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The Misinformation Crisis: How Social Media Undermines
Democratic Legitimacy and Political Deliberation
M. A. Rahim
1
, Md. Rahmat Sarker
2
1
Associate Professor, Department of Law and Land Administration, Patuakhali Science and Technology
University, Bangladesh
2
Assistant Professor, Department of Law and Land Administration, Patuakhali Science and Technology
University, Bangladesh
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2025.91100208
Received: 10 November 2025; Accepted: 20 November 2025; Published: 05 December 2025
ABSTRACT
The rapid growth of social media has had an impact on political communication that has never before been
seen. It provides an enormous opportunity for information to be disseminated. Perhaps one of the biggest
concerns of social media is the widespread dissemination of “misinformation
1
” a topic that Study has shown
has had an appreciable impact on society and a disproportionate impact on democratic processes and the
widening of the gap in the political spectrum. This paper examines the relationship of misinformation to
democracy with emphasis placed upon the role social media sites play in spreading fake or misleading
information. Using theoretical frameworks and empirical data from case studies, the paper illustrates and
provides insight into the harmful effects misinformation can have on the legitimacy of democratic institutions
and the increase in ideological polarization toward elections. The paper continues to provide insights on how
the concepts of algorithms, echo chambers and filter bubbles help promote the reinforcement of polarized
viewpoints at the expense of deliberative democracy. Finally, the paper concludes with potential remedies to
address the problem of misinformation, such as improving media literacy and fact checking and regulatory
measures while also emphasizing the need to find a balance between addressing the spread of misinformation
and protecting free speech.
Keywords: Misinformation Crisis, Social Media, Democratic Legitimacy, Political Deliberation
01. Historical Background and Evolution of Misinformation or Fake News
The existence of misinformation is long-standing. It can be found dating back to early forms of
communication. For example, in ancient Rome, politicians would knowingly disseminate false rumors about
their opponents as a way to weaken them.
2
In the time of the Reformation, the circulation of propaganda
pamphlets and forged documents was an effective means for promoting both religious and political agendas.
3
Newspapers in the nineteenth and early twentieth century also used ‘yellow journalism’ sensational or entirely
fabricated stories to draw readers and exert pressure on the government through media outlets. Both World War
I and World War II saw the deliberate use of propaganda as a weapon of war.
4
The governments involved in
these wars deliberately spread false information as a way to undermine enemy morale and to generate patriotic
fervor among their own citizenry.
7
During the 20th century as radio and television developed so did the ability for interest groups and government
agencies to alter large amounts of the ‘stories’ the masses heard. An example is how the U.S. and Soviet Union
used propaganda during the Cold War to shape the opinions of people around the world.
8
Although there were
many sources of information either print and broadcast, the way mass media worked as a gatekeeper provided
1
Misinformation has also been used as the fake News throughout the study.
2
Mark U Steinberg, Voices of Revolution, 1917 (Yale University Press 2001).
3
W Joseph Campbell, Yellow Journalism: Puncturing the Myths, Defining the Legacies (Praeger 2001).
4
Philip M Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day (3rd edn, Manchester
University Press 2003).
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some level of control over what was accurate. Standards for editors and journalists helped to minimize the
spread of misinformation. However, this changed when the Internet and social media developed.
5
Between the latter part of the twentieth century and the beginning twenty-first century, the Internet expanded at
an incredible rate and changed how news was produced and consumed. The Internet has given users free space
to communicate with each other through various forms of social media like Facebook, Twitter (now X) and
YouTube.
6
However, the Internet and social media have destroyed the role of gatekeeper that traditionally
existed in media outlets. Traditional media are controlled by editors or producers who determine what is
suitable for public consumption.
7
In contrast, social media is determined by algorithms that focus on user
engagement as opposed to the accuracy of content. Study indicates that misinformation travels faster over the
Internet than true information due to its sensationalism and emotional appeal. Misinformation was able to
reach millions of people through Facebook alone during the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, and in many
instances, it received more interaction from users than true news did.
8
Misinformation has created an increasing problem with how it relates to democracy. In order for democracy to
exist, citizens need to have access to the most accurate possible information so they can make the best
informed decisions.
9
Misinformation works to undermine this process by creating confusion, and further
contributing to distrust in government or other institutions; and even influencing the outcome of elections
through manipulation. For example: Brexit Referendum (2016) where Misinformation campaigns exaggerating
the potential economic advantages of leaving the European Union influenced many voters’ behaviors,
10
US
Presidential Election (2016) where disinformation sponsored by Russia was spread among American voters in
order to create further division within America's politics,
11
Indian General Elections (2019)where
misinformation being sent via WhatsApp helped to create further polarization, as it spread rumors regarding
religious minorities.
12
These examples illustrate that misinformation does not only threaten the integrity of
elections, but also creates further division in society through long term political polarization.
Social media has evolved from becoming merely a tool for people to interact socially into a major tool used for
political communication as well. As such, social media has emerged as one of the tools that political figures
use to create their campaigns, agenda-set, and mobilize public support.
13
While this makes it easier for citizens
to have access to participate in the political debate, there are drawbacks.
14
The narratives being created by
politicians and their supporters can be altered with the creation of ‘fake’ accounts or bot activity, as well as
with targeted advertisements.
15
The emergence of these practices highlights the duality of social media while it
5
European
Commission,
Fake
News
and
Disinformation
Online
(Flash
Eurobarometer
464,
European
Union
2018)
https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2183 accessed 22 November 2025.
6
Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris, and Hal Roberts, Network Propaganda: Manipulation, Disinformation, and Radicalization in
American Politics (Oxford University Press 2018).
7
Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral, ‘The Spread of True and False News Online’ (2018) 359 Science 1146.
8
Hunt Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow, ‘Social Media and Misinformation in the 2016 Election’ (2017) 31 Journal of Economic
Perspectives 211.
9
Emily Harmer and others, Online Othering: Exploring Digital Violence and Discrimination on the Web (Palgrave Macmillan 2019).
10
Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Cyberwar: How Russian Hackers and Trolls Helped Elect a President (Oxford University Press 2018).
11
Joyojeet Pal, WhatsApp and Political Instability in India (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2019).
12
Hunt Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow, ‘Social Media and Misinformation in the 2016 Election’ (2017) 31 Journal of Economic
Perspectives 211.
13
ibid
14
ibid
15
Cass R Sunstein, #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media (Princeton University Press 2017).
