

Navigating Informality and Mobility: A Borderland Perspective on the India–Myanmar Free Movement Regime

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ABSTRACT

The India–Myanmar borderland is a result of the colonial process of boundary-making. It fragmented the borderland communities. Post-independence, the Indian government acknowledged the ground reality of divided ethnic groups in the borderland. Thus, passport exemptions led to the introduction of the Free Movement Regime (FMR) in 1968, which allowed for crossing without a passport within a certain distance from the border. In 2024, the Government of India announced the suspension of the FMR and proposed fencing the 1,643-kilometre-long border. This was necessitated by the civil war in Myanmar starting in 2021 and the ethnic conflict in Manipur beginning in 2023. This article reinterprets the FMR as a negotiated arrangement for informal border governance rather than a concession of administrative control. It argues that the 2024 turn marks a transition from negotiated informality to securitised territorial control. The concept of sovereignty along this border is constantly negotiated among state organisations, customary institutions, and cross-border networks, as political informality and infrapolitics are traversed. The new government rearranges that negotiation but does not eliminate it.

Keywords: Borderland Governance, Free Movement Regime, Infrapolitics, Political Informality, Sovereignty

INTRODUCTION

In February 2024, the Union Home Minister of India announced two orders which would change the face of one of the most porous borders in South Asia: the Free Movement Regime (FMR) with Myanmar and the fencing of the 1,643 km India-Myanmar border. The announcement was not a final legal determination but an administrative decision. However, the FMR was recommended for "immediate suspension" by the Home Ministry. Whereas, the Ministry of External Affairs is "in the process of scrapping" it, as the minister himself put it, as of early 2025 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2024a). The operating instrument was only issued in December 2024, when the Home Ministry reduced permitted mobility for people living within 10 kilometres of the border (Singh, 2024). A territory that had been administered through negotiated informality was being constructed at the administrative pace, with the intention of territorial control.

The boundary, imposed on the borderland communities without their consent, was drawn across the hills for generations. It was gradually fixed by colonial surveys after the 1826 Treaty of Yandabo, Burma's separation from British India in 1937, and the bilateral settlement of 1967. The FMR (1968) was, in part, the belated recognition by the state of this severance, and was built on the 1948-50 passport exemptions. The free passage was reduced from 40 to 16 kilometres in 2004, further restricted in 2016, and became a formal bilateral arrangement in 2018 through the Land Border Crossing Agreement. These protocols, however, were not the ones that dominated everyday cross-border life for half a century. It is the language, culture, and kinship obligation were more important, as was tacit official tolerance.

What does the suspension of the FMR mean for everyday mobility in the India–Myanmar borderlands? What does it tell us about the modality of border governance? This paper asks these questions. This suggests that the 2024 turn should shift from negotiated, informal governance of the borderland to the securitisation of territorial control. The paper builds on the work of scholars of the everyday life in the Northeast borderlands (van Schendel, 2005; McDuie-Ra, 2016; Roluahpuia, 2019), but diverges in its approach to the FMR itself as an object of state strategy, rather than a site of rights claims, and as an informal institution in the sense of Helmke and Levitsky (2004) as a site of contestation through infrapolitics. This order is not easily replaced by the securitising move (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998) but provokes new negotiations about who can move and on what terms. This is reflected in the differentiated response. While the legislatures of Mizoram and Nagaland opposed the scrapping of FMR, the Manipur government welcomed the suspension.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The India–Myanmar borderland has called into question the traditional notion of static territorial boundaries between states. Borders are continually produced in everyday social, political and administrative processes (Newman, 2006). The perspective is appropriate for the India–Myanmar border, where the social world existed beyond the nation-state, and historically connected communities had been divided by colonial line-making.

This paper does not consider the FMR as an exception to state sovereignty, but rather as a form of negotiated border governance. It's a sovereignty of land, mainly the Indian state at its edge – the authority to decide who can cross, live, and belong. These claims were, however, made in tandem, if not through, the traditional authority of borderland institutions, and the sovereign presence of Myanmar was sparse and even after 2021, fragmented. Negotiated sovereignty, therefore, does not mean a weak sovereignty, but a sovereignty that is subject to action by non-state actors it cannot control or replace.

