Necessity and Sufficiency of Belief, Justification and Truth as Conditions for Knowledge

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ABSTRACT

Philosophers have always considered knowledge in an epistemological perspective to entail propositional knowledge, not skill acquisition or possession or acquaintance. In order for information to qualify as knowledge, it must meet three necessary and sufficient conditions; belief, justification and truth. A necessary condition in knowledge is one without which we cannot validly claim to know. A necessary condition is that which offers enough basis to guarantee the existence of knowledge. However, some scholars have cast doubt as to whether these three conditions are necessary and sufficient for knowledge. To justify their claims, they present scenarios in which at least one of the conditions is absent and yet knowledge is attained. The objective of this paper was to examine the nature and validity of the three classical conditions for knowledge. The study was library-based and involved an examination of relevant texts by various scholars. The paper examined each of the arguments for or against JTB conception of knowledge and demonstrated the insufficiency of the counter arguments presented by critiques of the JTB conditions. This study posited that each of the conditions is necessary for knowledge, but none is sufficient by itself. They are collectively sufficient for knowledge. As such, absence of one limits the possibility of knowledge acquisition. Belief is a necessary condition because it enables the subject to have an awareness of the truth value (truth or falsity) of their ideas. A conviction that an idea is true or false forms the basis of one's understanding of it. Truth is necessary for knowledge because when we claim knowledge of something, we must demonstrate that we really know it and the only way to do this is by proving that our belief is in agreement with the state of affairs. Further, justification cannot be wished away because it is what makes our beliefs worth having. In its absence, it would not be possible to distinguish between a belief that is worth holding and one that should be discarded because there would be no reason whatsoever to reject any belief or conviction.

Keywords*: Knowledge, Belief, Justification, Truth, Necessity, Sufficiency.

INTRODUCTION

An investigation into the nature of knowledge, specifically, knowledge as Justified True Belief, was necessary in this study because various scholars have cast doubt into the necessity and sufficiency of one or more of these conditions. If these conditions, which have been widely accepted by epistemologists as valid, are determined to be unnecessary or insufficient, then one can never claim to know anything at all. Human claims to knowledge, therefore, would be fallacious. It was therefore important to examine these conditions individually as well as logically investigate the foundations of critiqued advanced against them.

The term, "knowledge" has been used in a variety of ways to denote different states of information or skill acquisition. However, knowledge in the strict sense of the term can only be validly applied in one of these ways. Firstly, knowledge has been used to describe possession of a certain skill (know how) such as driving,

swimming, playing football, carpentry, etc. (Angier, 2010). Secondly, one may refer to acquaintance as knowledge and this occurs when someone is familiar with a place, or person (know of) (Lemos, 2020). Familiarity of this kind does not necessarily require direct encounter or experience, but can be formed through third parties, e.g. you can know someone through hearing about them from some other person. According to Lemos (2020), the third kind of knowledge is phenomenal knowledge and is characterized by an individual forming an idea about something based on their experience of this thing. For instance, one can say that Jane knows the taste of ice cream because she has consumed it before. The fourth type of knowledge is propositional knowledge (know that) and it involves declarative sentences (statements) which declare that something is or is not. In other words, propositions declare something (affirm or negate) the state of affairs.

The first three types of knowledge are not knowledge in the proper sense of the term, hence, not relevant in this research. They are only experiential (and essentially subjective), cannot be argued for linguistically nor transferred verbally. Verbally sharing one's experience of ice cream tastes is not similar to how the same ice cream actually tastes. Despite the importance of experiential knowledge (demonstrated by the first three types of knowledge mentioned above), this study focuses on propositional knowledge because it can be interpersonally communicated and acquired through evidence-based investigation and also argumentation.

Propositional knowledge can be defined as Justified True Belief. This definition contains within itself three components that every body of information must have in order for it to be categorized as knowledge. In essence, then, knowledge can be said to be a body of information which meets these three conditions which are regarded as necessary and sufficient (Hetherington, 2016). In the absence of any of them, the body of information remains to be just that, and cannot be accepted as knowledge. Among the earliest proponents of this definition of knowledge is Plato (427-347 BCE) in his dialogue, *Theaetetus, in* which Socrates and two interlocutors (Theaetetus and Theodorus) ultimately conclude that knowledge consists in justified true beliefs (Plato, 2019). One cannot know p and not believe p, they cannot know p if they do not have sufficient reason(s) to hold that p, and they cannot know p if it is not true that p.

The concept of knowledge as justified true belief can be traced to Socrates 'conversation with Theaetetus concerning the nature of expertise. In the conversation, Socrates posts the question, "what is knowledge?" to Theaetetus, and this prompts the discussion. Three responses are given by Theaetetus, each emerging from the rejection of the preceding one.

The first response given by Theaetetus is that knowledge is perception. Socrates critiques and rejects this description of knowledge by arguing that knowledge cannot be simply equated with perception only. Perception has been proven to be fallible, and deceptive as well. In essence, acceptance of this definition would be acceptance of false beliefs as knowledge. Socrates posits that empirical observation may help to constitute knowledge, but by itself, it is insufficient to provide it. Our observations and interpretation of things are mediated by context such that different people may experience a similar experience but draw different conclusions about it (Plato, 2019). For instance, if a blacksmith emerges from his workplace and encounter a breeze, they would consider it cool while someone from a chilli cave would consider the same breeze warm. Based on these grounds, Socrates rejects this definition of knowledge (Lisi, 2020).

According to Barceló-Aspeitia and González-Varela (2023), the second definition offered by Theaetetus is that knowledge is true judgment. Theaetetus triggers an epistemological discussion with Socrates on the nature of false beliefs, if at all they exist. This definition, according to Socrates, is still incoherent because there are instances which constitute true judgment but are not knowledge. For instance, if one accidentally (without reason or proof) forms a belief about something and it is indeed true, they cannot be said to have knowledge.

For the third time, Theaetetus attempts to describe knowledge as true belief with an account (*logos*). The

finding that one can have true beliefs which do not necessarily constitute knowledge leads Theaetetus to add the component of account to his description of knowledge (Lisi, 2020). Addition of the clause "with an account" points to the fact that an extra component is required in addition to true belief to make it knowledge. This component is proof or justification for holding a belief true. The belief, apart from being true, must be supported by evidence or a rational explanation which distinguishes it from mere opinion or just any other belief (Cornford, 2018). This account of knowledge has been widely accepted by scholars, not only in the ancient age of philosophy, but up to date (Lemos, 2020). This, however, does not mean that the agreement is unanimous. Some scholars have objected to it and argue that it is insufficient and to some extent, incoherent.

This discussion aimed at examining whether indeed Belief, Justification, and Truth are necessary and sufficient for knowledge as posited by Plato and other subsequent epistemologists. Other scholars who have objected to this definition of knowledge citing limitations in each of the three conditions also had their arguments examined for validity in this section. Therefore, it is essential to examine arguments for and counter arguments for Belief, Justification and Truth as conditions for knowledge.

The research did not conduct an empirical study, rather, it was qualitative and it engaged in conceptual analysis of various works done by different scholars who both advocate for the validity of the JTB conditions as well as those done by critiques of these classical conditions.

NECESSITY AND SUFFICIENCY OF BELIEF, JUSTIFICATION AND TRUTH AS CONDITIONS FOR KNOWLEDGE

Hetherington (2016) makes it clear that necessary and sufficient conditions are ones which must be present and at the same time, enough for something to obtain. In pursuit of knowledge, epistemologists argue that belief, justification, and truth are individually necessary but collectively sufficient for knowledge to occur. This means that each condition is necessary for knowledge, but not sufficient if taken individually.

a. Necessity and Sufficiency of Belief

The belief condition refers to a mental condition in which an individual is convinced of the truth value of a particular thing. Belief occurs when we have some conviction (could be little to absolute) that something is or is not the case. In empirical investigations, beliefs occur when one encounters a phenomenon with their senses and mentally attributes meaning to their perceptions (Schukraft, 2017). For instance, one may form the belief that thunder only occurs when there is rain because the two events occur simultaneously. This belief may be accurate or false and no amount of conviction would justify it as accurate when it is not. According to Smithies (2019), belief arises from consciousness and subsequently, this consciousness culminates in knowledge. In absence of consciousness, we would not be aware of any object of belief, and ultimately knowledge. When one is conscious, they are aware of their surroundings, and can form beliefs base on what their senses offer them as perceptions. Consciousness, therefore, is a necessary element of belief and knowledge because it allows one to be alive and in charge of their mental processes.

When one encounters a proposition, there are three possible reactions towards it; acceptance as true, rejection as false, or deferment of judgment due to lack of sufficient or convincing proof. In all of these instances, whichever belief one forms will be influenced by availability of evidence as well as how much convincing power this evidence presents (Lemos, 2020). Nevertheless we will still formulate beliefs, whether or not there is sufficient evidence to support the claim.

Belief, therefore, can be understood as a propositional attitude that is characterized by the relationship between the proposition and the subject (the person seeking to know). This relationship ranges from firm

and absolute conviction to cautious as well as tentative acceptance (Lemos 2020). One may ask, is there any level or intensity of belief that is required for knowledge to occur, and some other level which does not meet the requirement for knowledge? The answer to this, one may argue, is that belief needs to be firm because it is dependent on the evidence availed concerning the subject. This means that acceptance of belief is dependent on the justification condition. The stronger the evidence, the stronger the belief, hence, an individual would be justified in believing the accuracy of an experience strongly supported by proof.

The belief condition in knowledge asserts the idea that knowledge is not a matter of mere true belief, but rather is a matter of belief that is justified, or warranted. This means that knowledge is more than just accepting something as true—it is accepting something as true because it is supported by evidence (Peddle, 2021). In other words, knowledge is based on a rational, logical process of evaluating facts and evidence, rather than just blindly accepting something as true (Lemos, 2021). This condition is important because it helps us to distinguish between knowledge and mere opinion, and it encourages us to seek out evidence and reasoning to back up our beliefs. Belief is formed when one encounters something and a concept of the experienced thing is implanted in their mind. A belief, in this case, involves an imprint of something in the mind of an individual that can be supported by evidence of the individual's experience.

