INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue X October 2025  
Judicial Trend in Relation to Unilateral Conversion of Minor  
Children to Islam: An Analysis of Recent Cases in Malaysia  
Su’aida Safei1*, Ibtisam @ Ilyana Ilias2, Siti Sarah Sulaiman3, Su’aidi Safei4  
1,2, 3Faculty of Law, Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM), Malaysia  
4Institute of Technology Management and Entrepreneurship (IPTK), Universiti Teknikal Malaysia  
Melaka (UTeM), Malaysia  
*Corresponding author  
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2025.910000505  
Received: 20 October 2025; Accepted: 28 October 2025; Published: 17 November 2025  
ABSTRACT  
The issue of unilateral conversion of minor children to Islam by a converting parent without the consent of the  
non-converting parent continues to generate legal uncertainty in Malaysia. This doctrinal study critically  
examines the judicial trend reflected in recent landmark decisions of the Federal Court, particularly Indira  
Gandhi A/P Mutho v Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors (2018) and Pendaftar Mualaf Negeri Perlis  
& Ors v Loh Siew Hong and another appeal (2025). The focus is on the interpretation of Article 12(4) of the  
Federal Constitution, concerning parental consent, and the implications of distinguishing between ab initio cases  
and renunciation cases within Malaysia’s dual legal system. Through comparative analysis of decided cases  
between 2018 and 2025, the paper highlights judicial consistency in affirming that the consent of both parents is  
required for a valid conversion of minors to Islam. The paper also discusses tensions arising from divergent  
judicial reasoning in recent decisions such as Dahlia Dhaima bt Abdullah v. Majlis Agama Islam Selangor and  
another appeal (2025). Findings emphasise that while Islamic legal principles recognise unilateral parental  
consent in certain situations, constitutional supremacy dictates that both parents must provide consent for a  
conversion of minor children to be valid. The paper concludes that recent jurisprudence has strengthened legal  
protections for minors and supports the uniform application of constitutional principles across the states.  
Keywords: Unilateral conversion, Parental consent, Malaysian Islamic legal system, Federal Constitution,  
Judicial trends in Malaysia  
INTRODUCTION  
This paper focuses on the legal issue concerning the unilateral conversion of minor children below the age of  
eighteen to Islam by one converting parent without obtaining the consent from the non-converting parent. The  
matter has become one of the most contentious contemporary legal disputes in Malaysia due to the interaction  
between civil law and Islamic law within the nation’s dual legal system. Recent reported cases demonstrate  
increasing judicial scrutiny on whether unilateral acts of conversion may override constitutionally protected  
parental rights and the welfare of minor children.  
Significant jurisprudence has emerged in the past decade, particularly from the Federal Court, which has had to  
reconcile the civil law requirements governing guardianship and constitutional rights with the Syariah legal  
framework applicable to Muslims. This paper, therefore, limits its examination to the legal validity of unilateral  
conversions and does not extend its analysis to jurisdictional conflicts or broader constitutional matters beyond  
what is necessary for legal clarification. The aim is to analyse judicial developments and evaluate the  
consistency of the courts in interpreting Article 12(4) of the Federal Constitution and relevant statutory  
provisions.  
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This paper employs a qualitative legal research methodology grounded in doctrinal analysis. According to Jain  
(1975), doctrinal legal research involves “analysis of case law, arranging, ordering and systematising legal  
propositions and the study of legal institution through legal reasoning or rational deduction.” It also provides “a  
systematic exposition of the rules governing a particular legal category, analyses the relationship between rules,  
explains areas of difficulty and perhaps predicts future development” (Pendleton, 2007). Therefore, in making  
the assessment, both primary and secondary sources of law were examined. The latter is important to highlight  
the current development in the respective area of law (Abd Razak, 2009).  
Thus, it focuses on the close examination of primary legal sources, particularly Federal Court decisions  
addressing unilateral conversion of minor children between 2018 and 2025. Relevant case laws including Indira  
Gandhi a/p Mutho v. Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak &Ors and other appeals [2018] 1 MLJ 545, Rosliza  
bt Ibrahim v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor [2021] 2 MLJ 181), Dahlia Dhaima bt Abdullah v. Majlis  
Agama Islam Selangor and another appeal [2025] 1 MLJ 334, and Pendaftar Mualaf Negeri Perlis & Ors v.  