This reading is based on the idea of political informality. Helmke and Levitsky describe informal institutions as “socially shared rules, typically unwritten, that are instituted, communicated and enforced outside official channels” (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). Three differences follow and are followed throughout this paper. An informal institution is a rule that creates shared expectations and sanctions violations, as, for instance, when customary councils determine who can cross, trade, or use land. Such rules organise patterned behaviour, such as vouched-for crossing or head-loaded exchange, which are informal practices. Examples include the everyday aspects of social life – kinship visits, funerals, marriages – they are not either unless they are regulated by a common rule or given political meaning in terms of state ordering. The informal order is part of a broader anthropology of the margins. Das and Poole demonstrate that margins are places where authority is continually constructed and challenged, not outside of government (Das and Poole, 2004).

Scott's conception of infrapolitics is needed to flesh out the notion of borderland agency. Infrapolitics is low-visibility actions such as avoidance, adaptation, and quiet negotiation that Scott identifies as influencing power relations beneath the surface of formal political expression (Scott, 1985; Scott, 1990). Not every cross-border activity is eligible. Visiting relatives is, quite simply, social reproduction, and is infrapolitical when the state considers it an illegal act, yet it happens anyway as a tacit challenge to the territorial order, thereby sustaining a social geography the state has tried to preempt. The relation between practice and state ordering is the analytical weight, not the practice itself.

The 2024 turn follows securitisation theory. The turn of 2024 is understood in the strictest sense of the term “securitisation” in securitisation theory. Securitisation, for the Copenhagen School, is a political move in which an actor securitises an issue by framing it as an existential threat to a referent object and appealing to an audience to approve of extraordinary measures (Wæver, 1995; Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998). All these elements are crucial. The Union government as a securitising actor, internal security and the demographic structure as referent objects, and finally, the set of divided audiences that cannot be taken for granted. The material practice is another way in which securitisation works. Moreover, walls often serve as a theatre for sovereign power in the spaces where sovereignty is least secure (Brown, 2010). While teichopolitics – the politics of barrier-building – is a term used by Rosière and Jones (2012) to describe walls that filter populations and reassert territorial

control beyond their security claims. So, the emergence of border governance is not just a state imposition, nor is it a result of local production. It is the outcome of their constant interaction.

METHODOLOGY

This paper uses an interpretive, qualitative design to answer a question about the mode of border governance rather than measuring it. It goes through two strategies. The first one is policy analysis and document analysis. The two decisions — from the Ministry of Home Affairs in February 2024 and the Ministry of External Affairs in December 2024 — are interpreted as texts of governance along with the movement protocol and the fencing announcements. The focus lies on the way they define mobility, threat, and belonging, rather than on what they prescribe. The second approach is to triangulate this official narrative with peer-reviewed scholarship on the India–Myanmar borderlands, civil society arguments and credible journalistic reports. Consequently, the paper is conceptual and interpretative, and claims are calibrated.

From Yandaboo to the Free Movement Regime

The India–Myanmar border is not a pre-existing nation-state boundary, but an artefact of colonial state-making, inherited, hardened and securitised. The comparative borderlands literature argues that borders are not natural, but constructed. Baud and van Schendel (1997) write that, “The borders are not natural but political, because they attempt to impose a territorial logic upon worlds that are organised socially by other logics”. When seen this way, the 2024 suspension does not seem like the culmination of a security measure but rather the next step in a gradual expansion of policing.

The course starts with the Treaty of Yandabo (24th February 1826), which ended the First Anglo-Burmese War. Its territorial stipulations were not even, and this disparity influenced the nature of the border it created. The treaty then placed Company power on the margins of the Indo-Burmese uplands, but did not settle any line across them, laying the foundations for an asymmetric frontier that was to be the theatre for later colonial boundary-making.

The borderland communities were neither consulted nor acknowledged as parties, given that their social areas occupied the frontier. The results, in turn, were a prolonged process of objectification of cartography. In the Indo-Burmese uplands, like in Siam, cartographic knowledge superseded indigenous concepts of space, provoking conflict wherever ideas of boundary, sovereignty and margin clashed (Winichakul, 1994). The instruments grew in number over time. The Inner Line was established under the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation of 1873 and set up an administrative line that ran through the hills (Mackenzie, 1884). In April 1937, Burma's integration with British India ended, and the division deepened. In 1967, the colonial boundary was confirmed as an international boundary with no corrections.

