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Regional Economic Integration: African Growth and Opportunities

Act (AGOA) in Focus

Eko-Raphaels, Melvin Urhoromu

& Mojekwu, Ogechukwu Rita

Department of Maritime Economics and Finance, Nigeria Maritime University, Okerenkoko, Delta

State, Nigeria.

Department of Finance and Banking, Faculty of Management Sciences, University of Port Harcourt,

Rivers State Nigeria.

DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2025.91100005

Received: 10 November 2025; Accepted: 17 November 2025; Published: 27 November 2025

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) within the context of Africa’s regional

integration efforts, particularly its interaction with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Regional

economic integration has emerged as a strategic pathway for African countries to overcome structural limitations

and strengthen participation in the global economy. The study contributes to knowledge by situating AGOA

within Balassa’s stages of economic integration and presenting practical policy reforms for both Africa and the

United States. The study utilizes a qualitative policy analysis of trade data, institutional reports and comparative

case studies (Kenya, Lesotho, Ethiopia, and Nigeria) to assess AGOA’s impact on Africa’s trade performance,

industrialization, and regional cohesion. Findings reveal that while AGOA has enhanced market access and

export diversification in select countries, its overall contribution to regional integration remains limited due to

factors such as, but not limited to its unilateral and temporary design, as well as its dependence on extractive

sectors. The study concludes that aligning AGOA with Africa’s integration agenda requires industrial

capacitybuilding and the transformation of AGOA into a more reciprocal, long-term partnership framework.

Keywords: Regional integration, AGOA, AfCFTA, United States-Africa trade, Industrialization, Trade policy,

Economic development

INTRODUCTION

Regional economic integration has long been viewed as a pathway for African countries to overcome the

structural weaknesses of small, fragmented markets and limited global competitiveness. By pooling resources,

reducing trade barriers, and coordinating policies, integration can expand intra-African trade, stimulate

industrialization, and strengthen the continent’s bargaining power in the global economy. Scholars argue that

integration is not only about trade but also about addressing Africa’s development challenges, from infrastructure

gaps to vulnerability to external shocks (Asante et al., 2021). This logic underpins continental projects like the

African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which aims to create the world’s largest free trade area by

membership.

The United States has historically engaged Africa more through aid and security partnerships than through trade.

However, in 2000, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) marked a shift toward trade-led

engagement. AGOA provides eligible African countries duty-free access to the U.S. market for thousands of

products, with the goal of stimulating export-led growth. Since its implementation, AGOA has boosted trade in

certain sectors such as textiles, apparel, and agricultural goods, but the overall benefits have been uneven across

countries and heavily concentrated in oil exports (Oluwafemi & Kudratov, 2012; Kasunsumo, 2023). Critics note

that while AGOA improved United States–Africa trade relations, it has not fully transformed African economies

or significantly advanced regional integration (Cook & Jones, 2020).

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Why AGOA Matters in the Context of African Integration

The central problem is that while AGOA has opened opportunities for African countries to access the U.S.

market, it remains an external, unilateral policy framework rather than a regionally owned integration

mechanism. This creates tensions: on one hand, AGOA can enhance competitiveness and global linkages, but on

the other, it risks diverting attention from African-led initiatives like AfCFTA. Moreover, benefits have been

uneven, with a few countries capturing the majority of trade gains, raising questions about whether AGOA is

fostering integration or deepening inequality among African states (Kuhlmann, 2022).

In light of these, this paper aims to critically examine AGOA’s role within Africa’s broader regional integration

agenda. It seeks to answer the following key questions:

1. How has AGOA shaped U.S.–Africa trade relations since its inception?

2. To what extent has AGOA contributed to or hindered regional economic integration in Africa?

3. What are the main challenges and opportunities of AGOA in the context of AfCFTA and other African

regional blocs?

4. What policy lessons can be drawn to better align external trade preferences with Africa’s integration

goals?

