Improvement Strategy for PT Sampoerna Karya Bangsa as a Sustainability Initiative of PT Hanjaya Mandala Sampoerna Tbk

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ABSTRACT

PT Sampoerna Karya Bangsa (SKB), the social investment platform of PT HM Sampoerna Tbk, has reached only about 60% of the targets set by its global headquarters, while comparable affiliates in a similar market reached about 112% of their own, even though funding and stakeholder support are in place. This study asks where SKB falls short in its three pillars (the Sampoerna Entrepreneurship Training Center, vocational training and the Holistic Program of Employability), why, and how the gap can be closed. A qualitative single embedded case study was conducted using semi-structured interviews with the three pillar leads and SKB's year-end project update of December 2025, coded against the Quadruple Bottom Line and the McKinsey 7S Framework. Input-process-output gap analysis and Five Whys root cause analysis were applied to each pillar. Participant reach was 124% of target (16,284 participants against 13,150), so volume is not the problem. The gaps lie in partnerships, commercial conversion and evidence of outcomes, which stay hidden because the scorecard gives 77% of its weight to participants and only 4% to partnerships. Nine root causes were traced to Skills, Staff and Style, and Style, a management style that rewards reach and reads performance only in aggregate, is the deepest. Six initiatives, two per pillar, are proposed in an 18-month, three-phase plan with a review gate after each phase: post-journey governance and a certified mentor network for SETC, a paid-class model and a trainer ecosystem for the vocational pillar, and a packaged corporate offer and a business development cell for HOPE. By month 18 the targets are 11 contracted HOPE partners, 1,500 SETC mentees a year and a learning place for at least 80% of vocational registrants. The plan gives SKB a practical route from reach to contracted partners, paid delivery and proof of results.

Keywords: gap analysis, McKinsey 7S, quadruple bottom line, root cause analysis, social investment

INTRODUCTION

The Indonesian tobacco industry is under pressure from excise increases that outpace inflation, weaker purchasing power, illicit cigarettes and a shift of consumers toward cheaper products. The effects reach beyond the firms themselves, because the tobacco value chain employs many workers with limited formal education who find it hard to move into other industries. For a large player such as PT HM Sampoerna Tbk, business continuity is therefore tied to social and economic wellbeing. In this setting sustainability is no longer philanthropy. It is expected to create value for the company and for society at the same time (Porter & Kramer, 2011), and firms are expected to show a balanced contribution across economic, social and environmental dimensions rather than isolated community gestures (Saulick et al., 2023).

HM Sampoerna responded in 2008 by establishing PT Sampoerna Karya Bangsa (SKB), a social investment platform that seeks measurable, lasting impact through human capital development. SKB runs on three pillars: the Sampoerna Entrepreneurship Training Center (SETC) for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), vocational training for young people, and the Holistic Program of Employability (HOPE) for employees preparing to retire. Even so, SKB has reached only about 60% of the targets set by the global headquarters (Sampoerna Karya Bangsa [SKB], 2025), while similar affiliates working in a comparable market

have reached about 112% of their own. This is puzzling, because investment per activity is reasonable and the program is endorsed by strategic stakeholders.

The literature offers many factors that explain why sustainability targets are met in some organizations and missed in others, among them leadership, culture, learning, capability, governance and measurement systems (Kantabutra, 2024; Wijaya et al., 2025). What is harder to find is a way to trace a shortfall in a corporate social investment platform, pillar by pillar, to the organizational conditions behind it. This study addresses that need. It asks two questions: (1) why has SKB not achieved its sustainability targets even though investment and resources have been deployed, and (2) what strategic recommendations can improve SKB's performance so that it reaches them? It combines the Quadruple Bottom Line (QBL), which defines what success means, with the McKinsey 7S Framework, which explains why success has not been reached, and it turns the findings into an 18-month implementation plan.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Sustainability and the Quadruple Bottom Line

The most cited definition of sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). Companies first operationalized this idea as corporate social responsibility, a set of community activities that ran beside the core business. Porter and Kramer (2011) argue that this misses the point, because well-designed sustainability should create shared value in which social outcomes and business performance move together. The Triple Bottom Line (TBL) of Elkington (1997) gave firms a common language by judging performance on Profit, People and Planet. Elkington (2018) later conceded that TBL was often reduced to an accounting exercise in which the three dimensions were reported separately instead of being built into strategy.