The FMR is conventionally dated to 1968, but its substance is older. Passport-rule exemptions of 1948–50 permitted hill communities within forty kilometres of the frontier to cross without documents. The radius was cut to sixteen kilometres in 2004, and all movement was limited to crossing points, with the argument that this was necessitated by insurgency and the trafficking of narcotics and arms, and was again tightened in 2016. The 2018 Agreement on Land Border Crossing (ALBC) has been interpreted as a liberalising move within the context of the Act East Policy, but the government's own explanation for the Agreement is that it is designed to “regulate and harmonise” existing free movement rights (Press Information Bureau, 2018). The agreement made the mobility customary into a channelled, legible crossing. Border processes along this frontier have been “security-centric”, creating narrow trade pathways and limiting the “diffuse cross-border life” of ethnic kin (Haokip, 2015).

Governing Through Informality: Mobility Before the Suspension

If the previous section traced how the boundary was made and tightened, this one asks what governed movement across it before 2024. The answer is not the FMR as a body of rules. Its formal architecture was thin: a permitted radius, designated crossing points, and, after 2018, a bilateral protocol that few borderlanders invoked. Cross-border life was sustained instead by customary practice, kinship obligation, and tacit official tolerance. The claim

advanced here is that this thinness was not a defect but the regime's operative principle. Because implementation was never robust, everyday governance fell to informal institutions; reading those institutions as a mode of rule — rather than the absence of rule — reveals sovereignty along this frontier as co-produced rather than centrally dictated.

Informal trade

The gap between formal regime and actual practice is clearest in the cross-border economy. Official trade through the Moreh–Tamu and Zokhawtar–Rihkhawdar gates remained marginal throughout the FMR's life, while Taneja et al. (2019, 14) find that informal flows — moving through kinship networks, headloading, and unrecorded routes — substantially exceeded formal figures, with discrepancies between Indian and Myanmar-side reporting underscoring the under-capture. The markets themselves were anything but negligible: Mitra (2023) shows how Champhai, Zokhawtar, and Moreh grew into busy entrepôts resting on flows the formal regime neither captured nor controlled. Where the documented economy was thin, an undocumented one was thick, and it was the latter that organised livelihoods. Successive formalisation efforts were less about creating commerce than about rendering pre-existing mobility legible and taxable.

Customary governance

If the formal protocol was regulated little, the substantive work of governing mobility was done elsewhere. Roluahpuia's (2019) village-level study of the Mizoram–Myanmar border shows the regime functioning through a confluence in which state and community agendas often converged to enhance trade and liberalise movement. Borderlanders experienced the sixteen-kilometre radius less as an enforced limit than as a notional threshold, with crossing negotiated by social rather than statutory criteria: facilitated, vouched for, and sometimes taxed by headmen, traders, and ethnic bodies performing regulatory functions the state had neither the reach nor the will to exercise. These were rule-governed arrangements in Helmke and Levitsky's sense — shared expectations, locally enforced, operating alongside and frequently in place of the official rule.

Kinship and customary land use

While the last section focused on the creation and incrementation of the boundary, this examines what previously influenced boundary movements prior to 2024. The answer is not the FMR as a body of rules. It had a light, formal architecture. An authorised radius, the special points of crossing, and, since 2018, a bilateral document that few members of the borderland used. Alternate ways of sustaining cross-border life were customary practice, kinship obligation, and tacit official tolerance. Implementing sovereignty on this frontier has never been strong; however, everyday governance was left to informal institutions, which, if implemented, constitute a form of rule (not rulelessness) that reflects co-production of sovereignty.

Informal trade

In the cross-border economy, this dichotomy is most apparent. Throughout the FMR's existence, official trade via the Moreh–Tamu and Zokhawdar–Rihkhawdar gates was marginal. Taneja et al. (2019) demonstrate that informal trade, conducted through kinship channels, headloading, and unrecorded routes, far outstripped official statistics, with differences in reporting across both sides of the border highlighting under-capture. The markets were not insignificant, as Mitra (2023) demonstrates in the case study of the development of Champhai, Zokhawtar, and Moreh as busy entrepôts emerging along streams that remained outside the state's formal control and regulation. Where the documented economy was scanty, the undocumented economy was dense and organised. Each formalisation attempt was less about the formation of commerce than its making legible and taxable.