LITERATURE REVIEW

Regional economic integration refers to the process by which neighbouring states reduce or remove trade barriers

and coordinate economic policies to encourage closer economic relations. Balassa (1961) outlined five stages of

integration:

1. Free Trade Area (FTA), where countries eliminate tariffs on intra-regional trade while maintaining

independent external tariffs;

2. Customs Union, where members adopt a common external tariff;

3. Common Market, which adds the free movement of labour and capital;

4. Economic Union, involving harmonization of economic policies; and

5. Complete Economic Integration, where countries effectively merge policies and institutions.

Bela Balassa’s Stages of Economic Integration (1961) remain one of the most influential frameworks for

understanding how countries move from loose economic cooperation to full political union. At its core, the model

explains integration as a step-by-step process: starting with a Free Trade Area (removing tariffs between

members), progressing to a Customs Union (adopting a common external tariff), then a Common Market

(allowing free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor), followed by an Economic Union (harmonizing

fiscal and monetary policies), and finally a Political Union (shared governance and institutions). This staged

approach highlights both the economic and political deepening required for meaningful regional integration,

showing that trade liberalization alone is not enough without institutional and policy alignment.

In the African context, Balassa’s theory is particularly relevant as the continent navigates agreements like the

African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) while engaging with external frameworks such as the African

Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Africa’s current position is largely within the Free Trade Area/Customs

Union stages, with ambitions to move toward a common market under AfCFTA. AGOA, while not part of

Africa’s internal integration agenda, complements these stages by giving African producers external market

access.

However, Balassa’s model also reminds us that integration is not automatic or linear; it requires political will,

capacity building, and institutional reforms. Thus, his framework provides both a roadmap and a lens through

which to evaluate whether initiatives like AGOA are helping Africa climb the ladder of integration or simply

reinforcing its dependence on external trade preferences.

In Africa, initiatives such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community

of West African States (ECOWAS), and most recently, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA),

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reflect attempts to move along this continuum (Ajewumi, Afolabi, & Akunne, 2024). The dominant theories of

integration emphasize two key mechanisms: trade creation and trade diversion. Trade creation occurs when

integration allows cheaper imports from member states to replace higher-cost domestic production, improving

efficiency and welfare. Trade diversion, however, happens when cheaper imports from non-member countries

are replaced by more expensive imports from member states due to preferential tariffs, which can reduce overall

welfare (Viner, 1950). Applied to Africa, empirical studies such as Candau, Schlick, and Guepie (2018) have

shown that while some RTAs like COMESA and ECOWAS have fostered trade creation, others have had limited

or uneven impacts.

From an International Economics perspective, integration is also expected to expand market size, stimulate

industrialization, and enhance competitiveness, especially for small economies (Mevel & Mathieu, 2016).

However, the challenges of weak infrastructure, overlapping memberships, and governance constraints often

undermine these expected gains (Melo, 2013).

Trade Agreements and Development in Emerging Economies

For emerging economies, trade agreements can act as vehicles for structural transformation. By improving

market access, attracting foreign investment, and fostering technology transfer, agreements create pathways

toward industrial upgrading (Asche, 2021). Yet, outcomes depend heavily on the quality of institutions and

complementary policies such as investment in infrastructure and human capital (Kimenyi, 2013). Africa’s

experience with external agreements such as Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the EU

demonstrates both the opportunities for export growth and the dangers of fragmentation when agreements are

misaligned with continental integration goals (Asche, 2021).

Where AGOA Fits in this Framework

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), enacted by the United States in 2000, offers unilateral trade

preferences to eligible African countries. Conceptually, AGOA does not fit neatly within Balassa’s stages of

integration because it is a non-reciprocal preferential trade agreement rather than a step toward deeper

institutional integration. However, in practice, it interacts with Africa’s integration agenda by shaping production

patterns, export orientation, and industrial strategies.