Knowledge is a product of a conscious process. Beliefs are formed after perception or sometimes through analytical processes (Mukhopadhyay, 2019). Firstly, when one experiences an occurrence through their five senses, they formulate beliefs concerning these perceptions. For instance, when I sense heat, I form the belief that a lot of it can cause damage to my being. I will be convinced of the accuracy of this belief due to sufficient evidence gathered from various encounters with heat. Secondly, through analysis of the universe and how it works, St. Thomas Aquinas formulated a cosmology-based defence for the existence of God. Despite not being able to encounter any deity by way of the senses, Aquinas used analysis to formulate this belief. He had to be aware of the laws of the universe and formulate a belief based on this perception (Arp, 2016).

Belief is a necessary condition for knowledge because without it one would not be aware of the object of knowledge (Foley, 2012). Gettier (1963) acknowledges that knowledge acquisition begins when we form a concept of a particular entity or being and ascribe meaning to it. We believe that it is of a particular kind, and not of another due to perception available to us at that given time. Despite its necessity, belief by itself is not a sufficient condition for knowledge. We have beliefs that turn out to be true and yet cannot be considered knowledge. For instance, if I believe that my preferred presidential candidate will win the Kenyan 2027 presidential elections and it happens as I believed, it would be fallacious to say that I knew it. This is despite the fact that it happened exactly as I believed it would. Knowledge must require belief because you cannot know what you do not believe (belief must include conscious conviction that something is true), however, not every belief is knowledge (Rescher & Vinci, 1975).

Despite belief being considered a necessary condition for knowledge, it is not synonymous with knowledge because it is fallible while knowledge is infallible. Belief involves holding something to be true or factual based on evidential grounds available to the knower while knowing involves possession of information that is an accurate description of the actual state of affairs. A belief is subject to change or refutation but it is impossible to refute knowledge because the latter would involve denial of things as they are, which would be fallacious.

b. Objection to Belief as a condition for Knowledge

Various scholars, such as Farkas (2015), Radford (1966, 1990), Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (2013), as well as Baumann (2019), have argued that the tripartite conception of knowledge is erroneous because one of the conditions, belief, is not necessary. They attempt to present cases in which one may still argue for knowledge even in the absence of belief. In essence, these philosophers think that there is need to redefine

knowledge and its conditions.

1. Farkas' Theory of Knowledge without Belief

Farkas (2015) argues that the conventional description of knowledge contains within itself a provision of an attitude, which is belief. When one encounters a proposition, he argues, in order for them to claim that they know it, they must believe it first. This means that knowledge must always occur when one is convinced of the truth or accuracy of a proposition. He presents scenarios which can be considered knowledge processes where knowledge comes first, then belief later. If his theses are accepted, then it would mean that the JTB criterion is false.

Farkas agrees with Williamson's (2000) claim that knowledge can be broken down into independent components such as belief justification and truth. As such, it would be impossible to isolate a mental state (belief) and define it as one of the components for knowing.

According to Farkas (2015), a certain type of access to information attained and kept in an appropriate manner may be sufficient for knowledge, not necessarily involving belief. Belief is one of the ways one gains and stores information, but not the only one. Supposing two people, Inga and Otto, want to go to a museum (Museum of Modern Art- MoMA). Inga recalls the location of the museum and sets off while Otto has severe memory loss and relies on information on his notebook for directions. Most scholars, as Clark and Chalmers (1998), in their work, *The Extended Mind,* would argue that Otto has belief that the Museum is on 53rd street because they looked it up in the notebook and were convinced of the accuracy of this location. Therefore, both Otto and Inga have belief on the accuracy of the museum's location. Farkan thinks that this conclusion is mistaken and that Otto knows the location without believing it.

Farkas (2016) argues that it is more plausible to attribute knowledge than belief to Otto because his mind is completely oblivious of any memory he may have had of the museum and he gets the information (which is factual) immediately he consults the notebook. The contents of the notebook do not constitute belief because it must be a mental state. That means that Otto acquires knowledge directly from the notebook and does not have to formulate beliefs in his mind. If he formulates the belief that the museum is on the 53rd street, it will be only after he has acquired the knowledge.

2. Critique of Farkas' Objection to the Role of Belief in Knowledge

A critical assessment of Farkas' arguments led to the following conclusion; that his understanding of knowledge without belief is erroneous. Firstly, it is not logically correct to claim that Otto acquires knowledge without first forming a belief. For him to consult the notebook to establish the whereabouts of the museum, he must have had the belief that the information in the notebook was factual. Otherwise, he would not have trusted the directions. Knowledge must always involve a level of conviction that a certain proposition is accurate, otherwise, we would reject or suspend judgment on the matter. This critique is consistent with how Russell (2022), Lemos (2020), and Rescher (2003) describe the process of knowledge acquisition. The process is not random but intentional and requires an encounter with something before a belief is formed. This is a necessary phase of knowing.

One can even go further to interrogate the state under which the notebook was written. If Otto was the author of the notebook before his memory was wiped out, he had already possessed knowledge of the location of this museum. This knowledge must have involved acquisition of information (probably through the senses) on the location, formation of a belief that the 53rd street was the actual spot, and justified this belief by way of justification (observation, coherence of ideas, etc.). Therefore, revisiting the notebook was just a reminder of what he had forgotten. If Otto had decided not to consult the notebook and look it up on the internet or consult someone else, they would still have belief that the information is accurate because

they trust the source. Either way, knowledge of the museum's location must have involved formulation of conviction that it was located on 53rd street.

Additionally, claiming that knowledge comes before a belief is formed is fallacious. It is clear, to any attentive mind that knowledge is distinct from belief, but the former cannot exist without the latter. Knowledge acquisition involves conscious mental processes that seek to understand the universe in which we live. According to Audi (2010), our beliefs are formed after conscious experiences that create concepts in our mind. Justification of these ideas is also a deliberate process which involves seeking evidence to prove that our beliefs are true. In essence, therefore, one may argue that belief is indispensable (Goldman & McGrath, 2015). Mental awareness of a proposition, therefore, precedes knowledge of the proposition. For example, a mentally challenged person is usually absolved blame for wrongdoing because they lack consciousness or awareness of their actions. A sane individual, on the other hand, is fully responsible for human actions because they are fully conscious of their choices and actions. For the former to be blameworthy, they must be aware and understand what they do, but since this is not the case, they cannot be judged. Therefore, we cannot claim that they know the moral value of their actions.

Farkas, one may conclude, offers a weak justification for the claim that belief is not a necessary condition for knowledge. Assessment of his thesis does not offer clear and distinct scenarios which prove beyond reasonable doubt that knowledge is possible without involvement of a mental state that is belief.

3. Collin Radford's Critique of Belief

In his work, *Knowledge: by examples,* Radford (1966) presents cases where individuals correctly respond to questions through guessing the answers then later realizing that they had, at some point previously, known these answers to be true but could not recall them during the exam. In this case, someone will answer a question correctly but not believe that they are correct at the time. Radford claims that this is an appropriate demonstration of knowledge without belief.

The following example (used by Radford) suffices to demonstrate his point. Supposing Jean is questioned on the exact date that Elizabeth I and James I died and he answers that Elizabeth I died in 1603 and James I in 1625 (which are the correct answers). Jean is not certain that this answers are correct, in fact, he is fairly certain that they are wrong and probably some other answers are the right ones. He had learnt it at some point but it was forgotten by the time of the questioning.

The question arises, "does Jean have knowledge that Elizabeth I died in 1603 and James I in 1625 at the time of answering?" Radford replies in the affirmative. Firstly, he argues, Jean did not get these answers by sheer chance, but through previous training or learning that exposed him to the dates. However, he had forgotten that he had learnt them. This means that his loss of memory can only be associated with remembering that he learnt the dates, not the dates themselves. Therefore, Jean knows that the deaths of Elizabeth I and James I occurred in 1603 and 1625 respectfully (Armstrong, 1969).

Radford's example, according to him, demonstrates that belief is not a necessary condition for knowledge. In essence, he argues, one may know without believing that he knows or their information is correct. (Radford, 1966) This is contrary to the tripartite conception of knowledge which would require one to hold a belief about something in order for them to be considered knowledgeable. Those who hold that being sure that one knows something (belief) is a necessary condition for knowledge, he argues, are mistaken. These people would argue that, if Jean claimed, "I know the date of death of both Elizabeth I and James I," he would have been incorrect and improper. However, for Radford, this statement would be correct but improper because he was not aware that he knew.

Radford (1966) argues that there is a difference between knowing something (*p*) and knowing that we know

p. In Jean's case, he knows *p* but does not know that he knows *p*. This does not make him ignorant of *p*. If Jean had claimed to know *p*, it would have been improper from a moral point of view (claiming to be knowledgeable while not being sure or believing that he knows) but not an epistemological one (he possesses the knowledge, whether he is conscious of it or not).

4. Radford's Misconception of the Belief Condition

Armstrong (1969) evaluates Radford's argument and concludes that he (Radford) is mistaken in referring to Jean's case as an occurrence of knowledge without belief. In fact, Armstrong argues, if Jean has knowledge that *p*, the he also has belief that *p*. If, for instance, Jean's guess would have been the year 1306 (Elizabeth I's death) instead of 1603, one would argue that this is not a case of knowledge but that of false belief. This error would be attributed to a faulty memory trace that got the figures wrong. Scholars who advocate for the validity of JTB would disagree that it is a false belief because Jean admitted to not believing it, however, the fact that Radford thinks that if it was correct it would constitute knowledge, it is only logical that he admits the error as a case of false belief.

The guesses that Jean gave to the questions, one can argue, are in fact driven a weak sense of belief, otherwise, he would not have uttered them. One can compare this case with one where an individual is afraid of making a categorical declaration due to fear of failure or being wrong. Instead, they claim that they do not have certainty of the accuracy of their answer but have a faint or weak sense that it could be the right answer. When the individual gets the answer right, they will claim that they knew it all along. However, if they get it wrong, their claim that they did not know will be considered accurate.

Radford, therefore, fails to offer a compelling counter-example of possession of knowledge that excludes belief. A correct guess remains to be just that, and cannot qualify to be knowledge because it lacks an element of consciousness or awareness of the fact. If someone was taught something and they forget about it, at that particular moment, they cannot claim to know it because it is not in their consciousness. They will lack justification for holding it to be knowledge. They cannot give adequate reasons why they think their answer is valid if they fail to offer a logical explanation for it. However, if they can recall it, they will have reason to refer to it as a justified or true belief because of the availability of evidence.

