

Unveiling the Pressure on Italian Language: Patriarchy, Trans-feminist Resistance, and EU Resolution 2021/2557

Piermauro Catarinella^{1*}, Suhardi Kram², Izzat Syazwan Ab Halim³

¹Academy of Language Studies, UiTM Shah Alam, Malaysia

²Faculty of Sports Science & Recreation, Samarahan, UiTM Sarawak, Malaysia

³St. John's International School, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

*Corresponding Author

DOI: <https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2026.10200271>

Received: 12 February 2026; Accepted: 18 February 2026; Published: 06 March 2026

ABSTRACT

In March 2021, the EU Parliament adopted Resolution 2021/2557, a legally binding measure that mandates all 27 member states to recognize the right to gender self-identification and to implement juridical norms aligned with this principle. Among its most transformative provisions, the Resolution calls for eliminating the male-female binary in favor of a more expansive framework that currently recognizes at least twenty-one gender identities - a number expected to grow. It also urges the revision of national languages to dismantle patriarchal structures and ensure that legal and institutional language reflects principles of gender plurality and inclusivity. Widely seen as a landmark victory for trans-feminist individuals and advocacy groups, this measure has sparked both support and controversy. The research examines whether such linguistic reforms foster inclusion or provoke democratic tensions in Italy, where gendered language is deeply rooted in historical, grammatical, and cultural traditions. It further investigates how trans-feminist advocacy - supported ideologically and financially by EU bodies (Commission, Parliament, and Council) - has gained significant influence, particularly as left-wing progressive political forces currently hold the majority within these institutions. These actors play a central role in shaping the narrative and enforcement of gender policies across EU member states. Employing a qualitative case study methodology, the analysis draws on a diverse range of materials, including press articles, televised debates, public messaging, lexical usage, multimedia content, and ideologically charged propaganda to assess the impact of EU gender policy on Italy's linguistic landscape. Findings suggest that while these interventions promote visibility and recognition for gender-diverse individuals, they also raise concerns about linguistic autonomy, democratic principles, and the broader cultural consequences of ideologically driven legal mandates.

Keywords: EU Resolution 2021/2557, Gender plurality, Italian language, Linguistic reform, Trans-feminist discourse

INTRODUCTION

EU Resolution 2021/2557

On 11 March 2021, the EU Parliament adopted Resolution 2021/2557, officially designating the EU as an "LGBTIQIA+ Freedom Zone". This declaration affirms that all individuals within EU borders have the right to express their sexual orientation and gender identity free from discrimination, intolerance, or persecution. The Resolution also requires member states to amend national legislation to ensure that (Visconti, 2023; Markowski et al., 2024):

1. Transsexual individuals have easy, cost-free access to specialized clinics for gender-affirming care.
2. Transgender individuals can swiftly amend gender markers on official documents without undergoing surgical procedures.

3. At least 20% of each member state’s public health budget is allocated to address the needs of transgender populations.
4. Minors may legally or surgically transition without parental consent, as the right to a fulfilling life is upheld regardless of age.
5. The protection of transgender and transsexual individuals is a core priority under EU law, as their rights fall within the broader framework of fundamental human rights.
6. Member states that fail to comply may face significant sanctions.
7. Trans individuals can appeal to the EU Court of Justice if their rights are violated.
8. Comprehensive education on gender identity and transition must be included in primary and secondary school curricula, and at least 40% of teaching staff should consist of transsexual and transgender individuals.
9. All educators must undergo specialized training on the legal and social dimensions of trans rights before being hired.
10. Non-EU citizens lacking comparable protections in their home countries are entitled to seek asylum and be granted protection within the EU.
11. Member states must develop national LGBTQIA+ strategies to implement these provisions.
12. They are also required to revise their national languages to ensure inclusivity and respect for all recognized gender identities, in alignment with the principles of Resolution 2021/2557 and the LGBTQIA+ Equality Strategy 2020–2025.
13. Citizens, journalists, editors, broadcasters, writers, and commentators who use language deemed offensive or derogatory toward LGBTQIA+ individuals may be subject to serious penalties.

The Resolution passed with 492 votes in favor, 141 against, and 46 abstentions (Vivaldelli, 2021). In response, Italy adopted its own LGBTQIA+ Strategy in September 2022, committing to language reform that reflects the demands and expectations of the LGBTQIA+ community. This pioneering initiative reaffirms the EU’s vision of a “Union of Equality,” where diversity is respected and individuals can live freely without discrimination, exclusion, or violence. The strategy outlines policies to enhance LGBTQIA+ rights across sectors and elevate marginalized voices. It also mandates integrating trans rights education into school curricula, ensuring minors are fully informed of their legal protections (Solimani, 2024; Romito & Szczerba, 2023).

With these measures, the EU Parliament enforces binding legal obligations consistent with the Council of Europe’s 2017 and 2018 Recommendations. These earlier directives called for eliminating medical requirements for legal gender recognition, enabling gender changes for minors, and removing mandatory gender markers from official documents (Borrelli, 2024). Nevertheless, despite strong lobbying efforts supporting the resolution, it has faced resistance in some EU member states. Beyond legal mandates, the EU Parliament has allocated significant financial support to advance the rights of transsexual and transgender individuals. Table 1 outlines several multi-year initiatives funded by the EU to promote LGBTQIA+ inclusion and advocacy (Campanella, 2024; Magnani, 2024).

Table 1 Selected EU-Funded Projects Supporting LGBTQIA+ Advocacy

| Project Name | Objective | Funding (Million EUR) |
|--|--|-----------------------|
| DragTivism Jr. | Explore and develop drag performance culture. | €55 |
| Awareness and Inclusion of Transgender | Raise public understanding of transgender and transsexual needs. | €80 |
| Early Gender Equality Education | Promote early education on gender identity. | €110 |
| Rainbow Bridges | Increase awareness of LGBTQIA+ rights. | €135 |
| Youth Affirmative Mental Health Approaches | Support LGBTQIA+ youth mental health. | €160 |
| PPE - Promoting Pluralistic Education in EU Universities | Address subtle forms of LGBTQIA+ discrimination in academia. | €120 |

| | | |
|----------------------------|--|------|
| BS - Beyond Stereotypes | Train activists to support LGBTQIA+ causes. | €175 |
| UNIQUE | Enhance academic outcomes for LGBTQIA+ students. | €70 |
| QCP – Queer Cinema Project | Foster careers in queer filmmaking. | €30 |

Sources:

1) Campanella, 2024: <https://www.secoloditalia.it/2024/08/lunione-europea-finanzia-un-programma-per-insegnare-ai-ragazzini-a-fare-le-drag-queen/>

2) Magnani, 2024: <https://www.ilsussidiario.net/news/dragtivism-campus-drag-queen-per-minori-con-soldi-ue-fondi-pubblici-per-diffondere-ideologia-gender/2749861/>

Recent studies indicate that trans advocacy networks have emerged as one of the most influential lobbying forces within EU governance, second only to the defense industry. Their coordinated efforts across the European Parliament, Commission, and Council have enabled them to shape key policies on gender identity, healthcare access, and minority rights. Backed by institutional support and substantial funding, these networks have demonstrated remarkable organizational strength, allowing them to steer legislative agendas. Their growing influence illustrates how ideologically driven initiatives - such as the Resolution under discussion - can sometimes override traditional safeguards, especially those concerning the welfare of minors (Gianni, 2024).

Feminism and Trans-feminism: Divergent Agendas

Although the term trans-feminism may suggest alignment with broader feminist advocacy for women’s rights, its focus diverges significantly. Rather than centering on the rights of all women, trans-feminism prioritizes the emancipation of transgender women and is closely aligned with progressive, left-wing political ideologies (Dalrì, 2021). As a powerful lobbying force within EU institutions, trans-feminist activism is both politically and financially supported, forming part of the broader LGBTQIA+ agenda. Tensions between traditional feminist movements and trans-feminist groups have deepened, often placing them in direct opposition. Feminists primarily advocate for biological women's rights, workplace protections, and personal autonomy, particularly regarding motherhood, while resisting perceived encroachments by individuals who are not biologically female. The public defense of Italian Senator Lavinia Mennuni - who expressed pride in aspiring to motherhood and was subsequently vilified by trans-feminist activists - illustrates the ideological divide. Feminists argue that choices such as full-time motherhood must be respected, while trans-feminists often view such decisions as forms of patriarchal subjugation (Pizzimenti, 2023).

Contentious issues also include access to single-sex public spaces and inclusive education. Feminists support preserving women-only facilities and advocate for parental rights in decisions regarding education on gender identity, while trans-feminist groups support gender-neutral spaces and compulsory gender education in schools, regardless of parental consent (De Simone, 2024; Carioti, 2025). These positions reflect fundamentally different views on the role of the State versus the family in shaping societal values.

Another divisive topic is surrogacy. Feminists widely denounce it as the commodification of women’s bodies, whereas trans-feminist activists defend it as a legitimate pathway for LGBTQIA+ individuals to form families (Barbati, 2024). Feminists also demand transparency in media coverage of gender-based violence, insisting that perpetrators be identified regardless of ethnicity or origin. Trans-feminists, by contrast, often oppose publicizing such information when the aggressors are non-European, arguing that doing so could fuel xenophobia (Romano, 2025; Campana, 2025). These ideological rifts extend to national identity and citizenship. Trans-feminists champion borderless mobility and automatic citizenship rights, while feminists emphasize the constitutional role of the State in defending national borders (Ticozzi, 2025). Moreover, feminists have celebrated the appointment of Giorgia Meloni as Italy’s first female Prime Minister. Trans-feminists, however, have criticized her for using the masculine grammatical form *il Presidente del Consiglio* (Prime Minister), despite linguistic authorities affirming its correctness and neutrality in official usage (Canaletti, 2022).

Language reform is another battleground. Feminists reject inclusive forms such as the asterisk (*) or schwa (ə), warning that erasing grammatical gender undermines the visibility of women and promotes a homogenized view of identity. They advocate for legal and social equality that respects sexual difference, rather than eliminating it. Trans-feminists, however, endorse gender-neutral language and argue for the legal recognition of self-identified gender, regardless of biological sex (Izzo, 2021; Santini, 2023).

Figure 1

Incumbent Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni opts for the masculine title *Il Presidente del Consiglio* (Prime Minister) rather than the feminine *La Presidenta*. Source :<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hPW6TzXTOq8>



Figure 2

On 9 April 2025, Meloni is referred to as *Il Presidente del Consiglio* during her meeting with King Charles III. Source :<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p60KH5wszjM>



Further controversy arose over the Miss Italia beauty pageant, which restricts participation to individuals assigned female at birth. Trans-feminist activists condemned this as discriminatory, framing it as a violation of human rights (Costabile, 2023). Finally, while feminists typically position themselves outside strict partisan frameworks and emphasize the protection of all women, trans-feminist movements are more closely associated with progressive-left ideologies. Individuals who dissent from their views are often labeled with politically charged terms such as “fascist” or “Nazi” (Casalini, 2024).

Patriarchy in Contemporary Italy

Most scholars of social phenomena contend that patriarchy no longer characterizes Italian society. The Italian Constitution guarantees full gender equality in both family life and the workplace. Women currently hold leadership roles in several major institutions, including the Office of the Prime Minister, the Regional Government of Sardinia, the Constitutional and Supreme Courts, the Chamber of Deputies, and, previously, the Senate. Likewise, the President of the Italian Stock Exchange is female, and in many professional fields - medicine, law, engineering, finance, and science - women now outnumber men (D'Ascenzo, 2025).

Nevertheless, an ideological narrative persists, linking femicide in Italy to the enduring presence of patriarchy. Trans-feminist discourse promotes an idealized and victimized image of women, portraying them as perennial targets of male domination, violence, and subjugation. This perspective, however, is not grounded in empirical evidence. Humanity, inclusive of all genders, is equally capable of violence, cruelty, and perversion. Femicide is not a product of patriarchy *per se*, but rather of broader cultural and societal failures, particularly the erosion of parental responsibility and the widespread reluctance to instill ethical and emotional accountability in younger generations (Feltri, 2025).

Italy recently passed a law introducing the autonomous crime of femicide, punishable by life imprisonment. Though described in the media as a “disruptive” and “historic” measure, the legislation merely reclassifies a crime already punishable under existing homicide laws. As such, it appears to be more of a political marketing tool than a response to genuine legal necessity. Voluntary homicide already carries the same maximum penalty. Comparative data from Interpol as of 31 December 2024 confirm that Italy remains one of the safest EU countries, with a homicide rate of 0.55 per 100,000 inhabitants, second only to Switzerland (0.48). By contrast, France (1.21), Spain (1.35), Germany (1.42), and Latvia (4.05) all report significantly higher rates. Yet none of these countries is commonly labelled a misogynistic or violently patriarchal society (Carta, 2025).