Customary governance

If there was little regulation of the formal aspect, the substantive aspect of governing mobility was elsewhere. The regime operates, as per Roluahpuia's (2019) study, at the village level along the Mizoram–Myanmar border, at a confluence where the interests of states and communities often merge, with a view to facilitating trade and

free movement. This sixteen-kilometre radius was not a hard rule, but rather a conceptual boundary—social, not legal—in fact negotiated by headmen, traders, and ethnic regulatory organisations for which the state never had the reach or will to apply the regulatory finger. Helmke and Levitsky speak of “rule-governed” arrangements, which are shared expectations enforced locally, in addition to, and often instead of, the official rule.

Kinship and customary land use

Kinship sustains the movement in this frontier. For families divided by the line, cross-border movement maintained kin networks decades after displacement (Haokip, 2024). The borderland villages are divided by the line, working agricultural and forest land across it, and recognising customary authority, such as the Konyak Angh of Longwa village, whose house is divided between the two boundaries. The borderlanders regarded the frontier as a space of their history and kinship networks. It had preceded the creation of the international frontier (Ralte and Thomas, 2026).

Customary land use, in particular, was revealing – the practices of jhum cultivation, grazing, and forest access involved crossing a single tenurial system, and the recognition of customary rights frequently involved crossing an international boundary. The following two analytical points are of interest. Where such activities were regulated by a customary council or tenurial rules, they were not only informal behaviour but also informal institutions. In themselves, the visits and use of the land were normal forms of social reproduction, and the significance of the regime was that it tolerated them rather than outlawed them. This sort of mobility was not a violation of the FMR; it was its daily life.

Uneven orders and everyday mobility

This negotiated order was not a standard one. The social geography of the Naga Hills and Mizoram was more permeable, with thick transborder relationships and strong customary authority, while other parts of Manipur were more contested, with the line more militarised and crossing more easily becoming defined as a security issue. Different political orders emerged from the same formal regime, anticipating the asymmetric political orders discussed later. The concept of “porosity” also applies to basic services. McDuire-Ra (2016) reports that patients from the Tamu area get treated at the Shija Hospital in Imphal, which does not provide these services on the Myanmar side.

Could these be considered infrapolitical? Prior to 2024, these strategies were mostly not intended for a divided people, for a separated people, but rather as everyday strategies through which a divided population continued to live as one, its political character latent. They left the boundary always subject to negotiation, and sovereignty at the border was a co-production. But it's the same dynamic elsewhere, as the comparative literature can attest. Sur's (2021) study of Garo border-crossing movements between India and Bangladesh indicates that informal mobility was maintained through the mutuality and trust between border communities and security actors, without compromising formal governance, but rather through alternative means. In line with this, Van Schendel (2005) argues that the ways in which borders are constructed and reconstructed are keyed into the practices of the borderlanders themselves. The FMR provided partial, provisional recognition of an already negotiated order in the border communities.

Taking away casual, everyday freedom is not an accident or a lapse in governance. It is a deliberate tactic used by authorities to force people out of the shadows and into a highly documented system where they are easier to watch and manage.

From Negotiation to Control: The 2024 Turn

The FMR is an epitome of informality, while the subsequent 2024 turn governs through documentation, surveillance and territorial enclosure. The Union Home Minister announced plans to fence the 1,643-kilometre boundary and build a patrol track on 6 February 2024, while on 8 February 2024, the Home Ministry announced the decision to suspend the FMR, “to ensure the internal security of the country and to maintain the demographic structure of India's North Eastern States bordering Myanmar” (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2024b).

These statements do precise securitising work. As a securitising actor, the Union government determines referent objects (internal security, territorial order, demographic stability) and frames cross-border mobility as a problem that needs exceptional intervention. From a sociological perspective, securitisation is successful if the formulation of threat is “audience-oriented” and situated in context, and if it is “used and maintained through institutional practice” (Balzacq, 2011). By interpreting the hardening of the border as a security built over time rather than a one-shot, the fence and pass can be seen as securitising instruments. The February 2024 announcements began a process whose content was in the practices and infrastructures that ensued.