Loh Siew Hong and another appeal [2025] 1 ShLR 1 were systematically retrieved via the LexisNexis online  
legal database and examined to identify key principles, judicial reasoning, and evolving legal standards  
This doctrinal case-study approach is supported by secondary sources including legal textbooks, statutory  
commentaries, and journal articles, enabling the development of a comprehensive literature review to identify  
existing gaps and justify the significance of this research. Case content was analysed using thematic content  
analysis to:  
i.  
ii.  
trace legal interpretations of the parental consent requirement;  
determine the relevance of distinguishing ab initio and renunciation categories of cases; and  
assess judicial implications for the welfare and religious identity of minor children.  
iii.  
This approach strengthens the reliability of findings and facilitates a clear evaluation of judicial trends shaping  
Malaysian family and constitutional law.  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
The issue of unilateral conversion of a minor child by one converting parent without the consent of the other  
parent in Malaysia is complex and contentious, primarily due to the dual legal system comprising Syariah law  
for Muslims and Civil law for non-Muslims. This duality often leads to overlapping jurisdictions and conflicting  
legal interpretations. Malaysia operates under a dual legal system where Syariah law governs Muslims and Civil  
law governs non-Muslims. This system works well when laws are clearly demarcated; however, complications  
arise when they overlap, particularly in cases of religious conversion (Nair, Shamsuddin, & Yusoff, 2017). The  
main legal contention is whether the consent of both parents is required for the conversion of a minor child to  
Islam. The lack of clear legal provisions and conflicting court decisions have exacerbated the issue, leading to  
an unsatisfactory and complex legal process (Kusrin, Hamjah, & Sham, 2022).  
Past studies offered useful insights into the court’s judgments regarding the issue of unilateral conversion.  
Historically, the courts have been inconsistent. Earlier cases often ruled that the minor child’s religion follows  
the converting parent, typically the father. However, more recent decisions have leaned towards maintaining the  
child's original religion before the conversion of one parent (Kusrin, Hamjah, & Sham, 2022; Balasingam, 2018).  
The Federal Court of Malaysia has made significant rulings on this matter. For instance, in the case of Indira  
Gandhi A/P Mutho v. Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors and other appeals [2018] 1 MLJ 545, the court  
addressed issues of judicial review, the jurisdiction of Syariah courts, and the necessity of parental consent for  
conversion (Ali, Hasan, Subri, & Shah, 2019). Another landmark case, Viran a/l Nagapan v Deepa a/p  
Subramaniam [2016] 1 MLJ 585, highlighted the civil court's jurisdiction over Muslim children and the  
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presumption that a child of seven years can make an independent judgment regarding their own interests  
(Balasingam, 2018).  
The unilateral conversion often leads to custody disputes, impacting the welfare and best interest of the child.  
The courts have to balance the welfare principle with the religious rights of the parents, which remains a  
contentious issue (Nair, & Chuan, 2017; Zin, & Soh, 2012). The issue is further complicated by socio-political  
factors, including rising Muslim religious conservatism and the Islamisation of laws, which influence public  
discourse and legal interpretations (Khan, & Samuri, 2022; Samuri & Khan, 2021).  
The literature review reveals the gap in the studies examining a detailed scrutiny of decided cases including the  
latest decision of Dahlia Dhaima bt Abdullah v. Majlis Agama Islam Selangor and another appeal [2025] 1 MLJ  
334 and Pendaftar Mualaf Negeri Perlis & Ors v. Loh Siew Hong and another appeal [2025] 1 ShLR 1 on the  
issue of unilateral conversion of a minor child by one converting parent without the consent of the other in  
Malaysia. Hence, this paper attempts to close the gap by doctrinally and comparatively analysing relevant and  
latest cases on this matter.  
FINDINGS & DISCUSSIONS  
Brief Facts of the Case  
The parties involved were the appellants, the Registrar of Muallafs Perlis, Majlis Agama Islam, and Adat Istiadat  
Melayu Perlis (MAIPs), and the respondents were Loh Siew Hong, a Hindu-Buddhist mother, and her three  
minor children, born from Loh’s civil marriage to Nagahswaran a/l Muniandy. Loh and Nagahswaran were  
married under the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, and they had three children. Loh and  
Nagahswaran were later divorced on 23 September 2021, with Loh being granted sole custody of the children.  
