AGOA and Nigeria-United States Economic Relations in the 21st Century

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ABSTRACT

This research empirically analyzes the impact of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) on the U.S.-Nigeria relations through legislative, export performance, structural constraints, and institutional analysis of U.S.-Nigeria trade relations. The approach combines quantitative trade data compiled from the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), 2024 AGOA Biennial Report, Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics, and a literature survey; policy document assessment; and institutional examination of the Commercial and Investment Partnership (CIP). It indicates that Nigeria leads its recipients in volumes exported (in 2023 U.S. \$3.8 bn or 42.26% of U.S. \$9.7bn AGOA imports) but petrol forms part of nearly 88.26% export value while average non-oil exports stands below 10.88%, this shows that 25 years of the AGOA has failed to catalyze the export diversification of the economy. Among critical obstacles to Nigeria's realization of trade benefits under AGOA include a lack of infrastructure facilities and adherence to standards, exchange rate fluctuations, and lack of certainty caused by annual re-enlistment. A sectoral approach-based framework provided by the 2024 CIP across the digital economy, agriculture, and infrastructure may yet maximize benefits. However with recent limited AGOA tenure of extension until December 2026 and subsequent shift of U.S. Trade policy to match reciprocity and win-win cooperation, Nigeria risks losing gains with greater uncertainty ahead, and would do well to leverage on its AFCTA strategy to effectively hedge against a loss in favorable trade terms and benefits. The study concludes that while a considerable flow of trade has existed within the bilateral framework under AGOA, its primary diversification objectives have yet to be met and require concerted and collaborative programmatic reforms at both the legislative and the domestic policy level for preferential trade provisions to effectively contribute to national economic gains.

INTRODUCTION

US-Nigeria trade relations have always been sensitive and of great strategic relevance to both countries. A nation of more than 200 million people, Nigeria represents sub-Saharan Africa’s largest country by population and Africa's biggest economy based on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) representing more than 5 percent of the region’s total economic output (Zafar, 2023). Nigeria is perceived as America’s ‘anchor state’ in West Africa, a view reflected in its security cooperation, aid and, crucially, trade relationship with the United States (United World International, 2026). Enacted in 2000, America’s flagship trade legislative package aimed at promoting a closer relationship between the U.S. and sub-Saharan Africa, the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) offers duty-free access to thousands of product categories in the U. S. Markets to support African export growth, economic reform, and help move toward the alternative to an aid-dependent model (United States Trade Representative [USTR], 2024). In the context of U. S. – Nigeria trade relations, AGOA’s record is nuanced, as it is Africa’s top recipient of benefits in terms of volume, yet fails to use this benefit to diversify economy away from the crude oil export commodity (Folawewo & Adeoye, 2021; Stimson Center, 2024). This study systematically evaluates how AGOA has influenced the U.S.-Nigeria relations through the lenses of four distinct areas: its legislative development and eligibility; Nigeria's export performance under the regime, including the split between oil and non-oil exports; structural barriers in Nigeria that have prevented the utilization of its benefits; and recent institutional development, namely, the U. S.-Nigeria CIP in 2024 and the legal uncertainties in the provision beyond 2025. This paper uses relevant data obtained from the United States Trade

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Representative (USTR), the 2024 AGOA Biennial Report, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of Nigeria and other scholarly literature.

Background

Legislation and architecture of the AGOA

The AGOA was enacted on 18 May 2000 in the United States of America (USA) by President William J. Clinton. Known as the Trade and Development Act of 2000, Public Law 106-200 (Agoa.info, n.d.), the act was the product of a decade of discussions in the U. S. Executive and Congress on how the U. S. Should structure economic engagement with sub-Saharan Africa. The proponents of AGOA argued that preference based, rather than aid based, assistance for Africa would stimulate private sector development, encourage foreign direct investment in sub-Saharan African economies, and integrate them in the global trading systems better than conventional concessionary aid (Moyo, 2009; Cohn, 2016). The core of AGOA involves the extension and improvement of the U. S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) on Africa. The GSP provided duty-free access to the USA market for 5,000 product lines for most developing countries, but AGOA added more than 1,8000 product lines specifically for eligible sub-Saharan African countries, giving beneficiaries a duty-free market access in more than 6,800 product categories-"the most liberal market access accorded to any country or region that has not negotiated a bilateral free trade agreement with the U. S." (USTR, 2024, p. 1). For a country to be an AGOA beneficiary, it should meet the requirements of sections 19 U. S. C. 2462 and 19 U. S. C. 3703, meaning that it must show progress towards the development of a market-based economy and rule of law, political pluralism, and due process (CRS, 2026). Also, its government should be taking steps to remove barriers to U. S. Trade and investment, reduce poverty and protect human rights, and enact policies to combat corruption and child labor (USTR, 2024). As a preference program that is also expected to promote political and good governance reforms, AGOA has been subject to political discussions of conditioning trade preferences on benchmarks for political progress as unilaterally defined in Washington (Stimson Center, 2024).

