

Judicial Trend in Relation to Unilateral Conversion of Minor Children to Islam: An Analysis of Recent Cases in Malaysia

Su'aida Safei^{1*}, Ibtisam @ Ilyana Ilias², Siti Sarah Sulaiman³, Su'aidi Safei⁴

^{1,2,3}Faculty of Law, Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM), Malaysia

⁴Institute of Technology Management and Entrepreneurship (IPTK), Universiti Teknikal Malaysia Melaka (UTeM), Malaysia

*Corresponding author

DOI: <https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2025.910000505>

Received: 20 October 2025; Accepted: 28 October 2025; Published: 17 November 2025

ABSTRACT

The issue of unilateral conversion of minor children to Islam by a converting parent without the consent of the non-converting parent continues to generate legal uncertainty in Malaysia. This doctrinal study critically examines the judicial trend reflected in recent landmark decisions of the Federal Court, particularly *Indira Gandhi A/P Mutho v Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors* (2018) and *Pendaftar Mualaf Negeri Perlis & Ors v Loh Siew Hong and another appeal* (2025). The focus is on the interpretation of Article 12(4) of the Federal Constitution, concerning parental consent, and the implications of distinguishing between *ab initio* cases and renunciation cases within Malaysia's dual legal system. Through comparative analysis of decided cases between 2018 and 2025, the paper highlights judicial consistency in affirming that the consent of both parents is required for a valid conversion of minors to Islam. The paper also discusses tensions arising from divergent judicial reasoning in recent decisions such as *Dahlia Dhaima bt Abdullah v. Majlis Agama Islam Selangor and another appeal* (2025). Findings emphasise that while Islamic legal principles recognise unilateral parental consent in certain situations, constitutional supremacy dictates that both parents must provide consent for a conversion of minor children to be valid. The paper concludes that recent jurisprudence has strengthened legal protections for minors and supports the uniform application of constitutional principles across the states.

Keywords: Unilateral conversion, Parental consent, Malaysian Islamic legal system, Federal Constitution, Judicial trends in Malaysia

INTRODUCTION

This paper focuses on the legal issue concerning the unilateral conversion of minor children below the age of eighteen to Islam by one converting parent without obtaining the consent from the non-converting parent. The matter has become one of the most contentious contemporary legal disputes in Malaysia due to the interaction between civil law and Islamic law within the nation's dual legal system. Recent reported cases demonstrate increasing judicial scrutiny on whether unilateral acts of conversion may override constitutionally protected parental rights and the welfare of minor children.

Significant jurisprudence has emerged in the past decade, particularly from the Federal Court, which has had to reconcile the civil law requirements governing guardianship and constitutional rights with the Syariah legal framework applicable to Muslims. This paper, therefore, limits its examination to the legal validity of unilateral conversions and does not extend its analysis to jurisdictional conflicts or broader constitutional matters beyond what is necessary for legal clarification. The aim is to analyse judicial developments and evaluate the consistency of the courts in interpreting Article 12(4) of the Federal Constitution and relevant statutory provisions.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This paper employs a qualitative legal research methodology grounded in doctrinal analysis. According to Jain (1975), doctrinal legal research involves “analysis of case law, arranging, ordering and systematising legal propositions and the study of legal institution through legal reasoning or rational deduction.” It also provides “a systematic exposition of the rules governing a particular legal category, analyses the relationship between rules, explains areas of difficulty and perhaps predicts future development” (Pendleton, 2007). Therefore, in making the assessment, both primary and secondary sources of law were examined. The latter is important to highlight the current development in the respective area of law (Abd Razak, 2009).