In July 2020, Nagahswaran converted to Islam and brought the children to the Perlis Islamic Religious  
Department (JAIPs), where their conversions were registered. The conversion certificates were issued to the  
children without Loh’s consent. Section 117(b) of the Perlis Administration of the Religion of Islam  
(Amendment) Enactment 2016 (the “Perlis Enactment 2016”) allows the unilateral consent of either a mother or  
father for the conversion of children under 18 years old to Islam. Loh filed for judicial review, arguing the  
conversions were unconstitutional and violated Article 12(4) of the Federal Constitution and the Guardianship  
of Infants Act 1961. The High Court dismissed the judicial review on 11 May 2023. The Court of Appeal then  
set aside the High Court’s order and allowed the judicial review on 22 January 2024. The appellants subsequently  
applied for leave to appeal to the Federal Court against the Court of Appeal's decision.  
Islamic perspective on section 117(b) of the Perlis Enactment 2016  
Before proceeding further, it is worth noting the Islamic perspective of Section 117(b) of the Perlis Enactment  
2016, as quoted above, in that it allows the unilateral consent of either a mother or father for the conversion of  
children under 18 years old to Islam. The Islamic scholars generally support a minor’s conversion to Islam when  
it aligns with the objectives of Maqasid Syariah. Maqasid Syariah refers to the higher objectives of Islamic law,  
which aim to preserve five essential values: religion (din), life (nafs), intellect (‘aql), lineage (nasab), and  
property (mal). In the context of a minor’s conversion, two important values are relevant: Hifz al-Din and Hifz  
al-Nasab. On Hifz al-Din (Protection of Religion), the scholars argue that guiding a child toward Islam fulfills  
the obligation to protect faith, especially if one parent is a Muslim. On Hifz al-Nasab (Protection of Lineage),  
conversion must also consider the child’s familial ties and avoid severing relationships unjustly (Khan, A. S. N.,  
& Samuri, M. A. A., 2022). Jasser Auda, a leading scholar on Maqasid Syariah, emphasises that "the preservation  
of religion is not merely about ritual practice, but about ensuring access to spiritual truth and moral development  
from a young age" (Auda, J. (2008). Similarly, Mohammad Hashim Kamali argues that "In matters involving  
children, Maqasid Syariah requires a balance between spiritual welfare and parental rights, especially in plural  
societies" (Kamali, M.H. (2008). In addition, Maryam et.al stated that the conversion of a minor is seen as valid  
if it promotes the child’s spiritual welfare and does not violate other Maqasid principles (Maryam Jamilah et.al.  
(2025). In summary, based on the above authorities, section 117(b) of the Perlis Enactment was enacted in line  
with the principles of Maqasid Syariah in Islam, specifically with regard to the protection of religion and lineage.  
Hence, based on the relevant protection of Maqasid Syariah, it is not wrong in Islam to allow a unilateral  
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conversion of minor children by the Muslim parent. Nevertheless, in the context of the Malaysian legal system,  
where the Federal Constitution is the supreme law of the land (Wan Arfah, 2009 and Ashgar Ali, 2020), section  
117(b) of the Perlis Enactment was held to be inconsistent with Article 12 (4) of the Federal Constitution, hence  
the unilateral conversion of minor children is null and void, as being decided by the Court of Appeal in this case  
of Loh Siew Hong, which will be elaborated further in the subsequent paragraph of this paper.  
A Summary of the Decision of the High Court in Loh’s case  
In relation to the issue of unilateral conversion of minor children by their father, the High Court judge (who is  
the current Chief Justice, YAADatuk Seri Utama Wan Ahmad Farid) acknowledged the Federal Court’s decision  
in Indira Gandi, which ruled that the consent of both parents is required under Article 12 (4) of the Federal  
Constitution for the conversion of minor children to be valid. Nevertheless, he stated that the welfare of the  
children must take precedence, which was another aspect of the case of Indira Gandhi that has been rarely  
discussed in subsequent reported cases. He further pointed out that the children continued to practise Islam  
despite living with their Hindu-Buddist mother, such as by performing Subuh prayer, which indicated their  
religious identity. He also highlighted that there was no evidence showing that the children were unhappy or that  
they had reverted to Hinduism; therefore, maintaining their Muslim identity was seen as consistent with the  
welfare of the children. The High Court applied the “force of evidence” test from Rosliza’s case to conclude that  
the children professed Islam. The “force of evidence” in Loh’s case points to the inevitable conclusion that the  
three children never left the religion of Islam. The High Court upheld the conversions and dismissed the judicial  
review application.  
