INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue X October 2025  
Today's International Relations: A World in Transition  
Mayssa Ben Ali  
University of International Business and Economics, Germany  
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2025.910000784  
Received: 07 November 2025; Accepted: 14 November 2025; Published: 24 November 2025  
INTRODUCTION  
The contemporary global order stands at a crossroads. Rapid technological change, environmental degradation,  
shifting alliances, and power realignments have transformed the nature of international relations. The world is  
witnessing a reconfiguration of political, economic, and security structures that defined the post–Cold War  
period. The rise of new powers, the resurgence of nationalism, and the weakening of multilateral institutions  
are reshaping global governance in ways that challenge both theory and practice.  
In this transitional context, the study of international relations (IR) has never been more relevant.  
Understanding how states, organizations, and non-state actors interact under evolving conditions is vital to  
addressing global challenges such as conflict, inequality, migration, and climate change. This paper explores  
these dynamics, tracing the ongoing transformation of world politics through theoretical, institutional, and  
regional lenses.  
Keywords International Relations, Multipolarity, Global Governance, Power Transition, United Nations,  
Great Power Politics, Institutional Reform, Humanitarian Crises, Global-Regional Cooperation  
Problem Statement  
The international system of 2025 reflects a period of profound transformation marked by major conflicts,  
shifting power balances, and the erosion of established governance frameworks. Despite the persistence of  
global institutions such as the United Nations and regional organizations like the African Union and ASEAN,  
their ability to address escalating crises remains limited. The problem lies in the growing gap between global  
challenges—ranging from war and displacement to technological and environmental threats—and the capacity  
of existing international structures to manage them effectively. This study seeks to identify how these  
structural deficiencies and political divisions contribute to systemic instability and to what extent a transition  
toward multipolarity may reshape the principles and mechanisms governing international cooperation.  
Research Gap  
Existing research has extensively analyzed great power competition and the decline of U.S. unipolarity, but  
limited attention has been paid to the simultaneous institutional fragmentation and normative contestation that  
characterize the current era. Much of the literature focuses on isolated regions or specific conflicts rather than  
the interlinkages between global and regional transformations. There is a lack of integrative studies connecting  
geopolitical realignment, the weakening of liberal norms, and the practical limitations of multilateral  
governance. This paper fills that gap by providing a comprehensive framework that situates ongoing conflicts  
and institutional challenges within the broader evolution of international order.  
METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW  
This research adopts a qualitative analytical approach, combining document analysis, discourse analysis, and  
theoretical synthesis. Primary sources include UN reports, policy briefs from international think tanks (e.g.,  
International Crisis Group, Stimson Center), and statements from global actors. Secondary sources comprise  
peer-reviewed literature and policy analyses addressing international order transitions. The methodology  
emphasizes comparative analysis between different regions (e.g., Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Indo-  
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Pacific) and the evolving roles of great powers and institutions. The study integrates theoretical perspectives  
from realism, liberal institutionalism, and constructivism to interpret the interaction between power politics,  
norms, and institutional performance.  
Significance of the Study  
This research contributes to both scholarly debate and policy discourse by offering an updated,  
multidimensional analysis of global transitions in the post-unipolar era. It provides insights into how  
institutional reform, regionalization, and shifting power dynamics affect global governance and humanitarian  
response. The findings aim to guide policymakers, international organizations, and scholars in developing  
adaptive governance models that reconcile power realities with the need for legitimacy, cooperation, and  
human security. The study also advances theoretical discussions by bridging the gap between systemic analysis  
and normative theory.  
Ethical Considerations  
The study is based entirely on publicly available sources and secondary data. No human subjects were  
involved, ensuring compliance with academic ethical standards. The author maintains neutrality by presenting  
multiple perspectives, particularly regarding contested international events. All data, quotes, and  
interpretations are appropriately referenced to uphold intellectual integrity and avoid misrepresentation or  
plagiarism. The analysis aims to respect the diversity of national and regional viewpoints within the evolving  
global system.  
Limitations of the Study  
The study’s qualitative nature limits its capacity to measure causality or provide quantitative predictions.  
Given the fluidity of international politics, ongoing developments may alter the conclusions drawn from mid-  
2025 data. Furthermore, access to confidential diplomatic communications or classified institutional reports is  
restricted, constraining the depth of analysis in certain cases. Nonetheless, the research provides a robust  
analytical foundation based on verifiable and credible sources.  
RELATED LITERATURE  
Research on international order transitions highlights the shift from U.S. dominance to multipolar complexity  
(Ikenberry, 2018; Acharya, 2014). Realist scholars emphasize renewed great power rivalry (Mearsheimer,  
2019), while liberal institutionalists stress institutional resilience amid systemic change (Keohane, 1984; Weiss  
et al., 2018). Constructivists explore the role of norms, legitimacy, and identity in shaping international  
behavior (Wendt, 1999; Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001). Recent works by the Center for International  
Governance Innovation (2025) and International Crisis Group (2024) illustrate practical challenges facing the  
UN and other multilateral systems. This paper synthesizes these strands to develop an integrated understanding  
of global transformation in 2025.  
Major Conflict Zones Shaping International Relations in 2025  
The Middle East: Regional Transformation and Conflicst Escalation  
The Middle East in June 2025 is one of the most unstable parts of the world, with the Israel-Hamas conflict  
that started in October 2023.  
continuing to change the way things work in the region and in international diplomacy. The fight started when  
Hamas attacked Israel in a way that had never been seen before on October 7, 2023. About 1,200 people died  
and more than 200 were taken hostage. Israel's next military campaign in Gaza caused a lot of damage, killed  
civilians, and caused a humanitarian crisis. By June 2025, the conflict has become a more complicated regional  
confrontation involving many actors, even though there have been many attempts to reach ceasefire  
agreements.  
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The fighting has spread beyond Gaza to include regular gunfire between Israel and Hezbollah along the border  
between Israel and Lebanon. Hezbollah, with Iran's help, has been carrying out more and more complex  
attacks on Israeli targets. Israel, on the other hand, has been targeting Hezbollah leaders and infrastructure in  
Lebanon with airstrikes. This escalation has made people very worried that a full-scale war between Israel and  
Lebanon could break out and involve other countries in the region. Iran's support for both Hamas and  
Hezbollah has put it directly against Israel, and the tensions between the two countries have gotten very high.  
Iran carried out a major drone strike operation against Israeli air bases in May 2025, showing off its advanced  
capabilities and willingness to directly confront Israel (Understanding War, May 29, 2025).  
The conflict has effects on the whole region, not just the people directly involved. The Abraham Accords  
framework, which helped Israel and a number of Arab states get along better, is having a lot of trouble. The  
United Arab Emirates and Bahrain still have formal diplomatic ties with Israel, but the progress toward  
normalizing relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel that seemed likely before October 7, 2023, has stopped.  