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has the potential to increase citizen engagement and participation in democracy. It is also capable of
undermining the ability of democracy to function effectively by allowing false information to spread rapidly.
16
02. Objective of the Study
Below are four clear points of the Study objectives with an explanation of each objective, summarized and
condensed:
1. The goal of this Study project is to study how misinformation impacts the views people have about
their political process in democratic countries.
2. This Study will explore the part that social media plays in the dissemination of misinformation and the
creation of further political divisions.
3. A secondary focus of this Study is to assess various legal, institutional and societal methods for
limiting the spread of misinformation and reducing its impact on democratic societies.
4. A final aspect of this Study is to find policies and methods of intervention that help minimize the
negative consequences of misinformation but protect both democracy and free expression.
03. Importance of the Study
This study is very important for many reasons in several ways. The study shows how social media is
undermining democratic legitimacy and political deliberation by spreading misinformation is one of the
biggest issues that all of the world’s democracies are dealing with today.
Scholarly Significance: There is a lot of scholarly importance to this Study because misinformation Study has
been expanding rapidly since 2016 and went from only three peer reviewed articles in 2016 to over 300 peer
reviewed articles in 2021.
17
Additionally, this line of Study spans multiple fields like communication studies,
political science, sociology, information science and therefore offers the opportunity for scholars to collaborate
across disciplines.
18
Also, there are many areas of Study in which the existing knowledge of misinformation is
being called into question especially related to the long term behavioral effects of misinformation and its
impact outside of western countries.
19
Therefore, this Study will help contribute to critical approaches to
studying disinformation, and place those studies within their historical, cultural and political contexts.
20
Further, it will advance our theoretical understanding of how democratic deliberation works or does not work
in hybrid media systems where social media platforms alter the way that traditional gate-keeping mechanisms
function.
25
Political Importance: From an overall policy/political perspective, the Study described here represents some
of the biggest threats to democratic government and democratic institutions. Disinformation campaigns have
shown the ability to affect the outcome of elections.
26
The U.S. presidential election in 2016 and the Brexit
referendum represent two watershed moments when coordinated disinformation was able to influence public
opinion and undermine the legitimacy of democratic processes.
27
The World Economic Forum warns that
16
ibid
17
Bramer, W. M., Giustini, D., & Kramer, B. M. R. (2016), Comparing the coverage, recall, and precision of searches for 120
systematic reviews in Embase, MEDLINE, and Google Scholar: A prospective study, Systematic Reviews,5(1), 39.
https://doi.org/10.1186/s13643-016-0215-7
18
Acerbi, A., Altay, S., & Mercier, H. (2022), Fighting misinformation or fighting for information?. Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)
Misinformation Review, 3(1)., https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-87
19
Aftab, O., & Murphy, G. (2022), A single exposure to cancer misinformation may not significantly affect related behavioural
intentions. HRB Open Study, 5(82), 82. https://doi.org/10.12688/hrbopenres.13640.1
20
Albarracin, D., & Shavitt, S. (2018). Attitudes and attitude change. Annual Review of Psychology, 69, 299–327.
https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-psych-122216-011911
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“misinformation can seriously destabilize the real and perceived legitimacy of newly elected governments.”
There are studies that document that there are organized social media manipulation campaigns operating in at
least 81 countries. Authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes are using disinformation to stifle dissent and to
shape public discourse.
28
The Study in this field is necessary for policymakers to understand how to effectively
regulate social media platforms while preserving freedom of speech.
21
The Study in this field shows how
political polarization increases through echo chambers and algorithmic amplification of extreme content and
creates the conditions where democratic compromise becomes more difficult.
22
Social Value: The social implications go far beyond politics and address the fundamental issues of trust and
social cohesion. Misinformation affects public confidence not only in media, but also in democratic
institutions.
23
The Study describes how false narratives directed at vulnerable communities such as religious,
ethnic, language minority groups can result in real-world violence of Myanmar’s Rohingya genocide,
antiMuslim attacks in Sri Lanka and Nigeria and communal violence in India.
24
The Study demonstrates that
misinformation spreads faster than true content online and 70% of users struggle to differentiate between real
and fake news.
25
By exploring these dynamics, the study can shed light on how societies can maintain the level
of informed public discourse that is necessary for democratic deliberation.
26
It also examines the differential
impacts of disinformation on marginalized communities who suffer disproportionately from false narratives
that perpetuate systemic inequalities.
25
Boeker, M., Vach, W., & Motschall, E. (2013). Google Scholar as replacement for systematic literature searches: good
relative recall and precision are not enough. BMC Medical Study Methodology, 13(1), 131. https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2288-13-
131
26
Camargo, C. Q., & Simon, F. M. (2022). Mis- and disinformation studies are too big to fail: Six suggestions for the field’s
future.
Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) Misinformation Review, 3(5). https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-106
27
Guay, B., Berinsky, A. J., Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. (2023). How to think about whether misinformation interventions
work.
Nature Human Behaviour, 7, 1231–1233. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-023-01667-w
28
Pennycook, G., Cannon, T. D., & Rand, D. G. (2018), Prior exposure increases perceived accuracy of fake news. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 147(12), 1865–1880. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000465
21
Bastick, Z. (2021). Would you notice if fake news changed your behavior? An experiment on the unconscious effects of
disinformation., Computers in Human Behavior, 116, 106633, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2020.106633
22
Verplanken, B., & Orbell, S. (2022). Attitudes, habits, and behavior change. Annual Review of Psychology, 73, 327–352.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-020821-011744
23
Gusenbauer, M., & Haddaway, N. R. (2020), which academic search systems are suitable for systematic reviews or meta-analyses,
Evaluating retrieval qualities of Google Scholar, PubMed, and 26 other resources, Study Synthesis Methods, 11(2), 181–217,
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1002/jrsm.1378
24
Nagasako, T. (2020), Global disinformation campaigns and legal challenges, International Cyber security Law Review, 1(1–2),
125–136, https://doi.org/10.1365/s43439-020-00010-7
25
Tenove, C. (2020). Protecting democracy from disinformation: Normative threats and policy responses, The International Journal of
Press/Politics, 25(3), 517–537, https://doi.org/10.1177/194016122091874
26
Erlich, A., & Garner, C. (2023), Is pro-Kremlin disinformation effective? Evidence from Ukraine, the International Journal of
Press/Politics, 28(1), 5–28. https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612211045221
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Practical Application: From a practical application standpoint, this Study is useful for the development of
effective interventions and policy responses. The Study evaluates a variety of strategies for countering
misinformation; including fact checking and media literacy programs, content moderation by social media
platforms, and requiring transparency in algorithms. Social media companies, non-profit organizations, and
governments use evidence from the Study to develop effective responses to misinformation in different
contexts. The Study on the role of social media in political participation also highlights both positive e.g.,
increased civic engagement, particularly by youth and negative e.g., bots, deep fakes and inauthentic
coordination aspects of social media.
