



AI and Evidence in Nigerian Courts: Can You Still Believe What You See and Hear?

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ABSTRACT

A courtroom is, at its core, a place where a story is tested against proof. For most of legal history, the proof spoke for itself. A document was a document. A photograph was a photograph. A recording was a recording. Artificial intelligence has quietly dissolved that certainty. A Judge in Lagos or Abuja can now be handed a video, an audio clip or a document that looks entirely authentic and is, in fact, a fabrication produced by a machine. This article examines whether the Evidence Act 2011, as amended in 2023, is equipped to handle that possibility. It traces the statutory journey from the Supreme Court's early recognition of computer-generated records in *Esso West Africa Inc v Oyegbola*, through section 84 of the Evidence Act, to the newer sections 84A to 84D introduced by the Evidence (Amendment) Act 2023. It then tests that framework against the specific problem of AI-manipulated audio, images, video and documents, and considers the role of expert evidence, the shifting burden of proof, and the particular dangers this problem poses in electoral litigation. The article concludes that Nigeria's evidential architecture, though genuinely progressive for its time, was not built to answer the one question that now matters most: not whether a record was properly kept, but whether the reality it claims to show ever happened at all.

Keywords: Artificial intelligence; Evidence; Deepfakes; Admissibility; Authentication; Nigeria

INTRODUCTION

Picture a Nigerian courtroom. Counsel rises and tenders a video. It shows the opposing party admitting to a fraud, or a defendant confessing to a crime, or a candidate accepting an inducement to withdraw from an election. The video is clear. The voice matches. The face matches. Nothing about it looks wrong. A generation ago, that would have been the end of the inquiry, subject only to the ordinary rules on relevance and the maker's availability for cross-examination. Today, it is only the beginning of the inquiry, because the video may have been produced not by a camera but by a machine that has never seen the person it depicts.

This is not a distant hypothetical. Nigerians have already watched fabricated videos of well-known public figures endorsing investment schemes they never heard of, produced by generative artificial intelligence tools that are now free, fast and difficult to detect with the naked eye.¹ Nigeria's data protection regulator has itself acknowledged the scale of the problem, joining more than sixty counterpart authorities worldwide in February 2026 to warn of the misuse of AI systems that generate realistic but false depictions of identifiable people.² If a machine can convincingly fabricate a public figure endorsing a scam, it can just as easily fabricate a private citizen confessing to a crime, or authorising a transaction, or saying words that will decide a court case.

The law of evidence exists to answer a narrow but essential question. Should the court believe this? For electronic material, Nigeria answers that question chiefly through section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011, as amended in

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¹ M Balogun "GUIDE: Scam trends to watch out for in 2026 and how to stay safe online" <[GUIDE: Scam trends to watch out for in 2026 and how to stay safe online - Africa Check](#)> accessed 18 July 2026.

² "Joint Statement on AI-Generated Imagery and the Protection of Privacy" <[2026-02-23-joint-statement-ai-generated-imagery-61-signatories.pdf](#)> accessed 18 July 2026.



2023. That provision was drafted to solve a specific, well understood problem, distinguishing a genuine computer record from an unreliable one, and guarding against tampering after the fact. It was not drafted with a technology in mind that can generate a video of an event that never occurred, complete with a face, a voice and a plausible setting, without any underlying camera or recording device at all.

This article asks whether that statutory framework can still do its job. It proceeds in six stages. It begins with a short account of how Nigerian evidence law arrived at its current treatment of electronic material. It then examines the architecture of section 84 in detail, before testing that architecture against AI-manipulated audio, images, video and documents specifically. It considers the role of expert evidence and the practical limits of judicial competence when faced with sophisticated fabrication. It examines the troubling possibility that deepfake technology allows genuine evidence to be dismissed as fake, a problem sometimes called the liar's dividend. It closes with a look at electoral litigation, where the stakes of getting this wrong are highest, a brief comparative glance at how other jurisdictions are responding, and a set of proposals for reform.

From Ledgers to Deepfakes: A Short History of Electronic Evidence in Nigeria

Nigerian courts recognised the evidential value of computer records long before Parliament caught up. In the 1969 case of *Esso West Africa Inc v Oyegbola*, the Supreme Court accepted that modern business record keeping, including mechanical and electronic reproduction, could not be ignored simply because the applicable statute had been drafted with paper ledgers in mind.³ The Court's reasoning was, in essence, an instruction to future lawmakers. The law had to keep pace with the tools that businesses and citizens actually used to create and store information.