Modifications and legislative extensions of AGOA

The initial AGOA provided benefits to the eligible countries from October 2000 until September 2008. In July 2004, in order to address concerns about the program's brief period and in response to African government and American business stakeholders calls, Congress passed the AGOA Acceleration Act and renewed AGOA up to September 2015 (Agoa.info, n.d.). More meaningfully, in June 2015, President Barack Obama signed into law H. R. 1295 (The Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015), which extended AGOA for 10 years through September 2025 (California Chamber of Commerce, 2026). This renewal also introduced modifications by requiring that the U. S. Trade Representative to report annually to Congress on the U. S.-Africa trade relationship and providing increased reporting to Congress and opportunities for increased African government ownership of AGOA-related activities, including the development of AGOA utilization strategies, and also allow out-of-cycle eligibility reviews in response to public petitions (CRS, 2026). With the September 2025 expiration of AGOA drawing nearer, uncertainty surrounds the AGOA legislation's future. On April 17, 2024, Senators Todd Young (R-Ind.), James Risch (R-Idaho) and Chris Coons (D-Del.) introduced the AGOA Renewal and Improvement Act of 2024, which will extend the act for sixteen years to 2041 and link it to the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) framework for strengthening regional supply chains across Africa (United States Senate, 2024). It however did not become law by the time the program expired at the end of September 2025. Instead, a short-term renewal to December 31, 2026 was approved through section 5019 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2026 (P. L. 119-75), thereby restoring retroactive duty free benefits from September 2025 (CRS, 2026). Such prolonged uncertainty around AGOA highlights persistent criticism that the program's unilaterally enacted nature creates an unstable planning horizon for businesses and governments relying on the trade benefits (Quincy Institute, 2026). Again, AGOA has been extended by two years to 2028 displaying the importance of Sub Saharan Africa as an integral trading partner with the United States.

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Nigeria in AGOA: a trade profile

An overview of trade flows

Nigeria has been a participating AGOA partner country since the programme began in 2001 and continues to be one of its largest commodity exporters by value. According to the 2024 Biennial Report on the Implementation of AGOA (US Trade Representative [USTR], 2024), Nigeria was the programme's top-ranked apparel exporting country, and in 2023 was also the largest source of US imports under the programme. This contributed USD 3.8 billion of total AGOA imports of USD 9.7 billion. In 2024, the country remained its premier crude oil producer and supplier to the United States, producing USD 1.6 billion of oil imports under AGOA (Council for Research in Africa [CRA], 2026). Total US-Nigeria bilateral goods and services trade reached USD 13 billion in 2024, with US exports valued at USD 4.2 billion (mainly machinery, vehicles, agricultural produce and consumer goods) (United States Embassy Nigeria, 2026). These figures present a picture of robust bilateral commercial ties; the United States Embassy to Nigeria recently confirmed that the nation is the second largest US trading partner in Africa, with USD 7.9 billion invested in Nigeria by the United States (United States Embassy Nigeria, 2026). The commercial relationship is increasing with strong US presence and investment flow, even in the face of persistent sectoral imbalances (CFR, 2025).