Studies show that AGOA has boosted African exports especially in textiles, apparel and certain agricultural

products but its benefits have been uneven, with a concentration in a few countries like South Africa, Kenya, and

Lesotho (Kasunsumo, 2023). Moreover, scholars argue that while AGOA provides opportunities, its temporary

and conditional nature limits its developmental impact compared to Africa-driven frameworks like AfCFTA

(Talton, 2021). Thus, AGOA illustrates both the opportunities and contradictions of external agreements within

Africa’s broader trajectory toward regional economic integration.

Key Provisions of the AGOA

AGOA grants duty-free access to the U.S. market for over 6,500 products from eligible African countries.

Covered goods include textiles, apparel, footwear, agricultural commodities and manufactured products,

although petroleum exports have historically dominated trade flows. Eligibility is conditional: countries must

demonstrate progress toward establishing a market economy, upholding the rule of law, eliminating barriers to

U.S. trade and investment, and protecting internationally recognized worker rights (Kasunsumo, 2023). The U.S.

President conducts annual reviews to determine whether countries continue to meet these requirements, giving

Washington significant discretion over African participation.

Since its original passage, AGOA has been renewed and amended multiple times, creating four major phases:

1. AGOA I (2000–2004): The original enactment provided duty-free benefits and eligibility conditions for

sub-Saharan African countries.

2. AGOA II (2004): Extended benefits through 2015 and broadened product coverage, particularly for

textiles and apparel.

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3. AGOA III (2006): Expanded eligibility for lesser-developed beneficiary countries and extended certain

textile provisions.

4. AGOA IV (2015): Signed by President Barack Obama, this renewal extended AGOA until 2025 and

encouraged stronger alignment with Africa’s own integration efforts, such as the African Continental

Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) (Kuhlmann, 2022).

Each amendment not only prolonged the lifespan of the Act but also reflected shifting U.S. priorities, such as

promoting diversification of exports beyond oil and encouraging African participation in global supply chains

(Williams, 2015).

Political Motivations Behind AGOA

Beyond economics, AGOA has always had clear political motivations. It was intended to reward African

countries that embraced liberal democracy, good governance, and open markets, aligning with U.S. foreign

policy goals at the end of the Cold War. By conditioning eligibility on governance reforms, AGOA reinforced

U.S. leverage in shaping African domestic policy (Cook & Jones, 2020). At the same time, AGOA was part of

the U.S. strategy to counterbalance the growing influence of other global powers especially the European Union

and, more recently, China in African markets (Kuhlmann, 2022).

While hailed as a landmark in U.S.–Africa relations, critics note that AGOA’s unilateral nature, that is, being

dependent on U.S. discretion and without reciprocal African influence limits its sustainability as a framework

for long-term development and integration. Nevertheless, its historical trajectory highlights both the promise and

the geopolitical complexity of linking Africa’s development agenda to external trade preferences.

Challenges and Criticisms of AGOA

One of the most persistent criticisms of AGOA is that it has largely entrenched Africa’s dependence on a narrow

set of export commodities. Oil and energy products have consistently dominated AGOA exports, particularly

from countries like Nigeria and Angola. This over-reliance undermines the program’s stated aim of diversifying

African economies and promoting industrialization (Cook & Jones, 2020). While countries such as Kenya and

Lesotho have made gains in textiles and apparel, most African states have not fully utilized AGOA’s provisions,

leading to highly uneven benefits across the continent (Williams, 2015). The result is a situation where a handful

of countries dominate AGOA trade flows, limiting the program’s developmental impact.

Regulatory and Institutional Barriers in Africa

Even where opportunities exist, many African states lack the regulatory and institutional capacity to take

advantage of AGOA. Weak infrastructure, poor logistics, and high trade costs limit the competitiveness of

African exports in U.S. markets. In landlocked states such as Uganda or Mali, transporting goods to seaports

adds prohibitive costs that diminish AGOA’s preferential access advantages (Kasunsumo, 2023). Moreover,

weak governance and bureaucratic inefficiencies create bottlenecks for certification and compliance with

AGOA’s rules of origin, further reducing utilization.

