INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)

ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XI November 2025

Page 2516

www.rsisinternational.org

Legislative Oversight and Government Accountability: Implications for

Good Governance in Nigeria

Samuel Oni

, Adetoun Esther Adenuga

, Moyosoluwa Priscilla Dele-Dada

1,3

Department of Public Policy and Administration, Miva Open University, Abuja

Department of Public Administration, Distance Learning Institute, University of Lagos

DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2025.91100202

Received: 10 November 2025; Accepted: 20 November 2025; Published: 04 December 2025

ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the extent to which the Nigerian federal legislature has been able to perform its oversight

role to promote accountability and its impact on good governance in Nigeria. The research design used in the

study is qualitative research design to examine the legislative activities and their effectiveness in improving

accountability by using secondary data in scholarly articles, government documents and other related case

studies. The findings show that legislative control has been a major factor in enhancing transparency and

balancing executive operations. However, the effectiveness of legislative oversight is compromised by

problems such as political interference, lack of adequate resources, and internal corruption, which might not be

in a position to facilitate accountability in governance to the maximum. Moreover, the separation of powers

limits the extent of the legislature, as the executive is often obliged to implement the law. The paper has

established that despite the fact that legislative oversight is a key accountability mechanism, which is a

characteristic of good governance, its effectiveness still requires improvement. The article, therefore, indicates

that internal ethical standards and anti-corruption mechanisms should be enhanced in the legislature to enhance

the credibility of the population and the legitimacy of the control measures. This is to ensure that there is good

governance and that the legislative oversight has a positive role to play in the democratic stability in Nigeria.

Keywords: Accountability, governance, legislature, legislative oversight, Nigeria

INTRODUCTION

Legislative oversight is a fundamental aspect of democratic governance because it offers a system of checks

and balances that allows the legislature to check the executive and ensure that government actions comply with

the established legal and ethical standards (Stapenhurst et al., 2019). Oversight enables the legislature to check

government actions, safeguard the interests of the people, and foster transparency and accountability in the

administration of the government (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2013). In this role, oversight serves as an instrument

to assess and check the efficiency, effectiveness, and equity of government functions, which should be in line

with the rule of law (Putri & Ausath, 2024).

In Nigeria, the legislative oversight role is bestowed on the National Assembly, which is made up of the Senate

and the House of Representatives at the federal level, and state assemblies at the regional level. The Nigerian

constitution gives these legislative institutions the power to check the activities of the executive, scrutinize

government spending, and hold government officials accountable (Omotoso & Oladeji, 2019). As an example,

Section 88 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria empowers the National Assembly to investigate matters within

its legislative competence, including budgetary allocation, policy implementation, and administrative

efficiency (Udemezue & Chioke, 2024). This legislative role is essential in the Nigerian context, where the

problems of corruption, mismanagement of state funds and executive excesses are always a threat to good

governance. Nigeria is low on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, which indicates

that there are still problems with accountability in the country in terms of its public institutions (Transparency

International, 2023). The oversight role of the National Assembly is, therefore, essential in limiting these

issues by ensuring accountability of the public officials and reviewing budget implementations, policy results,

and spending habits (Adeniyi & Bakare, 2023). As an example, the oversight role of the National Assembly is

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)

ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XI November 2025

Page 2517

www.rsisinternational.org

applied in the annual budget review process, where the legislative committees scrutinise the budget proposal of

the executive, evaluate its compatibility with national priorities, and make amendments to achieve a balanced

and equitable distribution of resources (Fagbadebo, 2019).

Although the Nigerian Constitution and other legal systems provide the National Assembly with significant

powers to exercise legislative oversight, there is low government accountability as demonstrated by high levels

of corruption, poor institutional checks, and enforcement of accountability mechanisms. Corruption and

misappropriation of government funds remain common (Agu, Nkwo & Eneiga, 024). According to

Transparency International, Nigeria ranks low in the 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index, which shows that the

country has not overcome its governance issues, and people do not trust its institutions. The number of people

who have been killed by the police in the country is high (Transparency International, 2022; Ojo, 2018; Enofe

et al., 2021). It is on this premise that this paper will look at the current situation of legislative oversight in

Nigeria, the particular challenges that impede its effectiveness and the wider implications of these issues on

good governance in the country. This research is especially timely at this point, as effective oversight is an

important aspect of ensuring transparency, integrity, and the rule of law in a democracy. In Nigeria where

governance issues like corruption, mismanagement, and executive overreach continue to plague the country,

there must be a strong system of legislative oversight to make sure that government actions are in the best

interest of the people. This study, therefore, seeks to explore the complexities and effectiveness of legislative

oversight in Nigeria, identifying areas where improvements are needed and providing insights that can

contribute to strengthening the country's democratic processes and enhancing good governance.

METHODOLOGY

The study adopts a secondary data collection method, whereby the researcher relies on existing sources of

information that are pertinent to the study. Secondary data were accessed through official government

publications, legislative reports, audit reports of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) in Nigeria,

publications of non-governmental organisations concerned with governance and accountability, academic

journals and research papers. Reliable online databases like JSTOR, ResearchGate, and Google Scholar were

also used to collect data on literature that addresses the functions of legislative oversight, government

accountability, and governance practices in Nigeria.

A systematic review of these secondary sources was undertaken to identify data that could be used in

legislative oversight mechanisms, accountability metrics and good governance indicators. This was done by

examining portions of the powers of the National Assembly, legislative oversight of executive actions,

instances of investigative hearings, and published audits of government agencies and departments. This wide

range of secondary data sources enables a thorough insight into the current legislative framework and its

contribution to transparency, accountability, and good governance in Nigeria. To make the data reliable and

relevant, the sources were chosen according to such criteria as their publication during the last decade, their

applicability to the Nigerian governance system, and their attention to the legislative practices. The study keeps

the current information on the efficiency of legislative oversight and its influence on government

accountability by using recent publications. Older sources were only used selectively when it was necessary to

establish the background or conceptual underpinnings of the study.

