

Performative Security Diplomacy: Kosova and the Risks of Strategic Overreach

Luan Blakaj*

Peking University Beijing, China

*Corresponding Author

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2026.100600202>

Received: 25 May 2026; Accepted: 30 May 2026; Published: 20 June 2026

ABSTRACT

This article examines the foreign-policy paradox of Kosova's parliamentary approval to commit troops to the proposed International Stabilization Force in Gaza. As a small, partially recognized state that remains fundamentally dependent on external security guarantees (KFOR) domestically, Kosova's external military activism presents a structural puzzle. Drawing on role theory and the concept of performed sovereignty, the article argues that Kosova's commitment functions as a form of symbolic external projection rather than evidence of consolidated strategic maturity. By joining a high-visibility, US-backed coalition, Kosova seeks to perform the role of a reliable security provider, aiming to accrue diplomatic capital and signal sovereign normalcy to Western patrons. A brief comparison with Albania highlights that while both states use crisis participation for diplomatic signalling, Kosova's projection is uniquely compensatory and premature. The article concludes that this performative security diplomacy risks strategic overreach; when symbolic ambition outpaces domestic institutional consolidation, high-visibility external projection threatens to expose the very dependencies the state seeks to obscure.

INTRODUCTION

Kosova's parliamentary approval of troops for the proposed International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza creates an unusual foreign-policy puzzle. A small, partially recognised Balkan state that continues to rely on an externally underwritten security architecture at home is seeking to appear abroad as a contributor to one of the most visible stabilisation initiatives of the contemporary Middle East. The Board of Peace's charter was ratified at the World Economic Forum in January 2026, its inaugural meeting followed in February 2026, and subsequent reports identified Kosova among the first states prepared to commit troops to the proposed ISF, a multinational contingent operating under the advocacy of the United States-backed Board of Peace framework (Bami, 2026, para. 1; 'Kosovo Approves Troops to Gaza under US-Backed Scheme', 2026, paras 1–3; Madhani & Lee, 2026, paras 14–17; Rowlands, 2026, paras 2–3). This commitment, subsequently approved by the Kosova parliament ('Kosova ndjek SHBA-në në Gazë', 2026, para. 11), gives institutional form to a striking act of external military signalling. Kosova's leadership has framed this participation as a reciprocal gesture, with Prime Minister Albin Kurti noting that Prishtina has benefited from an international military presence since the 1999 war (Bami, 2026, paras 4–7; 'Kosovo Approves Troops to Gaza under US-Backed Scheme', 2026, para. 4). Taken together, the government's proposal and parliamentary approval represent a highly visible attempt to move Kosova's status from a recipient of security assistance towards that of a contributor. At the same time, political authorisation should not be confused with operational deployment or with the existence of fully consolidated military capacity. The primary paradox stems from the apparent contradiction between domestic security dependence and external military ambition. Unlike established troop-contributing countries, Kosova still exists within an ongoing international peace-support architecture. Under the mandate of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) continues to serve as the lawful military presence responsible for deterring hostilities and ensuring public safety and order (Bami, 2026, para. 7; Muharremi & Ramadani, 2024, pp. 44, 57). Historically, local armed formations were demilitarised and transformed under strict international supervision, establishing a framework in which Kosova's strategic

interests have been managed primarily through cooperation with NATO rather than through fully independent military capacity (Muharremi & Ramadani, 2024, pp. 50, 57). Hence, the state remains reliant on external guarantees for its domestic stability. Why would a state facing unresolved foundational security challenges seek direct involvement in one of the most politically charged and contested stabilisation projects of the contemporary era? (Kanj, 2026, paras 11, 12) Accordingly, this article is not primarily concerned with the operational viability of the Gaza mission itself, but with the politics of small-state international projection.