Saudi Arabia is being more careful because it wants to counter Iran's influence while also dealing with the  
backlash against Israel's military campaign in Gaza at home and in the region.  
The conflict has also shown how the roles of outside powers in the region are changing. The United States,  
which has usually been the most powerful outside force in Middle Eastern affairs, has been criticized for how  
it has dealt with the conflict. At first, the Biden administration strongly supported Israel, but as the  
humanitarian situation in Gaza got worse, their position became more complex. However, the damage to U.S.  
credibility in the region has been significant. Russia and China have tried to take advantage of this by  
positioning themselves as alternative partners for states in the region. China's efforts to help Saudi Arabia and  
Iran get along in 2023 showed that it was becoming more powerful. Russia has used its military presence in  
Syria and diplomatic ties with Iran and Arab states to improve its standing in the region.  
The war has had terrible effects on people. Gaza is in terrible shape, with widespread destruction of  
infrastructure and a lack of basic needs of food, water, and medical supplies, and a lot of people are moving.  
Since the ceasefire in Gaza broke down, UNRWA says that more than 599,000 people have been forced to  
leave their homes again. This includes more than 161,000 people who left between mid-May 2025 and now.  
The humanitarian crisis has put a lot of stress on the international aid system and made people wonder how  
well international humanitarian law works to protect civilians during war.  
The conflict in the Middle East has also had big effects on international organizations, especially the UN. The  
Security Council has been very divided. At first, the United States used its veto power to stop resolutions that  
called for a ceasefire. This split has hurt the Council's ability to deal with the conflict and its credibility. The  
International Court of Justice has gotten involved by taking cases against Israel for breaking the Genocide  
Convention. This adds a legal aspect to the international response.  
The Russia-Ukraine War: Stalemate and Diplomatic Maneuvering  
As of June 2025, the war between Russia and Ukraine, which has been going on for four years, is still a major  
event in the world. The war that started when Russia fully invaded Ukraine in February 2022 has turned into a  
long war of attrition with big effects on European security, relations across the Atlantic, and the world order.  
The military situation on the ground has reached a relative stalemate. Russia is slowly gaining ground in  
eastern Ukraine, but Ukraine is still fighting back. Ukraine's military strategy has been more and more focused  
on using asymmetric warfare and new tactics to make up for Russia's numerical advantages. In June 2025,  
Ukraine carried out a large number of drone strikes on several Russian air bases at the same time, showing that  
it could hit targets deep inside Russia (Institute for the Study of War, June 1, 2025). The operation hit strategic  
Russian planes, like the A-50 long-range radar detection planes and the Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 strategic bombers.  
It caused about $7 billion in damage and destroyed 34% of Russia's strategic cruise missile carriers.  
With Donald Trump back in the White House in 2025, the diplomatic situation around the conflict has changed  
a lot. Trump has said he wants the war to end quickly, even if that means making the Ukrainians look bad in  
front of everyone while supporting Russia (Foreign Affairs, May/June 2025). This way of doing things is very  
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different from the Biden administration's policy of "supporting Ukraine for as long as it takes." Russian and  
Ukrainian officials are talking about peace in Istanbul, but they still disagree on a lot of important issues  
(Reuters, June 2, 2025). Russia has started a new offensive, moving at the fastest pace since fall 2024 and  
starting a new front in the northern Kharkiv region (New York Times, June 2, 2025).  
European allies are worried about the change in U.S. policy because they are afraid of being left behind and a  
deal that favors Russia. This has sped up talks about Europe's strategic independence and defense capabilities.  
NATO is still officially committed to helping Ukraine, but there are disagreements within the organization  
about how much help to give and how Ukraine could join.  
The economic aspects of the conflict are still changing. Western sanctions on Russia have had big but not  
game-changing effects on the Russian economy. The economy has changed by doing more business with  
China, India, and other non-Western partners. The energy ties between Russia and Europe have changed a lot,  
and Europe now relies less on Russian oil and gas. This has changed the way energy markets work around the  
world. For example, Russia is now sending more energy to Asian markets, and Europe is getting energy from a  
wider range of sources.  
The conflict is still having a terrible effect on people. Millions of Ukrainians are still living in other countries  
as refugees or in their own country. Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, especially energy  
facilities, have made life very hard for the people of Ukraine. The war has also made it harder for people  
around the world to get food by stopping Ukrainian agricultural exports. However, some of this effect has been  
lessened by finding new ways to export goods.  
The war between Russia and Ukraine has big effects on the world order. Russia's invasion was a direct attack  
on the UN Charter's principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Western countries have put sanctions on  
Ukraine and sent troops to help, while many countries in the Global South have taken more neutral positions.  
This shows that the international community is very divided. These divisions show that there is a bigger fight  
going on over the rules and norms of the international system.  
Indo-Pacific Tensions: Taiwan, China, and Regional Security  
In June 2025, the Indo-Pacific region is a key area of geopolitical competition, with tensions between China  
and the US rising to new heights over Taiwan and other regional flashpoints. Taiwanese security officials say  
that the situation around Taiwan has become very unstable. In May 2025, China sent two aircraft carrier  
groups and dozens of ships to the area (Anadolu News, June 2, 2025). This show of military force shows how  
China is becoming more aggressive toward what it sees as a "renegade province" that needs to be reunited with  
the mainland.  
According to U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, China is a "imminent" threat in the Indo-Pacific region. He  
said that China's army is "rehearsing for the real deal" when it comes to Taiwan (NBC News, June 2025). This  
language shows that both parties in the U.S. still agree on the threat that China poses, even though the second  
Trump administration has made changes to other areas of foreign policy. China has warned the U.S. not to  
"play with fire" over Taiwan (Politico, June 1, 2025), showing how easy it is for the two nuclear powers to  
make mistakes.  
The political situation in Taiwan makes things even more complicated. Cross-strait relations have gotten worse  
since Lai Ching-te (William Lai) of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was elected president in January  
2024. China has called Lai a "separatist" and put more pressure on Taiwan through military, economic, and  
diplomatic means. In Taiwan, the political landscape has changed, and thirty-one Kuomintang (KMT)  
lawmakers are up for special recall elections. The DPP, which is in charge, has said that it could win more than  
10 legislative seats, which would give it a majority (Institute for the Study of War, May 30, 2025).  
In addition to Taiwan, maritime disputes in the South China Sea are still causing problems. U.S. officials say  
that China has put offensive weapons in the South China Sea, which makes its anti-access/area denial  
capabilities stronger. This could make it harder for the U.S. and its allies to get involved in regional conflicts.  
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The US has kept up freedom of navigation operations in the disputed waters, which goes against China's broad  
maritime claims. China is still putting pressure on countries in the region, such as Vietnam, the Philippines,  
Malaysia, and Indonesia, as they try to keep their relationships with both China and the United States in check.  