Thus, it focuses on the close examination of primary legal sources, particularly Federal Court decisions addressing unilateral conversion of minor children between 2018 and 2025. Relevant case laws including *Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho v. Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors and other appeals* [2018] 1 MLJ 545, *Rosliza bt Ibrahim v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor* [2021] 2 MLJ 181, *Dahlia Dhaima bt Abdullah v. Majlis Agama Islam Selangor and another appeal* [2025] 1 MLJ 334, and *Pendaftar Mualaf Negeri Perlis & Ors v. Loh Siew Hong and another appeal* [2025] 1 ShLR 1 were systematically retrieved via the LexisNexis online legal database and examined to identify key principles, judicial reasoning, and evolving legal standards

This doctrinal case-study approach is supported by secondary sources including legal textbooks, statutory commentaries, and journal articles, enabling the development of a comprehensive literature review to identify existing gaps and justify the significance of this research. Case content was analysed using thematic content analysis to:

- i. trace legal interpretations of the parental consent requirement;
- ii. determine the relevance of distinguishing *ab initio* and renunciation categories of cases; and
- iii. assess judicial implications for the welfare and religious identity of minor children.

This approach strengthens the reliability of findings and facilitates a clear evaluation of judicial trends shaping Malaysian family and constitutional law.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The issue of unilateral conversion of a minor child by one converting parent without the consent of the other parent in Malaysia is complex and contentious, primarily due to the dual legal system comprising Syariah law for Muslims and Civil law for non-Muslims. This duality often leads to overlapping jurisdictions and conflicting legal interpretations. Malaysia operates under a dual legal system where Syariah law governs Muslims and Civil law governs non-Muslims. This system works well when laws are clearly demarcated; however, complications arise when they overlap, particularly in cases of religious conversion (Nair, Shamsuddin, & Yusoff, 2017). The main legal contention is whether the consent of both parents is required for the conversion of a minor child to Islam. The lack of clear legal provisions and conflicting court decisions have exacerbated the issue, leading to an unsatisfactory and complex legal process (Kusrin, Hamjah, & Sham, 2022).

Past studies offered useful insights into the court’s judgments regarding the issue of unilateral conversion. Historically, the courts have been inconsistent. Earlier cases often ruled that the minor child’s religion follows the converting parent, typically the father. However, more recent decisions have leaned towards maintaining the child’s original religion before the conversion of one parent (Kusrin, Hamjah, & Sham, 2022; Balasingam, 2018).

The Federal Court of Malaysia has made significant rulings on this matter. For instance, in the case of *Indira Gandhi A/P Mutho v. Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors and other appeals* [2018] 1 MLJ 545, the court addressed issues of judicial review, the jurisdiction of Syariah courts, and the necessity of parental consent for conversion (Ali, Hasan, Subri, & Shah, 2019). Another landmark case, *Viran a/l Nagapan v Deepa a/p Subramaniam* [2016] 1 MLJ 585, highlighted the civil court’s jurisdiction over Muslim children and the

presumption that a child of seven years can make an independent judgment regarding their own interests (Balasingam, 2018).

The unilateral conversion often leads to custody disputes, impacting the welfare and best interest of the child. The courts have to balance the welfare principle with the religious rights of the parents, which remains a contentious issue (Nair, & Chuan, 2017; Zin, & Soh, 2012). The issue is further complicated by socio-political factors, including rising Muslim religious conservatism and the Islamisation of laws, which influence public discourse and legal interpretations (Khan, & Samuri, 2022; Samuri & Khan, 2021).

The literature review reveals the gap in the studies examining a detailed scrutiny of decided cases including the latest decision of *Dahlia Dhaima bt Abdullah v. Majlis Agama Islam Selangor and another appeal* [2025] 1 MLJ 334 and *Pendaftar Mualaf Negeri Perlis & Ors v. Loh Siew Hong and another appeal* [2025] 1 ShLR 1 on the issue of unilateral conversion of a minor child by one converting parent without the consent of the other in Malaysia. Hence, this paper attempts to close the gap by doctrinally and comparatively analysing relevant and latest cases on this matter.