The Quadruple Bottom Line responds to this critique by adding a fourth, anchoring dimension to People, Planet and Prosperity. Ragazou et al. (2024) name it Purpose and ask whether an activity fits the organization's reason for existing, while Tajbakhsh et al. (2024) name it Policy and stress the governance conditions under which the other three can be pursued. Its advantage is diagnostic. TBL describes how much value was created, whereas QBL also asks whether that value still serves the reason the initiative exists. Because SKB was deliberately designed around a social mandate and not around conventional CSR, this study uses QBL with Purpose as the fourth dimension.

Sustainability Target Performance

Sustainability performance is the long-term result of a balanced combination of context, strategy, management processes, resources and intangibles (Farchi et al., 2021). Target performance is the extent to which an organization reaches the goals it has set for its initiatives. Two points from the literature matter here. First, output indicators (people trained, participants reached) must be separated from outcome indicators (higher income, jobs, business resilience). Most assessment approaches still rely on output-style measures because outcome data are costly to collect (Saulick et al., 2023), which leaves a program exposed when its budget is questioned. Second, performance is the visible end of a chain that runs from a sustainability-oriented culture through strategy and practice (Kantabutra, 2024). If the chain breaks anywhere, targets stop turning into results. Shortfalls can therefore be traced along an input-process-output (IPO) logic to the stage where they begin.

McKinsey 7S Framework and Conceptual Framework

The 7S Framework identifies seven interdependent elements: the hard elements Strategy, Structure and Systems, and the soft elements Shared Values, Skills, Staff and Style (Waterman et al., 1980). Its value lies in showing that a strong element, usually Strategy, can hide weak ones, and that a change in one element ripples through the others (Suwanda & Nugroho, 2022). The factors named in the sustainability literature fit this map. Leadership and management map onto Style, culture onto Shared Values, learning and capability onto Skills, and governance

and measurement onto Systems (Kantabutra, 2024; Saulick et al., 2023; Wijaya et al., 2025). The conceptual framework in Figure 1 therefore runs in four steps: literature factors are organized through the soft 7S elements, these elements shape sustainability performance evaluated across the QBL dimensions, and performance determines whether targets are achieved. The gap this study addresses is that these lenses are usually applied separately. Using QBL to define success and 7S to explain the shortfall allows an underperforming platform to

be diagnosed rather than only described.




Figure 1. Conceptual framework from literature factors to sustainability target achievement

METHODOLOGY

This study used a qualitative single embedded case study design following Yin (2018). The questions are "why" and "how" questions about a contemporary organizational phenomenon over which the researcher has no control, which are the conditions under which Yin considers a case study appropriate. The case is one organization, SKB, a revelatory case of a corporate-backed social investment platform in a heavily scrutinized industry. It is embedded because three sub-units of analysis, the SETC, vocational and HOPE pillars, were examined separately to see whether the causes of underperformance are shared or specific to each pillar. Findings are meant to support analytical rather than statistical generalization.

Primary data came from three semi-structured interviews, one with the person who leads each pillar. The questions followed five themes: sustainability purpose, impact, stakeholder perception, contribution to corporate strategy, and challenges and opportunities. The interviews were held in Bahasa Indonesia, conducted online or offline, and the statements reported here were translated by the author. Secondary data came from SKB's year-end project update of December 2025 (SKB, 2025) and four pages of SKB's public website (home, About Us, Training and SETC) viewed on 4 October 2026. Table 1 lists the evidence base. Because each pillar has only one main respondent, interview findings were used to explain patterns that the documents already showed and were not treated as proof on their own.