The technological side of competition in the Indo-Pacific has become more and more important. On May 20,  
2025, the United States announced the Golden Dome space-based defense system. It would use a network of  
sensors and interceptors to protect against missile threats. China, Russia, and North Korea all spoke out against  
the project, saying it would make space more militarized and could lead to "a global nuclear and space arms  
race" (Institute for the Study of War, May 30, 2025). Even though people have said bad things about it, China  
is building its own military power in space. U.S. officials have seen "five different [PRC] objects in space  
maneuvering in and out and around each other in synchronicity and in control," and they have also noted that  
China's on-orbit capability has grown by about 620 percent over the past ten years.  
As China grows, the security structures in the Indo-Pacific region keep changing. The United States has made  
its ties with Japan stronger.  
South Korea, Australia, and others are also forming smaller groups, like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue  
(Quad) with Japan, Australia, and India, and AUKUS with Australia and the UK. These deals are part of a plan  
to build coalitions to counterbalance China's growing power. ASEAN still claims to be the most important  
group in the region, even though its member states are becoming more divided in how they deal with  
competition between the US and China.  
The economic part of Indo-Pacific relations is still complicated. Even though there are political tensions, China  
and its neighbors, including U.S. allies, are still very economically dependent on each other. China has met  
with ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council to promote economic cooperation and lessen the United  
States' global power. In 2024, trade between ASEAN and China was more than 900 billion US dollars, which  
is almost twice as much as trade between the US and ASEAN. This economic reality makes it harder to build  
strong coalitions against China and shows how complicated relationships are in the region.  
The situation in the Indo-Pacific shows how hard it is to handle competition between great powers in a region  
where economies are linked, there are territorial disputes, and there are long-standing grudges. The chance of  
making a mistake or accidentally escalating the situation is still high, especially when it comes to Taiwan,  
where China's red lines and the U.S.'s strategic ambiguity create a potentially dangerous mix. The region is  
probably the most important stage for the future of international order, as the established superpower and the  
rising challenger interact in military, economic, technological, and diplomatic areas.  
Great Power Competition and Realignment  
From Competition to Collusion: Evolving Great Power Dynamics  
By June 2025, the landscape of great power relations had shifted in ways that fundamentally altered the  
international system. For nearly a decade, “great power competition” dominated U.S. strategic thinking. The  
Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy declared that “after being dismissed as a phenomenon  
of an earlier century, great power competition has returned,” and the Biden administration’s 2022 version  
reinforced this framing by identifying China and Russia as “powers that layer authoritarian governance with a  
revisionist foreign policy.” These documents reflected a bipartisan consensus that the United States was  
engaged in long-term systemic rivalry with Beijing and Moscow. However, Trump’s return to office in  
January 2025 rapidly dissolved this consensus. Analysts now describe the emerging landscape not as  
competitive multipolarity but as “great power collusion,” a shift highlighted by Foreign Affairs (May/June  
2025) as increasingly reminiscent of the 19th-century Concert of Europe, where major powers coordinated to  
manage the international order on their own terms.  
In this context, great power collusion refers to a strategic environment in which major powers cooperate to  
negotiate spheres of influence, pursue transactional bargains, and stabilize the global order through elite  
arrangements rather than multilateral institutions. This represents a departure from the post-Cold War  
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emphasis on rules-based governance and aligns more closely with hierarchical bargaining in which the  
interests of smaller states are subordinated. Rather than competing across all domains, the United States,  
China, and Russia increasingly seek selective cooperation, dividing regions into zones of influence and  
managing crises through personalized diplomacy between leaders rather than established institutions.  
Trump’s approach to the Ukraine war illustrates this shift most clearly. Reports from The New York Times  
(2025) suggest that he has signaled willingness to pressure Kyiv into territorial concessions in order to achieve  
a rapid settlement, a policy that favors Russian interests and breaks sharply from prior U.S. commitments to  
Ukrainian sovereignty. Simultaneously, Trump has floated the idea of meeting Xi Jinping “man-to-man” to  
negotiate a comprehensive package on trade, investment, and nuclear arms control. Analysts such as those at  
the Stimson Center have referred to this as a “reverse Kissinger” strategy—rather than splitting China from  
Russia, Trump seeks to work with both to reorder global politics. More broadly, this behavior reflects an  
emerging model in which great powers collaborate to impose a shared vision of order centered on strongman  
leadership, transactional diplomacy, and limited regard for the autonomy of smaller states.  
This shift toward collusion is further reinforced by Trump’s treatment of traditional U.S. allies. At the same  
time as he extends outreach to Beijing and Moscow, he has intensified economic pressure on partners in  
Europe and North America. According to Foreign Affairs (2025), he has reportedly suggested forcing Canada  
into becoming “the 51st state,” revived U.S. interest in acquiring Greenland, and even expressed ambitions  
regarding control over the Panama Canal. These pressures signal a move away from alliances as the foundation  
of U.S. strategy toward a foreign policy defined by coercion, hierarchy, and unilateral bargaining. This  
combination—conciliatory engagement with rivals and punitive pressure on allies—marks a dramatic  
departure from the post-World War II international order.  
The implications of this shift from competition to collusion are profound. First, it accelerates the erosion of the  
rules-based international order by replacing norms of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and human rights with  
great power bargains. Second, it increases insecurity for small and medium powers, which become objects of  
negotiation rather than autonomous actors. Third, it weakens collective defense arrangements such as NATO  
and the EU, which were premised on U.S. reliability and shared commitments. Fourth, it strengthens  
authoritarian governance models by reducing scrutiny among major powers and enabling mutual tolerance of  
domestic repression. Finally, while collusion may reduce the risk of direct confrontation between the United  
States, China, and Russia, it produces a volatile system in which stability depends on the personal preferences  
of leaders rather than institutional safeguards. This analysis draws on U.S. strategic documents, major media  
reporting, and expert commentary from sources such as Foreign Affairs, the Stimson Center, and The New  
York Times, complemented by IR scholarship on multipolarity and great power management  
U.S.-China Relations: Competition, Cooperation, and Confrontation  
Even though things are moving toward more cooperation, the relationship between the U.S. and China is still  
complicated and has many sides. Trump's tariffs are now in effect, and there is a threat of Chinese retaliation,  
so economic competition is still going on. China has used U.S. tariffs to make itself look like a supporter of  
multilateralism. It has accused the U.S. of hurting the global trading system and asked members of the World  
Trade Organization to stabilize trade between countries.  