35
These dual natures require a nuanced approach to policy-making that
the Study is beginning to illuminate.
36
Most importantly, the Study demonstrates that addressing
misinformation requires moving beyond individual-level solutions of media literacy to structural changes in
the design and governance of social media platforms.
27
Global and Local Implications: In addition to having global implications, this Study addresses the
contextspecific manifestations of universal problems. Developing democracies e.g., Bangladesh, Brazil, India
whose institutions are more fragile and whose populations may be less digitally literate, face particularly high
risks from misinformation.
28
Study has demonstrated that zero rating practices where carriers offer free access
to certain platforms can limit users to information environments that are susceptible to manipulation.
29
At the
global level, this Study contributes to international governance frameworks e.g., UNESCO, UN Internet
Governance Forum.
30
While misinformation is a universal problem, the form, scope, and potential remedies for
misinformation vary significantly depending upon the country, political culture, institutional capacity, and
technological infrastructure.
31
The comparative study of misinformation across countries and platforms
provides insight into the conditions under which the risk of undermining democratic deliberation is
exacerbated or mitigated.
32
Finally, Study in this area is critical infrastructure for protecting democratic societies in the digital age and will
provide evidence-based responses to one of the most defining challenges of modern governance.
27
Saint Laurent, C., Murphy, G., Hegarty, K., & Greene, C. M. (2022). Measuring the effects of misinformation exposure and beliefs
on behavioural intentions: A COVID-19 vaccination study. Cognitive Study: Principles and Implications, 7(1), 87.
https://doi.org/10.1186/s41235-022-00437-y
28
Gusenbauer, M., & Haddaway, N. R. (2020). Which academic search systems are suitable for systematic reviews or meta-analyses?
Evaluating retrieval qualities of Google Scholar, PubMed, and 26 other resources. Study Synthesis Methods, 11(2), 181–217.
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1002/jrsm.1378
29
Wilson, T., & Starbird, K. (2020). Cross-platform disinformation campaigns: lessons learned and next steps. Harvard Kennedy
School (HKS) Misinformation Review, 1(1). https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-002
30
Murphy, G., Lynch, L., Loftus, E., & Egan, R. (2021). Push polls increase false memories for fake new stories. Memory, 29(6),
693–707. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2021.1934033
31
Fazio, L. K., Pillai, R. M., & Patel, D. (2022). The effects of repetition on belief in naturalistic settings, Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 151(10), 2604–2613. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001211
32
Tenove, C. (2020). Protecting democracy from disinformation: Normative threats and policy responses, The International Journal of
Press/Politics, 25(3), 517–537. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161220918740
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04. Conceptual Issues
35
Porter, E., & Wood, T. J. (2021), the global effectiveness of fact-checking: Evidence from simultaneous experiments in
Argentina, Nigeria, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 118(37), e210423511,
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2104235118
36
Fazio, L. K., Pillai, R. M., & Patel, D. (2022), The effects of repetition on belief in naturalistic settings, Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 151(10), 2604–2613. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001211
Misinformation: The term ‘misinformation’ refers to information often presented in a legitimate journalistic
format created for the intent to deceive the readers shaping their opinion. Misinformation can be broken into
two subcategories; a. misinformation b. false information provided. However it is not intended to create harm
or financial gain and disinformation that are false information provided but not intended to create financial
gain or harm.
43
The rapid growth of the digital media landscape has caused misinformation to grow at an
alarming rate and now threatens traditional methods of journalism while also impacting our discourse.
44
Democracy: Democracy is generally defined as a means of governing in which the people have control over
the government through free and fair elections and where those elected serve the people, not their own self
interests.
33
In political terms, democracies depend on equality and accountability for the people to elect their
leaders.
34
As such, deceit or an attempt to influence the beliefs of citizens via the dissemination of
misinformation represents a threat to democracy.
35
Therefore, the health of democratic institutions is largely
dependent on the quality of information available to the citizens.
Democratic Legitimacy: The democratic legitimacy of government is when citizens accept or recognize their
governments as being legitimate or just. The legitimacy of democracy is based upon the belief that government
receives its power and authority from those who are governed.
36
Democratic legitimacy can be furthered
through citizen involvement in governance, accountability, open and transparent decision making, citizen
protections through rights and adherence to democratic standards.
37
Political Deliberation: Deliberative politics is a form of discussion where citizens and government officials
discuss issues in the public interest and consider alternative perspectives on those issues prior to taking
action.
38
Deliberative politics emphasizes rationalism and deliberation (reasoned argument) as opposed to a
struggle for political power; it provides a means for developing an informed position based upon a broad range
33
Robert A Dahl, On Democracy (Yale University Press 1998).
34
Ibid
35
Larry Diamond, ‘Facing Up to the Democratic Recession’ (2015) 26 Journal of Democracy 141.
36
Fiveable. "democratic legitimacy – Intro to Comparative Politics." Edited by Becky Bahr, Fiveable, 2024,
https://fiveable.me/keyterms/introduction-comparative-politics/democratic-legitimacy. Accessed 13 Nov. 2025.
37
Ibid
38
Steiner, J., Bächtinger, A., Spörndli, M., & Steenbergen, M. (2005). Deliberative politics in action: Analyzing Parliamentary
discourse. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. Sunstein, C. (2017). #Republic: Divided democracy in the age of social
media. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
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of views.
39
The purpose of the effective deliberation is to provide support for the legitimacy of democracy by
providing a framework to make decisions that are based upon collective reasoning and shared values.
40
Political Polarization: Polarization in politics is when people are so far on one end of a spectrum that it makes
them less willing to compromise with others who have a different viewpoint and this can create even more
divisions in society than already exist.
53
This type of political polarization exists at both the elite level i.e.
43
Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan, Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework for Study and Policy
Making (Council of Europe Report 2017).
44
Hunt Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow, ‘Social Media and Misinformation in the 2016 Election’ (2017) 31 Journal of
Economic Perspectives 211.
politicians and the mass level.