It took more than four decades for that instruction to be answered comprehensively. The Evidence Act 2011 introduced section 84, the first dedicated statutory provision governing the admissibility of a statement contained in a document produced by a computer.⁴ A further significant step followed in 2023. President Bola Ahmed Tinubu signed the Evidence (Amendment) Act 2023 into law on 12 June 2023, inserting new sections 84A to 84D into the principal Act and expanding the statutory definition of an electronic record to include data, images and sound stored, received or transmitted electronically.⁵ Section 84A now provides that a legal requirement for information to be in writing or printed form is satisfied where the information is available in electronic form and remains accessible for future reference.⁶ The amendment also introduced provisions on digital signatures and electronic oath taking, bringing Nigerian evidence law closer to prevailing international practice.

These are genuine advances. They reflect a legislature and a judiciary willing to treat electronic material as a normal, rather than exceptional, category of evidence. What neither the 1969 judgment, nor the 2011 Act, nor the 2023 amendment anticipated was a technology capable of generating a record of an event that never took place. *Esso v Oyegbola* assumed that a computer was faithfully reproducing information that a human being had fed into it. Section 84 assumes the same thing. Generative artificial intelligence breaks that assumption entirely.

The Architecture of Section 84: Conditions and Certificates

Section 84(1) provides that a statement in a document produced by a computer is admissible as evidence of any fact of which direct oral evidence would be admissible, provided the conditions in section 84(2) are met. Those conditions require the party tendering the document to show that the computer was regularly used to store or process information for the relevant activities, that information of the relevant kind was regularly supplied to the computer in the ordinary course of those activities, that the computer was operating properly throughout the material period, and that the information contained in the statement reproduces or is derived from information supplied to the computer in the ordinary course of those activities.⁷ These four conditions can be established

³*Esso West Africa Inc v T Oyegbola* (1969) 1 NMLR 194.

⁴Evidence Act 2011, s 84(1) and (2).

⁵Evidence (Amendment) Act 2023, inserting ss 84A to 84D into the Evidence Act 2011; OM Atoyebi "An Overview of the Evidence (Amendment) Act 2023" [AN OVERVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE \(AMENDMENT\) ACT, 2023 | Omaplex Law Firm](#) accessed 18 July 2026.

⁶Evidence Act 2011, s 84A, as inserted by the Evidence (Amendment) Act 2023.

⁷Evidence Act 2011, s 84(2)(a) to (d).



either through oral evidence laid as a foundation, or through a certificate of compliance under section 84(4), identifying the document and describing the manner of its production.⁸

The Supreme Court settled an important procedural question in *Kubor v Dickson*, holding that a party who wishes to rely on an electronically generated document must do more than simply hand it up from the bar. Sufficient proof, satisfying the conditions in section 84(2), must first be adduced, whether by oral testimony or by certificate.⁹ The Court of Appeal has since narrowed the practical reach of the certificate requirement. In *Stanbic IBTC Bank v LongTerm Global Capital Ltd*, the court held that a party who does not possess or control the device from which a document was produced cannot be compelled to tender a section 84(4) certificate to authenticate it.¹⁰ Together, these decisions show a judiciary attentive to the mechanics of authentication, but focused, understandably, on the question of whether a document was properly produced from a real underlying source, not on whether that source itself depicted something genuine.

It is worth pausing on what section 84 was designed to catch and what it was designed to exclude. The provision exists to filter out hearsay dressed up as a computer printout, and to prevent a party from tendering a document that has been altered after its creation without anyone being able to test how. Both purposes assume a linear, traceable chain: an event occurs, a device records or processes information about that event, and a document results. Every safeguard in section 84 is built around securing the integrity of that chain. None of it asks whether the first link, the event itself, ever existed.

When The Computer Lies: AI-Manipulated Audio, Images, Video and Documents

Generative artificial intelligence does not fit comfortably inside the assumptions described above, and recent Nigerian legal commentary has begun to say so plainly.¹¹ Section 258(1) of the Evidence Act defines a computer broadly, as any device used for storing and processing information, and some commentators argue this definition is wide enough to bring AI systems within section 84's reach.¹² That may be correct as a matter of statutory language. It is less clearly correct as a matter of statutory purpose, because the four conditions in section 84(2) were written for a very different kind of machine.