The research used qualitative content analysis to explain the secondary data. Content analysis enabled a

detailed analysis of textual information, including government reports and legislative documents, to identify

patterns and common themes regarding legislative oversight practices. This method also helped to identify

formal and informal oversight mechanisms used by the Nigerian legislature and the problems faced in holding

the executive accountable. Using a thematic coding framework, data from the secondary sources were

systematically organised under themes such as "Oversight Mechanisms," "Challenges in Legislative

Accountability," and "Impact on Good Governance." Sub-themes were allocated to each theme that captured

certain dimensions of legislative oversight, including the role of investigative hearings, committee inquiries,

budgetary review, and public audits in improving government accountability. This thematic framework

enabled a subtle appreciation of the role of legislative practices in Nigeria in shaping the outcomes of

governance.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)

ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XI November 2025

Page 2518

www.rsisinternational.org

The results were then synthesised to establish the effectiveness of legislative oversight in enhancing

accountability and its implications for good governance. Comparative analysis was used to determine the

extent to which the practices in Nigeria conform to or diverge from the standard oversight practices in other

democracies. In addition, the information was put into the context of governance theories to explain the

correlation between legislative oversight and the quality of governance in Nigeria. The analysis compares the

findings with the existing governance benchmarks to identify the areas where the Nigerian legislative practices

either contribute to or detract from the accountability objectives. The use of secondary data and qualitative

content analysis is suitable in the study as the topic of study is based on the analysis of legislative and

governance documentation, which gives an understanding of the institutional practices and results without the

necessity of primary data collection. The approach allows a comprehensive and extensive examination, which

identifies the main trends and issues in Nigerian governance that can be used to draw conclusions about the

role of legislative oversight in fostering government accountability and good governance.

Legislative Oversight and Government Accountability: Exploring extant Literature

The body of literature on legislative oversight and government accountability is extensive and varied, with

researchers in different disciplines contributing to the understanding of how these two notions are defined,

used, and interconnected. This literature review explores some of the major definitions, the theoretical

interconnection between legislative oversight and accountability, and criticisms of the global and Nigeria-

specific scholarly views. The review aims at demystifying points of agreement and disagreement among

researchers and identifying gaps that can be used to guide future studies.

Conceptualising Legislative Oversight

Usman (2016) defines oversight as a process that is embraced by the legislative arm of a government to

supervise, oversee, scrutinise and monitor the activities, actions and performance of the executive and its

agencies on a continuous basis to ensure efficiency and effectiveness. Also, Fagbadebo (2019) described

oversight as a series of activities undertaken by the legislature that has a legally established responsibility to

monitor and control all activities undertaken by the administration and its agents to identify gaps in policy

execution or deviations thereof. According to Griglio (2020), the term legislative oversight refers to

mechanisms that are used by the legislature to perform its functions of checks and balances in a democratic

form of government. In the same vein, Jooji (2019) stated that legislative oversight is interested in the different

ways in which the executive can be made accountable and in ensuring that programmes are carried out in line

with laws and budgets passed by the legislature. This is done to make sure that the executive's powers are not

unrestrained. Accordingly, the National Conference of State Legislatures (2022) explained legislative oversight

as a primary check and balance to review the actions of the executive and its agencies in the implementation of

laws and policies. For Omotosho & Oladeji (2019), legislative oversight symbolises the power of the

legislature over the executive’s enforcement and administration of legislation. In contrast, Walker (2017) sees

legislative oversight as a continuation of the process of lawmaking to ascertain the effectiveness of legislation

passed in response to a specific problem as intended by the drafters. In broad terms, legislative oversight

describes techniques and methods adopted by the legislature to ensure accountability of the government as well

as efficiency and effectiveness in the implementation of programmes formulated for the sustenance,

development and improvement of the society (Hildreth, Miller, & Rabin, 2021). According to Jooji (2019),

legislative oversight makes it possible and simple to monitor and regulate government actions. In a democratic

system, the ability to check, balance and control the activities of the government is a vital component of

democracy because the more the powers of the government are subjected to control, checks and balances, the

greater the prospects for democracy (Stapenhurst, Jacob & Olaore, 2016). Also, Dogara (2016) explained that

it is the responsibility of legislators to monitor the operations of government agencies, particularly those of the

executive branch, on behalf of those whom they are tasked with representing. This procedure brings the actions

of the executive branch to the attention of the general public, and it provides the 20 voters with the opportunity

to assess whether public officials are truly serving their common interests or not. The oversight of the

legislative process is one of the legislature's primary constitutional responsibilities. In a system of separation of

powers, the legislature is required to counterbalance the executive and keep its power in check. According to

Frolick (2016), legislators have the legal authority, the legal basis, and the obligation to hold the government

accountable for its acts, as well as the responsibility to do so. According to Onyango (2020), legislators are

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)

ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XI November 2025

Page 2519

www.rsisinternational.org

responsible for holding government departments and agencies accountable to the public. The goal of legislative

oversight is to allow the legislature to pass essential legislation on any subject within its legislative jurisdiction

and to remedy any flaws in existing laws (Maricutt-Akbik, 2021). The legislature regularly monitors

administrative agencies to ensure accountability in the use of public resources for stated goals and objectives

while studying and evaluating the executive's operations to make sure they remain within acceptable bounds

(Gberevbie, 2017). According to Busuioc & Lodge (2016), the legislature exerts control over the activities of

public officials in order to hold them accountable for their actions in carrying out their duties and

responsibilities on a daily basis through legislative oversight, question time, adjournment debate, and, where

necessary, amendment of the law, all of which are done to ensure that the citizens' interests are well protected.

