INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XI November 2025
competition for power devoid of policy coherence (Carothers, 2002; Bratton, 2007). Recent regional research
indicates that weak governance and institutional fragmentation continue to hamper democratic consolidation
across Africa (Resnick & Signé, 2025).
The Gambia’s political landscape after 2016 reflects this paradox. The proliferation of political parties and
movements-each portraying itself as a guardian of democratic renewal—has fragmented governance. Rather
than consolidating democratic gains, elites have pursued personal or factional agendas, leading to coalition
breakdowns and legislative paralysis (Daffeh et al., 2024).
Populist rhetoric has increasingly replaced policy engagement, with leaders mobilising citizens around
grievances instead of governance issues (Olasunkanmi, 2024). This creates cycles of political noise but minimal
institutional output. Ambition without reform orientation becomes an obstacle to state performance, turning
democracy into a perpetual campaign cycle (Carothers, 2002).
These dynamics also strain civil society, forcing activists into reactive positions and polarising public discourse.
The cumulative effect is a governance vacuum in which leadership legitimacy erodes and citizen trust diminishes
(Minko, 2023).
Civil Society: Between Advocacy and Polarisation
Civil society organisations (CSOs) are vital to democratic deepening through accountability, service delivery,
and mobilisation (Diamond, 1999). However, contemporary studies emphasise that CSO behaviour in Africa is
shaped by embedded political networks, donor dependencies, limited autonomy, and internal fragmentation
(Schritt, 2020; Ogunwa & Ogunwa, 2023).
During the 2016 democratic transition, Gambian CSOs mobilised citizens and defended electoral integrity. Yet,
with political liberalisation, internal divisions and strategic misalignment emerged. Some CSOs aligned with
political factions or donor priorities, compromising neutrality, while others prioritised visibility over sustained
policy engagement (Minko, 2023).
This “activism fatigue” reduces credibility and undermines influence. Social media activism, though vibrant,
often amplifies polarisation rather than promoting constructive dialogue (Ajaegbu & Ajaegbu, 2024).
A recalibrated civil society must embrace policy dialogue, coalition building, and self-regulation. Only through
renewed professionalism and autonomy can CSOs maintain legitimacy as governance stakeholders.
Reforms without Transformation in the Security Sector
Security institutions form the backbone of national stability yet are often neglected in governance reform
(Bryden & Hänggi, 2005). Analyses of Africa’s democratic landscape confirm that civil-military relations and
SSR remain essential to resilience (Resnick & Signé, 2025; Hutchful, 2003).
The Gambia’s SSR agenda sought to modernise and professionalise its forces. However, progress remains slow
and inconsistent. Morale within the armed forces and police has been eroded by irregular reforms, weak welfare
systems, and political patronage (Ball, 2002). Leadership turnover and recycling of retired officers further
demotivated younger professionals.
The absence of a coherent national security doctrine has left institutions reactive rather than strategic (Sedra,
2010). Public trust remains fragile due to historical memories of repression, creating a dual perception of security
forces as both necessary and suspect. An uninspired security force contributes to national uncertainty.
Motivation, professionalism, and autonomy are essential for anchoring democratic stability (Huntington, 1957).
The Governance Triangle: Ambition, Activism, and Apathy
The interaction among political movements, civil societies, and security institutions creates a condition of
institutional fatigue (Bratton, 2007). Regional studies affirm that fragile democracies are plagued by overlapping
challenges: weak checks and balances, polarisation, and security governance gaps (Resnick & Signé, 2025).
Page 2101