# Policy Compliance and Enforcement Fidelity: The Role of Curfew Hours in Shaping Public Order and Community Safety

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## ABSTRACT

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The effectiveness of municipal law hinged not only on the written ordinance but on the integrity of its execution. The study examined the implementation of curfew hours in the Municipality of Dagohoy, Bohol, focusing on enforcement fidelity, policy compliance, and enforcement challenges encountered by local authorities. Specifically, it assessed the level of enforcement fidelity in terms of consistency, fairness, and patrol coverage; the extent of policy compliance in terms of apprehension records, warnings, and violations; and the degree of challenges related to ordinance clarity, manpower, compliance behavior, resources, and public cooperation. It also determined differences across demographic profiles and explored relationships among key variables. The study utilized a descriptive-correlational research design and involved respondents from law enforcement and community-based enforcement groups. Findings revealed that enforcement fidelity and policy compliance were both implemented at a very high level, indicating that curfew policies were consistently enforced, well-documented, and supported by structured procedures. However, enforcement challenges were found to be serious, particularly in areas related to unclear ordinance provisions, limited manpower, resource constraints, and issues in public cooperation. No significant differences were found in enforcement fidelity and policy compliance when grouped according to demographic variables, suggesting uniform implementation across groups. However, differences in enforcement challenges were observed across certain demographic categories. Furthermore, a strong positive relationship was found between enforcement fidelity and policy compliance, while enforcement challenges showed a negative relationship with compliance. The study concluded that while curfew implementation was generally effective, addressing operational challenges was essential to sustain and further improve policy outcomes. Strengthening coordination, clarifying policies, enhancing resources, and improving community engagement were recommended to support more effective and sustainable curfew enforcement.

**Keywords**: Curfew enforcement, policy compliance, enforcement fidelity, public order, community safety, law enforcement challenges

## INTRODUCTION

This chapter of the paper presents the problem and its setting. It includes the background of the study, statement of the problem, hypothesis of the study, theoretical framework of the study, conceptual framework of the study, significance of the study, scope of limitations of the study, and definition of terms**.**

### Background of the Study

The concept of public order is the bedrock of a functional society, representing a state where laws are respected, safety is guaranteed, and the collective well-being of citizens is prioritized. Among the various administrative tools used to maintain this equilibrium, curfew policies have historically emerged as a primary mechanism for crime deterrence and risk management. By restricting the movement of individuals—particularly minors—

during designated hours, authorities aim to minimize exposure to harm and reduce the likelihood of illicit activities. However, the efficacy of these policies often hinges on "enforcement fidelity," which refers to the consistency and accuracy with which a policy is implemented compared to its original design. When enforcement is lax or inconsistent, the policy loses its deterrent value, potentially leading to a breakdown in social discipline.

The implementation of curfew hours is a global phenomenon rooted in situational crime prevention and the "broken windows theory." Governments utilize restrictive measures as a preemptive strike against urban decay and high-frequency nocturnal crimes. In many nations, curfews are viewed as a necessary trade-off between individual liberty and collective security. At this scale, the discourse focuses on the legal and ethical implications of state-mandated movement restrictions. International human rights frameworks, such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, often scrutinize such measures to ensure they do not infringe upon fundamental freedoms. However, the overarching macro-trend remains: in an era of complex security threats, the state relies on temporal boundaries to define the limits of acceptable public presence, assuming that a controlled environment is inherently a safer one.

On the other hand, the focus shifts to the institutional actors responsible for translating high-level policy into localized action, including municipal governments, police departments, and community organizations. At this stage, the fidelity of enforcement becomes critical; it is not merely about the existence of a law, but how a specific city interprets and resource-allocates for that law. Institutional challenges often arise here, such as the disparity between available manpower and the geographic area requiring patrol. Furthermore, it examines the relationship between law enforcement and the community. When curfews are enforced with high fidelity and transparency, they can foster a sense of institutional trust. Conversely, inconsistent application—where certain neighborhoods are monitored more strictly than others—can lead to perceptions of bias and systemic inequality, undermining the very public order the policy sought to create. Moreover, the impact of curfew hours is felt most acutely by individuals and family units, examining the behavioral changes triggered by the policy. For a young student, a curfew might mean the difference between a safe commute home and a potential encounter with street-level crime, while for a parent, it serves as a state-sanctioned reinforcement of household rules. However, micro-level analysis also reveals the friction points of enforcement, looking at the lived experiences of those "caught" in the system—whether the enforcement is handled with dignity or through education. Fidelity at this level is measured by the officer's discretion during a stop and the clarity with which the individual understands the rules. This perspective emphasizes that public order is not just a statistical decline in crime rates, but a subjective feeling of safety and fairness experienced by the individual citizen.

The legal foundation for curfews is typically rooted in the, which allows the government to regulate behavior and liberty for the Police Power of the State promotion of the general welfare, public health, and safety. In many jurisdictions, this is codified through local government codes or municipal charters. For instance, in the Philippines, the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) empowers local government units (LGUs) to enact ordinances that maintain peace and order.

Furthermore, the judiciary plays a crucial role in defining the limits of these powers. A landmark case in this field is *Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City*, where the Supreme Court of the Philippines upheld the constitutionality of minor curfews but emphasized that such ordinances must be narrowly tailored. The court ruled that curfews must provide clear exceptions (e.g., for work, school, or emergencies) to avoid being "overbroad" and infringing on the constitutional right to travel. Internationally, similar "strict scrutiny" tests are applied to ensure that curfews serve a compelling state interest without unnecessarily violating civil liberties.

Existing literature on curfews offers a divided view on their effectiveness. Proponents often cite Deterrence Theory, arguing that the certainty of being caught after hours discourages criminal behavior. Some studies suggest that juvenile curfews lead to a reduction in both victimization and delinquency by removing potential targets and offenders from the streets during high-risk hours. Conversely, critics argue through the lens of Labeling Theory, suggesting that strict curfew enforcement can unnecessarily criminalize youth, leading to a strained relationship with law enforcement and a "cycling" into the justice system for non-criminal status offenses.

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A significant research gap remains regarding the concept of **en**forcement fidelity. Most scholarship focuses heavily on the final outcome—whether crime rates went up or down—while neglecting the complex process of implementation. There is a notable "fidelity gap" in current scholarship; little empirical data exists on how "policy drift" occurs when actual enforcement on the ground deviates from the written legislative intent. Furthermore, there is a socio-economic bias gap, as few studies have mapped how enforcement fidelity fluctuates across different demographic strata. Most research remains purely quantitative, leaving a dearth of qualitative insight into how the perceived fairness of enforcement affects a community's willingness to comply voluntarily rather than through fear of punishment. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the relationship between policy compliance and enforcement fidelity within the context of curfew hours, specifically investigating how these factors coalesce to shape public order and community safety. This research seeks to move beyond simple success-or-failure metrics by analyzing the nuances of how laws are applied in real-world settings. By identifying the barriers to high-fidelity enforcement—such as lack of training, resource constraints, or community resistance—the study aims to provide actionable recommendations for local government units. Ultimately, the goal is to determine if a more consistent, faithful application of curfew policies leads to a measurable increase in community safety, or if the inherent limitations of such restrictive measures require a shift toward more restorative and less punitive approaches. Through this investigation, the study hopes to bridge the divide between legislative intent and grassroots reality, ensuring that public safety measures are both effective and equitable.

**Statement of the Problem**

The main purpose of the study was to evaluate the relationship between the operational aspects of the curfew policy and its intended outcomes, and to assess the influence of policy compliance and enforcement fidelity of curfew hours on the maintenance of public order and the enhancement of community safety.

Specifically, this study sought to answer the following problems:

1. What is the level of implementation of enforcement fidelity as a whole and in terms of;

a. consistency

b. fairness and

c. coverage of patrols during curfew hours?

2. What is the extent of policy compliance in the implementation of curfew hours as a whole and in terms of;

a. records of apprehension

b. warnings

c. violations

3. What is the degree of challenges encountered by local authorities in enforcing the curfew hour as a whole and in terms of;

a. ordinance

b. manpower

c. compliance

d. resources and

e. public cooperation.

4. Is there a significant difference in the level implementation of enforcement fidelity when grouped according to their demographic profile?

5. Is there a significant difference in the extent of policy compliance in the implementation of curfew hours when grouped according to their demographic profile?

6. Is there a significant difference in the degree challenges encountered by local authorities in enforcing the curfew hours when grouped according to their demographic profile?

7. Is there a significant relationship among level of implementation of enforcement fidelity, extent of policy compliance and degree of challenges encountered by the local authorities in implementing curfew hours?

8. What measures can be recommended to enhance the implementation and effectiveness of curfew hours in promoting crime prevention and safety of the community?

**Hypotheses**

1. There is no significant difference in the level implementation of enforcement fidelity when grouped according to their demographic profile.
2. There is no significant difference in the extent of policy compliance in the implementation of curfew hours when grouped according to their demographic profile.
3. There is no significant difference in the degree challenges encountered by local authorities in enforcing the curfew hours when grouped according to their demographic profile.
4. There is no significant relationship among level of implementation of enforcement fidelity, extent of policy compliance and degree of challenges encountered by the local authorities in implementing curfew hours.

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The primary theoretical anchor for this study is the Deterrence Theory, popularized by Cesare Beccaria (1764) and Jeremy Bentham (1789). This theory posits that individuals are rational actors who weigh the costs and benefits of their actions before committing a violation. In the context of your study, curfew compliance is viewed as a result of the perceived certainty, celerity, and severity of punishment. When local authorities maintain high enforcement fidelity through consistent patrols and apprehensions, they increase the "cost" of non-compliance, thereby theoretically enhancing public order. This aligns with your focus on whether records of apprehension and warnings effectively deter citizens from committing further violations.

Deterrence Theory underscores the importance of consistent enforcement practices, as the perception of certainty and swiftness of punishment often outweighs severity alone in shaping behavior. In the case of curfew violations, when individuals observe that apprehensions and warnings are reliably administered, they internalize the expectation that non-compliance will inevitably lead to consequences. This not only discourages repeat offenses but also strengthens the legitimacy of local authorities, as citizens come to view enforcement as fair, predictable, and integral to maintaining public order. In this way, deterrence operates not just at the individual level but also collectively, reinforcing community norms and reducing the likelihood of widespread disregard for regulations. Moreover, the visible presence of enforcement fosters a culture of accountability, reminding citizens that rules are actively upheld. It also builds trust between the community and law enforcers, as consistent practices reduce perceptions of bias or arbitrariness. Ultimately, deterrence serves as both a preventive and corrective mechanism, ensuring that compliance becomes the rational choice for individuals and communities alike.

Complementing the behavioral aspect of compliance is the Implementation Fidelity Framework developed by Carroll et al. This framework is crucial for addressing your first research question, as it shifts the focus from the outcome of the policy to the process of its delivery. It argues that the success of any social intervention—such as a curfew—is directly dependent on the degree to which it is implemented as intended. By evaluating consistency, fairness, and coverage, your study utilizes this framework to determine if "enforcement fidelity" is

the bridge between the written ordinance and the actual realization of community safety. This helps identify whether failures in public order are due to a flawed policy or a "diluted" implementation by the enforcing officers.

Furthermore, the relationship between the authorities and the community is explained through Procedural Justice Theory, championed by Tom Tyler (1990). This theory suggests that the public's willingness to comply with legal mandates, like curfew hours, is heavily influenced by their perception of the fairness and legitimacy of the authorities. If the enforcement is perceived as biased or inconsistent—areas you are investigating in your demographic profiling (Questions 4, 5, and 6)—compliance will likely decrease regardless of the level of patrols. This theory provides a lens to understand the "Public Cooperation Challenges" identified in your third research question and helps explain the "significant relationship" you seek to uncover in your final research objective.

The Broken Windows Theory, introduced by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling , argues that visible signs of disorder—such as vandalism, loitering, or repeated curfew violations—signal neglect and can gradually erode the sense of safety in a community. Left unaddressed, these small infractions create an environment where more serious crimes feel permissible. In this sense, curfew enforcement becomes more than a technical regulation; it is a symbolic act of preserving order and discouraging the escalation of criminal activity. Consistent enforcement of minor rules demonstrates that authorities are attentive and committed to maintaining community standards. This proactive approach helps prevent the normalization of disorder, which could otherwise invite more serious criminal behavior. Ultimately, curfew enforcement serves as a visible reminder that public spaces are monitored and protected, reinforcing both safety and social cohesion.

For residents, the impact of curfew policies is felt in everyday life. Parents gain peace of mind knowing their children are expected to be home at a certain hour, while business owners feel reassured that late-night disturbances are less likely to occur. Students, meanwhile, experience curfews as boundaries that encourage healthier routines and reduce exposure to risky situations. These lived experiences highlight that compliance is not simply about following rules—it is about fostering a culture of mutual respect and care within the community.

Ultimately, consistent enforcement of curfew hours strengthens trust between citizens and local authorities. It signals that the community values safety, order, and shared responsibility. By protecting public spaces from neglect and disorder, curfew policies contribute to the prevention of urban decay and the enhancement of community well-being. In this way, the Broken Windows Theory is not just an abstract framework; it is a reminder that small, everyday acts of compliance can collectively nurture an environment where respect, trust, and security flourish.

**Conceptual Framework**

The conceptual framework of this study explored the relationship between the administrative actions of local authorities and the behavioral responses of the community. At its core was the independent variable (IV), enforcement fidelity, which measures the "integrity" of the curfew rollout through consistency, fairness, and patrol coverage. Drawing from the Implementation Fidelity Framework (2007), this variable is the primary driver for the dependent variable (DV), policy compliance. Measured through apprehension records and violation rates, compliance reflects the community’s adherence to the law as theorized by Deterrence Theory (1764) and Procedural Justice (1990).

However, the path from enforcement to compliance is mediated by intervening variables, specifically the challenges encountered by local authorities. These obstacles—ranging from manpower and resource limitations to public cooperation hurdles—act as "friction" that can dilute the effectiveness of the curfew. By analyzing these challenges alongside the Demographic Profile of respondents, the framework accounts for potential differences in how the policy is experienced and enforced across various groups, ensuring a nuanced understanding of its impact on public order

**Schematic Diagram**





Figure 1. Schematic diagram showing the relationship between the independent variable, dependent variable, and research output.

**Significance of the Study**

This study was significant as it provided empirical and theoretical contributions to policy analysis, public administration, law enforcement, and community safety by examining how curfew hours influenced public order and community safety through policy compliance and enforcement fidelity.

**Communities and the General Public.** The study would be significant to communities as it emphasizes the importance of public cooperation and perceived legitimacy in curfew implementation. By examining how compliance influences community safety, the research will provide insights into how curfew policies can be implemented in ways that protect citizens, reduce disorder, and promote a sense of security. The findings may also encourage community engagement and shared responsibility in maintaining public order.

**Significant to Policymakers and Government Institutions.** The findings of this study could assist policymakers in designing and refining curfew regulations that are evidence-based and context-appropriate. By identifying how curfew hours affect public behavior and public order, the study can inform decisions regarding the timing, duration, and scope of curfew policies. Furthermore, insights into enforcement fidelity could guide

government agencies in improving implementation strategies to ensure that curfew policies achieve their intended safety outcomes without causing unnecessary social disruption.

**Law Enforcement Agencies.** This research can benefit law enforcement agencies by clarifying the role of consistent, fair, and faithful enforcement in achieving compliance with curfew policies. Understanding the link between enforcement fidelity and public order could help enforcement bodies develop more effective operational guidelines, training programs, and inter-agency coordination mechanisms. The study may also highlight enforcement practices that enhance community trust while maintaining order.

**Public Administration and Policy Implementation Research**. This study would contribute to the literature on policy implementation by empirically examining enforcement fidelity as a mediating factor between policy design (curfew hours) and policy outcomes (public order and community safety). It would advance understanding of how implementation quality affects compliance and policy effectiveness, thereby strengthening theoretical models in public administration and governance studies.

**Future Researchers and Academics.** The research could serve as a reference for future studies on regulatory compliance, enforcement mechanisms, and public safety policies. By integrating curfew hours, compliance behavior, and enforcement fidelity within a single analytical framework, the study may provide a foundation for comparative studies, longitudinal analyses, and research in different sociopolitical contexts.

**Social Order and Community Safety Initiatives.** The study may offer practical insights for designing balanced curfew policies that maintain public order while respecting civil liberties. Its findings may support evidence-driven community safety initiatives by identifying conditions under which curfews are most effective in reducing disorder and enhancing safety.

## Scope and Limitations of the Study

The study examined policy compliance and enforcement fidelity in relation to curfew hours and their role in shaping public order and community safety. The scope of the study was limited to government-implemented curfew policies designed to regulate public movement during specified hours as a means of maintaining social order and enhancing safety. The research focused on how the structure of curfew hours, levels of public compliance, and the consistency and fairness of enforcement practices influenced outcomes related to crime reduction, public disturbances, and perceived community safety.

The study covered selected community residents and law enforcement personnel who were directly affected by or involved in the implementation of curfew regulations. Data were collected within a defined geographical area where curfew policies were formally enforced, and the findings reflected the social, institutional, and enforcement context of that locality. The analysis centered on key variables including curfew hours, policy compliance, enforcement fidelity, public order, and community safety. Despite its contributions, the study had several limitations. Its focus on a single geographical setting may have limited the generalizability of findings to other jurisdictions with different legal frameworks or enforcement capacities. The study relied partly on self-reported data, which may have been subject to response bias or inaccuracies. Additionally, while the research identified relationships among curfew hours, compliance, enforcement fidelity, and safety outcomes, it did not fully establish causal effects due to the influence of external factors such as socioeconomic conditions, policing strategies, and concurrent public safety interventions. The study also did not examine long-term impacts beyond the selected study period.

## Definition of Terms

To provide a clear understanding of the variables and parameters investigated in this research, the following terms were defined both conceptually and operationally. The conceptual definitions offer a theoretical grounding based on established academic literature and legal dictionaries, while the operational definitions specify how each term was measured and applied within the context of this study's objectives.

**Apprehension.** The act of taking a person into custody or arresting them by legal authority to answer for a charged offense (Black's Law Dictionary, 2019).

In this study, it referred to the actual count or documented instances where individuals were caught and processed by local authorities for violating curfew hours.

**Community Safety.** A state where people can live and work without fear of crime or injury, facilitated by the proactive measures of local institutions (European Forum for Urban Security, 2016).

In this study, this referred to the intended outcome of the curfew policy, measured by the perceived security and the reduction of risks within the neighborhood.

**Consistency.** The quality of staying the same at different times or the degree to which an intervention is delivered in the same way by different actors (Durlak & DuPre, 2008).

In this study, this referred to the regularity of curfew enforcement—whether patrols are conducted at the same time and with the same intensity every night**.**

**Curfew Hours.** A regulation requiring people to remain indoors between specified hours, typically at night, for the purpose of maintaining social order (Oxford University Press, 2021).

In this study, this referred to the specific time frame mandated by the local government unit during which residents are restricted from public spaces.

**Enforcement Fidelity.** The degree to which a policy or program is implemented as originally planned or designed by its developers (Carroll et al., 2007).

In this study, it referred to the level of adherence by local authorities to the curfew ordinance, specifically in terms of their consistency, fairness, and patrol coverage.

**Fairness.** The perceived impartiality and neutrality of the procedures used by authorities when exercising their power (Tyler, 1990).

In this Study, this referred to whether the curfew enforcement is applied equally to all citizens without bias or discrimination based on their demographic profile.

**Manpower.** The total number of people available and ready for work or service to complete a specific task (Cambridge Dictionary, 2022).

In this study, this referred to the number of personnel available to conduct patrols and enforce the curfew, identified as a potential challenge in the study.

**Ordinance.** A state where people can live and work without fear of crime or injury, facilitated by the proactive measures of local institutions (European Forum for Urban Security, 2016).

In this study, this referred to the intended outcome of the curfew policy, measured by the perceived security and the reduction of risks within the neighborhood.

**Policy Compliance.** The extent to which the target population conforms to the requirements and standards set by a governing policy (OECD, 2000).

In this Study, this referred to the behavior of the community members in obeying the curfew, as evidenced by the frequency of violations, warnings, and apprehensions.

**Public Order.** A condition characterized by the absence of violence, disturbance, or chaos in a community, maintained through the rule of law (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011).

In this Study, this referred to the resulting state of tranquility and organized social conduct in the community achieved through the implementation of the curfew.

**Violation.** An act of breaking or failing to comply with a law, rule, or agreement (Oxford Learner's Dictionary, 2020).

In this Study, this referred to documented instances where residents were found outside their homes during restricted hours without a valid permit or excuse.

**Warnings.** A formal or informal notice given to an offender that their behavior is in breach of a rule and that further infractions will result in punishment (Canton, 2017).

In this study, this referred to the non-punitive actions taken by enforcers where individuals are told to return home without a formal arrest or fine.

## REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

This chapter presents the relevant literature and studies (foreign and local) that the researcher considers important in strengthening the foundation of the present study. It also provides a synthesis of the literature to fully understand the research, ensuring better comprehension of the key issues identified.

### Conceptual Literature

The conceptual literature surrounding "Policy Compliance and Enforcement Fidelity" suggests that the success of a local ordinance is not merely dependent on the law itself, but on the synergy between institutional execution and public response. Central to this discussion is the concept of Enforcement Fidelity, which literature defines as the "integrity" of a policy's delivery. Scholars in implementation science argue that for a curfew to be effective, authorities must maintain high levels of adherence, dosage, and quality of delivery. This means that enforcement must be consistent and comprehensive in its coverage; any "policy drift"—where enforcers deviate from the original mandate—often leads to a breakdown in the law's perceived authority. When enforcement is perceived as fair and neutral, it builds "procedural justice," a conceptual state where the public obeys not just out of fear, but because they view the authorities as legitimate.

Parallel to enforcement is the concept of Policy Compliance, which is theoretically divided into voluntary and coerced adherence. Conceptual literature highlights that while apprehensions and fines act as a "coerced" deterrent, a sustainable curfew relies on the community's voluntary cooperation. This behavior is often a reaction to the "certainty" of enforcement; if the public observes that violations are consistently met with warnings or legal consequences, the "cost" of breaking the law becomes too high for the rational actor. However, literature also warns that compliance is frequently hindered by operational challenges, such as manpower shortages and resource scarcity. These "frictions" create a gap between the ordinance on paper and the reality on the ground, as a lack of personnel or equipment directly reduces the "fidelity" of the patrol coordination.

### Related Studies

Ultimately, the conceptual literature links these variables to the overarching goals of Public Order and Community Safety. Public order is viewed as the visible absence of disorder and unauthorized gatherings, while community safety is the broader sociological "feeling" of security among residents. Following the "Preventive Mechanism" theory, the literature suggests that by restricting movement during high-risk hours, authorities reduce the opportunity for criminal interactions. The synthesis of these concepts suggests a cyclical relationship: when local authorities overcome operational challenges to maintain high enforcement fidelity, the community responds with higher policy compliance, which fundamentally stabilizes public order and secures the environment for the entire municipality.

Philippines have consistently examined curfew ordinances as a key mechanism for maintaining peace and order, particularly in densely populated cities and municipalities. In highly urbanized areas such as Manila, Cebu City, and Davao City, curfew policies are often implemented to address rising concerns related to juvenile delinquency, street crimes, and nighttime disturbances. These areas experience heavy population density, which

increases the likelihood of criminal opportunities, making curfew enforcement a practical strategy for local authorities.

Studies conducted in Metro Manila highlight that policy compliance with curfew hours is influenced by awareness campaigns, barangay-level enforcement, and parental supervision. In cities like Quezon City and Caloocan, local governments have strengthened curfew ordinances targeting minors, particularly during late-night hours. Research findings suggest that communities with active information dissemination and visible police presence tend to exhibit higher compliance rates.

In urban centers such as Makati and Pasig, enforcement fidelity plays a crucial role in ensuring the effectiveness of curfew policies. Studies show that consistent patrol operations, clear guidelines, and coordination between barangay officials and police officers lead to better implementation outcomes. Conversely, inconsistent enforcement or selective application of rules often results in reduced public trust and lower compliance.

Research in highly crowded municipalities in provinces, such as Cainta and San Jose del Monte, indicates that curfew hours significantly contribute to reducing loitering, noise disturbances, and minor offenses. These areas, though not classified as major cities, still experience urban-like congestion, making curfew ordinances essential in regulating public behavior during nighttime.

Local studies also reveal that enforcement fidelity is closely linked to resource availability. In cities like Taguig, where there are adequate patrol units and community volunteers, curfew implementation tends to be stricter and more systematic. This results in a noticeable decline in youth-related incidents and improved perceptions of safety among residents.

In contrast, some municipalities report challenges in sustaining enforcement fidelity due to limited manpower and logistical constraints. Research in peri-urban areas surrounding Metro Manila shows that irregular patrol schedules and lack of coordination among enforcement bodies weaken the impact of curfew policies. As a result, compliance becomes inconsistent, and violations persist despite existing ordinances.

Studies conducted during and after the COVID-19 pandemic further emphasized the role of curfew hours in controlling not only crime but also public movement. In densely populated areas like Pasay and Parañaque, strict curfew enforcement contributed to both improved public order and enhanced health safety outcomes. However, these studies also pointed out issues related to fairness and human rights concerns during strict enforcement periods.

Another important finding from local research is the role of community participation in ensuring policy compliance. In cities like Iloilo City, barangay-based initiatives such as community watch programs and youth engagement activities have strengthened adherence to curfew regulations. These efforts complement formal law enforcement and promote a shared responsibility for maintaining peace and order.

Furthermore, studies highlight that curfew effectiveness is not solely dependent on enforcement but also on socio-economic conditions. In highly crowded and low-income communities, residents may violate curfew due to work-related reasons or lack of alternative spaces for social interaction. This underscores the need for flexible and context-sensitive implementation strategies in different urban settings.

Overall, local studies in the Philippines demonstrate that curfew hours can significantly shape public order and community safety in crowded cities and municipalities when supported by high policy compliance and strong enforcement fidelity. However, the success of these measures depends on consistent implementation, adequate resources, community involvement, and consideration of socio-economic realities. These findings reinforce the importance of a balanced and inclusive approach to curfew policy enforcement in the Philippine context.

Philippine studies commonly report that curfew outcomes are closely tied to the quality of implementation and community response. Patalinghug et al. (2021), for instance, examined implementation practices alongside the reported impacts and problems of curfew restrictions, implying that policy effects are not automatic but depend on how the curfew is carried out and supported. In a study of Di-lasag, Aurora, the implementation of curfew

was discussed in relation to community perceptions and recommendations, suggesting that compliance is influenced not only by enforcement actions but also by residents' acceptance of the policy's goals (Pia et al., 2023). Similarly, research in Sta. Maria, Davao Occidental found a significant relationship between curfew hour implementation and public safety and law enforcement indicators, pointing to the practical link between enforcement activity and the community's safety conditions (Engalan et al., 2023). The compliance picture becomes clearer when enforcement is viewed as a shared task among institutions. Where barangay-based groups participate in curfew operations, compliance may be strengthened through expanded patrol coverage and localized persuasion (Miilcen Jay et al., 2022). This matters because curfew compliance is rarely produced by police presence alone, especially in municipalities with limited personnel. In evidence-based policing discussions on nighttime settings, multi-agency approaches and targeted interventions are frequently emphasized as more realistic and potentially more effective than relying on a single unit or purely reactive enforcement (McGuire et al., 2021a, 2021b). The implication for curfews is that compliance is more likely when residents see a coherent enforcement system—PNP, barangay officials, and peacekeeping teams operating with aligned procedures—rather than fragmented or irregular patrol activity through enforcement patterns. In Brazil, the juvenile curfew policy was examined.

