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Border Management and Insecurity in Nigeria

Njoku, Chinwendu Shedrack

, Nwogu Boniface Kelechi Phd

Department of Political Science, K.O. Mbadiwe University, Ideato, Imo State

Department of Public Administration, IMO state Polytechnic, Omuma

DOI:

https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2025.910000717

Received: 29 October 2025; Accepted: 03 November 2025; Published: 21 November 2025

ABSTRACT

Nigeria’s vast and porous land and maritime borders pose major challenges to effective border management,

significantly contributing to the country’s insecurity. The numerous unofficial crossing points, difficult terrains,

and limited surveillance systems enable illicit activities such as small arms proliferation, terrorism, human and

drug trafficking, cattle rustling, and irregular migration. These transnational crimes worsen internal conflicts and

criminal networks. Weaknesses in Nigeria’s border governance—stemming from inadequate funding,

corruption, poor inter-agency coordination, and weak political commitment—have created opportunities for

groups like Boko Haram, bandits, and secessionists to smuggle weapons, recruit fighters, and conduct cross-

border attacks. The unchecked movement of people and goods also strains local economies, heightens ethnic

tensions, and deepens socio-economic instability in border regions. This study emphasizes the need for a

comprehensive approach to border security that integrates advanced surveillance technologies, intelligence

gathering, inter-agency cooperation, regional partnerships, and community engagement. Strengthening the

capacity of border personnel and addressing the marginalization of border communities are vital for building

trust and enhancing security. Effective border management, therefore, is essential not only for combating

insecurity but also for achieving lasting peace and sustainable national development.

Keywords: Border Management, Insecurity, Terrorism, Smuggling, Nigeria.

INTRODUCTION

Borders are essential features of modern states, representing both geographical boundaries and symbolic markers

of sovereignty. Effective border management is crucial for maintaining territorial integrity, facilitating legitimate

trade, and ensuring national security. In Nigeria, border management has gained prominence due to persistent

insecurity challenges, including terrorism, smuggling, arms proliferation, human trafficking, and cross-border

crimes that threaten internal stability and economic development (Okumu, 2010). As the most populous country

in Africa with over 200 million people, Nigeria’s security is not only a domestic concern but also a regional and

continental priority. The country’s porous borders, shared with neighboring states such as Niger, Chad,

Cameroon, and Benin, have remained difficult to monitor, thus providing fertile ground for insecurity to thrive

(Eze, 2021).

Nigeria’s borders are vast, stretching over 4,000 kilometers of land and maritime frontiers, much of which remain

poorly demarcated and inadequately policed (Onuoha, 2013). The porous nature of these borders has facilitated

the uncontrolled movement of people, goods, and illicit weapons, thereby compounding the country’s internal

security challenges. In recent decades, terrorist groups such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa

Province (ISWAP) have exploited these weaknesses to infiltrate Nigeria and launch deadly attacks. Additionally,

smuggling activities, particularly of petroleum products, agricultural goods, small arms, and light weapons,

continue to undermine Nigeria’s economy and exacerbate violent conflicts (Akinyemi & Omotola, 2019).

Consequently, border insecurity has become one of the most pressing national security concerns in Nigeria.

The management of Nigeria’s borders is further complicated by structural and institutional challenges. Weak

governance, corruption among border officials, inadequate surveillance technology, and limited inter-agency

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coordination undermine effective border control (Okolie, 2019). Moreover, the socio-economic realities of

border communities, who often depend on informal cross-border trade for survival, create conditions where state

regulations are resisted or ignored (Adewumi, 2020). These dynamics point to a complex interplay between

security, governance, and livelihoods in border regions, underscoring the need for a comprehensive and balanced

approach to border management.

The implications of ineffective border management for Nigeria’s national security are profound. The influx of

small arms and light weapons has fueled violent crimes, banditry, and communal clashes across the country

(Aghedo & Osumah, 2014). Human trafficking and irregular migration not only pose humanitarian concerns but

also strain Nigeria’s bilateral relations with neighboring countries. Additionally, uncontrolled borders contribute

to the persistence of organized crime networks that operate transnationally, challenging the capacity of the

Nigerian state to exercise full sovereignty (Oluwatayo, 2021). These realities reinforce the argument that border

security is a cornerstone of Nigeria’s broader internal security architecture.

In response, the Nigerian government has adopted several measures to improve border management, including

the deployment of security agencies such as the Nigeria Immigration Service, Nigeria Customs Service, and the

Nigerian Army to border areas. Policies such as the 2019 border closure aimed at curbing smuggling and

boosting local production demonstrate the state’s recognition of the problem, although such policies have

produced mixed results (Adeleke, 2020). Nigeria has also engaged in bilateral and multilateral collaborations

with neighboring countries and regional bodies like the Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS) to strengthen border security and combat transnational crimes. Despite these initiatives, the

persistence of insecurity suggests that existing measures remain insufficient and require re-examination.

Understanding the nexus between border management and insecurity in Nigeria is, therefore, crucial to designing

effective policies for peace and stability. As the global security environment continues to evolve with rising

transnational threats, Nigeria’s border governance must balance security imperatives with economic integration

and human security concerns. This calls for a holistic framework that integrates technological innovation,

regional cooperation, community engagement, and institutional reforms. This paper, therefore, examines the

relationship between border management and insecurity in Nigeria. It interrogates the historical and

contemporary challenges of securing Nigeria’s borders, highlights the security threats arising from porous

borders, and evaluates the responses of the Nigerian state and regional actors. By situating the discussion within

broader debates on state sovereignty, security governance, and regional cooperation, the paper contributes to

understanding how border management can be reformed to address insecurity more effectively in Nigeria.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Borders have long been central to the study of statehood and international relations, not only as geographical

lines but also as political, social, and economic constructs that embody sovereignty, identity, and authority.

Traditionally, borders are understood as territorial markers that define the jurisdiction of states and differentiate

them from others. They are critical for maintaining order, facilitating legitimate economic activities, and

safeguarding national security. Yet, when poorly managed, borders can also become entry points for insecurity,

illicit flows, and governance challenges (Newman, 2006).

Border management refers broadly to the policies, institutions, and practices that states employ to regulate and

monitor the movement of people, goods, and services across their territorial boundaries. It encompasses legal

frameworks, administrative procedures, security operations, and diplomatic engagements designed to balance

the imperatives of sovereignty, security, and integration (Andreas, 2003). Scholars emphasize that border

management is not merely a security function but a multidimensional process involving economic, political, and

social considerations (Okumu, 2010). For instance, while border controls aim to prevent the infiltration of

criminal elements, they must also facilitate trade, regional integration, and people-to-people interactions that

sustain borderland communities.

