project. The interplay between state narratives and everyday practices illustrates the complexity of building a
nation in a plural society.
Shamsul Amri Baharuddin: Two Social Realities And Nations-Of-Intent
Shamsul Amri Baharuddin’s framework offers one of the most influential interpretations of identity formation
in Malaysia. He introduced the concept of two social realities which consist the 'authority-defined reality' and
the 'everyday-defined reality' [[8] The former encompasses state-driven narratives, laws, policies, and
institutional structures that articulate what it means to be Malaysian. The latter reflects the lived experiences of
ordinary citizens in negotiating ethnic, cultural, and economic relations. National identity, according to Shamsul,
emerges not from one reality alone but from the dialectics between these two spheres [8].
Within this framework, Shamsul developed the concept of 'nations-of-intent' which competing visions of the
nation advanced by different groups. For instance, projects such as 'Bangsa Melayu,' 'Bangsa Malaysia,' or the
'Islamic Ummah' represent divergent yet overlapping attempts to define national belonging [9]. These competing
narratives illustrate the contested nature of Malaysian identity. Importantly, Shamsul highlights the idea of 'stable
tension,' a state in which ethnic and cultural conflicts persist but are managed and contained through institutions,
negotiation, and political compromise [9]. This notion resonates strongly with Malaysia’s post-independence
history, where moments of crisis, such as the 1969 ethnic riots, gave rise to state interventions like the National
Economic Policy (NEP), which simultaneously addressed economic inequalities while entrenching certain
ethnic-based policies.
Malaysia as a “State without Nation”
Drawing from Shamsul’s seminal argument, Malaysia may be more accurately described as a “state without
nation” [10]. The colonial state apparatus which comprising its legal framework, bureaucratic institutions, and
territorial demarcations, remained largely intact after independence in 1957. While the “state” as an entity was
firmly established, the “nation” as an imagined community imbued with a shared sense of belonging has
remained an unfinished agenda. Unlike the European ideal of the nation-state, where state and nation converge,
Malaysia exemplifies the postcolonial condition in which political sovereignty did not automatically translate
into cultural or national cohesion.
This disjuncture is especially salient in multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies such as Malaysia, where the
anti-colonial struggle itself was fragmented along ethnic and ideological lines. As a result, independence did not
resolve questions of national identity; instead, it institutionalized a state framework within which multiple
visions of nationhood continued to compete. Consequently, recurring debates on education, language, religion,
and cultural identity are not merely policy disputes but expressions of Malaysia’s persistent condition as a “state
without nation”. This condition provides fertile ground for the articulation of diverse “nations-of-intent”, each
seeking to define the cultural principle of national identity.
Competing Nations-of-Intent in Malaysia
Building on this, Shamsul’s concept of “nations-of-intent” refers to the coexistence of multiple, often competing,
visions of what Malaysia as a nation-state should be [10]. A nation-of-intent encompasses a programmatic idea
of territory, population, language, culture, symbols, and institutions that bind a community together. In Malaysia,
the absence of a singular, uncontested national identity has enabled various political elites and social groups to
project their own competing nations-of-intent, some of which have been institutionalized through party
platforms, state policies, and cultural practices.
Three notable examples illustrate this contestation. First, “Bangsa Malaysia”, promoted during Mahathir
Mohamad’s premiership (1981–2003), envisaged unity through national integration while retaining the
constitutionally enshrined privileges of the bumiputera. Second, the “Malaysian Malaysia” vision, originally
articulated by Lee Kuan Yew in 1963 and later championed by the Democratic Action Party (DAP), demanded
absolute equality irrespective of ethnicity or religion, thus calling for radical constitutional reform, a proposal
strongly resisted by Malay political elites. Third, local experiments in Kelantan and Sabah, where state-level