One would be justified in refuting Radford's claim that knowledge does not necessarily require belief by examining the nature of belief, and subsequently knowledge. Firstly, belief may be formed after an encounter with a phenomenon or entity, through analysis of ideas, or sometimes through well demonstrated or supported intuitions (as demonstrated by Lemos (2020)). A physical encounter will lead to formation of concepts and judgment about the experience. One will then formulate a belief out of it. For example, we may watch a video recording that shows someone breaking into a house and carrying away property. This observation will lead us to form the belief that the person breaking into the house is a thief. This belief may later be proven true or false after investigations. Secondly, a belief through analysis is formed when we examine a situation and infer something that was not immediately experienced from it. For instance, we may infer from the case above that the thief is experienced in crimes of this kind or they had knowledge of the layout of the premises. Beliefs from intuition are not logically justifiable because we do not have facts to back them up, but cannot be dismissed because they are sometimes used to make judgment. For example, I may have a strong feeling that someone is a thief but have no proof or reason to lead me to this conclusion. This belief may later be proven to be false, nevertheless it remains to be a belief that the answers were accurate. The question should not be whether Jean actually believed that *p*, rather, it should be about the magnitude or intensity of the conviction or belief.

5. Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's Advocacy for Knowledge without Belief

Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (2013) begin by arguing that epistemologists who claim that knowledge

must entail belief do not offer adequate arguments to support their conclusions. They only make assumptions and expect it to be as they imagine it. The arguments by epistemologists are heavily reliant on lack of sufficient evidence to show the irrelevance of belief, as opposed to arguments for the indispensability of belief. In their work, '*Knowing that P without Believing that P'* they offer five counter examples of cases where knowledge is attained without a corresponding belief. These examples, they argue were designed to elicit reactions from students (not philosophers) at the University of Wisconsin. The respondents, therefore, were not clearly informed on the distinction between the various senses of the term 'to know' and the interviewer substituted the term 'belief' with 'know.' Each participant was a passer-by and was given a candy bar in exchange for filling out the questionnaire.

The first example involves a demonstration of skill or expertise without having corresponding knowledge. An individual such as a musician or chef demonstrate high proficiency levels in their work and do not necessarily hold beliefs corresponding to each of their skills or expertise. Knowledge demonstrated by these professionals may have been acquired over a period of time through experience as well as practice. In this case, these individuals may be said to have knowledge of their craft but lack corresponding beliefs. Plato's (2019) description of *techne* corresponds to this kind of expertise.

Secondly, an individual acquires information through the senses, acting on it and making informed decisions without being conscious of their activities. For example, a bus driver used to a particular route is told that the usual route will be blocked and that he has to use an alternative road. The following day, he forgets that the road is closed and keeps on driving along the same route, failing to adhere to advise given to him. This driver, the respondents argued, knows the route, even when not conscious of it. This demonstrates a level of knowledge and understanding that is not compatible with the conventional JTB criterion.

One may claim, in this case, that belief is always present in our pursuit of knowledge, regardless of whether we acknowledge it or not. In Radford's (1966) case, Jean does not acknowledge that he believes that *p*, however, it is clear that he had some belief or conviction, however limited, that *p*. Otherwise, the correct answers could not be picked from the subconscious randomly. This correctness and attribution of knowledge to Jean's answers, therefore, cannot be attributed to randomness and lack of conviction.

Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (2013) present the third example in which individuals have within themselves biases or stereotypes that affect their actions. A case of a teacher who initially assumes that students involved in athletics are less intelligent than the non-athletic ones is presented. She always engages the former in less-thought-provoking tasks and the latter in highly intellectual discussions because of this bias. However, she later finds out that intelligence does not depend on the athleticism of an individual. Nevertheless, she continuous to act discriminately with these two groups of students. This implies that even after forming a belief that intelligence is not determined by athleticism or lack thereof, the teacher still acts as if the athletic students are less intelligent. The scholars interpret this as proof that one can believe something but still act contrary to it. Majority of the respondents argued that the teacher knew but did not believe that intelligent was not a matter of being athletic or not, while a minority argued that the teacher believed and knew it.

In the fourth case, Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (2013) present a scenario in which an individual may hold beliefs or attitudes which contradict each other and therefore experiences cognitive dissonance and discomfort arising from this contradiction. Nevertheless, they will act in ways that are in conflict with their consciously held beliefs and attitudes. In this example, two friends watch a horror movie in which aliens lay eggs and require in order for their eggs to hatch. One of them gets uncomfortable watching the movie and they decide to go to the movie shop to purchase a new one. As they leave, one of them fetches drinking water from the tap and the other, visible affected by the movie they just watched, knocks down the glass of water (the assumption is that he thought the water would be contaminated by alien eggs). The respondents involved were questioned on whether the individual who knocked down the glass knew that water would

flow from the tap, and majority answered in the affirmative (that the individual had knowledge, while the minority argued that he believed it. This, one may conclude, is evidence that the actions of these individuals are informed by implicit knowledge domiciled in their subconscious.

The fifth example involves a man's not being convinced that the wife is cheating on him but he has not acquired sufficient evidence to be fully convinced of this fact. The wife is indeed cheating, but the man does not believe it, even when he gets subtle hints. When the respondents were asked whether the man knew his wife was cheating on him, most of them respondent in the affirmative. This, according to Schulz and Schwitzgebel, implies the existence of implicit knowledge in the individual's subconscious.

6. Critique of Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's conception of knowledge without belief.

A critical examination of the five counter-examples demonstrates that Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel present cases which do not adequately capture the true nature of knowledge. An obvious error in their arguments is that they introduce linguistically ambiguous terms and apply them in unconventional ways. For instance, their use of the term, 'knowledge' to substitute 'belief' is wrong and cannot be valid from an epistemological point of view. Zagzebski (2017) clearly stipulates the distinction between knowledge and belief by asserting that the latter is a component of the former and therefore, the two cannot be used synonymously. Further, one may argue that their choice of respondents is inappropriate because individuals not familiar with epistemological concepts and terms cannot be relied upon to give valid feedback on the questions posed to them. The five counter-examples are critiqued as follows:

In the first example, Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (2013) understand knowledge as 'know how' as opposed to the epistemologically appropriate conception of knowledge as 'know that.' Their argument, in this counter-example, does not present a valid critique of belief because they commit the fallacy of equivocation. Copi, Cohen, and Rodych (2018) describe the fallacy of equivocation as one that occurs when one term or phrase is used in more than one occasion but in different contexts and denoting different meanings in the same argument. This fallacy results in confusion of meaning and drawing of false conclusions. In essence, Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (2013) use the term knowledge in a loose sense, not its proper sense.

Concerning the second example, the scholars fail to distinguish between possession of knowledge and forgetfulness. In the first instance, the driver acquired information concerning closure of his usual route, believed it and noted that he had to use an alternative route. This means that he was already conscious of it, therefore, had belief that this information was true. Conscious belief is what led him to implant that knowledge in his mind in the first place. In the second scenario, the fact that he forgets that the usual route is closed and proceeds to drive along it does not imply that he has knowledge but is unaware of it. If at all he possesses that knowledge, then the acquisition process should be considered to determine whether he acquired this knowledge devoid of belief. Forgetfulness is another matter altogether because it is concerned with recollection of knowledge that has already been acquired and stored in the mind. The existence of this knowledge would not have been possible if the individual was not conscious of it, but an individual can habitually operate according to their knowledge (as the driver does) and sometimes subconsciously act. This, however, does not mean that this is proof that he has knowledge without belief. Frise (2017) argues that one is justified in arguing that they hold a belief even if in the course of time they forget it. Possession of this belief and making a claim that one has it, even when they cannot trace its justification is still valid.

In the third case, the majority of the respondents assume that one's prejudices form their beliefs while knowledge is independent of these prejudices and beliefs. That is why the teacher believes that anyone can be intelligent regardless of their affiliation to athletics, however, these beliefs do not influence their actions. One may argue that the fact that the teacher acts discriminately, despite knowing that they should not act in such a manner, is not sufficient to argue that the teacher holds contrary beliefs. Belief, as demonstrated

earlier in this work, denotes a condition where an individual is convinced that a proposition is an accurate representation of the state of affairs. In this counter-example, Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (2013) adequately prove that the teacher acknowledges that her students are intelligent regardless of their interest in athletics. However, deep seated bias and habits that prove hard to instantly abandon still influence her actions. These authors do not offer sufficient information to prove that she was convinced of this fact or was merely uttering it. One may claim that the teacher went back to her prejudicial treatment of her students because she was still not convinced that they were all equal. Further, even if she was convinced of this fact, one may ask, "does it necessarily mean that a belief will always lead to acting in accordance with it, even when an individual possess deep seated biases?"

This counter-example, one may therefore claim, is defective because it only offers a limited scope of the belief and knowledge scenarios and the respondents involved fail to distinguish belief and knowledge and the knowledge acquisition process. For instance, if one argues that the teacher, after being presented with evidence, came to know that intelligence is not reliant on athleticism or lack thereof, then they have to demonstrate how she was transformed from ignorance to knowledge. She must have been presented with a belief that a student's intelligence is independent of their athleticism (the belief), and evidence presented to support this belief (justification). She could only accept this belief to be true if the evidence presented was convincing. It is therefore impossible for one to acknowledge information as knowledge if at all they do not have a justified belief that turns out to be true.

Regarding the fourth example, Schulz and Schwitzgebel present a skewed example which offers limited information that is insufficient to adequately justify their claims of knowledge without belief. The respondents do not have knowledge of the distinction between beliefs and knowledge, therefore, their answers cannot be held to be accurate. Further, it is clear that the individual who knocks down the glass of water has knowledge that water flows from the tap, however, his actions were caused by a false belief that the water contained alien's eggs. This false belief is not, in any way, relevant to the initial knowledge held by the individual concerning the contents of the water. In the final example, it is clear that the distinction between belief and knowledge is not understood by the respondents, hence, making their answers invalid. Additionally, the man has no knowledge of the fact that his wife is cheating, at best, his can only be considered a belief that has not yet been verified. This fifth case, is more of a justification problem that it is belief.

The five counter-examples in Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's work introduce thought provoking discussions and introduces new perspectives in the discussion of whether knowledge requires belief. They present scenarios that compel thinkers to re-examine their beliefs concerning knowledge in diverse ways, however, they also oversimplify a complex epistemological problem by making valid the responses of individuals who barely understand it. Layman's opinions do not offer relevant solutions to this problem because they apply the terms 'knowledge' and 'belief' improperly. In some cases, they even mistake them for synonyms. The lack of clear demarcation of these concepts makes it impossible to establish coherence and relevance in the responses of the respondents. The ambiguity that results during analysis of the feedback is therefore an obstacle to attainment of accurate findings and conclusions.