Academic discourse on border management draws from different theoretical lenses. From the realist perspective,

borders are primarily instruments of sovereignty and territorial control. Realists argue that the survival of the

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state depends on the ability to defend its borders from external threats through military and security measures

(Wæver, 1995). In contrast, liberal and constructivist perspectives highlight cooperation, institutional

frameworks, and shared norms as vital for effective border governance, especially in a globalized world where

threats transcend national boundaries (Rumford, 2006). Another strand of scholarship emphasizes the concept

of “borderlands” regions adjacent to borders that are often socially and economically integrated despite formal

divisions. This perspective highlights that borders are not only lines of separation but also zones of interaction,

negotiation, and hybridity (Newman & Paasi, 1998). Consequently, effective border management must

incorporate the interests and agency of borderland communities, whose everyday realities often conflict with

state-centric security approaches.

Also, scholars generally distinguish between “hard” and “soft” approaches to border management . Hard

strategies focus on coercive measures, including military deployment, policing, the erection of fences and walls,

surveillance technologies, and immigration restrictions (Andreas & Biersteker, 2003). Such strategies are rooted

in the realist tradition, emphasizing sovereignty and security over integration. Examples include Israel’s

separation wall, the United States–Mexico border wall, and militarized patrols in conflict-prone areas. In Nigeria,

hard border strategies are exemplified by the deployment of the military in the northeast to counter Boko Haram

insurgents and the use of joint border patrols to deter smuggling and arms trafficking (Onuoha, 2013).

By contrast, soft strategies emphasize cooperation, information sharing, regional integration, and the promotion

of legal trade and people-to-people exchanges as tools of border security (Adewumi, 2020). This approach aligns

with liberal theories of international relations, which view interdependence and collaboration as more sustainable

means of promoting security. Soft strategies include bilateral agreements, community policing, joint

development projects, and frameworks such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

Protocol on Free Movement of Persons. In practice, soft border management recognizes that communities on

either side of a border often share cultural, linguistic, and economic ties, making cooperative approaches more

legitimate and effective than militarization alone (Okolie, 2019).

Globalization has significantly reshaped the conceptualization of border management. While some scholars

argue that globalization has eroded the relevance of borders by increasing flows of capital, information, and

people, others maintain that borders remain central but have been reconfigured to adapt to new realities

(Rumford, 2006). The securitization of migration, the rise of transnational terrorism, and the global illicit

economy have underscored the importance of borders as sites of control and regulation (Andreas, 2003).

Border studies and border management continue to be enriched by recent empirical research, especially in Africa,

which adds nuance to earlier theoretical debates. For example, Enugu State University of Science and

Technology and the National Boundary Commission explored how poverty, corruption and porous borders

combine to weaken governmental institutions’ capacity for border governance in Nigeria. They argue that weak

institutions, limited resources, and poor inter‐agency coordination exacerbate insecurity along borderlands.

journals.npsa-se.org.ng Similarly, studies on the Nigeria–Niger border show that cross‐border crime—including

arms trafficking, human smuggling, and drug distribution—is exacerbated by economic disparities and political

instability; these factors allow non‐state networks to exploit border porosity. journals.covenantuniversity.edu.ng

Public policy analyses also contribute to understanding how specific interventions succeed or fail. For instance,

Idoniboye-Obu (2021) examined President Buhari’s 2019 land border closure policy, using a human needs

framework, to assess its implications. While security aims were cited, the study found mixed results in terms of

trade interference, smuggling persistence via unofficial routes, and socio-economic disruption in border

communities. Another study of the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol along the Nigeria-Benin border

highlights the tension between regional integration and transnational organized crime: though protocols aspire

to facilitation of movement, porous borders without adequate facilities or monitoring enable human trafficking

and other illicit trade.

On the technological front, a 2025 study examining technology adoption by the Nigeria Immigration Service

found that integration of digital systems, biometrics, data management, and modern monitoring tools correlates

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positively with improved performance in border control functions. However, challenges of maintenance, staff

training, corruption, and infrastructure continue to undermine effectiveness.

The theoretical literature has also been extended. Recent work (“Are Borders a Burden? Debates and Counter-

Narratives on Nigeria’s National Security”) problematises the dominant narrative of “porosity” by showing how

internal political patronage, state weakness, and domestic governance failures are often as, or more, important

than the physical nature of borders in causing insecurity. This suggests that policies focused solely on sealing

borders may overlook deeper drivers.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Border management and insecurity are interlinked governance concerns in Nigeria, a state whose territorial

integrity and internal cohesion continue to be undermined by porous frontiers, transnational crimes, and violent

non-state actors. Nigeria’s borders—spanning over 4,000 kilometres of land and 853 kilometres of coastline—

connect it with four neighboring countries and the Gulf of Guinea. Yet, these borders are marked by institutional

weakness, illicit flows, and security lapses that endanger national stability. To understand these dynamics, the

Structural-Functionalist Theory provides a valuable analytical framework. It helps explain how the functions or

dysfunctions of state institutions responsible for border management affect the larger social system’s

equilibrium, thus shaping patterns of insecurity.

Structural Functionalism, rooted in the works of Émile Durkheim (1895/1982) and developed by Talcott Parsons

(1951) and Robert Merton (1968), views society as an organized system whose parts (institutions, norms, and

roles) work together to maintain stability and social order. According to Parsons, every social structure performs

functions that contribute to the survival and integration of the system, summarized by his AGIL schema—

Adaptation, Goal attainment, Integration, and Latency. When a component fails to perform its function

adequately, the system experiences disequilibrium, which may manifest as conflict or insecurity (Parsons, 1951).

In Political Science, Structural Functionalism has been widely adopted as a framework for analyzing political

systems, state institutions, and governance structures. Scholars such as Almond and Powell (1966) and Easton

(1965) applied functionalist principles to explain how political institutions perform vital roles—such as interest

articulation, rule-making, enforcement, and communication—that sustain political stability and legitimacy.

Within this perspective, the political system is viewed as a subsystem of the larger social structure, interacting

with economic, cultural, and security systems to maintain equilibrium. When political institutions, such as the

legislature, executive, judiciary, or security agencies, fail to discharge their expected functions, dysfunctions

emerge, resulting in instability, insecurity, or systemic breakdown. Therefore, Structural Functionalism provides

an analytical lens through which the performance and interdependence of institutions—such as those managing

borders and national security—can be assessed in maintaining political order and stability.