A Summary of the Decision of the Court of Appeal in Loh’s case  
On the issue of unilateral conversion of the minor children, the Court of Appeal set aside the decision of the  
High Court. It reaffirmed the Federal Court’s decision in Indira Gandhi, which held that both parents must  
consent to the conversion of the children to Islam for it to be valid. The Perlis Enactment 2016, which allows  
unilateral consent of the minor children, was held to be inconsistent with Article 12 (4) of the Federal  
Constitution and is therefore null and void. The Court of Appeal also held that the High Court had misapplied  
the precedent in Rosliza’s case, which involved an ab initio claim (never a Muslim), not a challenge to  
conversion by a parent. It was also pointed out that Rosliza’s case contains different facts and issues from Loh’s  
case. The Court of Appeal also highlighted that the High Court failed to follow a binding precedent in the case  
of Indira Gandhi. The appeal was allowed, and the unilateral conversion of the children was held to be invalid.  
A Summary of the Decision of the Federal Court in Loh’s case  
The Federal Court in the case of Loh maintained the position in the earlier precedent ofthe Federal Court decision  
in Indira Gandhi (2018) that a conversion of minor children below the age of eighteen is only valid if consent of  
both parents is obtained. Since in Loh’s case, she, as a mother, did not give consent to the conversion of her three  
children by their father, who was her ex-husband, their conversion was not valid. The Federal Court in Loh’s  
case also maintained the interpretation of Article 12(4) of the Federal Constitution as in Indira Gandhi’s case, in  
that the word “parent” meant “both parents” and not “one parent” only.  
The Federal Court also quoted a hypothetical situation given by the learned JC in Indira Gandhi’s case,  
illustrating how complicated a child's life can be if only one parent can consent to the conversion of a minor  
child. The quotation states that “if by ‘parent’ is meant either parent then we would have a situation where one  
day the converted parent converts the child to his religion and the next day the other parent realising this would  
convert the child back to her religion. The same can be repeated ad nauseam.” Consequently, if such a thing is  
allowed to happen, it will be contrary to the welfare of the child. That also justified the case of Indira Gandhi to  
adopt a purposive interpretation ofArticle 12 (4) of the Federal Constitution, which is consistent with the welfare  
of the child, i.e., to obtain consent of both parents for the conversion of a minor child to be valid.  
Differentiating between cases of ab initio and renunciation and jurisdictions of civil courts or Syariah  
Court  
The Federal Court in Loh’s case referred to the case of Rosliza bt Ibrahim v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor  
[2021] 2 MLJ 181 (“Rosliza’s case”) in drawing differences between ab initio cases, of where the civil courts  
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have jurisdiction to hear such cases from renunciation cases, of which the Syariah courts are the proper court to  
hear such cases. It is best to reproduce the relevant parts of the case of Rosliza here, where it is highlighted that  
“in ab initio cases, the issue before the court is not one of faith. It is a question of one’s identity under the Federal  
Constitution. In contrast, renunciation cases concern persons who, despite being Muslims, no longer have faith  
or believe in the religion. An ab initio case is where what is alleged is that the applicant was never a Muslim. Ab  
initio cases constitute those where there is insufficient proof that the applicant affirmatively professed the  
religion of Islam at the material time. Renunciation cases occur where what is alleged is that the applicant is no  
longer a Muslim. In other words, where the Syariah Court’s approval is required before the applicant is permitted  
to leave the religion.”  
In relation to the Loh case, it falls within the category of ab initio cases, where civil courts have jurisdiction to  
hear such cases. The Federal Court in Loh’s case clearly stated that Indira Gandhi’s case is applicable to Loh’s  
case because of the similar facts it has in that three minor children were converted to Islam with the consent of  
only one parent, hence the conversions are ab initio null and void, following the decision of Indira Gandhi.  
The Issue of whether the case of Indira is applicable to Wilayah Persekutuan only and not Perlis.  