Consider each condition against a generative AI system. The first condition asks whether the computer was regularly used, in the ordinary course of activities, to process the relevant kind of information. A large language model or an image generator is not typically used as part of a regular, identifiable business process in the way a bank's transaction server is. The second and fourth conditions ask whether the output reproduces or is derived from information supplied to the computer in the ordinary course of those activities. Generative AI output is not a reproduction of supplied information at all. It is a statistically generated composition, drawn from patterns learned across a vast and usually undisclosed training dataset, that may bear no traceable relationship to any specific input a party can point to.¹³

The third condition, that the computer was operating properly throughout, is perhaps the most difficult of all to apply. Generative AI models are frequently described, even by their own developers, as black boxes, since the exact reasoning behind a particular output usually cannot be fully explained even by the engineers who built the system.¹⁴ These models are also known to hallucinate, producing convincing but entirely fabricated content with no signal to the user that anything is amiss. Asking whether such a system was operating properly is a different exercise from asking whether a bank's transaction server logged a payment correctly. There is no equivalent baseline of proper operation against which a deepfake generator's output can be measured, because producing a

⁸Evidence Act 2011, s 84(4).

⁹*Kubor v Dickson* (2013) 4 NWLR (Pt 1345) 534 (SC).

¹⁰*Stanbic IBTC Bank v LongTerm Global Capital Ltd & Ors* (2021) LPELR-55610 (CA).

¹¹O Ikuforiji and M Adeboye "Justice In The Age Of Artificial Intelligence: Is Nigeria's Evidence Act Adequate For AI-Generated Evidence?" <[Justice In The Age Of Artificial Intelligence: Is Nigeria's Evidence Act Adequate For AI-Generated Evidence? - Court Procedure - Nigeria](#)> accessed 19 July 2026.

¹²Evidence Act 2011, s 258(1).

¹³O Ikuforiji and M Adeboye (n 11).

¹⁴*Ibid.*



convincing fabrication is not a malfunction of the system. For many such tools, it is the system working exactly as designed.

The practical consequence is unsettling. A sophisticated fabricated video, image, audio clip or document can, on its face, satisfy every formal requirement of section 84. It can be stored regularly, retrieved properly, and accompanied by a technically accurate certificate describing how the file was produced and preserved. None of that says anything about whether the underlying scene it depicts is real. A certificate under section 84(4) authenticates a file. It was never designed to authenticate the truth of what that file shows, and courts applying it to AI-generated material risk mistaking the one for the other.

It is useful to separate the four categories of AI-manipulated material by the distinct evidential problem each one poses, since courts often encounter them differently. Fabricated audio, voice cloning drawn from a short genuine sample, tends to surface in disputes involving alleged confessions, threats, or instructions to make a payment. It is often tendered without any accompanying video, which removes one obvious layer of cross-checking and places heavy weight on forensic voice analysis that few Nigerian litigants can currently afford. Fabricated still images, by contrast, are frequently tendered in defamation, matrimonial and employment disputes, where a single doctored photograph can carry disproportionate persuasive force precisely because still images have traditionally been treated as close to unimpeachable. Fabricated video, the most resource-intensive category to produce but increasingly the most accessible, combines the risks of both, and is the category most likely to appear in high-stakes criminal and electoral matters. Fabricated documents, meanwhile, raise a slightly different question, since a generative language model can now produce a contract, a letter or a receipt that reads as entirely authentic in style and register, without any of the spelling or formatting irregularities that once served as a rough, informal marker of forgery. Each category will eventually need its own body of forensic practice, and a single undifferentiated approach to admissibility risks treating all four as though they raised the same evidential question, when in truth they do not.