Applying this theory to border management in Nigeria implies seeing border institutions—customs,

immigration, military, and intelligence agencies—as functional subsystems that maintain equilibrium between

national sovereignty, security, and socio-economic development. Their effectiveness or failure directly

influences Nigeria’s internal order and international relations.

From a structural-functionalist viewpoint, border management constitutes a subsystem within the broader

security and governance structure of the Nigerian state. Its core functions include territorial control, regulation

of movement, facilitation of legal trade, and prevention of illicit flows (Andreas, 2003; Okumu, 2010). When

these functions are effectively performed, they contribute to systemic stability—ensuring that economic,

political, and social institutions operate within a secure environment.

In functionalist terms, border management performs both manifest and latent functions (Merton, 1968). The

manifest functions are explicit and intended—such as preventing smuggling, controlling migration, and

collecting customs revenue. The latent functions are unintended but consequential, including fostering cross-

border cultural exchanges or providing livelihood opportunities for borderland communities. However, when

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dysfunctions emerge—corruption among border officials, poor surveillance technology, or lack of inter-agency

coordination—they disrupt the equilibrium, leading to insecurity.

Empirical studies reveal that Nigeria’s borders have become zones of dysfunction due to systemic weaknesses.

The Nigerian Immigration Service and Customs Service often face overlapping jurisdictions, inadequate

funding, and bureaucratic inefficiency (Enugu State University of Science and Technology, 2023). These

dysfunctions impede their adaptive capacity (Parsons’s “A”) and goal attainment (“G”), thereby undermining

the overall integration (“I”) of the national security system. In the Nigerian context, the institutions charged with

border management—the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), National Drug

Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), and the armed forces—represent the structural components performing

specific roles toward system stability. Their coordination reflects the interdependence typical of a functionalist

system. When functioning optimally, the agencies provide surveillance, enforce trade regulations, and prevent

cross-border infiltration by criminal or terrorist groups (Onuoha, 2013).

However, institutional inefficiency and corruption produce dysfunctions that reverberate across the security

architecture. Studies show that officers often engage in rent-seeking behavior, allowing smugglers or traffickers

to bypass checkpoints (Adewumi, 2020). Such practices undermine the legitimacy of the state and enable the

proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), fueling insurgency and banditry in the north (Okolie,

2019). In functionalist terms, the dysfunction of one subsystem triggers strain in others: poor border control

enables criminal economies, which in turn threaten political stability and social cohesion.

Parsons’s idea of system equilibrium underscores the need for feedback mechanisms—policy reform, capacity

building, and community engagement—to restore balance. Without such corrective functions, insecurity

proliferates and the system gravitates toward anomie, a condition Durkheim described as normlessness resulting

from institutional failure (Durkheim, 1895/1982).

Functionalism also emphasizes interconnectedness among social institutions. Border management in Nigeria

does not exist in isolation but interacts with the economy, politics, and social order. For instance, smuggling and

human trafficking across the Nigeria–Benin and Nigeria–Niger borders are not merely criminal issues but

reflections of structural unemployment, poverty, and weak governance. These socio-economic dysfunctions

reinforce insecurity, illustrating Merton’s notion of strain—where societal goals (prosperity, stability) become

unattainable through legitimate means, prompting deviant alternatives (Merton, 1968).

Economic marginalization of border communities further compounds the problem. Many residents depend on

informal cross-border trade for survival. When hard security measures, such as border closures or militarization,

restrict livelihoods, they produce latent dysfunctions by pushing communities toward illicit networks

(Idoniboye-Obu, 2021). Consequently, rather than enhancing security, rigid enforcement may deepen alienation

and resistance—undermining the integration function that sustains societal balance. Moreover, the technological

dimension of border management in Nigeria remains underdeveloped. A recent study found that adoption of

biometric and digital surveillance systems improved detection capacity but faced maintenance and corruption

challenges (African Journal of Business and Management, 2025). From a functionalist lens, technological

modernization represents the adaptive function, enabling institutions to adjust to environmental changes. When

technological adaptation fails, it signifies systemic rigidity that breeds vulnerability to transnational threats.

Structural Functionalism advocates reform through functional realignment rather than revolutionary overhaul.

Therefore, restoring equilibrium in Nigeria’s border management system requires aligning institutional roles,

reinforcing capacity, and enhancing coordination. The theory suggests that each agency must clearly understand

its function within the security architecture to avoid redundancy and conflict.

First, improving inter-agency coordination through joint task forces and centralized data systems would

strengthen integration. Second, addressing latent social needs of border communities—such as infrastructure,

education, and inclusion in policy formulation—would reduce the appeal of illicit economies and promote

community-based intelligence (Lead City University, 2022). Third, Nigeria must deepen regional cooperation

within ECOWAS, aligning with the soft-border management model that emphasizes information sharing and

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legal trade facilitation (ECOWAS, 2021). These reforms correspond to Parsons’s AGIL framework by enhancing

adaptability, goal clarity, institutional integration, and legitimacy. Finally, Structural Functionalism underscores

the importance of normative consensus. Insecurity flourishes when societal norms are weak or contested. The

Nigerian state must therefore promote a shared sense of national identity and legitimacy across its borderlands.

A coherent border management policy rooted in transparency, accountability, and community participation

would reinforce the collective moral order, thereby reducing the incidence of transnational crime and insurgency.

Historical Context of Border Management in Nigeria

The history of border management in Nigeria cannot be understood without revisiting its colonial roots. Nigeria’s

borders, like many in Africa, were products of the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, during which European

powers partitioned the continent into spheres of influence without regard to pre-existing cultural, ethnic, or

political boundaries (Asiwaju, 2001; Nugent, 2002). In this context, Nigeria’s boundaries were arbitrarily drawn

to serve colonial administrative convenience and economic exploitation rather than indigenous realities. These

boundaries divided ethnic groups such as the Yoruba between Nigeria and Benin, the Hausa-Fulani between

Nigeria and Niger, the Kanuri between Nigeria and Chad, and the Efik between Nigeria and Cameroon (Miles,

1994). This colonial legacy produced borders that were essentially “artificial” in nature, severing communities

that had long histories of social, cultural, and commercial interaction (Herbst, 2000). As a result, border

communities often maintained cross-border relations in defiance of imposed colonial demarcations, creating a

structural tension between the lived experiences of border peoples and the expectations of the state (Nugent,

2002).