The oil problem

This problem can best be analyzed through the overwhelming dependence on the oil sector in Nigeria's trade. Nigeria's total exports of crude petroleum under AGOA wereUSD 3.6 billion in 2023, up fromUSD 1.2 billion in 2021 with oil exports increasing in the latter, in both price value rather than export volume or diversification of exports (USTR, 2024). In 2024, Nigeria's exports hit N77.44 trillion but Nigeria produced up to N55 trillion of it, amounting to 71.39 percent. However, when oil products were taken into cognizance, this accounted for up to 88.26 percent of Nigeria's export performance (Intelpoint, 2025). Nigeria's non-oil exports to the US accounted for USD4.517 billion in 2023 and rose to USD5.450 billion in 2024 – which is a 20.79 percentage point increase in terms of USD but this increase is mainly influenced by the sharp naira depreciation from mid-2023 following the liberalization of the FX policy by President Bola Tinubu administration (Olujobi, 2025).

In proportional terms, non-oil exports account for an average of 10.88 percent of Nigeria's aggregate export value between January and September 2024, which has been the general trend over the past five years despite all diversification efforts (Olujobi, 2025). A study conducted by Folawewo & Adeoye (2021) indicated that low level of adherence to international standards, lack of production scale, and underdeveloped infrastructures among others have constrained the country from fully utilizing the AGOA regime's benefits to increase its exports.

Specific Sector Performance

A few non-oil sectors within the country that conform with AGOA eligible product list, have experienced meaningful expansion over time, notably agricultural products and foods. These include sesame seed, cocoa products, and cashews, as well as the exportation of processed foods to the U.S (NES Group, 2024). In 2025 CFR notes that apparel is the largest AGOA category for Africa, but Nigeria does not play a dominant role among other significant African exporter nations like Kenya, Madagascar and South Africa in these goods as well. In textile and apparel exports under third country provision, Nigeria under-performs compared to nations that developed apparel industry that have capitalized on this benefit by focusing on the U. S market such as Kenya. In Nigeria this is due to the decades-old issue of industrial policy neglect coupled with an oil sector induced Dutch Disease that had been destroying its non oil tradable goods sector since way before AGOA was conceived (Gold &Tregenna, 2024; Oyelami & Ajeigbe, 2021).The structural issues are blocking Nigerian AGOA Utilisation

The Deficit in Infrastructure

Perhaps the most pervasive impediment Nigeria faces to increasing its exports underAGOA is the inadequacy of its physical and technical infrastructure. The availability and cost of electricity, refrigerated storage facilities to maintain food quality, road transport to get products from farms to the ports and efficiency at theApapa and Tin Can Island ports all collectively shape Nigerian producers' ability to meet US buyer needs on both cost and

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quality metrics (Folawewo & Adeoye, 2021). Electricity availability is particularly lacking as Nigeria's installed generation capacity has been perennially insufficient to meet overall energy demands, significantly raising production costs and making manufacturers systemically less competitive than those in countries with more functional electricity grids (Zafar, 2023).

It is a similar problem with logistics: Apapa port has, at times, faced turnarounds ranking amongst the worst in West Africa, inflating shipping costs and reducing predictability of cargo arrival to levels unacceptable for many US buyers (NES Group, 2024). Although theLekki Deep Sea Port's operationalisation since 2023 presents promise in relieving such pressures, its broad-impact on Nigerian export logistics was not, by the time of this analysis, being fully manifested (Guardian Nigeria, 2026).4.2 Standards and Compliance Challenges Nigerian exporters often struggle to meet the stringent product, safety, packaging and labelling standards mandated for imports to the US. While theStandards Organisation of Nigeria (SON)andthe National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) are gradually progressing towards international harmonisation of standards,there remains a gap between the quality of Nigerian products and that required by theUS Food and Drug Administration (FDA)making for substantial non- tariff barriers (Folawewo & Adeoye, 2021). Notably, Heliyon's 2021 research found the failure of manyNigerian companies to observe international standards and packaging had played a substantial role in Nigeria's inability to optimise its benefits under AGOA (Folawewo & Adeoye, 2021). Such challenges are particularly prevalent in agriculture, with export procedures constrained by phytosanitary and pest concerns as well as pesticide levels, and packing regulations that pose challenges for the predominantly small and medium sized players who constitute the bulk of Nigerian agriculture (Zafar, 2023).

This is compounded by a lack of awareness: theStimson Center noted a considerable lack of knowledge about US compliance regimes among African government and business elites (Stimson Center, 2024).4.3Exchange Rate InstabilityNigeria's exchange rate regime has systematically hampered planning and diminished the competitive boost intended from AGOA.