Similarly, Stapenhurst, Jacob, and Olaore (2016) made a submission that hearings in committee, plenary

assembly hearings, parliamentary questions, question time, and interpellation are all tools that could be used to

monitor the executive's actions. The parliamentary standing committees, in particular, are responsible for a

constant examination of the activities of MDAs in respective subject areas. Legislators have also established

special and standing committees to assess the functioning and performance of government agencies (Tobi,

Ayodeji & Odalonu, 2021). These tools come in handy, particularly in determining the effectiveness and

efficiency of policies and programmes formulated to address specific challenges in the country. Legislative

oversight could be undertaken both ex-ante and ex-post, depending on the nature of the program or policy

(Dogara, 2016). The ex-ante, which is an oversight conducted before policy implementation, allows legislators

to make suggestions on policy designs which is in line with the demands of their constituencies (Bundi, 2016).

This involves carrying out two major activities, which involve giving consideration to the design of policies

while taking into consideration their peculiarities and details. The second major activity involves the screening

and determination of an appropriate policy that would best address pressing challenges of the people

(Fagbadebo, 2018). The process of monitoring and making reports on the implementation of policies approved

at the ex-ante stage falls under ex post oversight (Bundi, 2018). This form comes after the selection and

passage of the preferred policy design. Following the passage of legislation, the legislature's principal role is to

ensure that the legislation is effectively implemented and that it appropriately reflects the objective of the

legislators who drafted it. Additionally, lawmakers and their staff, individually or collectively, can have an

impact on bureaucratic conduct, whether or not they intend to. The legislature is responsible for ensuring that

existing programs are implemented and managed effectively, efficiently, and in accordance with legislative

intent (Wenibowei, 2021).

Importance of Legislative Oversight

a. Promotion of Transparency and Accountability: Accountability and transparency are specific demands

of the governed in a democratic state. In a representative democracy, it is expected that those who represent the

governed in government would act in the collective interest of the governed if they are required to answer for

their actions and outcomes (Olsen, 2017). Thus, this becomes a mechanism for ensuring the promotion of the

interests of the governed. Through legislative oversight, the actions and inactions of the government are made

known, and therefore the government is forced to be made accountable to those that are being governed

(Malapane, 2019). This enables the governed to determine whether or not the government is working in their

best interest and what steps to take should it be revealed that the actions of the government are in contrast with

their collective will. Legislative oversight is also quite important in ensuring fiscal accountability by the

government (Kgatjepe, 2018). Through its oversight duties, the legislature ensures that all projects of the

government are within the approved budgetary limits. The purpose of this is to prevent mismanagement of

public funds and corrupt practices by the government and its agencies.

b. Determination of Programme and Policy Effectiveness: Information elicited from the conduct of

legislative oversight allows the legislators to determine if a policy was effective 22 in addressing a particular

challenge for which it was formulated. In this sense, the goal here is to determine if actual performance is

equal to standard performance. In such a situation, the legislature closely monitors the implementation of the

programmes to determine if it’s being done properly or not (Vedung, 2017). The result of this exercise would

therefore serve as a justification for the performance of the programme. Legislative oversight also creates the

opportunity for legislative intervention in situations where the results yielded by the policy are in a completely

negative contrast with what was expected (Gaitonde, Oxman, Okebukola, & Rada, 2016). In determining the

effectiveness of the programme through its oversight duties, the legislators would also be able to assess the

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)

ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XI November 2025

Page 2520

www.rsisinternational.org

impact of a policy on society and the lives of the governed (PLAC, 2019)

c. Identification of Non-compliance with Constitutional Directives by the Executive: The practice of

democracy does not allow for the concentration of absolute power at the disposal of any institution of the state.

The legislature exists to serve as a check and balance of the powers of the executive, and this is attained

through conducting oversight on the actions and activities of the executive. By nature of the executives’

position in government, there is a tendency for their actions to sometimes stray away from what is obtainable

within the constitution for reasons known to them. Such actions can only be noticed, identified and addressed

through proper monitoring by the legislature (Chohan, 2017).

d. Promotion of Rationality in the Formulation and Administration of Public Policy: Policy designs do

not just become public policies; they are often subjected to ex-ante oversight, which is usually carried out

before the formulation of policies (Nwogwugwu & Ishola, 2019). This is done to determine which of the

policy designs would best address the present policy demand and at what cost. The ex-ante also goes further to

determine persons whom the policy is supposed to benefit and the expected result to be realised. The purpose

of conducting an ex-ante oversight is to acquire information that is required to help in the development of a

sensible and practical policy to accomplish the necessary goals. (Omotosho & Oladeji, 2019).

Tools for Legislative Oversight

The legislature has different oversight instruments at its disposal when overseeing the actions of the executive.

Audit commissions, hearings in plenary sessions of parliament, inquiry, question time and interpellations, as

well as the auditor’s general are some of the most frequently used tools (Stapenhurst, Jacob & Olaore, 2016).

This collection of oversight tools can be divided into two categories. The first of these dimensions is concerned

with the timeliness of the oversight activities; “instruments of control ex ante.” This refers to oversight

measures that are employed before a certain policy is implemented or before the government engages in a

specific activity (Stapenhurst, Jacob & Cedric Eboutou, 2019; Patty & Turner, 2021). The use of ex ante

mechanisms, such as hearings in committees, is one of the options open to lawmakers. As long as the

legislative oversight is undertaken after the government has passed legislation in order to ensure that the

legislation is effectively executed, the legislative oversight tools are referred to as “instruments of control ex

post” (after the policy has been implemented). Interrogations, interpellations, and the formation of committees

of inquiry are some of the methods that are employed after the fact (Patty & Turner, 2021). Another aspect to

consider is whether the oversight tools are developed within or outside of the Parliament, that is, if they are

internal or external oversight instruments. Questions, question time, interpellations, hearings, and public

accounts committees are all examples of internal tools, whereas the auditor’s general is an example of external

instruments (Fagbadebo, 2019).

