities.
- **Independent Audits and Vulnerability Assessments:** For companies implementing e-voting systems, independent audits and regular vulnerability assessments are essential to ensure system integrity and prevent vote manipulation. These assessments, as highlighted by Rahman et al. (2017), play a critical role in building trust in e-voting platforms.
- **Educating Shareholders:** Educating shareholders on best practices for online security and responsible e-voting procedures is vital. This can involve workshops or online resources that emphasize the importance of strong passwords, responsible use of voting credentials, and reporting any suspicious activity to the company.

## **POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCED SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN ZAMBIA**

This article has explored the potential benefits of adopting a differentiated approach to notice periods for shareholder meetings in Zambia, leveraging technology to facilitate efficient and inclusive participation. Based on this analysis, the following policy recommendations are proposed:

### **Amend the Companies Act No. 10 of 2017:**

The current one-size-fits-all approach to notice periods in the Companies Act (2017) hinders optimal shareholder engagement. Amending the Act to introduce a nuanced approach is crucial. This could involve:

- **Differentiated Notice Periods:** Enable differentiated notice periods based on the type of meeting. As discussed earlier, shorter notice periods (e.g., 7-10 days) could be permissible for AGMs that address routine matters, while standard or slightly extended periods (e.g., 10-14 days) could be maintained for EGMs involving complex decisions. This aligns with best practices observed in jurisdictions like Singapore (Lien & Siah, 2018).
- **Online Availability of Meeting Materials:** Specify minimum requirements for the online availability of meeting materials. This should mandate companies to make all relevant documents (agendas, reports, proposals) readily accessible on a secure and user-friendly platform well in advance of the meeting, regardless of the notice period.

### **Develop Clear Guidelines for Technology Use:**

The Zambian regulatory landscape should evolve to accommodate the use of technology for shareholder engagement. This necessitates the development of clear guidelines or regulations for companies regarding:

- **Disseminating Meeting Information Electronically:** These guidelines should outline best practices for disseminating meeting information electronically, ensuring accessibility and transparency.
- **Facilitating Participation Through Online Platforms:** Regulations should address the use of online platforms for virtual meetings, Q&A sessions, and potentially, e-voting (if deemed appropriate). This includes outlining security protocols and data protection measures.
- **Capacity Building for Companies:** Regulatory bodies can offer educational resources or workshops to equip companies with the knowledge and skills necessary for effective online shareholder engagement.

### **Emphasize Stakeholder Engagement and Capacity Building:**

Bridging the digital divide is essential for inclusive participation. Policymakers should:

- **Promote Stakeholder Engagement:** Encourage ongoing dialogue between regulators, industry players, and civil society organizations to develop solutions for addressing the digital divide and promoting digital literacy among shareholders, especially those in rural areas.
- **Support Capacity Building Initiatives:** Allocate resources and support initiatives that provide basic technology training to shareholders, familiarizing them with online platforms and empowering them to participate actively in the digital age of corporate governance.

## **THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF SHORTER NOTICE PERIODS AND TECHNOLOGY ON FIRM PERFORMANCE**

While this article primarily focuses on the potential benefits of shorter notice periods and technology for shareholder participation, it's also valuable to explore the possible impact on firm performance.

### **Theoretical Linkages:**

- **Enhanced Decision-Making:** Shorter notice periods, coupled with efficient online communication strategies, could facilitate swifter decision-making by management. This agility could enable companies to capitalize on fleeting market opportunities or respond more effectively to emerging challenges.
- **Increased Shareholder Engagement:** Improved information access and participation opportunities through online platforms might lead to a more engaged shareholder base. This could benefit firms by fostering trust, aligning shareholder interests with long-term company goals, and potentially attracting new investors (Baysinger & Frigo, 2016).
- **Reduced Costs:** Transitioning from traditional mail-based communication to online platforms can lead to cost savings for companies. Additionally, shorter notice periods may translate to lower logistical costs associated with physical shareholder meetings.