Kosova's posture towards Gaza is best understood not as evidence of fully consolidated strategic maturity, but as a form of symbolic external projection under constraint. Through this commitment, a security-dependent and partially recognised state seeks to demonstrate alliance value, political reliability and sovereign normalcy (Bami, 2026, paras 5–7; Brajshori, 2025, p. 35). For a state navigating a fragmented international system with limited recognition, participation in a distant multilateral coalition function as a diplomatic signal aimed at external audiences, particularly key Western patrons (Loshaj, & Ilazi, n.d., p. 12) whose recognition and security guarantees remain central to its international position (Brajshori, 2025, pp. 35–36; McManus & Yarhi-Milo, 2017, p. 702). This article argues that Kosova's commitment to the ISF reveals a structural mismatch between symbolic external ambition and incomplete domestic strategic consolidation. The argument is not that Kosova should refrain from international security missions, its aspiration to become a security provider is legitimate. The point is more precise: the Gaza episode suggests that Kosova's external security activism is moving ahead of the domestic conditions that would make such a role fully convincing.

Albania serves in this article only as a brief comparative reference. Tirana's reported participation (Hunnicut & Jackson, 2026; 'Shqipëria dhe Kosova do të dërgojne trupa në Gaza', 2026) illustrates a broader regional pattern in which Balkan states use crisis participation to amplify diplomatic relevance, and demonstrate reliability to Western partners. Yet Albania does not face the same contradiction – as a fully recognised NATO member, it participates from a position of consolidated juridical sovereignty and formal alliance integration. Kosova's case is different because external military projection intersects with limited recognition, domestic security dependence (Gigleux, 2018, pp. 6–7, 29; 'Shqipëria dhe Kosova do të dërgojne trupa në Gaza', 2026, paras 4–5) and an unfinished transition from security recipient to security provider. The analysis proceeds by first outlining the conceptual frame of functional participation and performed sovereignty, before turning to small-state role theory, Kosova's domestic security dependence, the diplomatic utility of the Gaza commitment, Albania as a limited comparator and the risk of strategic overreach.

Conceptual Frame

States navigating the international system with limited recognition do not passively await universal juridical acceptance. Rather, the condition of non-recognition produces a persistent legitimacy problem that pressures contested entities to orient their external behaviour towards continuous self-justification (Voller, 2015, pp. 2–3). For Kosova, the absence of universal diplomatic consensus has required a departure from traditional pathways of state consolidation. The state pursues international integration through strategic diplomacy, institutional flexibility and deliberate engagement within multilateral architectures (Brajshori, 2025, p. 35). By targeting institutions and coalitions where entry is shaped by functional capacity rather than unanimous political recognition, Kosova operationalises a strategy of pragmatic multilateralism (Brajshori, 2025, pp. 41–42). Because full accession to the United Nations remains obstructed by the veto politics of permanent Security Council members, the state is compelled to seek international standing through alternative memberships, specialised agencies, regional frameworks and practical cooperation (Baliqi, 2020, pp. 14, 18). This structural vulnerability can also function as a catalyst, heightening the state's exposure to international norms and encouraging a more intensive pursuit of interaction with global audiences (Voller, 2015, p. 5). Sovereignty is therefore best understood here not simply as an inherited legal condition, but as a relational practice that must be asserted, negotiated and institutionally reproduced through active engagement (Brajshori, 2025, p. 39). Legitimacy is accumulated progressively through functional participation rather than granted through a single act of formal recognition (Brajshori, 2025, p. 41). This does not mean that participation automatically resolves contested statehood, it means that Kosova seeks to build international presence through repeated demonstrations of usefulness, reliability and institutional compatibility.