Conceptualising Government Accountability

The concept of public accountability emphasises the belief that the public has a "right to know," meaning they

have the right to access reliable information from the government (Omar et al., 2007; Pablos et al., 2002). It is

widely understood that accountability arises when one party is responsible for reporting decisions and actions

to another party (Omar et al., 2007). Therefore, accountability exists when the agent receives resources and

responsibilities from the principal (Kluvers & Tippett, 2010; Pina et al., 2010). In the public sector, the

relationship of accountability indirectly positions the public as a key user of the information and services

provided by the government (Lily et al., 2012). As such, the public has the right to know how financial

resources are utilised and managed by the government (Perez et al., 2005). Citizens are interested in obtaining

information that allows them to assess the current performance and financial status of the government (Pablos

et al., 2002). Consequently, the government should be more transparent in disclosing the information needed

by the public (Steccolini, 2004). This obligation is essential for fulfilling its responsibility and represents a

vital means of implementing accountability to the public.

Accountability is a broad concept that can be interpreted differently depending on the context. Traditionally, it

describes the relationship between parties involved in a particular operation (Roberts & Scapens, 1985). From

an organisational standpoint, Shahul (2000) argues that accountability goes beyond merely using resources

effectively, efficiently, and economically (the 3Es). It also includes a responsibility to prevent any misuse of

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)

ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XI November 2025

Page 2521

www.rsisinternational.org

these resources. This implies that individuals must provide explanations for their actions to those who have the

right to know.

Accountability is closely linked to the concept of power; while power can be delegated, responsibility cannot

be transferred. This means that a manager is accountable for the actions of their subordinate employees.

Furthermore, accountability is tied to the value of individual responsibility. It is essential for everyone

entrusted with a task to understand the importance of responsibility and to execute their duties meticulously

and ethically, without any elements of fraud, corruption, injustice, or treachery. If negative actions affect the

completion of a job, even stellar results cannot justify them. Ultimately, an individual will face consequences

that reflect the severity of their misdeeds.

In the context of civil service, accountability refers to the obligation of officers to explain their actions and

decisions to those entitled to receive such explanations. Traditionally, accountability has been understood as

vertical accountability, where civil servants are answerable to their superiors and the government. The

meaning of accountability has however changed. It also includes the role of officers to interact with a wider

network than their immediate hierarchy as they carry out their duties today. Therefore, the concepts of

responsibility and commitment to the work should be maintained on a regular basis with the help of high

ethical principles, appropriate values, and laws and regulations. This view is supported by Jones and

Pendlebury (2000), who emphasise that the management of public resources should be conducted effectively,

efficiently, and economically, often referred to as the "3E" principles.

Accountability is a multifaceted term that denotes the duty of the officials in the government to answer to the

people or other authorities about their actions and the reasons behind their decisions. There is a general

consensus among scholars that accountability entails three elements, namely, transparency, responsibility, and

responsiveness to the people. Nevertheless, critics of this idea point out its depth and breadth. Bovens (2010)

describes accountability as a relationship where an actor feels obliged to explain and justify his or her actions

to some other significant party, usually a supervisory body or the people. Although this definition is commonly

used, Koppell (2015) claims that it is too procedure-oriented and does not pay enough attention to substantive

results. According to Koppell, accountability must be evaluated on the basis of the concrete outcomes of

oversight, including the minimisation of corruption and the enhancement of the delivery of public services, and

not the mere presence of reporting and justification systems. In the case of Nigeria, Salisu (2020) suggests that

definitions of accountability that focus on formal obligations might not be sufficient. Procedural requirements

are often met by public officials who do not show any real transparency or responsiveness. Salisu asserts that

accountability in practice should not only be the duty to justify actions but also a commitment to ethical

governance, which entails the absence of corrupt or self-serving behaviours. This broader definition of

accountability is similar to the arguments of Ojo and Omole (2022), who state that accountability must also

include a proactive commitment to the public interest, particularly in fragile democracies where institutional

checks are weak.

Nexus of Legislative Oversight and Government Accountability

The nexus between legislative oversight and government accountability is frequently discussed in terms of

their interdependent roles in ensuring transparency, preventing corruption, and fostering public trust in

government. Legislative oversight is viewed as an essential mechanism through which accountability can be

operationalised, providing a means for legislators to scrutinise executive actions, evaluate policy outcomes,

and prevent the misuse of public resources (Gerring & Thacker, 2022).

However, critiques arise regarding the extent to which oversight genuinely enhances accountability. According

to Adeniyi and Bakare (2023), the effectiveness of legislative oversight in promoting accountability is

contingent upon several factors, including the autonomy, resources, and expertise available to legislative

bodies. They argue that in many developing democracies, oversight bodies lack the independence needed to act

against the executive, thus undermining their role as mechanisms of accountability. This critique aligns with

the perspectives of Salisu (2020), who notes that oversight is often symbolic in nature, fulfilling formal

requirements without achieving substantive accountability.

Moreover, some scholars argue that the link between oversight and accountability is idealised and does not

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)

ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XI November 2025

Page 2522

www.rsisinternational.org

account for the realities of power dynamics and political patronage. Ayee (2020) suggests that oversight often

serves as a tool for partisan or personal gain rather than as an objective means of promoting accountability.

This instrumentalisation of oversight is particularly evident in countries where legislative members may be

aligned with the executive, leading to collusion rather than confrontation. This critique reflects a broader

concern within the literature that oversight mechanisms may be undermined by political interests, especially in

contexts like Nigeria.