Advocates for the persistence of patriarchy often point to the masculine dominance in the Italian language, arguing that it marginalizes women. They invoke Article 3 of the Constitution, which states: *Tutti i cittadini hanno pari dignità sociale e sono eguali davanti alla legge, senza distinzione di sesso, di razza, di lingua, di religione, di opinioni politiche, di condizioni personali e sociali* (All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, or personal and social conditions). Critics argue that the use of *cittadini* (citizens, masculine plural) excludes women. However, such claims disregard grammatical conventions, where the masculine plural is linguistically inclusive of all genders. Legal scholars agree that Article 3 unequivocally ensures gender equality and that the Constitution contains no patriarchal provisions (Algoistino, 2024). Nonetheless, left-wing parties and LGBTQIA+ groups often invoke the idea of patriarchy as part of a broader ideological campaign to transform the Italian language, aiming to eliminate gender distinctions in grammar and, by extension, in social identity (Prandi, 2024).

LITERATURE REVIEW

This study, which extends beyond a purely linguistic analysis of the changes introduced by EU Resolution 2021/2557, draws on existing scholarship across four major areas: the persistence of patriarchy in contemporary society; the ideological evolution of the Italian left from the post-World War II era to the present; the rise of conservative political parties following the Italian and EU elections of September 2022 and June 2024, and the contrast between classical feminism and contemporary trans-feminism. In the Italian context, research on patriarchy has largely addressed workplace inequalities and cultural representations of women's roles. Scholars are deeply divided, with perspectives often reflecting broader ideological and political affiliations.

One school of thought views patriarchy as a pervasive socio-cultural system enforcing a singular family model in which men hold dominant authority over women and children. From this framework, various societal ills are said to emerge: restrictions on gender transition, opposition to same-sex marriage and abortion, and the reinforcement of the nuclear family led by a male figure. Proponents argue that violence against women stems from this patriarchal structure, forcing women to navigate public and private life in a state of constant fear of harassment, abuse, stalking, or attack. Everyday actions - being alone at night, riding public transport, or interacting with male colleagues - are framed as potential risks.

Even language is cited as complicit in sustaining patriarchal norms. Expressions such as *Se l'è cercata* (She deserved it) exemplify a cultural tendency to blame victims rather than perpetrators, reinforcing a cycle of violence and silencing. From a young age, women are socialized to accept male misconduct - taught that male anger is natural, that men are instinctively predatory, and that women must adapt accordingly. Phrases like “men are like that” normalize and excuse harmful behavior, from aggression to infidelity. This perspective underscores how patriarchy reinforces rigid and detrimental norms of toxic masculinity. Men are expected to be heterosexual, dominant, sexually assertive, emotionally restrained, competitive, financially successful, and largely exempt from domestic responsibilities. Such stereotypes not only negatively impact men themselves but also serve to uphold broader structures of gender inequality. Within this framework, gender fluidity - as advocated by LGBTQIA+ movements - is regarded as a significant challenge to these entrenched patriarchal norms (Campo, 2024).

An alternative perspective emphasizes that the Italian Constitution prohibits sex-based discrimination. However, the increase in sexual violence is also linked to marginalization and deviance, partly resulting from irregular immigration. Violence against women - manifested in femicide, sexual assault, and discrimination - constitutes an affront to civilization itself. Ensuring women's safety, freedom, and equal opportunities is essential to uphold human dignity. The issue of patriarchy can be analyzed from two different standpoints: a practical one rooted in constitutional principles, and a more subjective one driven by specific worldviews. The latter often focuses on promoting a particular narrative rather than addressing social problems effectively. From this viewpoint, patriarchy is regarded as a pervasive legal structure, despite its formal abolition following the 1975 family law reform that replaced the hierarchical family model with one of gender equality. In reality, residual male chauvinism - commonly referred to as “machismo” - persists, reducing women's status and fostering conditions conducive to violence and abuse. Statistics from the Ministry of the Interior reveal that much of the violence against women is committed by irregular immigrants from cultures with traditional gender norms that conflict with Western societal values. Such perspectives often lead to misinterpretations of women's behavior or attire, fueling acts of violence (Birolini, 2024). Although violence against women cannot be solely attributed to a patriarchal system, it remains a critical issue in Italy. In response, Article 577-bis of the Penal Code was recently introduced, imposing life imprisonment for homicide motivated by gender-based discrimination, hatred, or attempts to suppress women's rights and identity (Pinto, 2025).

In 2024, Giovanni Sallusti published *Mi mancano i vecchi comunisti. Confessione inaudita di un libertario* (I Miss the Old Communists: An Unheard Confession of a Libertarian), a significant work that illuminates the transformation of Italy's largest left-wing political party. Although Sallusti regards the old communists as adversaries rather than enemies, he acknowledges certain virtues of the former Italian Communist Party (PCI). The PCI embraced the Industrial Revolution as a positive socio-economic development and aligned itself with Western values. It focused on advocating for workers' rights and the disadvantaged, while respecting voters and traditional values of family and nation. Unlike the contemporary left, represented by the Democratic Party (PD), the PCI did not exhibit “oicophobia”, the rejection of Western cultural heritage. Today, the PD increasingly displays intolerance toward dissenting views and has shifted its priorities from social rights to championing minority groups, often disregarding the preferences of the broader Italian populace. Conservative voters are frequently disparaged, revealing an elitism that undermines democratic pluralism (Zanellato, 2025). The PD's dismissal of electoral opponents as uninformed and narrow-minded exemplifies its reluctance to accept political alternation. This elitist posture, coupled with an emphasis on inclusion of minority groups - sexual, ethnic, and religious - has supplanted the left's historic focus on equality and the working class. From the 1990s onward, issues concerning immigrants and sexual minorities, collectively framed under the LGBTQIA+ acronym, have taken precedence over traditional struggles for wages, employment, housing, and healthcare. This strategy confers political advantages by avoiding the substantial costs and sacrifices associated with addressing core social issues. Emphasizing causes like surrogate motherhood, parenthood rights, anti-homotransphobia laws, and low-cost maritime rescues allows the left to assert moral superiority while circumventing economically demanding reforms. As a result, the PD has estranged its traditional working-class base, which increasingly views immigration as a security and economic concern, a perspective largely ignored by party elites (Ricolfi, 2024). While the PD has been electorally weakened in Italy, it retains significant influence within EU institutions, where its ideology continues to prevail.

Mirella Serri's *Nero indelebile. Le radici oscure della nuova destra italiana* (Indelible Black: The Dark Roots of the New Italian Right, 2024) cautions against the rise of conservative parties within the EU, which have recently gained significant electoral support. Serri contends that progressive EU policies favoring LGBTQIA+ rights and migrant inclusion face opposition from these emergent right-wing governments. In Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni epitomizes a right-wing party deeply rooted in the ideological legacies of 1960s European movements and the defunct Italian Social Movement (MSI). Under Meloni's leadership, rhetoric invoking Mussolinian language, sovereigntism, and xenophobic populism has resurfaced, alongside hostility toward immigrants and the LGBTQIA+ community, perceived as threats to traditional family values founded on heterosexual unions. However, Serri overlooks that the reforms introduced by EU Resolution 2021/2557 did not revive fascist-era terminology; rather, they replaced longstanding terms such as *padre* and *madre* (father and mother), integral to Western European cultural and linguistic heritage, with gender-neutral language by political mandate. This linguistic shift, enforced by law, raises questions about compatibility with liberal democratic principles - principles that, according to Serri, right-wing governments seek to undermine. Serri's book has faced severe criticism from historians and political scientists, who characterize it as a polemical and propagandistic narrative marked by inaccuracies, confusion, and a lack of up-to-date bibliographic references. Consequently, *Nero indelebile* is widely regarded as a partisan work rather than a rigorous scholarly analysis (Di Bari, 2025).

In his book *Via Crux. Contro il politicamente corretto* (Via Crux: Against Political Correctness), Giuseppe Cruciani presents a robust libertarian critique of contemporary Italian society's embrace of politically correct discourse. He argues that language norms imposed from above are artificial constraints that erode authenticity, individuality, and the spontaneity of human relationships. Framing political correctness as the principal enemy of free expression, Cruciani addresses contentious themes such as cancel culture, inclusion, restricted vocabulary, LGBTQIA+ advocacy, modern feminism, and immigration. The work positions itself as a manifesto against what the author perceives as an ideological imposition that seeks to homogenize thought and suppress dissent. Cruciani contends that the growing obsession with avoiding offense leads to artificial conformity and undermines genuine interpersonal communication. He defends the right of individuals to express their views without being subject to prescriptive linguistic codes or punitive sanctions for nonconformity. The control of language is described as a veiled form of tyranny, an insidious totalitarianism cloaked in the rhetoric of compassion and inclusivity. He warns that the suppression or alteration of language in the name of political correctness endangers personal liberty, arguing that offense alone should not justify censorship. Ultimately, *Via Crux* denounces what it sees as a cultural trend that stifles subjectivity and punishes divergent thought (Bezzi, 2024).

In *Gender: Il sesso degli angeli e l'oblio dell'Occidente* (Gender: The Sex of Angels and the Oblivion of the West), Giulio Meotti critiques the rise of gender theory, which he presents as a radical departure from biological understandings of sex. He contends that until recently, the distinction between male and female - grounded in chromosomal and reproductive differences - was self-evident and uncontested. However, gender theory has supplanted this biological framework with the notion that gender identity is self-determined and independent of physical sex. This perspective, he argues, has gained dominance across academia, education, entertainment, and economic institutions, marginalizing dissenting views. Meotti characterizes the resulting climate as a new form of ideological orthodoxy - a "neo-inquisition" - that punishes those who question the prevailing narrative, thereby threatening the foundations of Western liberal civilization. The analogy he draws between current debates and the theological disputes in Constantinople prior to its fall underscores his view that society is distracted by abstract ideological constructs while facing profound civilizational challenges. He further criticizes the erosion of medical and psychological rigor in gender transitions, portraying the affirmation of identity through unilateral self-declaration as emblematic of an ideology that seeks to erase nature in favor of ideological conformity.

In April 2025, Ioanna Schimizzi and Giuliano Guzzo analyzed "The Special Report 11/2025" of the EU Court of Auditors. While the EU granted €7.4 billion to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) between 2021 and 2023 as part of its internal policies, the Court of Auditors expressed concern over excessive opacity in this funding, as detailed in a report published on 7 April 2025. Despite certain advances, the data on EU financial support to NGOs active in internal policy areas continues to be fragmented and inaccurate. The EU Commission serially fails to adequately disclose certain funded advocacy activities, and lacks active mechanisms to ensure that funded NGOs uphold EU values, exposing the Union to reputational risks. Furthermore, the definition of "NGO" varies across member states and is seldom codified in national legislation. In 2024, the EU provisionally

defined an NGO as a non-profit organization independent of public authorities. Although this represents progress, the definition alone cannot guarantee accurate classification within the EU's financial transparency system, as entities self-declare NGO status, and the Commission does not verify key factors such as government influence or whether NGOs pursue commercial interests. The report also revealed that over €1.5 billion of EU funds have been allocated to promote a radical LGBTQIA+ agenda, particularly concerning "gender identity", illustrating the substantial influence of LGBTQIA+ lobbying within EU institutions and shedding light on related political and legislative decisions adopted by the EU Parliament.

RESEARCH AIMS AND QUESTIONS

This study investigates the impact of EU Resolution 2021/2557, which implements the rights of transgender and transsexual individuals, on the Italian language, specifically focusing on the prohibition of certain nouns and adjectives considered not only offensive and disrespectful to these communities but also symbolic of patriarchal structures. While the primary focus lies in examining how the Italian language has been modified under the influence of EU legislation and trans-feminist advocacy groups, the research also critically explores the broader political context underpinning these linguistic changes. Notably, the decision to ban long-established and commonly used Italian terms reflects political choices made at the EU level, shaped by the ideological stance of left-wing political forces. These forces have utilized their influence within EU institutions to advance a gender policy agenda that extends beyond language reform, encompassing wider societal and cultural transformations.

Specifically, this study aims to:

1. Examine the evolution of EU law through Resolution 2021/2557, which mandates member states, including Italy, to revise their national languages to accommodate the demands of the transgender community, thereby directly influencing the Italian linguistic landscape.
2. Analyze the specific Italian words, adjectives, and proverbs that have been prohibited due to their perceived association with patriarchy and opposition to the rights of transgender and transsexual individuals. This analysis also investigates the nature of these linguistic modifications and the mechanisms of control exercised over public speech and writing.
3. Explore the broader societal implications of LGBTQIA+ ideology beyond linguistic issues, assessing its influence on social norms and cultural practices.