41
The use of social media is a major factor which adds to the effects of echo
chambers and filters bubbles and increases the potential for all people to become even farther to the right or
left of their respective ideologies.
42
Social media: social media refers to digital platforms such as Facebook, Twitter (X), YouTube, and TikTok,
which enable the creation and exchange of user-generated content.
43
These platforms democratize information
dissemination but also provide fertile ground for misinformation to spread widely often faster than verified
news.
44
Their algorithms prioritize engagement, sometimes at the expense of truth which intensifies
polarization and misinformation circulation.
45
05. Theories Relating to Spreading the Misinformation to Undermine the Democratic Legitimacy and
Political Deliberation
Agenda-Setting Theory: First introduced by McCombs and Shaw, the theory of agenda-setting suggests that
the media does not define what people should think but what to think about and thus defines the priorities of
the population in a disproportional manner.
46
In the realm of social media, the misinformation employs
agenda-setting by amplifying particular issues or stories disproportionately and thus defines what people
should pay attention.
39
Warren, M. & Pearse, H. (2008). Designing deliberative democracy: The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly, Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press.
40
Noel, H. (2012). The Coalition Merchants: The ideological roots of the civil rights realignment. Journal of Politics, 74(1), 156–173
53
Nolan McCarty, Keith T Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (MIT Press
2006).
41
José van Dijck, The Culture of Connectivity: A Critical History of Social Media (Oxford University Press 2013).
42
Marc J Hetherington, ‘Review Article: Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization’ (2001) 95 American Political
Science Review 619.
43
Cass R Sunstein, #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media (Princeton University Press 2017).
44
Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy and Sinan Aral, ‘The Spread of True and False News Online’ (2018) 359 Science 1146
45
Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, ‘The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media’ (1972) 36 Public Opinion Quarterly 176
46
Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, ‘The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media’ (1972) 36 Public Opinion Quarterly 176
60
Robert M Entman, ‘Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm’ (1993) 43 Journal of Communication 51.
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Framing Theory: Framing theory explores how the presentation and interpretation of information shape
perceptions and attitudes.
60
Misinformation employs manipulative frames often emotional, sensational or
conspiratorial that distorts democratic debates and polarizes opinions.
47
Spiral of Silence Theory: Proposed by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, the spiral of silence theory suggests that
individuals may suppress their opinions if they perceive them to be in the minority.
48
In social media
environments dominated by fake or polarized content, minority voices risk marginalization leading to a
distorted picture of public opinion.
49
Echo Chamber and Filter Bubble Theories: The echo chamber phenomenon also refers to the tendency of
people to interact with similar groups, reinforcing their prior beliefs without being exposed to a variety of
opinions and views i.e. the latter applies to the area of artificial news as well.
50
A similar phenomenon is called
filter bubble by Eli Pariser which emphasizes the fact that the algorithm shows people content related to their
preferences instead of diverse ideas and points of view being represented.
51
Critical Theory of Media and Democracy: According to the critical theorists, media structures are not
neutral and serve power interests; Social media platforms, the ostensibly decentralized are corporatized and
algorithmic and thus contrary to democratic deliberation.
52
In this framework, misinformation turns not only
into a direct by-product but it becomes a structural problem.
Networked Public Sphere Theory: Yochai Benkler’s theory of the networked public sphere explains how
digital platforms decentralize political communication.
53
While this creates opportunities for participatory
democracy, it also enables disinformation to spread unchecked challenging institutional authority and factbased
discourse.
06. Effects of Misinformation on Democratic Legitimacy and Political Deliberation
Democratic systems are at a risk of being severely damaged by misinformation and disinformation; however,
rather than affecting each person’s belief directly, these types of false information can cause psychological and
institutional damage that can affect how individuals engage in democratic processes and the levels of trust that
exist within the process. As such, rather than affecting an individual’s belief directly, misinformation and
disinformation will ultimately lead to the erosion of democracy through the harm they cause to the very
foundation of democracy citizen involvement based on informed choice, the legitimacy of institutions and the
public’s ability to make decisions based on fact.
The Core Threat to Democratic Legitimacy: Misinformation threatens a democratic system at its core due to
an issue with knowledge of misinformation rather than what people believe about false statements.
54
Specifically, the way awareness of misinformation exists reduces the level of epistemic trust among citizens
47
Budd, M., Entman, R. M., & Steinman, C. (1990), the affirmative character of U.S. cultural studies, Critical Studies in Mass
Communication, 7, 169-184.
48
Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, the Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion – Our Social Skin (University of Chicago Press 1984).
49
Zaller, J. R. (1992). 7'be nature and origins of mass opinion. New York: Cambridge University Press.
50
Ibid
51
Diana C Mutz, Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative Versus Participatory Democracy (Cambridge University Press 2006).
52
Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You (Penguin 2011).
53
Jürgen Habermas, the Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (MIT Press 1991).
54
Reglitz, M 2022, 'Fake news and democracy', Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 162-187
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toward one another.
55
Epistemic trust acceptance of information from other people because you think those
other people will provide accurate information has been considered essential to a successful democratic
process.
56
As people become aware that a significant amount of misinformation exists and people also believe
that most of their fellow citizens have been misled by misinformation then people lose faith in society’s ability
to make good choices. Democracies are impacted by the eroding of epistemic trust in ways that affect
democratic institutions.
57
Epistemic trust is a prerequisite for citizen's belief that democratic institutions are
legitimate because it requires citizens to trust that democratic decisions are made with good reasoning and
represent their fellow citizens.
58
When misinformation erodes epistemic trust citizens increasingly question the
legitimacy of democratic institutions and process regardless of whether they believe the false claims about an
issue.
59
The perceived loss of legitimacy may be the greatest threat to democratic stability as it can lead to
democratic backsliding and lead some to accept or support anti-democratic alternatives.
60
Erosion of Public Trust in Democratic Institutions: The dissemination of false information and “fake news”
is damaging public trust in mainstream media and our democratic institutions; this decreased trust will make it
increasingly difficult for the public to be confident in their elections and communication from government.
Both the election process and government legitimacy are threatened by this decline.
75
Destabilization of Election Confidence: Misinformation about voting systems circulating through social
media has undermined public confidence in elections which has resulted in broad skepticism about the validity
and fairness of democracy itself.
61
Examples of this have included attempts to discredit mail-in voting and
spread false allegations of voter fraud.
62
Amplification of Political Polarization: Misinformation and political disinformation exacerbate division
along ideological lines and promote greater animosity and polarization among differing groups.