The strategic side of the relationship between the U.S. and China is still changing. China's military  
modernization is moving quickly, with a focus on capabilities that could threaten U.S. dominance in the  
Western Pacific. In May 2025, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) sent two groups of aircraft carriers  
to the waters near Taiwan. This shows that they have improved their blue-water capabilities. China's anti-  
access/area denial capabilities have gotten more advanced, which could make it harder for the U.S. military to  
operate in Taiwan. Space has become a new area of competition, with both countries building up their military  
capabilities in orbit. U.S. officials have seen Chinese spacecraft doing complicated maneuvers that could be  
used for military purposes. China, on the other hand, has criticized the U.S. Golden Dome space defense  
project.  
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Even though these competitive factors are at play, Trump's approach shows that he is more willing to work  
with China on issues that are important to both countries. The possibility of a big deal that includes trade,  
investment, and nuclear weapons shows that the relationship is more businesslike. This change has worried  
U.S. allies in Asia, who are afraid that their interests might be put on hold during U.S.-China talks. Japan,  
South Korea, and Australia have all responded by improving their own defenses while trying to keep good  
relations with the United States.  
The technological aspect of U.S.-China relations is still very controversial. The US still limits China's access to  
advanced semiconductor technology and other important technologies that can be used for both military and  
civilian purposes. These rules are meant to slow down China's progress in technology that could be used for  
military purposes, like artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and biotechnology. China has responded by  
putting a lot of money into homegrown innovation and looking for other ways to get technology. The  
technological split between the two biggest economies in the world has big effects on global supply chains and  
innovation ecosystems.  
U.S.-Russia Relations: Accommodation and Strategic Implications  
Trump's approach to Russia may be the biggest change in U.S. foreign policy in a long time. Trump has said  
he wants to improve relations with Moscow after years of bad relations since Russia took Crimea in 2014 and  
invaded Ukraine in 2022. This change is most obvious in how he has handled the Ukraine conflict, where he  
has said he supports ending the war quickly, possibly on terms that are good for Russia.  
This change is a big break from the Biden administration's policy of backing Ukraine "for as long as it takes."  
It has also made European allies worry about how committed the U.S. is to European security. NATO  
members, especially those in Eastern Europe, are worried that a deal between the U.S. and Russia could hurt  
them. These worries have sped up talks about Europe's ability to defend itself and be strategically independent,  
but there are still big problems that make it hard to really be free of U.S. security guarantees.  
Better relations between the U.S. and Russia have effects on more than just Europe. Russia and China have  
strengthened their strategic partnership in the past few years by working together on military exercises, sharing  
technology, and diplomatic efforts. Some experts think that Trump's outreach to Russia is meant to drive a  
wedge between Moscow and Beijing, which is what was called the "reverse Kissinger" approach earlier. But  
this strategy may not work as well because of how close China and Russia are and how much they both want  
to stop the U.S. from being in charge  
Even though its economy is weak, Russia still sees itself as a challenger to the U.S.-led world order. Its  
military actions in Ukraine, support for the Assad regime in Syria, and growing presence in Africa show that it  
is determined to reassert itself as a global power. Trump's approach seems to want to get along with Russia  
instead of keeping it in check. This could mean that he sees Russia as a great power with a lot of influence in  
its own neighborhood.  
Global South and Middle Powers: Strategic Autonomy and Hedging  
As the balance of power changes, middle powers and countries in the Global South are having to deal with  
complicated relationships with the U.S., China, and Russia. India, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, and Saudi  
Arabia are all trying to make their foreign policies more independent. They want to have more freedom and  
use their ties with multiple major powers to their advantage.  
India is a good example of this because it keeps its strategic partnership with the US while also keeping its  
long-standing ties with Russia and dealing with its complicated relationship with China. India is worried about  
China's growing power, which is why it is part of the Quad with the U.S., Japan, and Australia. However, India  
has not condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine and continues to buy Russian oil and military equipment.  
India's foreign policy is multidirectional, which means it can keep its strategic independence while getting  
benefits from its relationships with all the major powers.  
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Middle Eastern countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have also made their  
international ties more varied. They have strengthened their economic and diplomatic ties with China and  
Russia while keeping security ties with the United States. Saudi Arabia's interest in joining the BRICS group  
and its 2023 reconciliation with Iran through China show that it is becoming more independent in its foreign  
policy. The UAE's balanced stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict and growing trade ties with China show that  
it is using a similar hedging strategy.  
Brazil, under President Lula da Silva, has once again taken on the role of regional leader and Global South  
advocate in Latin America. Brazil has kept its relationships with the U.S., China, and Russia in balance while  
pushing for changes to global governance institutions to give developing countries more say. It wants a more  
multipolar world system, which is why it is a member of the BRICS group and supports de-dollarization.  
The economic aspect of these relationships is especially important. China has worked with multinational  
groups like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to  
boost economic cooperation and lessen U.S. influence around the world. In 2024, ASEAN's trade with China  
and the GCC was more than $900 billion, which is almost twice as much as trade between the US and  
ASEAN.  
These economic ties give China a lot of power and make it harder for the U.S. to build strong coalitions against  
Chinese interests.  
Implications for International Stability and Order  
The transition from great power rivalry to a more collusive strategy raises critical questions about the future of  
international stability and order. From a realist perspective, great power collusion resembles a modern attempt  
to recreate a concert system, in which dominant states jointly manage global affairs by informally dividing  
spheres of influence. Historical precedents suggest that such arrangements can produce periods of relative  
stability, yet they remain fragile: they tend to collapse when power asymmetries shift, when rising states seek  
to revise the status quo, or when major powers disagree on the boundaries of influence. Whether a 21st-century  
“concert of powers” can succeed is uncertain, in part because today’s international environment differs  
profoundly from the 19th-century model realism draws upon.  
Several structural factors distinguish the contemporary system. The presence of nuclear weapons, a classic  
realist constraint, strongly discourages direct confrontation among great powers. Meanwhile, elements  
emphasized by liberal theory, such as economic interdependence, continue to discourage conflict even amid  
selective decoupling. In addition, transnational challenges—including climate change, pandemics, and  
terrorism—require sustained cooperation across ideological divides. These functional pressures create  
incentives for major powers to collaborate despite geopolitical rivalry. Yet the risks remain significant.  
Potential flashpoints like Taiwan, Ukraine, or the Middle East could escalate rapidly through miscalculation,  
and regional powers may seek to exploit either competition or collusion among the great powers to advance  
their own agendas. In a more fragmented system, non-state actors—from terrorist networks to criminal  
organizations—may also gain greater operational freedom.  
The constructivist dimension of this shift carries equally far-reaching implications. A system grounded in  
spheres of influence reflects a normative reorientation away from universal liberal principles toward a  
hierarchical order defined by great-power prerogatives. Such a transition threatens to marginalize norms of  
sovereignty, self-determination, and human rights, which have been central pillars of the liberal international  
order. The move toward collusion among major powers therefore not only reallocates material influence but  
also reshapes the ideational foundations of global governance, potentially eroding the legitimacy of  
international institutions and weakening support for normative constraints on state behavior.  