To achieve these objectives, the study addresses the following research questions:

1. How has EU supranational law, enacted under the influence of trans-feminist advocacy, reshaped the Italian language?
2. What criteria and processes determine whether a word or expression is permitted or subject to sanctions?
3. To what extent do left-wing political forces, through their support of trans-feminist groups at both EU and national levels, adhere to democratic principles inherent in pluralistic societies?

By responding to these questions, this research seeks to offer a comprehensive analysis of the ongoing political contestation between left-wing and conservative forces, each defending distinct values and visions within the frameworks of EU institutions and Italian society.

METHODOLOGY

This study adopts a multi-method qualitative approach within a case study framework (Yin, 2018) to examine the implications of EU Parliament Resolution 2021/2557 - considered a pivotal milestone for transgender rights - and the subsequent Italian measures implementing its provisions, with particular attention to their effects on traditional linguistic structures.

1. Policy Analysis

The study includes a focused analysis of EU Parliament Resolution 2021/2557, with particular attention to the sections encouraging linguistic and cultural reforms across the 27 EU Member States. While the Resolution

applies at the EU level, this research concentrates exclusively on its implementation in Italy and its implications for the Italian language. The analysis also covers Italy's National Strategy for the LGBTQIA+ Community 2022–2025, adopted in January 2022, which outlines the national response to the resolution's objectives. This policy layer provides the institutional framework necessary to contextualize Italy's approach to language reform as a dimension of broader social and legal change.

2. Document Analysis

Relevant Italian legislation enacted to align with the Resolution, as well as judicial rulings, were reviewed to contextualize the legal and political framework shaping linguistic change. This analysis helps trace how language becomes a site of contestation in policy and law.

3. Qualitative Interview Analysis

Publicly accessible interviews with policymakers, trans-feminist activists, media figures, and linguists were selected for thematic analysis. This method enabled an exploration of motivations, points of contention, and the broader discursive landscape, capturing a range of perspectives - both supportive and critical - on linguistic transformation. Interviews were chosen based on relevance to the topic and diversity of viewpoints, ensuring representation of both mainstream and dissenting positions.

4. Media Content Analysis

A systematic content analysis was conducted on recent print and televised media from major Italian outlets. Sources were selected to ensure ideological diversity. On the left, newspapers such as *La Repubblica*, *La Stampa*, and *Il Fatto Quotidiano* were analyzed, alongside televised political talk shows like *Piazza Pulita* and *Di Martedì*, both known for their progressive editorial stance. To provide contrast, right-leaning newspapers including *Il Giornale* and *Libero Quotidiano*, as well as the conservative-oriented program *Porta a Porta*, were also examined. Articles and debates were identified using keyword searches (e.g., “patriarchal language”, “inclusive language reform”, “gender identity”, “linguistic equality”), and analyzed for tone, frequency of coverage, narrative framing, and ideological orientation. This comparative approach allowed for the identification of recurring discursive patterns and divergences in how linguistic reforms are portrayed across the political spectrum.

5. Engagement with Scholarly Literature on Language and Political Authority

In addition to policy documents, interviews, and media sources, this study is grounded in a critical engagement with peer-reviewed scholarly literature in linguistics, gender studies, and socio-legal research. Previous academic studies examining language regulation, state-imposed linguistic change, and the relationship between political authority and linguistic norms were systematically reviewed and integrated into the analytical framework. This body of scholarship provides the theoretical and empirical foundation for interpreting contemporary debates on inclusive language, gender-neutral forms, and institutional language reform. By situating the Italian case within established academic discussions on language governance, power, and resistance, the study ensures that media discourse is analyzed not as authoritative evidence but as empirical data reflecting broader ideological and cultural dynamics already examined in the literature.

6. Data Synthesis

Triangulating data across policy texts, legal documents, interviews, and media sources allowed for a more comprehensive and nuanced interpretation of the ongoing shifts in linguistic norms. This cross-source validation strengthens the analytical claims and enhances the empirical foundation of the study.

7. Limitations

Despite the methodological breadth, some limitations remain. First, the reliance on publicly available interviews may omit key perspectives, particularly from actors unwilling to speak publicly. Second, media sources - though carefully selected for ideological balance - may reflect editorial biases that influence the framing of linguistic

reforms. Third, access to confidential government documents or internal policy deliberations was not possible. These constraints may affect the full scope of interpretation. However, the study mitigates such limitations through methodological triangulation, offering a multi-angled perspective that enhances the credibility and analytical depth of the findings.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Before the adoption of Resolution 2021/2557, several journalists, authors, politicians, and left-wing activists advocated for reforming the Italian language to make it more inclusive of LGBTQIA+ identities. One proposed strategy involved replacing gendered word endings with symbols such as the asterisk (*) or the schwa (ə). These alternatives were intended to neutralize gender in language by eliminating the binary male/female distinction and highlighting non-normative gender identities. For instance, the grammatically correct phrase *Ciao a tutti* (Hi everyone) is modified by replacing the masculine plural ending “i” with either an asterisk or a schwa (Bucci et al., 2018).

Figure 3

The asterisk removes the masculine gender from the word *tutti*. Source: <https://cercatoridiatlantide.it/asterisco-quando-come-perche-usarlo-nei-gdr/>



Figure 4

The schwa (ə) replaces the masculine ending in *tutti*. Source: <https://www.secoloditalia.it/2025/03/scuola-addio-boldrinate-lo-stop-del-ministero-a-schwa-e-asterischi-no-gender-offendono-litaliano/>



Despite these efforts, such linguistic innovations have not gained widespread acceptance among Italian speakers. Most linguists reject the use of these symbols, arguing that they are incompatible with the phonetic and

grammatical structure of the language, difficult to pronounce, and ultimately distort its natural sound. Currently, their use remains limited to a small segment of the population wishing to visibly express solidarity with the LGBTQIA+ community (Giannoli, 2025). By contrast, EU Resolution 2021/2557 imposes a legal obligation on member states to revise official language when it contains terms considered offensive or exclusionary by LGBTQIA+ groups who, across the EU, represent a clear minority (Gaudiosi, 2021). In Italy, for example, a 2023 survey reported that only 9% of the population identifies with a gender differing from their biological sex. The figures are similar in other countries: 13% in Spain, 11% in Germany, 7% in Portugal, and 6% in Poland (Terribili, 2023).

Italy's 2022–2025 LGBTQIA+ National Strategy

Pursuant to EU Resolution 2021/2557, Italy launched its own LGBTQIA+ National Strategy in January 2022 (Guerra, 2022; Calabrese et al., 2023). It consists of a broad set of legal measures and policy interventions, including Law No. 164/1982, which permits gender reassignment; Law No. 76/2016 (the Cirinnà Act), which introduced civil unions for same-sex couples; and the National Strategy for the Prevention and Combating of Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, adopted in 2013 by the Department for Equal Opportunities under the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. It also incorporates key rulings by the Constitutional and Supreme Courts - such as decisions No. 170/2014, 15138/2015, and 33/2021 - which have set important precedents in Italian jurisprudence on LGBTQIA+ rights (De Stradis & Caporusso, 2025).

The National Strategy addresses eight priority areas: employment, security, health, education, sport, culture, media, and language. For each sector, it outlines specific systemic actions to ensure effective implementation. These measures are subject to ongoing monitoring, and the results achieved are periodically reported in writing to the European Commission, which is responsible for evaluating the progress made by each member state. From a specifically linguistic standpoint, the strategy established a commission chaired by the Minister for Equal Opportunities - or a designated representative - which holds regular monthly consultations with LGBTQIA+ advocacy groups (Galati, 2022).


These meetings address concerns in areas such as employment, safety, education, healthcare, media representation, and communication. The goal is to formulate targeted measures to foster full societal integration and well-being for individuals with non-heteronormative gender identities (De Rosa, 2022). Following each session, the Italian government submits a progress report to the EU Commission. If any requests are denied - due to legal constraints, financial infeasibility, or concerns related to public order - the LGBTQIA+ community may appeal directly to the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights. Should this authority consider the government's refusal a violation of human rights, they may request a policy review or escalate the matter to the ECHR (European Court of Human Rights), which will deliver a ruling after a public hearing *post auditas partes* (De Perini, 2024). Following this overview, it is important to analyze the linguistic modifications implemented in Italian at the request of the LGBTQIA+ community. Traditional gendered terms reflecting a binary male-female classification were restructured to acknowledge a broader spectrum of gender identities. The conventional male/female, heterosexual/homosexual dichotomy is increasingly regarded as incompatible with a contemporary social framework that now acknowledges at least 21 gender identities, a number expected to grow (Tumino & Valmori, 2024). To support this shift, a dedicated LGBTQIA+ glossary has been developed, aiming to standardize terminology that embraces the full range of sexual orientations and gender identities. This lexicon introduces terms such as allosexual, androphilic, gynosexual, and pansexual, and encourages their correct usage as part of an inclusive linguistic practice (Passatore, 2024). Simultaneously, previously common expressions - such as homosexual, gay, lesbian, or sexual preference - are now deemed inappropriate, contributing to the construction of a new "political correctness". This shift has also raised concerns regarding limitations on freedom of expression, particularly for individuals who feel constrained in their lexical choices. Moreover, misuse or noncompliance with inclusive language standards can result in serious repercussions, including professional dismissal, public condemnation, social exclusion, or significant fines (Tripodi, 2024). These transformations, which involve both the creation of new terms and the suppression of language considered offensive, generally escape judicial oversight. This is because the joint commission formed under the 2022–2025 National Strategy produces guidelines that establish enforceable measures that are not strictly juridical, as they lack the element of *opinio iuris ac necessitatis* (i.e., the widespread belief that such norms carry legal obligation). Nevertheless, these guidelines can, in practice, affect individual rights. In cases of legal dispute, judges are required to prioritize

EU law over domestic provisions when rendering decisions (Stella, 2024; Rossi & Tovo, 2023). Among the mandated changes introduced through EU Resolution 2021/2557 and Italy's national strategy is the reform of terminology in school documentation. For instance, *babbo* (father) and *mamma* (mother) have been officially replaced with *Genitore 1* (Parent 1) and *Genitore 2* (Parent 2).

Figure 5

Parents are now required to sign as *Genitore 1* and *Genitore 2*.


Source: <https://www.rainews.it/articoli/2024/02/corte-appello-roma-carta-didentita-ok-genitore-1-e-2-famiglie-arcobaleno-bocciato-un-decreto-del-ministero-interno-del-2019-guidato-all-epoca-da-salvini-2020b1b7-30d5-4d57-9543-c68fdc411cfc.html>



Following a legal dispute between LGBTQIA+ associations and the Ministry of the Interior, the Italian Supreme Court ruled on April 8, 2025, that EU law takes precedence over national legislation. The Court deemed the terms father and mother discriminatory toward so-called rainbow families - households with same-sex parents. In a decision that went *ultra petita* (i.e., addressing matters beyond those raised in the case), the Court further declared that Parent 1 and Parent 2 must also be used in identity documents. According to the ruling, each minor has the right to an identity card reflecting their specific family structure, rendering gendered terms inappropriate when both parents are of the same sex (Frosina, 2025). In response, a nationwide petition demanding the reinstatement of mother and father in school and identification documents collected over five million signatures in 2025. Opponents argue that families with same-sex parents represent a small minority and should not impose linguistic changes on the majority. For them, replacing traditional parental terms reflects not just a linguistic adjustment but an ideological shift that erodes the rights of children raised in heterosexual families (Alliva, 2025). Public sentiment appears to reflect these concerns. In 2024, while the case was pending before the Court of Appeal, polling institute Noto Sondaggi surveyed four million Italians aged 18 to 70 using the CAWI (Computer-Assisted Web Interviewing) method. The results showed that 58% opposed the adoption of Parent 1 and Parent 2, 21% supported it, and 13% were undecided or declined to respond.

Figure 6

Results of the 2024 Noto Sondaggi survey. Source :<https://www.provitaefamiglia.it/blog/gender-sondaggio-provita-famiglia-80-italiani-per-liberta-educativa-prossimo-governo-difenda-famiglia-e-minori>



The singular term *famiglia* (family), traditionally understood as the union of a man and a woman, has increasingly been associated with organized crime, particularly the mafia. This semantic shift has prompted the replacement of *famiglia* with the more neutral and inclusive term *unione* (union) in institutional discourse (Carboni, 2025).