This approach requires moving beyond a binary understanding of sovereignty (Brajshori, 2025, p. 41). Rather than treating statehood as either fully present or entirely absent, the literature on unrecognised and partially recognised states shows that sovereignty develops across multiple dimensions. Entities may consolidate domestic, territorial or interdependence sovereignty while still lacking full international legal recognition (Voller, 2015, p. 3). This conceptualisation is important for Kosova because internal consolidation and external visibility have not developed at the same pace. Kosova has expanded its international profile through diplomacy and security cooperation, while its domestic security framework remains closely tied to international guarantees. In this environment, external projection can compensate for internal limitations by allowing the state to perform sovereign agency on the international stage. By aligning with Western security architectures, Kosova uses foreign policy to signal reliability, balance against regional threats and convert military cooperation into political capital (Kiçmari, 2020, p. 46). For a partially recognised entity, projecting military capability and diplomatic normalcy through distant crisis management is therefore less a straightforward reflection of organic strategic autonomy than a deliberate attempt to transform limited participation into systemic legitimacy, diplomatic credit and a stronger claim to international normality (Brajshori, 2025, p. 42; Voller, 2015, pp. 3–4).

Analytical Framework: Preformed Sovereignty and Role Theory

The external security behaviour of small states is frequently reduced to an assumption of intrinsic peacefulness or an inherent drive for norm entrepreneurship (Gigleux, 2018, pp. 6, 30). Within this conventional framework, small states are often understood as committing military and administrative resources to international peace-support operations primarily to cultivate the image as good international citizenship (Gigleux, 2018, p. III, 6). However, this categorisation obscures the political reality of small-state foreign policy. As Victor Gigleux demonstrates, the assumption that small states possess a natural predisposition to forgo national interests in favour of impartial conflict resolution fails to capture the strategic calculation behind their international engagements (Gigleux, 2018, pp. 39–40). Rather than operating with a single, fixed foreign-policy disposition, small states negotiate their international postures through the interaction of structural pressure, domestic political agency and external expectations (Gigleux, 2018, p. 42).

Role theory helps explain why a security-dependent entity would seek to project military capacity abroad. In this framework, international roles are not static identities derived automatically from material weakness, but are socially and politically negotiated constructs (Gigleux, 2018, pp. 38, 40). They emerge through a dual process: role socialisation, in which external actors such as major powers or international institutions articulate expectations of appropriate behaviour, and domestic role conception, through which local policymakers interpret and adapt these expectations to their own political purposes (Gigleux, 2018, pp. 44–46, 13). Consequently, small states do not contribute to distant crisis management simply out of altruism. Their participation may also reflect a bargaining process in which the state seeks a more advantageous position within the international system (Gigleux, 2018, pp. 44–46). They perform roles such as loyal ally, responsible contributor or global system collaborator in response to the influence of dominant partners whose recognition, support and security guarantees they require (Gigleux, 2018, p. 84).

Applied to Kosova, this framework clarifies the logic of the Gaza commitment. Kosova's parliament-approved participation in the ISF can thus be read as an attempt to step into a more active international role. Confronted with a volatile geopolitical environment and an ongoing deficit in security autonomy, Kosova uses external security activism to meet the role expectations of its primary Western patrons before its own security-provider role has been fully consolidated at home. By committing personnel to a high-visibility, United States-backed multilateral coalition, the state enacts the role of a reliable security provider, aligning its external behaviour with the strategic preferences of the United States and its allies. In this sense, participation in the proposed ISF represents a socially negotiated performance rather than a simple reflection of autonomous military capacity. The point is not that Kosova's Gaza posture is empty or irrational. Rather, it shows how policymakers in a partially recognised state attempt to elevate the state's systemic status through visible international contribution. Such activism allows Kosova to claim diplomatic relevance and security provider status before that role has been fully consolidated domestically. The analytical tension lies precisely in this gap between the role being claimed externally and the strategic conditions still shaping the state internally.

Kosova's Domestic Security Dependence

The strategic anomaly of Kosova's participation in the proposed ISF must be analysed against the backdrop of its domestic security dependence. Kosova is not yet a fully autonomous security producer or provider; under the mandate of UNSC Resolution 1244, the NATO-led KFOR continues to serve as the lawful military presence (Muharremi & Ramadani, 2024, p. 57) responsible for deterring hostilities and ensuring public safety and order, thereby restricting Kosova's independent authority over territorial defence (Muja, 2013, p. 17). The necessity of this ongoing international military presence underscores a persistent limitation in internal security autonomy. While local institutions have progressively assumed greater administrative and security responsibilities, the ultimate guarantee of territorial stability remains international rather than exclusively national (Dragúňová, 2026, para. 10; Muharremi & Ramadani, 2024, p. 57).

