

Eu-Gambia Migration Diplomacy: How Does Gambia Coordinate Its Diplomatic Responses to Eu Migration Policies, Examining Bilateral Cooperation Within Multilateral Frameworks?

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines Gambia's diplomatic responses to the European Union's migration policies with emphasis on externalization. Using the remote control of migration theory as its analytical framework, it explores bilateral cooperation of Gambia within the broader multilateral frameworks. Using the qualitative case study design, the data is generated from 16 respondents purposively selected from returnees, residents, youth, and other persons of interest. The study revealed key diplomatic approaches such as deportation (31.25%) and readmission, EU-funded control initiatives, and identification missions, among other initiated agreements, which provide aid but place administrative burdens and social stigma on returnees. The asymmetric power in EU-Gambia relations is highlighted by these dynamics, which have a detrimental impact on migrant mental health, asylum access, and local livelihoods through remittance volatility (31% of GDP) and reintegration gaps. In order to reduce irregular flows while preserving sovereignty, the paper recommends balanced policies that prioritize youth employment and legal migration channels and sustainable reintegration strategies.

Keywords: diplomacy, migration, bilateral, returnees, EU, cooperation, readmission,

INTRODUCTION

This study has concentrated on analyzing the Gambia's bilateral cooperation and its diplomatic reactions to EU migration policy in order to comprehend public sentiments on migration. The reasons and effects on life and livelihood that young Gambians face during this dangerous travel or in their host European countries are documented in some empirical studies. For young people who view this path as the most certain path to a successful life, the trip reflects both direct and contextual indicators. Among the main drivers of illegal migration are peer pressure, familial pressure, and a lack of work possibilities.

Migration, as old as human civilization, has been a central feature of social, economic, and political life.¹ Once spoken languages emerged within human civilization, migration from one community to another became a practice for various reasons. This first epoch is pegged by Manning (2020) at about 70,000 years ago. Simultaneously, migration and migrants control emerged as a public policy matter. Both Plato and Aristotle wrote about who the migrant was and what rights and restrictions must the state bestow and or impose on them. The role of migration in global history is eminent, from colonization, exploration, (post) industrialization to globalization.

Globally, 281 million people, equivalent to 3.6% of the world's population (IOM, 2024) are classified as international migrants. With increased globalization, irregular migration has become one of the most complex challenges confronting states. African and Middle Eastern Migrants escaping underdevelopment, exclusion, marginalization and conflicts have become a significant percentage of irregular migrants, especially in Europe. In recent years, news of young people, especially those from Africa, drowning in the Mediterranean Sea and perishing in the deserts have become a common headline. To go across the vast oceans, the migrants use dinghies

and dangerous boats. Due to the hazardous nature of the trip, boats have frequently capsized costing thousands of lives. Nonetheless, those who reached often find rejection, forced return and limited reintegration.

BACKGROUND

According to recent research, the European Union experiences a complex migration issue necessitating not only a delicate balance between diplomatic endeavors and human rights considerations but also national interests. The need to balance a variety of often competing interests among member states while also respecting international commitments and guaranteeing internal security exacerbates this conundrum (Dogan et al., 2025). Additionally, Dogan et al., (2025) shows that the EU has created the idea of accepting "sustainable migration" as a political instrument ready to promote agreement among EU member states. But according to a study (Loxa, 2024), the idea lacks clear legal duties, which makes it difficult to implement effectively and lets national interests take center stage.

The strategic use of diplomatic instruments, agreements, and alliances by the European Union to control migrant flows—especially irregular migration from Africa, the Middle East, and beyond—is referred to as EU migration diplomacy. In order to achieve cooperation from third nations on border control, returns, and resolving core problems like poverty or violence, the EU frequently adopts a "carrot-and-stick" approach incorporating aid, trade incentives, and visa regulations. Through bilateral and multilateral agreements like readmission agreements and mobility partnerships, which trade development assistance or legal migration channels for the repatriation of illegal migrants, this diplomacy places a strong emphasis on the externalization of EU borders. Dogan (2025) claims that frameworks such as the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum incorporate these initiatives, giving priority to international agreements on migration while managing member state differences.