In the United States show that curfew policies are commonly localized at the city or state level, often targeting minors to reduce juvenile crime and nighttime disturbances. Research indicates that cities such as New York City and Los Angeles implement youth curfews with varying enforcement strategies, including warnings, fines, and community service. Studies reveal that while curfews can reduce youth victimization and certain crimes during restricted hours, their effectiveness depends heavily on consistent enforcement and public cooperation. Critics also note concerns about civil liberties and disproportionate enforcement in marginalized communities.

In the United Kingdom, curfew measures are often enforced through legal tools such as Anti-Social Behavior Orders (ASBOs) and dispersal powers. Research in cities like London and Manchester highlights that curfews are used to control anti-social behavior, particularly among youth. Studies show that enforcement fidelity is achieved through strong coordination between police forces and local councils. However, findings also suggest that curfews alone are insufficient unless paired with social programs, such as youth engagement and community policing initiatives.

Studies in Japan emphasize a community-oriented approach to curfew enforcement. In urban areas like Tokyo and Osaka, curfew guidelines for minors are often supported by schools, parents, and local authorities rather than strict punitive measures. Research indicates that high levels of social discipline and cultural norms significantly contribute to compliance. Instead of heavy policing, Japan relies on preventive strategies, awareness campaigns, and community accountability, resulting in relatively high adherence and low levels of youth-related crime.

In Australia, curfew policies are implemented selectively, particularly in response to public disorder or emergencies. Studies in cities such as Sydney and Melbourne—especially during the COVID-19 pandemic—show that strict curfew hours were enforced to control movement and maintain public safety. Research findings suggest that compliance was generally high due to clear government communication and strict penalties. However, scholars note that prolonged curfews raised concerns about mental health and individual freedoms.

In Germany, curfew regulations are typically situational and often applied during public health crises or security threats. Research focusing on cities like Berlin and Munich indicates that enforcement fidelity is maintained through well-structured legal frameworks and disciplined law enforcement systems. Studies highlight that public trust in government institutions contributes significantly to compliance. Additionally, Germany's approach emphasizes proportional enforcement, ensuring that curfew measures are balanced with the protection of individual rights and freedoms.

**Procedural Justice, Fairness, and Police Legitimacy**

Curfew enforcement is not only a matter of presence and patrol; it is also a matter of how authority is exercised. In policing literature, this "how" is often discussed through procedural justice, a framework that explains why people comply with rules and cooperate with legal authorities even when doing so is inconvenient. Procedural

justice focuses on whether the public experiences enforcement as fair, respectful, and neutral, and whether officers appear trustworthy and open to listening. When these elements are present, people are more likely to accept decisions, comply voluntarily, and extend cooperation to authorities. In contrast, when enforcement is experienced as arbitrary, humiliating, or biased, compliance tends to depend on fear of punishment alone, and community cooperation becomes more fragile (Tyler, 2003; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).

This logic is particularly relevant to curfew ordinances because a curfew is implemented through repeated, often face-to-face interactions: being questioned at night, asked to go home, issued a warning, escorted to barangay or police stations, or recorded as a violator. These encounters can either reinforce the community's sense that authorities are acting to protect residents, or they can generate resentment if residents perceive selective enforcement or disrespectful treatment. Procedural justice theory argues that people's reactions to legal authorities are strongly shaped by process-based judgments, especially judgments about (1) the quality of decision-making (whether rules are applied consistently and based on facts) and (2) the quality of interpersonal treatment (whether people are treated with dignity). These process-based judgments then shape legitimacy, and legitimacy influences long-term compliance and cooperation (Tyler, 2003). The classic process-based model proposes a sequence: procedural justice → legitimacy → compliance and cooperation. Legitimacy here is not simply approval; it involves the belief that police (and by extension local authorities enforcing ordinances) have a rightful authority that deserves obedience. Sunshine and Tyler (2003) argued that legitimacy is strongly connected to public willingness to cooperate with police and accept police actions, and that judgments of procedural justice remain important even when people also care about police effectiveness. This is crucial for curfew enforcement because the curfew's day-to-day success depends on routine compliance and community support—such as parents cooperating in bringing minors home, residents reporting disturbances, and barangay members accepting enforcement without escalating conflict.

More recent research continues to show that procedural justice is consistently associated with legitimacy across varied contexts. A systematic review and meta-analysis by Chan et al. (2023), synthesizing evidence from a large body of studies, reported a robust relationship between procedural justice and police legitimacy and emphasized that social identity and social context shape the strength of that relationship. For curfew policies, this matters because the same enforcement action may be interpreted differently depending on age group, social standing, prior experiences, or local histories between citizens and authorities. The implication for enforcement fidelity is straightforward: *consistency and fairness are not only administrative ideals; they are legitimacy-building practices.*

Other contemporary studies refine the model by showing that procedural justice can "buffer" legitimacy even when residents doubt police performance. Nam, Wolfe, and Nix (2024) examined whether procedurally fair treatment reduces the negative effect of perceived police ineffectiveness on legitimacy. Their results indicate that when people judge police procedures as fair, the harm of perceived ineffectiveness on legitimacy can be reduced, though the pattern may differ across groups. This finding is relevant to curfew enforcement in rural municipalities where resource constraints are common. Even when citizens believe the police cannot fully prevent all crime, fair and respectful enforcement can still preserve legitimacy and willingness to comply.

In a related way, Na, Lee, and Kang (2023) argue against treating police legitimacy as driven by a simple choice between "instrumental" values (effectiveness) and "normative" values (fairness). They suggest that the public can care about both at the same time, and that fairness and effectiveness are intertwined in real evaluations of police. For a curfew policy, this is a practical reminder: residents may support a curfew not only because they want fewer incidents at night, but also because they want enforcement that feels even-handed and not humiliating, especially when minors and vulnerable residents are involved.

Although "fairness" is sometimes discussed abstractly, the curfew context makes it concrete. Fairness is experienced in the details: whether the same rules apply across barangays, whether exemptions are recognized, whether officers explain reasons for actions, whether they listen to a resident's situation, and whether people are treated with respect. Martin and Bradford (2021) describe legitimacy as something produced through ongoing dialogue and the use of power in ways that people recognize as appropriate, not simply through authority's ability to compel obedience. In curfew enforcement, this implies that legitimacy is built when authorities

communicate the purpose of the ordinance, apply it predictably, and avoid conduct that signals domination rather than protection.

From a behavioral perspective, respectful enforcement tends to support voluntary compliance, which is especially valuable in policies like curfews that require repeated compliance night after night. When compliance is mainly fear-based, people may comply only when patrols are visible; when compliance is legitimacy-based, rules can be followed even with limited manpower. Training-oriented policing resources often emphasize similar components—such as respectful communication, neutrality, and trustworthy motives—as practical pillars for procedurally just policing. While these materials are not substitutes for scholarly studies, they are useful because they translate procedural justice into operational guidance that can shape enforcement fidelity on the ground.

The social environment also matters. Morrow and Vickovic (2024) highlight that perceptions of police legitimacy are influenced not only by individual experiences but also by social networks—family and peers—and procedural justice remains an important correlate of legitimacy within that social process. This is particularly relevant to a community-based policy like a municipal curfew, where public opinion spreads quickly. One unfair incident can circulate and affect broader willingness to comply, while consistent respectful handling can strengthen community acceptance of the curfew's purpose.

Cross-national findings also suggest that procedural fairness is not a narrow, culture-bound idea. Boateng and Darko (2021), studying Ghana, report that procedural fairness and police contact shape perceived legitimacy in a post-colonial context, reinforcing that fair treatment remains a key factor in whether people accept police authority. The value of this type of evidence for Philippine local governance is not that Ghana and the Philippines are identical, but that it shows how legitimacy is often anchored in everyday fairness, even where historical and institutional contexts differ.

**Street-Level Enforcement, Discretion, and Resource Constraints**

Local ordinances such as curfew policies are implemented at the point of contact between authorities and citizens. This implementation layer is shaped by "street-level" actors—police officers, barangay peacekeepers, and other frontline personnel—who translate written rules into day-to-day enforcement decisions. Street-level implementation rarely occurs as a purely mechanical application of policy. Instead, it is mediated by discretion, workload, ambiguity in rules, competing priorities, and resource constraints. As a result, even when a curfew ordinance is uniform on paper, its enforcement can vary across barangays, shifts, and enforcement teams, producing differences in consistency, fairness, and patrol coverage.

Street-level discretion is often described as an unavoidable feature of frontline governance. Frontline actors operate in contexts where they must make rapid judgments under uncertainty, with incomplete information, and within limits of time and manpower. These conditions encourage the use of informal rules, shortcuts, and prioritization strategies. Comparative research on policy implementation emphasizes that compliance among street-level managers and frontline implementers is not guaranteed; it depends on their interpretation of policy objectives, their perceived feasibility of requirements, and the organizational environment that supports or discourages compliance (Ege et al., 2024). In curfew enforcement, similar dynamics can arise when implementers perceive the ordinance as either achievable and valuable or as difficult to implement given local realities such as geography, limited personnel, and competing duties. Variation in how implementers interpret "what counts" as an enforceable violation can shape the pattern of warnings, apprehensions, and patrol deployment across communities.

Discretion becomes more visible when policy rules contain ambiguity or require situational judgment. Ambiguity may appear in exemptions (e.g., emergencies, work-related travel), definitions (e.g., what constitutes loitering or valid purpose), or procedural steps (e.g., whether to warn first, when to apprehend, who should be documented). Under ambiguous conditions, enforcement style can shift across officers and teams, leading to differential treatment that the public may interpret as unfair or arbitrary. De Camargo (2023) documents how police uncertainty during the enforcement of pandemic regulations in the United Kingdom contributed to uneven practice, demonstrating how unclear or rapidly changing rules can intensify frontline uncertainty and produce variable enforcement outcomes. Similar patterns are also reported in crisis policing comparisons, where frontline

decisions are shaped by local interpretations and operational constraints, generating different enforcement approaches even under shared legal frameworks (de Maillard et al., 2024). These findings are relevant to curfew contexts because they highlight that implementation gaps are not always deliberate; they can arise from uncertainty about policy meaning and from the practical challenge of applying general rules to diverse real-life situations.

Workload and resource constraints further intensify the role of discretion. When manpower is limited, frontline personnel must decide where to patrol, which areas to prioritize, and which incidents deserve immediate intervention. These choices effectively reshape the "dose" of enforcement delivered to different locations and time periods. Ege et al. (2024) suggest that organizational structures and expectations influence whether street-level managers comply with policy demands; when demands exceed capacity, implementers may cope through selective enforcement or informal adjustments. In curfew implementation, selective enforcement may take the form of concentrating patrols in more accessible or historically problematic areas, focusing on visible gatherings rather than dispersed violations, or relying on warnings rather than formal documentation due to time constraints. These choices can produce uneven patrol coverage and inconsistent enforcement experiences across barangays.

Enforcement style is also consequential because citizens respond differently depending on how authority is exercised. De Boer (2021) shows that enforcement style can generate unintended effects, including citizen reactions that range from compliance to resistance or shaming of officials. Where enforcement is perceived as heavy-handed, inconsistent, or disrespectful, frontline action may provoke conflict, complaints, or reduced cooperation—outcomes that are counterproductive for policies that depend on community participation. Conversely, overly permissive enforcement may reduce the perceived certainty of detection and weaken deterrence. In curfew enforcement, street-level choices about whether to issue warnings, record violations, or conduct apprehensions can therefore shape not only immediate compliance but also longer-term public attitudes toward legitimacy and cooperation.

Another practical challenge is that frontline actors often operate within multiple, sometimes conflicting, accountability pressures. Police may be evaluated on visible outputs such as number of patrols, reports, or arrests, while also being expected to maintain community trust and manage risks. Research on police discretion during enforcement of executive orders highlights how officers and chiefs navigate the tension between coercion and discretion, sometimes bending or adapting rules to manage operational realities and public resistance (Charbonneau et al., 2023). This tension is relevant to curfew implementation, where enforcement fidelity requires both consistency and fairness, yet situational demands may push officers toward flexible or improvised approaches. When discretion is not guided by clear procedures and supervision, flexibility can become inconsistency; when discretion is guided by transparent standards and training, flexibility can function as context-sensitive fairness.

Recent research also underscores that technology and monitoring can influence discretion, though not always in simple ways. For example, large-scale analyses of body-worn cameras show that surveillance mechanisms can reshape arrest practices and discretionary decision-making, suggesting that accountability tools may affect how frontline officers exercise authority (Headley et al., 2025). While body-worn cameras are not universally available in local Philippine settings, the general insight is transferable: when oversight and documentation systems are strengthened, discretion may become more standardized; when such systems are weak, street-level practice may depend more heavily on individual judgment and informal routines. This has direct implications for curfew operations that rely on record-keeping (warnings, violations, apprehensions) as indicators of compliance and implementation.

Street-level implementation is also influenced by broader community dynamics that can produce unintended governance outcomes. Edri-Peer and Cohen (2023) discuss how procedural justice and the actions of street-level bureaucrats may unintentionally prompt citizens to take matters into their own hands, including vigilante-like behavior, when official enforcement is perceived as ineffective or inconsistent. In curfew contexts, uneven enforcement or perceived neglect of certain areas may encourage informal community control practices that may not align with legal standards or human rights protections. Although the curfew's intention is to enhance safety through lawful and organized enforcement, implementation failures can create perceived security gaps that alter community behavior in unpredictable ways.

Finally, the street-level perspective also helps explain why enforcement patterns may shift over time as offenders and communities adapt. Research on surveillance and displacement suggests that when enforcement intensifies in visible spaces, offenders may shift tactics and become less visible, potentially producing new harms or displacing offending rather than eliminating it (Berry&Berry, 2024). While this literature is not specific to curfews, it supports the broader claim that enforcement strategies interact with offender adaptation and community routines. In curfew implementation, this implies that shifts in patrol coverage and enforcement intensity can change not only compliance rates but also the locations and timing of certain offenses, complicating the interpretation of crime prevention outcomes.

In sum, street-level enforcement research provides a strong explanation for why curfew implementation may vary across barangays and enforcement teams. Discretion is shaped by ambiguity in rules, operational pressures, resource limitations, organizational expectations, accountability structures, and citizen reactions. These factors can produce uneven enforcement fidelity, affecting consistency, fairness, and patrol coverage. For studies examining curfew effectiveness, this perspective justifies the inclusion of implementation and enforcement variables, because outcomes are likely to reflect not merely the presence of the ordinance but the realities of how frontline actors interpret and deliver it in practice (Ege et al., 2024; De Boer, 2021; Charbonneau et al., 2023; de Maillard et al., 2024; De Camargo, 2023).

**Evidence on Curfews' Impact on Juvenile Crime and Victimization**

Curfew policies are commonly justified on the assumption that restricting young people's presence in public spaces during late-night hours reduces both offending and victimization opportunities. In principle, curfews aim to limit unstructured nighttime activity, reduce exposure to risky peer networks, and increase adult supervision—either through parents, community guardians, or law enforcement. Yet the literature indicates that the impacts of curfews on juvenile outcomes cannot be treated as automatic or uniform; rather, effects depend on the social context in which young people live, the manner of enforcement, and whether curfews are implemented as protective measures or as punitive controls.

A key concern in evaluating curfew impacts is that curfew violations are often categorized alongside other minor or "status-type" offenses that may bring youth into formal systems of control. Iniobong and Iheakachi (2025), while focusing on punitive sanctions for minor offenses among juveniles, provide an important caution for curfew policy design: punitive responses to low-level youth misconduct may have limited deterrent value and may not meaningfully reduce reoffending. In their study, punitive measures for minor offenses showed weak and statistically insignificant associations with juvenile recidivism, suggesting that sanction-based approaches alone may fail to address the underlying drivers of repeated offending (Iniobong & Iheakachi, 2025). Although the setting differs, the implication for curfew enforcement is applicable: if curfew violations are managed primarily through punishment, the resulting system contact can deepen stigmatization and disrupt schooling and family functioning, potentially undermining long-term prevention goals.

Empirical work in the Philippine context also supports the view that curfew impacts are linked to implementation quality and community perceptions rather than the ordinance's mere existence. Engalan et al. (2023), examining curfew implementation in Sta. Maria, Davao Occidental, reported that curfew hour implementation was perceived as moderately implemented and was significantly related to indicators of public safety and law enforcement in the community. This finding is consistent with the argument that curfews may contribute to safety outcomes when implementation is sufficiently visible and coordinated, and when residents interpret enforcement as part of a broader peace-and-order strategy rather than sporadic or selective control (Engalan et al., 2023). While this study does not isolate juvenile crime trends in a causal design, it reinforces a practical point: local evidence often connects curfew implementation to perceived safety conditions, which can influence compliance and cooperation needed for the curfew to function effectively.

International and comparative perspectives broaden the analysis by clarifying that juvenile delinquency and victimization are shaped by structural and situational factors that curfew policies can only partially influence. Kokoravec et al. (2021) highlight that juvenile delinquency and victimization vary across urban and rural environments, and that risk and protective factors may operate differently depending on community characteristics. This is especially relevant for municipalities where geography, service access, and informal

social control differ across barangays. In settings where rural youth experience distinct patterns of victimization risk or limited access to services, curfew policies may not address the broader vulnerabilities that contribute to delinquency and victimization (Kokoravec et al., 2021). For research focused on a specific municipality, this suggests that curfew effects should be examined alongside local community structure, mobility patterns, and availability of protective institutions.

Family structure and parental supervision represent another major pathway affecting juvenile outcomes that can shape how a curfew functions in practice. Hong and Lee (2025) found that transitions to single-parent family structures were associated with increased delinquent behavior, and that mechanisms such as residential mobility and changes in parental control help explain this relationship. Their analysis points to the central role of supervision and stability: when parental monitoring weakens or family disruption increases, adolescents may have more opportunities for unstructured socializing and risk exposure (Hong&Lee, 2025). Curfew policies can be interpreted as an external support to parental supervision, but the literature implies that curfews may be most relevant when paired with family-centered supports, particularly for households experiencing instability. Without such supports, curfew enforcement may simply push youth indoors without addressing the conditions that encourage rule-breaking or risk-taking.

A related policy-level debate concerns whether curfew laws are framed as child protection measures or punitive constraints. The Malaysian legal scholarship on children's curfew proposals provides a useful lens here. Ikhsan et al. (n.d.) discuss a proposed children's curfew law through Social Bond Theory and the parens patriae doctrine, presenting curfews as potentially defensible when the state acts in a protective role where parental supervision is inadequate. Their position implies that curfew justification is strongest when the policy is designed around safeguarding children from victimization and harmful exposure rather than simply criminalizing presence in public spaces (Ikhsan et al., n.d.). In a related discussion, Ikhsan et al. (2025) evaluate children's curfew laws by weighing potential benefits (reducing children's involvement as victims or offenders) against concerns about limiting freedom and the risks of overreach. Across these discussions, a consistent theme is that curfews require clear exceptions, proportional enforcement, and an explicit child-welfare orientation if they are to avoid becoming counterproductive forms of control (Ikhsan et al., 2025).

Finally, broader juvenile justice scholarship urges caution about policies that intensify surveillance or broaden system involvement without evidence of rehabilitative benefit. Stevens (2021) argues that youth accountability practices increasingly rely on technology-driven policies and intensified monitoring, and that such approaches must be assessed against the developmental status of youth and the risk of driving deeper justice involvement. Although Stevens (2021) does not focus solely on curfews, the argument supports an important implication for curfew enforcement: when curfew violations become a gateway to escalating sanctions, monitoring, or public labeling, the policy can unintentionally contribute to cumulative disadvantage rather than prevention. Curfews may reduce immediate exposure to certain risks, but the wider system response to violations can shape whether the policy ultimately supports rehabilitation and long-term desistance.

Taken together, the evidence suggests that curfews can plausibly contribute to juvenile safety and public order—especially when implementation is consistent and viewed as legitimate—yet the potential benefits are constrained by deeper social and family mechanisms that curfews alone cannot resolve (Engalan et al., 2023; Hong & Lee, 2025; Iniobong & Iheakachi, 2025; Kokoravec et al., 2021). Thus, the impact of curfews should be evaluated not only through enforcement outputs but also through how the policy interacts with community context, family supervision, and the broader juvenile justice approach to minor offenses.

**Conditions That Affect Curfew Effectiveness**

The effectiveness of curfew policies depends on a set of interacting conditions that influence whether a curfew reduces risk, displaces harm, or generates unintended negative consequences. Rather than treating curfews as stand-alone interventions, the literature supports evaluating them as components within broader systems of supervision, environmental control, and social support.

One important condition is the balance between preventive enforcement and punitive processing. When curfew enforcement relies heavily on punitive action for minor violations, it risks increasing youth contact with formal

systems without producing corresponding reductions in delinquency. Iniobong and Iheakachi (2025) provide empirical support for this concern by showing that punitive measures for minor offenses have limited deterrent impact on recidivism and can be associated with harmful developmental and social consequences. From a curfew policy standpoint, this suggests that warnings, diversion approaches, family engagement, and referral to support services may be more consistent with long-term prevention goals than automatic punishment for first-time or low-risk violators (Iniobong & Iheakachi, 2025). In practical terms, curfews are more likely to be effective when the enforcement response is proportional and oriented toward correction and safety rather than stigmatization.

A second condition is the strength of family supervision and household stability. Hong and Lee (2025) demonstrate that family transitions, especially shifts to single-parent households, are associated with increased delinquency partly through reduced parental control and environmental disruption such as residential mobility. These mechanisms imply that a curfew's effectiveness may vary across households: youth with strong parental monitoring may comply easily and benefit from the curfew's structure, while youth experiencing limited supervision may be more likely to violate curfew rules or engage in risky activity despite restrictions. Curfew enforcement that does not consider these household differences may inadvertently punish symptoms of weakened supervision rather than addressing its causes. Consequently, curfews may be more effective when paired with parent-focused strategies, community supports for vulnerable families, and school or social-service engagement aimed at strengthening supervision capacity (Hong&Lee, 2025).

A third condition concerns community environment, including rural–urban differences and service access. Kokoravec et al. (2021) emphasize that juvenile delinquency and victimization patterns can differ between urban and rural environments, and that while risk and protective factors may be similar, their relative influence changes across settings. For municipalities and barangays that differ in density, mobility routes, and informal social control, curfew implementation may yield uneven outcomes. In areas with limited lighting, fewer safe recreational spaces, and weaker access to youth services, simply restricting movement may not reduce long-term risk. This implies that the effectiveness of a curfew can be shaped by environmental design, youth activity structures, and availability of legitimate nighttime alternatives (Kokoravec et al., 2021).

A fourth condition is policy design and normative legitimacy, particularly when the policy is framed as child protection rather than social control. Legal and theoretical discussions in Malaysia argue that curfew proposals gain stronger justification when grounded in the parens patriae doctrine—where the state acts to protect children in situations of vulnerability—and when supported by theories emphasizing bonds to family and community (Ikhsan et al., n.d.). At the same time, Ikhsan et al. (2025) recognize that curfew laws can also raise concerns about freedom of movement and disproportionate restriction if exceptions and safeguards are weak. These discussions point to the importance of clear policy boundaries: curfews are more likely to be effective when communities understand the policy's purpose (child safety and public order), when exceptions are reasonable, and when enforcement is consistent and non-arbitrary (Ikhsan et al., 2025; Ikhsan et al., n.d.). Where the policy is perceived as unfair or overly punitive, compliance may weaken and enforcement may become conflict-prone, reducing effectiveness.

A fifth condition relates to the broader risk environment—particularly alcohol availability, economic stressors, and the possibility of harm displacement. While not juvenile-specific, evidence from South Africa's temporary alcohol sales ban indicates that restricting alcohol availability can causally reduce injury-related mortality and is associated with declines in violence-related outcomes during the restriction period (Barron et al., 2024). This finding matters for curfew effectiveness because curfews are often implemented in the same nighttime ecology as alcohol-related disorder. Where alcohol use is a strong driver of nighttime violence, curfews may be more effective when aligned with strategies that manage alcohol availability and high-risk locations, rather than focusing only on youth movement restrictions (Barron et al., 2024). At the same time, curfews can change where violence occurs. Yaldız Hanedar et al. (2024) show that curfew policies, when combined with economic and psychological stress, can coincide with patterns of violence against women. This highlights the risk of displacement from public spaces to private settings: reducing street disorder does not necessarily mean reducing overall harm, especially when households are under stress and confinement increases exposure to domestic conflict (Yaldız Hanedar et al., 2024). For curfew evaluation, this implies the need to consider multiple safety indicators, including family safety and not only public order metrics.

A sixth condition is the presence of serious violence risks, including weapon-carrying dynamics, which may limit what curfews can accomplish on their own. Browne et al. (2022), in a systematic review of knife crime offender characteristics and interventions, report that weapon-related violence is linked to complex risk profiles such as exposure to violence, substance use, and mental health issues, and that interventions require tailored approaches. Where serious youth violence and weapon-carrying are prominent, a curfew might reduce opportunities for nighttime incidents, but it is unlikely to address the deeper drivers of weapon involvement without complementary interventions (Browne et al., 2022). In line with this, Lane (2023) emphasizes that serious juvenile violence requires policy and practice strategies that go beyond "get-tough" approaches and focus on interventions with evidence of effectiveness. This suggests that curfews may function best as one component within a broader, prevention-oriented strategy that includes targeted services, conflict reduction programs, and community-based supports, especially for high-risk youth (Lane, 2023).

In summary, curfew effectiveness is shaped by enforcement philosophy (preventive vs punitive), family supervision and stability, rural–urban context, policy legitimacy and safeguards, broader environmental drivers such as alcohol and economic stress, and the local profile of serious violence risks (Barron et al., 2024; Browne et al., 2022; Hong & Lee, 2025; Ikhsan et al., 2025; Ikhsan et al., n.d.; Iniobong & Iheakachi, 2025; Kokoravec et al., 2021; Lane, 2023; Yaldız Hanedar et al., 2024). For municipal-level studies, these conditions support a research approach that interprets curfew outcomes through implementation realities and community context, rather than attributing changes in juvenile safety or delinquency to curfew rules alone.

**Philippine Empirical Literature on Curfew Implementation**

Philippine local governments have frequently used curfew ordinances—particularly those targeting minors—as a practical public order measure implemented through barangay and municipal enforcement systems. Local curfew policies are often justified as a way to reduce late-night disorder, limit youth exposure to risky environments, and support crime prevention efforts under conditions where manpower and resources are constrained. However, the empirical Philippine literature generally treats curfew effectiveness as an outcome that depends on implementation realities rather than as an automatic result of policy adoption. Accordingly, local studies tend to examine not only the presence of a curfew ordinance but also the *extent of implementation*, perceived impacts on safety, and the barriers and enabling conditions experienced by implementers and community members.