During the colonial period, British administrators introduced rudimentary forms of border control, primarily to

secure colonial economic interests. Customs posts and excise duties were established to regulate trade, with the

main aim of maximizing revenue rather than enhancing security (Asiwaju, 2001). However, these measures were

largely ineffective, as the vast frontiers of Nigeria—stretching over 4,000 kilometers of land borders and a

significant coastline—were impossible to police effectively with the limited resources at the disposal of the

colonial government (Anene, 1970). Colonial authorities also selectively encouraged cross-border migration to

meet labor demands in mining, railway construction, and agriculture. Migrant workers, particularly from Niger

and Chad, were allowed into northern Nigeria under regulated conditions (Adepoju, 2005). At the same time,

informal and unregulated movements continued across porous borders. Thus, while colonial administrations

sought to institutionalize border management, enforcement remained weak, leaving a legacy of porousness and

informality that persists today (Okolie, 2019).

At independence in 1960, Nigeria inherited these colonial boundaries and the attendant challenges of managing

them. The newly sovereign state was confronted with the task of consolidating national sovereignty while also

maintaining cordial relations with its neighbors. However, weak institutional capacity, corruption, and limited

technological infrastructure hindered effective border control (Onuoha, 2013). The Nigerian Civil War (1967–

1970) marked a critical moment in the history of border management. The secessionist Republic of Biafra relied

heavily on arms smuggling and cross-border support from sympathizers in neighboring countries. The porous

borders with Cameroon and other neighbors facilitated clandestine inflows of weapons, food, and humanitarian

supplies (Osaghae, 1998). The federal government’s inability to completely seal the borders demonstrated both

the strategic importance of border security and the limitations of Nigeria’s institutional capacity. This period

also cemented the idea that national survival and sovereignty were intimately tied to border control (Aghedo &

Osumah, 2014).

The oil boom of the 1970s transformed Nigeria into an economic hub, attracting labor migrants from neighboring

West African countries such as Niger, Chad, Ghana, and Benin. Migration across porous borders was largely

tolerated during the period of economic prosperity, as migrants contributed to Nigeria’s labor force (Adepoju,

2005). However, the economic downturn of the early 1980s, coupled with rising unemployment and inflation,

triggered resentment against foreign migrants. This culminated in the mass expulsions of undocumented

immigrants in 1983 and 1985, during which over two million people—mostly from Ghana and Niger—were

expelled from Nigeria (Afolayan, 1988).

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These expulsions highlighted the link between border management, economic realities, and national security.

Borders became politicized as the state sought to control migration flows during economic crises. At the same

time, Nigeria’s membership in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established in

1975, introduced new contradictions. The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons encouraged

regional integration and economic cooperation by permitting freer cross-border movement (Adepoju, 2005).

However, while this strengthened economic ties, it also created vulnerabilities by facilitating the exploitation of

Nigeria’s porous borders for smuggling and other transnational crimes (Okolie, 2019).

The 1990s marked the rise of new threats linked to border insecurity. Following the end of the Cold War, the

proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) across Africa exacerbated instability (Aghedo &

Osumah, 2014). Nigeria’s borders, especially in the north, became conduits for illicit weapons from conflict

zones in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Chad. These arms fueled communal conflicts, armed robbery, and ethnic

militias within Nigeria. At the same time, the collapse of state institutions during prolonged military rule

undermined border enforcement. Corruption within customs, immigration, and security agencies meant that

smugglers and traffickers could operate with impunity (Eze, 2021). Border communities, neglected by successive

governments, turned increasingly to informal and illegal cross-border trade as a survival strategy, further

entrenching the culture of weak enforcement and complicity between state agents and non-state actors (Okolie,

2019).

The rise of Boko Haram in the 2000s, and its evolution into a transnational insurgency after 2009, brought border

management to the center of Nigeria’s security agenda. Boko Haram and its splinter group, the Islamic State

West Africa Province (ISWAP), exploited porous borders with Chad, Niger, and Cameroon to establish

sanctuaries, smuggle weapons, and conduct cross-border raids (Zenn, 2020). The insurgency demonstrated that

border insecurity had moved beyond smuggling and migration issues to become a fundamental threat to state

survival. In response, Nigeria collaborated with neighboring states through the Multinational Joint Task Force

(MNJTF), established under the Lake Chad Basin Commission. This regional initiative underscored the

recognition that border insecurity could not be managed unilaterally but required cooperative, multilateral

frameworks (Aghedo & Osumah, 2014).

Another defining moment came with Nigeria’s unilateral border closure between August 2019 and December

2020. The closure was intended to combat smuggling, particularly of rice and fuel, and to stimulate local

agricultural production (Adeleke, 2020). While the policy achieved some short-term gains in reducing

smuggling, it also disrupted regional trade, violated ECOWAS free movement protocols, and strained relations

with Benin and Niger (Eze, 2021). The episode reflected Nigeria’s persistent reliance on ad hoc, securitized

approaches to border management, often at the expense of long-term regional cooperation and economic

integration.

Therefore, the foregoing historical trajectory of border management in Nigeria highlights enduring challenges

rooted in colonial boundary-making, weak institutional frameworks, and socio-economic pressures. From

colonial-era customs posts to post-independence expulsions, from the Biafran War to the Boko Haram

insurgency, Nigeria’s experience demonstrates the centrality of borders in questions of sovereignty, security,

and development. Each phase of Nigeria’s history has reinforced the reality that border management is not

merely a technical or administrative issue, but a deeply political one intertwined with state-building, economic

survival, and regional relations.

Contemporary Challenges of Border Management in Nigeria

Nigeria’s border management in the contemporary era is confronted with multifaceted challenges that undermine

both national security and economic stability. These challenges are rooted in structural, institutional, and

transnational factors, making effective border control an elusive goal. With Nigeria’s extensive borders

stretching over 4,000 kilometers across land and maritime spaces, poor governance capacity and rising

transnational crimes have combined to exacerbate insecurity in ways that threaten state authority and sovereignty

(Akinyemi & Omotola, 2019). The following subsections highlight the most pressing contemporary challenges

of border management in Nigeria.