Legislative Oversight and Government Accountability in Nigeria

Literature on legislative oversight and government accountability in Nigeria has tended to point out the

difficulties experienced by the Nigerian legislature in its oversight role. Political interference and executive

dominance have been cited as some of the biggest challenges to effective oversight in Nigeria. According to

scholars like Ojo (2023), the executive in Nigeria has a lot of influence over the legislature, which is usually

achieved through budgetary control, political appointments, and the capacity to co-opt members of the

legislature through party affiliation. This superiority restricts the independence of the legislature and

discourages it from questioning executive actions.

Critics, however, believe that these analyses tend to exaggerate the influence of the executive and

underestimate the agency of the legislators. According to Agbaje and Osabuohien (2022), the legislative

members can oppose the executive dominance by acting together and forming strategic partnerships with civil

society organisations, yet these options are not used to their full potential. They suggest that the legislature's

inability to assert its authority is partly due to internal fragmentation, lack of solidarity among lawmakers, and

the absence of a strong legislative culture.

The other theme that is prevalent in the literature is the absence of institutional capacity in the Nigerian

legislative institutions, which makes it difficult to conduct effective oversight. Research by Eme et al. (2021)

indicates that Nigerian legislative committees often do not have the funds, qualified staff, and information

access to conduct comprehensive investigations. In the absence of sufficient resources, legislative institutions

can hardly perform their mandates, which results in the oversight functions being limited to mere symbolic

actions with no real effect.

However, critics of this view have stated that such a narrow approach can be counterproductive in solving

structural problems, including corruption and political will. Salisu (2020) states that resource constraints are a

legitimate concern, but the bigger problem is that there is no commitment to accountability in the legislature.

He argues that even in the case where resources are present, they are usually misused or used inefficiently

because of the lack of accountability among the legislators themselves. This criticism poses critical questions

regarding the contribution of legislative ethics and internal accountability systems to the improvement of

oversight.

Another common topic of discussion that compromises the effectiveness of oversight is corruption in the

legislature. According to Eme and Edeh (2021), conflicts of interest, bribery, and nepotism among legislators

are likely to result in compromised oversight because lawmakers might be reluctant to investigate their

colleagues or government officials with whom they are financially or politically connected. This culture of

corruption undermines the confidence of the people in the legislature as an independent watchdog.

Nevertheless, other researchers argue that corruption-focused analyses can inadvertently overshadow other

forces that affect the effectiveness of oversight. Akinyemi (2023) states that corruption is a widespread

problem, but the emphasis on it can result in a deterministic perspective that ignores the possibility of change.

Akinyemi suggests a more subtle approach that would look at how institutional reforms, including transparent

legislative procedures, performance-based incentives, and public accountability measures, would reduce the

effects of corruption on oversight.

The literature often points to Public Accounts Committees (PACs) as an important mechanism of fostering

financial accountability in Nigeria. According to Ojo (2023), PACs are important in examining government

spending and making sure that money is spent as per the budgetary allocations. PACs give a platform to hold

the executive accountable in financial management through their reviews of audit reports and the power to

summon government officials. However, the criticisms of PAC effectiveness in Nigeria show that these

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)

ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XI November 2025

Page 2523

www.rsisinternational.org

committees have serious problems. According to Ojo (2023), PACs usually do not have enforcement

capabilities, and their recommendations are not binding and can be ignored by the executive without any

repercussions. Also, the slow pace of acting on PAC recommendations and poor follow-up systems further

compromise the effectiveness of these committees in holding governments accountable. According to scholars

such as Fagbadebo and Ruffin (2022), the failure to follow through is indicative of larger institutional failures

and political will, which PACs cannot solve alone.

Another area where scholars differ is in the issue of public trust in the process of legislative oversight.

Research shows that citizens have a low opinion of the effectiveness of the legislature, and they tend to believe

that the legislature is either part of the corruption or incapable of enforcing accountability (Adeniyi & Bakare,

2023). This image is partially supported by media coverage of cases of legislative scandals, conflicts of

interest, and compromised investigations. Criticisms of this viewpoint state that although the issue of public

distrust is a serious one, it is not always an insurmountable obstacle.

Theoretical Framework

This study is anchored on the Agency Theory which studies the interaction between two parties, the principal

and the agent, the former who delegates work to the latter who performs that work on behalf of the former.

This relationship is established through delegation and trust, but it is also vulnerable to conflict of interest,

particularly in cases where the two parties do not share the same objectives and do not have equal access to

information. The ideas behind the theory had been debated in economics and political science earlier, but were

most fully and powerfully developed in 1976 by Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling in their seminal

paper, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Their contributions

added to previous ones like those of Stephen A. Ross in 1973, but it was the approach of Jensen and Meckling

that gave the formal model that is used widely in business, economics, political science, and public

administration today.

The core of the theory is the understanding that not all objectives of the principals and the agents coincide. As

an example, shareholders (principals) would want managers (agents) to maximise shareholder value, but

managers might be interested in their own benefits (salaries, job security, prestige projects) that do not always

coincide with shareholder interests. This difference is further compounded by information asymmetry,

whereby the agents tend to possess more specific information about their activities and the work environment

than the principals, and thus, they are better placed to influence the results in accordance with their

preferences. The theory is anchored on a number of important assumptions. First, the principals and the agents

are regarded as rational actors driven by self-interest. Second, they tend to have different goals, i.e., what is

good to one is not always good to the other. Third, it is characterised by information asymmetry where the

agent possesses better or concealed information. Fourth, the principals and the agents might differ in their

attitudes towards risk; agents might not risk venturing into risky projects that might risk their status, and the

principals might prefer riskier projects, which might yield greater returns. Lastly, the theory presupposes that it

is expensive to monitor the actions of the agent and that decision-making is bound by rationality, time

constraints, information constraints, and human capacity constraints. The theory proposes a number of

solutions to this problem of agency that emerges due to these dynamics. These are the alignment of incentives,

where the rewards of the agent are linked to the goals of the principal, enhancing monitoring and reporting to

minimise asymmetric information, and bonding, where the agents give guarantees against the possible losses

that may be incurred by their actions.