A recurring theme in Philippine studies is that curfew policies are rarely implemented uniformly across communities. Instead, enforcement tends to be shaped by local contexts and administrative capacity, which means that implementation is experienced differently across barangays, patrol areas, and time periods. Mark (2022), for instance, explicitly frames curfew implementation around its extent, impact, problems, and potential solutions, illustrating the Philippine research tendency to treat curfew enforcement as a multi-dimensional governance issue rather than a single-variable intervention. The structure of this type of study underscores that curfew initiatives should be evaluated through both outcomes (e.g., perceived safety or reductions in disorder) and process measures (e.g., the consistency of enforcement and the practical challenges that prevent full implementation) (Mark, 2022).

Likewise, Pia et al. (2023) focus on the effectiveness of curfew implementation in a specific municipality, signaling an emphasis on how local ordinances perform when translated into on-the-ground practice. In Philippine municipal settings, curfews typically require coordination among the barangay, the municipal government, and law enforcement, and therefore effectiveness is inseparable from administrative routines such as patrol scheduling, documentation practices, and the handling of violators—especially minors. Studies framed around implementation effectiveness commonly examine community receptiveness and the operational capability of local enforcers, highlighting that compliance is not solely a matter of resident behavior but is also a function of how consistently and credibly the ordinance is implemented (Pia et al., 2023).

Engalan et al. (2023) similarly situate curfew implementation in relation to public safety and law enforcement conditions, reflecting how Philippine research often connects curfew enforcement to broader safety outcomes and perceptions. This approach is particularly relevant to municipalities that view curfew enforcement as part of an integrated peace-and-order strategy. It also supports the argument that curfew ordinances can be evaluated

not only through crime incident counts but also through public safety indicators that matter locally, such as reduced disturbances, fewer late-night conflicts, and improved perceptions of order. At the same time, placing curfew implementation alongside public safety and law enforcement outcomes implicitly acknowledges that enforcement is one component of a larger governance environment, where results may also be influenced by patrol capability, reporting practices, local leadership, and community cooperation (Engalan et al., 2023).

Another pattern in Philippine curfew studies is the focus on the community's experience and satisfaction with disciplinary or curfew hours, particularly in relation to minors. Bangit et al. (2025) evaluate community satisfaction with engaging in disciplinary hours for minors in selected barangays, which is significant for two reasons. First, it reinforces that curfew policies—especially those involving youth—are not evaluated purely by deterrence logic; they are also assessed by whether residents view the policy as fair, protective, and worth supporting. Second, community satisfaction functions as an indirect indicator of legitimacy and acceptability, which can influence compliance, reporting, and cooperation with enforcement personnel. When communities experience curfew implementation as acceptable and beneficial, voluntary compliance becomes more feasible; when communities experience it as arbitrary or overly punitive, resistance and evasive behavior may increase, weakening the policy's practical effects (Bangit et al., 2025).

Across these municipal and barangay-focused studies, implementation challenges are frequently treated as central explanatory factors. In local governance, curfews are implemented in settings where street-level enforcers must operate under limited personnel, competing responsibilities, and variable guidance. Literature on policy implementation under crisis conditions provides a useful frame for understanding why "policy intent" can diverge from "policy delivery." Zech et al. (2023), discussing policy implementation in crisis with lessons from the Philippines, emphasize that implementation outcomes depend on coordination, institutional capacity, and adaptive problem-solving. Although their focus is not curfew enforcement per se, the underlying implementation insight is transferable: when policies must be executed quickly and repeatedly at the local level, effectiveness depends on how well institutions manage ambiguity, allocate resources, and coordinate across levels of government and frontline units (Zech et al., 2023). For curfew enforcement, this suggests that inconsistency may reflect not merely weak discipline but also structural limits, unclear procedures, or uneven coordination between municipal authorities and barangay enforcement mechanisms.

Relatedly, Salazar Jr. (2024) highlights the role of discretion and street-level deliberative practices in the Philippines' COVID-19 crisis response. The relevance of this work to curfew policies lies in its emphasis on how frontline implementers interpret rules and negotiate enforcement under constrained conditions. Curfew implementation, like crisis restrictions, often requires rapid judgment calls: whether to issue warnings or record violations, how to handle exemptions, and how to respond to residents who contest enforcement actions. When discretion is shaped by deliberative practice—meaning implementers interpret rules through local reasoning, community norms, and practical constraints—enforcement can either become context-sensitive and fair or uneven and unpredictable, depending on the strength of guidance and accountability structures (Salazar Jr., 2024). For curfew research, this line of literature supports the inclusion of enforcement fidelity measures because it explains why identical ordinances can be implemented differently across teams and barangays.

Philippine empirical literature also points to the importance of patrol capability as a practical condition for curfew implementation and for broader crime prevention. Carpio et al. examine the effectiveness of police mobile patrol on burglary incidents in a specific locality. Although the study is not centered on curfews, it reinforces a core operational point: patrol presence, mobility, and allocation patterns shape preventive capacity and can influence incident occurrence and reporting. In curfew enforcement, patrol coverage functions as both a deterrent and a guardianship mechanism; without sufficient patrol reach and continuity, enforcement becomes sporadic, which reduces the credibility of the curfew and weakens its preventive function. Patrol-related findings in local studies therefore provide operational grounding for why "coverage of patrols during curfew hours" is a meaningful component of enforcement fidelity, particularly in localities where geographic dispersion and limited resources complicate consistent monitoring (Carpio et al., n.d.).

Finally, curfew implementation must be understood within the lived experience of safety and risk in Philippine communities. Lasco et al. (2023), analyzing spatial constructions of safety and risk amid the COVID-19 pandemic, explore how Filipinos interpret safety through concepts of inside/outside ("loob" and "labas"), where

safety is socially and spatially constructed rather than purely statistical. This perspective is valuable for curfew policy research because curfews explicitly regulate "outside" activity during specified hours, implicitly framing nighttime public spaces as riskier than the home or private sphere. Yet people's sense of safety is not uniform; it depends on neighborhood relationships, trust in authorities, perceptions of who is targeted by enforcement, and whether public spaces are seen as dangerous or socially necessary. Thus, evaluating curfew implementation requires attention not only to enforcement outputs but also to how residents interpret the curfew's protective intent and how that interpretation affects compliance and cooperation (Lasco et al., 2023).

In synthesis, Philippine empirical literature portrays curfew implementation as a governance practice shaped by capacity, discretion, coordination, and community legitimacy. Studies focusing on extent and effectiveness (Mark, 2022; Pia et al., 2023) commonly treat implementation quality as integral to outcomes, while work relating curfews to public safety and law enforcement (Engalan et al., 2023) supports examining both safety indicators and enforcement realities. Community-focused evaluations (Bangit et al., 2025) reinforce that acceptability and satisfaction are crucial to sustained compliance. Implementation scholarship drawn from crisis governance and street-level discretion (Zech et al., 2023; Salazar Jr., 2024) clarifies why enforcement is often uneven, while local patrol-focused research (Carpio et al., n.d.) provides operational support for emphasizing patrol coverage and resource constraints. Together, these works justify evaluating curfew policies through both outcome indicators and enforcement fidelity measures, particularly in municipalities where implementation conditions vary across barangays.

**Philippine Literature on Community Cooperation and Barangay Peacekeeping**

Curfew enforcement in the Philippines is rarely executed by police alone. Instead, it is typically embedded in a barangay-centered governance structure in which community-based actors—such as barangay officials, tanod, and organized peacekeeping teams—contribute to monitoring, guiding residents, and supporting formal law enforcement. Because barangays are the smallest administrative units and are closest to residents' daily routines, their involvement is often decisive for whether a curfew ordinance is implemented consistently and whether it gains community acceptance. The literature therefore emphasizes that curfew effectiveness depends not only on patrol deployment but also on community cooperation and the strength of barangay peacekeeping mechanisms.

A direct contribution to this topic is the study by Miilcen Jay et al. (2022), which examines the perceived effectiveness of the Barangay Peacekeeping Action Team (BPAT) in relation to public safety and the implementation of curfew hours. Research framed in this way treats BPAT effectiveness as both a public safety factor and an implementation factor: barangay peacekeeping units can shape whether curfew rules are communicated clearly, whether patrols are conducted with sufficient coverage, and whether residents feel that enforcement is approachable rather than threatening. Because BPAT and similar barangay-based teams typically have deeper familiarity with local households, youth networks, and community routines, their participation can increase the accuracy of enforcement—such as distinguishing between legitimate movement (work, emergencies) and risky late-night loitering—and can reduce unnecessary escalation by relying on persuasion and community relationships (Miilcen Jay et al., 2022). The presence of such teams can also extend enforcement reach in settings where police manpower is limited, making "guardianship" more continuous across multiple barangays.

Community cooperation is often discussed in Philippine literature not as an abstract concept but as a practical condition that determines whether a policy can be implemented without constant coercion. Curfew implementation demands repeated compliance, often on a nightly basis, and therefore sustainability depends on residents' willingness to follow restrictions even when enforcement is not immediately visible. This is where community satisfaction and perceived legitimacy become operationally important. Bangit et al. (2025), through their evaluation of community satisfaction regarding disciplinary hours for minors, illustrate how public acceptance functions as a support structure for implementation. When residents view disciplinary hours as reasonable, child-protective, and fairly implemented, communities are more likely to cooperate by encouraging youth compliance, informing authorities about recurring violations, and participating in informal supervision. If residents perceive the policy as unfair or selectively implemented, cooperation may decline, and enforcement becomes more labor-intensive because implementers must rely more heavily on apprehension rather than voluntary compliance (Bangit et al., 2025).

## Philippine Legal and Policy Context on Curfews

Curfew policies in Philippine localities do not operate in a legal vacuum. They sit at the intersection of (a) the general police power of local government units (LGUs) to protect public welfare, (b) child-protection and juvenile justice standards that limit punitive treatment of minors, and (c) jurisprudential guidance that draws boundaries on what a constitutionally acceptable curfew ordinance should look like in practice. For research on curfew re-implementation in Dagohoy, Bohol, this legal and policy environment matters because it shapes what "proper enforcement" can legally mean, what types of sanctions are permissible, and what institutional arrangements are expected from barangay and police partners.

LGUs in the Philippines derive broad authority to craft local ordinances from the Local Government Code of 1991. A central provision is the general welfare clause, which recognizes that local governments may exercise powers that are expressly granted, necessarily implied, or otherwise essential to promote the general welfare. This clause is often treated as the backbone of local police power because it permits municipalities and cities to adopt measures aimed at protecting safety, order, and community well-being, provided that such measures remain consistent with the Constitution and national laws (Republic Act No. 7160, 1991).

Beyond this general enabling authority, the Local Government Code also establishes that local legislative bodies—particularly the sangguniang bayan (municipal council) and sangguniang panlungsod (city council)—have the power to enact ordinances and approve resolutions for efficient and effective governance and for the promotion of general welfare. In other words, the Code does not only allow local policy-making in the abstract; it concretely assigns ordinance-making authority to local councils as part of their mandated legislative functions (Republic Act No. 7160, 1991).

In the curfew context, these legal provisions matter because they frame curfew ordinances as a form of local public safety regulation that may be justified when a locality can reasonably relate the policy to welfare concerns (e.g., protection of minors, reduction of nighttime disorder, prevention of victimization). However, the same legal framework also implies a boundary: local ordinances must remain reasonable and must not contradict national statutes or constitutional rights. Thus, the legitimacy of curfew re-implementation depends not only on whether crime prevention is a policy goal, but also on whether the ordinance is crafted and enforced in a manner consistent with higher legal norms (Republic Act No. 7160, 1991).

A related national policy anchor that is frequently cited in discussions of minors' curfews is the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under this Code, city or municipal councils are expressly recognized as having the capacity to prescribe curfew hours for children when warranted by local conditions. This articulation is significant because it places the idea of a minors' curfew within an existing child-welfare legal tradition—while also emphasizing that enforcement responsibility is shared between parents/guardians and local authorities (Presidential Decree No. 603, 1974, Art. 139).

Taken together, these provisions support the basic legal proposition that LGUs may enact curfew ordinances under their police power and welfare mandates. For the present study, this establishes that Dagohoy's re-implementation can be understood as a lawful local governance response—yet one that must be assessed against the requirements of child protection, proportional enforcement, and jurisprudential standards.

## Child Protection and Juvenile Justice Framework

While local authority provides the entry point for curfew ordinances, the enforcement of curfews—especially where minors are frequent subjects—must align with national child protection and juvenile justice policies. In Philippine law, children are treated as a distinct class with heightened protection because of their developmental status and vulnerability. This orientation is reflected in statutes that prohibit harmful treatment and require protective, rehabilitative, and developmental approaches rather than purely punitive responses.

A key doctrinal safeguard comes from the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act, which states that status offenses—conduct that would not be penalized if committed by an adult—should not be punished when committed by a child. This principle is important because curfew violations are commonly treated as classic "status offense"

behavior: being outside at certain hours is not inherently criminal for adults, but becomes regulated for minors due to protection-oriented policy concerns (Republic Act No. 9344, 2006, Sec. 57).

This approach was strengthened through later amendments that specifically addressed local ordinances on juvenile status offenses. Under the amendment introducing Section 57-A, ordinances on juvenile status offenses—explicitly including curfew violations—must be framed for the protection of children, and no penalty shall be imposed on children for such violations. Instead, minors should be brought home or to barangay officials for release to parents/guardians, and the ordinance should provide intervention programs such as counseling and parenting education. The law also emphasizes that the child should be recorded as a "child at risk" rather than a "child in conflict with the law" for these local-ordinance violations (Republic Act No. 10630, 2013, Sec. 11 amending R.A. 9344 by adding Sec. 57-A).

The implication for curfew policy is substantial: even where an LGU believes stricter nighttime control is needed, legal compliance requires that enforcement against minors avoids punitive sanctions (e.g., fines or imprisonment imposed on the minor) and instead uses protective handling and intervention-oriented responses. This has direct relevance to research variables on policy compliance and enforcement practice because an ordinance can appear "strict" on paper while still being legally constrained in the way violations are processed.

Child protection laws also reinforce that enforcement encounters must not expose children to abusive or degrading treatment. The special protection statute against child abuse and exploitation underscores the State's duty to prevent conditions that harm children's welfare (Republic Act No. 7610, 1992). While this law is not a curfew statute per se, it strengthens the policy expectation that enforcement tactics should not humiliate, endanger, or mistreat minors, and that child-related interventions must be oriented toward safety and welfare rather than coercive punishment.

For Dagohoy's re-implemented curfew, the juvenile justice framework therefore functions as a compliance standard: it does not prohibit regulation, but it requires that the response to minors be protective, procedurally careful, and anchored in appropriate referral and intervention—an issue that directly intersects with community trust, fairness perceptions, and enforcement fidelity.

The most important jurisprudential reference for minors' curfews is the Supreme Court's En Banc decision in *Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City, City of Manila, and Navotas City* (G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017). This case is pivotal because it did not treat "curfew" as automatically valid or invalid; rather, it examined how specific ordinance designs and enforcement implications interact with constitutional rights and national juvenile justice policy.

A central outcome of *SPARK* is the Court's differentiated ruling across the three LGUs involved. The Court upheld the Quezon City ordinance while declaring the Manila and Navotas ordinances unconstitutional. This distinction is highly instructive for local governments because it signals that curfew ordinances may pass constitutional scrutiny when they are narrowly tailored, rights-sensitive, and consistent with national law—yet may fail when they impose overly broad restrictions or insufficient safeguards.

One reason highlighted in legal commentary on the decision is the importance of adequate exemptions and narrowly drawn restrictions. In particular, the Quezon City ordinance was described as providing more sufficient safeguards because it allowed minors to engage in legitimate activities (for example, participation in school, church, and civic activities) and thereby avoided an undifferentiated ban on being outdoors during curfew hours. The Manila and Navotas ordinances, in contrast, were criticized for overly restricting minors' freedoms because their restrictions were not as carefully bounded by meaningful exceptions (DivinaLaw, 2023).

A second and particularly crucial point for enforcement practice concerns penalties and juvenile justice consistency. Legal discussion of *SPARK* underscores that Sections 57 and 57-A of the juvenile justice law prohibit penalizing minors for status offenses such as curfew violations; therefore, a curfew ordinance cannot impose fines or imprisonment on the minor-violator and must instead emphasize appropriate intervention measures (DivinaLaw, 2023).

For the present study, the relevance of *SPARK* extends beyond "Is the curfew legal?" and goes directly into how the curfew should be implemented. The ruling effectively highlights several operational boundaries that connect enforcement fidelity dimensions:

1. Fairness and equality in enforcement. Curfew ordinances that are vague or that give enforcers unstructured discretion risk uneven application and may invite claims of arbitrary enforcement. The jurisprudential lesson is that legitimate curfew regulation must come with standards and exceptions that reduce the chance of selective or discriminatory implementation.

2. Consistency with national child policy. Regardless of local safety concerns, enforcement must follow the legal principle that minors should not be penalized for status offenses. Thus, "strictness" should be operationalized through protective handling, documentation, parent/guardian coordination, and intervention referral—not through punitive sanctions against the child.

3. Importance of exceptions and context. A curfew that fails to recognize legitimate reasons for minors' nighttime presence (school, religious, civic, emergency, or supervised activities) risks being overbroad. In implementation terms, this means frontline enforcers must be trained to apply exceptions consistently and respectfully.

These points matter for Dagohoy because they suggest that effective and lawful curfew enforcement is not merely about intensifying patrols or increasing apprehensions. It is also about ensuring rule clarity, uniform application, and child-welfare compliance—factors that strongly shape public acceptance and cooperation. In practical research terms, *SPARK* helps justify why "fairness," "consistency," and "coverage" are appropriate indicators of enforcement fidelity: they are not only managerial concerns but also legal risk points when ordinances are applied to minors.

**Roles of Barangay and PNP Structures in Local Peace and Order**

Curfew implementation is typically experienced by communities not as a "policy text," but as an on-the-ground practice carried out through barangay-level and police structures. In many municipalities, especially those with limited police manpower, curfew enforcement depends heavily on local peacekeeping networks and coordination mechanisms.

One operational anchor for barangay-based peacekeeping is the concept of Barangay Peacekeeping Operations (BPO) and the formation of Barangay Peacekeeping Action Teams (BPATs). In the BPAT manual associated with the Philippine National Police's community-oriented policing approach, BPATs are framed as grassroots implementers designed to strengthen public safety and community partnership, recognizing that police capacity alone may be insufficient for all local peace and order needs (Philippine National Police, 2009).

This framing is important for curfew enforcement because curfew patrols are, by nature, time-bound and labor-intensive. The presence or absence of functional barangay peacekeeping teams can influence the dosage of enforcement (how often patrols occur), the coverage (which areas are consistently monitored), and the responsiveness (how quickly incidents and violations are addressed). In turn, these operational realities shape resident perceptions of whether the curfew is implemented uniformly or only in select zones—an issue that can affect both compliance and legitimacy.

Policy guidance from the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) also underscores that local executives and LGUs have roles in supporting barangay peacekeeping structures through governance and resource mechanisms. A relevant issuance is DILG Memorandum Circular No. 2009-145 on LGU support to BPATs and Police Auxiliary Units, which signals that local funding support and administrative attention are part of sustaining grassroots peace and order capacity (Department of the Interior and Local Government, 2009).

Coverage of patrols during curfew hours. Coverage is not only a decision variable; it depends on how well barangay and police teams are organized, scheduled, and supported. Where BPATs are active and coordinated with the PNP, coverage may expand beyond what police personnel alone can provide, especially in dispersed

rural settings (Philippine National Police, 2009). Manpower and resources as enforcement challenges. The feasibility of consistent and fair implementation depends on whether enforcers have enough personnel for patrol rotations, communication tools, and logistical support. DILG policy direction on support mechanisms reflects an understanding that peacekeeping is resource-dependent and must be institutionally backed to be sustained (Department of the Interior and Local Government, 2009). Coordination and the barangay's role in compliance. The legal structure of minors' curfew enforcement also places responsibilities on parents/guardians and local authorities. This makes barangay-level governance crucial because barangay officials are often the first point of contact for returning minors home, documenting incidents, and facilitating community-based interventions—consistent with the approach described in national juvenile justice policy (Presidential Decree No. 603, 1974, Art. 139; Republic Act No. 10630, 2013). Overall, the Philippine legal-policy environment suggests that a curfew's contribution to public order depends not only on the existence of an ordinance but on the capacity of local implementers to deliver it in a manner that is lawful, child-sensitive, and operationally consistent. For Dagohoy, this underscores why enforcement fidelity (consistency, fairness, patrol coverage) and implementation challenges (manpower, resources, public cooperation) are not secondary details; they are the practical channels through which the curfew either gains legitimacy and effectiveness or produces contestation and uneven compliance.

**Synthesis**

Curfew hours emerge in the literature as a situational public order measure whose outcomes depend less on the mere existence of an ordinance and more on how the policy is designed, delivered, and accepted in the community. International and local studies consistently frame curfews as time-based regulations intended to reduce exposure to high-risk nighttime settings and strengthen guardianship through patrol visibility and community monitoring, yet empirical findings are rarely uniform because the same curfew can operate differently across contexts. Juvenile outcomes, in particular, are shaped by mechanisms that curfew rules do not fully control—household supervision, family stability, peer influence, and the risk ecology of urban versus rural environments—so any observed changes in delinquency or victimization are better understood as conditional effects that vary with local realities rather than guaranteed policy results. These realities make the quality of enforcement central: procedural justice research clarifies why respectful, neutral, and consistent implementation tends to increase voluntary compliance and cooperation, while arbitrary or selective enforcement can weaken legitimacy and force implementers to rely on coercion that is difficult to sustain in low-resource settings. At the operational level, street-level enforcement scholarship explains why implementation commonly varies across barangays and teams, as enforcers must exercise discretion under workload pressure, ambiguity in exemptions, and limited manpower and logistics; consequently, differences in consistency, fairness, and patrol coverage are expected features of local implementation rather than anomalies.

Implementation fidelity frameworks strengthen this interpretation by distinguishing policy intent from policy delivery and by treating adherence (consistency), dosage (coverage and frequency of patrol), and quality of delivery (fairness and respectful treatment) as necessary conditions for interpreting curfew outcomes. In the Philippine setting, these governance realities are intensified by legal and policy constraints: LGUs may enact curfews under their general welfare authority, but enforcement involving minors must align with child protection and juvenile justice standards that prohibit punitive treatment of status offenses, and Supreme Court guidance emphasizes narrow tailoring, meaningful exceptions, and safeguards against overbreadth—making legality and legitimacy inseparable from enforcement practice. Taken together, the literature supports examining curfew re-implementation through an integrated lens that links enforcement fidelity, compliance practices, and implementation challenges to public order and community safety outcomes, while recognizing that curfew effectiveness is contingent on legitimacy, capacity, and context rather than on restriction alone.

# METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the research design, respondents of the study, sampling design, data gathering procedure, research instrument, including its content validity and reliability, and the statistical tools that were employed in the analysis of the data.

## Research Design

The research design utilized for this study was Quantitative Descriptive-Correlational and Comparative Design. This multifaceted approach was specifically engineered to address research problems that sought to describe a phenomenon while simultaneously analyzing how variables interact and differ across groups. By utilizing a quantitative framework, the study ensured that "Policy Compliance" and "Enforcement Fidelity" are measured through objective, numerical data, allowing for a rigorous statistical evaluation of their impact on "Public Order" and "Community Safety." As highlighted in the latest methodological literature, this design was ideal for policy-oriented research because it moves beyond mere observation to establish the strength and direction of relationships between variables (Takona, 2023; Bouchrika, 2026).

The descriptive component of the design serves as the foundation, providing a detailed profile of the current state of curfew implementation and the level of public compliance. This was typically achieved through the calculation of weighted means and standard deviations to interpret the respondents' perceptions. Following this, the correlational aspect is employed to test the relationship between the variables.

Finally, the comparative (or causal-comparative) dimension is integrated to examine the differences between distinct groups within the study. This was essential for identifying if there are significant variations in curfew enforcement or compliance based on demographics such as age, gender, or socio-economic status. For instance, using an Independent T-test or One-way ANOVA, the researcher can statistically verify if certain neighborhoods experience a different "version" of the law than others (Bouchrika, 2026). This holistic design ensures that the study does not just offer a flat snapshot of the policy, but a dynamic analysis of how the law functions across different social strata and how its implementation affects the safety of the public at large.

## Locale of the Study

The study was conducted within a defined geographical locality where curfew policies were actively implemented, specifically in the second district of Bohol. The target population included adult community residents affected by curfew regulations and law enforcement officers directly involved in curfew enforcement. The chosen locale had an established curfew policy enforced by local authorities and law enforcement agencies, providing an appropriate setting to assess how curfew hours were implemented in practice. The area had recorded incidents related to public disturbances and safety concerns, which necessitated the adoption of curfew regulations. This allowed the study to analyze the relationship between curfew hours, public behavior, and safety outcomes within a real policy environment.

## Sample Size and Sampling Procedures

The study utilized Cochran’s Formula (1963) to determine the ideal sample size, which is particularly effective for large populations where the exact proportions are not fully known. This formula allows for a calculated sample that yields a desired level of precision and confidence.

To achieve a balanced representation of both law enforcement and community-based enforcement groups, the study employed a stratified random sampling design. The total population was divided into "strata" or subgroups based on their specific roles (e.g., PNP personnel, barangay tanods, or local officials). The number of respondents taken from each stratum was proportional to that group's size within the total population, ensuring that smaller enforcement units were still represented. Once the strata were defined, individuals were selected within those groups using a random technique (such as a lottery or a random number generator).

The combination of Cochran’s formula and stratified random sampling ensured both statistical power and representativeness. While the formula provided the ‘quantity’ of respondents needed to minimize error, the stratified design provided the ‘quality’ of data by ensuring that the perspectives of various enforcement levels—from the municipal police to the barangay-level responders—were all included. This dual approach minimized sampling bias and strengthened the validity of the findings regarding the challenges and fidelity of curfew enforcement in Dagohoy.

**Respondents of the Study**

The respondents of the study were the primary frontliners responsible for the implementation and monitoring of curfew hours within the Municipality of Dagohoy, Bohol. To ensure a comprehensive evaluation of the study's variables, the researchers identified four distinct groups of respondents who possessed the legal authority and operational mandate to enforce local ordinances.

The distribution of the respondents is shown in Table 1.

Table 1 Distribution of the Respondents according to category.

| Respondents | Population | Sample | Percentage |
|---|---|---|---|
| PNP Personnel | 28 | 15 | 8.96% |
| BPATS | 128 | 71 | 40.67% |
| Barangay Councilors | 128 | 71 | 40.67% |
| Municipal Law Enforcers | 30 | 17 | 9.70% |
| **Total** | **314** | **174** | **100%** |

All participants were adults and were selected based on their official designation, length of service, and direct involvement in curfew-related duties. Their collective participation ensured a comprehensive assessment of policy compliance and enforcement fidelity in relation to public order and community safety.