This constrained domestic authority is also visible in other areas of Kosova's post-war institutional development, including the internationally mediated Kosova Specialist Chambers (Hasani & Mjeku, 2019, pp. 8, 18). For the purposes of the Gaza case, however, the decisive issue is the security sector itself. Kosova's military institutions did not emerge through an uninterrupted process of autonomous national consolidation, instead they developed through externally supervised transformation (Muharremi & Ramadani, 2024, pp. 49, 51). Following the 1998-99 war, the UÇK¹ was subjected to a rigorous process of demilitarisation and transformed into the TMK², a civilian emergency agency operating under the strict day-to-day operational direction of KFOR (Muharremi & Ramadani, 2024, pp. 50–51). Successive iterations of Kosova's security institutions, resulting in the current KSF, have been carefully shaped to match international expectations and NATO standards (Ligji Nr. 06/L-123 për Forcën e Sigurisë së Kosovës, 2019, Article 5 (2)). The phased development of the security sector established a framework in which strategic interests are managed primarily through compliance or cooperation with external patrons rather than through fully independent military capacity (Muja, 2013, p. 19). Consequently, the institutional architecture of Kosova's security apparatus remains characterised by structural reliance on external guarantees (Muharremi & Ramadani, 2024, p. 57).

The central contradiction of Kosova's foreign policy emerges from this institutional history. The decision to commit personnel to the Gaza mission presents a tension between dependence at home and high-visibility projection abroad. The state continues to face unresolved security challenges, evidenced by periodic escalations that require KFOR to maintain a resolute presence ('Eskaloni situata në Zveçan', 2023; United Nations, 2025, p. 3). At the same time, the political leadership presents Kosova as capable of contributing specialised personnel to one of the most politically sensitive stabilisation projects of the contemporary era ('Kosova ndjek SHBA-në në Gazë', 2026, para. 22). This gap cannot be reduced to a simple matter of deploying demining, medical or search-and-rescue units (Lirë, 2026). Such niche capabilities may be useful and politically meaningful. Rather, the tension lies in the symbolic weight attached to projecting military usefulness abroad while the state's own strategic consolidation remains incomplete.

This legal and institutional sequence further clarifies the nature of this commitment. In early 2026, the Kosova government formally approved the Ministry of Defence's proposal to send KSF personnel to the proposed Gaza mission, presenting the move as a demonstration of the state's reliability as an international partner (Lirë, 2026, paras 1–6). Under Kosova's legal framework, participation in international operations requires parliamentary approval by two-thirds of the Assembly, alongside final authorisation from the President (Bami, 2026, para. 10; Ligji Nr. 06/L-123 për Forcën e Sigurisë së Kosovës, 2019, Articles 15, I; Lirë, 2026, paras 1–6). The subsequent parliamentary approval gives the commitment stronger constitutional and political weight. Yet authorisation should still be distinguished from operational deployment, and deployment should be distinguished from demonstrated strategic capacity. The political value of the decision lies partly in this distinction: even before the operational effects of any contribution can be assessed (Bami, 2026, para. 10), parliamentary approval allows Kosova to signal reliability, maturity and strategic usefulness to external audiences.

¹ eng. KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army)

² eng. KPC (Kosovo Protection Corps)

This analysis should not be read as an argument that the Republic of Kosova should never contribute internationally. For small and developing states, participation in multilateral peacekeeping, peacebuilding and stabilisation operations is a rational strategy for demonstrating reliability, integrating into global security architectures and accumulating international prestige ('Angazhimi FSK-Së Në Gazë, Hap Strategjik Për Afirmim Ndërkombëtar', 2026, paras 2–4; Lirë, 2026). Kosova's aspiration to transition from a security consumer to a security provider is a legitimate long-term strategic objective. At the same time, the Gaza situation exposes the unevenness of that transition. Kosova seeks to project the image of a security actor abroad while its domestic security remains partly externally guaranteed. The issue is not external ambition itself, but the mismatch between that ambition and the still-incomplete consolidation of the state's own security framework.