As a result, in order to bargain with the governments of immigrant nations, the European Union's member states use cooperative strategies that relate migration to more general foreign policy objectives like trade and climate agreements and aid through coordinated actions. However, there is also a shift toward coercive methods, like deporting citizens from non-compliant nations and imposing or threatening visa restrictions. The EU relentlessly concentrates its regional attention on the external aspect of its migration policy and cooperation, making intense bilateral and multilateral engagements with African countries, since migration is still a current issue on the borders of the majority of Western European countries as well as other European countries. This regional bloc thus developed externalization policies, including as readmissions, returns, and restrictions on travel inside its borders, for those African migratory groups.

EU migration diplomacy with African governments has a strong emphasis on externalization—that is, outsourcing border control, returns, and management—using funding, visas, and sanctions as leverage. According to Dogan et al. (2025), this leads to asymmetric relationships in which African nations receive development assistance while their sovereignty is undermined and human rights are restricted. Migration management was a major component of the EU commission's policy for Africa, which was introduced in March 2020 (Kandilige L & Yeboah T, 2024). While collaboration in controlling migration between the EU and Africa has taken numerous forms, it is focused on achieving a shared objective, with the EU initiating the majority of the discussions (Kandilige L & Yeboah T, 2024). The EU's migrant cooperation initially concentrated on southern nations known as the Mediterranean countries, but it later expanded to include West African nations until eventually encompassing the entire continent of Africa.

Gambia, Senegal, Nigeria, and Mali are West African nations most affected by this threat. In some states, the trafficking of immigrants to Europe has surpassed narcotics trafficking in terms of profit and disturbance. However, a large number of illegal migrants perish in transit, and the majority of those who are denied asylum are repatriated to Africa, where they must start over if there is a chance at all. African migrants have always chosen Europe as their destination because of its close proximity.

Historical Context of Irregular Migration of Gambians in the Post-Jammeh Era (2017 to present)

Nearly 73% of Gambians live on less than US\$1.25 per day in rural areas, where households are more than twice as impoverished as those in urban areas, according to empirical results. These speeds up the nation's rural-urban

migration and emigration. Additionally, earlier research revealed that a significant number of Gambians are traveling to Europe. According to reports, 14,036 Gambians crossed the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe in 2016. The number of Gambians migrating to EU states has increased even after the change of the Jammeh dictatorship even though earlier commentators have blamed the exodus on the Jammeh regime.

According to Frontex Europa, an estimated 35,000 Gambians arrived at EU external borders between 2015 and 2022, making up around 1% of the country's total population. Furthermore, Frontex, reported that The Gambia registered 7000 Gambians as migrants annually during the peak years of 2014 to 2016. The Central Mediterranean route, which the vast majority of Gambian irregular migrants use, is the deadliest of all the sea crossings to Europe; however, the exact number of Gambians who have perished in the process is unknown. In 2016, more than 5,000 migrants perished while traveling to Europe by sea, and in the first ten months of 2017, around 3,000 more perished.

In 2016, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) conducted research that included interviews with 6,485 migrants who arrived in Italy from West Africa, the Horn of Africa, and North Africa. The average age of Gambians was determined to be 20, with 91% of them being unmarried and only 8% being married. According to the data, 70% of travelers traveled alone, and 24% underwent secondary migration, beginning their journey to Europe after spending a year or more abroad. According to the IOM research, 32% of migrants had completed basic school and 48% had completed secondary school, but only 3% had completed postsecondary education. In a similar vein, the World Bank reports that 19% of Gambian immigrants to OECD nations in 2011 had postsecondary education, whereas 28% of Gambians with postsecondary education departed in 2010–11. People with varying degrees of education seem to have been active in these earlier stages of migration. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has 38 member nations. It is an intergovernmental organization established in 1961 to encourage economic growth, trade, and policy coordination among democracies dedicated to market economies and it represents advanced and rising economies in Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America, is the successor to the post-World War II Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). These economies now account for roughly 63% of the global GDP.

Additionally, post-2018 decreases brought about by EU agreements, especially between 2023 and 2025, are estimated to be less than 1,000 migrants annually utilizing the “back way” route. Despite this significant number, many individuals were either forcibly returned by their hosts or deported to the due to violations of the immigration laws of their host countries. According to the International Organization for Migrants (IOM), between 2017 and 2024, over 20,000 Gambians were repatriated, including deportees and voluntary returns (Activist statistics, 2024).