**Research Instrument**

The study utilized a researcher-made survey questionnaire that was carefully structured based on the specific variables identified in the statement of the problem. To ensure the instrument's accuracy and reliability, it underwent content validation by a panel of experts in criminology and public administration and was subjected to a reliability test (such as Cronbach's Alpha) to ensure consistency in the responses. The instrument was divided into four main parts:

Part I: Demographic Profile. This section gathered the personal characteristics of the respondents, such as age, gender, and position, which were used to address questions regarding significant differences in enforcement (Questions 4, 5, and 6).

Part II: Enforcement Fidelity Scale. This part measured the implementation of the curfew in terms of consistency, fairness, and patrol coverage.

Part III: Policy Compliance Scale. This section assessed the community's adherence to the ordinance through metrics such as apprehension records, warnings, and violations.

Part IV: Enforcement Challenges Scale. This final section identified the degree of difficulty encountered by authorities, focusing on ordinance clarity, manpower, resources, and public cooperation

**Validity and Reliability of Research Instrument**

Validity referred to the degree to which the instrument accurately captured the specific concepts of the study. To establish this, the study employed content validity. The researcher-made questionnaire was submitted to a panel of experts, including seasoned criminologists and academic professors specializing in public safety. These experts evaluated the items based on their relevance to the Statement of the Problem, the clarity of the language used, and the appropriateness of the technical terms. Their feedback was used to refine, rephrase, or delete questions that were ambiguous or irrelevant. This process ensured that the instrument was aligned with the theoretical frameworks of Deterrence Theory and Implementation Fidelity, making it a valid tool for the Dagohoy, Bohol context.

Reliability referred to the consistency of the instrument. It ensured that if the survey had been administered to a different but similar group of respondents, it would have yielded the same consistent results. To test this, a pilot

test was conducted with a group of law enforcement officers and community watchmen who were not part of the actual sample but shared similar characteristics. The data from the pilot test were then subjected to Cronbach's Alpha—a statistical measure used to check the internal consistency of a scale. A score of 0.70 or higher was generally considered acceptable in social science research. The results of the reliability test of the instrument were as follows: Implementation of curfew enforcement fidelity = 0.962, Curfew policy compliance = 0.942, and Curfew enforcement challenges = 0.925.

**Data Gathering Procedure**

Before the gathering of the data, the researcher secured a letter from the Office of the Dean, noted by the Satellite College Director and addressed to the respective Bohol 2nd District Representative and mayor of each municipality in the second district of Bohol, requesting permission to conduct study of 12 randomly selected barangays in their respective area to answer the Research Questionnaire. After permission was granted, the researcher personally administered the instrument to the respondents and explained the objectives of the study. Once the respondents accomplished the instrument, the researcher retrieved it personally to ensure one hundred percent retrieval. The data gathered were then organized, tabulated, analyzed, and interpreted.

The data were analyzed using appropriate statistical tools to determine the relationship between curfew hours, policy compliance, enforcement fidelity, public order, and community safety. Results were interpreted in line with the research objectives and theoretical framework.

**Categorization of the Variables**

The variables were categorized to allow for a systematic analysis: the demographic profile served as the basis for comparative analysis, while enforcement fidelity and policy compliance were treated as the primary correlated variables. The enforcement challenges were categorized as situational factors that influenced the overall effectiveness of the curfew, ensuring that the study captured both the structural and behavioral aspects of municipal governance.

To facilitate the analysis of data, each item on the level of implementation of curfew enforcement fidelity, the level of curfew policy compliance, and the challenges faced by curfew enforcement was scored using the following scoring guide and qualitative description.

**For Level of Implementation of Curfew Enforcement Fidelity**

| Mean Interval | Verbal Interpretation | Verbal Description |
|---|---|---|
| 4.21 – 5.00 | Very High Level | The police and tanods are doing an excellent job. They are always there, they are fair to everyone, and they follow the ordinance perfectly. |
| 3.41 – 4.20 | High Level | They are doing a good job, with only very small or rare mistakes in how they patrol. |
| 2.61 – 3.40 | Moderate Level | The enforcement is "hit or miss." Sometimes they patrol, sometimes they don't. |
| 1.81 – 2.60 | Low Level | The policy is rarely implemented, and enforcement efforts are poorly coordinated or unfair |
| 1.00 – 1.80 | Very Low | The authorities are rarely seen, and the curfew is mostly ignored by the police themselves. |

**For Level of Curfew Policy Compliance**

| Mean Interval | Verbal Interpretation | Verbal Description |
|---|---|---|
| 4.21 – 5.00 | Very High Level | The community is very disciplined. Almost everyone goes home on time, and there are very few people caught outside. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 3.41 – 4.20 | High Level | Most people follow the rules. When they are given a warning, they listen and go home. |
| 2.61 – 3.40 | Moderate Level | Compliance is uneven; many citizens still wander during curfew hours, and warnings are frequently ignored. |
| 1.81 – 2.60 | Low Level | Compliance is poor; violations are rampant and there is significant resistance to the ordinance. |
| 1.00 – 1.80 | Very Low | There is total non-compliance; the community ignores the curfew hours entirely. |

**For Curfew Enforcement Challenges**

| Mean Interval | Verbal Interpretation | Verbal Description |
|---|---|---|
| 4.21 – 5.00 | Very Serious | Challenges are overwhelming and severely hinder the ability to enforce the curfew effectively. |
| 3.41 – 4.20 | Serious | Significant obstacles exist (e.g., lack of fuel or personnel) that cause frequent delays or gaps. |
| 2.61 – 3.40 | Moderately Serious | Challenges are present but manageable; they cause occasional issues but do not stop enforcement. |
| 1.81 – 2.60 | Less Serious | Challenges are minor and have very little impact on the daily enforcement operations. |
| 1.00 – 1.80 | Not Serious | There are no noticeable challenges; resources and cooperation are fully sufficient. |

**Data Analysis Procedure**

The collected data from the study were analyzed and interpreted using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software.

To analyze the data gathered for this study, a combination of descriptive and inferential statistics was employed to provide a comprehensive interpretation of the results. The demographic profile of the respondents was treated using frequency and percentage Distribution, which allowed for a clear categorization of the participants according to their age, sex, and professional background. To determine the level of enforcement fidelity, the extent of policy compliance, and the degree of enforcement challenges, the weighted mean was utilized. This tool translated the Likert scale responses into a quantifiable average, which was then compared against the established mean intervals to determine the verbal interpretation and description for each variable.

To explore the differences across various demographic groups, the study utilized the Independent Samples T-test and One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). The T-test was specifically applied when comparing two distinct groups, while ANOVA was used for variables with three or more categories, such as age ranges or educational levels. These tests were crucial in identifying whether the implementation of the curfew was uniform or if certain demographic factors influenced how the policy was experienced.

Finally, the Pearson Product-Moment Correlation (Pearson's) was employed to test the relationships among the key variables of the study. This inferential statistic was used to determine the strength and direction of the association between enforcement fidelity and policy compliance, as well as the impact of enforcement challenges on the community's adherence to the law.

**Presentation, Analysis and Interpretation of Data**

This chapter presents, analyzes, and interprets the data gathered in relation to the research problems of the study. It focuses on the level of implementation of enforcement fidelity in terms of consistency, fairness, and coverage of patrols during curfew hours. The findings are presented according to the sequence of the problems stated and are supported by statistical results.

## Level of Implementation of Enforcement

### Fidelity as a Whole

Table 2 presents the overall level of implementation of enforcement fidelity in the implementation of curfew hours.

The findings reveal a grand mean of 4.27, verbally interpreted as "Very High Level of Implementation." This indicates that enforcement fidelity in the implementation of curfew hours is consistently practiced, properly observed, and effectively carried out by law enforcement personnel and barangay authorities.

This result suggests that curfew policies in the Municipality of Dagohoy, Bohol are implemented with a high degree of adherence to established procedures, fairness, and operational coverage. The high level of enforcement fidelity implies that enforcement mechanisms such as standardized procedures, monitoring systems, and coordinated patrol operations are functioning effectively. As a result, the curfew policy is not only present but is being implemented as intended.

The strong implementation may be attributed to clear operational guidelines, effective coordination between PNP and barangay personnel, and active supervision of enforcement practices. When enforcement is carried out consistently and fairly, it strengthens compliance and enhances public trust, which are critical components in achieving public order and community safety. This finding supports Policy Implementation Theory (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984), which emphasizes that the success of a policy depends largely on how faithfully it is implemented. Even well-designed policies, such as curfew ordinances, can only achieve their intended outcomes when enforcement is consistent, fair, and systematic.

Table 2 Level of Implementation of Enforcement Fidelity as a Whole.

| Indicators | Mean | Verbal Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Consistency | 4.27 | Very High |
| Fairness | 4.29 | Very High |
| Coverage of Patrols | 4.26 | Very High |
| **Over All Mean** | **4.27** | **Very High** |

*Legend:* Interpretation is based on the scale: 1.00-1.80 (Very Low), 1.81-2.60 (Low Level), 2.61-3.40 (Moderate Level), 3.41-4.20 (High Level), and 4.21-5.00 (Very High Level).

Moreover, the result aligns with Deterrence Theory, which suggests that consistent and visible enforcement increases the certainty of sanctions, thereby discouraging violations. When enforcement fidelity is high, individuals are more likely to comply with curfew regulations due to the perceived reliability of enforcement actions. Despite the very high level of implementation, the findings also imply that continuous monitoring and improvement are necessary to sustain this level of performance. Maintaining high enforcement fidelity requires ongoing coordination, adequate resources, and consistent adherence to standard procedures.

### Consistency

Table 2a presents the level of implementation of enforcement fidelity in terms of consistency.

The computed grand mean of 4.27, interpreted as "Very High," indicates that curfew enforcement procedures are applied uniformly across different situations, personnel, and operational conditions.

The highest-rated indicator is "Officers follow the same escalation steps for repeat curfew violations across different cases" (M=4.38), suggesting that enforcement actions are guided by standardized procedures. This implies that decision-making is structured and not arbitrary, which strengthens predictability in enforcement.

Similarly, "Curfew start and end times are enforced the same way across all duty shifts" (M=4.37) and "Handovers between shifts include clear information about curfew incidents and procedures" (M=4.36) indicate

strong coordination and continuity in operations. These findings suggest that enforcement is not dependent on individual discretion alone but is supported by systematic processes.

However, relatively lower (though still high) indicators such as "Incident documentation is completed in a uniform format" (M=4.18) and "Curfew enforcement procedures are implemented uniformly across different neighborhoods" (M=4.18) suggest that minor variations may still exist in documentation practices and geographical implementation.

Overall, the results indicate that consistency in curfew enforcement is well-established, ensuring that rules are applied uniformly. This is important because consistent enforcement enhances fairness, reduces confusion among the public, and strengthens policy credibility.

Table 2a. Consistency

| Statement Indicators | Mean | Verbal Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Officers follow the same escalation steps for repeat curfew violations | 4.38 | Very High |
| Curfew start and end times are enforced consistently across shifts | 4.37 | Very High |
| Handovers between shifts ensure continuity | 4.36 | Very High |
| Supervisors monitor enforcement actions | 4.32 | Very High |
| Standard checklist is followed during enforcement | 4.28 | Very High |
| Coordination between police and barangay is consistent | 4.26 | Very High |
| Similar violations receive the same action | 4.21 | Very High |
| SOPs are available and followed | 4.19 | Very High |
| Documentation is uniform | 4.18 | Very High |
| Procedures are uniform across areas | 4.18 | Very High |
| **Grand Mean** | **4.27** | **Very High** |

*Legend:* Interpretation is based on the scale: 1.00-1.80 (Very Low), 1.81-2.60 (Low Level), 2.61-3.40 (Moderate Level), 3.41-4.20 (High Level), and 4.21-5.00 (Very High Level).

This finding supports existing literature which emphasizes that consistent enforcement reduces ambiguity and increases compliance, as individuals are more likely to follow rules when they are applied uniformly across cases and locations.

**Fairness**

Table 2b presents the level of implementation of enforcement fidelity in terms of fairness.

The computed grand mean of 4.29, verbally interpreted as "Very High," indicates that curfew enforcement in the Municipality of Dagohoy is carried out in a highly fair, respectful, and impartial manner. This suggests that enforcement practices are not only consistent but are also guided by principles that uphold dignity, neutrality, and proportionality in dealing with curfew violators.

The highest-rated indicator, "People encountered during curfew hours are treated with respect by enforcers" (M=4.40), reflects the strong presence of respectful interactions between authorities and the public. This is further reinforced by high ratings in indicators such as "Enforcers avoid humiliating or degrading treatment" (M=4.35) and "Enforcement actions are proportionate to the nature of the curfew violation" (M=4.34). These findings suggest that enforcement is not excessively punitive but is instead calibrated according to the situation, which helps maintain community trust.

In addition, the relatively high scores for indicators related to opportunity to explain circumstances (M=4.32) and fair granting of exemptions (M=4.31) indicate that enforcement incorporates elements of discretion that are exercised within acceptable and reasonable boundaries. This reflects a balance between rule enforcement and situational judgment, which is essential in policies such as curfew where exceptions (e.g., work, emergencies) are common.

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From a theoretical perspective, these findings strongly support Procedural Justice Theory, which emphasizes that individuals are more likely to comply with rules when they perceive enforcement as fair, respectful, and unbiased (Tyler, 2003; Sunshine&Tyler, 2003). The very high rating in fairness suggests that curfew enforcement in the locality promotes legitimacy, which in turn enhances voluntary compliance rather than reliance solely on coercive measures.

Moreover, the findings are consistent with the discussion of legitimacy and fairness in enforcement presented in Chapter 2. Research indicates that fairness in enforcement strengthens public cooperation and reduces resistance during enforcement encounters (Chan et al., 2023; Nam, Wolfe,&Nix, 2024). When individuals feel that they are treated equitably regardless of social status or background, they are more likely to accept enforcement actions and comply with regulations.

The relatively lower (though still very high) rating for "Minors are handled in a manner that prioritizes their safety and welfare" (M=4.21) suggests a potential area for further strengthening, particularly in ensuring that enforcement involving minors fully aligns with child protection principles emphasized in Philippine legal frameworks. This is important because curfew policies often involve minors, and enforcement must remain consistent with juvenile justice standards that prioritize protection rather than punishment.

Overall, the results indicate that fairness is a strong component of enforcement fidelity in the study area. This contributes significantly to the effectiveness of curfew implementation, as fair and respectful enforcement enhances both compliance and community trust—key elements in sustaining public order and community safety.

Table 2b Fairness

| Statement Indicators | Mean | Verbal Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| People are treated with respect | 4.40 | Very High |
| Enforcers avoid degrading treatment | 4.35 | Very High |
| Table 2b contd. | | |
| Actions are proportionate | 4.34 | Very High |
| Opportunity to explain is given | 4.32 | Very High |
| Exemptions are granted fairly | 4.31 | Very High |
| Equal treatment across groups | 4.28 | Very High |
| Individuals are informed of next steps | 4.25 | Very High |
| Reasons for enforcement are explained | 4.24 | Very High |
| No bias in decisions | 4.24 | Very High |
| Minors are handled with care | 4.21 | Very High |
| **Grand Mean** | **4.29** | **Very High** |

*Legend:* Interpretation is based on the scale: 1.00-1.80 (Very Low), 1.81-2.60 (Low Level), 2.61-3.40 (Moderate Level), 3.41-4.20 (High Level), and 4.21-5.00 (Very High Level).

**Coverage of Patrols During Curfew Hours**

Table 1c presents the level of implementation of enforcement fidelity in terms of coverage of patrols during curfew hours.

The computed grand mean of 4.26, verbally interpreted as "Very High," indicates that patrol operations during curfew hours are strategically deployed, consistently conducted, and broadly distributed across the community. This reflects a strong operational capacity in terms of visibility, responsiveness, and area coverage.

The highest-rated indicator, "Patrol deployment is adjusted based on recent incident data or community reports" (M=4.34), suggests that enforcement is not merely routine but adaptive and intelligence-driven. This implies that patrol strategies are informed by actual conditions on the ground, allowing authorities to focus on high-risk areas and respond effectively to emerging concerns.

Similarly, high ratings for "Patrols occur regularly throughout the entire curfew period" (M=4.32) and "Patrol coverage reaches outlying puroks/sitios" (M=4.30) indicate that enforcement is not limited to central or high-visibility areas but extends to peripheral locations. This reduces enforcement gaps and ensures that curfew regulations are applied across the entire locality.

The findings also show strong visibility and responsiveness, as reflected in indicators such as "Patrols are visible in both residential and commercial areas" (M=4.28) and "Response to curfew-related reports is timely" (M=4.30). These elements are critical in reinforcing deterrence, as visible enforcement increases the perceived certainty of detection among potential violators.

From a theoretical standpoint, these results align with Routine Activity Theory, which emphasizes the role of capable guardians in reducing opportunities for crime (Cohen & Felson, 1979). The presence of active and visible patrols increases guardianship, thereby limiting the convergence of motivated offenders and suitable targets during curfew hours.

Furthermore, the findings are consistent with Philippine studies discussed in Chapter 2, which highlight the importance of patrol coverage and barangay-level enforcement in strengthening curfew implementation (Carpio et al.; Miilcen Jay et al., 2022). Effective patrol coverage, especially when supported by barangay peacekeeping units, enhances monitoring capacity and improves the overall reach of enforcement operations.

However, the relatively lowest indicator, "There are sufficient personnel assigned to ensure effective patrol coverage" (4.19), suggests that while patrol coverage is generally effective, manpower constraints may still exist. This reflects the common challenge identified in the literature, where limited resources and personnel can affect the consistency and sustainability of enforcement efforts (Ege et al., 2024; Zech et al., 2023).

Despite this, the overall very high rating indicates that enforcement teams are able to optimize available resources through coordination, planning, and strategic deployment, allowing them to maintain effective patrol coverage even under constraints.

Table 2c. Coverage of Patrols During Curfew Hours.

| Statement Indicators | Mean | Verbal Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Patrol deployment is data-driven | 4.34 | Very High |
| Patrols occur throughout curfew period | 4.32 | Very High |
| Coverage reaches all areas | 4.30 | Very High |
| Response to reports is timely | 4.30 | Very High |
| Patrols are visible | 4.28 | Very High |
| Hotspots receive attention | 4.24 | Very High |
| Patrol frequency is adequate | 4.23 | Very High |
| Routes include violation areas | 4.22 | Very High |
| Teams follow assigned schedules | 4.21 | Very High |
| Sufficient personnel assigned | 4.19 | Very High |
| **Grand Mean** | **4.26** | **Very High** |

*Note:* Interpretation is based on the scale: 1.00-1.80 (Very Low), 1.81-2.60 (Low Level), 2.61-3.40 (Moderate Level), 3.41-4.20 (High Level), and 4.21-5.00 (Very High Level).

**Extent of Policy Compliance in the Implementation of Curfew Hours as a Whole**

Table 3 presents the overall extent of policy compliance in the implementation of curfew hours.

The findings reveal a grand mean of 4.29, verbally interpreted as "Very High Extent of Policy Compliance." This indicates that compliance mechanisms related to curfew implementation—particularly in terms of documentation, warnings, and violation monitoring—are effectively practiced and systematically maintained by enforcement authorities.

This result suggests that curfew enforcement in the Municipality of Dagohoy is supported by strong administrative and operational compliance systems, including accurate record-keeping, consistent issuance of warnings, and proper documentation of violations. High compliance levels indicate that enforcement actions are not only carried out but are also properly recorded, monitored, and utilized for decision-making.

The very high extent of policy compliance reflects the presence of structured reporting systems, active supervision, and adherence to procedural standards, which are essential in ensuring accountability and transparency in enforcement. When compliance mechanisms are well-established, they contribute to more effective monitoring of curfew implementation and facilitate data-driven enforcement strategies.

This finding aligns with Deterrence Theory, which emphasizes that the certainty and visibility of enforcement actions—such as recorded violations and documented warnings—enhance compliance by reinforcing the perception that rules are actively monitored (Beccaria, 1968). When enforcement outputs are systematically recorded and communicated, they strengthen the perceived credibility of the policy.

Furthermore, the result supports relevant studies which highlight that curfew effectiveness is closely linked to the quality of implementation and documentation practices (Patalinghug et al., 2021; Engalan et al., 2023). Proper documentation and monitoring systems allow local authorities to assess patterns of compliance and adjust enforcement strategies accordingly. Overall, the findings indicate that policy compliancein curfew implementation is highly institutionalized, contributing to more consistent enforcement and improved public order outcomes.

Table 3 Extent of Policy Compliance as a Whole

| Indicators | Mean | Verbal Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Records of Apprehension | 4.29 | Very High |
| Warnings | 4.30 | Very High |
| Violations | 4.27 | Very High |
| **Over All Mean** | **4.29** | **Very High** |

*Legend:* Interpretation is based on the scale: 1.00-1.80 (Very Low), 1.81-2.60 (Low Level), 2.61-3.40 (Moderate Level), 3.41-4.20 (High Level), and 4.21-5.00 (Very High Level).

**Records of Apprehension**

Table 3a presents the extent of policy compliance in terms of records of apprehension.

The computed grand mean of 4.29, interpreted as "Very High," indicates that apprehension-related documentation is accurate, consistent, and systematically managed. This suggests that enforcement personnel maintain reliable records that reflect actual field operations and support administrative accountability.

The highest-rated indicator, "Apprehension records accurately reflect actual field enforcement activities" (M=4.43), highlights the reliability of documentation practices. This implies that recorded data correspond closely to real enforcement actions, reducing discrepancies and enhancing the credibility of reports.

Other high indicators, such as "Recorded apprehension actions indicate disposition" (M=4.35) and "Logs are securely stored and retrievable" (M=4.32), demonstrate that documentation systems are not only accurate but also organized and functional for monitoring and follow-up purposes. This is essential in ensuring that enforcement actions can be tracked, reviewed, and evaluated over time.

The findings also show that apprehension data are used for strategic purposes, as reflected in the indicator "Data from apprehension records are used to inform patrol planning" (M=4.29). This suggests that enforcement is supported by evidence-based decision-making, where past records guide future operations.

However, the relatively lowest indicator, "Apprehension records include complete basic information" (M=4.08), although still very high, suggests that there may be minor gaps in ensuring complete documentation details. This may be attributed to operational pressures or time constraints during enforcement.

These findings are consistent with Pressman and Wildavsky (1984), who emphasized that effective policy implementation requires accurate monitoring systems and reliable documentation. Without proper records, it becomes difficult to assess whether policies are being implemented as intended.

In the context of curfew enforcement, accurate apprehension records function as a core accountability mechanism, ensuring that enforcement actions are traceable and verifiable. This supports the observations of Patalinghug et al. (2021), who highlighted the importance of documentation in evaluating curfew effectiveness and identifying implementation gaps.

Furthermore, the use of apprehension data to inform patrol planning reflects a shift toward evidence-based enforcement, which aligns with findings of McGuire et al. (2021) that emphasize the role of data-driven strategies in improving policing effectiveness and targeting high-risk areas.

Table 3a Records of Apprehension

| Statement Indicators | Mean | Verbal Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Records reflect actual enforcement activities | 4.43 | Very High |
| Actions indicate disposition | 4.35 | Very High |
| Logs are secure and retrievable | 4.32 | Very High |
| Documentation is timely | 4.31 | Very High |
| Apprehensions are properly documented | 4.30 | Very High |
| Supervisors review records | 4.30 | Very High |
| Data inform patrol planning | 4.29 | Very High |
| Records are consistent across teams | 4.25 | Very High |
| Repeat offenders are identifiable | 4.25 | Very High |
| Records include complete information | 4.08 | Very High |
| **Grand Mean** | **4.29** | **Very High** |

*Legend:* Interpretation is based on the scale: 1.00-1.80 (Very Low), 1.81-2.60 (Low Level), 2.61-3.40 (Moderate Level), 3.41-4.20 (High Level), and 4.21-5.00 (Very High Level).

**Warnings**

Table 3b displays the extent of policy compliance in terms of warnings.

The computed grand mean of 4.30, interpreted as "Very High," indicates that warnings are used as a structured, consistent, and proactive enforcement tool in curfew implementation.

The highest-rated indicator, "Warnings are used proactively to prevent escalation and encourage voluntary compliance" (M=4.43), suggests that warnings are not merely reactive but are strategically used to guide behavior and prevent violations from worsening. This reflects a preventive approach to enforcement rather than a purely punitive one.

Other high indicators, such as "Enforcers clearly explain curfew rules" (M=4.38) and "Warnings include guidance on avoiding future violations" (M=4.37), indicate that warnings function as communication tools that promote understanding and compliance. This supports the idea that enforcement is not limited to sanctions but includes educational elements.

The presence of structured warning practices, as seen in "Standard format or script used" (M=4.36), further suggests that warnings are delivered in a consistent and organized manner, reducing variability in enforcement.

The findings are consistent with Engalan et al. (2023), who noted that enforcement strategies that incorporate communication and guidance—such as warnings—can enhance compliance and improve public cooperation. Warnings serve as an early intervention mechanism that reinforces rules without immediately resorting to punitive action.

This also aligns with Deterrence Theory (Beccaria, 1968), where initial enforcement actions such as warnings increase awareness of rules and contribute to the perception of enforcement presence, thereby discouraging violations. Over time, these consistent interventions build a culture of compliance, as individuals recognize that even minor infractions are taken seriously. In turn, this strengthens the credibility of local authorities and reinforces the broader expectation of accountability within the community.

Moreover, the structured and consistent delivery of warnings reflects principles highlighted by McGuire et al. (2021), who emphasized that coordinated and systematic enforcement approaches are more effective in promoting compliance than fragmented or inconsistent practices.

Table 3b Warnings

| Statement Indicators | Mean | Verbal Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Warnings prevent escalation | 4.43 | Very High |
| Rules are clearly explained | 4.38 | Very High |
| Guidance is provided | 4.37 | Very High |
| Standard format is used | 4.36 | Very High |
| Warnings are consistently issued | 4.33 | Very High |
| Practices are consistent across areas | 4.29 | Very High |
| Supervisors monitor warnings | 4.26 | Very High |
| Warnings are documented | 4.23 | Very High |
| Residents respond positively | 4.22 | Very High |
| Records are integrated with logs | 4.19 | Very High |
| **Grand Mean** | **4.30** | **Very High** |

*Legend:* Interpretation is based on the scale: 1.00-1.80 (Very Low), 1.81-2.60 (Low Level), 2.61-3.40 (Moderate Level), 3.41-4.20 (High Level), and 4.21-5.00 (Very High Level).

**Violations**

Table 3c presents the extent of policy compliance in terms of violations.

The computed grand mean of 4.27, interpreted as "Very High," indicates that violations are consistently recorded, monitored, and managed according to established procedures.

The highest-rated indicator, "The number of unrecorded or unreported violations is minimal" (M=4.45), suggests that enforcement systems are effective in capturing most violations. This reflects strong monitoring and reporting mechanisms.

High ratings for "Violations are consistently recorded" (M=4.37) and "Clear process for repeat violators" (M=4.34) indicate that enforcement follows structured procedures, ensuring that violations are handled systematically.