Scholars such as Umoru & Imimole have linked Nigeria's level of non-oil exports with its real effective exchange rate (Umoru & Imimole, 2022). An overvalued Naira has meant Nigerian goods are expensive to purchase in foreign currency, the devaluation of the Naira in 2023 necessitated due to previous overvaluation, while it likely made exports cheaper in foreign currency, has caused importing to become prohibitively expensive and could lead to compressed profit margins for value-added exporters dependent on imported inputs (Olujobi, 2025).

The Annual Eligibility Review

The annual eligibility reviews inherent to AGOA's legislative framework impose significant uncertainty forNigerian exporters. The US President is obliged by law to review the eligibility of participating countries against a range of criteria on an annual basis, and has the authority to withdraw eligibility at any time(CRS, 2026). For export-oriented firms seeking to invest in machinery, or other significant assets, with the presumption of continued access to AGOA benefits, this creates an intractable planning horizon problem: such investment should rationally be avoided, as access beyond a 12-month horizon is uncertain (Stimson Center, 2024). Indeed, an eligibility suspension forNigeria is a recurring political possibility, given pastUS administration actions– specifically the Trump administration's probe into forced labour which placed Nigeria among countries of concern, along withSouth Africa and Angola(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [CEIP], 2026). Notably, those three countries together accounted for more than seventy percent of US imports under AGOA at the time of the review (CEIP, 2026).

Origins and Structure with AGOA

The bilateral trade relationship has been provided with a complementary institutional framework, the United States-Nigeria Commercial and Investment Partnership (CIP). The Partnership began as a dialogue mechanism – the United States-Nigeria Commercial and Investment Dialogue-in 2017 and evolved into the current implementation-oriented mechanism in 2023. This mechanism was concretized in July 2024 when United States Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo and the then Nigerian Minister of Industry, Trade and Investment signed a five-year Memorandum of Understanding. The first working group sessions for the CIP was convened in Abuja on June 24, 2025. There are three working groups for CIP: Agriculture, Digital Economy and Infrastructure.

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Each working group is mandated to identify, implement and track targeted deliverables in their respective areas with a biannual review to ensure progress and alignment. The CIP reflects an institutional shift in the bilateral engagement from broad dialogues to a structured and sector-specific framework for facilitating trade and investment, promoting regulatory reforms, enhancing business climate, and achieving tangible outcomes in priority areas. It has become a cornerstone of the American mission's economic policy in Nigeria, and Nigerian authorities view it as a strategic instrument for enhancing the country's economic competitiveness and international trade ties, particularly with the United States. In January 2026, a ministerial review was held in Lagos, reiterating commitment from both countries toward further progress and innovation.

Sectoral Priorities

Agriculture

The Agriculture working group has been a key focus of the CIP, working to broaden the reach and scope of Nigerian agro-product exports and increase access for US companies to sell to Nigeria. Nigeria boasts significant capacity in the processing of several value-added agro products like cashews, cocoa, tomatoes, and soybeans which can benefit from the AGOA preference mechanism. Access for US technology and private equity investors in the agriculture sector, in which a significant proportion of Nigeria's working population is employed, is a major objective. The working group supports harmonisation of regulatory environments to ease investment and engagement for US players.

Digital Economy

The Digital Economy working group leverages Nigeria's position as Africa's leading digital innovation and tech entrepreneurship hub. It focuses on facilitating trade and investment flows in the technology sector, where several US venture funds have significantly invested inNigerian startups in financial technology, e-commerce, and software solutions. Key objectives of the working group include addressing market access barriers for digital services, data governance frameworks, intellectual property protection and other regulatory reforms necessary to unlock deeper engagement and cooperation in the digital space. Infrastructure

The Infrastructure working group addresses Nigeria's fundamental structural impediments to enhanced trade and investment, notably the country's port infrastructure deficits and connectivity issues through road and rail projects, as well as challenges in energy supply. The United States is actively encouraging its firms that are specialists in construction, energy, and logistics infrastructure to explore investment opportunities. Through initiatives like those of the United States Trade and Development Agency, financial and technical assistance are provided to facilitate US firms in winning infrastructure contracts, thus addressing one of the critical issues that limit Nigeria's optimal use of AGOA and other trade preferences.