Expert Evidence and The Limits of Judicial Competence

Where a court cannot resolve a question from ordinary knowledge alone, Nigerian evidence law turns to the expert. Section 68 of the Evidence Act 2011 permits the reception of expert opinion where the court must form a view on a point of science, art, foreign law, custom, or the identity of handwriting or fingerprints.¹⁵ A witness qualifies as an expert where their knowledge, training or experience in the relevant field goes beyond that of the ordinary judge, and the Court of Appeal has confirmed that the admissibility of such opinion rests substantially on the trial judge's discretion, subject to the court being satisfied of the witness's genuine qualification and the soundness of the reasons given for the opinion.¹⁶ Formal academic qualification is not, in itself, a precondition. What matters is demonstrated skill and experience in the relevant field.¹⁷

This provision is, in principle, well suited to the deepfake problem. Forensic analysis of a video or audio file, examining compression artefacts, lighting inconsistencies, unnatural blinking patterns, or statistical irregularities in a voice recording, is precisely the kind of specialised knowledge section 68 contemplates. The difficulty is not the legal category. It is capacity. Nigeria has a limited pool of digital forensic experts capable of testifying credibly and surviving cross-examination on the authenticity of AI-generated content, and no formal accreditation regime yet exists for this specific subfield of digital forensics. A litigant who lacks the resources to instruct such an expert, and many litigants do lack those resources, is left with no meaningful way to challenge a fabricated exhibit beyond bare assertion, which courts are entitled to treat with some scepticism absent supporting evidence.

The election context illustrates how demanding this can become even for a comparatively familiar kind of expert evidence. In a dispute concerning statistical analysis of election results, the Supreme Court in *Andrew v INEC* held that a petitioner must call witnesses who were actually present when the underlying entries were made, and who can speak to how those entries arose, rather than relying on someone who merely reviewed documents made

¹⁵Evidence Act 2011, ss 67 and 68.

¹⁶*Bayo Ayadi & Ors v Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited* (2016) LPELR-41599 (CA).

¹⁷*Ibid.*



by others.¹⁸ Statistical or documentary analysis, however skilled, could not substitute for direct knowledge of how the primary record came into being.¹⁹ If Nigerian courts take that same rigour into deepfake disputes, and there is every reason to think they should, then a forensic expert's opinion on whether a video shows signs of AI manipulation may itself need to be supported by a clear, tested methodology, not mere assertion of expertise. Building that evidentiary culture, and the pool of experts capable of sustaining it, will take deliberate institutional investment.

The Liar's Dividend and The Burden of Proof

There is a second, subtler danger, and it may ultimately prove more corrosive than the risk of a fabricated exhibit being wrongly believed. Once judges, lawyers and the public know that deepfakes exist, genuine evidence becomes newly vulnerable to a false denial. A defendant confronted with authentic, damaging video footage of their own conduct can now plausibly claim, whether or not it is true, that the footage is an AI fabrication. Commentators studying this phenomenon internationally call it the liar's dividend, the benefit that accrues to a wrongdoer simply because deepfakes exist, regardless of whether the specific evidence in question is actually fake.²⁰

Nigerian evidence law currently has no settled answer to this problem. Section 84 assumes that once its formal conditions are met, the evidence is properly before the court, leaving weight and credibility to be assessed in the ordinary way. It contains no explicit mechanism for allocating the burden of proof once a party raises a good faith challenge to a piece of electronic evidence on the specific ground that it may be an AI fabrication, as opposed to the more familiar ground that it may have been altered or improperly produced. Should the party tendering the evidence bear the burden of proving it is not a deepfake? Should the party alleging fabrication bear the burden of proving that it is? Or should the court require some threshold showing, comparable to the reliability inquiry that some other jurisdictions are now developing, before either side is put to proof?²¹ Nigerian statute and case law are, for now, silent on all three questions.

This silence is not a small gap. It sits at the exact point where the credibility of the entire justice system is most exposed. A court that admits a fabricated exhibit without adequate scrutiny risks a wrongful outcome built on a lie the machine told. A court that too readily accepts an unsupported claim that genuine evidence is fake risks rewarding the guilty and punishing the honest. Nigerian evidence law needs a considered answer to this question, not the accidental one it currently has by default.

The dynamic plays out differently depending on who holds the resources in a given dispute. A well-funded litigant facing damaging authentic evidence can afford to retain a forensic expert to manufacture reasonable doubt about its authenticity, even where no real doubt exists, simply by pointing to the general possibility of AI fabrication and inviting the court to speculate. A poorly resourced litigant facing a genuinely fabricated exhibit may have no comparable means of mounting a technical challenge at all. The asymmetry cuts against the very people the evidential system is meant to protect, and it is difficult to see how the ordinary rules on the burden of proof, developed for a world in which fabrication required skill, equipment and time that most people did not have, can absorb a world in which fabrication requires none of those things.