63
Online hate
speech and false information can lead to a “tribal mentality” thereby reducing the ability of opposing sides to
find common ground and engage in mutual understanding in political deliberations.
64
Obstruction of Evidence-Based Policy Discussions: Misinformation is also causing public confusion about
scientific and policy issues such as those regarding climate change or public health, thereby undermining the
55
Beckett, Charlie, and Sonia Livingstone., Tackling the Information Crisis: A Policy Framework for Media System Resilience.,
London School of Economics and Political Science, 2018, https://www.lse.ac.uk/law/news/2018/truth-trust -technology.
56
Sunstein, Cass. #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017.
57
Anderson, Elizabeth. 2021. “Epistemic Bubbles and Authoritarian Politics.” In Political Epistemology, edited by Elizabeth
Edenberg and Michael Hannon. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
58
Bronstein, Michael V., Pennycook, Gordon, Bear, Adam, Rand, David G. and Cannon, Tyrone D. 2019. “Belief in Fake News is
Associated with Delusionality, Dogmatism, Religious Fundamentalism, and Reduced Analytic Thinking.” Journal of Applied
Research in Memory and Cognition 8 (1): 108-117.
59
Minow, Saving the News (n 23) pp. 120–25; Eugene Volokh, ‘Treating Social Media Platforms Like Common Carriers?’ (2021) 1
Journal of Free Speech Law 377, at 383, 433–39.
60
Roger Koppl and Abigail Devereaux, ‘Biden Establishes a Ministry of Truth’, The Wall Street Journal, 1 May 2021
61
Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948) pp. 25–27, 88–91
62
David A. Graham, ‘The “Comet Pizza” Gunman Provides a Glimpse of a Frightening Future’, The Atlantic, 5 December 2016
63
Lymari Morales, ‘Distrust in US Media Edges Up to Record
High’, Gallup,
29 September 2010, https://news.gallup.com/poll/143267/distrust-media-edges-record-high.aspx.
64
Jeremy Barr, ‘Why These Fox News Loyalists Have Changed the Channel to Newsmax’, The Washington Post, 27 December
2020,
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process of reasonable and science based debate on policy decisions.
65
Misinformation therefore undermines the
epistemological integrity that is needed to have meaningful deliberation in democratic societies.
66
Undermining the Shared Knowledge Base: For a functional democracy, the citizens have to access to the
same accurate information so that they can deliberate about public policy issues and vote based on the same
facts.
67
Misinformation undermines this commonality among citizens and creates unevenness in the knowledge
base that leads to misunderstandings and perpetuates “belief echoes” that continues after corrections are
made.
68
Manipulation and Discrediting of Civil Society: Misinformation, disinformation and mal-information are
commonly used as weapons against civil society groups and to damage the reputations of opposition leaders
while protecting those who act unethically, thereby reducing transparency and accountability in democracies.
69
Reduced Democratic Participation and Increased Cynicism: Increased exposure to pervasive
misinformation has been associated with increased levels of political cynicism and disengagement, as citizens
become increasingly skeptical of government, which can lead them to either refrain from participating in the
electoral process i.e., voting or disengage entirely from civic engagement.
85
The decline in citizen participation
reduces the likelihood of achieving the democratic ideal of widespread citizen involvement in governance.
86
Foreign Interference and Targeted Manipulation: Foreign actors use misinformation to undermine
democratic elections, create societal polarization, and reduce public trust in democratic institutions by using
targeted propaganda designed to create distrust and confusion within multiple communities.
87
Foreign actions
designed to reduce public trust in democratic institutions also diminish both domestic legitimacy of democratic
institutions and foreign trust in democratic processes.
88
07. Cognitive Biases and Susceptibility to Fake News:
Cognitive biases
89
like confirmation bias and the affect heuristic make people more susceptible to fake news by
influencing how they process information.
70
Confirmation bias leads people to accept information that aligns
with their existing beliefs while the affect heuristic causes them to rely on their immediate emotional reactions
instead of critical analysis.
71
Both biases can be amplified by algorithms that show users content they are likely
to engage with creating a cycle where fake news is easily shared and reinforced.
72
65
John Milton, Areopagitica (ed. by J. W. Hales, Oxford: Clarendon, (1644) 1874)
66
Adee Hassan, ‘Covid Vaccine Misinformation Still Fuels Fears Surrounding Pregnancy, a New Study Finds’, The New York Times,
3 June 2022
67
Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: Revised and Updated: The Collapse and Revival of the American Community (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 2020).
68
Donie O’Sullivan, ‘Her Son Was an Accused Cult Leader – She Says He Was a Victim, Too’, CNN.com, 23 September 2023
69
Clothilde Goujard, ‘Musk Ousts X Team Curbing Election Disinformation’, Politico, 28 September 2023
70
Michal Piksa, Karolina Noworyta, Aleksander Gundersen, Jonas Kunst, Mikołaj Morzy, Jan Piasecki and Rafał Rygula, ‘The
Impact of Confirmation Bias Awareness on Mitigating Susceptibility to Misinformation’ (2024) 12 Frontiers in Public Health
1414864, doi:10.3389/fpubh.2024.1414864.
71
American Psychological Association, “Why We’re Susceptible to Fake News, How to Defend Against It” (ScienceDaily, 10 August
2018) <www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/08/180810120037.htm
72
N Boonprakong, S Pareek, B Tag, J Goncalves and T Dingler, Assessing Susceptibility Factors of Confirmation Bias in News Feed
Reading (SSRN, 17 April 2024) https://ssrn.com/abstract=4797710
93
‘Confirmation
bias’ (Wikipedia)
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Confirmation bias
93
is the primary mechanism by which people become vulnerable to misinformation.
94
This
cognitive tendency leads individuals to seek, accept, and recall information that aligns with pre-existing beliefs
while actively rejecting or ignoring contradictory evidence.
73
The brain is essentially hardwired to protect
existing worldviews by filtering information through a confirmation lens, making people resistant to
85
Minow, Saving the News (n 23) pp. 120–25; Eugene Volokh, ‘Treating Social Media Platforms Like Common Carriers?’
(2021) 1 Journal of Free Speech Law 377, at 383, 433–39
86
Nick Robertson, ‘Trump Campaign Says It Has Raised More Than $6.5M Since Federal Indictment’, The Hill, 14 June
2023, https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/4050350-trump-campaign-says-it-has-raised-over-6-5m-since-federal-indictment.