LITERATURE REVIEW

Statement of Problem

Irregular immigration is a contentious issue in Gambia. Although empirical research has revealed the motivations of migrants, a number of projects to curb migration, the state's diplomatic responses to EU, a more powerful supranational power, and their implications has received limited interest.

This study evaluates Gambia's diplomatic responses to Western European countries' demands and examines how those responses impacted illegal migration across Europe's various borders. It centers on two main issues: (1) How does Gambia manage irregular migration through diplomatic engagement with Western European nations? (2) How does the diplomatic responses affect Gambian migrants and livelihoods at home?

Theoretical framework: Remote Control of Migration Theory

FitzGerald proposed the hypothesis of remote control of migration in 2020. The relationship between people and their surroundings is explained by this idea (Härkönen, 2007). According to FitzGerald's (2020) theoretical framework, which is described in "Remote Control of Migration: Theorizing Territoriality, Shared Coercion, and Deterrence," migration diplomacy is a process of remote control in which powerful states, such as EU members, project migration enforcement beyond their borders through extra territorialization, contracting out

border functions to origin/transit states while stepping up hyper-territorial controls at their own borders (FitzGerald, 2020, Remote Control of Migration). Dual territorial dynamics, shared coercion mechanisms, the metaphor of medieval building, and strategic objectives are among the fundamental ideas developed by the theory.

While states are beefing migration control at their border lines, they are increasingly ensuring that migration is controlled out of their territorial boundaries which helps them to limit migrants' rights. This phenomenon is accompanied by extra-territoriality – a process of exerting control outside a state's territory just as hyper-territorialization. Although the modern state attempts to exert control over migration, it no longer monopolizes it. Through the externalization of migration, the state's legitimacy in migration is shared and collaborative. Powerful states go into other states to shape emigration and transit. While that legitimacy is heavily contested, states continue to take extraterritorial action either in secrecy or framing it as friendly cooperative action. This research is anchored on this theory. It investigates EU-Gambia migration diplomacy focusing on the dual territorial dynamics of extraterritorialisation and hyper-territorialization, and shared coercive mechanisms.

1. Dual Territorial Dynamics:

Extra territorialization: The diffusion of sovereignty into third nations through "push out" controls, such as financing border patrols in Gambia (EU-IOM programs), readmission agreements, or carrier sanctions. This establishes a "remote control continuum" ranging from border fortifications to remote interventions. Invoking dual territorial dynamics, we investigate to what extent EU has push out controls in Gambia. We further explore hyper-territorialization.

Hyper-territorialization: States simultaneously micromanage their borders (e.g., EU Frontex hotspots), adjusting legal spaces to restrict rights (non-refoulement) outside of their borders while shielding domestic courts and non-governmental organizations from accountability.

2. Shared Coercion Mechanism: In contrast to unilateral action, remote control entails hierarchical cooperation between powerful governments (like the EU) and uses incentives or sanctions (like threats of Schengen suspension) to coerce weaker ones (like Gambia), presenting coercion as "partnership." Asymmetry is concealed by legitimacy. Thus, we attempt to answer the question on The Gambia's loss of control over outflows yet accepts returns for reintegration monies.

Table 1: Applicability of the concept of remote-control of migration on the context of EU-Gambia migration diplomacy

		Base line	Actual	Means/sources of verification
Extra territorialization	No. EU-funded border controls ID Missions	€193 million (2021-2027) Grant for migration partnership, expecting 10 – 15 ID missions/year	Actual missions averaged 8-12/year (2021-2024)	EU MIP documents, IOM reports, Government statistics
Hyper Territorialization	No. of asylum rejections No. of deportations	90% + rejection rate 30 – 50% of rejected	1,500-2000/year EU- wide 500– 1,000/year	EU MIP documents, official partnerships pages

Shared coercion	No. of aid conditionality No of visa threats	IOM project aid for 1,500 returning migrants reintegration	Return rates- 30%	Research studies (e.g., Cham 2024) EU reports
Loss of sovereignty	No. of public clashes No. of public protest	Low due to government control Minimal	2-3 documented events 1-2 incidents linked to migration returns	Local reports, refugee associations News archives, studies

METHODOLOGY

A case study, according to social science researchers, is essential for examining research subjects or populations as a whole (Ebneyamini & Sadeghi Moghadam, 2018). The researchers used this method to examine both individuals and groups of people in an effort to comprehend the viewpoints of study participants. Purposive participant selection was used in the study to choose research subjects. Purposive sampling, according to Johnson (2020), is a technique for choosing study participants according to particular standards.

