INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue X October 2025
In their study, Oke and Ikpesu (2022) investigated how bank asset quality influences the performance of the
Nigerian banking sector. They analysed annual panel data for the period 2010 to 2019 by using the system
generalised method of moments (SGMM) technique and data obtained from the audited financial statements of
twelve banks listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The twelve banks control approximately 95% of the market
share, and the results show that capital adequacy and asset quality positively affect bank performance in Nigeria.
The data suggest that banks with higher capital buffers do better, as do those with fewer bad loans, although they
are less informative about overall bank performance. Moreover, having enough capital and sounder assets
translates into better bank earnings. Continuous improvement in asset quality remains important for
management, as non-performing loan ratios are still high. Additional credit policies, culture and corporate
governance also seem necessary to manage non-performing loan levels.
Ayiro et al (2022) assess the influence of asset quality on the financial performance of tier IV commercial banks
in Kenya. The study was guided by the scientific theory of management, Transaction Cost theory and
Contingency theory. This study employed a longitudinal research design. As of 2022, there were 13 tier IV
commercial banks in Kenya, according to the Central Bank of Kenya's website. Panel data were analysed using
STATA. Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficient yielded r = -0.4306 and a p-value of 0.0000, both of
which are significant for asset quality. The regression coefficient was -0.14, with a p-value of 0.013, for asset
quality (AQ) and financial performance (ROE) at a 5% level of significance. These results indicate that asset
quality had a significant influence on financial performance. Consequently, the descriptive statistics table,
including mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum, was not presented. However, because the study
was conducted in Kenya, the variables might differ from similar studies in Nigeria.
A study conducted by Giulio and colleagues from 2021 examined a group of 63 publicly listed banks from
Europe. They aimed to discern the relationship between capital levels and asset quality—specifically examining
provisioning and coverage of these banks—and overall risk and performance metrics. Results revealed different
outcomes depending on whether risk-based or non-risk-based capital levels were assessed. For instance, the
information value of the leverage ratio was only superficially related to the size of the bank. In contrast, the total
capital ratio exhibited a positive correlation with stability levels and a negative correlation with insolvency risk.
These findings underscore the significance of capital reserves to the broader resilience of the banking sector.
Moreover, banks with larger capital buffers tended to record higher performance levels, while those enforcing
heavy coverage and provisioning measures were generally linked to lower resilience and poorer performance.
Theoretical Framework
The Public Interest Theory of Regulation, which emerged prominently in the 1960s, provides a classical
justification for why governments intervene in markets. According to Oyedokun and Osho (2023), the central
argument of this theory is that without oversight, private businesses may act in ways that exploit consumers or
undermine broader societal welfare. Regulation, therefore, serves as a corrective mechanism, protecting citizens
from harmful practices, safeguarding public safety, and ensuring that businesses operate not solely for profit but
also for the benefit of society at large.
Pagratis and Staikouras (2021) further argue that markets are prone to failures and imperfections, making it
necessary for the state to step in and guide the allocation of resources toward the common good. In this sense,
regulatory bodies play a crucial role by issuing binding rules and standards designed to foster efficiency,
transparency, and stability. Nonetheless, the theory acknowledges an inherent tension. Regulatory agencies,
while established to protect the public interest, may themselves be vulnerable to influence or even capture by
the very industries they oversee (Iwan & Azhar, 2016). This concern is echoed by Becker (1983), who suggested
that control by a small group of influential individuals may sometimes improve efficiency but may also distort
regulations away from their intended goals. Similarly, Adams, Hayes, Weierter, and Boyd (2007) observed that
the close interaction between regulators and the regulated can expose agencies to pressure, potentially weakening
their ability to act impartially. When such capture occurs, the public good may be compromised, leaving
consumers unprotected.
Jamal et al. (2014) note that while the theory emphasises the government's responsibility to uphold the public
good, it does not fully explain how regulatory capture occurs or how it can be remedied. Ystrom (2010) also
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