The reconfiguration of great-power relations in June 2025 thus represents more than a tactical adjustment in  
U.S. foreign policy; it signals a potential transformation of the international system itself. Whether this  
emerging order evolves into a stable form of concert diplomacy or descends into intensified instability remains  
uncertain. What is clear is that the implications will extend across all domains of international relations,  
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influencing the distribution of power, the functioning of global institutions, and the normative commitments  
that underpin the international order.  
Table 1: Theoretical Interpretations of Great Power Collusion (2025)  
IR Paradigm  
Realism  
Core Assumptions  
States  
Interpretation of 2025 Great Predicted  
Power Collusion International Order  
Implications  
for  
-
pursue - Collusion is a strategic bargain - Temporary stability among great  
in an among major powers to manage powers.  
survival  
anarchic  
system. rivalry and avoid costly conflict. - High risk of collapse if power  
- Power and security - Resembles a modern concert of shifts.  
are primary interests. powers dividing spheres of - Small states’ sovereignty  
- Balance of power influence.  
becomes  
vulnerable.  
shapes behavior.  
- Trump’s 2025 shifts reflect - Flashpoints (Taiwan, Ukraine)  
power calculations, not ideology. remain volatile.  
-
Interdependence - Partial collusion emerges from - Erosion of the rules-based order.  
Liberalism  
reduces likelihood of economic interdependence and - Institutions weakened but not  
conflict.  
-
institutional  
fatigue. irrelevant.  
International - U.S., China, and Russia - Allies feel insecure as U.S.  
institutions  
behavior.  
-
shape cooperate pragmatically where reliability  
interests align (trade, nuclear - Increased transnationalism in  
Cooperation is stability). diplomacy.  
declines.  
possible  
under -  
Weakening  
multilateral  
shared rules.  
institutions opens space for  
informal bargains.  
-
State behavior - Collusion reflects converging - Decline of liberal norms  
Constructivism  
shaped by identities, narratives among strongman (sovereignty, human rights, self-  
norms,  
and leaders (Trump, Xi, Putin). determination).  
narratives.  
-
- Normative shift away from - Rise of authoritarian legitimacy  
Leadership liberal  
universalism  
toward and  
strongman  
diplomacy.  
perceptions matter.  
hierarchical  
governance.  
great-power - Smaller states lose normative  
protection.  
- Domestic political identities  
influence  
foreign-policy  
alignments.  
Realism, liberalism, and constructivism together provide a multidimensional explanation for the shift from  
great-power competition to collusion in 2025. Realism highlights the structural incentives—shifting power  
balances, nuclear constraints, and the logic of spheres of influence—that make collusion a rational strategy for  
managing rivalry. Liberalism adds that economic interdependence, institutional ties, and global challenges  
create functional pressures that push great powers toward selective cooperation despite political tensions.  
Constructivism explains the role of leadership identities and shared narratives, particularly the alignment  
among strongman leaders who prefer transactional, hierarchical governance over liberal norms. When  
combined, these paradigms reveal that great-power collusion is not driven by a single logic but emerges from  
the interaction of material interests, institutional constraints, and evolving political identities.  
International Order and Governance Challenges  
The United Nations System Under Strain  
In June 2025, the United Nations system is going through one of the most difficult times in recent history, with  
several crises putting its ability and legitimacy to the test. The war between Israel and Hamas that started in  
October 2023 has cast a long shadow over the organization. Many UN members are worried that it is not doing  
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its main job of keeping the peace and safety (International Crisis Group, September 2024). The U.S., Russia,  
and China don't get along as well in the Security Council anymore, and UN officials say that morale is low  
within the organization. The UN's ability to deal with big global problems is getting weaker because of  
tensions between countries and a lack of resources.  
The Security Council, which is the UN's main body for keeping the peace and security around the world, has  
been especially hurt by divisions between major powers. The conflict between Hamas and Israel changed how  
the Council does diplomacy, putting the US on the defensive. After being publicly criticized for a long time by  
the U.S. and its allies at the UN for its attack on Ukraine, Russia quickly accused Washington of having  
different standards when it came to the two wars. The U.S. blocked several draft resolutions that called for  
pauses or a complete end to hostilities in Gaza. The U.S. was becoming more and more isolated in the Council,  
with only the UK offering partial support. The elected members of the Council, led by Malta and the United  
Arab Emirates, had to convince the U.S. not to veto resolutions that only dealt with the humanitarian aspects of  
the conflict by the end of 2023.  
The Biden administration's stance started to change in early 2024 as they became more upset about how long  
the war was going on and how it was affecting people. In March 2024, the U.S. finally agreed to stay out of a  
short resolution that called for a ceasefire. Washington still didn't want the UN to play a political role in the  
conflict, as shown by its veto of a resolution in April 2024 that would have suggested letting Palestine join the  
UN as a member state. The way the Biden administration dealt with the UN during the Gaza conflict has hurt  
the US's reputation in Turtle Bay for a long time (International Crisis Group, September 2024).  
The UN has had a hard time dealing with other big wars, like the civil war in Sudan and the war in Ukraine, in  
addition to the Middle East. The Security Council is still split on Ukraine, and Russia is using its veto power to  
stop resolutions that criticize its actions. The international community hasn't given enough attention or  
resources to the situation in Sudan, which has caused one of the world's biggest displacement crises. This  
shows how hard it is for the UN to deal with more than one crisis at a time.  
Even with these problems, the UN is still involved in a lot of peacemaking and humanitarian work in countries  
where there is conflict. UN aid agencies and peace operations still have a lot of conflict management skills,  
some of which are even unique. Even when the UN is being abused and is in danger of being ignored, like in  
Gaza or Myanmar, it helps civilians who can't get help from anyone else. The UN is still the only place where  
all countries can speak out about major crises in diplomacy.  
Reform Initiatives and Governance Challenges  
Member states have tried to reform the UN in different ways because they know it can't handle all of today's  
problems. In September 2025, leaders from around the world will meet for a special Summit of the Future to  
talk about changing the organization. However, the talks that took place before the summit showed that there is  
not a common vision among states for the future of multilateralism. It is unlikely that major changes will  
happen soon in the UN's work on peace and security, but there may be chances for smaller changes to the UN's  
peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and sanctions systems.  
China is now more involved in talks about UN reform. It plans to hold an open debate on "Practicing  
Multilateralism, Reforming and Improving Global Governance" (Security Council Report, January 2025). This  
project shows how China's power is growing in multilateral organizations and how it wants to shape the future  
of global governance. But there are big differences between how China and the West see the world order,  
which makes it harder to agree on important changes.  