Instead of using someone who has no knowledge of the research topic, this method enabled the researchers to carefully choose research participants most suited for the study. The researchers interacted with participants who have precise information about the research topic, which is not only convenient for them but also provides them more substance. The researchers deliberately chose research participants among stakeholders and deportees/returnees from various homes throughout the seven regions of Gambia.

The participant's comprehension of irregular migration and the government's official declarations regarding its diplomatic interactions with other European nations in the field of migration diplomacy served as the selection criteria. Since it is a societal phenomenon, the selection criteria were varied to include perspectives from many facets of society, including parents, educators, leaders, returnees, and civil society organizations.

Returnees, stakeholders, and young people directly involved in the irregular movement to Europe. The study aims for a total of 16 respondents, both male and female, in each region, as well as a content analysis of the documents relating to migration and EU diplomacy.

Table 2: Demographic description of the respondents (n=16)

	Frequencies	percent
Gender		
Male	12	75
Female	4	25
Region		
Banjul Municipality	1	6.25
Kanifing Municipality	2	12.50
West Coast Region	2	12.50

North Bank Region	3	18.75
Lower River Region	2	12.50
Central River Region	3	18.75
Upper River Region	3	18.75
Educational Background		
Basic education (1-12)	3	18.75
Tertiary	4	25
Non-formal	5	31.25
None	4	25

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In terms of extraterritoriality, we focused on three main variables, financing border patrols in the Gambia (EU-IOM programs), readmission agreements, or carrier sanctions.

Gambia has not conducted official research examining the causes of migration due to the narrow breadth of knowledge. Migration is frequently motivated by complicated factors. However, ActionAid's interviews with different stakeholders and other public data point to four main, frequently connected explanations. First of all, from the public's point of view, the dearth of decent farming livelihoods is an evidence factor. In The Gambia, farming is labor-intensive and less profitable. In addition to inadequate support, young people increasingly perceive this industry as having little future. According to Action Aid's interviews, if prospective migrants had more opportunities to succeed in farming, they would be discouraged from moving.

According to ActionAid's interviews, many young people in the country migrate to EU countries in search of better opportunities due to a lack of skills and employment opportunities. Many young people feel helpless and desperate due to the rising unemployment and underemployment rate, which drives them to look for possibilities elsewhere, notably through illegal immigration to Europe.

Some young Gambians are motivated to travel to Europe for economic reasons, political restrictions, and a lack of social freedom. Evidence, however, clearly indicates that a significant contributing cause was the political repression of the former Jammeh regime. 50% of Gambians interviewed for the 2016 IOM research stated that political insecurity was their primary reason for leaving the nation, while 27% cited economic reasons.

Gambia Migration Governance

Gambia's migration governance, which emphasizes border management, returns, and the underlying reasons of irregular migration, responds to EU policy through a combination of national frameworks and cooperative partnerships. This strategy strikes a compromise between the Gambia's local aims for orderly migration and EU incentives including money (EU, 2025).

In accordance with the National Development Plan and global norms such as the Global Compact for Migration, Gambia approved the National Migration Policy (NMP) 2020–2030 as a model for migration regulation. Through stakeholder cooperation spearheaded by the Ministry of Interior, this document addresses the underlying causes of irregular migration, encourages legal pathways, and protects migrant rights. The Gambia Immigration Department (GID) discouraged more than 2,700 undocumented migrants in 2025 by stepping up border patrols, data management, and interceptions (GID, 2026).

Bilateral Cooperation

Gambia primarily relies on EU-wide nonbinding agreements and has few bilateral agreements, particularly on returns, with individual EU members. As of 2020 statistics, three unidentified EU member states reported similar bilateral agreements or arrangements; nonetheless, compliance was frequently characterized as inadequate or declining. The EU-Gambia "Good Practices document" from 2018, which described identification and return processes but encountered implementation challenges because of The Gambia's 2019 embargo on forced returns, was complemented by these bilateral arrangements (Statewatch). Literature claims that certain member states involved readmission requests, the issuing of travel documents, and activities using commercial or charter planes, but these details were not made public in the reports that were available.

Following the ban, Gambia resumed collaboration in 2024–2025, facilitating returns through Joint Working Groups and EU programs like MoCADEM, with bilateral components continuing for nations managing high Gambian return volumes (EU, 2025).