Principal-Agent Theory has been subject to a lot of criticism despite its widespread use. One of the major

criticisms is that it has a narrow view of human motivation since it presumes that individuals are primarily

self-interested and opportunistic and ignores other factors like trust, ethics, or intrinsic commitment. The

theory has also been criticised by those who feel that it oversimplifies human and organisational relationships

to contractual relationships and ignores cultural, social and psychological factors. The assumptions of

opportunism and goal divergence might not hold in certain situations, e.g. in non-profits or in public service

organisations. In addition, the outcomes of most processes can hardly be measured precisely, and it is difficult

to design optimal incentive contracts. The theory has also been faulted as being too fixed in that it does not

entirely capture the dynamic and evolving nature of principal-agent relationships over time. Finally, excessive

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)

ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XI November 2025

Page 2524

www.rsisinternational.org

attention to control through monitoring and incentive plans can be counterproductive, creating adversarial

rather than cooperative relationships and generating costs that can outweigh the benefits.

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

Legislative oversight is crucial; its effectiveness is hindered by systemic and structural issues within Nigeria's

political landscape. The findings align with past studies suggesting that strong oversight is necessary for

accountable governance (Stapenhurst, 2019). Addressing these issues requires strengthening the institutional

capacity of the legislature, promoting public engagement, and implementing policies that foster legislative

independence.

The findings reveal that while legislative oversight has contributed positively to the quest for transparency and

accountability, several weaknesses limit its effectiveness in ensuring good governance.

Positive Contributions

Promotion of Transparency and Accountability: Legislative oversight is an important factor in enhancing

accountability in the governance systems of Nigeria. The ability of the legislature to check the executive and

seek explanations on its actions has resulted in more scrutiny and uncovering of inefficiencies and corruption.

As an example, legislators have used public committee hearings and inquiries to hold government agencies

accountable in terms of budget allocations, public spending and policy outcomes. This has created a higher

level of transparency where citizens can look at government activities with a more critical eye and promote

ethical practices of governance (Dogara, 2016; Freedom of Information Act).

Constitutional Mandate for Oversight: The National Assembly has wide powers to conduct inquiries and

investigations under the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. Section 88 enables it to call people, demand documents

and even issue warrants to enforce compliance. This authority gives the legislature the ability to check the

compliance of the executive with the laws and programs, and therefore, it is a crucial element in the balance

and separation of powers in the government system (Ezeani, 2010). Legislative scrutiny has resulted in major

policy improvements as it has brought to the attention of the people corruption, mismanagement and policy

failures (Jinadu, 1979; Yusuf, 2000).

Contribution to Democratic Processes: Legislative oversight promotes democratic governance because it

makes sure that the actions of the executive are in line with the will of the people. Lawmakers represent a

variety of constituencies and must therefore examine executive actions and promote the interests of the people,

which creates an atmosphere in which citizens can observe their interests being safeguarded. These acts

promote the merits of democracy, including freedom of expression, rule of law, and equal representation in

governance, which are critical to good governance (Kabong, 1986; Alemika, 2000).

Weaknesses and Limitations

Political Interference and Abuse of Oversight: Although legislative oversight is constitutionally supported,

its effectiveness is often undermined by political interference. Legislators have sometimes used oversight tools

as a means to exert political pressure on the executive rather than promote accountability. This has resulted in

cases where oversight activities are perceived as tools for harassment or political retaliation rather than genuine

governance checks. Former President Obasanjo’s response to legislative inquiries illustrates how executive

leaders may resist or criticise oversight, viewing it as encroachment or misuse of power by the legislature

(Oluwadare Aguda; Tony Momoh vs. Senate, 1982).

Corruption and Collusion: Legislative oversight is also affected by internal issues, including corruption

within the legislative body itself. Legislators may be involved in corrupt activities, leading to a situation where

oversight becomes superficial or selective. This undermines the credibility of oversight actions and may

prevent critical issues from being addressed. The problem of legislators allegedly extorting resources from

ministries or government agencies, as noted during Obasanjo’s administration, reflects these issues (National

Network, 2016).

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)

ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XI November 2025

Page 2525

www.rsisinternational.org

Limited Resources and Capacity Constraints: Effective oversight requires well-resourced and capable

institutions; however, Nigerian legislators often face constraints in terms of technical expertise, resources, and

adequate research support. Legislative committees may lack the necessary information or technical

understanding to thoroughly evaluate complex policies or expenditures, limiting their ability to conduct

comprehensive investigations. The lack of access to independent research facilities and budget constraints

further hampers legislative oversight, reducing its effectiveness in promoting accountability (Dogara, 2016).

Judicial Limitations and Separation of Powers: Legislative powers of oversight are bound by the principle

of separation of powers, which restricts them from carrying out investigative or prosecutorial roles reserved for

the judiciary and executive. In cases such as Tony Momoh vs. Senate, the judiciary has reinforced these

boundaries, clarifying that the legislature should not overstep its authority by conducting investigations that

resemble executive or judicial actions. These legal constraints can limit the legislature's capacity to pursue

accountability fully, as they must often rely on the executive to act upon findings of oversight committees

(Corel Pagination, International Policy Brief).

Implications for Good Governance

The findings indicate that while legislative oversight has positively contributed to accountability and

transparency, substantial challenges hinder its ability to guarantee good governance comprehensively. The dual

issues of political manipulation and internal inefficiencies reduce the legislature’s credibility, which in turn

weakens the public’s trust in its oversight functions. For legislative oversight to effectively promote good

governance, there is a need for stronger ethical standards within the legislature, as well as reforms to enhance

legislative capacities, minimise political interference, and ensure effective coordination with judicial and

executive arms.