87
Shannon Bond, ‘Elon Musk Allows Donald Trump Back on Twitter’, NPR, 19 November 2022,
www.npr.org/2022/11/19/1131351535/elon-musk-allows-donald-trump-back-on-twitter; Ryan Mac and Kellen Browning, ‘Elon
Musk Reinstates Trump’s Twitter Account’, The New York Times, 19 November 2022
88
Geneva Sands, ‘DHS Shuts Down Disinformation Board Months after Its Efforts Were Paused’, CNN News, 24 August
2022, www.cnn.com/2022/08/24/politics/dhs-disinformation-board-shut-down/index.html
89
A cognitive bias is a systematic but often subconscious, error in thinking that affects the judgments and decisions people
make. These mental shortcuts or heuristics help the brain process the vast amount of daily information quickly but can lead to
distorted perceptions, illogical interpretations and irrational behavior.
fact-based corrections.
96
This bias intensifies in polarized information environments where emotionally
charged content activates identity-based reasoning causing even educated individuals to embrace false
narratives supporting their political group.
97
The affect heuristic
98
amplifies confirmation bias by prioritizing emotional responses over logical analysis.
Research shows that anxiety a dominant emotional heuristic exerts the strongest impact on misinformation
sharing, with an effect size of 0.343.
74
When people encounter content triggering fear, anger or outrage, they
rely on fast intuitive System thinking rather than deliberate reasoning. This emotional shortcut causes
individuals to overlook factual inconsistencies and share unverified claims without scrutiny.
Together, these biases create a reinforcing cycle. Confirmation bias predisposes people toward in-
groupsupporting falsehoods while the affect heuristic overrides critical evaluation through emotional
intensity.
75
Time pressure and information overload endemic to social media exacerbate this dynamic by
forcing reliance on these mental shortcuts rather than careful reasoning.
76
Understanding these mechanisms is
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_bias](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_bias) accessed 22 November 2025.
94
Yanqing Sun and Juan Xie, ‘Do Heuristic Cues Affect Misinformation Sharing? Evidence From a Meta-Analysis’ (2024) Journalism
& Mass Communication Quarterly doi:10.1177/10776990241284597.
73
‘Affect Heuristic’ (Thinking Toolbox, Ness Labs) https://toolbox.nesslabs.com/affect-heuristic
accessed 22 November 2025.
74
Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularick and Christoph Trebesch, ‘Going to Extremes: Politics after Financial Crises, 1870–2014’ (2016)
88 European Economic Review 227.
75
Noortje Marres and Matías Valderrama Barragán, ‘Making Expert Advice Public in a Time of Emergency: Independent SAGE and
the Contestation of Science During the COVID Pandemic in the UK’ (2025) Social Studies of Science 55(4) 512,
doi:10.1177/03063127241309071.
76
‘Cognitive biases, why do we swallow the misinformation bait?’ (mSchools, 3 July 2022) https://mschools.com/cognitive-
biaseswhy-do-we-swallow-the-misinformation-bait/ accessed 22 November 2025.
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essential for designing interventions addressing why awareness alone rarely overcomes deeply rooted cognitive
vulnerabilities to fake news.
08. Challenges and Legal or Policy Responses to Protect Misinformation:
a. Algorithmic Amplification of False Information: More often than not social media algorithms are
designed to maximize user engagement while minimizing the likelihood that a user will see a piece of
inaccurate or false information as compared to fact-checked information.
77
As a result, false information is
frequently being sent to users by an algorithm prior to the time when a user would be able to access fact-
checking to aid in making informed decisions for democratic processes.
78
Legal Response: The EU’s Digital Services Act requires very large online platforms to conduct annual risk
assessments and adjust algorithms to minimize harm, with fines up to six percent of annual
96
Y Zhou and L Shen, ‘Processing of Misinformation as Motivational and Cognitive Biases’ (2024) 15 Frontiers in
Psychology 1430953, doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1430953.
97
uan Vidal-Perez, Raymond J Dolan and Rani Moran, ‘Disinformation Elicits Learning Biases’ (Research Square, 6 June
2024) https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-4468218/v1
98
Confirmation bias is a cognitive bias that is an error in thinking that describes the human tendency to search for, interpret,
favor, and recall information in a way that confirms or supports one's existing beliefs or opinions, while simultaneously ignoring or
undervaluing evidence that contradicts those beliefs. This process often happens unconsciously and is a mental shortcut the brain uses
to process information efficiently and protect self-esteem.
revenue for non-compliance.
104
Germany’s Network Enforcement Law mandates platform transparency
regarding algorithmic operations and prohibits discriminatory content promotion.
105
b. Erosion of Public Trust in Institutions: Misinformation campaigns deliberately targeted at diverse
communities create confusion about electoral integrity and government reliability. Studies show citizens
exposed to contradictory narratives lose confidence in media and governmental institutions.
106
c. Legal Response: The UN Countering Disinformation framework calls for states to ensure public
officials share accurate information and hold authorities accountable for spreading false information while
protecting freedom of expression through proportionate restrictions only in exceptional cases.
107
Foreign Interference and Election Manipulation: Russia's Internet Research Agency created thousands of
fake accounts to amplify divisive content during the 2016 U.S. election influencing voters’ perceptions of
electoral fairness.
79
The 2024 Romanian presidential election revealed coordinated TikTok manipulation
strategies exploiting platform vulnerabilities.
80
77
Y Zhou and L Shen, ‘Processing of Misinformation as Motivational and Cognitive Biases’ (2024) 15 Frontiers in Psychology
1430953, doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1430953.
78
Tworek, H. (2019, April 15). An Analysis of Germany’s NetzDG Law., Transatlantic Working Group; University of British
Columbia, https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/NetzDG_Tworek_Leerssen_April_2019.pdf
79
Michael Barthel, Amy Mitchell and Jesse Holcomb, Many Americans Believe Fake News Is Sowing Confusion (Pew Research
Center, 15 December 2016) https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2016/12/15/many-americans-believe-fake-news-is-
sowingconfusion/ accessed 22 November 2025.
80
W Phillips Davidson, ‘The Third-Person Effect in Communication’ (1983) 47(1) Public Opinion Quarterly 1.
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Legal Response: The DSA establishes systemic risk assessment requirements for VLOPs regarding foreign
interference campaigns. National governments are developing Rapid Response Election Security Cyber Units
to identify and disable accounts spreading election misinformation.
81
Platform Liability and Content Moderation Gaps: Major platforms reduced content moderation efforts
following policy changes in 2025 creating enforcement vacuums.