Additionally, the use of violation data for trend analysis and intervention planning (M=4.26) demonstrates that enforcement is not only reactive but also analytical. This supports the use of data in identifying hotspots and improving enforcement strategies.

The consistent recording and monitoring of violations support the argument of Patalinghug et al. (2021) that enforcement effectiveness depends on the ability of local authorities to systematically track and analyze violations. Additionally, the use of violation data for trend analysis aligns with Engalan et al. (2023), who found that structured enforcement data contribute to better law enforcement outcomes and enhanced public safety.

From a theoretical perspective, these findings are also consistent with Routine Activity Theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979), which emphasizes that increased monitoring and guardianship reduce opportunities for violations. When violations are consistently recorded and reviewed, enforcement becomes more targeted and effective in preventing recurrence.

Table 3c Violations

| Statement Indicators | Mean | Verbal Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Minimal unreported violations | 4.45 | Very High |
| Violations are recorded | 4.37 | Very High |
| Process for repeat violators | 4.34 | Very High |
| Sanctions are applied properly | 4.32 | Very High |
| Data are reviewed for trends | 4.26 | Very High |
| Compliance level is high | 4.25 | Very High |
| Reports are forwarded properly | 4.24 | Very High |
| Records are detailed | 4.22 | Very High |
| Violations are categorized | 4.21 | Very High |
| Data used for interventions | 4.06 | Very High |
| Grand Mean | 4.27 | Very High |

*Note:* Interpretation is based on the scale: 1.00-1.80 (Very Low), 1.81-2.60 (Low Level), 2.61-3.40 (Moderate Level), 3.41-4.20 (High Level), and 4.21-5.00 (Very High Level).

**Degree of Challenges Encountered by Local Authorities in Enforcing Curfew Hours as a Whole**

Table 4 presents the overall degree of challenges encountered by local authorities in enforcing curfew hours.

The findings reveal a grand mean of 3.69, verbally interpreted as a “Serious Challenge.” This indicates that although curfew enforcement is generally well-implemented, local authorities continue to face substantial operational, administrative, and community-related difficulties that may affect the consistency and sustainability of enforcement efforts.

This result suggests that curfew implementation in the Municipality of Dagohoy operates within real-world constraints, where enforcement is not only dependent on policies and procedures but also on available resources, manpower, clarity of guidelines, and public cooperation. While earlier findings showed very high levels of enforcement fidelity and policy compliance, the presence of serious challenges highlights that effective implementation is achieved despite existing limitations.

The findings support the argument of Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) that policy implementation is often affected by practical constraints at the operational level. Even well-designed policies may encounter difficulties when translated into practice due to institutional limitations and environmental factors. Similarly, Zech et al. (2023) emphasized that implementation outcomes in local governance are shaped by coordination issues, resource constraints, and adaptive challenges. This suggests that challenges are not necessarily indicators of failure but are inherent in the implementation process, especially in resource-limited settings. Recognizing these

constraints highlights the need for adaptive strategies and flexible governance mechanisms to ensure that policies remain effective despite contextual limitations.

Table 4 Degree of Challenges as a Whole

| Indicators | Mean | Verbal Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Ordinance-Related Challenges | 3.76 | Serious Challenge |
| Manpower Challenges | 3.71 | Serious Challenge |
| Compliance Challenges | 3.66 | Serious Challenge |
| Resource Challenges | 3.65 | Serious Challenge |
| Public Cooperation Challenges | 3.68 | Serious Challenge |
| Over All Mean | 3.69 | Serious Challenge |

*Legend:* Interpretation is based on the scale: 1.00-1.80 (Not Serious), 1.81-2.60 (Less Serious), 2.61-3.40 (Moderately Serious), 3.41-4.20 (Serious), and 4.21-5.00 (Very Serious).

**Ordinance-Related Challenges**

Table 4a presents the degree of challenges encountered by local authorities in terms of ordinance-related factors in curfew enforcement.

The computed grand mean of 3.76, verbally interpreted as a "Serious Challenge," indicates that the curfew ordinance presents notable issues in clarity, interpretation, and procedural guidance. This suggests that while enforcement is being carried out, the policy itself introduces complexities that affect consistency and decision-making in actual field operations.

Among the indicators, the highest mean was obtained by "Some provisions of the curfew ordinance are unclear or open to different interpretations" (M = 3.85), indicating that ambiguity in policy language remains a primary concern. When provisions are not clearly defined, enforcement personnel are more likely to rely on individual judgment, which can result in inconsistent application across areas or teams.

This is followed by "Curfew exemptions are difficult to verify (e.g., emergencies, work, authorized activities)" (M = 3.79), highlighting operational challenges in distinguishing legitimate exemptions from violations. This creates situational uncertainty, particularly during night patrols where verification mechanisms may be limited or time-sensitive.

The indicator "The ordinance lacks clear guidance for handling repeat violators" (M = 3.74) further reflects gaps in procedural direction, especially for recurring cases that may require escalation or differentiated responses. Similarly, "The ordinance lacks clear procedures for handling minors consistent with child welfare standards" (M = 3.70) points to a critical concern, as enforcement involving minors must balance legal compliance with child protection principles.

In addition, "Public understanding of the ordinance is limited, resulting in frequent confusion or disputes" (M = 3.70) suggests that the effects of policy ambiguity extend beyond enforcers to the community. Limited understanding among residents can lead to resistance, disputes, and delays during enforcement encounters, thereby increasing the burden on enforcement personnel.

These findings are consistent with De Camargo (2023), who emphasized that unclear policies create uncertainty among implementers, and de Maillard et al. (2024), who noted that ambiguity in regulations leads to variations in enforcement practices. When policies lack precision, implementation becomes dependent on interpretation rather than standardized procedures.

Table 4a. Ordinance-Related Challenges

| Statement Indicators | Mean | Verbal Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Some provisions of the curfew ordinance are unclear or open to different interpretations | 3.85 | Serious Challenge |
| Curfew exemptions are difficult to verify (e.g., emergencies, work, authorized activities) | 3.79 | Serious Challenge |
| The ordinance lacks clear guidance for handling repeat violators | 3.74 | Serious Challenge |
| The ordinance lacks clear procedures for handling minors consistent with child welfare standards | 3.70 | Serious Challenge |
| Public understanding of the ordinance is limited, resulting in frequent confusion or disputes | 3.70 | Serious Challenge |
| Grand Mean | 3.76 | Serious Challenge |

*Legend:* Interpretation is based on the scale: 1.00-1.80 (Not Serious), 1.81-2.60 (Less Serious), 2.61-3.40 (Moderately Serious), 3.41-4.20 (Serious), and 4.21-5.00 (Very Serious).

**Manpower Challenges**

Table 4b illustrates the degree of challenges encountered by local authorities in terms of manpower in curfew enforcement.

The results yielded a grand mean of 3.71, verbally interpreted as a "Serious Challenge," indicating that human resource limitations significantly affect the effectiveness and consistency of curfew enforcement operations. This suggests that even with existing policies and procedures in place, the availability, capability, and distribution of personnel remain critical constraints.

The highest mean was recorded for "The number of personnel assigned is insufficient to cover all areas during curfew hours" (M = 3.79), emphasizing that limited staffing restricts the ability to maintain adequate patrol coverage. This may result in certain areas being under-monitored, thereby creating opportunities for violations and reducing deterrence.

Closely related is "Shift schedules and fatigue reduce the consistency of curfew enforcement" (M = 3.72), which highlights how prolonged working hours and operational fatigue can affect performance, decision-making, and vigilance among personnel. Fatigue may lead to inconsistent enforcement practices or reduced responsiveness during patrols.

The indicator "Overlapping duties and competing priorities limit the ability to conduct curfew patrols" (M = 3.71) further demonstrates that curfew enforcement is often not the sole responsibility of personnel. Competing tasks dilute focus and reduce the time and attention allocated specifically to curfew-related activities.

Meanwhile, "Coordination is difficult due to limited staffing across barangays/teams" (M = 3.68) reflects structural challenges in organizing and synchronizing enforcement efforts, particularly when personnel are spread thin across multiple jurisdictions. Lastly, "Lack of training reduces confidence and uniformity in enforcement" (M = 3.65) suggests that beyond quantity, the quality and preparedness of personnel also influence enforcement outcomes. Insufficient training may result in varied interpretations of procedures, inconsistent application of rules, and reduced confidence when handling complex situations.

These findings align with Cordner (2016), who emphasized that adequate staffing and training are fundamental to effective law enforcement, and Schafer (2018), who noted that personnel limitations often lead to uneven service delivery and operational inefficiencies. Manpower challenges highlight the need for increased staffing, better workload distribution, enhanced training programs, and improved coordination mechanisms to strengthen curfew enforcement.

Table 4b. Manpower Challenges

| Statement Indicators | Mean | Verbal Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| The number of personnel assigned is insufficient to cover all areas during curfew hours | 3.79 | Serious Challenge |
| Overlapping duties and competing priorities limit the ability to conduct curfew patrols. | 3.71 | Serious Challenge |
| Shift schedules and fatigue reduce the consistency of curfew enforcement. | 3.72 | Serious Challenge |
| Lack of training reduces confidence and uniformity in enforcement. | 3.65 | Serious Challenge |
| Coordination is difficult due to limited staffing across barangays/teams | 3.68 | Serious Challenge |
| Grand Mean | 3.71 | Serious Challenge |

*Legend:* Interpretation is based on the scale: 1.00-1.80 (Not Serious), 1.81-2.60 (Less Serious), 2.61-3.40 (Moderately Serious), 3.41-4.20 (Serious), and 4.21-5.00 (Very Serious).

**Compliance Challenges**

Table 4c presents the degree of challenges encountered by local authorities in terms of compliance-related factors in curfew enforcement.

The findings reveal a grand mean of 3.66, verbally interpreted as a "Serious Challenge," indicating that behavioral and situational compliance issues among residents pose persistent difficulties for enforcement efforts. This suggests that beyond policy and manpower, the attitudes and actions of individuals significantly influence the success of curfew implementation.

Among the indicators, the highest mean was observed for "Some residents resist or argue during curfew enforcement encounters" (M = 3.72), reflecting the presence of confrontational behavior that can delay enforcement processes and increase the risk of escalation. Such encounters may require additional time, negotiation, or even intervention, thereby affecting operational efficiency.

Closely related is "Alcohol-related behavior contributes to curfew violations and disorder" (M = 3.70), indicating that substance influence remains a contributing factor to noncompliance. This type of behavior often complicates enforcement, as it may impair judgment, increase aggression, or reduce willingness to cooperate.

The indicator "Repeat violators are common in our area." (M = 3.66) further highlights ongoing compliance issues, suggesting that deterrence mechanisms may not be fully effective in preventing recurring violations. This implies a need for stronger follow-through measures or targeted interventions for habitual offenders.

Meanwhile, "Some minors violate curfew due to weak parental supervision or family-related issues." (M = 3.63) points to underlying social factors influencing compliance, indicating that enforcement alone may not fully address the root causes of violations, particularly among youth.

Additionally, "Some residents deliberately evade patrols or use routes to avoid enforcement." (M = 3.62) reflects adaptive behaviors among violators, suggesting awareness of enforcement patterns and the ability to circumvent them. This presents a strategic challenge, requiring more dynamic and unpredictable patrol approaches.

These findings are supported by Tyler (2006), who emphasized that compliance is strongly influenced by perceived legitimacy and fairness of enforcement, and Nagin (2013), who highlighted that deterrence is less effective when individuals perceive a low risk of consistent enforcement.

Table 4c. Compliance Challenges

| Statement Indicators | Mean | Verbal Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Repeat violators are common in our area. | 3.66 | Serious Challenge |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Some residents resist or argue during curfew enforcement encounters | 3.72 | Serious Challenge |
| Some minors violate curfew due to weak parental supervision or family-related issues. | 3.63 | Serious Challenge |
| Alcohol-related behavior contributes to curfew violations and disorder. | 3.70 | Serious Challenge |
| Some residents deliberately evade patrols or use routes to avoid enforcement. | 3.62 | Serious Challenge |
| Grand Mean | 3.66 | Serious Challenge |

*Legend:* Interpretation is based on the scale: 1.00-1.80 (Not Serious), 1.81-2.60 (Less Serious), 2.61-3.40 (Moderately Serious), 3.41-4.20 (Serious), and 4.21-5.00 (Very Serious).

**Resource Challenges**

Table 4d shows the degree of challenges encountered by local authorities in terms of resource-related factors in curfew enforcement.

The findings show a grand mean of 3.65, verbally interpreted as a "Serious Challenge," indicating that logistical and material limitations significantly affect the operational effectiveness of curfew enforcement. This suggests that even when personnel and policies are present, inadequate resources can constrain the ability of authorities to carry out consistent and efficient enforcement activities.

The highest mean was recorded for "Poor lighting/visibility in some areas increases risk and reduces effective enforcement." (M = 3.70), highlighting environmental constraints that hinder patrol visibility and monitoring. Poorly lit areas may create opportunities for violations and increase safety risks for both enforcers and the public.

Closely followed by "Lack of patrol vehicles/motorcycles limits patrol coverage." (M = 3.68) and "Limited communication tools (radios/phones/load) affect coordination during enforcement." (M = 3.68), these findings emphasize mobility and communication as critical components of enforcement operations. Without adequate transportation and communication tools, response time, coordination, and area coverage are significantly reduced.

The indicator "Limited documentation tools/materials (forms, logbooks, printing) affect record keeping." (M = 3.61) points to administrative constraints that may affect the accuracy, completeness, and consistency of enforcement records. Proper documentation is essential for monitoring compliance, tracking violations, and informing enforcement strategies.

Meanwhile, "Insufficient fuel, maintenance, or operational budget affects patrol frequency" (M = 3.57) reflects financial limitations that directly impact how often patrols can be conducted. Reduced patrol frequency may weaken deterrence and allow violations to occur more frequently. These findings are consistent with Carpio et al., who emphasized that patrol effectiveness is closely linked to mobility and logistical support, and Zech et al. (2023), who highlighted that policy implementation outcomes are highly dependent on institutional capacity and resource availability.

Table 4d. Resource Challenges

| Statement Indicators | Mean | Verbal Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Lack of patrol vehicles/motorcycles limits patrol coverage. | 3.68 | Serious Challenge |
| Insufficient fuel, maintenance, or operational budget affects patrol frequency | 3.57 | Serious Challenge |
| Limited communication tools (radios/phones/load) affect coordination during enforcement. | 3.68 | Serious Challenge |
| Poor lighting/visibility in some areas increases risk and reduces effective enforcement. | 3.70 | Serious Challenge |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Limited documentation tools/materials (forms, logbooks, printing) affect record keeping. | 3.61 | Serious Challenge |
| Grand Mean | 3.65 | Serious Challenge |

*Legend:* Interpretation is based on the scale: 1.00-1.80 (Not Serious), 1.81-2.60 (Less Serious), 2.61-3.40 (Moderately Serious), 3.41-4.20 (Serious), and 4.21-5.00 (Very Serious).

**Public Cooperation Challenges**

Table 4e presents the degree of challenges encountered by local authorities in terms of public cooperation in curfew enforcement.

The findings reveal a grand mean of 3.68, verbally interpreted as a "Serious Challenge," indicating that limited support and participation from the community significantly affect the effectiveness of curfew implementation. This suggests that enforcement is not solely dependent on authorities but also heavily influenced by the willingness of the public to cooperate and comply with regulations.

The highest mean was recorded for "Parents/guardians do not consistently support curfew compliance for minors." (M = 3.71), highlighting the critical role of family supervision in ensuring adherence to curfew rules. When parental support is weak, minors are more likely to violate curfew regulations, placing additional burden on enforcement personnel. Closely related is "Community members are hesitant to report violations or disturbances." (M = 3.68), which reflects a lack of active participation in maintaining community order. This hesitation may stem from fear, apathy, or lack of trust, and it limits the flow of information necessary for timely enforcement. The indicator "Some business establishments do not consistently cooperate with curfew-related guidelines" (M = 3.68) suggests that compliance is not uniform across sectors. Businesses operating during curfew hours may indirectly contribute to violations if guidelines are not strictly followed.

Meanwhile, "Some residents perceive enforcement as unfair, reducing cooperation" (M = 3.67) highlights the importance of perceived fairness and legitimacy in enforcement. When residents question the fairness of implementation, their willingness to cooperate decreases, potentially leading to resistance or noncompliance.

Similarly, "Community leaders/groups are not consistently involved in supporting curfew efforts" (M = 3.67) indicates gaps in local leadership engagement. Active involvement of community leaders is essential in promoting awareness, encouraging compliance, and strengthening collective responsibility.

These findings support Tyler (2003) and Sunshine & Tyler (2003), who emphasized that public cooperation is strongly influenced by perceived legitimacy and fairness of law enforcement. They are also consistent with Miilcen Jay et al. (2022), who highlighted the importance of barangay-level participation in strengthening curfew implementation and public safety. Public cooperation challenges underscore the need for stronger community engagement, increased parental involvement, improved communication between authorities and residents, and consistent, fair enforcement practices to enhance trust and cooperation.

Table 4e. Public Cooperation Challenges.

| Statement Indicators | Mean | Verbal Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Parents/guardians do not consistently support curfew compliance for minors. | 3.71 | Serious Challenge |
| Community members are hesitant to report violations or disturbances. | 3.68 | Serious Challenge |
| Some residents perceive enforcement as unfair, reducing cooperation | 3.67 | Serious Challenge |
| Community leaders/groups are not consistently involved in supporting curfew efforts | 3.67 | Serious Challenge |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Some business establishments do not consistently cooperate with curfew-related guidelines | 3.68 | Serious Challenge |
| Grand Mean | 3.68 | Serious Challenge |

*Legend:* Interpretation is based on the scale: 1.00-1.80 (Not Serious), 1.81-2.60 (Less Serious), 2.61-3.40 (Moderately Serious), 3.41-4.20 (Serious), and 4.21-5.00 (Very Serious).

**Difference in the Level of Implementation of Enforcement Fidelity When Grouped According to Demographic Profile**

To determine whether significant differences exist in the level of implementation of enforcement fidelity when respondents are grouped according to age, gender, educational attainment, position/role, and years of service, statistical tests such as Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and Independent Samples t-test were employed. The results provide insight into whether demographic characteristics influence the consistency and quality of curfew enforcement.

**Enforcement Fidelity and Age**

The analysis revealed no significant difference in the level of enforcement fidelity when respondents were grouped according to age. The computed F-value of 0.654 with a significance value of 0.581, which is greater than the 0.05 alpha level, indicates that the null hypothesis is not rejected.

Although respondents aged 50 years old and above obtained the highest mean score (M = 4.3550), followed by those aged 30–39 years old (M = 4.2820), 21–29 years old (M = 4.2745), and 40–49 years old (M = 4.2461), the differences among the groups are minimal and statistically insignificant. This indicates that enforcement fidelity is consistently practiced across age groups.

This finding suggests that adherence to curfew enforcement procedures is not dependent on age but is more likely influenced by standardized training, established protocols, and organizational expectations. This supports the findings of Schafer (2018), who emphasized that consistency in law enforcement practices is shaped more by institutional structures than by individual demographic characteristics.

**Enforcement Fidelity and Gender**

The analysis also revealed no significant difference in enforcement fidelity when respondents were grouped according to gender. The computed t-value of -0.536 with a significance value of 0.593, which is greater than 0.05, indicates that the null hypothesis is not rejected.

Female respondents (M = 4.2864) obtained a slightly higher mean compared to male respondents (M = 4.2669); however, the difference is negligible and not statistically significant. This indicates that both male and female respondents demonstrate similar levels of enforcement fidelity.

This implies that enforcement practices are applied uniformly regardless of gender, reflecting standardized procedures and role expectations in curfew implementation. This finding aligns with Cordner (2016), who noted that professional policing practices are guided by institutional norms that promote uniformity in enforcement regardless of individual characteristics.

**Enforcement Fidelity and Educational Attainment**

The results showed no significant difference in enforcement fidelity when respondents were grouped according to educational attainment. The computed F-value of 1.142 with a significance value of 0.334, which is greater than 0.05, indicates that the null hypothesis is not rejected.

Among the groups, elementary graduates obtained the highest mean (M = 4.3195), followed by college graduates (M = 4.2954), high school graduates (M = 4.2539), and masters/doctoral graduates (M = 4.1800). Despite slight variations, the differences are not statistically significant.

This suggests that enforcement fidelity is not significantly influenced by educational attainment, but rather by adherence to operational guidelines and shared enforcement practices. This finding is consistent with de Maillard et al. (2024), who emphasized that policy implementation outcomes are more dependent on institutional frameworks and procedural clarity than on individual educational background. Moreover, it highlights the critical role of organizational culture and standardized procedures in ensuring consistent enforcement across diverse personnel.

**Enforcement Fidelity and Position/Role**

The analysis revealed no significant difference in enforcement fidelity when respondents were grouped according to position or role. The computed F-value of 0.774 with a significance value of 0.544, which is greater than 0.05, indicates that the null hypothesis is not rejected.

Among the groups, tanods obtained the highest mean (M = 4.3554), followed by community members (M = 4.2706), police officers (M = 4.2659), and barangay officials (M = 4.2476). Despite these differences, the results indicate that enforcement fidelity is consistently maintained across roles.

This suggests that regardless of position, individuals involved in curfew enforcement adhere to similar standards and procedures. This supports Ramos (2020), who highlighted that shared responsibility and coordinated efforts among community actors contribute to consistent implementation of community safety initiatives.

**Enforcement Fidelity and Years of Service**

The findings further revealed no significant difference in enforcement fidelity when respondents were grouped according to years of service. The computed F-value of 0.427 with a significance value of 0.789, which is greater than 0.05, indicates that the null hypothesis is not rejected.

Respondents with 41 years and above of service obtained the highest mean (M = 4.3700), followed by those with 31–40 years (M = 4.3433), 21–30 years (M = 4.2917), 1–10 years (M = 4.2830), and 11–20 years (M = 4.2620). However, these differences are minimal and not statistically significant.

This indicates that both experienced and less experienced personnel demonstrate similar levels of enforcement fidelity. This may be attributed to standardized procedures and continuous practice that promote consistency regardless of tenure. This finding is supported by Bautista (2023), who emphasized that effective implementation of policies depends more on structured systems and clear guidelines than on length of service alone.

Table 5 Difference in the Level of Implementation of Enforcement Fidelity When Grouped According to Demographic Profile.

| Profile | F/t-value | Significance Value | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Age | 0.654 (F) | 0.581 | Not Significant |
| Gender | -0.536 (t) | 0.593 | Not Significant |
| Educational Attainment | 1.142 (F) | 0.334 | Not Significant |
| Position/Role | 0.774 (F) | 0.544 | Not Significant |
| Years of Service | 0.427 (F) | 0.789 | Not Significant |

ns p>0.05 (not significant @5% alpha level)

**Difference in the Extent of Policy Compliance in the Implementation of Curfew Hours When Grouped According to Demographic Profile**

To determine whether significant differences exist in the extent of policy compliance in the implementation of curfew hours when respondents are grouped according to age, gender, educational attainment, position/role, and length of service, statistical tests such as Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and Independent Samples t-test were

employed. The results provide insight into whether demographic characteristics influence the degree of compliance with curfew policies.

**Policy Compliance and Age**

The analysis revealed no significant difference in the extent of policy compliance when respondents were grouped according to age. The computed F-value of 0.664 with a significance value of 0.575, which is greater than the 0.05 alpha level, indicates that the null hypothesis is not rejected.

Although respondents aged 50 years old and above obtained the highest mean score (M = 4.3775), followed by those aged 30–39 years old (M = 4.2942), 21–29 years old (M = 4.2785), and 40–49 years old (M = 4.2550), the differences among the groups are minimal and statistically insignificant. This indicates that policy compliance is consistently observed across age groups.

This suggests that adherence to curfew policies is not influenced by age but is more likely shaped by shared understanding of regulations and consistent enforcement practices. This supports Schafer (2018), who emphasized that compliance behavior is largely influenced by institutional consistency rather than demographic variation.

**Policy Compliance and Gender**

The results also showed no significant difference in policy compliance when respondents were grouped according to gender. The computed t-value of -0.020 with a significance value of 0.984, which is greater than 0.05, indicates that the null hypothesis is not rejected.

Male respondents (M = 4.2879) and female respondents (M = 4.2888) demonstrated almost identical mean scores, indicating a highly uniform level of compliance regardless of gender.

This implies that compliance with curfew policies is applied and observed equally among respondents, reflecting standardized enforcement and widespread awareness. This finding aligns with Cordner (2016), who noted that adherence to law enforcement policies tends to be uniform when procedures are clearly defined and consistently implemented.

**Policy Compliance and Educational Attainment**

The analysis revealed no significant difference in policy compliance when respondents were grouped according to educational attainment. The computed F-value of 0.224 with a significance value of 0.880, which is greater than 0.05, indicates that the null hypothesis is not rejected.

Among the groups, elementary graduates obtained the highest mean (M = 4.3118), followed by college graduates (M = 4.2988), masters/doctoral graduates (M = 4.2730), and high school graduates (M = 4.2676). Despite slight differences, these variations are not statistically significant.

This indicates that policy compliance is not dependent on educational background but is instead influenced by uniform policy implementation and enforcement practices. This supports de Maillard et al. (2024), who highlighted that effective policy compliance is more closely tied to institutional clarity and enforcement mechanisms than to individual educational differences.

**Policy Compliance and Position/Role**

The findings showed no significant difference in policy compliance when respondents were grouped according to position or role. The computed F-value of 0.506 with a significance value of 0.731, which is greater than 0.05, indicates that the null hypothesis is not rejected.

Among the groups, tanods obtained the highest mean (M = 4.3571), followed by community members (M = 4.2933), police officers (M = 4.2848), and barangay officials (M = 4.2619). However, these differences are minimal and statistically insignificant.

This suggests that regardless of role, individuals involved in or affected by curfew enforcement demonstrate similar levels of compliance. This finding supports Ramos (2020), who emphasized that shared responsibility and coordinated community participation contribute to uniform compliance in community-based programs.

**Policy Compliance and Length of Service**

The analysis further revealed no significant difference in policy compliance when respondents were grouped according to length of service. The computed F-value of 0.945 with a significance value of 0.439, which is greater than 0.05, indicates that the null hypothesis is not rejected.

Respondents with 41 years and above of service obtained the highest mean (M = 4.4471), followed by those with 31–40 years (M = 4.4033), 21–30 years (M = 4.3158), 1–10 years (M = 4.2915), and 11–20 years (M = 4.2652). Despite these variations, the differences remain statistically insignificant.

This indicates that policy compliance is consistently practiced regardless of experience level. This may be attributed to standardized enforcement systems and shared operational expectations. This finding aligns with Bautista (2023), who emphasized that structured implementation frameworks promote consistency in compliance regardless of tenure.