Gaza As a Stage

Having established the organisational constraints governing Kosova's domestic security architecture, the analysis must now shift to the diplomatic utility of its external posture. The proposed ISF in Gaza represents an exceptional arena for Kosova to enact its external ambitions. The mission's appeal lies in its geopolitical visibility, its connection to the strategic priorities of the United States and its multilateral form. For a small, partially recognised state, the opportunity to attach itself to a high-profile, Washington-backed stabilisation framework delivers a potent platform for projecting international usefulness. In this sense, the commitment is less about the immediate material impact of a small contingent in the Middle East than about the political value of standing alongside established international actors.

The official discourse surrounding this commitment has been calibrated to frame participation in positive, internationalist terms, rather than as an admission of domestic deficits. Prime Minister Albin Kurti presented the commitment as an extension of the state's prior humanitarian contributions, noting the allocation of financial aid to Gaza earlier in 2025 (Bami, 2026, para. 8). More importantly, the executive rationale invoked a language of reciprocal stabilisation. Kurti justified the readiness to deploy and proposed contribution by stressing that Kosova itself has been a continuous consumer of international peace-support forces since 1999 (Bami, 2026, para. 7; Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2026, para. 3). Through this narrative, the political leadership transforms the state's own history of dependence into a justification for assisting others. This framing allows Prishtina to present participation as evidence that a former security recipient can gradually assume responsibilities beyond its borders.

This posture is further substantiated by highlighting specific niche capabilities, such as the KSF's search-and-rescue and demining profiles ('Angazhimi FSK-Së Në Gazë, Hap Strategjik Për Afirmim Ndërkombëtar', 2026, paras 6–7). By emphasising these specialised functions, Kosova avoids presenting itself as a large-scale expeditionary actor and instead claims practical relevance within a narrower operational role. This distinction matters as Kosova's proposed contribution does not lack material value, its diplomatic significance exceeds its likely operational scale. Niche capabilities allow the state to demonstrate usefulness while keeping the commitment compatible with the limited capacities of a still-developing security sector.

This rhetorical strategy operates as a calculated diplomatic signal directed primarily at key Western capitals, foremost among them Washington. In an increasingly fragmented international order, small states frequently use crisis participation to ensure their voices are heard by major powers and to consolidate their systemic relevance ('Kosovo, Bulgaria, Turkey Join Trump's "Board of Peace"', 2026, paras 5–6). By aligning itself with a major American diplomatic initiative, Kosova attempts to convert a modest troop commitment into political capital. The objective is to reassure external patrons that their prolonged investment in the state-building process has yielded a dependable security partner. Consequently, the commitment functions as a diplomatic signal designed to affirm Kosova's loyalty to the United States while demonstrating its utility within broader Western security architectures (Brajshori, 2025, pp. 36, 39, 42).

For an entity navigating the international system with limited recognition, this high-visibility participation also allows the state to perform sovereign normalcy. By integrating into a multilateral coalition, Kosova can partially bypass the traditionally blocked pathways of diplomatic recognition, accumulating international standing through functional participation rather than waiting passively for formal breakthroughs.

However, the pursuit of such high-profile external integration carries significant analytical and practical risks, particularly the danger of strategic overreach. As the literature on the diplomacy of unrecognised states warns, international visibility should not be mistaken for operational readiness or full strategic consolidation. Brajshori notes that while strategic sequencing usually dictates pursuing low-politicisation institutional integration to build capacity incrementally, the sudden insertion into a highly volatile and politically sensitive environment represents a profound deviation from this cautious approach (Brajshori, 2025, pp. 41, 60). When the desire for symbolic projection outpaces the material and institutional realities of the domestic security apparatus, states risk overextending their limited resources (Brajshori, 2025, p. 60). The enthusiasm to perform sovereign usefulness on a global stage may generate immediate diplomatic visibility, but it simultaneously exposes the fragility of the state's strategic calculations. Elevating external projection above internal consolidation threatens to reveal the very dependencies the state seeks to obscure, demonstrating that high-stakes diplomatic signalling cannot entirely compensate for the absence of domestic strategic consolidation. The Gaza episode therefore illustrates both the diplomatic utility and the limits of Kosova's attempt to convert constrained participation into international standing.