In conclusion, one can accurately claim that Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel do not succeed in demonstrating the possibility of knowledge without belief. On the contrary, their arguments prove that our knowledge must constitute within itself an element of belief or conviction. Belief, as condition for knowledge, must involve an awareness of a matter at hand (p), a conviction that p is the actual state of affairs, sufficient grounds to justify our conviction that p, and p being indeed the actual state of affairs (Foley, 2012). Further, Pollock (2015) demonstrates that the belief condition in knowledge asserts the idea that knowledge is not a matter of mere true belief, but rather is a matter of belief that is justified, or warranted. This means that knowledge is more than just accepting something as true—it is accepting

something as true because it is supported by evidence. In other words, knowledge is based on a rational, logical process of evaluating facts and evidence, rather than just blindly accepting something as true. This condition is important because it helps us to distinguish between knowledge and mere opinion, and it encourages us to seek out evidence and reasoning to back up our beliefs.

c. Necessity and Sufficiency of Truth

Truth refers to the quality or state of being in agreement or harmony with the state of affairs, reality or nature. In a statement, it refers to the quality that makes a proposition to match with reality (Ramsey 2012; Lynch, Wyatt, Kim & Kellen, 2021). It therefore makes reference to the accuracy or correctness of information in relation to the nature of the things it defines or describes.

Truth is considered one of the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. Epistemologists in support of the JTB criterion insist that in order for information to be knowledge, it must represent the actual state of affairs (Schantz, 2011). For instance, if John knows that p is true, then p is true. It is impossible that John knows that p is true but p is false because this is a case of false belief. Aristotle (2013) makes it clear when he asserts, "to say of what is, that it is, or to say of what is not, that it is not, is true." This means that if there is a match between what is and what is said about what is, it is true. The contrary is false. Truth must be involved in our understanding of knowledge because, without it, we are likely to have misunderstanding of phenomena. Our beliefs may be illusory which ultimately makes our conclusions to be mistaken for knowledge while in fact, they are false beliefs.

A belief is intended to describe a phenomenon as it actually and in essence, seeks to match an idea formed in the mind with the thing as it is. Falsity is a fault in beliefs. If there is a mismatch between the idea and thing perceived, then it becomes a case of a false belief, not knowledge (Williams, 1999). Knowledge must always include an agreement of things and the ideas that represent these things. When we seek knowledge, we seek to understand things as they truly are. It would be illogical to argue for knowledge in the absence of truth. Therefore, truth is a condition that is absolutely necessary for knowledge. However, this condition is not sufficient for knowledge because we have instances of truth without knowledge. For example, gamblers can predict the correct score in games that have yet to be played. When their prediction comes true, they cannot claim to have known even though they believed it to happen in the manner they envisioned it. This true belief lacks the element of justification. This section, therefore, discusses the nature of truth as a necessary condition for knowledge.

Concerning the nature of truth, there is agreement among most scholars that it is objective, not subjective (Audi, 2010; Marchesan, 2019; Stokes, 2023; Lemos 2020). Objectivity of truth holds that a proposition is true regardless of our opinions, beliefs or points of view (Walker, 2018). This means that, if a statement is true, it remains perpetually true under all circumstances. If at any point it turns out to be true, it was never true in the first place. Subjective truth, on the other hand, is not truth in the proper sense of the term because it varies with experiences and points of view. In this research, the objective conception of truth was adopted to refer to this condition for knowledge.

Wittgenstein (2021) argues that a proposition is a picture of reality and adds that if one understands a proposition, they necessarily know the state of affairs that it represents. The elements of the picture must correspond to the object for knowledge to occur. Tarski (2021) affirms Wittgenstein's position by asserting that the truth of a statement must correspond with reality. That means, a statement is true if it expresses a corresponding state of affairs. In essence, then, when one lacks knowledge they are not able to express that which is true because utterance of falsehood is describing that which is not compatible with the state of affairs. For both of these scholars, knowledge cannot exist in the absence of truth.

Various scholars have attempted to describe the nature of truth using theories. These theories are not

different definitions of truth, rather, they are different ways of verifying the truth of statements or propositions. Among these theories include: correspondence, coherence, pragmatism, semantic, deflationary and redundancy, among others. In this section, these theories were examined to determine which one offers a more logical and acceptable description of the nature of truth as a condition for knowledge.

1. Coherence theory of truth

This is a theory that considers truth to be the consistency of propositions or ideas in a particular system. If a statement fits into a system of established beliefs, then it is considered true, and if it does not, it is false (Alcoff, 2018; Walker, 2018). Truth is not determined by comparison of an idea with the entity it represents, but by its internal consistency and logical coherence within a system of ideas. This theory often stresses the interconnectivity of beliefs within a theory. Proponents of this theory of truth include idealists such as F.H. Bradley and J. Royce (Blackburn, 2018).

Despite its insistence on logical correctness of ideas as a criterion for truth, this theory is not considered adequate as a theory of truth due to the following reasons. Firstly, coherence is inadequate as a theory of truth because it assumes agreement of a proposition with others (Walker, 2017). In other words, accuracy of a statement is determined by its conformity to a set of other statements. However, some statements may be true but lack coherence with a set of beliefs. For example, it is either true or false that Czars (a Kenyan musician who has been missing since 2006) lives in China today. This statement could be true if he indeed is in China. If we have contrary beliefs or lack any set of beliefs that is coherent with this claim, proponents of the coherence theory will claim it to be false. A belief should not change its truth value on account of its agreement or disagreement with an established set of beliefs; instead, it should be true if it accurately represents the actual state of affairs.

Blackburn (2018) argues that, coherence implies that a statement cannot be verified to be true or false on account of isolated interrogation, it is only true or false based on how it relates with others. Proponents of this school of thought present a foundationalist defence for their position and argue that this criterion of truth is based on *apriori* judgments which cannot be compromised by shortcomings characteristic of human experiences. *Apriori* judgments arise from reasoning alone (Kant, 2005). They are not influenced by perception or the senses. A rationalist advocates for these kind of judgments because they are convinced that reasoning deals with knowledge itself, not its subjective interpretation common in empirical methods.

Moreover, coherence leads to circular arguments which involve justifying an idea with itself or related beliefs, without anchoring evidence on an independent source (Audi, 2010). As such, it would be impossible to note inconsistency or fault in the belief. A belief cannot be accepted as true if we only seek evidence in the body of knowledge that agrees with the said belief. There must be an external criterion, such as the actual reality being described, which acts as the objective basis for comparison.

Another objection to the coherence theory is that it is possible to have different belief systems, each with its own unique system of beliefs that are coherent and yet these systems are incompatible (Lemos, 2020). For instance, religious belief systems vary and yet are internally consistent. This makes it impossible to one to determine which belief system represents objective truth and which one is subjective.

The Ethiopian calendar (whose dates are similar to the Coptic-Egyptian calendar) and the Gregorian calendar are used to track dates and years in the world today. Each of these calendars has a justification for claiming accuracy of dates it gives and it can demonstrate an internal coherence which further justifies its claims. However, the calendars give different dates and years of the current day (Kumaar, 2022). If coherence was adopted, one would justifiably argue that both calendars are accurate, despite them being

conflicted in their explanation of the exact same phenomenon. This would seem to be a rejection of the principle of bivalence which states that every proposition is either true or false, but cannot be both.

Critiques of this school of thought may also raise another objection. Supposing a set of beliefs is coherent and even accepted by many people, however, there is no evidence (corresponding proof) for it. What if these beliefs are not accurate but fit well with each other? A proponent of coherence will still hold them true without investigating further if the foundations of these beliefs are valid (Blackburn, 2018). A common habit formed out of the belief that we can interact with, appease or offend ancestors in our African societies is to pour libations, invoke them when we slaughter animals for ceremonies, and adhere to their teachings and practises. The assumption behind this is that our lives will be more blessed if we appease them. This belief is passed on from generation to generation and adhered to because it is given to us by authorities we trust and do not want to question as well as being consistent with our conception of life, the afterlife and the role of ancestors in shaping the life of the living.

Further, coherence is inadequate as a theory of truth because it assumes agreement of a proposition with others. In other words, accuracy of a statement is determined by its conformity to a set of other statements. However, some statements may be true but lack coherence with a set of beliefs. For example, it is either true or false that Czars (a Kenyan musician who has been missing since 2006) lives in China today. This statement could be true if he indeed is in China. However, if we lack any set of beliefs that is coherent with this claim, proponents of the coherence theory will claim it to be false. A belief should not change its truth value on account of its agreement or disagreement with an established set of beliefs; instead, it should be true if it accurately represents the actual state of affairs.

Therefore, Blackburn (2018) argues, coherence implies that a statement cannot be verified to be true or false on account of isolated interrogation, it is only true or false based on how it relates with others. Proponents of this school of thought present a foundationalist defence for their position and argue that this criterion of truth is based on apriori judgments which cannot be compromised by shortcomings characteristic of human experiences. Apriori judgments arise from reasoning alone. They are not influenced by perception or the senses. A rationalist advocates for these kind of judgments because they are convinced that reasoning deals with knowledge itself, not its subjective interpretation common in empirical methods.

2. Correspondence theory of truth

According to this theory, truth is defined by how well a proposition accurately explains reality. In order to establish the truth value of a proposition, one must compare the idea in the mind with the actual entity being described (Philips-Gary, 2020). This is contrary to coherence (which examines the logical consistency of ideas) because it seeks to relate ideas with facts or objects that they describe. For instance, when I say that that John is in class, it is true if it is the case that John is in class. Despite its seemingly objectivity, some scholars have raised objections concerning its suitability as a theory of knowledge. These objections were reviewed in this section.

Wiredu (2004), in his critique of correspondence as a theory of truth, claims that correspondence only results in a tautologous explanation, not truth. He argues that language, especially the Akan, gives the same meaning to terms such as "is true" and "is the case". When we argue that truth is defined by propositions corresponding to the actual state of affairs, we are engaged in a tautologous affair that does not explain what truth is. Wiredu (2013) also claims that, being a theory of truth, correspondence is supposed to explain phenomena (a theory is supposed to offer an explanation for phenomena), but it fails to do so. We must first have a phenomenon before us before we can describe it, and once we perceive it, we can develop a working definition which will allow us to form theories concerning it. Without this background (working definition), we would not be able to theorize about anything and consequently, no scientific data can be gathered at all. A working definition serves as a neutral ground from which tests will be conducted to prove or disapprove

its accuracy. Persistent investigation will lead a researcher closer and closer to the nature of reality, until ultimately, they realize truth. Wiredu, in this argument, therefore advocates for pragmatism as the best explanation for truth in science.