82
Platforms previously claiming commitment
to election integrity failed to adequately address coordinated manipulation campaigns.
83
Legal Response: The EU's strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation, integrated into DSA effective
July 1, 2025 establishes concrete benchmarks for platform disinformation mitigation including demonetization
of false content and fact-checking commitments.
84
Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior and Bot Networks: Automated systems flood platforms with coordinated
messaging exploiting platform features to evade detection filters and manipulate visibility metrics.
85
104
Nathan Adams, ‘Institutional Legitimacy’ (2018) 26(1) Journal of Political Philosophy 84.
105
Charlie Beckett and Sonia Livingstone, Tackling the Information Crisis: A Policy Framework for Media System Resilience
(London School of Economics and Political Science, 2018) https://www.lse.ac.uk/law/news/2018/truth-trust-technology accessed 22
November 2025.
106
Robert Talisse, Overdoing Democracy: Why We Must Put Politics in Its Place (Oxford University Press 2019).
107
Hunt Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow, ‘Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election’ (2017) 31(2) Journal of Economic
Perspectives 211.
Legal Response: The DSA’s Article 21 grants users access to out-of-court dispute settlement bodies for
challenging platform decisions on content removal and de-amplification, creating accountability mechanisms
for automated content actions.
115
Threats to Democratic Legitimacy through Epistemic Undermining: When citizens unwittingly share
disinformation and observe others' complicity, democratic credibility weakens as citizen’s question each other's
epistemic reliability undermining mutual accountability essential to democracy.
116
Legal Response: The UN framework emphasizes involving civil society in designing policies and efforts
against disinformation, promoting media literacy and civic engagement to build public resilience.
86
Regulatory Overreach and Suppression of Legitimate Dissent: Anti-disinformation laws in Bangladesh,
India and Pakistan have been misused to target journalists and suppress legitimate political speech.
87
81
Lilliana Mason, ‘Ideologues without Issues: The Polarizing Consequences of Ideological Identities’ (2018) 82(S1) Political Opinion
Quarterly 866.
82
Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power (Profile Books
2019).
83
Lance W Bennett and Steven Livingston, ‘The Disinformation Order: Disruptive Communication and the Decline of Democratic
Institutions’ (2018) 33(2) European Journal of Communication 122.
84
Nir Grinberg, Kenneth Joseph, Lisa Friedland, Briony Swire-Thompson and David Lazer, ‘Fake News on Twitter during the 2016
US Presidential Election’ (2019) 363(6425) Science 374.
85
ndrew Guess, Jonathan Nagler and Joshua Tucker, ‘Less Than You Think: Prevalence and Predictors of Fake News Dissemination
on Facebook’ (2019) 5(1) Science Advances 1.
86
Branko Milanovic, Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization (Harvard University Press 2016).
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Legal Response: The DSA and UN guidelines require definitions to be precise and non-vague, with
restrictions proportionate and never serving to stifle freedom of expression. The European Court of Human
Rights enforces proportionality standards for any speech restrictions.
88
Generative AI-Enabled Deepfakes and Synthetic Media: Artificial intelligence poses unprecedented threats
to information integrity, enabling realistic but false audio, video, and text that could influence elections decided
by narrow margins.
89
Legal Response: The legislation requires transparency about algorithmic operations with fines up to 500,000
euros for violations establishing accountability for AI-driven content distribution.
90
Definitional Ambiguities across Jurisdictions: The DSA lacks a uniform legal definition of disinformation,
creating fragmentation and inconsistent enforcement across EU member states.
122
Legal Response: The strengthened Code of Practice provides detailed technical guidance and key performance
indicators for assessing disinformation risk mitigation standardizing platform accountability measures.
91
Insufficient Fact-Checking Resources and Capacity: Fact-checkers cannot match the speed and scale of
misinformation production leaving significant false claims unchallenged.
124
115
my Mitchell, Jeffrey Gottfried, Galen Stocking, Mason Walker and Sophia Fedeli, Many Americans Say Made-Up News Is a
Critical Problem that Needs to Be Fixed (Pew Research Center, 5 June 2019)
https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2019/06/05/many-americans-say-made-up-news-is-a-critical-problem-that-needs-to-befixed/
accessed 22 November 2025.
116
Gerald F Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory (Oxford University Press 1996).
Legal Response: The Code of Practice mandates platform transparency regarding independent factcheckers
used and requires labeling of fact-checked content enhancing visibility and credibility of verification efforts.
125
87
David M J Lazer, Matthew A Baum, Yochai Benkler, Adam J Berinsky, Kelly M Greenhill, Filippo Menczer, Miriam J Metzger et al,
‘The Science of Fake News: Addressing Fake News Requires a Multidisciplinary Effort’ (2018) 359(6380) Science 1094.
88
Nahema Marchal, Bence Kollanyi, Lisa-Maria Neudert and Philip N Howard, Junk News during the EU Parliamentary Elections:
Lessons from a Seven-Language Study of Twitter and Facebook (Data Memo 2019.3, Oxford Internet Institute 2019)
https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2019/05/EU-Data-Memo.pdf accessed 22 November 2025.
89
Hélène Landemore, Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many (Princeton University Press
2013).
90
David M J Lazer, Matthew A Baum, Yochai Benkler, Adam J Berinsky, Kelly M Greenhill, Filippo Menczer, Miriam J Metzger et al,
‘The Science of Fake News: Addressing Fake News Requires a Multidisciplinary Effort’ (2018) 359(6380) Science 1094.
122
Levi Boxell, Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse M Shapiro, ‘Is the Internet Causing Political Polarization? Evidence from Demographics’
(National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 23258, March 2017).
91
Hélène Landemore, Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many (Princeton University Press
2013).
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RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Enhance Media Literacy Education: Promote critical thinking and digital literacy in schools and
communities to help individuals recognize misinformation and understand the importance of credible
sources.
126
2. Strengthen Fact-Checking Initiatives: Support independent fact-checkers and integrate their work
directly into social media platforms to rapidly debunk falsehoods and limit their spread.
127
3. Mandate Algorithmic Transparency: Require platforms to disclose how their algorithms amplify or
suppress content, empowering oversight bodies and researchers to identify and mitigate manipulative
trends.
128
4. Promote Platform Accountability: Legislate clear responsibilities for social media companies to
detect, flag, and remove disinformation, with significant penalties for non-compliance.