Albania

The reported commitment of Albanian personnel to the ISF suggests that Kosova's external security activism should not be viewed in absolute isolation. As Reuters reported in February 2026, Kosova and Albania were among the first five states to agree to staff the proposed multilateral contingent in Gaza (Hunnicut & Jackson, 2026). Tirana's posture illustrates a broader regional logic in which Balkan states seek to amplify their diplomatic relevance through participation in politically visible international security frameworks. Even for a state with formal alliance integration, contributing to a distant and complex crisis can serve as a mechanism to demonstrate usefulness, signal political reliability and consolidate strategic partnerships with major Western powers.

However, Albania functions within this analysis strictly as a brief comparative reference rather than an analytically identical case study. Tirana possesses full juridical sovereignty and consolidated NATO membership, meaning its expeditionary commitments are exercised from a position of secure domestic authority and formal alliance integration. Its participation therefore does not carry the same compensatory function as that of a partially recognised and security-dependent entity. The primary paradox remains distinctly tied to Kosova. While both states may use the Gaza deployment as a platform for diplomatic signalling, Kosova's continuing reliance on an externally underwritten security framework at home renders its external projection more analytically revealing. For Albania, participation in a distant stabilisation project resembles a conventional exercise in alliance burden-sharing. By contrast, for Kosova, the same type of participation operates as a performance of normalisation that remains strategically premature at home. The Albanian comparator therefore highlights a shared regional impulse to accrue political capital through multilateral security cooperation, while underlining the strategic constraints that make Kosova's participation distinctive.

CONCLUSION

Why would a state that remains fundamentally dependent on an externally underwritten security framework seek to project military capacity into one of the most operationally complex and politically contested stabilisation missions of the contemporary era? Kosova continues to operate under the mandate of UNSC Resolution 1244, with KFOR retaining a central role in deterring hostilities and ensuring public safety and order. Its security institutions have been incrementally developed under strict international supervision and its domestic security autonomy remains structurally incomplete. Yet the state's political leadership has secured parliamentary approval for participation in the proposed ISF in Gaza; this decision does not simply mark a routine act of international contribution. It exposes a tension at the core of Kosova's contemporary foreign policy: the desire to appear externally as a security provider while remaining internally dependent on external security guarantees.

This article has argued that Kosova's ISF posture should be read not as evidence of consolidated strategic maturity, but as a case of symbolic projection under constraint. Faced with limited recognition, regional insecurity and continuing dependence on Western security support, Kosova has turned to external security activism as a

way to claim the role of a reliable partner. By associating itself with a high-visibility, Washington backed multilateral coalition, the state seeks to convert limited military participation abroad into diplomatic capital, alliance value and progressive legitimacy through functional participation. Yet this is precisely where the problem lies, the Gaza commitment projects the image of sovereign security provision before the domestic foundations of that role are secure.

The Albanian comparator stresses and underlines the specificity of Kosova's paradox. Albania's participation fits a familiar pattern of alliance signalling by a recognised NATO member. Kosova's participation carries a different analytical weight because it is shaped by limited recognition, domestic security dependence and an unfinished transition from security recipient to security provider. The issue is therefore not whether Balkan states use international crises to strengthen diplomatic relevance, they do, the sharper issue is that Kosova's use of this strategy risks turning external visibility into a substitute for domestic consolidation.