Wiredu's critique of correspondence is defective because he assumes that this theory's validity involves its ability to identify a phenomenon to be understood. A working definition can only work as a criterion, but not as a definition of truth. Philips-Gary (2020) asserts that correspondence is not only a theory, but a definition of truth. When one says, "it is snowing in Tunisia right now" and it is actually snowing in Tunisia at the time that these words are said, then this statement is true. The obviousness of this conformity makes correspondence more acceptable as a definition of the actual state of affairs. It cannot, therefore, be a working definition which requires justification to be considered a theory. The correspondence theory can be definitively used to demonstrate why some beliefs have been perpetually affirmed and why others have been falsified. It offers has explanatory power, not a working definition or criterion.

Another objection to the correspondence theory can be posed when one wonders how we can confirm the truth value of statements that are abstract (O'Connor, 2023). For example, propositions that describe reality whose existence is beyond empirical verification would not be possible; hence, this theory falls short of establishing an objective criterion for knowledge of this kind. It is also prudent to point out that beings that have extension also have abstract properties incapable of being assessed empirically. Therefore, we may be skeptical in accepting that this theory can be relied upon to establish the knowledge in both physical and non-physical beings. To this critique, one may argue that application of the correspondence theory is only valid in empirical science because a link between a proposition and that to which it refers is possible. However, concerning metaphysical reality, this theory would be incapable of making accurate claims because this reality is incomprehensible through the senses. One can never establish if a proposition conforms to reality they cannot experience, hence they can never claim knowledge of such kind of reality.

The correspondence theory is, however, relevant in explanation of perceivable phenomena because it necessarily demonstrates the link between an entity and propositions used to describe this entity (Schantz, 2011; David, 2023). For instance, the proposition, "the dog is in the compound" is true because one can perceive the dog's position in relation to the position of the compound. If the dog moves from the compound, the proposition will be false because there will be a change in the correlation between the dog's and compound's positions.

The validity of this theory of truth as a condition for knowledge consists in its holistic approach in understanding reality. It does not rely on evaluation of isolated statements, but seeks to justify these statements with regard to the reality they describe. Additionally, one may consider this theory to be an objective standard against which we can evaluate truth claims. Instead of relying on arbitrary and subjective criteria, an individual is able to use factual accuracy of propositions. Empirical methods of research purport to use this criterion of truth because they compare their theoretical assumptions with the phenomenon they investigate. However, this may not necessarily be the case. This concern was addressed in subsequent sections of this work.

3. The Pragmatic theory

This theory posits that the truth of a proposition is determined by its practical outcomes as well as usefulness in achieving desired consequences (Rescher & Vinci, 1975; Sleeper, 2001). This theory is contrary to the coherence and correspondence theories which rely on internal consistence and relationship with reality because it focuses on the functional role of specific beliefs in human experience.

One may argue that this theory of truth is valid because it shifts from the abstract conception of truth (particularly the coherence theory) to practical application of beliefs. This theory is relevant in problem

solving and decision making. In everyday occurrences, the pragmatic theory resonates with individuals because it relates with their experiences and concerns in daily affairs (Chang, 2019).

Additionally, this theory presents truth as a dynamic affair which changes with context, availability of evidence and time. This means that beliefs that may be useful in a particular context may be irrelevant in another. That does not imply that a belief that has been found to be irrelevant in a particular context is irrelevant in all others. In essence, one may argue, that our belief systems may work in the present day but be irrelevant in the future.

Peirce (1997) asserts that one day scholars, including scientists, will have a comprehensive understanding of the universe such that, that which works will be the final answer to the question, "what is truth?" Truth, therefore, will be determined by finding out which idea or theory works best or explains reality in the best way possible (Mounce, 2002). One may interpret Peirce's claims as implying that scientific experimentation may not give us correct answers to our questions, however, persistence and further application of the experimental method will ultimately result in knowledge of truth about the physical universe.

Proponents of Pragmatism appeal against the critique that theories have utility for a limited period of time and then replaced by others which are also phased out eventually. This makes theories to only have instrumental value, instead of describing reality as it is. The central argument of this instrumentalist claim is that truth does not explain things as they are, rather, it presents the practical value of a thing. This critique concludes that truth is objective and unchanging, hence whatever theory is adopted and discarded after a period of time is not an accurate representative of reality.

In their defence, pragmatists argue that the principle of bivalence can be achieved at some point during epistemological inquiry; hence, hope of this outcome must stay alive. Prolonged inquiry, they claim, will uncover objective truth (Champagne, 2022). If we abandon scientific inquiry on the basis that the findings of this process maybe erroneous, we will have blocked the pathway of inquiry and render knowledge of the universe unattainable at any point, whether present or in the future (Haack, 1976). The truth value of our theories will be established in the long run.

In justification of pragmatism, Cherryholmes (1992) argues that this theory presents us with an intuitive appeal. If we claim that truth is abstracted from the physical universe in which we live, then we might as well claim that it is not represented by the perceptions we get from this world. This implies then, that knowledge is unattainable to humans in their physical state of being. It would also make little sense to claim that we cannot interact with the real world which is out there but far from the reach of our intellectual faculties. One may conclude that truth about the universe is not alienated from us and we can possibly achieve it through the available means of inquiry (observation and experimentation).

The pragmatic theory of truth is not considered an accurate theory of truth for this study because it presents truth as subjective, thereby undermining its objectivity. There must always be an objective reality independent of our subjective perceptions and beliefs. This theory may overlook or ignore truths which are irrelevant to humanity. It may also overlook some essential epistemic virtues such as accuracy, coherence, as well as reliability in favour of utility of propositions.

4. The Deflationary Theory of truth

This school of thought takes a different turn in its explanation of truth as compared to conventional theories such as correspondence, coherence and pragmatism. The Deflationary theory posits that the error committed by the conventional schools of thought mentioned above is to assume that truth has a specific nature that can be investigated and theorized about (Blackburn, 2018). It possesses to property that can be used to distinguish it from something else. From the Deflationary theory, scholars have developed the school of

thought known as the redundancy theory of truth, which is also known as the minimalist or no-truth theory.

Redundancy theory of truth

This theory was firstly articulated in 1927 by Frank Plumpton Ramsey and differs from other theories of truth because it does not attempt to describe what truth is. Instead, it asserts that truth is an illusion stemming from vagueness in human language. In any given language, a proposition must have a subject and a predicate; the former is something being explained while the latter is the explanation given for the subject (Ramsey, Rescher & Majer, 1991; Rescher, 2003). For example, in the statement, "John is tall," the subject being discussed is John while that which is being said (predicate) about john is the attribute of tallness. Ramsey argues that the predicate is redundant, that means, it is without meaning, hence our attribution of truth value to the statement is meaningless as well.

Using the above proposition for demonstration, a proponent of this school of thought would argue as follows: The statement, "John is tall" is true if and only if it is indeed true that John is tall. The two sentences state the same information and arguing that one is true on account of another is fallacious. The complimentary statement does not add anything to the first, neither does it give evidence to warrant acceptance of the first statement. Truth, according to Ramsey (2012), is a word that can be conventionally used in some contexts but it does not make any meaningful reference in reality. It cannot conform to any being or entity in actual existence. In such a case, the predicate only serves as a tool of enabling us to make a general conclusion on the statement, instead of being an adjective which describes the subject term. When one says, "It is true that P" they do not add or deduct anything from the statement "p." Hence, the term 'truth' or 'fact' has no sense whatsoever.

Gottlob Frege presents a similar claim to the redundancy of the term 'truth' when he argues that its use in a statement does not change anything in the proposition to which it attributed. If one says, "I smell the scent of violets" and says, "It is true, I smell the scent of violets," both statements mean exactly the same thing. Therefore, inclusion of the phrase, 'it is true' is irrelevant. This problem, Ramsey thinks, is a result of the shortcomings of natural language (Frápolli, 2011).

A.J. Ayer further demonstrates the irrelevance of the term 'truth' by showing its redundancy in statements. He argues that there is no such property as truth in predicates because it lacks conformity to any being. When one claims that something is true, the natural response of a speculative philosopher is to seek knowledge of what this truth is. One assumes that it is a property of something; hence, natural curiosity will lead them to seek understanding of this thing. The philosopher will fail to obtain a satisfactory answer because the question, in the first place was illegitimate (Gower, 2015).

An objection to the validity of the redundancy theory can be expressed through the performative theory of truth. According to the latter, the value of truth is not in the concept itself, but in the individual who asserts it (Hosseinpour, 2022). For instance, when one claims that it is true that John is tall, the word 'true' is meaningless in this context, but it serves as an agreement of a person with the person who utters it. In other words, the value of truth is in the agreement or disagreement it elicits when it is uttered about a particular subject. A critical assessment of the performative theory leads one to conclude that it does not adequately resolve the problem raised by the redundancy theory. Further, it only serves to show that truth has a definite meaning, but falls short of offering a logical explanation for its nature. At best, truth and falsity would be a matter of subjective judgment because it makes reference to the relationship (of agreement or disagreement) of concepts and the subjects they describe. As such, the performative theory of truth is inadequate as a solution to the problem of truth and its validity.

The redundancy theory fails in accounting for a common human experience called the correspondence intuition. It is a common human habit to judge the acceptability of propositions based on how they agree or

conform to the facts they allege to represent. The mind automatically makes judgement of truth or falsity regarding a proposition when they compare it with the reality it supposedly explains. In the redundancy theory, however, propositions are not considered truth bearers or related to any reality whatsoever.

In this study, the redundancy theory of truth was not adopted as an appropriate theory because it categorically rejects the possibility of truth in propositions. It fails to show that a claim can be rendered true or false on the basis of comparing it with an actual situation or event, a set of beliefs, or it's utility when applied to address a particular issue. As such, this theory is irrelevant to an investigation into the possibility of attaining knowledge.