AGOA's Post-2025 Uncertainty and the Nigeria Strategy

At the expiry of AGOA at the end ofSeptember 2025, African producers and exporters faced unprecedented uncertainty regarding the future of trade relations with the US. It provided insight into how delicate the architecture on which the AGOA program is based. Although the United States had enjoyed bipartisan bipartisan support in Congress- as evidenced by the AGOA renewal legislation introduced by Senators Young, Risch and Coons as AGOA Renewal and Improvement Act of 2024-but as the Trump administration favored bilateral trade pacts built around the principles of reciprocity rather the continuation of preferences without reciprocities (context and Thomson ReutersFoundation 2025), the passage of the renewal legislation before the end date could not be assured (Reuters Foundation,2025). A one-year extension was presented by President Trump to governments across Africa as an interim fix that could not create sufficient confidence to secure investment plans and business confidence. For example, it will encourage African firms to cut export commitments to the United States and as a result, contribute to a reduction in AGOA trade volumes and the decline of political interest among other programs of export opportunities for the people of Africa.

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Second Trump Administration 'America First' Strategy and Africa

As indicated above, it is possible that trade with the second Trump administration, in office after January 2021 and thereafter will represent the greatest of challenges to US relations with Nigeria with the latter facing a number of additional concerns and issues (CRS 2026). The tariff rates on goods entering the USfrom Nigeria in2025 and 2026rose by 14 percent from 10percent on goods originating from either gas, the oil and agricultural industries (Nigeria HousingMarket 2026), although AGOA-eligible goods remained duty-free during those periods. With Section 301, there was a threat that US trade action based on forced labour concerns in Nigeria would be taken against producers in the country(CEIP,2026) and, as indicated above, in July 2025 the closure of the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) resulted in the termination of many development partners' capacity-building programs and other interventions that assisted Nigerian producers in adhering to the complex trade rules and regulations stipulated by AGOA. Indeed Margaret Olele, CEO of the Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, mines &agriculture (NACCIMA) said, 'A short- term renewal for AGOA would only worsen concerns for African exporters. We need a reform of the current AGOA-based trade relationship' (context and ThomsonReuters Foundation,2025), adding,'[The reforms] should incentivize increased investment in strategic sectors such as our mining sector, agribusiness and ICT.' Nigeria thus pursued a strategy of diversified commercial partnerships, including greater engagement under AfCFTA and deepened trade relations with the UK to mitigate the impact of the uncertainty over the future of AGOA on its export sector (ForeignPolicy 2025). Meanwhile, Nigeria's two largest export markets, China and India, were outside AGOA nevertheless, a number of observers expressed hope in March 2025 that in a bipartisan environment in the United States, that might lead to increased engagement with Africa under an improved AGOA program (ForeignPolicy, 2025)

The Role of the Continental Free Trade Area (Afcfta).

However, within the current AGOA sunset (although it has been extended to 2028), it is clear that an alternative trade framework can offer opportunities for Nigeria and the wider African region: namely, the Continental Free TradeArea(AfCFTA) which came into effect on 30 May 2019 and commenced trading on 30July 2021. The AfCFTA create a single market across 54 countries that will involve over 1.4 billion people and comprise 34 per cent of the continent's GDP (Zafar,2023); it will open up trade opportunities within the African region and enable Nigeria to develop regional supply chains stead or to supplement to USmarket access afforded by AGOA. Similarly, in a bid to boost trade between countries in the African region, theAGOARenewalandImprovement Act of2024suggested to support African supply chain development by linking to AGOA theAfcfta'starget'for intra-African trade (USSenate,2024). According to Afcfta,Nigeria has the potential to leverage from the AfCFTA framework given the size of the country as well as being the continent's richest country in terms of economy as well as population density (Zafar,2023). The current federal government's Export Trading Initiative (ETI)under the auspices of AfCFTA-launched in early 2025- aimed at enabling micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) in Nigeria to explore export trade to other African regions also represent a Nigerian strategy of hedging its current trade exposure (Guardian Nigeria,2026).