Figure 7

The term *famiglia* is now associated with the mafia. Source: <https://www.affaritaliani.it/cronache/risiko-sicilia-mafia-famiglia-gioco-tavolo-premio-953921.html>



Nevertheless, the plural *famiglie* (families) still retains its conventional meaning and encompasses both heterosexual and same-sex unions (Masserelli, 2025). Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni faced backlash for allegedly promoting homophobic and transphobic views after publishing a Father’s Day message on March 19, stating: “I wish to extend my best wishes to all the fathers in the world who cradle their newborns and are the backbone of every family”. She was widely criticized for using family in the singular form. In her defense, she clarified that “every family” includes all family types, including same-sex couples (Perdicchi, 2025). Controversy extended to the business world. On April 23, 2025, a national newspaper reported on two cisgender entrepreneurs - a man and a woman - announcing a professional merger using the term family in the singular. The journalist and her editor were subsequently fined for two reasons: using *famiglia* (which the authorities

interpreted as suggesting a criminal association), and displaying a photo of a heterosexual couple, which was considered offensive to non-heterosexual unions (Ravasio, 2025).

Figure 8

The singular *famiglia* now connotes a criminal association. Source: https://www.repubblica.it/design/2025/04/23/news/gamfratesi_vivienne_mette_su_famiglia-424143932/



GamFratesi: Vivienne mette su famiglia

di Manuela Mimosa Ravasio

Il duo italo danese continua la collaborazione con Minotti e dalla poltrona dello scorso anno sviluppa un versatile sistema: divani, chaise longue, tavolini e piani d'appoggio

23 APRILE 2025 ALLE 11:01

2 MINUTI DI LETTURA

The ideological influence of EU law has contributed to a linguistic transformation in Italian, affecting numerous terms traditionally marked by binary gender. Many of these words have either been replaced with gender-neutral alternatives or assigned new meanings, as in the case of *famiglia* (family). Masculine nouns such as *figlio* (son) and *figli* (children), alongside the feminine *figlia* (daughter), are no longer permitted due to their reinforcement of a male-female binary. Their use is prohibited by law, and individuals or entities persisting in their use may face severe sanctions enforced by AGCOM (the Authority for Communications Guarantees). The gender-neutral, epicene term *prole* (offspring), applicable in both singular and plural forms, has been mandated as the acceptable alternative. Similarly, the gendered terms *marito* (husband) and *moglie* (wife) have been replaced by the inclusive term *coniuge* (partner) (Marchi, 2024). The term Dio (God), inherently masculine in Italian, has also been subject to regulatory scrutiny. LGBTQIA+ advocacy groups contend that there is no theological basis for assigning a specific gender to the divine. Consequently, the use of Dio has been banned in formal and public communications, replaced by legally mandated, gender-neutral expressions such as *Divinità* (Divinity) or *Nume* (Deity) (Piva, 2024). The binary greeting *Signore e Signori* (Ladies and Gentlemen) has been eliminated from official and commercial communications. Booking platforms for flights, medical appointments, and event tickets are now legally required to offer gender-inclusive options. Retaining only the traditional *Sig.re* (Mr.), *Sig.ra* (Mrs.), and *Sig.na* (Miss) constitutes discrimination and may incur significant penalties. For instance, in 2023, Ryanair was ordered to pay €4,500 in damages and to update its booking system to incorporate non-binary options following a complaint by a passenger denied a non-binary title choice (Balsamo, 2025).

Derogatory terms such as *frociaggine* (homosexuality), *frocio* or *finocchio* (homosexual man), and *lesbica* (lesbian) are now classified as hate speech and banned from public and media discourse. Their utterance or publication triggers heavy financial penalties and, for journalists, may result in suspension or expulsion from professional registers. The adjudication of such cases falls exclusively under AGCOM's jurisdiction rather than civil or criminal courts. Though formally independent, AGCOM's members are appointed by Parliament, and its rulings often reflect their political orientation, leading to subjective, inconsistent, and legally questionable outcomes (Canepa, 2024). For example, the term *frociaggine* was publicly displayed by LGBTQIA+ activists at Milan's 2024 Gay Pride parade without incurring sanctions (Maurelli, 2024).

Figure 9

Attendees at Milan Gay Pride 2024 display a sign with the word *frociaggine*. Source: <https://www.secoloditalia.it/2025/04/schlein-arruola-il-papa-da-morto-ma-lipocrita-e-lei-nel-2024-lo-attaccava-al-gay-pride-sbaglia-ed-e-irrispettoso/>



Conversely, journalist Vittorio Feltri and the editor of *Il Giornale* were fined €100,000 for publishing the same term in quotation marks within an article, despite its citation from a third party (Feltri, 2025).

Figure 10

Journalist Vittorio Feltri's use of *frociaggine* in quotation marks in *Il Giornale* (April 22, 2025). Source: <https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/dito-puntato-io-conosco-abbiamo-multi-pensieri-comune-2469139.html>

The screenshot shows the article page on 'il Giornale'. The main headline is 'Quel dito puntato. "Io la conosco. Abbiamo molti pensieri in comune"'. Below the headline is a sub-headline: 'L'incontro in Vaticano lo scorso giugno per i cinquant'anni de "il Giornale"'. The author is listed as 'Vittorio Feltri | 22 Aprile 2025 - 08:00'. There is a video player for 'Il mio incontro con il Papa' and a 'Download this video' button. The article text begins with: 'Non sono in grado, per fortuna del Papa e dei lettori, di stilare una sintesi teologica di pensiero, parole e opere di Francesco. Ho però stampata dentro di me, e la porterò dietro finché vivo, la cronaca dell'incontro che la mattina del 1° giugno 2024 ho avuto il privilegio di avere con lui, scambiando poche frasi, e ricevendo il suo sorriso senza riserve e la sua benevolenza inaspettata, proprio per me. Ero nella piccola delegazione che, con la famiglia Angiucci e il direttore Alessandro Sallusti, veniva ammessa in udienza dal Pontefice per festeggiare i cinquant'anni di vita de il Giornale.' The article also includes a 'Leggi anche' section with related articles and a 'Rubriche' section with a photo of a woman.

In another case, Bari City Councilor Pasquale Finocchio was forced to change his surname after digital platforms repeatedly blocked his access, misinterpreting it as an offensive term. Meanwhile, openly gay journalist Tommaso Cerno has freely used terms such as *Dio* (God) and *frocio* (gay man) without censorship or penalty. On November 3, 2024, he posted the following on social media: *Ogni volta che vedo la signora Boccia in TV, ringrazio Dio di essere frocio* (Every time I see Mrs. Boccia on TV, I thank God I am gay) (Garau, 2024).

Figure 11

Tommaso Cerno’s social media post (November 3, 2024) featuring the phrase: I thank God I am gay. Source: <https://x.com/Tommasocerno/status/1852998254356545846>



A notable inconsistency in language usage emerges in political discourse. During the most recent German general election, the left-leaning newspaper *La Stampa* referred to Alice Weidel of the right-wing *Alternative für Deutschland* party as *una leader lesbica* (a lesbian leader), a term the LGBTQIA+ community had previously campaigned to eliminate from public discourse on the grounds that it was offensive and discriminatory. This selective usage raises concerns about ideological bias. If media outlets committed to LGBTQIA+ rights use the term “lesbian” to describe a political opponent, consistency demands that similar descriptors be applied to left-wing figures as well. Instead, progressive politicians are typically referred to using respectful and politically correct expressions such as *persona fluida* (gender-fluid person) or *arcobaleno* (rainbow person). This discrepancy suggests that linguistically respectful terminology is reserved for those aligned with left-wing ideologies, whereas political opponents are subject to labels that may carry pejorative undertones (Mascheroni, 2025).

Figure 12

La Stampa refers to Alice Weidel as *una leader lesbica*. Source: https://www.lastampa.it/esteri/2025/02/23/news/alice_weidel_afd_elezioni_germania-15018673/



These examples illustrate that language is often evaluated not by its objective content, but through the prism of political orientation.

Trans-feminist advocacy groups have called for a comprehensive revision of the Italian language, arguing that many commonly used terms are patriarchal, exclusionary, or heteronormative. For instance, they contend that the word *preservativo* (condom) should be eliminated, deeming it a “hetero-designed, phallogentric, and monogamous tool” that wrongly centers cisgender men, despite its broader use (Del Papa, 2024). Similarly, the term *casalinga* (housewife) is criticized as a patriarchal label confining women to domestic servitude. Yet, expressions like *la casalinga di Voghera* - long part of colloquial language - are viewed by many women as positive and socially meaningful, rather than demeaning (Carlioni, 2024). Trans-feminist critiques also target national symbols. Italy’s anthem *Fratelli d’Italia* (Brothers of Italy) is deemed exclusionary due to its masculine noun *fratelli*, prompting calls for more gender-inclusive language. Critics argue that such revisions undermine historical and cultural heritage, suggesting instead that dissenters may simply choose not to sing the anthem (Canonico, 2025). Likewise, the Christian prayer *Padre Nostro* (Our Father) is accused of promoting a binary, patriarchal worldview. Proposals to neutralize references to God and gender have sparked tensions within both Italian society and the Catholic Church. Although Pope Francis has expressed openness to LGBTQIA+ concerns, many conservative clerics view these reforms as capitulation to “woke” ideology (Dindo, 2023). Further demands include a complete overhaul of legal language to eliminate the so-called “overextended masculine”, the grammatical convention of using masculine plurals to refer to mixed-gender groups. Trans-feminist advocates argue that this practice erases non-masculine identities and conflates grammatical with social gender. However, Italian already includes numerous gendered terms that function inclusively or neutrally in practice: *guardia* (police officer), *persona* (person), *individuo* (individual), and even *soprano*, a grammatically masculine noun used exclusively for female voices. Linguists caution that interpreting gendered grammar ideologically risks distorting the internal logic of the language. Implementing such changes would require a radical revision of Italian legal and institutional texts, including the Constitution, which employs *cittadini* (citizens, masculine plural) to denote all people regardless of gender. The Penal Code similarly utilizes the masculine form *imputato* (defendant), yet legal precedents show that the term applies to all individuals, without discrimination based on gender identity (Chiari, 2024; Pagliarini, 2024).

Trans-feminists call for the elimination of Italian historical proverbs because they only reference males and females, excluding other gender identities. However, proverbs hold significant sociological value as cultural artifacts, reflecting the traditions, values, and collective mentality of a society. They transmit popular wisdom and social knowledge across generations, providing insight into interpersonal relationships, moral conduct, family roles, and work ethics. Linguistic analysis of proverbs reveals the use of metaphor, irony, and other rhetorical devices that illuminate communication patterns within communities. Proverbs relating to sexuality, women, sexism, and patriarchy - especially those reflecting discriminatory attitudes or gender stereotypes - must be approached critically and with historical awareness. Many originate from past eras with different social norms and gender roles, and though they may now be considered sexist or inappropriate, they serve as valuable markers of cultural change. In educational contexts, such proverbs can stimulate discussion on sexism, gender inequality, and the need for inclusive societal transformation, highlighting the evolution of social norms and prejudices over time. Proper contextualization in space and time is essential to grasp their full significance (Bozzi Sentieri, 2025). Moreover, proverbs can shift in meaning or usage due to social and historical changes. Often employed ironically or metaphorically, their concise and familiar structure makes them effective for humor, provocation, or emphasis in everyday speech and artistic expression. The creative reinterpretation of proverbs as rhetorical tools challenges or highlights viewpoints by playing on traditional understandings. Ultimately, proverbs are fundamental anthropological sources that reflect civilization’s knowledge. Their wholesale removal merely because they no longer align with contemporary values amounts to an unjustified form of cancel culture, disregarding the importance many place on preserving cultural heritage (Pistone, 2023).

The agenda of LGBTQIA+ and trans-feminist advocacy groups, strongly supported by progressive political forces dominant in EU institutions, now extends beyond linguistic reforms to reshape various dimensions of public and cultural life. Writers, journalists, and commentators are increasingly required to adopt language aligned with these advocacy positions, under threat of fines reaching up to €150,000 for inappropriate terminology (Teodori, 2024). Inclusive initiatives are visible throughout EU cities: pedestrian traffic lights depict same-sex couples, and metro stations and carriages are painted in rainbow colors, the widely recognized symbol of LGBTQIA+ pride (Marcomin, 2024).