Semantic Theory of Truth

The most notable proponent of this school is Alfred Tarski (author of *Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923 to 1938*). The theory posits that any claim that a statement is true can only be made as a formal requirement regarding the language in which this statement is expressed. In most theories of truth, scholars are interested in describing specific properties that make a proposition true; however, the semantic theory goes further than this quest. It further seeks to establish what makes a particular truth predicate (in a proposition) a sufficient definition of truth (Field, 1972). In essence, this theory is interested in establishing criterion that theories must adhere to if they are to be considered to be adequate descriptions of truth.

Whereas conventional theories of truth were focused on distinguishing between true and false theories, Tarski (1983) was interested in distinguishing between adequate and inadequate theories of truth. Tarski attempts to formulate a new theory of truth aimed at resolving the liar's paradox or antimony of the liar. This paradox can be stated as follows: A liar declares, "I am lying". If indeed the liar is telling the truth, then they are lying, but if they are telling a lie, then they a telling the truth (Michel, 2019). If we assign a truth value to this proposition, we will fall into contradiction.

A more comprehensive example will suffice to explain this contradiction. Supposing a politician claims that all politicians are liars and it is established that the person is a politician. Is this person telling the truth or lying? If indeed they are telling the truth, then they are lying because they are a politician and must be lying. If they are lying, then their statement is true, hence they are telling the truth. Either way, analysis of this statement will always lead to contradiction. Hence we cannot with certainty assign true or false value to the statement.

Tarski (1983) argues that to avoid such contradictions, we have to separate the language that one is talking about from the one used to explain reality. The former, he calls the *object language* and the latter, *metalanguage* or *use language*. Metalanguage is the language used to express the object language. As such, it must include all components of the object language. Woleński, (2019) adds that, the truth predicate cannot be expressed in the object language because it would lead one to a paradox, such as the liar's paradox. However, the truth predicate can be expressed by the metalanguage because it includes explanations and descriptions of the object language. The demonstration that follows shows how Tarski attempts to address the question of the nature of truth.

Quoted propositions (e.g. "P") will represent the object language and non-quoted propositions (e.g. p) will represent metalanguage. Tarski introduces the concept of Material Adequacy Condition, also known as 'Convention T' to demonstrate how each viable truth theory must have the object language contained in the metalanguage or use language. This means that "p" is true if and only if p (Woleński, 2019). For example, "Kenyans are black" if and only if Kenyans are black. The first statement, "Kenyans are black" is about the subject and predicate (Kenyans and black), but the second one is about the predicate (black). Both

statements appear to be trivial because they are stated in the same language; hence, the attribution, T-sentences.

Truth, according to Tarski (1983) will be attained if and only if the translation of a proposition from the object language into the use language can be demonstrated or proven in the metalanguage. This means that, all claims made in the metalanguage must necessarily be contained in the object language. If the metalanguage has less or more claims than in the object language, then the proposition is false (Horsten & ebrary Inc., 2011). One challenge that arises in the pursuit of truth is that natural languages (such as English, German, etc.) do not provide a rich metalanguage for defining the object language. Only formal languages (like mathematical one which are open semantically, and have an infinite number of predicates) can provide the material adequacy required for truth. Hence, truth cannot be adequately formulated in our natural languages.

d. Objection to the Necessity and Sufficiency of Truth

Various scholars have presented arguments in support of the claim that knowledge can be attained in absence of truth. These scholars assert that knowledge, such as mathematical knowledge and formal logic is not dependent on truth for its validity and acceptance, rather, it relies on the logical correctness and deduction, not accuracy. Logical truths, for example, are usually considered accurate if they are within the framework of a particular system, regardless of whether they correspond to the world or not. One can also argue that the conception of truth as objective is wrong because all conceptions of truth held by humanity are dependent on context; social, cultural, and historical. As such, truth (in its objective sense) is not attainable, yet we always claim to possess knowledge and can prove that we actually possess it. In this section we critically examine claims of the possibility of knowledge without truth as presented by various scholars.

1. Nenad Popovic's Rejection of Truth as a condition for Knowledge

In his work, *Why Truth is not a Necessary Condition for Knowledge*, Popovic (2015) posits that epistemologists have no unanimous agreement on what describes knowledge, however, and they consider truth to be a condition that must exist for knowledge to occur. He disagrees with this point of view and seeks to introduce counter-examples that would demonstrate his point. The first example is the rigged game demonstration.

In this counter-example, PoPovic (2015) presents a case of two teams competing against each other, team A and B. An individual, S, has strong evidence to suggest that team A will win the match (through rigging) even though team B is a much strong team. Suppose that players, managers, and owners of both teams have confided in S about this matter and even shared their betting slips with him to confirm this plan. S will have sufficient evidence to claim that he knows team A will win. At the end of the match, the score is exactly as he predicted. However, sometime later, the match fixing scheme is found out and the win is awarded to team B. This means that on official records, team B is the actual winner.

According to Popovic (2015), S knew the exact score and the team that would win and we can credit knowledge to him. However, it is also false to say that team A won because the official records have it that B won. This means that S possessed knowledge of an event and it happened exactly as it did, however, the claims to truth were proven to be false. He asserts that this is a clear case of knowledge even when falsity is involved. Popovic further claims that the above example is a demonstration of future knowledge.

Knowledge of the past, according to Popovic (2015), is possible, even when truth is not involved. Suppose that a person in the audience was watching the match described in the example above. This person expected team B to win but was shocked that A won. However, he accepts the outcome and goes home with the

knowledge that A won the match. This knowledge is based on the evidence of the final score line on the match day. However, a year later when the scores change, he could not claim that he did not have knowledge at the time the results were announced (on the day of the match). This individual knew that team A had won, even when it did not.

In critique of Popovic's counter examples, one may argue that his understanding of the term knowledge is different from the objective epistemological understanding. In epistemology, knowledge is static and does not change with time or circumstances (Lemos, 2020). Popovic's assertion that S knew that team A had won and later found out that it had lost is illogical because if S knew that the team won, it would, under no circumstances, could have lost. In Popovic's examples, then, team A did not win, even when it was declared to have won.

The author of this work also confuses the use of the term 'win' in its official context and in its improper context. In its official context, a win must involve fair play and refereeing. Team A did not meet these conditions because their triumph over team were rigged. As such, they did not actually win, but S had the illusion that this was a valid win. One can validly argue, therefore, that S did not have knowledge in the first place and even when his beliefs were confirmed by the announcement after the match, they were based on a misconceived notion of what it means to win. The governing body's conditions for attributing a win were not met. Popovic commits the fallacy of four terms in which an argument uses a term in two different meanings and derives a conclusion from it. This kind of reasoning does not guarantee logical correctness.

One, therefore, can categorically state that these counter-arguments do not prove that we can have knowledge without truth. On the contrary, they demonstrate that knowledge of falsity is impossible.

2. Tolliver's advocacy for knowledge without truth

In his rejection of truth as a condition for knowledge, Tolliver (1989) argues that it may be a condition for knowledge, but not necessary and that we can have alternative conditions serving the exact same purpose as truth. Knowledge, according to him, does not relate an individual to a true proposition.

Firstly, he agrees that knowledge requires epistemic correspondence relation. This means that there must be a relation that is responsible for determining what one has knowledge of when they have knowledge, and what they lack when they do not have knowledge. For instance, when I know that peter is tall, what makes me know and when I do not know that Peter is tall, what do I lack to make me ignorant of this fact?

Tolliver's (1989) rejection of the truth condition as necessary involves rejection of the notion that we know if we have propositions that are true. Instead, we need to adopt propositional states which do not depend on representational states that link the mind to correspondence with actual states of affairs. The reliability theory of knowledge is what he proposes to replace the theory of truth. An epistemically reliable belief is one that guarantees that it produces more true beliefs as opposed to false ones. It acts like a thermometer which is working perfectly. This thermometer gives a true reading of temperature that we can be certain of but if it is defective, we cannot be certain of its readings. Hence, one will be more justified in accepting the readings of a thermometer that has been tested an determined that it is in good working condition as opposed to one that is faulty.

One may reject Tolliver's theory of knowledge without truth based on the following argument. He admits that there must be adequate evidence that can be used to determine whether one knows something or they do not have knowledge of it. His introduction of reliability does not invalidate the necessity of truth. In fact, he succeeds in demonstrating that his alternative is not a necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge. The nature of reliability is that it is more concerned with consistency and dependability of a thing as opposed to its accurate description of reality. His example of a thermometer serves to show that something can be

reliable yet not accurate. One may be consistent in falsity or biasness yet still reliable. One may ask the question, "How can a consistent lie be considered knowledge?" The answer to this question is that in so far as something is a lie it cannot constitute knowledge because it misrepresents that nature of reality.

Truth, on the other hand, makes reference to the actual state of affairs or reality (Blackburn, 2018). An appropriate representation of reality is what necessarily constitutes knowledge because it is impossible to know that which not the actual state of affairs. It would be fallacious for one to claim they know something yet it is contrary to the actual state of affairs. It would be synonymous to saying that one can know that which is not (Adams, 2024). Reliability can only be a measure of consistency and dependability of tools, theories or information, but never a substitute for truth. Reliability can contribute to truth through a consistent presentation of accurate information, however, it cannot guarantee it (Hedge, Powell & Sumner, 2018). It is valid to argue that reliability only offers trustworthiness but never accuracy.

3. Priyedarshi Jetli's Knowledge without Truth

Jetli (2008) argues that whereas he agrees that truth is inseparable from knowledge, we cannot posit that the statement *p* is true is a necessary condition in the validity of the statement *s* knows that *p* is true. According to him, there is an element of circularity around the concept of truth in the three independent elements of the JTB criterion. Consider the following statement; S knows that P is true. If this statement is to be considered knowledge, the following conditions must be met; S believes that P is true, S is justified in believing that P is true, and P is true. One may argue that the three conditions have not been met because the satisfaction of the truth condition for the proposition (P) already presupposes knowledge of P. This may lead to an infinite regress problem, hence, making the explanation circular. In the definition of truth above, there is no presupposition that S knows P, however, there is a presumption that someone else (S1) knows that P is true. S1's knowledge that P is true is based on the presupposition that someone else knows that P and so on. This will lead to an infinite chain of presuppositions of knowledge of P. Assuming one were to accept the argument above, it means that they have to accept the assertion that truth cannot exist without knowers.