REFORMS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

AGOA Programme Reforms

The debate around AGOA's post-2025 extension is an opportunity to reform some of the programme's endemic weaknesses to meaningfully increase Nigeria's utilization rates. The highest priority for the post-2025 programme extension is a long-term (10-16-year minimum), legally certain renewal to allow for predictable investment decision-making by firms and governments alike (United States Senate, 2024; Quincy Institute, 2026). Shorter (one to three-year) extensions do not permit a long enough period to make investment in export capacity financially viable (Context/Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2025). A second necessary reform is to rationalize the current yearly eligibility review system, which allows all current beneficiaries to pass through the renewal process based on a list of clear criteria each year, thereby unnecessarily increasing uncertainty for countries with already significant bilateral trade relationships with the U.S.(Stimson Center, 2024). The 2024 AGOA Renewal and Improvement Act provision to stream-line this system to enable any enforcement action be

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timely, fair and clear represents a sound principle (United States Senate, 2024), as more graduated enforcement mechanisms, such as suspension by product, rather than country-wide removal, would help calibrate enforcement more precisely with the scope of any violation (CEIP, 2026).

Nigerian Domestic Policy Imperative Reform of AGOA alone will do little to achieve increased Nigerian utilization without corresponding actions in the domestic sphere. Most important is the acceleration of investments in power generation and port logistics in Nigeria, which significantly affect the cost competitiveness of export sector-led industries (Folawewo & Adeoye, 2021). While recent efforts in power sector reform and the opening of the Lekki Deep Sea Port are promising steps, the overall speed and scale of these investments needs to be intensified if AGOA's preferential tariff preferences are to yield significant results in Nigerian export growth (Guardian Nigeria, 2026). Second, greater investment is needed to boost standards compliance capacity in Nigeria. The Establishment of dedicated AGOA Export Advisory Offices within the Nigerian Export Promotion Council, the Standards Organisation of Nigeria, and NAFDAC, supported by staff trained in the U.S. Import requirements could help overcome some of the information obstacles faced by Nigerian producers wishing to export to the U.S. Market (Folawewo & Adeoye, 2021). CIP working groups would also offer an appropriate framework to deliver such support and capacity building through an official joint program with U. S. Technical assistance (United States Embassy Nigeria, 2026). Nigeria's Exchange Rate Policy has a more direct bearing on AGOA utilization.

A stable, predictable, and competitively valued exchange rate regime-which is free from either official overvaluation or disruptive volatility-is a prerequisite for the development of export sector industries (Umoru & Imimole, 2022; Springer Nature Link, 2025). CBN management of foreign exchange under the post-2023 reform will remain the most critical factors influencing the overall business environment for AGOA export firms and will not be easily addressed with preferential tariff benefits (Olujobi, 2025).7.3UtilizingtheCIPtoFurtherAGOAIntegrationThe US-Nigeria Commercial and Investment Partnership (CIP) offers an established bilateral institutional framework to work toward integrated AGOA reforms and enhanced utilization in a targeted, sector-specific manner (United States Embassy Nigeria, 2026). The CIP's structure around agriculture, digital economy, and infrastructure is closely aligned with Nigeria's largest non-oil export opportunities under AGOA (FMITI, 2025). Integrating AGOA utilization and reform priorities into the agenda of each working group could establish the CIP as a mechanism for translating the potential of preferential access under AGOA into tangible increases in U.S.-Nigeria trade and investment (Context/Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2025).

CONCLUSION

The U. S.-Africa trade relationship is based on preferential arrangements, but the AGOA implementation in Nigeria tells a mixed story. It has created a substantial bilateral trade: Nigeria is America's second largest trading partner on the African continent. Trade with the U.S has had an underpinning and legality because of the existence of the preferential arrangement. In addition to the bilateral trade relations between the two nations; it is noteworthy the presence of trade volume which can be directly linked to the provision of structure by the preferential arrangement between United States and Nigeria, hence serving as framework under which the two nations trade and interact(United States Embassy Nigeria, 2026; USTR, 2024). Furthermore, the structural bias of trade between the United States and Nigeria where trade is largely concentrated in oil has created vast difference between trade volume as against what AGOA was established to foster. In light of this, it does appear, therefore, that; the programme of the AGOA has not achieved its stated objective in Nigeria, with over twenty-five years since its inception as the dominant feature of the United States and sub-Saharan Africa policy, where Nigeria represents one of sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore it is clear that trade between the US and Nigeria cannot be entirely accredited as success with regards to the primary goal of the establishment of AGOA since the year that the policy came into operation(Intelpoint, 2025; Folawewo & Adeoye, 2021).

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