In an attempt to exclude the application of the case of Indira Gandhi to the Loh’s case, the appellants tried to  
argue that the case of Indira Gandhi was not applicable to Perlis and is applicable to Wilayah Persekutuan only.  
Nevertheless, this argument was rejected by the court, and it affirmed that all Federal court judgments, including  
the case of Indira Gandhi, are binding throughout the nation.  
The issue of whether the recent case of Dahlia Dhaima in 2025 is similar to Loh’s case, for it to apply,  
making the unilateral conversion of minor children to Islam valid  
The two Federal Court judges in Loh, Nallini J. and Abu Bakar J., pointed out that the case of Dahlia Dhaima  
could not be applied to Loh’s case. Justice Nalini emphasised that the legal requirement that the consent of both  
parents is required must be followed in accordance with the provisions in the Federal Constitution, and other  
factors cannot derogate from the constitutional requirement. It is viewed that this is consistent with following  
the decision of Indira Gandhi which interpreted the word “parent” in Article 12 (4) of the Federal Constitution  
to mean “both parents” need to give consent for the conversion of the minor children to be valid. In addition,  
Justice Abu Bakar highlighted that in Dahlia’s case, the applicant was not a minor, and she was a Muslim who  
came to the Syariah Court to seek a declaration that she was no longer a Muslim; hence, the facts of Dahlia’s  
case differ from those of Loh’s case. It is observed that the legal reasoning put forward by Justice Abu Bakar  
made more sense than Dahlia’s case, which cannot be followed for the different facts and situation it has, which  
is one of the exceptions that allows a precedent not to be followed in the Malaysian legal system. A judge may  
take the view that there are certain material differences between the precedent and the case before him to justify  
the court in not following the earlier case. (Wu Min Aun, 2005 and Ashgar Ali, 2020).  
It is best to see the key points of all four Federal Court judgments in cases of Loh Siew Hong (2025), Indira  
Gandhi (2018), and two main cases, referred to (Rosliza, 2021) and distinguished (Dahlia Dhaima, 2025), in a  
comparative analysis table below.  
Comparative Analysis Table of Four Federal Courts’ Judgments  
Case  
Validity  
conversion  
of Consent  
Parent  
of Jurisdiction Key Legal Principles  
of Court  
Decision of the  
court  
Indira  
Gandhi  
(2018)  
Null & void  
Consent of both Civil court  
-The word “parent” in The certificates of  
Article 12(4) of the conversion of the  
parents required.  
In this case, only  
one parent gave  
consent.  
Federal Constitution to minor  
mean “parents”. issued  
-Therefore, consent of Registrar  
both parents was required Muallafs  
children  
by  
the  
of  
Perak  
for a conversion of minor were void and set  
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children under the age of aside because only  
18 to be valid.  
one parent gave  
consent to such  
conversion.  
Rosliza  
(2021)  
Conversion  
not valid  
Not  
the plaintiff was  
an illegitimate  
child, hence the  
father was not a  
legal parent.  
applicable, Civil court  
-Differentiated  
initio” cases (which the illegitimate  
“ab -The child is an  
child  
civil  
court  
has since the mother  
from never married her  
cases father. Hence, she  
jurisdiction)  
“renunciation”  
(which the Syariah Court cannot be deemed as  
has jurisdiction).  
a Muslim by virtue  
of Islamic Law on  
the basis that either  
or both of her  
Indira  
case was also  
referred  
affirming  
consent of both  
parents required  
Gandi’s  
-A father  
of  
an  
to,  
that  
illegitimate child cannot  
ascribe paternity to the  
child in accordance with  
parents  
are  
Muslims.  
Islamic  
law  
for  
a
valid  
(Administration of the -Declaration  
Religion of Islam (State she was not  
of Selangor) Enactment Muslim granted.  
2003), hence he cannot  
that  
a
conversion of a  
minor child.  
decide on the religion of  
the child.  
-Similarly, even under the  
secular law, the said  
father cannot decide on  
the religion of the child  
alone,  
without  
the  
consent of the mother,  
following  
Indira  
Gandhi’s case.  