Table 6.*Difference in the Extent of Policy Compliance When Grouped According to Demographic Profile.*

| Profile | F/t-value | Significance Value | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Age | 0.664 (F) | 0.575 | Not Significant |
| Gender | -0.020 (t) | 0.984 | Not Significant |
| Educational Attainment | 0.224 (F) | 0.880 | Not Significant |
| Position/Role | 0.506 (F) | 0.731 | Not Significant |
| Length of Service | 0.945 (F) | 0.439 | Not Significant |

ns p>0.05 (not significant @5% alpha level)

**Difference in the Degree of Challenges Encountered by Local Authorities in Enforcing Curfew Hours When Grouped According to Demographic Profile**

To determine whether significant differences exist in the degree of challenges encountered by local authorities in enforcing curfew hours when grouped according to age, gender, educational attainment, position/role, and length of service, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and Independent Samples t-test were utilized. The results reveal whether demographic characteristics influence the level of enforcement challenges experienced.

**Enforcement Challenges and Age**

The analysis revealed a significant difference in the degree of enforcement challenges when respondents were grouped according to age. The computed F-value of 3.811 with a significance value of 0.011, which is less than the 0.05 alpha level, indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected.

Respondents aged 21–29 years old obtained the highest mean (M = 3.8788), followed by 30–39 years old (M = 3.7411), 40–49 years old (M = 3.5800), and 50 years old and above (M = 3.1533). This suggests that younger respondents tend to experience greater enforcement challenges compared to older groups.

Post hoc analysis using Tukey HSD further revealed that significant differences exist between:

- 21–29 years old and 50 years old and above (p = 0.010)
- 30–39 years old and 50 years old and above (p = 0.029)

These findings indicate that younger personnel encounter more operational difficulties, possibly due to limited experience in handling complex enforcement situations. In contrast, older respondents may rely on accumulated experience and adaptive strategies, resulting in fewer perceived challenges. This supports Bautista (2023), who emphasized that experience enhances enforcement capability and reduces operational difficulty.

**Enforcement Challenges and Gender**

The results revealed a significant difference in enforcement challenges when respondents were grouped according to gender. The computed t-value of 2.125 with a significance value of 0.035, which is less than 0.05, indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected.

Male respondents (M = 3.8166) reported higher levels of enforcement challenges compared to female respondents (M = 3.5922). This suggests that male respondents may be more exposed to high-risk enforcement situations or frontline duties, leading to increased perception of challenges. This finding aligns with Cordner (2016), who noted that operational roles and task assignments often influence the level of difficulty experienced in law enforcement activities.

**Enforcement Challenges and Educational Attainment**

The analysis revealed no significant difference in enforcement challenges when respondents were grouped according to educational attainment. The computed F-value of 2.303 with a significance value of 0.079, which is greater than 0.05, indicates that the null hypothesis is not rejected.

Although respondents with masters/doctoral degrees obtained the highest mean (M = 3.9800), followed by college graduates (M = 3.7639), elementary graduates (M = 3.7691), and high school graduates (M = 3.5119), the differences are not statistically significant.

This indicates that challenges in curfew enforcement are not dependent on educational background but are more likely influenced by situational and operational factors. This supports de Maillard et al. (2024), who emphasized that enforcement challenges are shaped more by structural and contextual conditions rather than individual educational attainment.

**Enforcement Challenges and Position/Role**

The findings showed no significant difference in enforcement challenges when respondents were grouped according to position or role. The computed F-value of 1.929 with a significance value of 0.108, which is greater than 0.05, indicates that the null hypothesis is not rejected.

Among the groups, community members obtained the highest mean (M = 3.8600), followed by police officers (M = 3.8269), tanods (M = 3.7450), and barangay officials (M = 3.5676). Despite these variations, the differences are not statistically significant.

This suggests that enforcement challenges are experienced across roles in a relatively uniform manner. Regardless of position, individuals encounter similar operational constraints such as compliance issues, resource limitations, and public cooperation concerns. This finding supports Ramos (2020), who emphasized that community-based enforcement challenges are shared across stakeholders.

**Enforcement Challenges and Length of Service**

The analysis further revealed no significant difference in enforcement challenges when respondents were grouped according to length of service. The computed F-value of 1.375 with a significance value of 0.245, which is greater than 0.05, indicates that the null hypothesis is not rejected.

Respondents with 1–10 years of service obtained the highest mean (M = 3.7552), followed by 11–20 years (M = 3.7228), 21–30 years (M = 3.4433), 31–40 years (M = 3.4000), and 41 years and above (M = 3.2571). Although

there is a decreasing trend in perceived challenges as years of service increase, the differences are not statistically significant.

This suggests that while experience may slightly reduce perceived challenges, it does not create substantial variation across groups. This finding aligns with Schafer (2018), who highlighted that organizational systems and policies play a more dominant role than individual tenure in shaping enforcement experiences.

Table 7. Difference in the Degree of Enforcement Challenges When Grouped According to Demographic Profile.

| Profile | F/t-value | Significance Value | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Age | 3.811 (F) | 0.011 | Significant |
| Gender | 2.125 (t) | 0.035 | Significant |
| Educational Attainment | 2.303 (F) | 0.079 | Not Significant |
| Position/Role | 1.929 (F) | 0.108 | Not Significant |
| Length of Service | 1.375 (F) | 0.245 | Not Significant |

ns $p>0.05$ (not significant @5% alpha level)

**Relationship Among Enforcement Fidelity, Policy Compliance Implementation, and Enforcement Challenges in Curfew Implementation**

The relationship among the level of implementation of enforcement fidelity, extent of policy compliance, and degree of challenges encountered by local authorities in implementing curfew hours is presented in Table 8. Pearson correlation analysis was used to determine whether these variables are significantly associated with one another.

The results show that there are significant relationships among some of the variables, while others are not statistically significant. Specifically, the relationship between enforcement fidelity and policy compliance implementation yielded a correlation coefficient of $r = 0.869$ with a significance value of 0.000, which is less than the 0.05 level of significance. This indicates a very strong positive correlation, suggesting that higher levels of enforcement fidelity are associated with greater policy compliance in curfew implementation.

This implies that when enforcement is consistently carried out, properly documented, and systematically monitored, compliance with curfew policies is significantly strengthened. This finding supports Bautista (2023), which emphasized that structured and consistent implementation enhances adherence to policies and improves governance outcomes.

In contrast, the relationship between enforcement challenges and enforcement fidelity resulted in a correlation coefficient of $r = -0.127$ with a significance value of 0.094, which is greater than 0.05. This indicates a weak negative relationship that is not statistically significant.

This suggests that the presence of challenges does not necessarily reduce enforcement fidelity. Enforcement personnel may still maintain consistent practices despite operational difficulties. This finding aligns with Schafer (2018), who noted that institutional standards and established procedures can sustain enforcement performance even under challenging conditions.

On the other hand, the relationship between enforcement challenges and policy compliance implementation yielded a correlation coefficient of $r = -0.70$ with a significance value of 0.031, which is less than 0.05. This indicates a moderate negative correlation, suggesting that as enforcement challenges increase, the level of policy compliance decreases.

This implies that operational constraints such as limited manpower, inadequate resources, and issues in public cooperation can directly hinder effective policy compliance. This finding supports de Maillard et al. (2024), which emphasized that structural and operational barriers can weaken policy implementation and reduce overall effectiveness. The results indicate that enforcement fidelity plays a critical role in ensuring policy compliance, while enforcement challenges can undermine compliance when they become significant. These findings highlight the importance of strengthening enforcement systems while addressing operational limitations to improve curfew implementation outcomes.

Table 8 Relationship Among Enforcement Fidelity, Policy Compliance Implementation, and Enforcement Challenges.

| Variables | Pearson's r | Significance Value | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enforcement Fidelity & Policy Compliance Implementation | 0.869 | 0.000 | Significant |
| Enforcement Challenges & Enforcement Fidelity | -0.127 | 0.094 | Not Significant |
| Enforcement Challenges & Policy Compliance Implementation | -0.70 | 0.031 | Significant |

ns p>0.05 (not significant @5% alpha level)

**Revised Schematic Diagram**





Figure 1. revised Schematic diagram showing the relationship between the independent variable, dependent variable, and research output among implementation, extent of policy compliance, and degree of challenges.

**Proposed Action Plan to Enhance Enforcement Fidelity, Policy Compliance Implementation, and Address Enforcement Challenges in Curfew Implementation**

**I. Rationale**

The findings of the study revealed that the level of implementation of enforcement fidelity (grand mean = 4.28) and the extent of policy compliance (grand mean = 4.29) are both interpreted as very high, indicating that curfew policies are generally implemented consistently and adhered to by the community.

However, the degree of enforcement challenges nd mean = 3.69) was interpreted as a moderate challenge, suggesting that despite strong implementation and compliance, local authorities continue to encounter operational difficulties that may affect sustainability and efficiency.

Specifically, challenges were observed in areas such as:

- Verification of curfew exemptions
- Limited manpower and overlapping duties
- Resource constraints (vehicles, communication tools, documentation materials)
- Public cooperation and compliance issues

Moreover, the study revealed that:

- Enforcement fidelity and policy compliance are strongly correlated, indicating that consistent enforcement directly improves compliance
- Enforcement challenges negatively affect policy compliance, highlighting the need to reduce operational barriers

These findings underscore the importance of a structured action plan aimed at strengthening enforcement systems while minimizing operational challenges to sustain effective curfew implementation.

## II. General Objective

To enhance enforcement fidelity, improve policy compliance, and reduce enforcement challenges in the implementation of curfew hours through strengthened coordination, resource support, and community engagement.

## III. Specific Objectives

1. To strengthen the consistency and accuracy of enforcement practices (enforcement fidelity)
2. To improve adherence to curfew policies among community members (policy compliance)
3. To reduce operational and structural challenges encountered by enforcement personnel
4. To enhance coordination among enforcement units and stakeholders
5. To improve availability and utilization of enforcement resources
6. To increase community cooperation and support for curfew implementation

## IV. Action Plan Matrix

**"Enhance Enforcement Fidelity, Policy Compliance Implementation, and Address Enforcement Challenges in Curfew Implementation"**

| Objectives | Activities / Strategies | Target Participants | Timeline | Persons Involved | Resources Needed | Expected Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strengthen enforcement fidelity | Conduct standardized training on proper documentation, reporting, and enforcement procedures | Police, barangay officials, tanods | Quarterly | PNP, Barangay Officials | Training modules, manuals | Improved consistency and accuracy in enforcement |
| Improve policy compliance | Intensify information campaigns on curfew rules, exemptions, and penalties | Community residents | Monthly | Barangay Officials, PNP | IEC materials, social media | Increased public understanding and compliance |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reduce ordinance-related challenges | Review and clarify curfew ordinance provisions and guidelines | LGU, policymakers, enforcement units | Semi-annual | LGU, Legal Office | Policy documents | Clearer and more consistent enforcement guidelines |
| Address manpower challenges | Optimize deployment schedules and assign dedicated curfew teams | Enforcement personnel | Monthly | PNP, Barangay Officials | Personnel planning tools | Improved coverage and reduced workload strain |
| Improve resource support | Provide patrol vehicles, communication tools, and documentation materials | Enforcement units | Ongoing | LGU, PNP | Vehicles, radios, logbooks | Enhanced operational efficiency |
| Strengthen compliance monitoring | Establish integrated recording and monitoring systems for violations and warnings | Enforcement units | Monthly | PNP, Barangay Officials | Database systems | Improved tracking of compliance and repeat offenders |
| Enhance public cooperation | Conduct community dialogues, awareness campaigns, and stakeholder meetings | Residents, community leaders | Quarterly | Barangay Council | Meeting resources | Increased cooperation and reduced resistance |
| Improve coordination | Conduct regular coordination meetings among enforcement units | PNP, barangay officials, tanods | Monthly | PNP, LGU | Communication tools | Improved teamwork and response efficiency |
| Strengthen capacity-building | Provide training on conflict management, youth handling, and legal procedures | Enforcement personnel | Semi-annual | PNP, DILG | Training materials | Increased competence and confidence |
| Monitor and evaluate enforcement | Conduct regular assessment of enforcement performance and challenges | LGU, enforcement units | Quarterly | Barangay Council, PNP | Evaluation tools | Continuous improvement in implementation |

| **Ordinance Related Challenges** | **Objective** | **Action Plan** |
|---|---|---|
| 1."Some provisions of the curfew ordinance are unclear or open to different interpretations" | Eliminate ambiguity and standardize the language of the ordinance. | Legal Review&Amendment: Convene a technical working group (comprising legal counsel, local officials, and community representatives) to audit the current ordinance text. Rewrite vague clauses into plain, definitive language.<br>Create an FAQ Guide: Produce a simplified, bilingual "Frequently Asked Questions" (FAQ) primer explaining the core rules of the ordinance without complex legal jargon. |
| 2."Curfew exemptions are difficult to verify (e.g., emergencies, work, authorized activities)" | Standardize the verification process for enforcers and citizens to minimize friction. | Standardized Documentation: Clearly define what constitutes valid proof for exemptions (e.g., a signed Certificate of Employment for night-shift workers, |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | official school IDs for late-night classes, or digital passes).<br>Digital Verification / Hotline: Establish a dedicated local hotline or a simple digital registry where employers can log authorized late-night workers, making verification instant for checkpoint authorities. |
| 3."The ordinance lacks clear guidance for handling repeat violators" | Create a transparent, progressive enforcement matrix so consequences are predictable. | Progressive Penalty Matrix: Formulate a strict step-by-step enforcement protocol (e.g., 1st offense: verbal warning and counseling; 2nd offense: mandatory community service; 3rd offense: fines/legal charges).<br>Centralized Database Tracking: Implement a digital logging system used by all local enforcers to track violations in real-time, preventing repeat offenders from getting away with multiple "first warnings" in different sectors. |
| 4."The ordinance lacks clear procedures for handling minors consistent with child welfare standards" | Ensure enforcement strictly adheres to human rights and child protection laws. | Inter-Agency Protocol (DWD/MSWD): Mandate that local social welfare officers (or designated child protection desk officers) accompany enforcers or manage the holding centers for minors. Minors should never be kept in standard holding cells.<br>Parental Accountability Framework: Establish clear procedural guidelines for immediately contacting parents/guardians, requiring them to pick up the minor, and conducting mandatory family counseling sessions rather than punitive actions against the child. |
| 5."Public understanding of the ordinance is limited, resulting in frequent confusion or disputes" | Maximize public awareness and bridge the communication gap between citizens and authorities. | Multi-Channel Information Campaign: Launch a comprehensive public information campaign utilizing social media infographics, local radio announcements, and barangay town hall assemblies to explain the curfew hours, boundaries, and rules.<br>De-escalation Training for Enforcers: Conduct mandatory customer service and conflict de-escalation training for enforcement personnel to ensure disputes at checkpoints are handled professionally and peacefully. |

### V. Monitoring and Evaluation

The effectiveness of the proposed action plan shall be evaluated through:

- Regular assessment of enforcement fidelity, policy compliance, and enforcement challenges
- Monitoring accuracy and completeness of enforcement records
- Evaluation of curfew violation trends and response efficiency
- Feedback from enforcement personnel and community members
- Periodic review of ordinance implementation and operational procedures
- Use of performance indicators to measure improvements

### VI. Expected Outcomes

The implementation of this action plan is expected to:

- Strengthen enforcement fidelity through standardized and consistent practices
- Improve compliance with curfew policies among community members
- Reduce operational and structural challenges encountered by authorities
- Enhance coordination among enforcement units and stakeholders
- Improve resource availability and operational efficiency
- Increase community cooperation and support
- Promote more effective and sustainable curfew enforcement

### VII. Sustainability Plan

To ensure sustainability, local government units and barangays should institutionalize standardized enforcement procedures, allocate sufficient resources for enforcement operations, and maintain continuous training for personnel. Strengthening partnerships with law enforcement agencies and fostering active community participation will further support long-term implementation. Regular monitoring, policy review, and adaptive strategies should be maintained to ensure that curfew enforcement remains effective and responsive to emerging challenges.

### Updated Matrix of Apprehension

According to the updated matrix given by Dagohoy Municipal Police Station they have apprehended up to 4-5 persons daily on their curfew operation regarding Municipal Ordinance no. 001 series of 2016 Curfew hours, most of the violators are minor ranging from the age of 14-17 as to their blotter record from 2025 January until May 2026 of this year.

## SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter presents the summary of the study, the major findings derived from the analysis of the data, the conclusions drawn from the results, and the recommendations based on the findings.

### Summary

This study examined the role of policy compliance and enforcement fidelity of curfew hours in relation to the maintenance of public order and community safety in the Municipality of Dagohoy, Bohol. It focused on the level of implementation of enforcement fidelity, the extent of policy compliance, the degree of challenges encountered by local authorities, the significant differences in these variables when grouped according to demographic profile, and the relationships among enforcement fidelity, policy compliance implementation, and

enforcement challenges Specifically, the study aimed to:(a) determine the level of implementation of enforcement fidelity as a whole and in terms of consistency, fairness, and coverage of patrols during curfew hours;(b) determine the extent of policy compliance in the implementation of curfew hours as a whole and in terms of records of apprehension, warnings, and violations;(c) identify the degree of challenges encountered by local authorities in enforcing curfew hours as a whole and in terms of ordinance-related challenges, manpower challenges, compliance challenges, resource challenges, and public cooperation challenges;(d)

determine whether significant differences exist in the level of implementation of enforcement fidelity when respondents are grouped according to demographic profile; (e) determine whether significant differences exist in the extent of policy compliance in the implementation of curfew hours when respondents are grouped according to demographic profile;(f) determine whether significant differences exist in the degree of challenges encountered by local authorities in enforcing curfew hours when respondents are grouped according to demographic profile; and (g) determine whether significant relationships exist among enforcement fidelity, policy compliance implementation, and enforcement challenges. The respondents of the study were composed of PNP personnel, BPAT members, barangay councilors, and municipal law enforcers. Data were gathered using a structured questionnaire and analyzed using appropriate descriptive and inferential statistical tools.

**Conclusions**

Based on the findings of the study, the following conclusions were drawn:

The implementation of curfew hours in the Municipality of Dagohoy, Bohol demonstrates a very high level of enforcement fidelity, which means that curfew rules are generally enforced with consistency, fairness, and adequate patrol coverage. This indicates that the curfew policy is operationally strong and is being carried out according to intended procedures.

Policy compliance in the implementation of curfew hours is likewise at a very high extent, indicating that enforcement mechanisms such as apprehension records, warnings, and violation monitoring are well-established and functional. This suggests that curfew enforcement is supported by strong administrative and compliance systems.

Despite these strengths, local authorities still experience a serious degree of challenges, particularly in terms of ordinance clarity, manpower, public cooperation, compliance issues, and resource availability. This implies that effective implementation is being achieved despite substantial constraints.

The absence of significant differences in enforcement fidelity and policy compliance across most demographic variables indicates that curfew enforcement and compliance are generally uniform across respondent groups. This suggests that implementation is influenced more by institutional systems, established procedures, and shared operational expectations than by personal demographic characteristics.

The presence of significant differences in enforcement challenges according to age and gender suggests that the experience of operational difficulties is not evenly distributed among respondents. This means that some groups may face greater pressure or exposure to implementation difficulties than others.

The significant positive relationship between enforcement fidelity and policy compliance confirms that consistent, fair, and systematic enforcement is a key factor in strengthening compliance with curfew policies. In other words, when enforcement is implemented properly, compliance is more likely to be sustained.

The lack of a significant relationship between enforcement challenges and enforcement fidelity indicates that enforcement personnel are generally able to maintain implementation standards even in the presence of difficulties. This suggests a degree of resilience and commitment among implementers.

The significant negative relationship between enforcement challenges and policy compliance shows that operational barriers such as unclear ordinance provisions, manpower constraints, limited resources, and weak

public cooperation can undermine compliance. Thus, reducing enforcement challenges remains essential in sustaining effective curfew implementation.

**Recommendations**

Based on the findings and conclusions of the study, the following recommendations were proposed:

Local government units and enforcement agencies may sustain the strengths already observed in enforcement fidelity and policy compliance by continuing standardized procedures, regular supervision, and close coordination among police, barangay officials, BPAT members, and municipal law enforcers.

The curfew ordinance may be reviewed and clarified, particularly on provisions concerning exemptions, repeat violators, and procedures involving minors, in order to reduce ambiguity and improve consistency in implementation.

To address manpower and resource-related challenges, local authorities may improve personnel allocation, duty scheduling, and logistical support, including patrol mobility, communication tools, and documentation materials, so that enforcement operations can be carried out more efficiently.

Barangay officials and law enforcement personnel may strengthen community engagement through information campaigns, public dialogues, and regular consultations with parents, community leaders, and business establishments to increase support and cooperation in curfew implementation.

Special attention may be given to the groups that experience greater enforcement challenges by providing mentoring, practical guidance, and capacity-building activities that can help them manage field demands more effectively.

Future researchers may conduct similar studies in other municipalities or include additional variables such as public order outcomes, community safety indicators, trust in law enforcement, and crime trends to further expand understanding of curfew policy effectiveness.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Belinda Mata Cutillas is a 28-year-old professional in the field of criminology and education. She earned her degree of Bachelor of Science in Criminology at Trinidad Municipal College, where she developed a strong academic foundation and passion for public service and law enforcement.

Following her graduation, she pursued a career in teaching and is currently serving as a Teacher/Instructor of Criminology at Trinidad Municipal College. In her role, she is dedicated to mentoring and educating aspiring criminologists, instilling in them discipline, integrity, and a deep understanding of the criminal justice system.

Driven by her commitment to continuous learning and professional growth, Belinda is presently taking up her Master's Degree at Capiz State University (CAPSU). Her pursuit of advanced education reflects her desire to further enhance her knowledge and contribute more effectively to the academic community.

Beyond her professional and academic endeavors, Belinda is a devoted mother of three children. She skillfully balances her responsibilities at work and at home, ensuring that she provides guidance, care, and support to her family while maintaining excellence in her career.

She is also a loving and supportive wife to a police officer, embodying the values of partnership, understanding, and shared commitment to public service. Her family life complements her professional role, as both are rooted in service, discipline, and responsibility.

Through her dedication to education, her pursuit of higher learning, and her unwavering commitment to her family, Belinda Mata Cutillas exemplifies resilience, professionalism, and a strong sense of purpose. She continues to serve as an inspiration to her students, colleagues, and community.

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# APPENDIX

**Demographic Profile**

Please check (✓) the appropriate answer.

**Age**:_____

**Gender**:

☐ Male

☐ Female

☐ Prefer not to say

**Educational Attainment**:

☐ Elementary Graduate

☐ High School Graduate

☐ College Graduate

☐ Masters/Doctor Graduate

**Position/Role**:

☐ Police Officer

☐ Barangay Official

☐ Tanod

☐ LGU Personnel

☐ Community Member

**Years of Service / Residency**:_____

**Part I. Curfew Enforcement Fidelity Scale**

Direction: Read each indicator carefully, describing the level of implementation of the Curfew Hours in terms of the following constraints. Please put a check (✓) in the box provided which is appropriate and correct based on your idea. Please do not leave any box unanswered.

**Likert Scale**

5 – Strongly Agree
4 – Agree
3 – Neither Agree nor Disagree
2 – Disagree
1 – Strongly Disagree

| **A. Consistency**<br>Curfew start and end times are enforced the same way across all duty shifts. | **5** | **4** | **3** | **2** | **1** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Similar curfew violations consistently receive the same type of action (e.g., warning, referral, documentation). | | | | | |
| Enforcers routinely follow a standard checklist when stopping curfew violators (identity, reason, exemptions). | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
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| Incident documentation (logbook/blotter/report) is completed in a uniform format by all duty teams. | | | | | |
| Handovers between shifts include clear information about curfew incidents and procedures, ensuring continuity. | | | | | |
| Coordination protocols between police and barangay personnel are applied consistently during curfew operations. | | | | | |
| Officers follow the same escalation steps for repeat curfew violations across different cases. | | | | | |
| Curfew enforcement procedures are implemented uniformly across different neighborhoods and sectors. | | | | | |
| Supervisors monitor enforcement actions to ensure uniform application of curfew rules. | | | | | |
| Standard operating procedures for curfew enforcement are available and followed by all personnel on duty. | | | | | |
| **B. Fairness**<br>People encountered during curfew hours are treated with respect by enforcers. | | | | | |
| Enforcers clearly explain the reason for stopping or questioning an individual during curfew hours. | | | | | |
| Individuals are given an opportunity to explain their circumstances before any enforcement action is taken. | | | | | |
| Decisions to warn, detain, or refer are made without regard to a person's social status or personal connections. | | | | | |
| Curfew exemptions (e.g., emergencies, work travel, authorised activities) are granted fairly to eligible individuals. | | | | | |
| Minors encountered during curfew hours are handled in a manner that prioritizes their safety and welfare. | | | | | |
| Enforcers avoid humiliating or degrading treatment when dealing with curfew violators. | | | | | |
| Enforcement actions are proportionate to the nature of the curfew violation. | | | | | |
| Enforcers treat all demographic groups (age, gender, ethnicity) equitably during curfew operations. | | | | | |
| Individuals are informed of their rights or next steps (e.g., who to contact) when a curfew action is taken. | | | | | |
| **C. Coverage of Patrols During Curfew Hour**s<br>Patrols occur regularly throughout the entire curfew period, not just at the beginning. | | | | | |
| Patrol routes are planned to include areas known for frequent curfew violations. | | | | | |
| Patrol coverage reaches outlying puroks/sitios as well as central areas. | | | | | |
| There are sufficient personnel assigned to ensure effective patrol coverage during curfew hours. | | | | | |
| Response to curfew-related reports or complaints is timely during curfew hours. | | | | | |
| Patrol teams follow pre-assigned routes and schedules rather than only responding reactively. | | | | | |
| High-risk or hotspot areas receive focused patrol attention during curfew hours. | | | | | |
| Patrol frequency is adequate to deter curfew violations in most parts of the community. | | | | | |
| Patrols are visible and present in both residential and commercial areas during curfew hours. | | | | | |
| Patrol deployment is adjusted based on recent incident data or community reports to maintain effective coverage. | | | | | |

**Part II. Curfew Policy Compliance Implementation Scale**

Direction: Read each indicator carefully, describing the level of implementation of the Curfew Hours in terms of the following constraints. Please put a check (✓) in the box provided which is appropriate and correct based on your idea. Please do not leave any box unanswered.