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Porous Borders and Inadequate Infrastructure: One of the most persistent challenges is the porous nature of

Nigeria’s borders. Large segments of the frontiers with neighboring countries such as Benin, Niger, Chad, and

Cameroon remain poorly demarcated and inadequately monitored (Onuoha, 2013). The absence of effective

surveillance infrastructure, such as modern scanners, drones, and electronic monitoring systems, means that vast

stretches of the borders remain vulnerable to illegal crossings. This problem is compounded by rugged terrains,

including forests, deserts, and rivers, which security agencies often lack the resources to effectively patrol

(Okolie, 2019). As a result, smugglers, arms traffickers, and insurgent groups exploit these gaps to conduct illicit

activities across borders.

A vivid example is the Lake Chad Basin, where Nigeria shares borders with Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. The

region has become a hotspot for Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) militants who

frequently move across the porous boundaries to evade military operations. The absence of clear demarcation

and sustained border surveillance has allowed these groups to establish transnational networks, smuggle

weapons, and recruit fighters from neighboring states (Adebajo, 2020). Similarly, along the Nigeria–Benin

border, widespread smuggling of petroleum products, rice, and small arms persists despite periodic government

crackdowns. These cross-border activities not only deprive Nigeria of significant customs revenue but also

undermine national security and contribute to the proliferation of illegal arms and insurgent violence within the

country.

Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons: The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs)

constitutes another major challenge. According to the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and

Disarmament in Africa (UNREC, 2016), West Africa hosts millions of illicit weapons, with Nigeria being a

principal hub. Weak border management enables the inflow of firearms that fuel violent crimes, communal

clashes, banditry, and terrorism (Aghedo & Osumah, 2014). For instance, Boko Haram and bandit groups in the

North-East and North-West have acquired much of their weaponry through porous borders with Chad and Niger.

The inability of security agencies to stem this flow highlights a systemic failure in arms control at Nigeria’s

borders.

A clear example is the 2011 United Nations Building bombing in Abuja, where investigations revealed that some

of the explosives and assault rifles used by Boko Haram were trafficked through the Niger–Chad corridor.

Intelligence reports indicated that these weapons originated from Libyan stockpiles looted after the fall of

Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 and were smuggled into Nigeria through the Sahel (Edeko, 2011). Similarly, in the

North-Western states of Zamfara and Katsina, bandit networks have been sustained by steady access to firearms

obtained via illegal routes along the Niger border. Local security operatives have repeatedly intercepted

smugglers transporting AK-47 rifles, ammunition, and rocket-propelled grenades concealed in trucks and

livestock convoys (Okoli & Ugwu, 2019). These cases demonstrate how porous borders and weak enforcement

mechanisms have allowed non-state actors to acquire sophisticated weapons, thereby escalating the scale and

lethality of violence across Nigeria.

Corruption and Institutional Weaknesses: Border management in Nigeria is also undermined by corruption

within the security and regulatory agencies. Reports indicate that customs and immigration officers often collude

with smugglers and traffickers in exchange for bribes, thereby enabling illicit trade and criminal infiltration

(Adewumi, 2020). Institutional rivalries and poor inter-agency cooperation between the Nigeria Immigration

Service, Nigeria Customs Service, and military forces further weaken border governance. The duplication of

roles and lack of synergy lead to inefficiency, while bureaucratic bottlenecks hinder the deployment of modern

management practices (Okolie, 2019). This governance deficit makes border security highly vulnerable to

compromise.

A notable example occurred in 2019 along the Seme–Krake border between Nigeria and Benin, where several

customs and immigration officers were arrested for facilitating large-scale rice and fuel smuggling operations.

Investigations revealed that officials received bribes to overlook contraband shipments, despite the government’s

border closure policy intended to curb illegal imports and protect local industries (Premium Times, 2019). Such

practices not only sabotaged Nigeria’s trade and fiscal objectives but also demonstrated how entrenched

corruption neutralizes official border enforcement measures.

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Another example is the illegal arms importation scandal of 2017, in which security operatives at the Lagos

seaports intercepted containers loaded with 661 pump-action rifles. Subsequent investigations by the Department

of State Services (DSS) and the Nigeria Customs Service exposed that the shipment had cleared multiple

checkpoints with the collusion of senior customs officers (Vanguard, 2017). This incident underscored how

institutional compromise and weak oversight mechanisms facilitate the entry of dangerous weapons into the

country, thereby exacerbating insecurity and violent crime. These cases collectively reveal that corruption and

institutional fragmentation remain central obstacles to effective border management in Nigeria.

Cross-Border Terrorism and Insurgency: Nigeria’s border regions have become theaters for cross-border

terrorism, particularly in the Lake Chad Basin area. Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa Province

(ISWAP) frequently exploit the porous frontiers with Cameroon, Niger, and Chad to move fighters, weapons,

and logistics (Eze, 2021). The regional nature of insurgency underscores the limitations of unilateral Nigerian

strategies in securing borders. Despite military offensives, the continued cross-border mobility of insurgents

reflects a serious weakness in Nigeria’s border management architecture, while also highlighting the need for

enhanced regional cooperation (Adeleke, 2020).

A prominent example occurred in 2015 during the capture and recapture of Gamboru-Ngala and Damasak—

twin border towns in Borno State. Boko Haram militants repeatedly crossed from Nigeria into Cameroon and

Niger after military confrontations, regrouped, and then launched renewed attacks on Nigerian territories. The

fluidity of movement across the border allowed the insurgents to evade capture and maintain operational

resilience (International Crisis Group, 2016). This demonstrated how the lack of coordinated surveillance and

joint military operations across frontiers hampers Nigeria’s counter-terrorism efforts.

Another striking instance is the 2018 attack on a military base in Metele, Borno State, where ISWAP fighters

reportedly advanced from hideouts along the Niger–Chad axis. Intelligence sources confirmed that the attackers

had exploited unmonitored border corridors to infiltrate Nigerian territory with heavy weaponry, resulting in the

deaths of dozens of soldiers (Campbell, 2019). The ease with which insurgents move through these transnational

spaces highlights the inadequacy of Nigeria’s border management system and underscores the necessity of

sustained collaboration with neighboring states through frameworks such as the Multinational Joint Task Force

(MNJTF). These examples reinforce that without integrated regional security strategies, Nigeria’s borders will

remain vulnerable to terrorist infiltration and cross-border violence.