As a consequence of the above chain of thinking, the knowability paradox gets generated. This paradox is understood as follows; if any true statement or proposition is known, then all true statements are knowable, but there are unknowable truths, therefore all truths are knowable (Bozza, 2020; Usberti 2023;). This conclusion seems to contradict the knowability principle because if there are unknowable truths such as future events and mathematical truths yet to be discovered, we cannot claim that all truths are knowable (Kvanvig, 2006). It therefore means that there are truths that are without knowers and certainly, there were no truths before the existence of knowers. However, this does not mean that facts do not exist independent of our minds. Knowledge is dependent on the mind being conscious of reality and forming concepts about that which it perceives.

This knowability paradox, we may argue does not in any way demonstrate that knowledge can exist without truth. It is fallacious to claim that truth can exist without knowers because once a conscious mind becomes aware of a thing, they are capable of knowing it if and only if they understand it in its actual state. In the absence of a knower, the process of knowledge cannot exist, and in fact, truth cannot be achieved. Truth is a product of an intentional process which involves forming ideas or concepts about something and representing the nature of this reality through statements. Without both the knower and object of knowledge, therefore, truth is impossible. Introduction of this paradox to the discussion at hand, therefore, is irrelevant.

Jetli (2008) further advances another argument to show that truth should be dropped as condition for knowledge. He asserts that if we define knowledge as JTB, we imply that neither the knower nor anybody else can have knowledge that the knower knows. Some scholars have accepted that knowing that a statement is true points to the assumption that the person knows that the person knows that the statement is true. Truth, as a matter of fact, is outside the mind of the knower, therefore it is possible that whatever the person knows

is true, they do not know that they know it is true.

To further justify his theory, Jetli (2008) adopts Tarski's bi-conditional to demonstrate that knowledge is not dependent on truth whatsoever. The bi-conditional states, "The statement, 'it is snowing (T)' is true if and only if it is snowing." If anyone knows T, then they believe that T is true and are justified in believing that T is true, and that T is true. Jetli (2008) accepts Tarski's assertion that T is stated in a language, however, it is not in the knower's mind. He adds that if this statement is true, then it may be known by knowers. However, the question that arises from this problem is, "how do we determine that it is true?" We can only respond to this question by positing that T is true if and only if it is true. That means that we do not have an objective way of making that determination. We only accept the bi-conditional as true because we cannot demonstrate it.

The implication of Jetli's thesis is that we can never be justified in believing that we know something is true because truth is outside the knower and it is impossible for the knower to confirm it. In essence, he says that we can never know that we know something.

Jetli (2008) further makes the following argument; knowledge is not a state of mind, but an ability and a process towards acquisition of truth. He argues that in the process of seeking to know something, we are also seeking the truth of it. This means that truth cannot be a condition for knowing, but we can argue that the search for truth is a condition for knowledge. Jetli thinks that epistemologists acknowledge that the truth condition should be dropped as necessary for knowledge but they are reluctant to do so.

A careful consideration of Jetli's work leads to the realization that he errs in arguing that truth is outside the knower. One may argue that he may have meant that reality is outside the mind of the knower, not truth because it is impossible for a statement that describes the state of affairs to exist on its own, outside the mind of the knower. It must be domiciled in the knower, specifically, in their mind. Truth, as discussed earlier in this work, is arrived at when we are conscious of the object of knowledge and are actively seeking to understand it. That's when propositions explaining the nature of the object are formulated and communicated. It is, therefore, impossible for any truth to exist outside the knower because outside this subject, we can only have reality itself.

Additionally, when he claims that it is impossible to prove that we know that we know, Jetli is mistaken. Proof of knowledge involves demonstrating awareness of our knowledge acquisition processes, including comparing what we claim as knowledge with the actual state of affairs (Lemos, 2020). He is also mistaken in characterizing the pursuit of truth as a process that involves an independent investigation where the mind seeks truth as an independent entity. Truth is not independent of the mind (Audi, 2010) and must be present before one can claim that they know. Jetli is wrong in this regard because his statement that truth should be dropped as a condition for knowledge implies that one can know falsity. A false statement, however, cannot be known because it does not represent any reality, hence it is impossible to know that which does not exists or that whose existence is not apparent to the mind that seeks it.

e. Necessity of Truth as a condition for knowledge

In the foregoing discussion, one may be justified in arguing that there is adequate demonstration that truth is a condition that is necessary for knowledge to occur. Truth is understood as a property in a proposition that makes it accurately describe things as they are. In other words, truth is an element of a statement or proposition which makes it compatible with the actual state of affairs. When one argues that we know something, we must demonstrate that the information in our minds is accurate, and if not, then we cannot say that we have knowledge.

False propositions are those which misrepresent the state of affairs. These propositions cannot be known

because they are not compatible with things as they are (Adams, 2024). Supposing that the statement, "all men are immortal" is uttered by person (S). The statement is clearly false and does not represent the actual state of affairs. It is impossible to know it because the idea as expressed in the proposition does not agree with the state of affairs. The state of affairs it describes is non-existence, hence nothing. Nothing, is a term that is used as a negative concept (cannot be understood by itself, rather, it is a deficiency of something) and can only be understood with regard to something that exists. In essence, therefore, we cannot know falsity because we cannot be aware of that which is not the case.

Objections that have been raised by various scholars in the section above have been examined and proved insufficient in their demonstration of the dispensability of truth. We may therefore argue that truth is a necessary condition for knowledge. However, by itself, it is not sufficient for knowledge. In instances where one holds a belief that is unjustified (lacks reason to support it) but it turns out to be true, we are not justified in attributing knowledge to it because we have not consciously acquired proof that leads us to make the conclusion. In other words, we lack logical grounds for acceptance of the belief. At best, we may call it a true belief, but not knowledge.

f. Necessity and Sufficiency of Justification

The justification condition for knowledge is the third of the tripartite conditions which asserts that in order for a true belief to constitute knowledge, there must be reasons that compel one to accept it (Lehrer, 1979). In other words, there must be proof or evidence that makes the belief to be considered an accurate description of reality. Pollock (2015) argues that this condition is important because it gives one a rational basis for acceptance of beliefs, not just mere luck or coincidence. The question that justification answers is, "why should one accept certain beliefs as knowledge and not others? "It distinguishes true beliefs from arbitrary and unfounded beliefs.

Justification plays a normative role because it provides rational conditions which stipulate whether we should accept or reject certain beliefs that we form. For instance, one would not be rationally justified to accept two contradictory propositions. These two beliefs would negate each other and violate the principle of non-contradiction, which is an essential logical principle present in every mind that reasons in a rational manner (Pritchard, 2023).For instance, if scientific claims to knowledge are true, then, Justification, guides the mind through the process of admitting beliefs as knowledge or rejecting them as irrational or illogical presuppositions.

Despite the necessity of justification in knowledge, the two are not synonymous. When I know something, then it must be true but when I have justification for believing something, it is not necessarily true. A reliable friend, for instance, can share information that is inaccurate and I will use the reliability and trust in this friend as justification that whatever they have shared is true. One, therefore, should not always assume that all instances of justified belief constitute knowledge.

The nature of justification and what constitutes sufficient justification for acceptance of beliefs has been a subject of discussion in epistemology. In this section, these concerns have been discussed with an aim of establishing whether indeed justification is a necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge.

g. Theories of Justification

There are various types of justification as a result of various types and sources of knowledge. Some kinds of justification do not qualify to be epistemic because they rely on luck and guesswork (Lemos, 2020). For example, practical justification is used when gambling or making bets. One is convinced that their team will win because they have belief and trust in them. In some other cases, some religious people will argue that what one professes is what they become and sometimes this belief comes true. In the following section we

examined epistemic justification which seeks to relate evidence with truth. This kind of justification includes; *apriori* justification (which involves logical reasoning), experience, and testimony from other sources. Various theories of justification have been proposed as appropriate for knowledge acquisition. They include: foundationalism, coherentism, and reliabilism.

1. Foundationalism

Proponents of this theory of justification argue that our beliefs are justified on the basis of other beliefs. This means that a belief is justified because it is based on other beliefs that we hold. This theory portrays knowledge as a hierarchical structure whereby basic beliefs form the foundation or base upon which all other beliefs are built (Fumerton, 2022). The relationship of these other beliefs with the basic ones will determine their validity and acceptability (McIntosh,2020). Critiques may argue that this foundational nature of justification may lead to an infinite regress problem where belief B1 will be justified by belief B2 and B2 will be justified by B3, ad infinitum. A proponent of foundationalism will argue that this regress problem will not occur because of the existence of the basic beliefs.

An example of this kind of justification is as follows; one will believe that person X is a criminal because their fingerprints were found in a crime scene, witnesses report seeing the person around the scene, and X has had criminal charges pressed against him before. The conviction that X is a criminal is not based on an actual encounter with him engaging in the crime, but on a series of beliefs that point towards this conclusion. The claim that X is a criminal is justified by a series of beliefs such as; the fingerprints on the crime scene were not planted, a competent investigator lifted the prints and did not mix them up with others, the eye witnesses are not lying, the previous criminal charges were based on evidence, among others.

The main assumption in foundationalism is that knowledge is based on basic beliefs that are self-evident. These basic beliefs are assumed to evident upon immediate perception, hence they require no further justification (Audi, 2010). Two kinds of foundationalist theories emerge from this discussion; classical and modest foundationalism (Stoutenburg, 2020). Classical foundationalism holds that the basic beliefs in any system of beliefs are infallible, thereby certain, indubitable and incorrigible (Mousavi Siany, 2024). Further, this school of thought posits that the only way we can transmit justification among beliefs is through deduction. Consider the following example for demonstration; assuming that one withdraws ksh.100000 from an ATM and all the notes that emerge from the machine are Ksh. 1000 notes. One may assume that they are justified in believing that the next withdrawal will produce Ksh.1000 denomination notes. A classical foundationalist would argue that this reasoning is fallacious because the first occurrence does not logically imply how the second one will occur.

Modest foundationalism is a much more accommodative version of foundationalist and its central thesis is that; firstly the basic beliefs must not necessarily be infallible and secondly, both induction and deduction can be used to transmit justified beliefs (Lawlor, 2022). Concerning the ATM withdrawal example given above, a modest foundationalist would argue that one would be inductively justified to make that assumption because the available evidence greatly supports this conclusion.