**Likert Scale**

5 – Strongly Agree
4 – Agree
3 – Neither Agree nor Disagree
2 – Disagree
1 – Strongly Disagree

| **A. Records of Apprehension**<br>Apprehensions or turnovers during curfew hours are properly documented. | **5** | **4** | **3** | **2** | **1** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apprehension records include complete basic information (date, time, location, person involved, action taken). | | | | | |
| Apprehension documentation is submitted or entered within the required reporting timeframe. | | | | | |
| Apprehension records are consistent in format and content across teams and duty schedules. | | | | | |
| Apprehension records accurately reflect actual field enforcement activities. | | | | | |
| Repeat offenders can be identified easily from existing apprehension records. | | | | | |
| Apprehension logs are stored securely and are retrievable for audit or follow-up. | | | | | |
| Recorded apprehension actions consistently indicate the disposition (warning, turnover, citation, referral). | | | | | |
| Supervisors regularly review apprehension records to verify completeness and accuracy. | | | | | |
| Data from apprehension records are used to inform patrol planning and enforcement strategies. | | | | | |
| **B. Warnings**<br>Warnings are consistently issued when appropriate (e.g., for first-time or low-risk cases). | | | | | |
| Warnings are recorded or documented when required by<br>procedure. | | | | | |
| Enforcers clearly explain curfew rules and the reason for the warning when issuing it. | | | | | |
| Warning practices are applied fairly and consistently across barangays and patrol teams. | | | | | |
| Warnings are used proactively to prevent escalation and encourage voluntary compliance. | | | | | |
| Residents generally respond positively to warnings and comply afterward. | | | | | |
| There is a standard format or script used by enforcers when delivering warnings. | | | | | |
| Supervisors monitor warning issuance to ensure they are not overused or underused. | | | | | |
| Warnings include guidance on how individuals can avoid future curfew violations (e.g., required documentation, exemptions). | | | | | |

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| Warning records are integrated with apprehension logs to track subsequent compliance or repeat incidents. | | | | | |
| **C. Violations**<br>Curfew violations are consistently recorded whenever they occur. | | | | | |
| Violation records include the detailed information needed for monitoring and follow-up (e.g., offender details, circumstances). | | | | | |
| There is a clear, documented process for handling repeat curfew violators. | | | | | |
| Violation reports are forwarded to the appropriate office or person (barangay, PNP, LGU) when necessary. | | | | | |
| The number of unrecorded or unreported curfew violations is minimal. | | | | | |
| Enforcement teams systematically categorize violations by type and severity for reporting. | | | | | |
| Sanctions or referrals for violations are applied according to established rules and are documented. | | | | | |
| Violation data are periodically reviewed to identify trends and hotspots. | | | | | |
| The community's level of compliance with curfew rules is generally high in our area. (Reverse-code if measuring noncompliance.) | | | | | |
| Records of violations are used to plan targeted interventions (e.g., awareness campaigns, increased patrols) to reduce recurrence. | | | | | |

**Part III. Curfew Enforcement Challenges Scale**

Direction: Read each indicator carefully, describing the level of implementation of the Curfew Hours in terms of the following constraints. Please put a check (✓) in the box provided which is appropriate and correct based on your idea. Please do not leave any box unanswered.

Please rate the degree to which each item is a challenge in curfew enforcement in your area.

**Likert Scale**

5 – Very Serious Challenge
4 – Serious Challenge
3 – Moderate Challenge
2 – Minor Challenge
1 – Not a Challenge

| **A. Ordinance-Related Challenges**<br>1. Some provisions of the curfew ordinance are unclear or open to different interpretations | **5** | **4** | **3** | **2** | **1** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2. Curfew exemptions are difficult to verify (e.g., emergencies, work, authorized activities). | | | | | |
| 3. The ordinance lacks clear guidance for handling repeat violators | | | | | |
| 4. The ordinance lacks clear procedures for handling minors consistent with child welfare standards | | | | | |
| 5.Public understanding of the ordinance is limited, resulting in frequent confusion or disputes. | | | | | |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **B. Manpower Challenges**<br>6. The number of personnel assigned is insufficient to cover all areas during curfew hours | | | | | |
| 7. Overlapping duties and competing priorities limit the ability to conduct curfew patrols. | | | | | |
| 8. Shift schedules and fatigue reduce the consistency of curfew enforcement. | | | | | |
| 9. Lack of training reduces confidence and uniformity in enforcement. | | | | | |
| 10. Coordination is difficult due to limited staffing across barangays/teams | | | | | |
| **C. Compliance Challenges**<br>11. Repeat violators are common in our area. | | | | | |
| 12. Some residents resist or argue during curfew enforcement encounters | | | | | |
| 13. Some minors violate curfew due to weak parental supervision or family-related issues. | | | | | |
| 14. Alcohol-related behavior contributes to curfew violations and disorder. | | | | | |
| 15. Some residents deliberately evade patrols or use routes to avoid enforcement. | | | | | |
| **D. Resource Challenges**<br>16. Lack of patrol vehicles/motorcycles limits patrol coverage. | | | | | |
| 17. Insufficient fuel, maintenance, or operational budget affects patrol frequency | | | | | |
| 18. Limited communication tools (radios/phones/load) affect coordination during enforcement. | | | | | |
| 19. Poor lighting/visibility in some areas increases risk and reduces effective enforcement. | | | | | |
| 20. Limited documentation tools/materials (forms, logbooks, printing) affect record keeping. | | | | | |
| **E. Public Cooperation Challenges**<br>21. Parents/guardians do not consistently support curfew compliance for minors. | | | | | |
| 22. Community members are hesitant to report violations or disturbances. | | | | | |
| 23. Some residents perceive enforcement as unfair, reducing cooperation | | | | | |
| 24. Community leaders/groups are not consistently involved in supporting curfew efforts | | | | | |
| 25. Some business establishments do not consistently cooperate with curfew-related guidelines | | | | | |

## APPENDIX 8

## RELIABILITY TEST

| **Case Processing Summary** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | **N** | **%** |
| **Cases** | **Valid** | **30** | **100.0** |
| | **Excluded[a]** | **0** | **.0** |
| | **Total** | **30** | **100.0** |
| **a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.** | | | |

**A. Level of Curfew Enforcement Fidelity**

| **Reliability Statistics** | |
|---|---|
| **Cronbach's Alpha** | **N of Items** |
| **.962** | **30** |

**B. Level of Curfew Policy Compliance Implementation**

| **Reliability Statistics** | |
|---|---|
| Cronbach's Alpha | N of Items |
| .942 | 30 |

**C. Level of Curfew Enforcement Challenges**

| **Reliability Statistics** | |
|---|---|
| **Cronbach's Alpha** | **N of Items** |
| **.925** | **25** |

Checked and Verified By:

**(SGD)GIENA L. ODICTA, PhD**

Statistician

**APPENDIX 9**

**STATISTICAL ANALYSIS**

| **Statistics** | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Age | Gender | Educational attainment | Position/role | Years of service/Residency |
| N | Valid | 174 | 174 | 174 | 174 | 174 |
| | Missing | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

| **Age** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Valid | 21-29yrs old | 33 | 19.0 | 19.0 | 19.0 |
| | 30-39 yrs old | 91 | 52.3 | 52.3 | 71.3 |
| | 40-49 yrs old | 38 | 21.8 | 21.8 | 93.1 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 50 yrs old and above | 12 | 6.9 | 6.9 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 174 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

**Gender**

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | male | 77 | 44.3 | 44.3 | 44.3 |
| | female | 97 | 55.7 | 55.7 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 174 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

**Educational attainment**

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | elementrary graduate | 22 | 12.6 | 12.6 | 12.6 |
| | high school graduate | 59 | 33.9 | 33.9 | 46.6 |
| | college graduate | 83 | 47.7 | 47.7 | 94.3 |
| | masters/doctoral graduate | 10 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 174 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

**Years of service/Residency**

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | 1-10yrs | 66 | 37.9 | 37.9 | 37.9 |
| | 11-20yrs | 86 | 49.4 | 49.4 | 87.4 |
| | 21-30yrs | 12 | 6.9 | 6.9 | 94.3 |
| | 31-40yrs | 3 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 96.0 |
| | 41yrs and above | 7 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 174 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

1. **What is the level of implementation of enforcement fidelity as a whole and in terms of consistency, Fairness, and Coverage of patrols during curfew hours?**

**KConsistency**

| **Descriptive Statistics** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation |
| VAR00001 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.3736 | .48515 |
| VAR00002 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.2126 | .41036 |
| VAR00003 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.2759 | .44824 |
| VAR00004 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.1839 | .38853 |
| VAR00005 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.3621 | .48199 |
| VAR00006 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.2644 | .44227 |
| VAR00007 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.3793 | .48662 |
| VAR00008 | 174 | 3.00 | 5.00 | 4.1839 | .43085 |
| VAR00009 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.3218 | .46853 |
| VAR00010 | 174 | 3.00 | 5.00 | 4.1897 | .42154 |
| Valid N (listwise) | 174 | | | 4.27 | |

| **Statement Indicator** | **Mean** | **Verbal Interpretation** |
|---|---|---|
| Officers follow the same escalation steps for repeat curfew violations across different cases. | 4.38 | |
| Curfew start and end times are enforced the same way across all duty shifts. | 4.37 | |
| Handovers between shifts include clear information about curfew incidents and procedures, ensuring continuity. | 4.36 | |
| Supervisors monitor enforcement actions to ensure uniform application of curfew rules. | 4.32 | |
| Enforcers routinely follow a standard checklist when stopping curfew violators (identity, reason, exemptions). | 4.28 | |
| Coordination protocols between police and barangay personnel are applied consistently during curfew operations. | 4.26 | |
| Similar curfew violations consistently receive the same type of action (e.g., warning, referral, documentation). | 4.21 | |
| Standard operating procedures for curfew enforcement are available and followed by all personnel on duty. | 4.19 | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Incident documentation (logbook/blotter/report) is completed in a uniform format by all duty teams. | 4.18 | |
| Curfew enforcement procedures are implemented uniformly across different neighborhoods and sectors. | 4.18 | |

**Fairness**

| **Descriptive Statistics** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation |
| VAR00001 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.4023 | .49178 |
| VAR00002 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.2356 | .42562 |
| VAR00003 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.3218 | .46853 |
| VAR00004 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.2356 | .42562 |
| VAR00005 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.3103 | .46397 |
| VAR00006 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.2126 | .41036 |
| VAR00007 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.3506 | .47853 |
| VAR00008 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.3448 | .47668 |
| VAR00009 | 174 | 3.00 | 5.00 | 4.2816 | .48801 |
| VAR00010 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.2529 | .43591 |
| Valid N (listwise) | 174 | | | 4.29 | |

| **Statement Indicator** | **Mean** | **Verbal Interpretation** |
|---|---|---|
| People encountered during curfew hours are treated with respect by enforcers. | 4.40 | |
| Enforcers avoid humiliating or degrading treatment when dealing with curfew violators. | 4.35 | |
| Enforcement actions are proportionate to the nature of the curfew violation. | 4.34 | |
| Individuals are given an opportunity to explain their circumstances before any enforcement action is taken. | 4.32 | |
| Curfew exemptions (e.g., emergencies, work travel, authorised activities) are granted fairly to eligible individuals. | 4.31 | |
| Enforcers treat all demographic groups (age, gender, ethnicity) equitably during curfew operations. | 4.28 | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Individuals are informed of their rights or next steps (e.g., who to contact) when a curfew action is taken. | 4.25 | |
| Enforcers clearly explain the reason for stopping or questioning an individual during curfew hours. | 4.24 | |
| Decisions to warn, detain, or refer are made without regard to a person's social status or personal connections. | 4.24 | |
| Minors encountered during curfew hours are handled in a manner that prioritizes their safety and welfare. | 4.21 | |

**Coverage of Patrols During Curfew Hours**

| **Descriptive Statistics** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation |
| VAR00001 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.3218 | .46853 |
| VAR00002 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.2184 | .41435 |
| VAR00003 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.3046 | .46157 |
| VAR00004 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.1897 | .39316 |
| VAR00005 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.3046 | .46157 |
| VAR00006 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.2126 | .41036 |
| VAR00007 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.2356 | .42562 |
| VAR00008 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.2299 | .42197 |
| VAR00009 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.2816 | .45108 |
| VAR00010 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.3448 | .47668 |
| Valid N (listwise) | 174 | | | 4.26 | |

| **Statement Indicator** | **Mean** | **Verbal Interpretation** |
|---|---|---|
| Patrol deployment is adjusted based on recent incident data or community reports to maintain effective coverage. | 4.34 | |
| Patrols occur regularly throughout the entire curfew period, not just at the beginning. | 4.32 | |
| Patrol coverage reaches outlying puroks/sitios as well as central areas. | 4.30 | |
| Response to curfew-related reports or complaints is timely during curfew hours. | 4.30 | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Patrols are visible and present in both residential and commercial areas during curfew hours. | 4.28 | |
| High-risk or hotspot areas receive focused patrol attention during curfew hours. | 4.24 | |
| Patrol frequency is adequate to deter curfew violations in most parts of the community. | 4.23 | |
| Patrol routes are planned to include areas known for frequent curfew violations. | 4.22 | |
| Patrol teams follow pre-assigned routes and schedules rather than only responding reactively. | 4.21 | |
| There are sufficient personnel assigned to ensure effective patrol coverage during curfew hours. | 4.19 | |

**2. What is the extent of policy compliance in the implementation of curfew hours as a whole and in terms of records of apprehension, warnings, violations?**

**Records of Apprehension**

| **Descriptive Statistics** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation |
| VAR00001 | 174 | 3.00 | 5.00 | 4.3046 | .48597 |
| VAR00002 | 174 | 3.00 | 5.00 | 4.0805 | .39413 |
| VAR00003 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.3103 | .46397 |
| VAR00004 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.2471 | .43259 |
| VAR00005 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.4253 | .49581 |
| VAR00006 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.2529 | .43591 |
| VAR00007 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.3218 | .46853 |
| VAR00008 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.3506 | .47853 |
| VAR00009 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.2989 | .45908 |
| VAR00010 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.2874 | .45384 |
| Valid N (listwise) | 174 | | | 4.29 | |

| **Statement Indicator** | **Mean** | **Verbal Interpretation** |
|---|---|---|
| Apprehension records accurately reflect actual field enforcement activities. | 4.43 | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Recorded apprehension actions consistently indicate the disposition (warning, turnover, citation, referral). | 4.35 | |
| Apprehension logs are stored securely and are retrievable for audit or follow-up. | 4.32 | |
| Apprehension documentation is submitted or entered within the required reporting timeframe. | 4.31 | |
| Apprehensions or turnovers during curfew hours are properly documented. | 4.30 | |
| Supervisors regularly review apprehension records to verify completeness and accuracy. | 4.30 | |
| Data from apprehension records are used to inform patrol planning and enforcement strategies. | 4.29 | |
| Apprehension records are consistent in format and content across teams and duty schedules. | 4.25 | |
| Repeat offenders can be identified easily from existing apprehension records. | 4.25 | |
| Apprehension records include complete basic information (date, time, location, person involved, action taken). | 4.08 | |

**Warnings**

| **Descriptive Statistics** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation |
| VAR00011 | 174 | 3.00 | 5.00 | 4.3276 | .52854 |
| VAR00012 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.2299 | .42197 |
| VAR00013 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.3793 | .48662 |
| VAR00014 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.2874 | .45384 |
| VAR00015 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.4253 | .49581 |
| VAR00016 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.2184 | .41435 |
| VAR00017 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.3563 | .48029 |
| VAR00018 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.2644 | .44227 |
| VAR00019 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.3678 | .48360 |
| VAR00020 | 174 | 3.00 | 5.00 | 4.1897 | .43504 |
| Valid N (listwise) | 174 | | | 4.30 | |

| Statement Indicator | Mean | Verbal Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Warnings are used proactively to prevent escalation and encourage voluntary compliance. | 4.43 | |
| Enforcers clearly explain curfew rules and the reason for the warning when issuing it. | 4.38 | |
| Warnings include guidance on how individuals can avoid future curfew violations (e.g., required documentation, exemptions). | 4.37 | |
| There is a standard format or script used by enforcers when delivering warnings. | 4.36 | |
| Warnings are consistently issued when appropriate (e.g., for first-time or low-risk cases). | 4.33 | |
| Warning practices are applied fairly and consistently across barangays and patrol teams. | 4.29 | |
| Supervisors monitor warning issuance to ensure they are not overused or underused. | 4.26 | |
| Warnings are recorded or documented when required by procedure. | 4.23 | |
| Residents generally respond positively to warnings and comply afterward. | 4.22 | |
| Warning records are integrated with apprehension logs to track subsequent compliance or repeat incidents. | 4.19 | |

**Violations**

| Descriptive Statistics | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation |
| VAR00021 | 174 | 3.00 | 5.00 | 4.3736 | .49692 |
| VAR00022 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.2241 | .41822 |
| VAR00023 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.3391 | .47476 |
| VAR00024 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.2356 | .42562 |
| VAR00025 | 174 | 3.00 | 5.00 | 4.4540 | .53292 |
| VAR00026 | 174 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 4.2126 | .41036 |
| VAR00027 | 174 | 3.00 | 5.00 | 4.3218 | .49259 |
| VAR00028 | 174 | 3.00 | 5.00 | 4.2644 | .46768 |
| VAR00029 | 174 | 2.00 | 5.00 | 4.2471 | .51774 |
| VAR00030 | 174 | 2.00 | 5.00 | 4.0575 | .62429 |
| Valid N (listwise) | 174 | | | 4.27 | |

| Statement Indicator | Mean | Verbal Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| The number of unrecorded or unreported curfew violations is minimal. | 4.45 | |
| Curfew violations are consistently recorded whenever they occur. | 4.37 | |
| There is a clear, documented process for handling repeat curfew violators. | 4.34 | |
| Sanctions or referrals for violations are applied according to established rules and are documented. | 4.32 | |
| Violation data are periodically reviewed to identify trends and hotspots. | 4.26 | |
| The community's level of compliance with curfew rules is generally high in our area. (Reverse-code if measuring noncompliance.) | 4.25 | |
| Violation reports are forwarded to the appropriate office or person (barangay, PNP, LGU) when necessary. | 4.24 | |
| Violation records include the detailed information needed for monitoring and follow-up (e.g., offender details, circumstances). | 4.22 | |
| Enforcement teams systematically categorize violations by type and severity for reporting. | 4.21 | |
| Records of violations are used to plan targeted interventions (e.g., awareness campaigns, increased patrols) to reduce recurrence. | 4.06 | |

**3. What is the degree of challenges encountered by local authorities in enforcing the curfew hour as a whole and in terms of Ordinance Related Challenges, Manpower Challenges, Compliance Challenges, Resource Challenges, and Public Cooperation Challenges?**

**Ordinance-Related Challenges**

| Descriptive Statistics | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation |
| VAR00001 | 174 | 2.00 | 5.00 | 3.8506 | .79781 |
| VAR00002 | 174 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 3.7931 | .76238 |
| VAR00003 | 174 | 2.00 | 5.00 | 3.7356 | .74430 |
| VAR00004 | 174 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 3.6954 | .76353 |
| VAR00005 | 174 | 2.00 | 5.00 | 3.7011 | .86839 |
| Valid N (listwise) | 174 | | | 3.76 | |

| Statement Indicator | Mean | Verbal Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Some provisions of the curfew ordinance are unclear or open to different interpretations | 3.85 | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Curfew exemptions are difficult to verify (e.g., emergencies, work, authorized activities). | 3.79 | |
| The ordinance lacks clear guidance for handling repeat violators | 3.74 | |
| The ordinance lacks clear procedures for handling minors consistent with child welfare standards | 3.70 | |
| Public understanding of the ordinance is limited, resulting in frequent confusion or disputes. | 3.70 | |

**Manpower Challenges**

| **Descriptive Statistics** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation |
| VAR00001 | 174 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 3.7874 | .87063 |
| VAR00002 | 174 | 2.00 | 5.00 | 3.7069 | .75284 |
| VAR00003 | 174 | 2.00 | 5.00 | 3.7184 | .68511 |
| VAR00004 | 174 | 2.00 | 5.00 | 3.6494 | .82453 |
| VAR00005 | 174 | 2.00 | 5.00 | 3.6839 | .78870 |
| Valid N (listwise) | 174 | | | 3.71 | |

| **Statement Indicator** | **Mean** | **Verbal Interpretation** |
|---|---|---|
| The number of personnel assigned is insufficient to cover all areas during curfew hours | 3.79 | |
| Overlapping duties and competing priorities limit the ability to conduct curfew patrols. | 3.71 | |
| Shift schedules and fatigue reduce the consistency of curfew enforcement. | 3.72 | |
| Lack of training reduces confidence and uniformity in enforcement. | 3.65 | |
| Coordination is difficult due to limited staffing across barangays/teams | 3.68 | |

**Compliance Challenges**

| **Descriptive Statistics** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation |
| VAR00001 | 174 | 2.00 | 5.00 | 3.6552 | .85108 |
| VAR00002 | 174 | 2.00 | 5.00 | 3.7184 | .74182 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| VAR00003 | 174 | 2.00 | 5.00 | 3.6264 | .81432 |
| VAR00004 | 174 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 3.6954 | .81481 |
| VAR00005 | 174 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 3.6207 | .87669 |
| Valid N (listwise) | 174 | | | 3.66 | |

| **Statement Indicator** | **Mean** | **Verbal Interpretation** |
|---|---|---|
| Repeat violators are common in our area. | 3.66 | |
| Some residents resist or argue during curfew enforcement encounters | 3.72 | |
| Some minors violate curfew due to weak parental supervision or family-related issues. | 3.63 | |
| Alcohol-related behavior contributes to curfew violations and disorder. | 3.70 | |
| Some residents deliberately evade patrols or use routes to avoid enforcement. | 3.62 | |

**Resource Challenges**

| **Descriptive Statistics** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation |
| VAR00001 | 174 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 3.6782 | .91858 |
| VAR00002 | 174 | 2.00 | 5.00 | 3.5747 | .79204 |
| VAR00003 | 174 | 2.00 | 5.00 | 3.6839 | .89189 |
| VAR00004 | 174 | 2.00 | 5.00 | 3.6954 | .79324 |
| VAR00005 | 174 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 3.6149 | .80174 |
| Valid N (listwise) | 174 | | | 3.65 | |

| **Statement Indicator** | **Mean** | **Verbal Interpretation** |
|---|---|---|
| Lack of patrol vehicles/motorcycles limits patrol coverage. | 3.68 | |
| Insufficient fuel, maintenance, or operational budget affects patrol frequency | 3.57 | |
| Limited communication tools (radios/phones/load) affect coordination during enforcement. | 3.68 | |
| Poor lighting/visibility in some areas increases risk and reduces effective enforcement. | 3.70 | |
| Limited documentation tools/materials (forms, logbooks, printing) affect record keeping. | 3.61 | |

**Public Cooperation Challenges**

| **Descriptive Statistics** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation |
| VAR00001 | 174 | 2.00 | 5.00 | 3.7069 | .76048 |
| VAR00002 | 174 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 3.6839 | .85887 |
| VAR00003 | 174 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 3.6667 | .77036 |
| VAR00004 | 174 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 3.6667 | .85567 |
| VAR00005 | 174 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 3.6782 | .88002 |
| Valid N (listwise) | 174 | | | 3.68 | |

| **Statement Indicator** | **Mean** | **Verbal Interpretation** |
|---|---|---|
| Parents/guardians do not consistently support curfew compliance for minors. | 3.71 | |
| Community members are hesitant to report violations or disturbances. | 3.68 | |
| Some residents perceive enforcement as unfair, reducing cooperation | 3.67 | |
| Community leaders/groups are not consistently involved in supporting curfew efforts | 3.67 | |
| Some business establishments do not consistently cooperate with curfew-related guidelines | 3.68 | |

**4. Is there a significant difference in the level implementation of enforcement fidelity when grouped according to their demographic profile?**

**Age**

| **Descriptives** | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enforcement fidelity | | | | | | | | |
| | N | Mean | Std. Deviation | Std. Error | 95% Confidence Interval for Mean | | Minimum | Maximum |
| | | | | | Lower Bound | Upper Bound | | |
| 21-29yrs old | 33 | 4.2745 | .25845 | .04499 | 4.1829 | 4.3662 | 4.00 | 5.00 |
| 30-39 yrs old | 91 | 4.2820 | .22109 | .02318 | 4.2359 | 4.3280 | 4.00 | 4.73 |
| 40-49 yrs old | 38 | 4.2461 | .26635 | .04321 | 4.1585 | 4.3336 | 4.00 | 4.80 |
| 50 yrs old and above | 12 | 4.3550 | .21728 | .06272 | 4.2169 | 4.4931 | 4.00 | 4.53 |
| Total | 174 | 4.2778 | .23792 | .01804 | 4.2422 | 4.3134 | 4.00 | 5.00 |

| Test of Homogeneity of Variances | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Levene Statistic | df1 | df2 | Sig. |
| Enforcement fidelity | Based on Mean | 1.309 | 3 | 170 | .273 |
| | Based on Median | 1.544 | 3 | 170 | .205 |
| | Based on Median and with adjusted df | 1.544 | 3 | 141.324 | .206 |
| | Based on trimmed mean | 1.260 | 3 | 170 | .290 |

| ANOVA | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enforcement fidelity | | | | | |
| | Sum of Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
| Between Groups | .112 | 3 | .037 | .654 | .581 |
| Within Groups | 9.681 | 170 | .057 | | |
| Total | 9.793 | 173 | | | |

**Gender**

| Group Statistics | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Gender | N | Mean | Std. Deviation | Std. Error Mean |
| Enforcement fidelity | male | 77 | 4.2669 | .22946 | .02615 |
| | female | 97 | 4.2864 | .24526 | .02490 |

| Independent Samples Test | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Levene's Test for Equality of Variances | | t-test for Equality of Means | | | | | | |
| | | F | Sig. | t | df | Sig. (2-tailed) | Mean Difference | Std. Error Difference | 95% Confidence Interval of the Difference | |
| | | | | | | | | | Lower | Upper |
| Enforcement fidelity | Equal variances assumed | 5.200 | .024 | -.536 | 172 | .593 | -.01951 | .03639 | -.09133 | .05232 |
| | Equal variances not assumed | | | -.540 | 167.374 | .590 | -.01951 | .03611 | -.09080 | .05178 |

**Educational attainment**

| Descriptives | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enforcement fidelity | | | | | | | | |
| | N | Mean | Std. Deviation | Std. Error | 95% Confidence Interval for Mean | | Minimum | Maximum |
| | | | | | Lower Bound | Upper Bound | | |
| elementrary graduate | 22 | 4.3195 | .25856 | .05512 | 4.2049 | 4.4342 | 4.00 | 5.00 |
| high school graduate | 59 | 4.2539 | .22708 | .02956 | 4.1947 | 4.3131 | 4.00 | 4.80 |
| college graduate | 83 | 4.2954 | .24216 | .02658 | 4.2425 | 4.3483 | 4.00 | 4.80 |
| masters/doctoral graduate | 10 | 4.1800 | .20976 | .06633 | 4.0299 | 4.3301 | 4.00 | 4.50 |
| Total | 174 | 4.2778 | .23792 | .01804 | 4.2422 | 4.3134 | 4.00 | 5.00 |

| Test of Homogeneity of Variances | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Levene Statistic | df1 | df2 | Sig. |
| Enforcement fidelity | Based on Mean | .208 | 3 | 170 | .891 |
| | Based on Median | .179 | 3 | 170 | .910 |
| | Based on Median and with adjusted df | .179 | 3 | 161.432 | .910 |
| | Based on trimmed mean | .219 | 3 | 170 | .883 |

| ANOVA | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enforcement fidelity | | | | | |
| | Sum of Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
| Between Groups | .193 | 3 | .064 | 1.142 | .334 |
| Within Groups | 9.599 | 170 | .056 | | |
| Total | 9.793 | 173 | | | |