The broader implication is not that Kosova, or small developing states more generally, should abstain from international security missions. Participation in multilateral peacekeeping and stabilisation operations can be a rational and legitimate strategy for accumulating international prestige, building experience and demonstrating reliability. However, the Gaza case suggests that sequencing matters, domestic strategic consolidation should precede high-visibility external security projection, especially when the proposed mission is politically volatile, operationally uncertain and closely tied to the strategic agenda of a major patron. When symbolic ambition outpaces the material and institutional conditions required to sustain it, the state risks exposing the very dependencies it seeks to overcome.

Kosova's aspiration to become a credible security contributor is valid. The problem is that the Gaza ISF episode makes this aspiration appear strategically premature. Parliamentary approval gives the commitment political and institutional weight, but authorisation is not deployment and deployment is not strategic autonomy. The episode therefore reveals the limits of performative security diplomacy: it may generate visibility, reassure patrons and produce short-term diplomatic credit, but it cannot manufacture the domestic security consolidation required to make that role convincing. Kosova is not wrong to want to become a contributor to international security. The strategic error lies in treating one of the most politically charged stabilisation projects of the contemporary era as the stage on which to prove that this transition has already been achieved.

Sources

1. Angazhimi FSK-së në Gazë, hap strategjik për afirmim ndërkombëtar. (2026, February 23). HelveticalForum. <https://www.helveticalforum.ch/angazhimi-fsk-se-ne-gaze-hap-strategjik-per-afirmim-nderkombetar/>
2. Baliqi, B. (2020). Anëtarësimi i Kosovës në Organizatën e Kombeve të Bashkuara: Sfidat dhe mundësitë? In *Politika e Jashtme e Kosovës në Këndvështrim Shkencor* (pp. 11–22). Instituti për Politikë të Jashtme i Kosovës.
3. Bami, X. (2026). Kosovo Govt Backs Sending Troops to Join Gaza 'Stabilisation Force'. *Balkan Insight*. <https://balkaninsight.com/2026/03/30/kosovo-govt-backs-sending-troops-to-join-gaza-stabilisation-force/bi/>
4. Brajshori, M. (2025). Performing Sovereignty: Kosovo and the Strategies of International Integration for States with Limited Recognition. *European Review of International Studies*, 12(1), 34–67. <https://doi.org/10.1163/21967415-12010002>
5. Dragúňová, D. (2026, February). Between Stability and Escalation: Kosovo Pursues to Enhance Its Security [Think Tank]. *Strategic Analysis*. <https://www.strategicanalysis.sk/between-stability-and-escalation-kosovo-pursues-to-enhance-its-security/>
6. Eskalon situata në Zveçan: Serbët e sulmojnë e KFOR-in, raportohet se ka të lënduar. (2023, May). *Nacionale*. <https://nacionale.com/politike/eskalon-situata-ne-zvecan-serbet-e-sulmojne-e-kfor-in-raportohet-se-ka-te-lenduar>
7. Gigueux, V. A. (2018). Explaining small states' changing patterns of peacekeeping contributions through role theory: The case of Austria and Belgium. <http://hdl.handle.net/1842/33105>