Electoral and Political Litigation: A Case Study in Heightened Risk

Nowhere is this problem more acute than in electoral litigation, where digital evidence already plays a decisive role and where the stakes for the country are highest. The Electoral Act contains no provision addressing AI-generated evidence specifically.²² Imagine a party in an election petition tendering a video that appears to show

¹⁸Andrew v INEC (2018) 19 NWLR (Pt 1625) 523; (2018) LPELR-43847 (SC).

¹⁹“Statistical analysis of election results crucial for expert evidence under section 68 of Evidence Act, 2011” <[Statistical analysis of election results crucial for expert evidence under section 68 of Evidence Act, 2011 | The Guardian Nigeria News - Nigeria and World News](#)> accessed 19 July 2026.

²⁰KJ Schiff, DS Schiff and N Bueno "The Liar's Dividend: The Impact of Deepfakes and Fake News on Trust in Political Discourse" <<https://osf.io/download/64d228b4a2be6b59fa314730/>> accessed 19 July 2026.

²¹A Hill “Proposed Rule 707 targets AI-crafted evidence” <[Judicial Panel Advances AI Evidence Rule 707](#)> accessed 19 July 2026.

²²*Ibid.*



electoral officials manipulating result sheets, or an audio recording that appears to capture a candidate offering an inducement to a voter. Under the current framework, the opposing party bears the practical burden of challenging that evidence, with no specialised statutory guidance on how such a challenge should be mounted or assessed, and with the same limited pool of forensic expertise discussed above standing between a fabricated exhibit and a wrongful judicial finding.²³

Nigeria's data protection authority has already connected AI-generated disinformation to electoral risk in general terms, warning that the misuse of personal data and AI-driven falsehoods could undermine confidence in the credibility of the country's forthcoming general election.²⁴ That warning was framed around public trust and political messaging. The evidential dimension is narrower but no less serious. A single well-crafted fabricated video, tendered at the right procedural moment in an election petition with a compressed statutory timeline, could distort the outcome of a case before the truth has any realistic chance of catching up. Electoral litigation, more than most other kinds of dispute, cannot afford to wait for the leisurely development of judicial doctrine on a problem of this kind.

The compressed statutory timelines that govern election petitions in Nigeria make the problem considerably worse than it would be in ordinary civil litigation. A petitioner or respondent facing a deepfake challenge in an ordinary commercial dispute may have months, sometimes years, to instruct forensic experts and build a considered response. An election petition typically must be filed and concluded within a matter of weeks. There is, at present, no fast-track mechanism within Nigeria's judicial or forensic infrastructure for verifying the authenticity of contested digital evidence within that kind of window. A tribunal confronted with a disputed video in the closing days of a petition may have little practical choice but to weigh the evidence as best it can, without the benefit of a proper forensic examination, simply because time has run out. This is not a hypothetical inconvenience. It is a structural vulnerability sitting at the heart of the process by which Nigeria resolves some of its most consequential political disputes.

Comparative Snapshots

Nigeria is not alone in facing this difficulty, though some jurisdictions have moved further and faster. The European Union's AI Act, which entered into force in 2024, imposes transparency obligations on certain AI-generated and manipulated content under its Article 50, requiring in appropriate cases that such content be clearly disclosed and made machine-detectable, with the stated aim of improving traceability and reducing the risk of deception.²⁵ In the United States, dozens of states have enacted legislation addressing deepfakes since 2022, and a federal statute targeting non-consensual intimate deepfake imagery was signed into law in May 2025.²⁶ More directly relevant to the evidential question examined in this article, the United States Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules has been considering a proposed new Federal Rule of Evidence, numbered 707, which would subject machine-generated evidence tendered without an accompanying expert witness to a reliability inquiry analogous to the standard already applied to expert testimony.²⁷ That proposal remained under review as at the time of writing, but its direction of travel is instructive.²⁸

The common thread across these responses is a recognition that AI-generated content is not simply another category of electronic record to be waved through an existing admissibility gate. It requires its own inquiry into

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ I Balogun “AI-powered disinformation could threaten Nigeria’s 2027 elections, NDPC warns” <[AI-powered disinformation could threaten Nigeria’s 2027 elections, NDPC warns - Technology Times | Latest and Breaking Nigeria Tech News](#)> accessed 19 July 2026.