Table 1. Evidence base used in the analysis

Code	Source	Main use in the analysis
I1	Interview with the SETC Program Lead	Monitoring after training, staff know-how, participant records
I2	Interview with a Vocational Co-Lead	Strategy for paid classes, staff capability, trainer ecosystem
I3	Interview with the HOPE Program Delivery Manager	Reach to outside clients, business development role
D	SKB year-end project update, December 2025 (18 slides)	Scorecard, pilots, partnership pipeline, module development
W	SKB public website (home, About Us, Training and SETC pages), viewed 4 October 2026	Mission, public view of SKB, statistics block, SME showcase

Data were analyzed through thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) in five stages: data arrangement, data reduction, topic identification, interpretation and synthesis. In line with Yin's proposition-driven logic, coding categories were fixed in advance from the QBL dimensions and the seven 7S elements. Two techniques were then applied. Gap analysis compared a pre-defined ideal state with the evidence at the input, process and output stage of each pillar and rated each gap as Low, Moderate or High by written rules. Root cause analysis used Five Whys chains for the Skills, Staff and Style elements of each pillar (45 why-statements in total) together with a fishbone diagram whose seven branches follow the 7S elements. Trustworthiness was assessed with the criteria of Lincoln and Guba (1985; Ahmed, 2024). Credibility was supported by triangulating interviews with documents, and confirmability by keeping an audit trail from raw data to codes and conclusions.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Reach Is Not the Problem; Results Are

By December 2025 SKB had run 161 programs and reached 16,284 participants against a target of 13,150, which is 124% of target (116% without HOPE Commercial) (SKB, 2025). Figure 2a shows this result. Volume is therefore not where SKB is short, and both the 60% headline and the 124% reach figure can be true only if the shortfall lies in the parts of the scorecard that a headcount does not show. The scorecard gives participants 77% of its weight, training programs 19% and partnerships 4%, so a healthy headline can read "on track" while the strategic components fall behind. This is the activity-over-outcome pattern that Saulick et al. (2023) describes.

The weak components are visible in the documents. Two memoranda of understanding exist (with RSPPN and with the Ministry of Defense), but the outside HOPE pipeline holds two prospects against a benchmark of more than ten, and neither has reached a purchase order. In the vocational pilot, 918 people registered against a target of 50, yet only 170 (18.5%) were selected for the two-day training and 108 of them (63%) passed the post-test (Figure 2b), so about 81.5% of registrants were not served. The SETC reports count participants but record no income or business results. On 4 October 2026 the public website also showed zero training and zero participants and an empty SME showcase. Because such pages may load dynamically, this was used only as evidence about Systems and the public face of SKB, not about how much training was delivered.




Figure 2. Participant achievement against target (a) and the B2C vocational pilot funnel (b). Source: SKB (2025)

What the Pillar Leads Said

Each interview pointed to one main "why". The SETC Program Lead explained that the system stops when the training ends: there is no step, form or tool for following up, staff were never taught how to do post-training monitoring, only registration data are kept, and the only follow-up is a voluntary survey. This study calls this the unavailability of post-journey governance, meaning that the stage after training has no owner, no method and no record. The Vocational Co-Lead explained that a paid class needs a different strategy from a free one, yet the pillar only ran free classes in the SETC style. Prices built from all fixed costs sit above the market, the young team is still learning to market paid classes, and trainers wait to be called instead of bringing classes of their own. The internal trainer contract was still being drafted in December 2025, and the operating permit arrived on 12 December 2025. The result is a pilot that works but is not yet a paid program that sustains itself. The HOPE Program Delivery Manager explained that HOPE was built as an employee benefit, that nobody is assigned to convert outside clients, and that no fixed package exists to offer. Yamaha has finished vendor registration and awaits a purchase order, and Aneka Tuna Indonesia has received a proposal. HOPE knows how to deliver the program but not yet how to sell it. Each point agreed with the documents, and none was contradicted by them.