These practices display the teichopolitical pattern described in Section 2, where the wall is a device for imposing sovereign power at the point where it is most subject to doubt (Brown, 2010), and barriers made legitimate via the “language of insecurity” have a filtering effect on populations and a reassertion of territorial power (Rosière and Jones, 2012). The mode is made real in the empirical record. In September, 2024, the Cabinet Committee on Security gave in-principle approval to a project to fence and upgrade roads along the border for approximately ₹31,000 crore, but by early 2025, less than 2 per cent of the boundary – around 30 kilometres – had been fenced (Chakraborty and Sinha, 2025). The fencing is still more programme than structure; its political work has taken place before its physical reality.

The December 2024 protocol was a method for putting the logic of control into practice. Instead of removing mobility, it reduced the zone of movement from sixteen kilometres to ten. The border crossing is enforced through forty-three designated crossing points. An individual must return to the crossing point they started at at the end of the day; biometric registration is required and regulated by the Assam Rifles, and there is a maximum 7-day stay limit (Morung Express, 2025). This is mobility as it becomes documentable and surveillable. Monopolising the legitimate methods of movement, turning movement into an activity authorised through identification and documentation, has been the basis for the modern state's control over movement (Torpey, 2018). The biometric pass does that conversion in a place where it had not been incorporated into a document in fifty years.

The securitising frame is grounded in three threat-claims. The first is the refugee influx after the coup in Myanmar since February 2021. An estimated 78,731 people have crossed into India from Myanmar – most of them to Mizoram (Siddiqui, 2025). The second is the Manipur conflict from May 2023, which opponents of the FMR interpret as evidence of border porosity. The third is drugs. The UNODC has identified that the bigger Golden Triangle is the regional hub for methamphetamine production, and that Shan State is the epicentre for this (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2024). The regional drug economy could be boosted by the FMR.

This view agrees that real problems exist, but it questions the government's solution. Building a fence and stopping locals from crossing does not fix the official threats. Instead, it is just a way to easily control the land and the people. A fence will not stop refugees fleeing a broken country. It only cuts them off from family members who could help them. Likewise, banning normal border crossings will not stop large-scale smuggling. Ultimately, there is a big difference between the government's stated goals and the actual results. This gap is the defining feature of border-wall politics.

People reacted very differently to the new border rules. Framing an issue as a security threat does not mean everyone will agree. In Manipur, the government supported the border fencing. Manipur, a Meitei majority state view the porous border as a means of refugee influx, demographic changes in the state, and fanning ethnic conflict. However, the governments in Mizoram and Nagaland voted against these actions. The borderland communities express their resentment at the scrapping of the border and its fencing. The new policy failed to find support in the border region. This situation highlights an old problem. Theories about security were created using European history. They do not work well in non-Western places where you cannot assume everyone is united (Wilkinson, 2007). The very border being secured splits the society that is supposed to approve the policy. India has long governed its Northeast region with a deep anxiety over who truly belongs there (Baruah, 2020). The 2024 policy does not create this old mindset. It simply builds a fence around it.

The final irony is clear. The fence tries to show strong state control. However, it is being built just as Myanmar's government has lost control of its side of the border. In western Myanmar, rebel groups control the land instead of the military government. This problem became obvious in May 2025. The Indian army killed ten Myanmar rebels near the Manipur-Myanmar border. The Myanmar military government did not protest this event. Instead, the rebel government (National Unity Government) protested and expressed its anguish over the incident. The Myanmar junta has largely stayed out of the border debate. India is trying to secure a border with a government that is barely involved. Finally, India is not building a wall against a stable country. It is building a wall against a fractured region where no single group holds sway.

Resisting the Fence: Infrapolitics Against the New Regime

The shift from negotiated mobility to securitised control was not a cessation of negotiation but a series of contestations and adaptations that revealed the limits of governing the borderlands through territorial enclosure alone. Most importantly, the 2024 turn altered the political nature of borderland practice. Prior to 2024, customary crossing was predominantly a social reproduction and a feature of the negotiated regime. After this, the continuation of such motion came to appear illegitimate, and the practices continued to take on the characteristics of infrapolitics proper: low-visibility conduct that does not coexist with the official territorial order but rather contests it.