Smuggling and Economic Sabotage: Smuggling remains one of the most pervasive border challenges, causing

both economic and security consequences. Smuggled petroleum products, rice, vehicles, and textiles undermine

Nigeria’s domestic industries and reduce state revenue through tax evasion (Akinyemi & Omotola, 2019). The

closure of Nigeria’s land borders in 2019 was partly justified as a response to widespread smuggling, but it also

exposed the structural weaknesses of border enforcement. While the closure temporarily curbed the inflow of

contraband goods, it disrupted the livelihoods of border communities and strained relations with neighboring

states (Adeleke, 2020). This suggests that Nigeria’s reliance on ad hoc, protectionist measures is unsustainable

without comprehensive reforms in border governance.

A notable example is the persistent smuggling of petroleum products across the Nigeria–Benin border,

particularly through the Seme and Idiroko corridors. Subsidized fuel from Nigeria is often diverted and sold at

higher prices in neighboring countries, leading to significant economic losses for the Nigerian government. In

2018 alone, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) estimated that over 10 million liters of petrol

were illegally exported daily through smuggling networks, aided by corrupt border officials and weak

surveillance (NNPC, 2018). Another example is the massive rice smuggling crisis of 2017–2019, which

flourished despite Nigeria’s import restrictions designed to protect local agriculture. Thousands of bags of

foreign parboiled rice entered the country through unofficial routes from Benin Republic, flooding markets in

Lagos, Ogun, and Kwara States. The Nigeria Customs Service reported that several seizures of contraband rice

were linked to sophisticated syndicates with international supply chains operating through Cotonou Port

(Premium Times, 2019). This illicit trade weakened local rice production efforts and undercut the government’s

agricultural diversification agenda.

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A further illustration is the influx of used vehicles and textiles through the Niger border at Jibia and Illela, where

smugglers exploit poorly monitored routes and the complicity of customs agents to avoid import duties (Okolie,

2019). These smuggling activities deprive Nigeria of substantial customs revenue while fueling corruption and

distorting local markets. Collectively, such examples reveal that smuggling is not merely an economic crime but

a multidimensional governance challenge that undermines state authority, regional cooperation, and border

security.

Human Trafficking and Irregular Migration: Another pressing issue is human trafficking and irregular

migration facilitated through poorly controlled borders. Nigeria is both a source and transit country for

trafficking victims, many of whom are smuggled across borders to destinations in North Africa, Europe, and the

Middle East (Okumu, 2010). Weak enforcement capacity at border posts and complicity of corrupt officials

enable traffickers to operate with relative ease. Beyond the humanitarian crisis, irregular migration also poses

regional security concerns, as it intersects with organized crime, human rights abuses, and loss of human capital.

A vivid example is the Benin City–Agadez–Libya trafficking corridor, which has become one of the most

notorious routes for the movement of Nigerian migrants and trafficking victims. Young women and men are

transported from Edo and Delta States through Niger’s Agadez region en route to Libya and eventually to

Europe. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2018), thousands of Nigerians rescued

in Libya reported having been trafficked by organized criminal networks operating freely across Nigeria’s

northern borders with Niger. Many victims suffered sexual exploitation, forced labor, and abuse in transit camps

controlled by militias.

Another example is the Kano–Katsina–Maradi corridor, where human smugglers exploit unguarded crossing

points between Nigeria and Niger Republic. Traffickers often disguise their operations as legitimate transport

services, collecting money from migrants seeking to reach North Africa. In 2020, the Nigeria Immigration

Service (NIS) intercepted over 500 migrants along this route, including minors being trafficked to Libya for

domestic work and sexual exploitation (NIS, 2020). Despite these interceptions, weak penalties and corruption

among border officers have allowed the illicit networks to continue thriving.

A further instance is the Calabar–Cameroon maritime route, which has emerged as a trafficking channel to

Central Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. Victims—particularly young women—are transported by boats through

the Bakassi Peninsula and onward to Gabon and Equatorial Guinea for forced labor and prostitution. The

National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP, 2021) reported several cases involving

traffickers colluding with boat operators and immigration officials to facilitate such movements. These examples

underscore the complex nexus between weak border governance, corruption, and transnational organized crime,

all of which perpetuate Nigeria’s human trafficking and irregular migration crisis.

Weak Regional and International Cooperation: Although Nigeria is a member of ECOWAS and has

committed to regional agreements on free movement and joint security, cooperation in border management

remains weak. Many neighboring states lack the capacity or political will to fully collaborate with Nigeria on

intelligence sharing and joint patrols (Okumu, 2010). Furthermore, overlapping mandates between ECOWAS,

the Lake Chad Basin Commission, and other regional bodies often create confusion and limit coordinated

responses. The gap between policy commitments and practical implementation has hindered Nigeria’s ability to

tackle transnational border-related threats effectively (Oluwatayo, 2021).

A key example is the limited effectiveness of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence

and Establishment (1979). While the protocol was designed to promote regional integration and legal migration,

it has been exploited by criminal networks who move contraband goods, arms, and trafficking victims across

borders under the guise of legitimate travel. For instance, despite Nigeria’s efforts to regulate cross-border

mobility, smuggling and trafficking continue unchecked through the Seme and Illela borders due to weak

cooperation from customs and immigration agencies in Benin and Niger (Eze, 2021). This highlights how the

absence of harmonized enforcement mechanisms among ECOWAS member states undermines the protocol’s

objectives and compromises regional security.

Another example is the limited coordination within the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) operating under

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the Lake Chad Basin Commission. Although Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon pledged joint military

collaboration to combat Boko Haram and ISWAP, operational disagreements, logistical constraints, and national

sovereignty concerns have weakened the alliance. In several instances, insurgents fled Nigerian offensives by

retreating into neighboring territories, where partner forces were either slow to respond or lacked capacity to

pursue them effectively (International Crisis Group, 2020). These gaps in real-time coordination and intelligence

sharing demonstrate the persistent institutional and political obstacles that frustrate regional border governance

efforts in West and Central Africa.

Technological Deficiencies and Capacity Gaps: Technological deficiencies represent a significant barrier to

effective border governance. Unlike advanced states that deploy biometric systems, satellite surveillance, and

artificial intelligence for monitoring, Nigeria continues to rely largely on manual inspection and outdated

practices (Okolie, 2019). Security personnel are often undertrained and poorly equipped to deal with

contemporary threats. Limited investment in capacity-building and modern technology has created

vulnerabilities that criminal groups exploit with increasing sophistication.

For example, the e-border management system launched in 2012 by the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) with

the goal of integrating biometric data collection and electronic surveillance has achieved minimal success. Many

border posts, particularly in remote areas of Adamawa, Katsina, and Sokoto States, remain without reliable

internet connectivity, power supply, or functional biometric equipment (Adewuyi, 2020). Consequently, the

verification of travelers and goods is still conducted manually, allowing illegal migrants, traffickers, and

smugglers to cross undetected. The failure to sustain this project underscores the broader problem of weak digital

infrastructure and inconsistent policy implementation in Nigeria’s security sector.