Gap Analysis

Table 2 summarizes the stage-level ratings. SETC holds up at the input and process stages, and its weakness is at the end of the chain, where results cannot be shown. The vocational pillar has the opposite problem. Its pilot output is the strongest in the deck, but its foundations, such as trainers, modules and agreements, were assembled late and partly with borrowed capacity. HOPE has a well-developed program design, and its difficulty sits in the middle of the chain, where proposals must become purchase orders. The pattern does not fit the simple rule that good inputs with weak outputs signal a process problem. The output SKB is measured on most, participant volume, is above target, while partnerships, conversion and proof of results lag together with gaps in capability and capacity. The reading that fits best is that SKB lacks the capability and capacity to turn reach into results, not effort, funding or reach. This is the broken chain described by Kantabutra (2024), and in all three pillars part of the output gap is a measurement gap.

Table 2. Stage-level gap ratings by pillar

Pillar	Input	Process	Output	Main "why"
SETC	Moderate	Moderate	High	No governance after the training ends: follow-up has no owner, method or record
Vocational	High	Moderate	High	No paid program model that sustains itself: pilots work but are not repeatable, priced or staffed
HOPE	Moderate	High	High	Low capability to convert clients: two prospects against a benchmark above ten, no purchase order

Note: Low = broadly in line with the ideal state, Moderate = partly in place, High = not in place or not shown by data. Vocational output refers to sustained and commercial output, not to the pilot result. Source: Author's analysis (2026).

Root Cause Analysis

The Five Whys chains stop at the fifth why, where the cause is something SKB can decide and change by itself. Table 3 compares the nine roots. The Skills roots concern capability assumed to carry over from one setting to another: from training to results, from entrepreneurship to vocational work, and from an internal audience to company buyers. The Staff roots concern capacity that is thin, borrowed or never created. The Style roots concern how performance is read and how decisions are made.

Table 3. Root causes by pillar and 7S element

Pillar	Skills root	Staff root	Style root
SETC	Skills were not updated when the expectation changed from delivering training to showing results	Staffing was never designed as a network of mentors or partner-delivered programs	Target-driven style that rewards reach and leaves little room to question what the target measures
Vocational	Vocational skills were assumed to carry over from SETC, with no capability plan for the expansion	No trainer cadre or engagement model of its own; capacity is borrowed from the parent company	Case-by-case decisions through relationships, not portfolio-level governance
HOPE	Capabilities were built for an internal audience, not for company buyers	No business development role was added when HOPE Commercial began	Aggregate-level review hides the lagging partnership component

Source: Author's analysis (2026).

Style is the deepest and most widely shared root. In every pillar at least one Skills or Staff chain passes through a management decision before reaching its root, such as the timing of the vocational mandate relative to capability, the sizing of teams by activity budgets and the choice not to add a business development role. A management style that rewards reach and reviews performance only in aggregate, turned into daily incentives by a scorecard that weights participants at 77%, shaped how teams were sized and which numbers were asked for. This supports the finding of Wijaya et al. (2025) that culture and leadership are more reliable predictors of sustainability performance than strategy documents, and it illustrates the interdependence stressed by the 7S Framework: the Skills and Staff gaps are partly the result of Style. Read through QBL, People is well served on reach but depth of benefit is not measured, Prosperity is supported only by anecdote, Purpose carries two

competing signals (social contribution and support for the commercial target), and Planet was not assessed because no program has an environmental target.

Proposed Business Solutions

SKB does not need to reach more people. It needs to turn the reach it has into contracted partners, paid delivery and proof of results. Two solutions are proposed for each pillar, guided by three principles: start where the root sits, contract before you borrow and borrow before you build, and require every solution to show evidence within two quarters. Table 4 links each solution to the root cause it answers and to its month-18 target.