Dogan (2025) and Wenden (2023) assert that the EU's bilateral and multilateral treaties with migrant countries are essential tools in the field of migration diplomacy because they allow for the externalization of national borders and the reciprocal granting of skilled migrant visas in return for the repatriation of undocumented individuals. EU migratory diplomacy has been criticized for its Eurocentric frameworks and for putting state interests ahead of humanitarian concerns (Gulsen, 2025).

Q1. What are the diplomatic responses of The Gambia to EU migration policies?

We created the questionnaire's items based on public impressions of Gambian migrant interactions in order to understand the government's diplomatic reactions to EU policies. "Strongly agree (6)" "agree (5)" "slightly agree (4)" "slightly disagree (3)" "disagree (2)" and "strongly disagree (1)" were the possible responses to the scale's items.

Table 3: The table below is the question items from the diplomatic responses of The Gambia to the EU migration policies.

Abbreviation	Items
DRI	The government has signed deportation agreements with EU countries.
DR2	EU aid to The Gambia effectively discourages irregular migration.
DR3	Gambia Immigration Personnel go to EU countries to identify immigrants.
DR4	Government strengthens border controls with EU support to reduce irregular migrants.
DR5	EU demands for readmission overburden the government's administrative capacity.

Table 4: Gambia Government's Diplomatic Responses to EU Policy Items

Diplomatic Responses	Number of Respondents	percent
Deportation Agreement	5	31.25
Identification Tours to Europe	4	25
Border Control with EU support	3	18.75
Readmission burden	2	12.50
Accepting aids for consent	2	12.50

Table 5: A descriptive interpretation of the EU-Gambia bilateral agreements

Agreement	Date	Key Features	EU Leverage	Gambian Gains
EU "Good Practices" Pact	May 2018	Returns procedures, 57% document rate, commercial flights	Visa sanctions threat	Reintegration funding Statewatch
Gambia-Italy IT MoU	~2018	Data sharing for ID	Bilateral aid	Technical capacity Statewatch
EU-IOM Joint Initiative	2017-2025	Voluntary returns (700+), €0.7M Caritas	Trust Fund	Skills training international-partnerships. Europa

Q2. What are the impacts of such diplomatic responses on Gambian migrants in Europe?

Gambia's diplomatic responses to EU migration policies, such as border management and readmission cooperation, have come under fire for having negative effects on Gambian migrants and public livelihoods. These consequences include strained domestic legitimacy, restricted reintegration support, and coerced repatriation.

Table 6: Impacts of Gambia-EU bilateral migration agreements on Gambian migrants

Impacts	Number of respondents	percentage
Social stigma	4	25
Inadequate reintegration assistance	2	12.50
Mental health issues	4	25
Asylum rejections	2	12.50
Returns	4	25

Q3. How do such diplomatic responses affect the livelihood of the public in the country?

Through assistance inflows, trade dynamics, and economic vulnerabilities, diplomatic actions in Gambia, especially in the area of migration cooperation with the EU, influence public livelihoods. These provide money for development and reintegration, but they frequently cause popular outrage about sovereignty and little job growth. In international systems, balancing bilateral agreements affects household earnings and remittances.

The country's cooperation on returns and border management post-2016 has unlocked €77 million in EU grants, funding reintegration programs that support returnees with skills trainings, though many face stigma and re-migration due to youth unemployment (Cham O.N., 2021). Remittances, vital at 31% of GDP, fluctuate with EU policies, dropping during deportations and stabilizing with legal pathways, directly impacting family sustenance and small businesses (Cham O.N., 2021). As a result, public protests arise from perceived "sellouts" and legitimacy erosion, reducing trust in governance amid inadequate local alternatives.

The findings of this study on Gambia's migratory diplomacy and its diplomatic reactions to EU policy have been categorized into a number of topical areas.