FINDINGS & DISCUSSIONS

Brief Facts of the Case

The parties involved were the appellants, the Registrar of Muallafs Perlis, Majlis Agama Islam, and Adat Istiadat Melayu Perlis (MAIPs), and the respondents were Loh Siew Hong, a Hindu-Buddhist mother, and her three minor children, born from Loh's civil marriage to Nagahswaran a/l Muniandy. Loh and Nagahswaran were married under the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, and they had three children. Loh and Nagahswaran were later divorced on 23 September 2021, with Loh being granted sole custody of the children. In July 2020, Nagahswaran converted to Islam and brought the children to the Perlis Islamic Religious Department (JAIPs), where their conversions were registered. The conversion certificates were issued to the children without Loh's consent. Section 117(b) of the Perlis Administration of the Religion of Islam (Amendment) Enactment 2016 (the "Perlis Enactment 2016") allows the unilateral consent of either a mother or father for the conversion of children under 18 years old to Islam. Loh filed for judicial review, arguing the conversions were unconstitutional and violated Article 12(4) of the Federal Constitution and the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961. The High Court dismissed the judicial review on 11 May 2023. The Court of Appeal then set aside the High Court's order and allowed the judicial review on 22 January 2024. The appellants subsequently applied for leave to appeal to the Federal Court against the Court of Appeal's decision.

Islamic perspective on section 117(b) of the Perlis Enactment 2016

Before proceeding further, it is worth noting the Islamic perspective of Section 117(b) of the Perlis Enactment 2016, as quoted above, in that it allows the unilateral consent of either a mother or father for the conversion of children under 18 years old to Islam. The Islamic scholars generally support a minor's conversion to Islam when it aligns with the objectives of *Maqasid Syariah*. *Maqasid Syariah* refers to the higher objectives of Islamic law, which aim to preserve five essential values: religion (*din*), life (*nafs*), intellect (*'aql*), lineage (*nasab*), and property (*mal*). In the context of a minor's conversion, two important values are relevant: *Hifz al-Din* and *Hifz al-Nasab*. On *Hifz al-Din* (Protection of Religion), the scholars argue that guiding a child toward Islam fulfills the obligation to protect faith, especially if one parent is a Muslim. On *Hifz al-Nasab* (Protection of Lineage), conversion must also consider the child's familial ties and avoid severing relationships unjustly (Khan, A. S. N., & Samuri, M. A. A., 2022). Jasser Auda, a leading scholar on *Maqasid Syariah*, emphasises that "the preservation of religion is not merely about ritual practice, but about ensuring access to spiritual truth and moral development from a young age" (Auda, J. (2008). Similarly, Mohammad Hashim Kamali argues that "In matters involving children, *Maqasid Syariah* requires a balance between spiritual welfare and parental rights, especially in plural societies" (Kamali, M.H. (2008). In addition, Maryam et.al stated that the conversion of a minor is seen as valid if it promotes the child's spiritual welfare and does not violate other *Maqasid* principles (Maryam Jamilah et.al. (2025). In summary, based on the above authorities, section 117(b) of the Perlis Enactment was enacted in line with the principles of *Maqasid Syariah* in Islam, specifically with regard to the protection of religion and lineage. Hence, based on the relevant protection of *Maqasid Syariah*, it is not wrong in Islam to allow a unilateral

conversion of minor children by the Muslim parent. Nevertheless, in the context of the Malaysian legal system, where the Federal Constitution is the supreme law of the land (Wan Arfah, 2009 and Ashgar Ali, 2020), section 117(b) of the Perlis Enactment was held to be inconsistent with Article 12 (4) of the Federal Constitution, hence the unilateral conversion of minor children is null and void, as being decided by the Court of Appeal in this case of *Loh Siew Hong*, which will be elaborated further in the subsequent paragraph of this paper.