For SETC, S1 gives the post-journey an owner, a method and a record: a baseline at registration, follow-up at 90 and 180 days through a short messaging-app form, a one-page monthly review owned by the SETC program manager, and a random sample of about 15% of other participants so that a small team can estimate results for the whole group. S2 turns the ten Collaborator Hub partners into contracted mentoring nodes, each naming about five mentors certified against a three-level competency standard and each mentor guiding about 15 mentees, which gives 750 mentees per cycle and 1,500 a year. For the vocational pillar, V1 labels every program as social investment (A), internal service (B) or commercial (C) before launch, prices class C from direct delivery cost plus a margin checked against the market, builds a standard module library and opens an online first stage so that unselected registrants can become paying learners. V2 builds a trainer ecosystem in three layers (core trainers, secondees from HM Sampoerna under a written HR and Legal agreement, and partner providers with revenue sharing). For HOPE, H1 packages the offer into Essential, Core and Plus packages with a procurement kit and a half-yearly proof sheet, and H2 creates a two-person business development cell that reports a seven-stage funnel weekly and is rewarded for purchase orders. Reaching 11 contracted partners requires about 55 target accounts and 23 proposals, using planning assumptions of 60%, 70% and 40% conversion between stages that SKB should replace with its own figures after two quarters.

Table 4. Solutions, root causes answered and month-18 targets

Pillar and solution	What it changes	Root cause answered	Month-18 target
SETC S1. Post-journey governance system	Baseline at registration, follow-up at 90 and 180 days, one owner, monthly review	Style: Reach is rewarded and results are not asked for	100% of participants with a baseline; at least 75% response at 90 days
SETC S2. Certified mentor network	Hub partners become contracted mentoring nodes; mentors certified against a competency standard	Skills not updated; no mentor network	50 certified mentors; 1,500 mentees a year
Vocational V1. Paid-class model	A, B and C labels, market-checked price, standard modules, a named seller	Skills assumed to carry over; case-by-case decisions	At least 80% of registrants offered a learning place (18.5% now); 6 standard modules
Vocational V2. Trainer and mentor ecosystem	Core, secondee and partner layers with written agreements and revenue sharing	Borrowed capacity; no trainer cadre	35 trainers in the cadre
HOPE H1. Packaged corporate offer with proof kit	Three packages, procurement kit, half-yearly proof sheet	Capabilities built for an internal audience	Packages and kit ready before Gate 1; 90% of participants with a readiness score
HOPE H2. Business development cell	Two-person cell, seven-stage funnel reported weekly, incentive on purchase orders	No business development role; aggregate review	11 contracted partners (6 by month 12)

Source: Author's analysis (2026).

Practical benchmarks exist for four of the six solutions. Shopee Indonesia's MSME program guides entrepreneurs from basic business skills through market access to export, with intensive monitoring after mentoring, which is the logic of S1. Mounev Academy runs regular entrepreneurship classes with three tiers of mentors, each building its own following, which is close to the mentor network in S2. Jobhun contracts its mentors as "Jobhun Expert" and lets them run independent paid classes under profit sharing, which is the model behind V2. People Shift sells customized corporate training packages with flexible pricing, which is the approach proposed in H1.

Implementation Plan and Expected Effects

The plan runs for 18 months in three phases. Phase 1 (months 1 to 6) sets the rules, namely the free-or-paid rule, the trainer agreement, the post-journey record and the business development cell, because these are decisions and not large projects and every later step depends on them. Phase 2 (months 7 to 12) builds the capacity these rules call for and runs the first cohorts. Phase 3 (months 13 to 18) scales what worked and checks it against the evidence. A gate closes each phase. Figure 3 shows the schedule and Table 5 shows what each gate checks. Because Style is the deepest root, Phase 1 also proposes to headquarters that follow-up coverage, paid seats and purchase orders be added to the scorecard next to participant numbers, with the old and new versions run side by side for two quarters so that a lower weight on reach is not read as lower performance.