Figure 13

Inclusive traffic lights featuring same-sex pedestrian icons installed across EU cities. Source: <https://www.nicolaporro.it/ma-li-morta-cruciani-impazzisce-di-fronte-ai-semafori-inclusivi/>



Figure 14

Rome's metro carriages decorated with rainbow colors as a symbol of LGBTQIA+ inclusion. Source: <https://abitarearoma.it/metro-a-il-treno-arcobaleno-fa-discutere/>



Figure 15

Colosseo metro station in Rome redesigned with rainbow-themed decor. Source: <https://quikymagazine.com/roma-la-metropolitana-si-tinge-dei-colori-dellarcobaleno-la-metro/>



The EU Football Federation mandates players to wear LGBTQIA+ symbol armbands; refusal results in suspension or disqualification. While this campaign promotes diversity and inclusion, it also serves political and image purposes (Moretti, 2024). At the Eurovision Song Contest, until 2024, only the national flags of participating countries were permitted in the venue. However, following sustained pressure from LGBTQIA+ advocacy groups, the contest's regulations were amended in 2025 to allow rainbow flags to be publicly displayed in the hall (Latorraca, 2025).

Figure 16

LGBTQIA+ rainbow flags displayed at the Eurovision Song Contest 2025. Source: <https://luce.lanazione.it/attualita/eurovision-2025-lgbtq-palestina-e32ded19>



Gender-neutral restrooms have widely replaced traditional male and female facilities in EU airports, schools, universities, and other public venues, promoting inclusivity for non-binary, transgender, and gender-diverse individuals (Guarino, 2025).

Figure 17

Gender-neutral restrooms implemented in EU public facilities to promote inclusivity. Source: https://www.repubblica.it/italia/2024/10/19/news/scuola_bagni_gender_neutral_inclusione-423565332/



In the media industry, LGBTQIA+-themed content has become virtually obligatory for distribution. Conversely, productions depicting traditional heterosexual relationships may be marginalized or labeled as transphobic. For instance, the 2024 television series *Alexander: The Making of a God* portrays the Macedonian conqueror's relationship with his loyal general Hephaestion as a romantic and homosexual bond, while neglecting key aspects of Alexander's historical legacy such as his military campaigns, three marriages, and two children. Critics view this as an example of ideological revisionism or "woke washing," imposing contemporary ideological frameworks on historical figures. Two prominent scholars of Greco-Roman history - Thomas Martin of Holy Cross University (Massachusetts) and Christopher Blackwell of Furman University (South Carolina) - argue that homosexual relationships were not widespread in Alexander's era, and that customs differed significantly between Athens and Macedonia (Moro, 2024).

Figure 18

The 2024 Netflix series *Alexander* depicts the Macedonian ruler's relationship with General Hephaestion as homosexual. Source :<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MqamFIYCBP8>



The radicalism underlying political correctness, which enforces rigid norms on permissible expression, increasingly functions as a form of censorship, silencing dissent and curbing the free exchange of ideas. This modern censorship affects journalists, writers, academics, students, and commentators, in open violation of Article 21 of the Italian Constitution, which guarantees freedom of expression across all forms of communication. Freedom of speech, a cornerstone of liberal democracy, includes not only the right to share agreeable views but also to provoke, ridicule, or offend. Without such latitude, constitutional protections become meaningless. In democratic societies, legitimacy does not derive from expert consensus but from the equal value of every individual's voice (Di Salvatore, 2023). Imposing politically correct norms through legal mechanisms is troubling, as it seeks to define what is morally acceptable and what is not, an approach historically aligned with authoritarian regimes. In fascist Italy (1922–1943), language was a tool of absolutism: foreign words were taxed, surnames Italianized, and regional dialects suppressed to eradicate dissent and enforce ideological conformity. The historical memory of such linguistic control should alert contemporary EU citizens to the signs of democratic erosion. A government that regulates language to shape thought cannot claim to be liberal or democratic. Language shapes both identity and social reality. As Orwell powerfully illustrated in 1984, totalitarian regimes manipulate language to control public consciousness, rewrite history, and suppress dissent. When language is co-opted for ideological ends, it degrades not only individual freedoms but also the intellectual and cultural foundations of society (Merlo, 2024). The issue at hand extends beyond the mere restriction of freedom of speech and opinion; it also represents a profound threat to the collective consciousness of ordinary people. More broadly, it entails a gradual erosion and impoverishment of intellectual dignity, cultural richness, humanistic values, and critical reasoning. This form of censorship even permeates scientific research. For example, studies on puberty blockers funded by public resources are suppressed or disregarded if their findings contradict prevailing LGBTQIA+ ideologies by highlighting potential harms. When scientific truths concerning public health are subordinated to ideological agendas, the integrity and well-being of society as a whole are jeopardized (Veneziani, 2025). True democracy demands respect for diverse opinions, cultures, sexualities, and beliefs, without requiring the renunciation of one's own traditions, identity, or speech. Imposed inclusivity, as promoted by EU institutions, often substitutes governance with coercion. By aligning with specific identity groups, progressive political forces aim to secure electoral gains rather than foster genuine societal inclusivity. This instrumentalization of minority rights undermines democratic pluralism (Bragato, 2024). The EU frequently claims a leading role in authentic democracy and liberalism, often portraying itself as the defender of fundamental freedoms. However, it often adopts a condescending stance when criticizing other nations, despite lacking the legitimate legal and moral authority to do so. A recent example is the EU's severe condemnation of the Afghan authorities' decision to ban the game of chess, which was deemed immoral and harmful to state values. Through its vehement criticism of the Afghan Taliban, the EU has once again exposed its profound hypocrisy (Patricelli, 2025). In February 2025, the EU further stirred controversy by declaring that Lego bricks - an iconic toy enjoyed by generations - are inherently homophobic and patriarchal. This assertion is based on the claim that the bricks perpetuate the notion of heterosexuality as the normative sexual orientation and thus should be removed from children's play. Officially, the design of the bricks is interpreted symbolically: the protruding pins represent the male element, the receiving holes the female, and their interlocking is termed "mating". Such a *modus operandi* in interpreting a children's toy reflects a systematic attempt to undermine the recognition of

the sexual and social identities of EU citizens. Such actions by EU institutions reflect a deep-seated intolerance toward the foundational democratic principles and core values that have shaped EU societies since the conclusion of the Second World War (Borselli, 2025). This ideological overreach has not gone unnoticed. The 2024 EU elections reflected growing public discontent, as evidenced by the significant decline in support for left-leaning parties.

To further contextualize the Italian case within broader European dynamics, it is useful to briefly consider parallel developments in other EU Member States.


Although this study adopts a single-country case study design centered on Italy, the linguistic developments analyzed here are not isolated phenomena. Comparable processes of institutional language reform have emerged across several EU Member States following the adoption of EU-wide equality and anti-discrimination frameworks. In France, debates surrounding *écriture inclusive* (inclusive language) have generated both administrative guidelines and political resistance, highlighting tensions between linguistic tradition and gender-inclusive reforms (Dartford, 2023). In Germany, the increasing use of gender-neutral forms such as the *Gendersternchen* (asterisk) in public administration and academia has similarly sparked legal, cultural, and constitutional debates (Friedrich, 2024).

These cases illustrate that language has become a contested site of governance across the EU, where political authority, cultural identity, and social inclusion intersect. Situating the Italian case within this broader European landscape reinforces the argument that contemporary linguistic reforms are part of a transnational pattern shaped by shared institutional pressures, while also manifesting distinct national trajectories and forms of resistance.

Widespread skepticism toward EU institutions has intensified, driven by the perception that they prioritize elite interests and influential lobbies - among them LGBTQIA+ advocacy groups - while disregarding the broader public will. High-profile corruption scandals, such as Pfizergate, Qatargate, Chinagate, Moscowgate, HuaweiGate, PieperGate, Timmermansgate, and Jetgate, have further undermined citizens' trust in the integrity of EU leadership, implicating several prominent officials (Capocci, 2025). The reappointment of Ursula von der Leyen as Commission President was met with considerable disapproval, as revealed by a survey conducted by La Piazza in July 2024, in which 64.3% of six million EU citizens aged 18–65 expressed dissatisfaction with her renewed mandate.

Figure 19

Outcomes of the public opinion survey carried out by La Piazza in July 2024. Source: <https://www.affaritaliani.it/esteri/sondaggio-la-piazza-internazionale-933429.html>



Additional recent surveys corroborate this growing dissatisfaction. The EU is widely perceived not only as distant and bureaucratic but also as an autocratic, technocratic entity devoid of a cohesive identity or

constitutional foundation. Citizens increasingly view it as an institution that imposes damaging policies, undermines national sovereignty, and fails to safeguard Europe's historical and cultural legacy (Maggi, 2025).

CONCLUSION

The EU Parliament, through Resolution 2021/2557, has contravened a widely accepted linguistic principle: that language evolves organically and should not be subject to top-down imposition (Deist, 2022). This approach recalls practices typical of authoritarian regimes, which have historically sought to control public discourse, a phenomenon Europe experienced firsthand during the fascist and Nazi eras between 1919 and 1943. Like all natural languages, Italian includes expressions that may be considered vulgar or offensive, but such terms cannot simply be eradicated from the lexicon through legislative fiat. Current developments in Italy and across the EU signal a concerning departure from liberal democratic principles. EU institutions appear to be adopting increasingly illiberal stances, curbing freedom of expression in ways that disproportionately affect various groups: comedians are censored for satirizing protected categories such as transgender individuals; Jewish students face physical aggression for expressing their faith and ideas publicly; women who embrace traditional roles as mothers or homemakers are socially marginalized; independent journalists risk de-registration for rejecting mainstream narratives; and authors must submit their work to "sensitivity readers" to ensure ideological conformity. Even sitting ministers who oppose controversial ethical issues - such as surrogacy or adoption by same-sex couples - are excluded from public discourse (Capezzone, 2025). If the EU continues down this path - where freedom of expression is selectively granted only to those aligned with progressive, left-leaning ideologies - it risks accelerating its own decline. A cornerstone of liberal democracy is the protection of all forms of expression, even those deemed controversial or offensive by prevailing public sentiment, provided they do not incite unlawful action (Muzzolon, 2025). As the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset argued, a truly free society must tolerate even extreme ideas, as only through open intellectual contestation can competing viewpoints be fairly tested and one ultimately prevail. In recent years, however, EU societies have increasingly succumbed to a culture of ideological censorship, where dissenting perspectives are systematically suppressed if they deviate from left-wing orthodoxy (Pecchioli, 2022). Within a union of 27 member states, divergent - and at times conflicting - views are inevitable. Yet only through open, democratic, and respectful dialogue can the cohesion and survival of the EU be ensured. The six-year tenure of Ursula von der Leyen as Commission President has coincided with policies that, in prioritizing the rights of certain minority groups, - including the LGBTQIA+ community - have sidelined the concerns of the broader majority. This has contributed to social and economic dissatisfaction across the Union. The electoral success of sovereigntist and nationalist parties in numerous member states - including Hungary, France, Portugal, Romania, the Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, and Poland - reflects growing public opposition to continued left-wing governance and a demand for the restoration of free expression and cultural identity (Cuomo, 2025).

IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH

This study highlights how EU Parliament Resolution 2021/2557 has intensified societal polarization, particularly regarding freedom of speech, a core tenet of liberal democracy. Nonetheless, some limitations must be acknowledged.

In recent years, powerful left-wing factions within EU institutions, having lost support among economically disadvantaged groups due to the perceived neglect of their social rights, have increasingly positioned themselves as political representatives of the LGBTQIA+ community. The Vatican has played a complex role in this dynamic. During Pope Francis's 12-year pontificate, the Holy See often aligned with progressive stances - welcoming homosexual couples to receive sacraments, endorsing the Queer Bible (a reinterpretation of biblical figures such as Jesus, Mary, and the apostles in LGBTQIA+-themed contexts), and permitting rainbow flag displays during Mass (Politi, 2025) -. These developments have drawn harsh criticism from conservative Cardinals, some even calling the Pope the "anti-Christ". Cardinal Gerhard Ludwig Müller, for instance, warned during the recent Conclave that the next pontiff should resist the "LGBTQIA+ lobby", which he claimed seeks global dominance through atheistic principles that undermine both human nature and divine order (Corrado, 2025). Although not an EU member, the Vatican still wields significant political influence. Its alignment with progressive forces has allowed the left to leverage the Holy See as an ally (Nuzzi, 2025). However, the recent election of U.S. citizen Robert Francis Prevost, now Pope Leo XIV, has sparked widespread debate regarding

his views on LGBTQIA+ issues and the future direction of Vatican policy. Future research should assess whether the Catholic Church under Pope Leo XIV will continue to support progressive political agendas or revert to more conservative positions. Although it is premature to draw definitive conclusions, initial signals suggest a potential shift. As Cardinal, Pope Leo criticized Western media for fostering sympathy toward values “contrary to the Gospel”, including “homosexual lifestyles and alternative families composed of same-sex partners and their adopted children” (Lodige, 2025). He reinforced this position during his first address to the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the Holy See, declaring that “the family is the vital fulcrum of society, but it must be founded on the stable relationship between two people of different sexes, a man and a woman” (Agasso, 2025). Nonetheless, many left-wing politicians and LGBTQIA+ advocates remain hopeful that Pope Leo XIV will continue Francis’s progressive legacy (Fittipaldi, 2025; Meo, 2025). The appearance of rainbow-colored smoke during the Conclave has been seen as a sign of ongoing Vatican support for LGBTQIA+ rights.