Despite attempts to demonstrate the suitability of foundationalism as appropriate for justification, the theory has some shortcomings. Firstly, it leads to epistemic circularity. Circular reasoning is inevitable in this type of justification because the validity of a belief is based on the validity of another belief on which it is dependent, and so on. We cannot logically argue for a non-circular system of justification when arguing for this theory. Secondly, the foundationalist attempt to introduce basic beliefs to eliminate circularity fails because they do not offer any logical criterion for choosing these basic beliefs. Different people have their own standards of what constitutes a basic belief but there is no universally accepted criterion that can be used to determine the nature of these beliefs, hence, it leads to ambiguity. Thirdly, this theory raises skepticism about the indubitability of basic beliefs because every belief will always be critiqued from

various points of view. The question then arises, "how will we tell that a belief is indubitable?"

2. Coherentism

This theory posits that beliefs are justified by their agreement with other beliefs which have been already been accepted as valid within a system. This coherence does not in any way compare beliefs with empirical evidence or agreement with reality as it is (Olsson, 2022). The distinction of this theory with foundationalism consists in the fact that it is not dependent on basic beliefs which act as the core, but with an established web of beliefs.

Most of our beliefs concerning the world appear to be valid because they cohere with our established beliefs drawn from our culture and habits. However, this is a weak system of justification because it overlooks the possibility of a belief system being wrong. A belief can be contrary to our established web of beliefs and be true but this theory will deem it false. Additionally, just like foundationalism, this theory can lead to circularity where we seek justification of beliefs in an endless chain.

3. Reliabilism

Proponents of reliabilism argue that a belief is justified or not justified depending on the reliability of the cognitive process that produces it. This means that the belief is accepted regardless of its truth value (Goldman, 2012). The content of the beliefs is not in consideration in this theory and this aids in identifying beliefs that may be true but unjustified because the process used to arrive at it is unreliable. One of the main proponents of this school of thought is Alvin Goldman. In his essay 'What is Justified Belief? (2020)' he argues that there is only one kind of process that can lead to justified beliefs. This process, he argues, must include standard perceptual processes, memory, logical thought, as well as introspection. On the other hand, unreliable processes involve use of emotions, wishful thinking, guesswork and hunches, as well as hasty generalization.

Unreliable processes are easily to identify because they produce erroneous outcomes most of the time. Justification-conferring processes, however, result in beliefs that are generally true. Standard perceptual processes, memory, logical thought, and introspection are sources of justification because they are reliable; they mostly produce accurate beliefs. This theory, however, raises certain questions. For instance, "in order to produce a justified belief, how reliable must a process be?" To this question, Goldman (2020) answers that our processes do not necessarily need to be infallible or perfect to be sources of justification. In some instances, he says, imperfect processes can be sources of justification. False beliefs that emanate from such processes can still be justified.

According to Lemos (2020), three objections can be raised against reliabilism, namely; the new evil demon problem, the unknown reliability problem, and the generality problem. The new evil demon problem can be described as follows: it is not possible to be certain of anything because there is always a possibility that we could be systematically deceived by an evil demon to believe that our beliefs are justified. The Rene Descartes' work, 'The Meditations on First Philosophy' (2017) adequately demonstrates the possibility of being sure that our beliefs are justified while in fact, our minds have been deceived into believing so. In the contemporary world, this evil deceiver may refer to artificial intelligence which may include simulations which replicate our experiences. As such, we can never be sure that our knowledge acquisition processes are justified. Despite the fact that the processes that resulted in one's beliefs are false and based on deception, they would still be considered epistemically justified. We may infer, as a matter of logical necessity, that the process is unreliable and the outcome false, hence reliabilism does not offer an adequate justification criterion.

The unknown reliability problem makes reference to circumstances where the trustworthiness or reliability

of an epistemic process is unclear or unknown. Some knowledge sources may not be reliable and can sometimes give accurate information (Lemos, 2020). For instance, a psychic may predict the course of events and they obtain. This person does not have any reason or justification for believing that these events will occur, nevertheless, they believe it and it comes to pass. A critique of reliabilism will argue that the process is reliable, but it cannot be justified, hence, cannot be considered knowledge. In essence, being reliably produced does not make a belief justified.

The generality problem refers to the difficulty that arises when we attempt to reconcile the general nature of knowledge claims with particular contexts in which these claims are applied (Lemos, 2020; Goldman, 2021). Supposing one look out their window one night and see a shiny object in the shape of a moon and make the following claim, "there is the moon." At face value, this claim will seem to be justified. However, when we examine the process used to arrive at this claim, we notice that there are various processes and each has a distinct level of reliability. For example, there is perception, visual perception at night, and visual perception of the illuminated object at night. If these processes were to be examined individually, we would discover that some of them offer no justification, however, the first process, perception, offers no justification whatsoever to the claim that is made, the third process, visual perception of an illuminated object at night, offers a reliable justification for the claim. Reliabilism does not determine the level of generality the relevant processes have to determine the level of justification it offers the claim. This is a major concern for epistemologists because epistemic processes must have contextual specificity.

Reliabilism may offer an acceptable criterion for justifying knowledge, however, it is not adequate to justify our claims to know because it lacks a clear methodology for distinguishing true beliefs from those that are false. Further, it errs in positing that false beliefs and unreliable processes can still be justified. In addition to critique raised above, it is imperative that one considers this theory insufficient for justification of beliefs.

h. Knowledge without Justification

Some scholars have argued against the claim that knowledge must constitute justified true beliefs. They assert that there are instances of knowledge which do not involve justification.

According to Olsson and Dellsén (2017), we have instances where understanding occurs without either belief or justification. They argue that understanding can sometimes occur intuitively or through grasping relevant concepts even at moments where justification is lacking. We may understand reality without being able to explicitly justify it. For instance, a student by the name Alice has failed in all assignments in a given year. She has reason to believe that she will fail in the next ones. However, unknown to her, she has a knack for geometry (which is her next assignment) and she unexpectedly scores well in the assignment. These scholars present a second example to demonstrate their case. Assuming a man, Bernie, is aware that a known conman is coming to town and all residents have been warned not to believe a word from his mouth. The conman encounters Bernie and claims that his vehicle has broken down. Bernie does not believe him but helps him diagnose the problem with the car. Eventually, Bernie finds out that the conman was telling the truth.

In the first case, Alice is assumed to be ignorant of the fact that she can perform well in geometry and is therefore justified in holding the belief that she will fail, just like she has in all other subjects. However, her alleged understanding of geometry without logical justification does not demonstrate that she has knowledge. Firstly, she is not aware and even if she was, could not argue that she was justified in claiming that she will pass the geometry test. Secondly, her belief is that she will fail the assignment but the contrary happens, therefore, we can only claim that her belief was wrong and that she possessed no knowledge. If we claim that she had knowledge, it would be fallacious because it would contradict the evidence presented. Knowledge must involve instances where an individual has a belief (that she will pass the geometry test or she understands geometry), a justification (there must be sufficient grounds that demonstrate her ability to

pass the test) and truth (she actually passes the test). Of these three conditions, Alice only met the last one, hence rendering Olsson and Dellsén's claim fallacious.

In the second instance, the same critique applies. Bernie does not believe that the conman's car is broken down. He is convinced that the man is trying to trick him. Bernie has enough justification that the man is a conman because it is widely circulated through trusted media houses. However, he later realizes that the man is not lying and the car has actually broken down. The diagnosis given by Bernie turns out to be accurate and the conman is vindicated. In this case, the conclusion (that the car has broken down) is not adequately supported by the evidence (that the conman has a history of lying and is most probably lying), hence claims to knowledge cannot be attributed to this scenario. Bernie did not know that the car was broken down and his diagnosis was based on knowledge already accumulated from his experience as a mechanic. One can argue, that these two cases do not submit any compelling case for knowledge without justification.

Sartwell (2011) argues that despite justification being an important part of the knowledge acquisition process, it is not always required for one to have knowledge. In some cases, he says, we are willing to attribute knowledge to information that has limited or even absent justification and this implies that if justification was absolutely necessary for knowledge, we would not attribute knowledge to this information. For example, a man claims that he knows his son, who has been accused of a crime is innocent. He holds his position despite overwhelming evidence that points to the son's guilt. Ultimately, the son is proven innocent and one may claim that the father knew it all along.

This, one may argue, is a defective argument because the father is deeply convinced, not knowledgeable that the son is innocent. When his belief is proven right we would not be right to claim that he knew it all along, unless we can present evidence that he had that the son was innocent. Suppose that the son has always been truthful and had confided in the father that he did not do it. Suppose that the father was aware that people can be framed for crimes they did not commit. He would have sufficient justification to hold the belief. However, this is not the case in this situation. One may counter Sartwell's argument by presenting a scenario where an individual strongly believes in something but lack justification but it later turns out to be true. A mentally challenged person can believe that they are in Nairobi, without being aware that this is indeed true. We cannot claim that they knew just because the belief was proven true. We must demonstrate that they had sufficient grounds to make the claim.

Most of the arguments offered to demonstrate the irrelevance of justification in knowledge offer limited understanding of what knowledge constitutes and mistake it for strong conviction or belief. These claims have not only been refuted, but this paper has demonstrated that knowledge is arrived at through a conscious process of evaluating beliefs, justifying why we believe them to be true and not any other, as well as the beliefs being actually true. In cases where justification is lacking, there is usually an element of guesswork or luck involved, not knowledge and understanding.

CONCLUSION

From the discussion above, one can confidently posit that arguments advanced against the necessity of the three conditions for knowledge are erroneous. Firstly, if belief is absent, one will not have a concept that they accept as the actual state of affairs. It will mean that they do not hold any position or conviction about the universe in which they exist. This state of existence is not possible for a rational mind. Secondly, truth is necessary because it is impossible to have knowledge of something that is false or that does not exist (that is not). The object of knowledge is being and in its absence, then we can never know anything at all. If one were to misrepresent the nature of any being they seek to know, they would not know anything at all because falsity does not make reference to reality. Finally, in absence of justification, our beliefs can only be

guesses and if proven to be true, cannot form instances of knowledge, but true beliefs. The necessity of these three conditions notwithstanding, none of them is sufficient for knowledge in isolation. They are all sufficient for knowledge and in cases where one is absent, then we cannot be certain that we have knowledge.

Ultimately, this paper asserts that the objections raised against the necessity and sufficiency of each of the classical tripartite conditions for knowledge fails to demonstrate their contingency. Instead, the arguments are informed by misunderstanding of the exact meaning of knowledge and the status of these three conditions in our pursuit of knowledge. It is therefore the position of this research that knowledge consists in beliefs that are not only justified, but true as well.

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