The paper highlights that although legislative oversight is critical to good governance, particularly in a

developing democracy like Nigeria, it is important to overcome the constraints within this system to make it

effective. The legislature can be further empowered to play its role as a key accountability mechanism in

Nigeria through reforms in oversight processes, increased institutional support and citizen participation.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

In sum, this paper has highlighted the importance of legislative oversight in enhancing government

accountability and good governance in Nigeria. Legislative oversight acts as a major tool of checking the

executive activities, ensuring that they are in line with the constitutional requirements, and also revealing cases

of mismanagement and corruption. The legislature has also contributed to transparency in government

operations through investigative hearings, budgetary reviews, and public committee hearings, which are key to

a democratic society (Dogara, 2016; Ezeani, 2010).

Although legislative oversight plays a major role in transparency and accountability, there are a number of

challenges that restrict its effectiveness. Political interference and misuse of oversight for partisan purposes can

undermine genuine governance objectives, as legislators may prioritise political gain over public interest.

Additionally, issues like corruption and limited resources within the legislature further compromise the

efficacy of oversight processes, eroding public trust and weakening accountability efforts (Obasanjo; Tony

Momoh vs. Senate). These internal challenges often lead to selective oversight, where certain issues remain

unaddressed, or investigations are cut short due to political considerations (National Network, 2016).

Moreover, judicial limitations and the separation of powers doctrine restrict the legislature’s role in certain

aspects of accountability, often requiring the executive to act on legislative findings. These boundaries

highlight the need for stronger collaboration between Nigeria’s arms of government, as well as reforms to

improve the legislature’s capacity and ethical standards (Corel Pagination, International Policy Brief).

For legislative oversight to realise its full potential, systemic reforms are needed. These should include

capacity-building initiatives, enhanced research support, and improved ethical governance practices within the

legislature. Strengthening legislative oversight mechanisms would not only bolster accountability but also

reinforce democratic principles in Nigeria, ensuring that government actions are genuinely aligned with public

interest. By overcoming these shortcomings, the legislative oversight in Nigeria can become a more efficient

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)

ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XI November 2025

Page 2526

www.rsisinternational.org

and believable instrument of good governance, which will eventually lead to democratic consolidation and

sustainable development.

This paper, therefore, recommends:

1. Strengthen Ethical Standards and Anti-Corruption Frameworks within the Legislature

To curb corruption within the legislative branch and to curb the abuse of oversight powers, a more stringent

code of conduct and an improved internal accountability system should be established within the legislative

branch. This may involve the introduction of compulsory anti-corruption education to the legislators and the

creation of an independent ethics committee that has the power to investigate and punish corrupt activities.

Increased scrutiny of lawmakers themselves would assist in regaining the trust of the people in their oversight

roles, making oversight activities more believable and effective (Dogara, 2016).

2. Increase Legislative Capacity through Training and Resources

Legislators and legislative aides require specialised training to conduct effective oversight, particularly for

evaluating complex policy issues and budgetary allocations. This can be achieved by providing ongoing

professional development programs and access to research support services, such as independent think tanks

and technical advisory teams. Improving these resources would empower the legislature to perform in-depth

reviews and develop informed recommendations, addressing the current gaps in technical expertise and

resource limitations (Ezeani, 2010; Corel Pagination, International Policy Brief).

3. Establish Cross-Agency Collaboration for Accountability

Legislative oversight would benefit from formalised collaboration with key government agencies, such as the

judiciary, anti-corruption agencies, and audit bodies like the Public Accounts Committee. Such partnerships

could improve the tracking of executive compliance with legislative recommendations and support interagency

efforts to address corruption. Improved cross-agency collaboration would strengthen oversight effectiveness by

ensuring that findings and recommendations from legislative inquiries are acted upon more efficiently

(Obasanjo; Tony Momoh vs. Senate).

4. Encourage Public Participation and Transparency in Legislative Processes

Transparency is essential for fostering public trust and ensuring accountability. Legislators should make

oversight processes more open by regularly publicising their findings and engaging with civil society and the

media. Platforms for public input, such as open hearings and digital portals for public feedback, can enhance

citizen engagement in governance. By promoting transparency and public involvement, the legislature can

ensure that its oversight functions reflect the will of the people, thereby bolstering the democratic process and

promoting better governance outcomes (Freedom of Information Act; Corel Pagination, International Policy

Brief).

These recommendations aim to create a more robust legislative framework that effectively monitors executive

actions, enhances accountability, and strengthens democratic governance in Nigeria.

REFERENCES

1. Adeniyi, T., & Bakare, J. (2023). Legislative oversight and executive dominance in Nigerian

governance. African Journal of Governance and Development, 15(1), 45-63.

2. Agbaje, A. & Osabuohien, E. (2022). Challenges and prospects of legislative accountability in Nigeria.

Journal of African Political Studies, 18(3), 188-204.

3. Akande, J. O. D. (2000). The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. MIJ Professional

Publishers.

4. Akinyemi, B. (2023). The 1999 Nigerian Constitution and legislative accountability. International

Journal of Law and Politics, 10(2), 113-130.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)

ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XI November 2025

Page 2527

www.rsisinternational.org

5. Ayee, J. R. A. (2020). Governing in an African context: The role of accountability mechanisms. African

Governance Review, 28(1), 75-94.

6. Busuioc, M. & Lodge, M. (2016). The Reputational Basis of Public Accountability. Governance, 29(2),

247-263.

7. Chohan, U. W. (2017). Legislative Oversight of the Bureaucracy. Global Encyclopedia of Public

Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, 1-5.

8. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.

https://nigeriareposit.nln.gov.ng/server/api/core/bitstreams/01016815-6c76-4370-a9c4-

0369458e9312/content

9. Dogara, Y. (2016). ‘Legislative oversight as a critical component of good governance’ Retrieved from

https://guardian.ng/features/legislative-oversight-as-a-critical-component-of-good governance/

10. Eme, O. I., & Edeh, J. (2021). Constitutional mandates and legislative oversight in Nigeria. Journal of

Law and Society, 19(4), 245-263.