Figure 20

It illustrates the rainbow smoke from the Sistine Chapel during the recent conclave. Source: <https://www.secoloditalia.it/2025/05/fumata-arcobaleno-dal-conclave-avanza-lincubo-di-un-papa-di-sinistra-pro-lgbt-e-migranti-ecco-i-nomi/>



Il toto-Pontefice

Fumata “arcobaleno” dal Conclave? Avanza l’incubo di un Papa di sinistra pro-Lgbt e migranti. Ecco i nomi

CRONACA - di Robert Perdicchi - 5 Maggio 2025 alle 13:54



A second avenue for research concerns the evolving relationship between the EU and the United States, especially following Donald J. Trump’s return to the presidency. Since beginning his second term, Trump has reaffirmed a binary view of gender grounded in biological essentialism. He has also secured Supreme Court approval for two controversial executive orders: the first barring transgender and transsexual individuals from serving in the military on the grounds that “every soldier must have an honorable, sincere, and disciplined lifestyle, even in their personal life”, and the second prohibiting trans women from participating in athletic competitions designated for individuals assigned female at birth (Gallo, 2025; Fiori, 2025). In Europe, policymakers, LGBTQIA+ activists, and scholars are closely observing these developments to assess how U.S. conservatism may influence EU civil rights debates. While many argue that Trump’s policies have transformed the U.S. into an illiberal democracy, thereby straining transatlantic ties (Bersani, 2025), others stress that Western alignment remains crucial. Some scholars warn that a fragmented Western alliance could lead to severe socio-economic and geopolitical consequences, including weakened collective security, diminished economic cooperation, and reduced global influence. Despite ideological differences - particularly on civil rights and cultural policies - they stress the need to preserve transatlantic solidarity, a cornerstone for sustaining stability and effectively addressing shared global challenges (Donzelli, 2025).

FUNDING

This research received no financial support or sponsorship from any public or private entity.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors wish to express their sincere gratitude to the polling institutes *Noto Sondaggi* and *La Piazza* for granting permission to use their survey data in this study.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The authors declare no actual or potential conflicts of interest, whether financial, professional, or personal, that could have influenced the design, conduct, or interpretation of this study.

REFERENCES

1. Agasso, D. (2025, May 17). *Il manifesto di Leone XIV: "Famiglia è uomo e donna"*. La Stampa. https://www.lastampa.it/vatican-insider/it/2025/05/17/news/il_manifesto_di_leone_xiv_famiglia_e_uomo_e_donna_e_offre_una_sede_ai_negoziati-15150954/
2. Algostino, A. (2024, April 1). *Costituzione e diritti delle donne*. LEFT. <https://left.it/2024/04/01/costituzione-e-diritti-delle-donne-il-fil-rouge-dellemancipazione/>
3. Alliva, S. (2025, April 9). «*Genitore 1 e genitore 2*». *Due sentenze della Cassazione smontano l'eterna fake news della destra*. Domani. <https://www.editorialedomani.it/fatti/genitori-padre-madre-carta-identita-cassazione-rete-lenford-famiglie-arcobaleno-coppie-omogenitoriali-lgbt-v2302rpz>
4. Balsamo, M. (2025, March 19). «*Non c'è il genere neutro*». *E il passeggero non binario porta in tribunale Ryanair*. Il Giornale. <https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/societ/non-c-genere-neutro-e-passeggero-non-binario-fa-causa-2453967.html>
5. Barbati, G. (2024, April 9). *Italia, comunità Lgbt critica il Vaticano per la condanna di maternità surrogata e gender*. Euro News. <https://it.euronews.com/2024/04/09/italia-comunita-lgbt-critica-il-vaticano-per-la-condanna-di-maternita-surrogata-e-gender>
6. Baudino, S. (2025, March 16). *Un nuovo scandalo sull'influenza delle lobby travolge il parlamento europeo*. L'Indipendente. <https://www.lindipendente.online/2025/03/14/un-nuovo-scandalo-sullinfluenza-delle-lobby-travolge-il-parlamento-europeo/>
7. Bersani, P. (2025, April 15). *Si è interrotta l'unità dell'occidente tra usa e europa. Gli usa sono diventati una democrazia illiberale per colpa di Donald Trump*. Di Martedì. <https://www.la7.it/dimartedi/video/bersani-trump-e-chi-gli-va-dietro-sono-apprendisti-stregoni-primao-poi-a-qualcuno-scappa-la-16-04-2025-591823>
8. Bezzi, R. (2024, October 20). *Giuseppe Cruciani: «Il politicamente corretto uccide la libertà d'espressione»*. *Il giornalista e conduttore radiofonico più irriverente presenta il suo ultimo libro "Via Crux" a Ravenna*. Più notizie. <https://piunotizie.it/giuseppe-cruciani-il-politicamente-corretto-uccide-la-liberta-despressione/>
9. Birolini, M. (2024, December 19). *Il caso. «Il patriarcato non esiste»: cosa ha detto Valditara sui femminicidi*. Avvenire. <https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/valditara-patriarcato-cecchettin>
10. Borrelli, I. (2024, March 26). *Il genere X sui documenti d'identità è l'avamposto della battaglia nonbinaria*. Domani. <https://www.editorialedomani.it/idee/commenti/il-genere-x-sui-documenti-didentita-e-lavamposto-della-battaglia-nonbinaria-t0jnbrd2>
11. Borselli, H. (2025, February 7). *L'ultimo delirio woke: i Lego possono essere omofobi*. Il Giornale. <https://www.ilgiornale.it/video/attualit/lultimo-delirio-woke-i-lego-possono-essere-omofobi-2434410.html>
12. Bozzi Sentieri, M. (2025, May 19). *Orgoglio per la riscossa della cultura di destra, silenziata dai comunicatori di sinistra. Dieci priorità, a cominciare dalla lingua italiana*. Secolo d'Italia. <https://www.secoloditalia.it/2025/05/orgoglio-per-la-riscossa-della-cultura-di-destra-silenziata-dai-comunicatori-di-sinistra-dieci-priorita-a-cominciare-dalla-lingua-italiana/>

13. Bragato, B. (2024, July 12). *Questioni di genere. DE&I: inclusione reale o mitigazione dell'esclusione?* Stati generali. <https://www.glistatigenerali.com/attualita/questioni-di-genere/dei-inclusione-reale-o-mitigazione-dellesclusione/>
14. Bucci, J. et al. (2018). *Vowel Reduction in Coratino (South Italy): Phonological and Phonetic Perspectives.* *Phonetica, International Journal of Phonetic Science.* https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326668470_Vowel_Reduction_in_Coratino_South_Italy_Phonological_and_Phonetic_Perspectives
15. Calabrese, G. et al. (2023). *Gender diversity in the workplaces: Regulatory framework, public policies, and a possible future scenario.* *Corporate Governance and Organizational Behavior Review*, 7(3), 27–41. <https://doi.org/10.22495/cgobrv7i3p3>
16. Campana, A. (2025, May 3). *Molestie di gruppo al concertone.* Studio Aperto del 3 maggio 2025. Mediaset Infinity. https://mediasetinfinity.mediaset.it/video/studioaperto/molestie-di-gruppo-al-concertone_F313662501245C01
17. Campanella, M. (2024, August 23). *L'Unione Europea finanzia un programma per insegnare ai ragazzini a fare le drag queen. Programma rivolto a minorenni di età compresa tra i 14 ei 17 anni.* *Secolo d'Italia.* <https://www.secoloditalia.it/2024/08/lunione-europea-finanzia-un-programma-per-insegnare-ai-ragazzini-a-fare-le-drag-queen/>
18. Campo, M. (2024, March 25). *Patriarcato. Cos'è, le origini e l'impatto che ha ancora sulla società.* Mariangela Campo. <https://www.mariangelacampo.it/2024/03/patriarcato-cosa-e-origini-impatto-oggi/>
19. Canaletti, R. (2022, October 25). *Meloni è "il presidente" (e non la presidente). Care femministe, è il successo del linguaggio gender fluid.* *MOW.* <https://mowmag.com/attualita/meloni-e-il-presidente-e-non-presidentessa-care-femministe-e-il-successo-del-linguaggio-gender-fluid>
20. Canepa, C. (2024, April 12). *La Rai sta diventando davvero il "megafono" del governo?* *Pagella politica.* <https://pagellapolitica.it/articoli/rai-elezioni-europee-par-condicio-governo-meloni>
21. Canonico, N. (2025, February 12). *Francamente, la polemica sull'Inno di Mameli: «Non è inclusivo». Fratelli d'Italia ritenuto poco rappresentativo di tutte le identità di genere.* *Io Donna.* <https://www.iodonna.it/video-iodonna/spettacoli-video/francamente-la-polemica-sullinno-di-mameli-non-e-inclusivo/>
22. Capezzone, D. (2025, May 18). *Sinistra, i compagni non accettano il diritto di parola. In Italia la libertà di parola è sempre più sistematicamente in pericolo.* *Libero quotidiano.* <https://www.liberoquotidiano.it/news/politica/42663385/sinistra-compagni-non-accettano-diritto-di-parola/>
23. Capocci, A. (2025, May 15). *Vaccini e segreti, la Corte Ue sanziona von der Leyen.* *Il Manifesto.* <https://ilmanifesto.it/vaccini-e-segreti-la-corte-ue-sanziona-von-der-leyen>
24. Carboni, S. (2025, January 21). *"La Famiglia - The Great Mafia War", il gioco da tavolo che fa arrabbiare i politici siciliani.* *Open.* <https://www.open.online/2025/01/21/la-famiglia-the-great-mafia-war-gioco-da-tavolo-polemiche/>
25. Carioti, F. (2025, May 2). *Decidono i genitori se i figli possono seguire le lezioni di sesso a scuola. Ma la sinistra non ci sta. Il consenso obbligatorio scatena l'opposizione. Per il Pd lo Stato non deve chiedere il permesso alle famiglie. Putiferio scontato.* *Libero quotidiano.* https://www.liberoquotidiano.it/news/politica/42469007/lezioni_sesso_scuola_decidono_genitori_sinistra_non_ci_sta/
26. Carloni, S. (2024, August 16). *Addio alla casalinga di Voghera. Scompare Paola Zanin Concati. Aveva 76 anni e aveva fondato l'associazione che si proponeva di contrastare lo stereotipo della casalinga ignorante. Dubbia l'origine dell'espressione che rappresenta un parametro per la comprensione della comunicazione in generale.* *AGI.* <https://www.agi.it/cronaca/news/2024-08-16/morta-a-76-anni-casalinga-di-voghera-27509845/>
27. Carta, G. (2025, March 8). *Reato di femminicidio: il nulla che avanza. Chi ha davvero vinto?* *Nicola Porro.* <https://www.nicolaporro.it/reato-di-femminicidio-il-nulla-che-avanza/>
28. Casalini, B. (2024). *La centralità della questione 'trans' per il femminismo/ The centrality of the 'trans' issue for feminism.* *Gender. International Journal of Gender Studies.* 13(25), 74-101. *Articoli Tematici.* <https://flore.unifi.it/bitstream/2158/1336351/4/5.%2BAG%2B1-2024%2BAT%2BCasalini%20%281%29.pdf>