First, the formal opposition was made. Both the measures were welcomed by the Manipur government, but the legislative assemblies of the neighbouring states of Mizoram and Nagaland passed resolutions against the suspension and the fencing project, respectively and termed them as threats to the ethnic, cultural and familial relations of the two states, instead of as a means for security (Department of Information and Public Relations, 2025; The Hindu Bureau, 2024). The point in this part is not just that they disagree on policy but that they have different conceptions of the nature of the border. For New Delhi, the border was a site of territorial control; for many borderlanders, it was a space of customary, familial social life lived through.

Civil society and indigenous institutions that transcend the international boundary expressed the most opposition. Communities in the frontier have used the word “ancestry” and “customary land rights” and “cross border obligations” in their arguments, using the grounds of shared ancestry, customary rights and cross border obligations, rather than just legal and constitutional language, to highlight the suspension as a violation of historical arrangements that recognised the artificial division of their ancestral territories (Sinha et al., 2024). Their criticism was not only of the difficulty of mobility, but also of the territorial imagination of the fence, which aimed to partition and distinguish between communities that were living as one.

Here, Scott's (1990) concept is applicable. Open opposition to the state has not typically been found in this part of the frontier. It has been expressed over the years through the persistence of customary rights, the assertion of cross-border kinship, and the rejection of the idea that mobility must be subject only to documentary evidence, as evidenced by the refusal of the ethnic organisations to apply for the revised border-pass procedures. The communities living on the border are not questioning India's sovereignty per se, but its method of functioning. The political meaning of what was once “accommodated practice” is now “quietly defiant practice”, the relational transformation the conceptual framework predicted. When the rules change, so does the political meaning of what was once “accommodated practice”.

These practices have continued, as demonstrated by recent scholarship. Kinship remains a major factor in arranging movement, identity, and belonging in the border communities of Mizoram, and pastoral and seasonal mobility, including the herding of buffaloes from the Kabaw Valley to the Naga Hills, continues in these communities (Ralte, 2026; Shimray and Ziipao, 2026). As such, the state's attempt to make movement fully legible comes across as only semi-compatible with social practices. Even if there are formal crossing points, physical barriers cannot easily replace the networks of reciprocity that have traditionally organised upland life. It has also resulted in new coalitions. The ethnic groups living in the periphery have formed alliances, even though they have opposing broader agendas, and are united by a shared interest in maintaining cross-border social ties. The solidarities that one faces can be produced inadvertently as a side effect of the securitisation.

The very fact of this ongoing negotiation highlights the constraints of securitisation as a form of border control. Crossings are made slower, more bureaucratic, and more closely monitored, but not completely territorialised. There is formal control and informal control, resilient institutions that do not fall apart, yet do not always obey the state; sovereignty is incomplete, the state is continually negotiating forms of control it does not always have and doesn't always push out. The turn of 2024 has consolidated the state's documentary and territorial capacities – and rekindled the informal institutions and solidarities it was trying to quell. The fence is not an end to negotiated governance but a changed landscape of governance.

CONCLUSION

This paper examines the 2024 end of the FMR and the border fencing from a different perspective. It is not just a change from an open border to a closed one. Instead, it is a shift from flexible, local compromises to strict, military-style control over the land.

The paper has made three main points. First, it changes how we view the FMR. The FMR was not just a special favour from the government or a break from the rules. It was a mediated system. It recognised that both the state and local people worked together to shape life along the border. In this region, government power was exercised in a shared manner rather than through strict orders from above.

Second, the India-Myanmar border example adds new ideas to theories about securitisation. Security is always a product of the conflict between multiple interlocutors, where the “society” that is supposed to authorise security is fractured. Securitisation faces multiple audiences, where its acceptance cannot be taken for granted, as the reception at the frontiers of the postcolonial state in 2024 differed in Manipur than in Mizoram and Nagaland.

Third, this situation illuminates a major contradiction about building border walls. India is using a fence to demonstrate its strict control over its territory. However, a secure border usually requires a stable neighbouring country, and Myanmar's government is currently falling apart. The wall tries to project a sense of order in a place where everything is deeply uncertain.

When a border divides closely connected communities, closing it does not stop people from finding compromises. It just changes how they negotiate. Will the government's strict new paperwork eventually replace local traditions? Or will people simply find ways to work around the new rules? This is the scope for future research and field study on the ground. This paper is intended to guide future research.

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