A Summary of the Decision of the High Court in Loh's case

In relation to the issue of unilateral conversion of minor children by their father, the High Court judge (who is the current Chief Justice, YAA Datuk Seri Utama Wan Ahmad Farid) acknowledged the Federal Court's decision in *Indira Gandhi*, which ruled that the consent of both parents is required under Article 12 (4) of the Federal Constitution for the conversion of minor children to be valid. Nevertheless, he stated that the welfare of the children must take precedence, which was another aspect of the case of *Indira Gandhi* that has been rarely discussed in subsequent reported cases. He further pointed out that the children continued to practise Islam despite living with their Hindu-Buddhist mother, such as by performing Subuh prayer, which indicated their religious identity. He also highlighted that there was no evidence showing that the children were unhappy or that they had reverted to Hinduism; therefore, maintaining their Muslim identity was seen as consistent with the welfare of the children. The High Court applied the "force of evidence" test from *Rosliza's* case to conclude that the children professed Islam. The "force of evidence" in *Loh's* case points to the inevitable conclusion that the three children never left the religion of Islam. The High Court upheld the conversions and dismissed the judicial review application.

A Summary of the Decision of the Court of Appeal in Loh's case

On the issue of unilateral conversion of the minor children, the Court of Appeal set aside the decision of the High Court. It reaffirmed the Federal Court's decision in *Indira Gandhi*, which held that both parents must consent to the conversion of the children to Islam for it to be valid. The Perlis Enactment 2016, which allows unilateral consent of the minor children, was held to be inconsistent with Article 12 (4) of the Federal Constitution and is therefore null and void. The Court of Appeal also held that the High Court had misapplied the precedent in *Rosliza's* case, which involved an *ab initio* claim (never a Muslim), not a challenge to conversion by a parent. It was also pointed out that *Rosliza's* case contains different facts and issues from *Loh's* case. The Court of Appeal also highlighted that the High Court failed to follow a binding precedent in the case of *Indira Gandhi*. The appeal was allowed, and the unilateral conversion of the children was held to be invalid.

A Summary of the Decision of the Federal Court in Loh's case

The Federal Court in the case of *Loh* maintained the position in the earlier precedent of the Federal Court decision in *Indira Gandhi* (2018) that a conversion of minor children below the age of eighteen is only valid if consent of both parents is obtained. Since in *Loh's* case, she, as a mother, did not give consent to the conversion of her three children by their father, who was her ex-husband, their conversion was not valid. The Federal Court in *Loh's* case also maintained the interpretation of Article 12(4) of the Federal Constitution as in *Indira Gandhi's* case, in that the word "parent" meant "both parents" and not "one parent" only.

The Federal Court also quoted a hypothetical situation given by the learned JC in *Indira Gandhi's* case, illustrating how complicated a child's life can be if only one parent can consent to the conversion of a minor child. The quotation states that "if by 'parent' is meant either parent then we would have a situation where one day the converted parent converts the child to his religion and the next day the other parent realising this would convert the child back to her religion. The same can be repeated *ad nauseam*." Consequently, if such a thing is allowed to happen, it will be contrary to the welfare of the child. That also justified the case of *Indira Gandhi* to adopt a purposive interpretation of Article 12 (4) of the Federal Constitution, which is consistent with the welfare of the child, i.e., to obtain consent of both parents for the conversion of a minor child to be valid.

Differentiating between cases of *ab initio* and renunciation and jurisdictions of civil courts or Syariah Court

The Federal Court in *Loh's* case referred to the case of *Rosliza bt Ibrahim v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor* [2021] 2 MLJ 181 ("*Rosliza's* case") in drawing differences between *ab initio* cases, of where the civil courts

have jurisdiction to hear such cases from renunciation cases, of which the Syariah courts are the proper court to hear such cases. It is best to reproduce the relevant parts of the case of Rosliza here, where it is highlighted that “in *ab initio* cases, the issue before the court is not one of faith. It is a question of one’s identity under the Federal Constitution. In contrast, renunciation cases concern persons who, despite being Muslims, no longer have faith or believe in the religion. An *ab initio* case is where what is alleged is that the applicant was never a Muslim. *Ab initio* cases constitute those where there is insufficient proof that the applicant affirmatively professed the religion of Islam at the material time. Renunciation cases occur where what is alleged is that the applicant is no longer a Muslim. In other words, where the Syariah Court’s approval is required before the applicant is permitted to leave the religion.”