Other multilateral organizations, like the UN, are also having trouble. The World Trade Organization's dispute  
resolution system is still broken, which makes it less useful for settling trade disputes. International financial  
institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have started making changes to their  
governance to give emerging economies more of a say, but the changes have been slow to happen. The  
European Union, the African Union, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are all examples of  
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regional organizations that have taken on more responsibilities for dealing with security and economic issues  
in their own areas. This shows a trend toward regionalization of governance.  
Managing new technologies is a big problem. New rules are needed for artificial intelligence, cyber  
capabilities, and space technologies, but current international organizations are having a hard time keeping up  
with how quickly technology changes. Competition between major powers makes it harder to set up global  
tech governance. This can lead to broken approaches and possible gaps in regulation. The U.S. Golden Dome  
space defense system was announced in May 2025, and China criticized the project for militarizing space. This  
shows how hard it is to govern new areas of technology (Institute for the Study of War, May 30, 2025).  
Multipolar World Order and Normative Contestation  
The international system is becoming more multipolar, which means that power is spread out among several  
centers. To lessen the risks of a multipolar order, we need to rethink the United Nations and other governing  
bodies (Center for International Governance Innovation, May 2025). As the balance of power in the world  
changes, there is a growing need for government reforms that create more fair and representative systems (UN  
DESA, April 2025).  
This multipolarity is accompanied by fundamental contestation over the organizing principles of the  
international order. The rules-based international order that was set up after World War II is having a lot of  
trouble with rising powers that challenge norms and institutions they see as serving Western interests. China,  
Russia, and many other countries in the Global South are pushing back against liberal interventionism by  
reasserting the idea of sovereignty. Authoritarian regimes and even some democratically elected governments  
that put national sovereignty and non-interference first push back against efforts to promote human rights and  
democracy.  
The rise of illiberal democracy and democratic backsliding in different parts of the world makes the normative  
landscape even more complicated. Since 2020, there have been a lot more unconstitutional changes of  
government (UCGs), which makes it harder for international governance (International Peace Institute, March  
2025). The international response to coups and other democratic backsliding has not been consistent. In their  
own areas, regional organizations often take the lead in dealing with UCGs.  
The breakdown of agreement on important international norms has consequences for resolving conflicts and  
providing aid. Finding common ground on how to deal with complicated crises is getting harder and harder  
without a shared understanding of ideas like sovereignty, self-determination, and the duty to protect. This  
normative contestation exacerbates the paralysis of international institutions and hinders efforts to resolve  
significant conflicts and humanitarian crises.  
Global Commons and Transnational Challenges  
In a world with many poles, it is especially hard to govern global commons like the oceans, atmosphere, outer  
space, and cyberspace. Even though the Paris Agreement framework is in place, climate change governance is  
still fragmented because of gaps in implementation and funding that make it harder to keep climate promises.  
There is a growing consensus that climate security is a peace and security issue, but the UN Security Council is  
split on whether to treat climate change as a security threat.  
Global health governance has also had to deal with a lot of problems. After the pandemic, there haven't been  
many changes to global health governance. The World Health Organization still has trouble getting money and  
power. There are still unfair differences in access to vaccines and medical technology, and we are not ready for  
future pandemics. The COVID-19 pandemic showed that current global health governance systems don't work  
very well and that countries need to work together more to deal with health emergencies.  
Cyberspace is another area where governance systems are not keeping up with the size of the problems. Cyber  
operations by both state and non-state actors have become more common and advanced, with a focus on  
critical infrastructure, money systems, and the way democracy works. There has been little progress in  
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establishing international norms for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. This is because major powers are  
taking different approaches to cyber governance.  
Outer space is becoming a contested area, with major powers building up their military capabilities in ways  
that could threaten things in space. The U.S. Golden Dome project and China's growing on-orbit capabilities  
show how space is becoming more militarized and how hard it is to set up good governance systems for this  
important area.  
Existing legal frameworks, including the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, are becoming less and less effective at  
dealing with modern problems in space governance.  
These problems that cross national borders show how limited a state-centered international system is when it  
comes to solving problems that affect more than one country. To manage global commons well, major powers  
need to work together and come up with new ways to govern that can balance different interests while  
encouraging people to work together. The current state of international relations, which is marked by  
competition or collusion between major powers instead of broad-based cooperation, makes it harder to deal  
with these common problems in a useful way.  
Implications for International Stability and Cooperation  
The problems with international order and governance have big effects on global stability and cooperation. The  
weakening of multilateral institutions and shared norms makes international relations less predictable and  
makes it harder to deal with common problems. Without good ways to handle conflicts and work together to  
solve problems that cross national borders, the chances of making mistakes, escalating problems, and failing to  
govern rise.  
The current situation also opens up new ways for global governance to be more creative. In November 2024,  
the Quincy Institute started a global project that brought together 130 scholars from 40 countries to come up  
with a plan for making the international security order more stable. These kinds of programs show that people  
understand that governance systems need to change to fit the needs of today instead of just keeping the ones  
that already exist.  
Regional organizations like the African Union, the European Union, ASEAN, and others are becoming more  
important in international governance. They are taking on more duties in managing conflicts and running the  
economy.  
This move toward regional governance is a response to the problems with global institutions and may lead to  
better ways to deal with regional problems.  
The G20 has become an important place to talk about global economic problems. It brings together both  
established and rising powers in a way that is more representative than traditional groups like the G7. In  
September 2024, the G20 Foreign Ministers called for action on reforming global governance. They stressed  
the need for international institutions that are more open and effective.  
The future of international order and governance will depend on how well countries can adapt to a world that is  
becoming more multipolar while keeping the institutions and rules that have helped keep the peace. This will  
necessitate reconciling the legitimate aspirations of emerging powers for enhanced representation and  
influence with the imperative to uphold fundamental principles such as sovereign equality, the peaceful  
resolution of disputes, and the safeguarding of human rights. Finding this balance in a world where great  
powers are competing with each other or working together is one of the biggest problems in modern  
international relations.  
Theoretical Consequences and Prospective Scenarios.  
The complicated state of the world in June 2025 puts current theories about international relations to the test  
and calls for more detailed frameworks to help us understand how things work on a global scale. Traditional  
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theories offer significant insights but necessitate modification to comprehensively reflect the complex  
dynamics of modern international relations.  
Realist Viewpoints  
The present international context offers compelling support for realist analyses of international relations. The  
return of great power politics, the creation of spheres of influence, and the focus on military strength are all in  
line with what classical realists expect from states in an anarchic international system. The change in U.S.  
foreign policy under Trump's second term, which favors working with Russia and China while putting pressure  
on traditional allies, shows a realpolitik approach that puts power ahead of values or institutional  
commitments.  