11. Eme, O., Uche, M., & Okeke, C. (2021). Challenges of legislative accountability in Nigeria. Journal of

African Studies, 22(3), 201-218.

12. Fagbadebo, O. (2019). An Overview of Legislative Oversight and Accountability Mechanisms in

Nigeria and South Africa. In: O. Fagbadebo & Ruffin, F. (eds) Perspectives on the Legislature and the

Prospects of Accountability in Nigeria and South Africa. Switzerland: Springer, Cham.

13. Gaitonde, R., Oxman, A. D., Okebukola, P. O., & Rada, G. (2016). Interventions to reduce corruption in

the health sector. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, (8) 2.

14. Gerring, J., & Thacker, S. C. (2022). Accountability and governance: A framework for democratic

oversight. Journal of Political Science, 36(2), 112-126.

15. Griglio, E. (2020). Parliamentary oversight under the COVID-19 emergency: striving against executive

dominance. The Theory and Practice of Legislation, 8 (1-2), 49-70.

16. Hildreth, W. B., Miller, G. & Rabin, J. (2021). Handbook of public administration (4th edition). New

York: Routledge.

17. Kgatjepe, M. I. (2018). Legislative Oversight and Accountability of Public Finances: A Case of

Limpopo, Provincial Legislature for the Period Between 1994 And 2010 (Doctoral dissertation,

University of Limpopo, Mankweng, South Africa). Retrieved 21 May 2020 from ULSpace Home.

18. Malapane, A. T. (2019). The Effects of The Oversight Role of Legislatures in Promoting Good

Governance in South Africa with Specific Reference to The Gauteng Legislature (Doctoral dissertation,

University of Limpopo, Mankweng, South Africa). Retrieved from ULSpace Home.

19. Maricutt-Akbik, A. (2021). Q&A In Legislative Oversight: A Framework for Analysis. European

Journal of Political Research, 60(3), 539-559.

20. National Conference of State Legislature (2022). Retrieved from https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-

state-legislatures/separation-of-powers-legislative oversight.aspx

21. Nwogwugwu, N. & Ishola, A. (2019). Legislators and their Oversight Functions in Policy

Implementation in Nigeria. International Journal of Humanities Social Sciences and Education

(IJHSSE), 6(3), 93-102.

22. Ojo, A. (2023). The role of Public Accounts Committees in Nigerian legislative oversight. West African

Journal of Administration, 11(4), 88-105.

23. Ojo, A., & Omole, K. (2022). Parliamentary oversight and the governance process in Nigeria. West

African Journal of Administration, 11(4), 88-105.

24. Olsen, J. P. (2017). Democratic Accountability and the Terms of Political Order. European Political

Science Review: EPSR, 9(4), 519.

25. Omotoso, F., & Oladeji, O. (2019). Legislative oversight in the Nigerian Fourth Republic. In The

Nigerian National Assembly (pp. 57-72). Springer, Cham.

26. Omotoso, F., & Oladeji, O. (2019). Legislative oversight in the Nigerian fourth republic. The Nigerian

National Assembly, 57-72.

27. Patty, J. W., & Turner, I. R. (2021). Ex Post Review and Expert Policy Making: When Does Oversight

Reduce Accountability? The Journal of Politics, 83(1), 23-39.

28. Pelizzo, R., & Stapenhurst, F. (2013). Government accountability and legislative oversight. Routledge.

29. Putri, R. N., & Ausath, M. A. (2024). The Oversight Role of Legislative Institutions In Emergency

Situations (Comparison Of Indonesia With The United States). Constitutionale, 5(1), 67-82.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)

ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XI November 2025

Page 2528

www.rsisinternational.org

30. Salisu, M. (2020). Corruption, conflicts of interest, and legislative performance in Nigeria. Journal of

Governance and Society, 27(2), 158-171.

31. Stapenhurst, R. (2019). Parliamentary oversight: A toolkit for effective accountability. World Bank

Publications.

32. Stapenhurst, R. (2020). Towards the Development of a Parliamentary Oversight Index. Anti-Corruption

Evidence: The Role of Parliaments in Curbing Corruption, 35-49.

33. Stapenhurst, R., Jacob, K. & Olaore, O. (2016). Legislative Oversight in Nigeria: An Empirical Review

and Assessment. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 22(1), 1-29.

34. Stapenhurst, R., Pelizzo, R., & Jacobs, K. (2019). Parliamentary oversight: A toolkit for effective

accountability. World Bank Publications.

35. Tobi A.A., Ayodeji G.I., Odalonu B.H. (2021). An Assessment of the Oversight Role of the National

Assembly, 1999–2019. In: F. A. Aremu, A. R. Bakare, (eds), Two Decades of Legislative Politics and

Governance in Nigeria’s National Assembly (189-217). Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.

36. Transparency International. (2023). Corruption Perceptions Index 2023. Transparency International.

Retrieved from https://www.transparency.orgFagbadebo, O. (2019). An overview of legislative

oversight and accountability mechanisms in Nigeria and South Africa. Perspectives on the legislature

and the prospects of accountability in Nigeria and South Africa, 19-44.

37. Udemezue, S. C., & Chioke, N. A. (2024). Does the Nigerian Federal Legislature Have Constitutional

Powers to Summon the President of the Republic Over Matters of National Importance?. NIU Journal of

Legal Studies, 10(1), 47-58.

38. Usman, S. (2016). Legislative Oversight, Good Governance and the Future of Nigeria's Democracy.

International Journal of Comparative Studies in International Relations and Development, 4 (1), 2354-

4201.

39. Vedung, E. (2017). Public policy and Program Evaluation. London: Routledge.

40. Walker, C.J. (2017). Legislating in the Shadows. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 165(6),

1377-1433.