In relation to the Loh case, it falls within the category of *ab initio* cases, where civil courts have jurisdiction to hear such cases. The Federal Court in Loh’s case clearly stated that Indira Gandhi’s case is applicable to Loh’s case because of the similar facts it has in that three minor children were converted to Islam with the consent of only one parent, hence the conversions are *ab initio* null and void, following the decision of Indira Gandhi.

The Issue of whether the case of Indira is applicable to Wilayah Persekutuan only and not Perlis.

In an attempt to exclude the application of the case of Indira Gandhi to the Loh’s case, the appellants tried to argue that the case of Indira Gandhi was not applicable to Perlis and is applicable to Wilayah Persekutuan only. Nevertheless, this argument was rejected by the court, and it affirmed that all Federal court judgments, including the case of Indira Gandhi, are binding throughout the nation.

The issue of whether the recent case of Dahlia Dhaima in 2025 is similar to Loh’s case, for it to apply, making the unilateral conversion of minor children to Islam valid

The two Federal Court judges in Loh, Nallini J. and Abu Bakar J., pointed out that the case of Dahlia Dhaima could not be applied to Loh’s case. Justice Nalini emphasised that the legal requirement that the consent of both parents is required must be followed in accordance with the provisions in the Federal Constitution, and other factors cannot derogate from the constitutional requirement. It is viewed that this is consistent with following the decision of Indira Gandhi which interpreted the word “parent” in Article 12 (4) of the Federal Constitution to mean “both parents” need to give consent for the conversion of the minor children to be valid. In addition, Justice Abu Bakar highlighted that in Dahlia’s case, the applicant was not a minor, and she was a Muslim who came to the Syariah Court to seek a declaration that she was no longer a Muslim; hence, the facts of Dahlia’s case differ from those of Loh’s case. It is observed that the legal reasoning put forward by Justice Abu Bakar made more sense than Dahlia’s case, which cannot be followed for the different facts and situation it has, which is one of the exceptions that allows a precedent not to be followed in the Malaysian legal system. A judge may take the view that there are certain material differences between the precedent and the case before him to justify the court in not following the earlier case. (Wu Min Aun, 2005 and Ashgar Ali, 2020).

It is best to see the key points of all four Federal Court judgments in cases of Loh Siew Hong (2025), Indira Gandhi (2018), and two main cases, referred to (Rosliza, 2021) and distinguished (Dahlia Dhaima, 2025), in a comparative analysis table below.

Comparative Analysis Table of Four Federal Courts’ Judgments

Case	Validity of conversion	Consent of Parent	Jurisdiction of Court	Key Legal Principles	Decision of the court
Indira Gandhi (2018)	Null & void	Consent of both parents required. In this case, only one parent gave consent.	Civil court	-The word “parent” in Article 12(4) of the Federal Constitution to mean “parents”. -Therefore, consent of both parents was required for a conversion of minor	The certificates of conversion of the minor children issued by the Registrar of Muallafs Perak were void and set