Another example is the ineffectiveness of the Integrated Customs Information System (ICIS) introduced by the

Nigeria Customs Service to automate trade monitoring and reduce smuggling. Despite its design to enhance

transparency and data sharing among agencies, poor interconnectivity between customs posts and the absence

of real-time data analytics have rendered the system largely inefficient. Criminal networks have taken advantage

of these gaps by using forged documents and manipulating entry logs to move contraband goods through land

borders and seaports (Abdullahi, 2021). These lapses illustrate how technological backwardness, coupled with

bureaucratic inertia, continues to undermine Nigeria’s border governance capacity.

Technological Adoption: The inadequate adoption and integration of modern technology in surveillance, data

management, and border control operations possess a major problem to border management in Nigeria. Most

border posts still rely on manual inspection and outdated communication systems, making it difficult to monitor

vast and porous borders effectively. The absence of advanced tools such as biometric scanners, drones, and real-

time surveillance cameras limits the ability of security agencies to detect illegal crossings and smuggling

activities. For instance, despite Nigeria’s membership in the ECOWAS biometric passport system, several border

checkpoints still lack the infrastructure to verify such documents digitally, leading to delays and security

loopholes that facilitate cross-border crimes.

Training of Border Personnel: Inadequate training of border personnel remains a significant challenge to

effective border management in Nigeria. Many officers lack the specialized knowledge required to handle

modern surveillance equipment, manage digital databases, or identify sophisticated methods of trafficking and

smuggling. This skills gap often results in inefficient screening, corruption, and human rights abuses at border

posts. For example, at the Seme border between Nigeria and Benin Republic, poorly trained customs and

immigration officers have been reported to mishandle the use of electronic cargo-tracking systems introduced to

monitor goods, leading to system failures and persistent revenue leakages.

Coordination among Agencies: Weak coordination and overlapping mandates among various border

management agencies hinder operational efficiency in Nigeria. Institutions such as the Nigeria Immigration

Service, Nigeria Customs Service, and National Drug Law Enforcement Agency often operate independently,

leading to duplication of efforts and inter-agency rivalry. This lack of synergy obstructs intelligence sharing and

coordinated responses to cross-border threats. A clear example is the 2019 border closure policy (“Operation

Swift Response”), during which conflicting directives from the Customs Service and Immigration Service led to

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confusion and inconsistent enforcement across border points, undermining the overall objective of curbing

smuggling and enhancing border security.

Arising from the foregoing, it is obvious that the contemporary challenges of border management in Nigeria are

deeply interconnected, reflecting weaknesses in state capacity, institutional corruption, regional insecurity, and

socio-economic pressures. These challenges have created an environment where smuggling, terrorism, arms

trafficking, and human trafficking thrive, further exacerbating insecurity within the Nigerian state. Addressing

them requires not only strengthening institutions and technology but also enhancing regional cooperation and

adopting holistic approaches that balance security imperatives with economic and social realities.

Strategies for Effective Border Management in Nigeria

The persistent challenges of weak border governance in Nigeria have triggered debates on effective policy

responses and strategies. As Africa’s most populous state and a regional power, Nigeria’s ability to secure its

borders has profound implications not only for internal stability but also for the security and integration of West

Africa. Addressing border insecurity requires a multidimensional approach that integrates institutional reforms,

technological innovation, regional cooperation, and socio-economic interventions (Adeleke, 2020).

Strengthening Institutional and Legal Frameworks

One of the primary strategies for effective border management is the strengthening of Nigeria’s institutional and

legal frameworks. The Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), and the Armed

Forces are central actors in border governance; however, overlapping mandates and bureaucratic inefficiencies

often hinder effective coordination (Okolie, 2019). Clear delineation of roles, improved inter-agency

collaboration, and enhanced training are essential to improve operational effectiveness.

Legal reforms are equally necessary. Nigeria’s current border security legislation is fragmented, with outdated

laws that inadequately address contemporary threats such as cybercrime, human trafficking, and terrorism.

Updating these laws in line with international standards will enhance accountability and ensure that agencies

have the legal authority to confront evolving border challenges (Oche, 2020).

Adoption of Technology and Intelligence-Led Policing

In the digital era, technology plays a critical role in border security. Nigeria’s reliance on manpower-intensive

border policing has proven ineffective against sophisticated transnational criminal networks. The adoption of

surveillance drones, biometric identification systems, satellite monitoring, and electronic databases for tracking

migrants and goods would greatly enhance Nigeria’s border management capacity (Chidozie, 2019).

Intelligence-led policing must complement technological innovation. Enhancing the collection, analysis, and

sharing of intelligence among agencies—both domestically and with regional partners—would enable proactive

responses to threats rather than reactive measures. For example, the establishment of the National Border

Management Strategy (NBMS) emphasizes intelligence-driven operations as a cornerstone of reform (Akinyemi

& Omotola, 2019).

Regional and International Cooperation

Given the transnational nature of insecurity, border management cannot be achieved by Nigeria alone. Regional

cooperation within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and bilateral agreements with

neighboring states are vital. ECOWAS’ Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and

Establishment provides opportunities for legal cross-border trade and migration, but Nigeria must balance

openness with the need for security (Adepoju, 2020).

Collaborating with Chad, Cameroon, and Niger in joint border patrols and intelligence sharing has proven

effective in the fight against Boko Haram, yet such initiatives need to be institutionalized rather than ad hoc

(Onuoha, 2013). At the international level, partnerships with the African Union (AU), the United Nations Office

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on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and donor agencies can provide both technical expertise and funding for modern

border control initiatives.

Community Engagement and Borderland Development

Border management strategies must also incorporate human security and socio-economic development. Many

Nigerian border communities suffer from poverty, marginalization, and neglect, making them vulnerable to

criminal recruitment and complicit in smuggling activities (Adewumi, 2020). Effective border security requires

winning the trust of these communities through inclusive governance, provision of basic infrastructure, and

alternative livelihoods.

Community policing and cross-border community dialogues can strengthen the relationship between local

residents and security agencies, thereby reducing hostility and fostering intelligence sharing. As Aghedo and

Osumah (2014) argue, securitization without local buy-in often fails, as communities continue to collaborate

with smugglers and insurgents to survive. Thus, integrating borderland development with security initiatives is

a long-term but necessary strategy.