Defensive realism elucidates the security dilemmas manifest in areas like the Indo-Pacific, where China's  
military modernization has incited countermeasures from the United States and its allies. The military buildups  
in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East are examples of security dilemma dynamics. States are  
improving their abilities to deal with threats, which could make everyone less safe.  
Offensive realism could view China's increasingly aggressive actions, especially in relation to Taiwan, as a  
logical outcome of its rising influence and the necessity to achieve regional dominance.  
Neoclassical realism, which includes domestic factors in realist analysis, helps us understand how internal  
factors affect decisions about foreign policy. The impact of domestic politics on U.S. policy towards Ukraine,  
Israeli choices concerning Gaza, and Chinese nationalism regarding Taiwan illustrates the necessity of  
amalgamating domestic and international analytical frameworks. The notion of "strategic culture" elucidates  
enduring patterns in state behavior that cannot be exclusively ascribed to structural factors.  
Challenges to Liberal Institutionalism  
Liberal institutionalism encounters considerable challenges in the contemporary international landscape yet  
remains pertinent in elucidating critical dimensions of state conduct. Multilateral institutions keep working and  
changing to fit new power dynamics, even though they face challenges. The United Nations is still involved in  
peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and diplomatic efforts in many conflicts, even though it is limited by divisions  
between major powers. The European Union, the African Union, and ASEAN are all regional organizations  
that are still very important in dealing with security and economic problems in their own areas.  
Economic interdependence, a fundamental tenet of liberal theory, endures despite geopolitical tensions and  
attempts at partial decoupling. The strong economic ties between the US and China are still holding back full  
decoupling, even though tariffs and limits on technology make things harder. European reliance on Chinese  
markets and investments hinders the formation of unified coalitions to counterbalance China. This ongoing  
interdependence bolsters liberal assertions regarding the limiting impact of economic connections on conflict  
behavior.  
Normative frameworks, a key aspect of liberal theory, persist in influencing state behavior and establishing  
criteria for assessing international conduct. Even though ideas like sovereignty, human rights, and democracy  
are being challenged, they are still important points of reference in international discussions. The necessity for  
states to rationalize their actions in accordance with established norms, even when contravening them,  
indicates the enduring significance of normative factors in international relations.  
Insights from Constructivism  
Constructivist approaches provide significant insights into the ideational aspects of contemporary international  
relations. The United States, China, and other powers have different ideas about what the international order  
should look like. These ideas are based on different stories about what the right way to organize the  
international system is. China's focus on "a community of shared future for mankind" and "win-win  
cooperation" offers a different view of the liberal international order that the US and its allies support.  
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The ongoing dispute about the meaning and use of sovereignty, human rights, and democracy shows how  
thesess  
ideas are made up by society. Russia and China have advocated for "sovereign democracy" and underscored  
the principle of non-interference in domestic matters, contesting Western interpretations of these norms.  
Countries in the Global South have progressively articulated their own interpretations of these concepts,  
mirroring their historical contexts and current priorities.  
Identity politics is becoming a bigger part of foreign policy decisions. Claims of national and civilizational  
identity are affecting how states act. The emergence of nationalist leaders across several nations has impacted  
strategies regarding international collaboration, migration, and conflict resolution. Religious and cultural  
identities persist in shaping conflict dynamics in areas like the Middle East, where sectarian divisions and  
conflicting historical narratives hinder peacemaking initiatives.  
Outside of Traditional Paradigms  
The intricacy of modern international relations indicates the necessity for theoretical frameworks that surpass  
conventional paradigms. The concurrent competition, cooperation, and collusion among major powers cannot  
be comprehensively represented by theories that prioritize either conflict or cooperation as the principal mode  
of interaction. The idea of "complex interdependence," which sees that states and non-state actors can interact  
in many different ways, gives us a more detailed view of these relationships.  
Multi-level analysis has grown more important for figuring out how things work between countries. The  
interplay among domestic politics, regional dynamics, and global trends influences outcomes in a manner that  
cannot be simplified to a singular analytical level. The effects of populist movements on foreign policy, the  
function of regional organizations in facilitating global-local interactions, and the influence of transnational  
networks on state conduct necessitate comprehensive analytical frameworks.  
The intricate relationship between material interests and normative factors poses an additional challenge to  
conventional theories. States pursue material interests while concurrently participating in normative discourse  
and identity politics.  
To comprehend this interplay, theoretical frameworks must encompass both the material and ideational aspects  
of international relations without diminishing one in favor of the other.  
Possible Future Scenarios for the International Order  
Several possible scenarios for the future of the international order come to mind when we look at current  
trends and dynamics. These scenarios are not mutually exclusive and may occur concurrently in various  
regions or domains.  
Managed competition  
In this case, the great powers set rules of engagement that keep them from fighting each other directly while  
still competing in other areas. The US, China, and Russia come to unspoken or spoken agreements about their  
areas of influence and red lines.  
lowering the chance of unintentional escalation. Competition persists in economic, technological, and  
ideological domains, yet is limited by the acknowledgment of the disastrous repercussions of direct military  
conflict among nuclear states.  
This situation is similar to the "great power collusion" approach that is starting to take shape under Trump's  
second term, but it has more formal ways to handle competition. There may be deals about how to control  
weapons, how to talk to each other during a crisis, and how to act in areas where there is a lot of competition,  
like cyberspace and outer space. Great powers would work together to deal with regional flashpoints like  
Taiwan, Ukraine, and the Middle East, which could hurt the interests of smaller states.  
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The managed competition scenario offers a measure of stability but engenders considerable apprehensions  
regarding the rights of smaller states and the future of liberal values in international relations. It signifies a  
reversion to a more conventional balance of power framework, albeit within an environment of unparalleled  
economic interdependence and transnational issues.  
Formation of a Bloc  
In another scenario, competing blocs could form around the United States, China, and maybe other powers.  
This would be a more confrontational version of multipolarity, with states having to choose sides more and  
more in a new "Cold War" situation. Economic decoupling would speed up, with the creation of separate trade,  
financial, and technological systems that work with different power centers.  
In this case, ideological differences would become clearer, with different ideas about how to run a country and  
how to run the world. The liberal democratic model endorsed by the United States and its allies would contend  
with the authoritarian state capitalism model linked to China and the nationalist authoritarianism represented  
by Russia. Countries in the Global South would be under more and more pressure to join one group or the  
other. However, some might be able to keep their strategic independence by carefully balancing their interests.  
The scenario of forming a bloc would probably lead to more geopolitical tension and less economic efficiency  
than managed competition. If the global economy split into competing spheres, it would be harder to deal with  
problems that cross national borders, like climate change and pandemics, and trade would be less profitable.  
There would be a higher chance of proxy wars, especially in areas where there is a lot of disagreement, like the  
Indo-Pacific, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East.  