29. Chiari, E. (2024, April 4). *All'Università di Trento si scrive un regolamento declinato tutto al femminile, in polemica con la regola linguistica del "maschile non marcato". Ma che cos'è esattamente? Davvero discrimina le donne? Che ne dice la Crusca?* Famiglia Cristiana. <https://www.famigliacristiana.it/articolo/regolamento-universita-di-trento-che-cos-e-il-maschile-sovraesteso-o-non-marcato-perche-fa-discutere.aspx>
30. Corrado, P. (2025, May 1). *Il cardinale Müller sul nuovo Papa: "No a un altro Bergoglio, non si faccia strumentalizzare dalle lobby gay". Gerhard Ludwig Müller, 77 anni, teologo.* Secolo d'Italia. <https://www.secoloditalia.it/2025/05/il-cardinale-muller-sul-nuovo-papa-no-a-un-altro-bergoglio-non-si-faccia-strumentalizzare-dalle-lobby-gay/>
31. Costabile, I. (2023, July 20). *Patrizia Mirigliani: "Transgender vorrebbero partecipare a Miss Italia?"* Fan page. <https://www.fanpage.it/spettacolo/personaggi/patrizia-mirigliani-transgender-vorrebbero-partecipare-a-miss-italia-non-cambiero-il-regolamento/>
32. Cruciani, G. (2024, July 2). *Via Crux. Contro il politicamente corretto.* Editor: Cairo. ISBN: 8830904007. <https://www.abebbooks.com/9788830904002/Crux-Contro-politicamente-corretto-Cruciani-8830904007/plp>
33. Cuomo, A. (2025, May 18). *L'Europa alla prova del sovranista di destra. In Polonia e in Portogallo può essere decisivo. La giornata di oggi, il 18 maggio 2025, potrebbe spingere ancora più a destra (e ad allontanare ancora da Bruxelles) l'Europa* Il Giornale. <https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/leuropa-prova-sovranista-destra-polonia-e-portogallo-pu-2480712.html>
34. Dalri, F. (2021, March 5). *Alexandra Geese: "Prendiamoci la metà del potere che ci spetta". L'eurodeputata Alexandra Geese è la promotrice di Half of it, la campagna che chiede che la metà dei fondi del Recovery plan sia investito per le donne.* Lavalibera. https://lavalibera.it/it-schede-500-alexandra_geese_half_of_it_giusto_mezzo
35. Dartford, K. (2023, November 2). *La France se rapproche de l'interdiction de l'écriture inclusive.* Euro News. <https://fr.euronews.com/culture/2023/11/02/la-france-se-rapproche-de-linterdiction-de-lecriture-inclusive>
36. D'Ascenzo, M. (2025, March 6). *Mai così tante donne al potere anche in Italia: il cambiamento arrivi da loro.* Il Sole 24 ore. <https://www.ilssole24ore.com/art/mai-cosi-tante-donne-potere-anche-italia-cambiamento-arrivi-loro-AGD6VHLD>
37. Deist, J. (2022). *Evolution or Corruption?: The Imposition of Political Language in the West Today.* Mises Institute. <https://mises.org/austrian/evolution-or-corruption-imposition-political-language-west-today>
38. Del Papa, M. (2024, January 14). *Delirio in rosa: guerra al preservativo "eterocisnormato" e "fallocentrico".* Nicola Porro. <https://www.nicolaporro.it/delirio-in-rosa-guerra-al-preservativo-eterocisnormato-e-fallocentrico/>
39. De Perini, P. (2024, January 1). *Consiglio d'Europa. Commissario per i Diritti Umani.* Centro di Ateneo Antonio Papisca. <https://unipd-centrodirittiumani.it/it/temi/commissario-per-i-diritti-umani-1>
40. De Rosa, G. (2022, October 7). *Piano per i diritti Lgbt+: l'eredità di Draghi a Meloni. L'ultimo atto del governo Draghi sarà la strategia nazionale per i diritti Lgbtq+.* News Mondo. <https://newsmondo.it/strategia-draghi-diritti-lgbt/politica/>
41. De Simone, M. (2024, February 18). *Alla Bocconi il caso politico dei bagni per i trans. Si tratta di servizi "gender neutral".* Zona Bianca, puntata del 18 febbraio 2024 su Retequattro. https://mediasetinfinity.mediaset.it/video/zonabianca/alla-bocconi-il-caso-politico-dei-bagni-per-i-trans_F313091201007C09
42. De Stradis, M. & Caporusso, B. (2025, January 13). *Tutti i capitoli LGBTQIA+.* Rapporto sullo stato dei diritti in Italia. <https://www.rapportodiritti.it/lgbtqi>
43. Di Bari, A. (2025, May 11). *L'operazione "Nero indelebile"? Roba da pistaroli. Quella di Meloni & co è tutta un'altra storia. La ricostruzione delle radici di FdI da parte di Mirella Serri.* Secolo d'Italia. <https://www.secoloditalia.it/2025/05/loperazione-nero-indelebile-roba-da-pistaroli-quella-di-meloni-co-e-tutta-unaltra-storia/>
44. Dindo, P. (2023, February 22). *Fatti Nostri. Il Padreterno diventerà gender fluid.* Corriere del Ticino. <https://www.cdt.ch/opinioni/commenti/il-padreterno-diventera-gender-fluid-308818>

45. Di Salvatore, E. (2023, August 18). *Vannacci, razzismo e sessismo e la banalità della libertà*. Libertà & Giustizia. <https://www.libertaegiustizia.it/2023/08/18/vannacci-razzismo-e-sessismo-e-la-banalita-della-liberta/>
46. Donzelli, G. (2025, May 14). *Dividere Europa e Stati Uniti è una follia. L'occidente va tenuto unito. L'Italia ed il Presidente del Consiglio Meloni sono impegnati in una mediazione in tal senso*. Porta a porta, programma serale su Rai uno condotto da Bruno Vespa. <https://www.raiplay.it/video/2025/05/Porta-a-Porta---Puntata-del-14052025-9208bb52-a81c-404d-9536-e410c2c6e104.html>
47. Feltri, V. (2025, April 9). *La madre degenerare di Mark Samson*. Il Giornale. <https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronaca-nera/madre-degenere-mark-samson-2463704.html>
48. Feltri, V. (2025, April 22). *Quel dito puntato. "Io la conosco. Abbiamo molti pensieri in comune"*. Il Giornale. <https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/dito-puntato-io-conosco-abbiamo-molti-pensieri-comune-2469139.html>
49. Fiori, D. (2025, February 6). *Trump vieta alle donne trans di competere negli sport femminili*. Il Fatto quotidiano. <https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2025/02/06/donald-trump-ordine-esecutivo-atlete-transgender-sport-femminile-notizie-oggi-caso-khelif-perche-non-centra-nulla/7866648/>
50. Fittipaldi, E. (2025, May 15). *I tanti problemi che il nuovo Papa dovrà affrontare: dalle casse vuote alla pedofilia*. Piazza Pulita. <https://www.la7.it/piazzapulita/rivedila7/piazzapulita-16-05-2025-596434>
51. Friedrich, M. et al. (2024). *Does the gender asterisk ("Gendersternchen") as a special form of gender-fair language impair comprehensibility?* Discourse Processes, 61(9), 439–461. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163853X.2024.2362027>
52. Frosina, P. (2025, April 9). *La Cassazione boccia il decreto Salvini: no a "padre" e "madre" sulla carta d'identità del figlio di due donne*. Il Fatto quotidiano. <https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2025/04/09/cassazione-boccia-decreto-salvini-padre-madre-carta-identita/7945913/>
53. Galati, A. (2022, October 8). *Cos'è la "strategia LGBTQIA" contro le discriminazioni in Italia, e tutto quello che significa*. Marie Claire. <https://www.marieclaire.it/attualita/news-appuntamenti/a41559761/strategia-lgbtq-governo-draghi/>
54. Galici, F. (2025, May 2). *"Vai via lurida tr..."*. Antagonisti e migranti aggrediscono giornalista nel palazzo occupato. Il Giornale. <https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/nazionale/vai-lurida-tr-antagonisti-e-migranti-aggrediscono-2473466.html>
55. Gallo, G. (2025, January 22). *Donald Trump e il decreto contro le persone transgender e non-binary. Donald Trump specifica di voler «difendere le donne dall'ideologia gender estremista, ristorando la verità biologica nel governo federale»*. Cosmopolitan. <https://www.cosmopolitan.com/it/lifecoach/news-attualita/a63492942/donald-trump-decreto-contro-persone-transgender/>
56. Gaudiosi, F. (2021). *La Risoluzione del Parlamento europeo sui diritti LGBTIQ e la sua rilevanza a livello internazionale*. University of Campania "Luigi Vanvitelli". https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351071357_La_Risoluzione_del_Parlamento_europeo_sui_diritti_LGBTIQ_e_la_sua_rilevanza_a_livello_internazionale
57. Garau, F. (2024, March 19). *Il consigliere Finocchio deve cambiare cognome. La censura di Facebook colpisce ancora*. Il Giornale. <https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronaca-locale/finocchio-facebook-cognome-offensivo-consigliere-costretto-2298779.html>
58. Gianni, M. (2024, August 2). *Caso Carini, Rampini su La7: "La lobby transgender è cattivissima e potentissima"*. TG La7. <https://tg.la7.it/esteri/caso-carini-olimpiadi-federico-rampini-video-02-08-2024-219152>
59. Giannoli, V. (2025, March 21). *Scuola, Valditara contro asterischi e schwa: "Nelle comunicazioni serve rispetto per l'italiano". L'uso di segni grafici non conformi rischia di compromettere la chiarezza e l'uniformità della comunicazione istituzionale*. La Repubblica. https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2025/03/21/news/asterisco_schwa_scuola_valditara-424077648/
60. Guarino, D. (2025, April 11). *Pontedera, polemica per bagni "neutri" a ISIS Marconi. Per Susanna Ceccardi è l'ennesima forzatura ideologica imposta da una sinistra che vuole distruggere l'identità sessuale, cancellando la biologia e il buon senso*. Controradio. <https://www.controradio.it/pontedera-polemica-per-bagni-neutri-a-isis-marconi/>

61. Guerra, E. (2022, October 7). *Lgbt, il blitz del governo: approva la strategia «vincolante» per i prossimi anni. FdI: «Grave e scorretto». Una mossa che ha suscitato forti critiche da parte di FdI.* Secolo d'Italia. <https://www.secoloditalia.it/2022/10/lgbt-il-blitz-dellultimo-cdm-approvata-la-strategia-vincolante-per-i-prossimi-anni-fdi-atto-grave-e-scorretto/>
62. Guzzo, G. (2025, April 26). *Dall'Unione Europea una montagna di soldi all'Agenda Lgbt.* Pro Vita & Famiglia. <https://www.provitaefamiglia.it/blog/dallunione-europea-una-montagna-di-soldi-allagenda-lgbt>
63. Izzo, F. (2021, June 24). *Ddl Zan. Ma con l'identità di genere si vuole annullare la donna.* Avvenire. <https://www.avvenire.it/opinioni/pagine/ma-con-lidentit-di-genere-si-vuole-annullare-la-donna>
64. Latorraca, C. (2025, April 30). *Perché l'Eurovision 2025 vieta le bandiere LGBTQIA+ agli artisti.* Luce. <https://luce.lanazione.it/attualita/eurovision-2025-lgbtq-palestina-e32ded19>
65. Lodige, F. (2025, May 8). *Conservatore o progressista? Chi è il nuovo Papa Prevost. L'americano ha scelto il nome di Leone XIV.* Nicola Porro. <https://www.nicolaporro.it/conservatore-o-progressista-chi-e-il-nuovo-papa-prevost/>
66. Maggi, A. (2025, March 24). *Politica. Mattarella loda l'Ue, Vannacci la demolisce: "Inutile, anzi dannosa. Ci ha truffato con i vaccini e con il Green Deal".* Affari italiani. <https://www.affaritaliani.it/politica/mattarella-vannacci-unione-europea-962098.html?ref=ig>
67. Magnani, N. (2024, September 13). *"Dragtivism", campus drag queen per minori con soldi Ue/ "Fondi pubblici per diffondere ideologia gender". Il progetto finanziato con i soldi della Ue.* Il Sussidiario. <https://www.ilsussidiario.net/news/dragtivism-campus-drag-queen-per-minori-con-soldi-ue-fondi-pubblici-per-diffondere-ideologia-gender/2749861/>
68. Marchi, R. (2024, May 7). *Linguaggio inclusivo: perché è importante, esempi e definizione.* Linguaggi umani. <https://robertamarchi.com/linguaggio-inclusivo-perche-e-importante-esempi-e-definizione/>
69. Marcomin, F. (2024, January 2024). *I semafori dell'amore.* Milano Città Stato. <https://www.milanocittastato.it/citta-del-mondo/i-semafori-dellamore-li-portiamo-a-milano/>
70. Markowski, R. et al., (2024). *The Eurodisappointed: On the disenchantment with the EU's limited response to democratic backsliding.* Vol. 25, Issue 2. SAGE JOURNALS. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116523121889>
71. Mascheroni, L. (2025, February 25). *Lesbo a titoli alterni. Rivendichiamo il diritto di usare il termine «lesbica», eccome; e non lo consideriamo certo un insulto. Insomma, siamo alle solite.* Il Giornale. <https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica-internazionale/lesbo-titoli-alterni-2443045.html>
72. Masserelli, B. (2025, May 6). *Adozioni internazionali anche per i single: una svolta storica. La sentenza della Corte Costituzionale non è solo una decisione giuridica, ma un'occasione per ripensare il concetto di genitorialità e ridefinire i ruoli di genere in famiglia.* Altalex. <https://www.altalex.com/documents/news/2025/05/06/adozioni-internazionali-single-svolta-storica>
73. Maurelli, L. (2025, April 24). *Schlein arruola il Papa da morto ma l'ipocrita è lei. Nel 2024 lo attaccava al Gay Pride.* Il Secolo d'Italia. <https://www.secoloditalia.it/2025/04/schlein-arruola-il-papa-da-morto-ma-lipocrita-e-lei-nel-2024-lo-attaccava-al-gay-pride-sbaglia-ed-e-irrispettoso/>
74. Meo, L. (2025, May 9). *Da Formigli a Bonelli: è già scattata la falsa narrazione sul Papa Che Guevara e anti-Trump.* Secolo d'Italia. <https://www.secoloditalia.it/2025/05/da-formigli-a-bonelli-e-gia-scattata-la-falsa-narrazione-sul-papa-che-guevara-anti-trump-e-anti-destra/>
75. Meotti, G. (2023, November 2). *Gender. Il sesso degli angeli e l'oblio dell'occidente.* Editor: Liberi Libri. ISBN: 9791280447296. <https://www.liberilibri.it/catalogo/gender/>
76. Merlo, A. (2024, September 5). *L'Europa illiberale contemporanea, una distopia che nemmeno George Orwell ha osato immaginare.* Vox Europa. <https://voxeurop.eu/it/orwell-illiberale-europa-distopia/>
77. Montesano, T. (2025, May 4). *Concertone, la sinistra non condanna gli abusi. Anzi: "La destra fa schifo". Non una parola sugli aggressori, né tantomeno sulla loro origine nordafricana.* Libero quotidiano. <https://www.liberoquotidiano.it/news/politica/42489946/concertone-sinistra-non-condanna-abusi-destra-fa-schifo/>
78. Moretti, G. (2024, December 13). *Calcio, "rainbow washing" e libertà di pensiero. Il sottile equilibrio tra sensibilizzazione, forzature e rainbow washing.* Sportellate. <https://www.sportellate.it/2024/12/13/rainbow-laces-lgbt-premier-polemiche/>