Addressing Corruption and Capacity Deficits

Another key policy response is the fight against corruption within security and customs agencies. Corruption

enables the smuggling of arms, drugs, and people, undermining formal security efforts (Eze, 2021). Transparent

recruitment processes, improved welfare for border personnel, and strict enforcement of accountability

mechanisms can help reduce the prevalence of corruption. Capacity building is equally vital. Training border

personnel in modern surveillance techniques, intelligence gathering, and human rights–compliant practices will

enhance professionalism and efficiency. International training programs and exchange missions with countries

experienced in advanced border management could provide valuable capacity development for Nigerian security

agencies (Okumu, 2010).

Balancing Security with Regional Integration

Finally, strategies for effective border management must balance the dual goals of security and integration.

Nigeria’s leadership role in West Africa requires it to champion regional economic cooperation while securing

its borders against illicit flows. Policies such as selective border closures—like the 2019 closure—undermine

trust with neighbors and disrupt legitimate trade (Adeleke, 2020). Instead, smarter border management

approaches that separate licit from illicit flows, supported by technology and intelligence, are preferable.

CONCLUSION

Border management remains a fundamental determinant of national security, state sovereignty, and regional

stability in Nigeria. The paper has demonstrated that Nigeria’s borders—spanning thousands of kilometers across

land and maritime boundaries—are porous and weakly managed, which has profound consequences for internal

security, economic development, and the preservation of national sovereignty. Beginning with the historical

context, it was established that Nigeria inherited artificially drawn colonial borders, which disregarded ethnic,

cultural, and economic ties. This legacy has made contemporary border governance more complex, as

communities along the frontiers maintain strong cross-border networks that sometimes weaken state authority.

The literature further reinforced that border security is not merely a question of territorial defense but one of

governance, cooperation, and the balance between security and legitimate movement of people and goods.

The contemporary challenges examined in this paper highlighted the multidimensional nature of border

insecurity. Nigeria’s borders are characterized by insufficient surveillance, inadequate infrastructure, corruption

among security personnel, weak inter-agency coordination, and poor community engagement. These weaknesses

have created opportunities for smuggling, human trafficking, arms proliferation, terrorism, and unregulated

migration, all of which exacerbate insecurity within the country. Moreover, globalization and regional

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integration under frameworks like ECOWAS, while offering economic opportunities, have further complicated

Nigeria’s ability to regulate cross-border movement. The literature consistently reveals that weak border

governance has amplified internal crises such as terrorism, banditry, and organized crime.

The implications of weak border management are far-reaching for Nigeria’s security and development. On one

hand, the unchecked flow of arms and fighters into the country fuels insurgencies like Boko Haram in the

Northeast and banditry in the Northwest. On the other hand, the loss of customs revenue through smuggling

undermines economic stability and deprives the state of critical resources. Additionally, the inability to

effectively regulate the borders has eroded citizens’ trust in the state’s capacity to protect them, further straining

state–society relations. Ultimately, porous borders are not only a security threat but also a governance deficit,

undermining Nigeria’s broader efforts at national development and democratic consolidation.

In response to these challenges, Nigeria has developed a range of policies and strategies aimed at strengthening

border governance. These include the establishment of agencies like the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) and

Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), increased deployment of joint border patrols, regional collaborations with

neighboring states, and initiatives to modernize surveillance through the use of technology such as drones and

biometric systems. While these strategies mark important steps, their effectiveness has been constrained by

issues of corruption, limited political will, inadequate funding, and overlapping mandates among security

institutions. The paper underscores that reforms must therefore go beyond reactive measures to encompass

systemic institutional strengthening, community engagement, and international cooperation.

In synthesizing the arguments, a key insight emerges: border management in Nigeria cannot be viewed solely as

a military or law enforcement challenge. It requires a holistic governance framework that integrates security,

economic, and social dimensions. Addressing border insecurity demands investments in modern technology,

professionalization of security agencies, and strong accountability mechanisms to curb corruption. Equally

important, border communities must be recognized as stakeholders rather than security risks; fostering local

development and building trust will encourage their cooperation in surveillance and intelligence gathering. At

the regional level, Nigeria must balance the benefits of ECOWAS free movement protocols with its domestic

security imperatives, ensuring that integration does not compromise national sovereignty.

The findings of this paper therefore demonstrates that the persistence of insecurity in Nigeria is deeply tied to

weaknesses in border management. Strengthening border governance is therefore not an option but a necessity

for national stability, economic prosperity, and democratic sustainability. Nigeria must pursue a comprehensive,

coordinated, and forward-looking strategy that combines institutional reform, community partnership,

technological modernization, and international collaboration. Only through such an integrated approach can

Nigeria transform its borders from spaces of vulnerability into gateways of opportunity, thereby consolidating

both security and development in the twenty-first century.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the structural-functionalist analysis of border management and insecurity in Nigeria, the study

recommends the strengthening of institutional capacity and functional specialization among border management

agencies. The Nigeria Immigration Service, Customs Service, and security agencies should clearly define and

coordinate their respective roles to prevent overlap and inefficiency. Investment in modern surveillance

technologies—such as drones, biometric systems, and real-time data integration—should be prioritized to

enhance adaptive and regulatory functions within Parsons’ AGIL framework. Furthermore, the government must

ensure adequate funding, staff training, and accountability mechanisms to minimize corruption and improve

institutional performance in securing Nigeria’s borders.

Secondly, the study recommends a people-centered and community-based approach to border governance.

Drawing from functionalist emphasis on social integration, the Nigerian state should recognize border

communities as critical actors in national security. Engaging local populations through intelligence sharing,

economic empowerment, and inclusive development initiatives can reduce their dependence on illicit cross-

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border activities. Socio-economic investments in infrastructure, education, and healthcare will promote trust in

state institutions, helping to restore equilibrium between the security apparatus and the social environment in

which it operates.

Finally, the study advocates for enhanced inter-agency and regional cooperation to address transnational

dimensions of insecurity. Nigeria should strengthen collaboration with neighboring states within the ECOWAS

framework to promote information sharing, joint patrols, and harmonized border policies. Functionalist theory

underscores the importance of systemic integration; hence, border management reform must be viewed as part

of a broader governance restructuring that aligns domestic institutions with regional and international security

mechanisms. Effective coordination at national and regional levels will not only improve territorial control but

also foster political stability and sustainable development across West Africa.

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