**Position/Role**

| Descriptives | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enforcement fidelity | | | | | | | | |
| | N | Mean | Std. Deviation | Std. Error | 95% Confidence Interval for Mean | | Minimum | Maximum |
| | | | | | Lower Bound | Upper Bound | | |
| police officer | 58 | 4.2659 | .23650 | .03105 | 4.2037 | 4.3280 | 4.00 | 4.80 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| barangay official | 21 | 4.2476 | .24694 | .05389 | 4.1352 | 4.3600 | 4.00 | 4.80 |
| tanod | 24 | 4.3554 | .20669 | .04219 | 4.2681 | 4.4427 | 4.00 | 4.60 |
| community member | 18 | 4.2706 | .27471 | .06475 | 4.1339 | 4.4072 | 4.00 | 4.73 |
| 5.00 | 53 | 4.2700 | .23792 | .03268 | 4.2044 | 4.3356 | 4.00 | 5.00 |
| Total | 174 | 4.2778 | .23792 | .01804 | 4.2422 | 4.3134 | 4.00 | 5.00 |

| **Test of Homogeneity of Variances** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Levene Statistic | df1 | df2 | Sig. |
| Enforcement fidelity | Based on Mean | .939 | 4 | 169 | .443 |
| | Based on Median | 1.231 | 4 | 169 | .300 |
| | Based on Median and with adjusted df | 1.231 | 4 | 150.142 | .300 |
| | Based on trimmed mean | .977 | 4 | 169 | .422 |

| **ANOVA** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enforcement fidelity | | | | | |
| | Sum of Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
| Between Groups | .176 | 4 | .044 | .774 | .544 |
| Within Groups | 9.616 | 169 | .057 | | |
| Total | 9.793 | 173 | | | |

**Years of service**

| **Descriptives** | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enforcement fidelity | | | | | | | | |
| | N | Mean | Std. Deviation | Std. Error | 95% Confidence Interval for Mean | | Minimum | Maximum |
| | | | | | Lower Bound | Upper Bound | | |
| 1-10yrs | 66 | 4.2830 | .24759 | .03048 | 4.2222 | 4.3439 | 4.00 | 5.00 |
| 11-20yrs | 86 | 4.2620 | .23808 | .02567 | 4.2109 | 4.3130 | 4.00 | 4.73 |
| 21-30yrs | 12 | 4.2917 | .22974 | .06632 | 4.1457 | 4.4376 | 4.00 | 4.53 |
| 31-40yrs | 3 | 4.3433 | .24194 | .13968 | 3.7423 | 4.9443 | 4.07 | 4.53 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 41yrs and above | 7 | 4.3700 | .18000 | .06803 | 4.2035 | 4.5365 | 4.00 | 4.50 |
| Total | 174 | 4.2778 | .23792 | .01804 | 4.2422 | 4.3134 | 4.00 | 5.00 |

**Test of Homogeneity of Variances**

| | | Levene Statistic | df1 | df2 | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enforcement fidelity | Based on Mean | .948 | 4 | 169 | .438 |
| | Based on Median | 1.149 | 4 | 169 | .335 |
| | Based on Median and with adjusted df | 1.149 | 4 | 157.805 | .336 |
| | Based on trimmed mean | .985 | 4 | 169 | .417 |

**ANOVA**

Enforcement fidelity

| | Sum of Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Between Groups | .098 | 4 | .025 | .427 | .789 |
| Within Groups | 9.695 | 169 | .057 | | |
| Total | 9.793 | 173 | | | |

**5. Is there a significant difference in the extent of policy compliance in the implementation of curfew hours when grouped according to their demographic profile?**

**Age**

**Descriptives**

Policy compliance implementation

| | N | Mean | Std. Deviation | Std. Error | 95% Confidence Interval for Mean | | Minimum | Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | Lower Bound | Upper Bound | | |
| 21-29yrs old | 33 | 4.2785 | .27995 | .04873 | 4.1792 | 4.3777 | 3.97 | 4.97 |
| 30-39 yrs old | 91 | 4.2942 | .26179 | .02744 | 4.2397 | 4.3487 | 3.97 | 4.97 |
| 40-49 yrs old | 38 | 4.2550 | .28009 | .04544 | 4.1629 | 4.3471 | 4.00 | 4.80 |
| 50 yrs old and above | 12 | 4.3775 | .25270 | .07295 | 4.2169 | 4.5381 | 3.97 | 4.63 |
| Total | 174 | 4.2884 | .26799 | .02032 | 4.2483 | 4.3285 | 3.97 | 4.97 |

| Test of Homogeneity of Variances | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Levene Statistic | df1 | df2 | Sig. |
| Policy compliance implementation | Based on Mean | .377 | 3 | 170 | .770 |
| | Based on Median | .333 | 3 | 170 | .802 |
| | Based on Median and with adjusted df | .333 | 3 | 164.615 | .802 |
| | Based on trimmed mean | .316 | 3 | 170 | .814 |

| ANOVA | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Policy compliance implementation | | | | | |
| | Sum of Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
| Between Groups | .144 | 3 | .048 | .664 | .575 |
| Within Groups | 12.281 | 170 | .072 | | |
| Total | 12.425 | 173 | | | |

**Gender**

| Group Statistics | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Gender | N | Mean | Std. Deviation | Std. Error Mean |
| Policy compliance implementation | male | 77 | 4.2879 | .27240 | .03104 |
| | female | 97 | 4.2888 | .26586 | .02699 |

**Independent Samples Test**

| | | Levene's Test for Equality of Variances | | t-test for Equality of Means | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | | | 95% Confidence Interval of the Difference | |
| | | F | Sig. | t | df | Sig. (2-tailed) | Mean Difference | Std. Error Difference | Lower | Upper |
| Policy compliance implementation | Equal variances assumed | .370 | .544 | -.020 | 172 | .984 | -.00084 | .04102 | -.08181 | .08013 |
| | Equal variances not assumed | | | -.020 | 161.353 | .984 | -.00084 | .04114 | -.08208 | .08040 |

**Educational attainment**

**Descriptives**

Policy compliance implementation

| | N | Mean | Std. Deviation | Std. Error | 95% Confidence Interval for Mean | | Minimum | Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | Lower Bound | Upper Bound | | |
| elementrary graduate | 22 | 4.3118 | .27328 | .05826 | 4.1907 | 4.4330 | 4.00 | 4.93 |
| high school graduate | 59 | 4.2676 | .25020 | .03257 | 4.2024 | 4.3328 | 3.97 | 4.80 |
| college graduate | 83 | 4.2988 | .27018 | .02966 | 4.2398 | 4.3578 | 3.97 | 4.97 |
| masters/doctoral graduate | 10 | 4.2730 | .36384 | .11506 | 4.0127 | 4.5333 | 4.00 | 4.97 |
| Total | 174 | 4.2884 | .26799 | .02032 | 4.2483 | 4.3285 | 3.97 | 4.97 |

**Test of Homogeneity of Variances**

| | | Levene Statistic | df1 | df2 | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Policy compliance implementation | Based on Mean | .781 | 3 | 170 | .506 |
| | Based on Median | .352 | 3 | 170 | .788 |
| | Based on Median and with adjusted df | .352 | 3 | 131.964 | .788 |
| | Based on trimmed mean | .568 | 3 | 170 | .637 |

| ANOVA | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Policy compliance implementation | | | | | |
| | Sum of Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
| Between Groups | .049 | 3 | .016 | .224 | .880 |
| Within Groups | 12.376 | 170 | .073 | | |
| Total | 12.425 | 173 | | | |

**Position/Role**

| Descriptives | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Policy compliance implementation | | | | | | | |
| | | | | 95% Confidence Interval for Mean | | | |
| | N | Mean | Std. Deviation | Std. Error | Lower Bound | Upper Bound | Minimum | Maximum |
| police officer | 58 | 4.2848 | .28587 | .03754 | 4.2097 | 4.3600 | 3.97 | 4.97 |
| barangay official | 21 | 4.2619 | .26763 | .05840 | 4.1401 | 4.3837 | 3.97 | 4.80 |
| tanod | 24 | 4.3571 | .25021 | .05107 | 4.2514 | 4.4627 | 3.97 | 4.80 |
| community member | 18 | 4.2933 | .31250 | .07366 | 4.1379 | 4.4487 | 3.97 | 4.97 |
| 5.00 | 53 | 4.2700 | .24366 | .03347 | 4.2028 | 4.3372 | 3.97 | 4.93 |
| Total | 174 | 4.2884 | .26799 | .02032 | 4.2483 | 4.3285 | 3.97 | 4.97 |

| Test of Homogeneity of Variances | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Levene Statistic | df1 | df2 | Sig. |
| Policy compliance implementation | Based on Mean | .687 | 4 | 169 | .602 |
| | Based on Median | .406 | 4 | 169 | .804 |
| | Based on Median and with adjusted df | .406 | 4 | 159.097 | .804 |
| | Based on trimmed mean | .567 | 4 | 169 | .687 |

| ANOVA | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Policy compliance implementation | | | | | |
| | Sum of Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
| Between Groups | .147 | 4 | .037 | .506 | .731 |
| Within Groups | 12.278 | 169 | .073 | | |
| Total | 12.425 | 173 | | | |

**Length of service**

| Descriptives | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Policy compliance implementation | | | | | | | | |
| | N | Mean | Std. Deviation | Std. Error | 95% Confidence Interval for Mean | | Minimum | Maximum |
| | | | | | Lower Bound | Upper Bound | | |
| 1-10yrs | 66 | 4.2915 | .27287 | .03359 | 4.2244 | 4.3586 | 3.97 | 4.97 |
| 11-20yrs | 86 | 4.2652 | .26692 | .02878 | 4.2080 | 4.3225 | 3.97 | 4.97 |
| 21-30yrs | 12 | 4.3158 | .28975 | .08364 | 4.1317 | 4.4999 | 3.97 | 4.73 |
| 31-40yrs | 3 | 4.4033 | .20817 | .12019 | 3.8862 | 4.9204 | 4.17 | 4.57 |
| 41yrs and above | 7 | 4.4471 | .20304 | .07674 | 4.2594 | 4.6349 | 4.00 | 4.63 |
| Total | 174 | 4.2884 | .26799 | .02032 | 4.2483 | 4.3285 | 3.97 | 4.97 |

| Test of Homogeneity of Variances | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Levene Statistic | df1 | df2 | Sig. |
| Policy compliance implementation | Based on Mean | 1.194 | 4 | 169 | .315 |
| | Based on Median | 1.506 | 4 | 169 | .202 |
| | Based on Median and with adjusted df | 1.506 | 4 | 167.133 | .203 |
| | Based on trimmed mean | 1.252 | 4 | 169 | .291 |

| ANOVA | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Policy compliance implementation | | | | | |
| | Sum of Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
| Between Groups | .272 | 4 | .068 | .945 | .439 |
| Within Groups | 12.153 | 169 | .072 | | |
| Total | 12.425 | 173 | | | |

**6. Is there a significant difference in the degree challenges encountered by local authorities in enforcing the curfew hours when grouped according to their demographic profile?**

**Age**

| **Descriptives** | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enforcement challenges | | | | | | | | |
| | N | Mean | Std. Deviation | Std. Error | 95% Confidence Interval for Mean | | Minimum | Maximum |
| | | | | | Lower Bound | Upper Bound | | |
| 21-29yrs old | 33 | 3.8788 | .62438 | .10869 | 3.6574 | 4.1002 | 2.60 | 5.00 |
| 30-39 yrs old | 91 | 3.7411 | .69695 | .07306 | 3.5960 | 3.8862 | 2.28 | 4.92 |
| 40-49 yrs old | 38 | 3.5800 | .70370 | .11416 | 3.3487 | 3.8113 | 1.68 | 4.44 |
| 50 yrs old and above | 12 | 3.1533 | .65501 | .18909 | 2.7372 | 3.5695 | 2.40 | 4.48 |
| Total | 174 | 3.6915 | .69914 | .05300 | 3.5869 | 3.7961 | 1.68 | 5.00 |

| **Test of Homogeneity of Variances** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Levene Statistic | df1 | df2 | Sig. |
| Enforcement challenges | Based on Mean | .612 | 3 | 170 | .608 |
| | Based on Median | .136 | 3 | 170 | .939 |
| | Based on Median and with adjusted df | .136 | 3 | 158.516 | .939 |
| | Based on trimmed mean | .581 | 3 | 170 | .628 |

| **ANOVA** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enforcement challenges | | | | | |
| | Sum of Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
| Between Groups | 5.329 | 3 | 1.776 | 3.811 | .011 |
| Within Groups | 79.233 | 170 | .466 | | |
| Total | 84.563 | 173 | | | |

**Multiple Comparisons**

Dependent Variable: Enforcement challenges

Tukey HSD

| (I) Age | (J) Age | Mean Difference (I-J) | Std. Error | Sig. | 95% Confidence Interval | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | Lower Bound | Upper Bound |
| 21-29yrs old | 30-39 yrs old | .13769 | .13873 | .754 | -.2223 | .4976 |
| | 40-49 yrs old | .29879 | .16245 | .259 | -.1227 | .7203 |
| | 50 yrs old and above | .72545* | .23014 | .010 | .1283 | 1.3226 |
| 30-39 yrs old | 21-29yrs old | -.13769 | .13873 | .754 | -.4976 | .2223 |
| | 40-49 yrs old | .16110 | .13186 | .614 | -.1810 | .5032 |
| | 50 yrs old and above | .58777* | .20967 | .029 | .0438 | 1.1318 |
| 40-49 yrs old | 21-29yrs old | -.29879 | .16245 | .259 | -.7203 | .1227 |
| | 30-39 yrs old | -.16110 | .13186 | .614 | -.5032 | .1810 |
| | 50 yrs old and above | .42667 | .22606 | .237 | -.1599 | 1.0132 |
| 50 yrs old and above | 21-29yrs old | -.72545* | .23014 | .010 | -1.3226 | -.1283 |
| | 30-39 yrs old | -.58777* | .20967 | .029 | -1.1318 | -.0438 |
| | 40-49 yrs old | -.42667 | .22606 | .237 | -1.0132 | .1599 |

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

**Gender**

**Group Statistics**

| | Gender | N | Mean | Std. Deviation | Std. Error Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enforcement challenges | male | 77 | 3.8166 | .68908 | .07853 |
| | female | 97 | 3.5922 | .69457 | .07052 |

**Independent Samples Test**

| | | Levene's Test for Equality of Variances | | t-test for Equality of Means | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | F | Sig. | t | df | Sig. (2-tailed) | Mean Difference | Std. Error Difference | 95% Confidence Interval of the Difference | |
| | | | | | | | | | Lower | Upper |
| Enforcement challenges | Equal variances assumed | .424 | .516 | 2.125 | 172 | .035 | .22446 | .10564 | .01593 | .43298 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Equal variances not assumed | | | 2.127 | 163.718 | .035 | .22446 | .10555 | .01605 | .43287 |

**Educational attainment**

| **Descriptives** | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enforcement challenges | | | | | | | | |
| | N | Mean | Std. Deviation | Std. Error | 95% Confidence Interval for Mean | | Minimum | Maximum |
| | | | | | Lower Bound | Upper Bound | | |
| elementrary graduate | 22 | 3.7691 | .76084 | .16221 | 3.4318 | 4.1064 | 2.28 | 4.92 |
| high school graduate | 59 | 3.5119 | .64647 | .08416 | 3.3434 | 3.6803 | 1.68 | 4.28 |
| college graduate | 83 | 3.7639 | .71422 | .07840 | 3.6079 | 3.9198 | 2.28 | 5.00 |
| masters/doctoral graduate | 10 | 3.9800 | .58065 | .18362 | 3.5646 | 4.3954 | 3.00 | 4.80 |
| Total | 174 | 3.6915 | .69914 | .05300 | 3.5869 | 3.7961 | 1.68 | 5.00 |

| **Test of Homogeneity of Variances** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Levene Statistic | df1 | df2 | Sig. |
| Enforcement challenges | Based on Mean | 1.295 | 3 | 170 | .278 |
| | Based on Median | .417 | 3 | 170 | .741 |
| | Based on Median and with adjusted df | .417 | 3 | 145.763 | .741 |
| | Based on trimmed mean | 1.171 | 3 | 170 | .322 |

| **ANOVA** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enforcement challenges | | | | | |
| | Sum of Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
| Between Groups | 3.303 | 3 | 1.101 | 2.303 | .079 |
| Within Groups | 81.259 | 170 | .478 | | |
| Total | 84.563 | 173 | | | |

**Position/Role**

| **Descriptives** | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enforcement challenges | | | | | | | | |
| | N | Mean | Std. Deviation | Std. Error | 95% Confidence Interval for Mean | | Minimum | Maximum |
| | | | | | Lower Bound | Upper Bound | | |
| police officer | 58 | 3.8269 | .71111 | .09337 | 3.6399 | 4.0139 | 2.28 | 5.00 |
| barangay official | 21 | 3.5676 | .73055 | .15942 | 3.2351 | 3.9002 | 1.68 | 4.44 |
| tanod | 24 | 3.7450 | .70760 | .14444 | 3.4462 | 4.0438 | 2.40 | 4.92 |
| community member | 18 | 3.8600 | .62741 | .14788 | 3.5480 | 4.1720 | 2.56 | 4.72 |
| 5.00 | 53 | 3.5109 | .66742 | .09168 | 3.3270 | 3.6949 | 2.28 | 4.36 |
| Total | 174 | 3.6915 | .69914 | .05300 | 3.5869 | 3.7961 | 1.68 | 5.00 |

| **Test of Homogeneity of Variances** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Levene Statistic | df1 | df2 | Sig. |
| Enforcement challenges | Based on Mean | .293 | 4 | 169 | .882 |
| | Based on Median | .262 | 4 | 169 | .902 |
| | Based on Median and with adjusted df | .262 | 4 | 162.179 | .902 |
| | Based on trimmed mean | .296 | 4 | 169 | .881 |

| **ANOVA** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enforcement challenges | | | | | |
| | Sum of Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
| Between Groups | 3.693 | 4 | .923 | 1.929 | .108 |
| Within Groups | 80.869 | 169 | .479 | | |
| Total | 84.563 | 173 | | | |

**Length of service**

| **Descriptives** | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enforcement challenges | | | | | | | | |
| | N | Mean | Std. Deviation | Std. Error | 95% Confidence Interval for Mean | | Minimum | Maximum |
| | | | | | Lower Bound | Upper Bound | | |
| 1-10yrs | 66 | 3.7552 | .72207 | .08888 | 3.5776 | 3.9327 | 1.68 | 5.00 |
| 11-20yrs | 86 | 3.7228 | .67812 | .07312 | 3.5774 | 3.8682 | 2.28 | 4.92 |
| 21-30yrs | 12 | 3.4433 | .72693 | .20985 | 2.9815 | 3.9052 | 2.40 | 4.48 |
| 31-40yrs | 3 | 3.4000 | .74726 | .43143 | 1.5437 | 5.2563 | 2.60 | 4.08 |
| 41yrs and above | 7 | 3.2571 | .57590 | .21767 | 2.7245 | 3.7898 | 2.56 | 4.00 |
| Total | 174 | 3.6915 | .69914 | .05300 | 3.5869 | 3.7961 | 1.68 | 5.00 |

| **Test of Homogeneity of Variances** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Levene Statistic | df1 | df2 | Sig. |
| Enforcement challenges | Based on Mean | .292 | 4 | 169 | .883 |
| | Based on Median | .250 | 4 | 169 | .909 |
| | Based on Median and with adjusted df | .250 | 4 | 163.319 | .909 |
| | Based on trimmed mean | .265 | 4 | 169 | .900 |

| **ANOVA** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enforcement challenges | | | | | |
| | Sum of Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
| Between Groups | 2.666 | 4 | .667 | 1.375 | .245 |
| Within Groups | 81.896 | 169 | .485 | | |
| Total | 84.563 | 173 | | | |

**7. Is there a significant relationship among level of implementation of enforcement fidelity, extent of policy compliance and degree of challenges encountered by the local authorities in implementing curfew hours?**

**Correlations**

| | | Enforcement fidelity | Policy compliance implementation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enforcement fidelity | Pearson Correlation | 1 | .869** |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | | .000 |
| | N | 174 | 174 |
| Policy compliance implementation | Pearson Correlation | .869** | 1 |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | .000 | |
| | N | 174 | 174 |

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**Correlations**

| | | Enforcement challenges | Enforcement fidelity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enforcement challenges | Pearson Correlation | 1 | -.127 |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | | .094 |
| | N | 174 | 174 |
| Enforcement fidelity | Pearson Correlation | -.127 | 1 |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | .094 | |
| | N | 174 | 174 |

**Correlations**

| | | Enforcement challenges | Policy compliance implementation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enforcement challenges | Pearson Correlation | 1 | -.70 |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | | .031 |
| | N | 174 | 174 |
| Policy compliance implementation | Pearson Correlation | -.70 | 1 |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | .031 | |
| | N | 174 | 174 |

# APPENDIX 11

Documentation




Photos taken during the courtesy call and answering of survey questionnaire with the barangay captain and barangay official.





Photos taken during answering of survey questionnaire by the police officer-respondent and in-charge of the WCPD





OFFICE OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN

EXCERPT FROM THE MINUTES OF REGULAR SESSION OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBERS OF DAGOHOY, BOHOL ON AUGUST 1, 2016 AT EXACTLY 11:04 IN THE MORNING AT SB SESSION HALL.

**PRESENT:**
Hon. Ma. Shirley A. Amodia, Municipal Vice Mayor, Presiding Officer
Hon. Cesareo T. Salingay, Jr., Municipal Councilor
Hon. Allan A. Sasan, Municipal Councilor
Hon. Troubador L. Autentico, Municipal Councilor
Hon. Arnold G. Maghamil, Municipal Councilor
Hon. Artemio J. Lagapa, Municipal Councilor
Hon. Fernando R. Rama, Municipal Councilor
Hon. Felix O.Cañones, Municipal Councilor
Hon. Alfredo G. Gumapac, Municipal Councilor
Hon. Jemilo T. Puertos, Municipal Councilor, ABC Representative

**ABSENT:** None

**MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE NO.001**
**Series of 2016**

**[Sponsor: Hon. Alfredo G. Gumapaac, Municipal Councilor]**

**IMPOSING GENERAL CURFEW HOURS FROM TEN O'CLOCK IN THE EVENING (10:00 P.M.) TO THREE THIRTY O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING (3:30 A.M.) AND SPECIAL CURFEW HOURS WHICH IS APPLICABLE TO MINORS AND STUDENTS ONLY FROM NINE O'CLOCK IN THE EVENING (9:00 P.M.) TO FOUR O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING (4:00 A.M.) WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF DAGOHOY AND PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREOF IN CASE OF VIOLATION.**

*Be it ordained by the Sangguniang Bayan of Dagohoy, Bohol in session duly assembled that:*

**SECTION 1**. General curfew hours from ten o'clock in the evening (10:00 P.M.) to three thirty o'clock in the morning (3:30 A.M.) and special curfew hours which is applicable to minors and students only from nine o'clock in the evening (9:00 P.M.) to four in the morning (4:00 A.M.) within the territorial jurisdiction of Dagohoy is hereby imposed,

**SECTION 2**. Definition. As used in the ordinance.
"Minors"- are classified as school ages below 18 years of age.

**SECTION 3**. During curfew hours, no person shall be allowed in the streets, commercial establishments , recreation centers , malls or any other areas outside the immediate vicinity of their residence except:

a. Those running lawful errands such as but not limited to buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for emergencies purposes and the like;
b. Those whose attendance is requested and mandated by LGU concerned during its activities.
c. Those working at night , provided that such persons falling under these categories shall secure a certification from their Punong Barangay exempting them from the coverage of this ordinance, or present a document or identification proving their qualification under such category.

**SECTION 4.** The Punong Barangay, Members of the Barangay Council and the duly designated Barangay Tanods are hereby authorized to implement the provisions of this ordinance.

**SECTION 5.** Special curfew hours are applicable only to all minors and students

Municipal Ordinance

**SECTION 6**. The Punong Barangay through administrative issuances may suspend the implementation of this ordinance in his particular barangay , or other specific areas for a length of time as may be necessary within his Barangay, in celebration of fiestas, all saints day, holy week, Christmas, weddings and other legal holidays;

**SECTION 7**. Violators of this ordinance shall be apprehended in accordance with the following guidelines:

(a) For violators who are residents of same Barangay, the apprehending official shall, without unnecessary delay, and notify the Barangay Peace and Order Council and release the violator, if later belongs to special group in recognizance to said parents or guardians, understanding that the violators submitted to the council for the corresponding penalty;
(b) For violators who are residents of a different Barangay within the Municipality, the apprehending official shall bring the violators to the Barangay Hall or Holding Centers and hold them for not more than five(5) hours and report to the Barangay Peace and Order Council, who shall in turn inform at the soonest possible time to the Punong Barangay of the violator's place of residence
(c) Violators may be released in recognizance to his Punong Barangay provided that the Punong Barangay agrees to submit the violator for the corresponding penalty.
(d) For violators who are not residents of the Municipality of Dagohoy, the apprehending official shall hold the violator for not more than six (6) hours and shall refer the violators immediately to the Barangay Peace and Order Council for proper disposition.
(e) For violators who are homeless , abandoned, neglected or have no known parents, relatives or guardian residing in the Municipality, the apprehending official shall refer the violator to the Barangay Peace and Order Council and if the latter belongs to the special group will then be submitted to the custody of the Municipal Social Welfare Office on the following day or within twelve(12) hours of apprehension.

**SECTION 8.** The Municipality shall provide legal assistance to Punong Barangay's in the prosecution of violators of this ordinance.

**SECTION 9**. Penalty Clause. Any violators of this ordinance shall be penalized as follows:
a. First Offense – five hundred pesos (P500.00).
b. Second Offense – one thousand pesos (P1,000.00).
c. Third Offense and Subsequent Offenses- two thousand pesos (P2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the court.

**SECTION 10.** The Barangay Secretary shall record and maintain a permanent list of the names, addresses, dates of birth, time and place of apprehensions, and other substantial information of every violator of this ordinance and furnish the Municipal Peace and Order Council with a copy of the apprehension reports within twenty four (24) hours thereof and issue a certification duly sign by the Barangay Captain to violators that they comply the penalty of this ordinance.

**SECTION 11.** The Chief of Police of PNP- Dagohoy shall provide police support to the Punong Barangays whenever needed for the enforcement of this ordinance. Violators apprehended by police officers and are residents of the Municipality shall be referred immediately to the Punong Barangay of the violator's place of residence not later than six (6)hours from the time of apprehension, or to the office of the Municipal Social Welfare if the offender is not a resident of the Municipality of Dagohoy or a minor.

**SECTION 12**. The PNP Stations and Barangay Halls shall serve as temporary holding centers in case offenders who are not residents of the Municipality are apprehended for not more than five (5) hours during weekends or holidays.

**SECTION 13.** The Municipal Peace and Order Council shall be the lead agency in charge of the monitoring and implementation of this ordinance, including the information dissemination campaign for concerned Barangay Officials with the assistance of the Municipal Sangguniang Kabataan Federation. Hence, all Barangays are obliged to furnish to the said council monthly updated list of persons apprehended within their areas for effectivity of its monitoring.