79. Moro, E. (2024, February 23). *Il bacio gay di Alessandro Magno su Netflix ha riaperto il dibattito sulla verità storica*. Elle. <https://www.elle.com/it/showbiz/tv/a46920452/bacio-gay-alessandro-magno-su-netflix/>
80. Muzzolon, A. (2025, May 14). *Libertà di stampa, se solo ai progressisti è concesso parlarne. Al convegno sull'informazione in Italia, bandite le voci sgradite come Cerno*. Libero quotidiano. <https://www.liberoquotidiano.it/news/europa/42612100/liberta-stampa-solo-progressisti-concesso-parlarne/>
81. Nuzzi, G. (2027, May 7). *Il progressismo di Bergoglio, una vera e propria icona del mondo LGBTQIA+ e di quello politico progressista di sinistra*. Programma televisivo Fuori dal Coro su Retequattro. https://mediasetinfinity.mediaset.it/video/fuoridalcoro/puntata-del-7-maggio_F313480901003301
82. Pagliarini, S. (2024, April 1). *Cos'è questa storia che l'Università ha riscritto il regolamento col femminile sovraesteso*. Trento Today. <https://www.trentotoday.it/cronaca/regolamento-universita-femminile-sovraesteso.html>
83. Passatore, EA. (2024, March 8). *Il cammino verso i diritti dell'identità di genere e orientamento sessuale*. L'Indipendente. <https://www.lindipendente.online/2024/03/08/il-cammino-verso-i-diritti-dellidentita-di-genere-e-orientamento-sessuale/>
84. Patricelli, M. (2025, May 13). *I Talebani cancellano anche gli scacchi*. Libero quotidiano. <https://www.liberoquotidiano.it/news/esteri/42595841/talebani-cancellano-anche-scacchi/>
85. Pecchioli, R. (2022, February 5). *José Ortega y Gasset, l'opera e le idee*. Nuovo Giornale Nazionale. <https://nuovogiornalenazionale.com/index.php/italia/larticolo-del-sabato/5393-jose-ortega-y-gasset-l-opera-e-le-idee.html>
86. Perdicchi, R. (2025, March 19). *Festa del Papà, gli auguri della Meloni a "chi culla i neonati, assiste la famiglia e la veglia dal cielo"*. Secolo d'Italia. <https://www.secoloditalia.it/2025/03/festa-del-papa-gli-auguri-della-meloni-a-chi-culla-i-neonati-assiste-la-famiglia-e-la-veglia-dal-cielo/>
87. Pinto, F. (2025, March 8). *Italia, il governo Meloni introduce il reato di femminicidio: approvato il disegno di legge*. Euro News. <https://it.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/03/08/italia-il-governo-meloni-introduce-il-reato-di-femminicidio-approvato-il-disegno-di-legge>
88. Pistone, L. (2023, December 9). *I proverbi riflettono la società e le tradizioni popolari*. Radionoff. <https://www.radionoff.it/i-proverbi-riflettono-la-societa-e-le-tradizioni-popolari/>
89. Piva, P. (2024, April 21). *L'analisi. Ma anche Dio è al di là (trans) dei generi (gender)*. Avvenire. <https://www.avvenire.it/famiglia/pagine/studi-di-genere-aiuto-al-rispetto-delle-differenze>
90. Pizzimenti, C. (2023, December 28). *«La prima aspirazione di una donna è diventare mamma» e tutto quello che non va in questa affermazione. Le parole della senatrice Mennuni su La7*. Vanity Fair. <https://www.vanityfair.it/article/la-prima-aspirazione-di-una-donna>
91. Politi, M. (2025, May 9). *Papa Francesco contestato dai conservatori, anche all'interno della Chiesa cattolica*. Otto e mezzo su La7. <https://www.la7.it/otto-e-mezzo/rivedila7/otto-e-mezzo-09-05-2025-595531>
92. Prandi, M. (2024, March 6). *Cancellare le differenze tra uomo e donna?* Centro Studi Livatino. <https://www.centrostudilivatino.it/cancellare-le-differenze-tra-uomo-e-donna/>
93. Priori, D. (2025, May 19). *Il mondo delle serie tv fa il punto a Rimini e Riccione*. Libero quotidiano. <https://www.liberoquotidiano.it/news/spettacoli/42668598/italian-global-series-festival-mondo-serie-tv-punto-rimini-riccione/>
94. Ravasio, MM. (2025, April 23). *Il duo italo danese continua la collaborazione con Minotti e dalla poltrona dello scorso anno sviluppa un versatile sistema. La Repubblica*. https://www.repubblica.it/design/2025/04/23/news/gamfratesi_vivienne_mette_su_famiglia-424143932/
95. Ricolfi, L. (2024, October 30). *La sinistra scorda gli operai e abbraccia il sesso perverso. Al posto degli operai e delle donne sono subentrati gli immigrati e le minoranze sessuali*. Il Giornale. <https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronache/sinistra-scorda-operai-e-abbraccia-sesso-perverso-2388296.html>
96. Romano, A. (2025, January 16). *Cos'è il Taharrush gamea degli stupri di Capodanno in piazza Duomo a Milano. Quello che è accaduto in piazza Duomo a Capodanno è un caso di taharrush gamea*. Open. <https://www.open.online/2025/01/16/taharrush-gamea-stupri-capodanno-duomo-milano/>

97. Romito, A. & Szczerba, A. (2023). *Chapter 5 Public Goods at Risk: The Crisis of the Rule of Law in the European Union in Light of the Violation of the Fundamental Rights of LGBT Persons*. BRILL. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004687264_007
98. Rossi, LS. & Tovo, C. (2023). *Il principio del primato del diritto dell'Unione Europea, pp. 97-109*. Europa tra presente e futuro. Alma Mater Studiorum, Università di Bologna. <https://cris.unibo.it/handle/11585/955403>
99. Sallusti, G. (2024, January 24). *Mi mancano i vecchi comunisti. Confessione inaudita di un libertario*. Editor: Liberi Libri. ISBN: 979-1280447319. <https://www.lafeltrinelli.it/mi-mancano-vecchi-comunisti-confessione-libro-giovanni-sallusti/e/9791280447319>
100. Santini, C. (2023, July 31). *All'origine del sesso e del genere*. Filosofemme. <https://www.filosofemme.it/2023/07/31/allorigine-del-sesso-e-del-genere/>
101. Serri, M. (2025, April 15). *Nero indelebile. Le radici oscure della nuova destra italiana*. Editor: Longanesi. ISBN: 8830462128. <https://www.libreriauniversitaria.it/nero-indelebile-radici-oscure-nuova/libro/9788830462120>
102. Schimizzi, I. (2025, April 7). *European Court of Auditors. Over €7bn granted to NGOs without any real transparency: report*. Delano. <https://delano.lu/article/over-eu7bn-granted-to-ngos-without-any-real-transparency-report>
103. Solimani, S. (2024, November 15). *Diritti delle persone LGBT+: cosa dice il rapporto ECRI sull'Italia*. Scienza e pace. <https://magazine.cisp.unipi.it/diritti-persone-lgbt-cosa-dice-rapporto-ecri-italia/>
104. Stella, V. (2024, November 9). «Primato del diritto italiano su quello Ue? Inutile propaganda». Il Dubbio. <https://www.ildubbio.news/interviste/primato-del-diritto-italiano-su-quello-ue-inutile-propaganda-td7kxrql>
105. Teodori, F. (2024, December 25). *Il più bel regalo è essere censurati*. Nicola Porro. <https://www.nicolaporro.it/il-piu-bel-regalo-e-essere-censurati/>
106. Terribili, M. (2023, February 10). *Lo studio della popolazione LGBT+ in Italia e nel mondo. La statistica al servizio della lotta alla discriminazione*. Neodemos. Popolazione, Società, Politiche. <https://www.neodemos.info/2023/02/10/lo-studio-della-popolazione-lgbt-in-italia-e-nel-mondo-la-statistica-al-servizio-della-lotta-alla-discriminazione/>
107. Ticozzi, M. (2025, April 25). *Il referendum sulla cittadinanza: cos'è e cosa prevede?* Avvocato Marco Ticozzi. <https://www.avvocatoticozzi.it/it/blog/384/il-referendum-sulla-cittadinanza-cosrsquo-e-cosa-prevede>
108. Tripodi, R. (2024, November 19). *La disfatta dei vip radical chic e del politically correct, la vittoria dei cittadini-spazzatura*. Pensieri divergenti. <https://www.lucidamente.com/la-disfatta-dei-vip-radical-chic-e-del-politically-correct-la-vittoria-dei-cittadini-spazzatura/>
109. Tumino, M. & Valmori, A. (2024, March 22). *Partiamo dalle basi: gli stereotipi di genere e le loro implicazioni*. Università di Padova. <https://ilbolive.unipd.it/it/news/scienza-ricerca/partiamo-dalle-basi-stereotipi-genere-loro>
110. Veneziani, M. (2025, February 17). *Ma in Europa non è a rischio solo la libertà di parola. Una minaccia che non proviene dall'esterno, ma al nostro stesso interno*. Marcello Veneziani. <https://www.marcelloveneziani.com/articoli/ma-in-europa-non-e-a-rischio-solo-la-liberta-di-parola/>
111. Visconti, A. (2023, June 28). *Oltre la "logica binaria" . . . L'identità di genere tra vecchie e nuove prospettive*. Federalismi. Alma Mater Studiorum, Università di Bologna. <https://cris.unibo.it/retrieve/0f65804c-ea87-4f12-aece-b3a6f5b235a4/federalismi%2015-2023.pdf>
112. Vivaldelli, R. (2021, March 12). *Il parlamento europeo dichiara l'Ue "zona di libertà Lgbtiq"*. Il Giornale. <https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/parlamento-europeo-dichiara-lue-zona-libert-lgbtiq-1930577.html>
113. Yin, R. (2018). *Case Study Research and Applications: Design and Methods*. Sage Publications. ISBN: 978-1506336169. <https://www.akademika.no/studieteknikk/metode/case-study-research-and-applications/9781506336169>
114. Zanellato, W. (2025, May 3). *Il prof Montanari ora insulta gli elettori: "Meloni parla ai sudditi"*. Il Giornale. <https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/interni/ora-prof-montanari-insulta-elettori-meloni-parla-ai-sudditi-2473821.html>