### **Empirical Evidence:**

However, the relationship between shorter notice periods, technology adoption, and firm performance remains an area of ongoing research. While some studies suggest potential benefits, others highlight the need for further investigation:

- **Limited Evidence:** Studies like Bebchuk et al. (2017) offer limited empirical evidence to conclusively demonstrate a direct causal link between shorter notice periods and improved firm performance.
- **Moderating Factors:** The effectiveness of shorter notice periods might be influenced by factors like company size, industry, and shareholder demographics. For instance, complex decisions in large, multinational corporations might require longer notice periods for in-depth shareholder analysis compared to routine matters in smaller firms.

### **Research Opportunities:**

The nascent nature of this field presents exciting research opportunities. Future studies could explore:

- **Longitudinal Analyses:** Long-term studies examining the impact of implementing shorter notice periods with technology on firm performance metrics like stock price or profitability.
- **Comparative Studies:** Comparative analyses across different jurisdictions with varying notice period regulations and technological landscapes to identify best practices and potential challenges.
- **Shareholder Sentiment Surveys:** Studies gauging shareholder sentiment towards shorter notice periods and the effectiveness of online communication platforms to understand their potential influence on firm-shareholder relationships.

## **CONCLUSION**

### **Embracing Technology for Enhanced Shareholder Participation in Zambia and Beyond**

This article has challenged the traditional, one-size-fits-all approach to notice periods for shareholder meetings in Zambia. The limitations of this approach become increasingly apparent in the digital age, where advancements in technology offer new avenues for efficient communication and informed shareholder participation. Studies by Lien and Siah (2018) and Ahn et al. (2011) demonstrate how online access to meeting materials can significantly increase shareholder awareness and engagement, paving the way for shorter notice periods without compromising participation.

However, embracing technology for shorter notice periods necessitates addressing potential challenges. The digital divide, where not all shareholders have reliable internet access or technological devices, poses a significant barrier to inclusivity. Solutions like providing alternative access methods (printed materials, designated physical locations) and offering basic technology training workshops can bridge this gap, as advocated by Fong et al. (2016). Furthermore, robust cybersecurity measures, regular vulnerability assessments, and shareholder education on online security practices are crucial to mitigate cyber threats and maintain trust in online platforms.

By implementing a nuanced approach to notice periods, coupled with robust technological infrastructure and initiatives to bridge the digital divide, Zambia can foster a more dynamic and inclusive corporate governance environment. Shorter notice periods for routine matters (AGMs) can lead to swifter decision-making, while longer periods can be maintained for complex decisions requiring in-depth shareholder analysis (EGMs). This approach aligns with best practices observed in jurisdictions like Singapore (Lien & Siah, 2018). Ultimately, leveraging technology empowers shareholders by increasing accessibility to information and facilitating participation in the decision-making process. This can contribute to improved corporate governance, potentially leading to a more robust and competitive corporate sector in Zambia.

The findings of this research extend beyond the Zambian context. Many developing countries grapple with similar challenges in modernizing corporate governance practices. The proposed framework, advocating for differentiated notice periods, robust online communication strategies, and addressing the digital divide, holds promise for broader applicability. This research can stimulate discussions about revising outdated notice period regulations and embracing technology to enhance shareholder participation in a globalized corporate environment.

While this article provides a framework for a future-oriented approach to shareholder engagement in Zambia, further research is necessary. Future studies could explore the optimal balance between notice period, information accessibility, and shareholder participation in the Zambian context. Additionally, research could delve deeper into the effectiveness of online information sessions and Q&A forums in facilitating informed decision-making under shorter notice periods. As technology continues to evolve, ongoing research will be crucial to ensure corporate governance practices remain efficient, inclusive, and secure in the digital age. By fostering a culture of innovation and embracing technological advancements, Zambia and other developing nations can create a more dynamic and empowered landscape for corporate governance.

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