The empirical results confirm FitzGerald's **remote-control** thesis by documenting how EU actors project migration enforcement into Gambian territory while simultaneously tightening control at their own borders. EU-funded border control programs, identification missions, and readmission arrangements embed EU priorities inside Gambian governance structures, illustrating extra-territorialization as "push-out" control. This dual territorial dynamic means that Gambian authorities operate along a continuum defined by EU policy: they are encouraged to intercept, identify, and accept returnees while the real leverage over status determination and mobility lies in European capitals. The discussion therefore situates Gambia less as a fully sovereign agenda-setter and more as an implementing partner of a wider European remote-control architecture

FitzGerald's shared coercive mechanism aligns with Gambia's primary diplomatic strategies, which include deportation agreements, border restrictions supported by the EU (18.75%), and human deployments to identify migrants (25%). According to survey results, this overburdened administration (12.5%) is unable to effectively stop migration because, in the face of persistent youth unemployment and poverty, EU assistance only marginally prevents irregular migrations. The repercussions on migrants include high returns (a significant concern), social stigma, mental health issues, and asylum denials, which raise the likelihood of re-migration due to insufficient reintegration, despite €77 million in EU grants for skills training.

These practices are not neutral technical cooperation but fit FitzGerald's notion of **shared coercion**, where a weaker state participates in enforcement under conditions shaped by a stronger actor. Aid conditionalities, threats of visa restrictions, and the risk of broader diplomatic fall-out act as background pressures that narrow Gambian negotiating space, even when formal language stresses "partnership."

Public livelihoods are negatively impacted by remittance instability associated with deportations, perceived "sellouts," and insufficient job development, notwithstanding National Migration Policy (2020–2030) initiatives. In international frameworks like EU-IOM initiatives, bilateral components with countries like Italy enhance technical competence, but they also highlight sovereignty trade-offs when post-2019 moratorium resummptions prioritize profits over fundamental considerations. Overall, the findings point to the mechanics of remote control, where Gambia gets money but loses agency, necessitating cautious diplomacy.

Table 5 shows that respondents most frequently point to social stigma, mental health challenges, and repeated returns as key impacts of current diplomatic choices. Deportations and enforced returns, even when wrapped in "voluntary" language, often occur in conditions of constrained consent and limited access to asylum rights, leaving returnees marked as failures or "liabilities" in their communities. This stigma interacts with weak reintegration support—reported as inadequate by respondents—and persistent structural unemployment, creating a cycle where many returnees contemplate or attempt re-migration despite the risks.

These dynamics feed into perceptions of "sellout" and sovereignty loss, as segments of the public see the government trading citizens' mobility and dignity for short-term funds. The discussion argues that this erodes trust in state institutions and constrains the regime's domestic legitimacy, particularly among youth, even while official strategies such as the National Migration Policy 2020–2030 and participation in global compacts signal commitment to "orderly, safe" migration

Bringing the strands together, the discussion interprets EU–Gambia migration diplomacy as a textbook illustration of remote-controlled migration governance in an asymmetric North–South relationship. Gambia has succeeded in securing aid, technical cooperation, and some recognition of its policy frameworks, and irregular departures appear to have declined compared to peak years. Yet these gains are offset by constrained policy autonomy, administrative overload linked to readmission demands, and significant social and psychological costs for migrants and their families.

CONCLUSION & POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSION

Through asymmetric EU relationships that prioritize aid, border management, and returns, Gambia manages migration diplomacy, reducing irregular flows from 7,000 per year (2014–2016) to less than 1,000 (2023–2025) through agreements like the 2018 Good Practices paper. These, however, have varied results: in the face of economic difficulties, over 20,000 returns (2017–2024) strain reintegration, promote stigma, and erode trust. This study supports the hierarchical coercion predictions of Remote-Control Theory by illuminating how externalization undermines sending-state autonomy while failing to address push factors like unemployment.

Recommendations

- Strengthen reintegration via targeted youth skills programs funded by EU grants, addressing stigma and re-migration through community sensitization.
- Negotiate equitable bilateral deals prioritizing legal migration pathways over coercive returns, diversifying partnerships beyond EU reliance.
- Enhance domestic policies under NMP 2020-2030 with job creation in agriculture and anti-trafficking enforcement to tackle root causes.
- Conduct longitudinal studies on returnee outcomes for evidence-based diplomacy, engaging civil society in policy formulation.
- Equip youths with relevant skills, knowledge and resources to become self-reliance and workable human resources in the country.
- Inculcate sense and spirit of nationalism for their country, Gambia, through media sensitizations and other civic awareness for the youth.
- Parents and families should help and encourage their sons and daughters that they can make ends meet in Gambia here. Though, this calls for an attitudinal redress onto the side of all and sundry.
- Providing mini grants and loans to youths who want to undertake business and other vocational enterprises in the country.

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