Adaptation of institutions  
A more positive picture is one in which international institutions slowly change to fit the new power dynamics  
while still upholding the main ideas of the post-World War II order. Both established and rising powers would  
have to make big compromises for this to happen. The US and its allies would have to agree to let China and  
other rising powers have more power in exchange for their promise to work within new institutional  
frameworks.  
Institutional adaptation might mean changing the way the Security Council works to reflect how power is  
distributed today, changing how votes are cast in international financial institutions, and coming up with new  
ways to govern new areas like cyberspace and artificial intelligence. Regional organizations would become  
more important, and the principle of subsidiarity would help decide who is responsible for what between  
global and regional institutions.  
This situation would keep some parts of the liberal international order while also meeting the reasonable  
requests of rising powers for more representation and power. It would necessitate a level of cooperation among  
major powers that appears difficult in the present geopolitical landscape, yet could become more achievable if  
common threats like climate change or impending pandemics generate enhanced incentives for collaboration.  
Breakdown of the System  
The worst-case scenario is that the international order will become more fragmented, which will increase the  
chances of conflict. In this situation, competition between great powers gets worse because there aren't any  
good ways to deal with tensions. This leads to arms races, proxy wars, and even direct confrontations. Major  
powers would further push international institutions to the side or use them for their own ends, making it  
harder for them to deal with global problems.  
Economic nationalism would be the most important thing, with countries putting self-sufficiency and security  
ahead of efficiency and interdependence. As restrictions on cross-border data flows, scientific collaboration,  
and technology transfer grow, competition in technology would speed up. The digital world could break up  
into competing "splinternets" that are run by different rules and technical standards.  
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This situation would have the highest chance of a major power conflict, which could be caused by a mistake or  
an escalation in places like Taiwan, Ukraine, or the Middle East. Even if there isn't a direct conflict, the  
breakdown of international cooperation would make it very hard to deal with problems that cross national  
borders, which would have terrible effects on human security and global stability.  
Final Thoughts  
The theoretical implications of modern international relations underscore the necessity for analytical  
frameworks capable of encompassing the complexity and multidimensionality of global politics. Conventional  
theories offer significant insights but necessitate modification to comprehensively address the concurrent  
competition, cooperation, and collusion that define interactions among major powers. The future of the  
international order is still unclear. There are many possible paths, from managed competition to system  
breakdown.  
It is clear that the time after the Cold War when the U.S. was in charge and the liberal international order grew  
is over. The new international system is more multipolar, has more conflicts, and could be more unstable. To  
get through this time of change, we will need smart diplomacy, new ways of doing things in institutions, and a  
willingness to find common ground even when we disagree strongly. There are a lot at stake, and the effects  
will be felt around the world, not just in relations between great powers. They will also affect human security,  
economic growth, and the environment.  
CONCLUSION  
The New International Order  
The international system in June 2025 is at a very important point in time. There are major conflicts going on  
at the same time, power is shifting, and the established global order is facing serious challenges. This paper has  
analyzed the collective impact of these developments on the transformation of international relations and the  
global balance of power. By examining significant conflict zones, great power rivalry, international  
governance issues, and humanitarian aspects, several critical conclusions regarding the characteristics of the  
evolving international order are drawn.  
First, the time after the Cold War when the U.S. was the most powerful country in the world and the liberal  
international order grew has come to an end. After the Soviet Union fell apart, the world became less stable  
and more complicated. China has become a major power, Russia has become more aggressive, and regional  
powers are pursuing their own foreign policies. This shift in power is happening in many areas, including the  
military, economy, technology, and social norms. This makes the competition more complex.  
Second, the way great powers interact with each other has changed a lot. The transition from great power  
competition to what certain analysts term "great power collusion" during the second Trump administration  
signifies a fundamental realignment of U.S. foreign policy. This strategy, which is similar to a "concert"  
system from the 1800s, puts pressure on traditional allies while trying to get along with Russia and China. It's  
not clear if this approach will work in the long run, but it could lead to a return to a more traditional balance of  
power system, even though the world is now more economically interdependent and facing problems that cross  
borders.  
Third, international organizations have a lot of trouble dealing with today's problems. The United Nations  
Security Council is still stuck on big conflicts. The U.S. is alone on Gaza, and the divisions between Russia  
and the West on Ukraine make it hard for countries to work together to solve problems. Reform efforts have  
only made small steps forward, which shows that states don't have a common vision for the future of  
multilateralism. Regional organizations have assumed increased responsibilities, indicative of a trend towards  
the regionalization of governance in response to the inadequacies of global institutions.  
Fourth, the humanitarian effects of the current wars are very bad and affect a lot of people. There are now  
122.6 million people forcibly displaced around the world, which is the highest number ever. The international  
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humanitarian system is having a hard time keeping up with major humanitarian crises in Gaza, Sudan,  
Ukraine, and the Sahel region.  
Funding shortfalls, access constraints, and the politicization of humanitarian action amid significant power  
rivalry hinder effective responses to these challenges.  
Fifth, the present international context contests established theoretical frameworks in international relations.  
Realist perspectives provide significant insights into power dynamics and security challenges, liberal  
institutionalism emphasizes the enduring nature of economic interdependence and normative frameworks, and  
constructivism reveals conflicting narratives and identity politics; however, no singular theoretical framework  
comprehensively encapsulates the intricacies of modern international relations. The concurrent competition,  
collaboration, and collusion among major powers necessitate more sophisticated analytical frameworks.  
There are a few possible scenarios for the future of the international order. These include managed  
competition, where great powers set rules for how to interact with each other that keep direct conflict from  
happening while they compete in other areas; bloc formation, where competing blocs form around different  
power centers; institutional adaptation, where international institutions slowly change to fit new power  
realities; and system breakdown, where the system becomes more fragmented and the risk of conflict rises.  
The international system is going through a time of change that is marked by a lot of uncertainty and  
instability. Nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence make it unlikely that there will be a major power  
war, but there is still a high risk of miscalculation and escalation in places like Taiwan, Ukraine, and the  
Middle East. In the next few years, we will find out if a new, stable international order can be created or if  
international relations will continue to be marked by conflict and fragmentation.  
To get through this time of change, we will need smart diplomacy, new ideas for institutions, and a willingness  
to find common ground even when we disagree strongly. For a more stable and fair international order, we  
need better ways to handle crises, institutional changes that improve representation while keeping  
effectiveness, new ways to help people in need during complex emergencies, and rules for new technologies.  
The stakes are high, and the effects will be felt not only in relations between major powers but also in terms of  
human security, economic growth, and environmental sustainability around the world. The decisions of  
political leaders, international organizations, and civil society in the next few years will have a big impact on  
the international system for many years to come. The first step to coming up with good answers to these new  
problems is to understand how international relations work in today's world.  
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