Figure 3. Implementation plan as a Gantt chart (months 1 to 18)

Table 5. Gate criteria for the 18-month plan

Gate	Month	What must be true to move on
Gate 1	6	Every new SETC participant has a baseline; all vocational programs are labelled A, B or C before launch; the trainer agreement is signed by HR and Legal; the business development cell is in place and the three packages and procurement kit are ready.
Gate 2	12	At least 50 mentors are certified and 750 mentees are in the Coach tier; a first paid vocational cohort has run with a pass rate of 60% or more; six corporate partners are under contract.
Gate 3	18	The month-18 targets are met or the reason for each gap is explained, and the gaps are rated again.

Source: Author's analysis (2026).

If the plan works, the input and process gaps are expected to fall by one level in every pillar by month 18: SETC input and process from Moderate to Low, vocational input from High to Moderate and process from Moderate

to Low, HOPE input from Moderate to Low and process from High to Moderate. No output stage is expected to reach Low within 18 months, because income gains, jobs after training and renewed contracts need time and a faster change would not be believable. What the plan does promise is that every output stage will have records behind it. Most of the plan changes how existing work is organized, so it can be funded from four sources: capacity reallocated from the 3,134 participants above target, class C income, secondments in kind from HM Sampoerna and the headquarters funding that is already committed. The main risks are that headquarters reads a lower weight on reach as lower performance, that line managers do not release trainers, that corporate sales cycles run longer than assumed and that quality falls as paid classes grow. The responses are the parallel scorecard run, an HR and Legal agreement signed in Phase 1, funnel-stage reporting with pilot batches for careful buyers, and a rule to pause the next cohort if the post-test pass rate falls below 60%.

CONCLUSION

This study asked why SKB has reached only about 60% of its headquarters targets despite adequate funding and stakeholder endorsement, and what it can do about it. The answer to the first question is that SKB lacks the capability and capacity to turn reach into results, and that its scorecard lets this go unseen. Participants stand at 124% of target, while partnerships, commercial conversion and evidence of outcomes lag. Each pillar has one main "why": SETC has no governance after training, the vocational pillar has no paid program model that sustains itself, and HOPE cannot convert prospects into clients. The nine roots lie in Skills, Staff and Style, and Style, a management style that rewards reach and reads performance only in aggregate, is the deepest. The answer to the second question is six initiatives, two per pillar, delivered over 18 months with a gate after each phase. By month 18 the targets are 11 contracted HOPE partners, 1,500 SETC mentees a year and a learning place for at least 80% of vocational registrants. These steps give SKB a practical route from reach to contracted partners, paid delivery and proof of results, which also protects the investment of the headquarters.

The study has limits. It is a single embedded case that relies mostly on internal sources and one main respondent per pillar, the gap ratings are the author's judgement, and the fee levels, conversion rates and scorecard weights are planning assumptions that SKB still has to test. Further research should follow participants for 12 to 18 months and compare outcomes with the baseline using Social Return on Investment or Return on Sustainability Investment, add beneficiaries, corporate partners and headquarters as sources, and cover the Planet dimension that was left out here.

Ethical Considerations

The study involved three semi-structured interviews with SKB staff who lead the three pillars. Respondents are identified in the text by role only. [Authors to complete before submission: state whether ethical approval or clearance was obtained for the interviews and whether the respondents gave informed consent to being quoted by role.]

Conflict Of Interest

[Authors to complete before submission: disclose any employment, funding or other relationship with PT HM Sampoerna Tbk or PT Sampoerna Karya Bangsa, or state that none exists.]

Data Availability

The year-end project update of December 2025 is an unpublished internal SKB report and cannot be shared publicly. The case study database, which holds the interview notes (in Bahasa Indonesia), coded themes and source documents, is kept by the corresponding author. [Authors to complete before submission: state what can be shared on request and the reason for any restriction.]

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