Dahlia  
Dhaima  
(2025)  
Majority  
decision-  
conversion  
was valid  
Consent from the Majority - Majority:  
father was not Syariah  
Majority:  
-the minor’s upbringing The appeal was  
obtained  
Court  
is important. The minor dismissed.  
was raised by her Muslim conversion  
The  
was  
mother as a Muslim since valid and the Court  
childhood. ofAppeal’s decision  
Dissenting-  
Civil court  
Dissenting  
judgment-  
invalid  
conversion  
(under  
was  
affirmed.  
-This is  
also  
a
renunciation/ apostacy  
case, as categorised in  
the  
Rosliza’s case, in which Dissenting:  
the Syariah Court has  
Administration  
The  
unilateral  
of  
Muslim  
jurisdiction.  
conversion by the  
-The fact that she initiated mother was void  
her case to renounce with reference to the  
Islam to the Syariah 1952 Enactment and  
Law  
Enactment  
1952 & the  
case of Indira)  
Court showed her belief Indira  
that she was a Muslim. case.  
Gandhi’s  
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Dissenting:  
The conversion of a  
minor is invalid by virtue  
of the Administration of  
Muslim Law Enactment  
1952, which prohibited  
conversion of a minor  
before she reaches the age  
of puberty. It was  
similarly invalid with  
reference to the case of  
Indira Gandhi.  
-The case is an ab initio  
case, as categorised by  
Rosliza’s case, in which  
the civil court has the  
jurisdiction to hear such  
case.  
Loh Siew Affirmed the Followed Indira’s Civil Court -Principles in Indira -The case of Dahlia  
Hong  
(2025)  
Court  
Appeal’s  
of case, in which the  
consent of both  
Gandhi’s case were Dhaima  
followed, and the distinguished.  
was  
decision on the parents is required  
case that the for a conversion to  
decision of the Court of  
Appeal was affirmed.  
-The decision in  
Indira Gandhi’s case  
conversion  
was void.  
be valid.  
-Unilateral conversion of was reaffirmed.  
minor children by the  
father without the consent  
-Leave to appeal  
dismissed.  
of the mother was void.  
CONCLUSION  
The recent case of Loh in 2025 clearly reinforced and clarified that the earlier Federal Court’s decision in Indira  
Gandhi in 2018 is still a good precedent to be followed and is applicable to all States throughout Malaysia. Loh’s  
case quoted various parts of Indira Gandhi’s judgment to reiterate the correctness of the legal principles being  
applied in Indira Gandhi, and it was not decided per incuriam, which justified a departure from its precedent. In  
relation to the unilateral conversion of minor children, there were Federal Court cases post Indira Gandhi case  
that were referred to in Loh’s case i.e. Rosliza’s case in 2021 and also distinguished from, i.e. the case of Dahlia  
Dhaima in 2025. Indira Gandhi’s case is still the landmark case to be followed, which established the principles  
of requiring the consent of both parents for a conversion to Islam of minor children to be valid.  
It should be noted that the Federal Court in Dahlia Dhamia (which was decided before Loh’s case was decided),  
and which was distinguished in Loh’s case, had revealed a judicial tension between the majority decision of  
Justices Abang Iskandar and Abu Bakar Jais and the dissenting judgment of Justice Mary Lim. The dissenting  
judgment maintained the legal position that is consistent with the Federal Court’s judgment in Indira Gandhi.  
Nevertheless, the majority decision in Dahlia Dhamia had given new impetus and opened new horizons in the  
area of unilateral conversion of minor children, considering the upbringing of the minor child, specifically that  
she was raised by her Muslim mother as a Muslim since childhood. This was actually what the High Court judge  
in Loh’s case tried to introduce in his judgment. The High Court in Loh’s case had earlier attempted to create  
what is seen as “judicial creativity” by adopting a different aspect of Indira Gandhi’s case, specifically regarding  
the welfare of children. He also applied the “force of evidence” test adopted by the Court of Appeal in Rosliza’s  
case, and thus maintaining the Muslim identity of the children was seen as consistent with the welfare of the  
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children. Nevertheless, it was later overturned by the Court of Appeal, which was also upheld by the Federal  
Court.  
Concerning the issue of unilateral conversion of minor children, it is viewed that future judges are now having  
two possible precedents to be considered at the Federal Court level, Indira Gandhi’s case (of which Loh’s case  
followed) and Dahlia Dhamia’s case. It would then depend on the facts and issues of the future cases to decide  
which one of the two precedents should be followed.  
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