92
5. Protect Whistleblowers: Ensure robust protections for insiders who expose coordinated
misinformation campaigns or unethical practices within tech companies.
93
6. Collaborate Internationally: Governments and civil society should collaborate across borders to share
best practices and intelligence on evolving disinformation tactics.
94
7. Support Quality Journalism: The Government should invest in public interest journalism and local
newsrooms to ensure citizens have access to verified, reputable information sources.
95
8. Empower Independent Oversight Bodies: Create specialized agencies dedicated to monitoring
misinformation trends and advising policymakers on effective responses.
96
9. Implement Real-Name Verification for Political Ads: Require clear identification of sponsors for all
political advertisements and limit the use of bots and fake accounts.
134
124
Thomas Christiano, ‘Democracy, Participation, and Information: Complementarity between Political and Economic
Institutions’ (2019) 56(4) San Diego Law Review 935.
125
S Mo Jang and Joon K Kim, ‘Third Person Effects of Fake News: Fake News Regulation and Media Literacy Interventions’
(2018) 80 Computers in Human Behaviour 295.
126
Thomas Christiano, ‘Self-Determination and the Human Right to Democracy’ in Rowan Cruft, Matthew Liao and
Massimo Renzo (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2015) 459.
127
Elisa Shearer and Katerina Eva Matsa, News Use across Social Media Platforms 2018 (Pew Research Center, 10 September
2018) https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2018/09/10/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2018/ accessed 22
November 2025.
128
S Mo Jang and Joon K Kim, ‘Third Person Effects of Fake News: Fake News Regulation and Media Literacy
Interventions’ (2018) 80 Computers in Human Behaviour 295.
92
Craig Silverman, ‘This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News Stories Outperformed Real News on Facebook’ (BuzzFeed
News, 16 November 2016) https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-outperformed-real-
newson-facebook accessed 22 November 2025.
93
Jacob Soll, ‘The Long and Brutal History of Fake News’ (Politico, 19 December 2016) https://www.politico.eu/article/fake-
newselections-trump-media/ accessed 22 November 2025.
94
Robert Talisse, Overdoing Democracy: Why We Must Put Politics in Its Place (Oxford University Press 2019).
95
Nahema Marchal, Bence Kollanyi, Lisa-Maria Neudert and Philip N Howard, Junk News during the EU Parliamentary Elections:
Lessons from a Seven-Language Study of Twitter and Facebook (Data Memo 2019.3, Oxford Internet Institute 2019)
https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2019/05/EU-Data-Memo.pdf accessed 22 November 2025.
96
Lilliana Mason, ‘Ideologues without Issues: The Polarizing Consequences of Ideological Identities’ (2018) 82(S1) Political Opinion
Quarterly 866.
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j. Encourage Civic Engagement: Engage citizens in democratic processes, emphasizing open dialogue and
diverse perspectives to build resilience against polarization fueled by misinformation.
135
10. Concluding Remarks
This paper has discussed how misinformation has permeated all aspects of the democratic process with specific
attention given to the role of social media in the escalation of political polarization.
136
The results reveal that,
as valuable tools in communication and information exchange, social media sites also turned into a source of
spreading false information fast.
137
Not only is misinformation disseminated through algorithmic amplification
but also cognitive biases, echo chambers, and the manipulative nature of misinformation by political parties.
97
The analysis shows that exposure to misleading or fake information greatly increases political polarization.
Selective attention to information that supports their preexisting prejudices is likely to strengthen partisan
differences and weaken rational discourse of the masses.
98
The empirical study indicates that misinformation
may skew the popular opinion, affect the results of the election process, and undermine the confidence in the
democratic institutions.
99
These difficulties can be solved only in a multi-faceted approach. The regulatory mechanisms should be
reinforced to keep both social media and propagators of misinformation to book. Platforms should in turn be
more transparent, better content moderated and credible sources favored.
100
The significance of education and
general awareness in creating digital literacy so that citizens can be critical of information and can resist being
manipulated cannot be underestimated as well.
101
The effectiveness of these interventions should be evaluated
with the help of constant research and monitoring to change the strategies in accordance with the developing
nature of online misinformation.
102
After all, democracy in the digital era will be strong only
134
Jennifer McCoy, Tahmina Rahman and Mura Somer, ‘Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy: Common Patterns,
Dynamics, and Pernicious Consequences for Democratic Polities’ (2018) 62(1) American Behavioral Scientist 16.
135
Amy Mitchell, Jeffrey Gottfried, Galen Stocking, Mason Walker and Sophia Fedeli, Many Americans Say Made-Up News Is
a
Critical Problem that Needs to Be Fixed (Pew Research Center, 5 June 2019)
https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2019/06/05/many-americans-say-made-up-news-is-a-critical-problem-that-needs-to-
befixed/ accessed 22 November 2025.
97
‘Cognitive biases, why do we swallow the misinformation bait?’ (mSchools, 3 July 2022) https://mschools.com/cognitive-
biaseswhy-do-we-swallow-the-misinformation-bait/ accessed 22 November 2025.
98
Gabriel R Sanchez and Keesha Middlemass, ‘Misinformation Is Eroding the Public’s Confidence in Democracy’ (Brookings, 26
July 2022) https://www.brookings.edu/articles/misinformation-is-eroding-the-publics-confidence-in-democracy/
accessed 22 November 2025.
99
Branko Milanovic, Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization (Harvard University Press 2016).
100
Jennifer McCoy, Tahmina Rahman and Mura Somer, ‘Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy: Common Patterns,
Dynamics, and Pernicious Consequences for Democratic Polities’ (2018) 62(1) American Behavioral Scientist 16.
101
Pew Research Center, The Public, the Political System and American Democracy (26 April 2018)
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2018/04/26/the-public-the-political-system-and-american-democracy/ accessed 22
November 2025.
102
Amy Mitchell, Jeffrey Gottfried, Galen Stocking, Mason Walker and Sophia Fedeli, Many Americans Say Made-Up News Is a
Critical Problem that Needs to Be Fixed (Pew Research Center, 5 June 2019)
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www.rsisinternational.org
136
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through the cooperation of governments, technology firms, civil society, academia, and individual citizens.
Through the provision of coordinated measures, the adverse impacts of misinformation, the polarization of
politics,
and
the
integrity
of
the
democratic
processes
can
be
reduced.
https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2019/06/05/many-americans-say-made-up-news-is-a-critical-problem-that-needs-to-
befixed/ accessed 22 November 2025.