8. Hasani, E., & Mjeku, G. (2019). Gjykata kushtetuese e ndërkombëtarizuar: Bartja e sovranitetit gjyqësor në rastin e Kosovës. *Revistë Për Çështje Juridike Dhe Shoqërore*, Viti XLIV(Nr. 1-4-2019), 7–35. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3491119>
9. Hunnicutt, T., & Jackson, K. (2026, February 19). Five countries commit troops to Gaza international security force, commander says. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/five-countries-commit-troops-gaza-international-security-force-commander-says-2026-02-19/>
10. Kanj, J. (2026, February 24). Trump's 'Board of Peace'—Aggrandizing Theater and the Impunity of Genocide. *Palestine Chronicle*. <https://www.palestinechronicle.com/trumps-board-of-peace-aggrandizing-theater-and-the-impunity-of-genocide/>
11. Kiçmari, S. (2020). Reflektimi i zhvillimeve ndërkombëtare në realizimin e interesave nacionale të Republikës së Kosovës. In *Politika e Jashtme e Kosovës në Këndvështrim Shkencor* (pp. 43–58). Instituti për Politikë të Jashtme i Kosovës.
12. Kosova ndjek SHBA-në në Gazë. (2026, May 3). *Bota Sot*. <https://www.botasot.info/aktuale-lajme/2478474/kosova-ndjek-shba-ne-ne-gaze/>
13. Kosovo approves troops to Gaza under US-backed scheme. (2026, March 30). *The Straits Times*. <https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/kosovo-approves-troops-to-gaza-under-u-s-backed-scheme>
14. Kosovo, Bulgaria, Turkey Join Trump's 'Board of Peace'. (2026, January 22). *Prishtina Insight*. <https://prishtinainsight.com/kosovo-bulgaria-turkey-join-trumps-board-of-peace/>
15. Ligji Nr. 06/L-123 për Forcën e Sigurisë së Kosovës, 06/L-123, *Gazeta Zyrtare e Republikës së Kosovës* (2019).
16. Lirë, R. E. E. (2026, March 30). Qeveria miraton propozimin për dërgimin e FSK-së në Gazë, vendimi i kalon Kuvendit. *Radio Evropa e Lirë*. <https://www.evropaelire.org/a/qeveria-miraton-propozimin-dergim-fsk-gaze/33719708.html>
17. Loshaj, J., & Ilazi, R. (n.d.). Kosova në vitin 2030—Një hulumtim me qasje parashikuese mbi angazhimin e SHBA-së, integrimin në BE, NATO/KFOR dhe dialogun për normalizim Kosovë–Serbi. Retrieved 5 May 2026, from <https://qkss.org/al/publikimet/kosova-ne-vitin-2030-nje-hulumtim-me-qasje-parashikuese-mbi-angazhimin-e-shba-se-integrimin-ne-be-nato-kfor-dhe-dialogun-per-normalizim-kosoveserbi>
18. Madhani, A., & Lee, M. (2026, February 19). Trump gets pledges for Gaza reconstruction and troop commitments at inaugural Board of Peace talks. *AP News*. <https://apnews.com/article/trump-board-of-peace-first-meeting-22e587df67e27cd1e1d96e446cb88378>
19. McManus, R. W., & Yarhi-Milo, K. (2017). The Logic of “Offstage” Signaling: Domestic Politics, Regime Type, and Major Power-Protégé Relations. *International Organization*, 71(4), 701–733. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818317000297>
20. Muharremi, R., & Ramadani, A. (2024). UNMIK, KFOR, and the Kosovo Protection Corps. In R. Muharremi & A. Ramadani (Eds), *Transforming a Guerilla into a Regular Army: From the Kosovo Liberation Army to the Army of the Republic of Kosovo* (pp. 43–63). Springer Nature Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-62817-7_3
21. Muja, A. (2013). Çka tutje me FSK: Ushtri apo jo? *Qendra Kosovare për Studime të Sigurisë and Forum* 2015.
22. Radio Slobodna Evropa. (2026, March 30). Vlada Kosova odobrila predlog za slanje bezbednosnih snaga u Gazu, odluka se šalje Skupštini. *Radio Slobodna Evropa*. <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/vlada-kosova-bezbednosne-snage-gaza-skupstina/33719737.html>
23. Rowlands, L. (2026, February 20). Indonesia, Morocco, Kosovo among 5 countries to send troops under Gaza plan. *Al Jazeera*. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/20/indonesia-morocco-kosovo-among-5-countries-to-send-troops-under-gaza-plan>
24. Shqipëria dhe Kosova do të dërgojnë trupa në Gaza. (2026, February 22). *Atlantiku*. <https://atlantiku.com/sq/lajme/shqiperia-dhe-kosova-do-te-dergojne-trupa-ne-gaza/2026/02/22/>
25. United Nations. (2025). Letter dated 19 August 2025 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2025/525). United Nations Security Council.
26. Voller, Y. (2015). Contested sovereignty as an opportunity: Understanding democratic transitions in unrecognized states. *Democratization*, 22(4), 610–630. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.856418>