²⁵ “EU AI Act: first regulation on artificial intelligence” <[EU AI Act: first regulation on artificial intelligence | Topics | European Parliament](#)> accessed 19 July 2026.

²⁶ AR Lee and JM Loring “Deepfakes as a service meets state laws governing synthetic media in a fragmented regulatory landscape” <[Deepfakes-as-a-Service Meets State Laws: Governing Synthetic Media in a Fragmented Legal Landscape | Jones Walker LLP](#)> accessed 19 July 2026.

²⁷ JHL Perez-Montes “Daubert in the digital age — Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 707” <[Daubert in the digital age — Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 707 | Reuters](#)> accessed 20 July 2026.

²⁸ *Ibid.*



provenance, transparency and reliability. Nigeria's Evidence Act, admirable as its 2023 modernisation was, has not yet begun that specific inquiry.

Towards Reform

A number of concrete steps would strengthen Nigeria's evidential response to AI-generated content, without requiring the law to reject electronic evidence generally, which would be neither realistic nor desirable.

First, section 84 should be reviewed with AI specifically in mind. This need not mean abandoning the existing framework. It could mean adding a distinct evidentiary track for content alleged, on a preliminary and good faith basis, to be AI-generated or AI-manipulated, one that asks directly about provenance and the method of creation, rather than forcing that inquiry through conditions written for a different kind of machine.

Second, the burden of proof question identified in section six above needs a legislative or, failing that, a considered judicial answer. A workable starting point would place an initial burden on the party raising a good faith challenge to identify a specific, articulable basis for suspecting fabrication, after which the burden would shift to the party relying on the evidence to establish its authenticity through expert or other credible proof. This mirrors the structured approach other jurisdictions are now developing, without requiring wholesale adoption of a foreign rule.²⁹

Third, Nigeria needs a larger and formally recognised pool of digital forensic experts capable of testifying on AI authenticity questions under section 68. This is an institutional investment, not a legislative amendment, and it falls naturally to the National Judicial Council, the Nigerian Bar Association and forensic science bodies working together.

Fourth, judicial training on the practical realities of generative AI, its capabilities and its limitations, would help judges ask the right questions even before an expert is called. A judge who understands, in general terms, how a diffusion model or a voice cloning tool works is better placed to assess an expert's evidence critically, rather than deferring to it entirely or dismissing it out of hand.

Fifth, given the compressed timelines that govern election petitions and other urgent proceedings, consideration should be given to a fast-track forensic verification mechanism for digital evidence in time-sensitive cases, so that the question of authenticity does not become a source of delay that itself defeats justice.

Sixth, public legal education has a quiet but important part to play. Many litigants, and not a few practitioners, still approach a video or an audio recording with the instinctive trust once reserved for a signed paper document. Bar associations, law faculties and continuing legal education providers could usefully build basic AI literacy into their standard offerings, not to turn every lawyer into a forensic technologist, but to ensure that the first, most important safeguard, a healthy and informed scepticism, is present in the room before a case ever reaches the point of needing an expert witness at all.

CONCLUSION

The title of this article asks whether Nigerians can still believe what they see and hear in court. The honest answer is that they can, but only if the law of evidence is allowed to catch up with the technology that now stands between the courtroom and the truth. Nigeria has a genuinely progressive evidential history on this subject. The Supreme Court saw the need for the law to accommodate computer records as early as 1969. Parliament codified that accommodation in 2011 and modernised it again in 2023. Each of those steps answered the question of its own era.

Generative artificial intelligence poses a different question, one that section 84, for all its careful conditions and certificates, was not built to answer. It is no longer enough to ask whether a document was properly produced and has not been tampered with since. Courts must now ask whether the event a document, a recording or an

²⁹ "Federal Judges Set Bar for Deepfake Evidence Challenges" <[Federal Judges Set Bar for Deepfake Evidence Challenges - Esquire Deposition Solutions](#)> accessed 20 July 2026.



image claims to show ever actually happened. That is a harder question, and Nigerian evidence law does not yet have a settled way of putting it, let alone answering it. Until it does, every video tendered in a Nigerian courtroom carries a small, silent asterisk, and closing that gap is no longer a matter of academic interest. It is a matter of whether justice itself can still be trusted to see clearly.

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