				children under the age of 18 to be valid.	aside because only one parent gave consent to such conversion.
Rosliza (2021)	Conversion not valid	Not applicable, the plaintiff was an illegitimate child, hence the father was not a legal parent. Indira Gandhi's case was also referred to, affirming that consent of both parents required for a valid conversion of a minor child.	Civil court	-Differentiated “<i>ab initio</i>” cases (which the civil court has jurisdiction) from “renunciation” cases (which the Syariah Court has jurisdiction). -A father of an illegitimate child cannot ascribe paternity to the child in accordance with Islamic law (Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003), hence he cannot decide on the religion of the child. -Similarly, even under the secular law, the said father cannot decide on the religion of the child alone, without the consent of the mother, following Indira Gandhi's case.	-The child is an illegitimate child since the mother never married her father. Hence, she cannot be deemed as a Muslim by virtue of Islamic Law on the basis that either or both of her parents are Muslims. -Declaration that she was not a Muslim granted.
Dahlia Dhaima (2025)	Majority decision-conversion was valid Dissenting judgment-invalid conversion (under the Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1952 & the case of Indira)	Consent from the father was not obtained	Majority - Syariah Court Dissenting- Civil court	Majority: -the minor's upbringing is important. The minor was raised by her Muslim mother as a Muslim since childhood. -This is also a renunciation/ apostacy case, as categorised in Rosliza's case, in which the Syariah Court has jurisdiction. -The fact that she initiated her case to renounce Islam to the Syariah Court showed her belief that she was a Muslim.	Majority: The appeal was dismissed. The conversion was valid and the Court of Appeal's decision was affirmed. Dissenting: The unilateral conversion by the mother was void with reference to the 1952 Enactment and Indira Gandhi's case.

				Dissenting: The conversion of a minor is invalid by virtue of the Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1952, which prohibited conversion of a minor before she reaches the age of puberty. It was similarly invalid with reference to the case of Indira Gandhi. -The case is an <i>ab initio</i> case, as categorised by Rosliza's case, in which the civil court has the jurisdiction to hear such case.	
Loh Siew Hong (2025)	Affirmed the Court of Appeal's decision on the case that the conversion was void.	Followed Indira's case, in which the consent of both parents is required for a conversion to be valid.	Civil Court	-Principles in Indira Gandhi's case were followed, and the decision of the Court of Appeal was affirmed. -Unilateral conversion of minor children by the father without the consent of the mother was void.	-The case of Dahlia Dhaima was distinguished. -The decision in Indira Gandhi's case was reaffirmed. -Leave to appeal dismissed.

CONCLUSION

The recent case of Loh in 2025 clearly reinforced and clarified that the earlier Federal Court's decision in Indira Gandhi in 2018 is still a good precedent to be followed and is applicable to all States throughout Malaysia. Loh's case quoted various parts of Indira Gandhi's judgment to reiterate the correctness of the legal principles being applied in Indira Gandhi, and it was not decided *per incuriam*, which justified a departure from its precedent. In relation to the unilateral conversion of minor children, there were Federal Court cases post Indira Gandhi case that were referred to in Loh's case i.e. Rosliza's case in 2021 and also distinguished from, i.e. the case of Dahlia Dhaima in 2025. Indira Gandhi's case is still the landmark case to be followed, which established the principles of requiring the consent of both parents for a conversion to Islam of minor children to be valid.

It should be noted that the Federal Court in Dahlia Dhamia (which was decided before Loh's case was decided), and which was distinguished in Loh's case, had revealed a judicial tension between the majority decision of Justices Abang Iskandar and Abu Bakar Jais and the dissenting judgment of Justice Mary Lim. The dissenting judgment maintained the legal position that is consistent with the Federal Court's judgment in Indira Gandhi. Nevertheless, the majority decision in Dahlia Dhamia had given new impetus and opened new horizons in the area of unilateral conversion of minor children, considering the upbringing of the minor child, specifically that she was raised by her Muslim mother as a Muslim since childhood. This was actually what the High Court judge in Loh's case tried to introduce in his judgment. The High Court in Loh's case had earlier attempted to create what is seen as "judicial creativity" by adopting a different aspect of Indira Gandhi's case, specifically regarding the welfare of children. He also applied the "force of evidence" test adopted by the Court of Appeal in Rosliza's case, and thus maintaining the Muslim identity of the children was seen as consistent with the welfare of the

children. Nevertheless, it was later overturned by the Court of Appeal, which was also upheld by the Federal Court.

Concerning the issue of unilateral conversion of minor children, it is viewed that future judges are now having two possible precedents to be considered at the Federal Court level, Indira Gandhi's case (of which Loh's case followed) and Dahlia Dhamia's case. It would then depend on the facts and issues of the future cases to decide which one of the two precedents should be followed.

REFERENCES

1. Abd Razak, A. (2009). Understanding legal research. *Integration & Dissemination*, 4, 19.
2. Ali, N. M., Hasan, Z., Subri, I. M., & Shah, H. A. R. (2019). Determination of child's religion upon a parent's conversion to Islam in the Malaysian law and Shariah: A case study of Indira Gandhi A/P Mutho. *Malaysian Journal of Syariah and Law*. DOI: 10.33102/mjssl.v7i2.205
3. Ashgar Ali Ali Mohamed (2nd ed., 2020). *Malaysian Legal System*, CLJ Malaysia Sdn Bhd
4. Auda, J. (2008). *Maqasid al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law*. International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT).
5. Balasingam, U. (2018). Judicial interpretation: The impact on individual and society in Malaysia. *International Journal of Engineering and Technology (UAE)*. DOI: 10.14419/ijet.v7i3.25.17596
6. Nair, H. L., Shamsuddin, J., & Yusoff, J. Z. M. (2017). Religious conversion of minor children: An analysis of the current legal provision in Malaysia. *Advanced Science Letters*. DOI: 10.1166/asl.2017.10047
7. Nair, H. L., & Chuan, G. C. (2017). The effects of conversion to Islam of a non-Muslim spouse on the custody of minor children: Thoughts and trends from a Malaysia perspective. *Advanced Science Letters*. DOI: 10.1166/asl.2017.7298
8. Jain, S. N. (1975). Doctrinal and non-doctrinal legal research. *Journal of the Indian Law Institute*, 17(4), 516–536.
9. Kamali, M. H. (2008). *Shari'ah Law: An Introduction*. Oneworld Publications
10. Khan, A. S. N., & Samuri, M. A. A. (2022). Unilateral conversion of minors to Islam: Legal discourse and Muslim converts' narrative on custody and religious rights in Malaysia. *Journal Kajian Malaysia*. Vol. 40(1), Universiti Sains Malaysia DOI: 10.21315/km2022.40.1.4
11. Kusrin, Z. M., Hamjah, S. H., & Sham, F. M. (2022). Muslim father's rights in determining his minor child's conversion to Islam in Malaysia. *European Journal of Social Science Education and Research*. DOI: 10.26417/ejser.v4i1.
12. Maryam Jamilah Khairul Anuar, Arifah Aina Zazali, Nur Anisah Maisarah Abdul Wahab, Nur Ain Mahazir, Mohd Harifadilah Rosidi, (2025). "The Implications of Religious Conversion on the Determination of a Child's Religion: A Comparative Analysis of Shariah and Malaysian Civil Law within the Framework of Maqasid al-Shariah," *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS)*, vol. 9(7), pages 421-429, July.
13. Pendleton, M. (2007). *Research methods for law* (M. McConville & W. H. Chui, Eds.). Edinburgh University Press. (Original work published 2007, p. 159)
14. Samuri, M. A. A., & Khan, A. S. N. (2021). Legal literacy for Muslim converts in Malaysia. *Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*. DOI: 10.47836/pjssh.29.3.12
15. Wan Arfah Hamzah (2009). *A First Look at the Malaysian Legal System*, Oxford Fajar Sdn Bhd
16. Wu Min Aun (1st ed., 2005). *The Malaysian Legal System*, Pearson Malaysia Sdn Bhd
17. Zin, N. M., & Soh, R. C. (2012). Legal disputes in determining the religion of the child when one parent converts to Islam under Malaysian law. *Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences*.