Criticism of AGOA’s Conditionalities and Political Leverage

AGOA’s annual eligibility reviews are tied to political and governance conditions, including democracy, human

rights, and market liberalization. While these conditions aim to promote good governance, critics argue that they

reflect U.S. strategic interests and often serve as tools of political leverage. For example, Ethiopia’s suspension

in 2022 due to human rights concerns was widely criticized for undermining export industries employing

thousands of workers (Talton, 2021). Such conditionalities create uncertainty for African producers and

investors, discouraging long-term commitments to AGOA-related industries.

Limited Sustainability: Temporary Preferences vs. Long-Term Development

Finally, AGOA is criticized for its temporary and unilateral nature. As a program subject to periodic renewal by

the U.S. Congress, its future remains uncertain. This lack of permanency discourages structural transformation

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and investment in African economies, as firms are reluctant to commit resources to industries that may lose

preferential access at any moment (Kuhlmann, 2022). Unlike reciprocal trade agreements, AGOA does not

institutionalize long-term commitments, limiting its potential to foster sustained growth and integration into

global value chains.

METHODOLOGY

This study adopts an exploratory and interpretive research design to assess the role of the African Growth and

Opportunity Act (AGOA) within Africa’s regional integration framework. The methodology combines

secondary data sources, scholarly literature and policy documents to provide a multi-dimensional understanding

of AGOA’s contributions. The data used for this study were sourced from official policy documents and reports

by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), World Bank, UNCTAD, and African Union Commission from 2000

to 2023.

The analysis is anchored on Balassa’s (1961) stages of economic integration and the trade creation and trade

diversion framework by Viner (1950). AGOA is examined against these theoretical lenses to assess whether it

encourages deeper integration (trade creation) or causes dependency and fragmentation (trade diversion).

Additionally, a comparative case analysis was conducted using the nations of Kenya, Lesotho, Ethiopia and

Nigeria to capture variations in AGOA’s sectoral and structural outcomes. These cases were purposively selected

based on differences in export structure, industrial capacity and utilization of AGOA benefits.

Data Presentation and Results

This section presents descriptive evidence on the performance of the African Growth and Opportunity Act

(AGOA) across selected sub-Saharan African countries. The data are drawn primarily from the U.S. International

Trade Commission (USITC), World Bank, and UNCTAD trade databases (2000–2023). The purpose is to

provide empirical grounding for the qualitative analysis.

Table 4.1: U.S. Imports under AGOA by Selected Countries (US$ Millions)

Year

Kenya

Nigeria

South Africa

Lesotho

Ethiopia

2001

7,104

2,435

260

2005

277

34,355

3,712

385

2010

292

19,470

4,519

340

2015

398

9,643

2,950

345

122

2019

452

4,260

2,875

312

245

2023

514

5,128

3,054

286

112

Source: Author (2025)

Table 4.1 reveals that while Nigeria dominated AGOA trade in absolute terms due to oil exports, Kenya and

Lesotho maintained consistent growth and it is due to their trade in textiles and apparel. South Africa was next

to Nigeria in terms of trade, and this is due to its diversification into automotive and agricultural products,

whereas Ethiopia’s gains were curtailed by political suspension. The structural imbalance reveals AGOA’s

concentration in resource exports and a few industrial clusters.

According to USTR, Ethiopia’s exports declined after its AGOA suspension in 2022

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Next, we consider the sectoral composition of AGOA in 2023. This is shown in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Sectoral Composition of AGOA Exports (2023)

Sector

Share of Total AGOA Exports (%)

Leading Contributors

Crude oil and petroleum products

61.3

Nigeria, Angola

Textiles and apparel

15.6

Kenya, Lesotho, Ethiopia

Automobiles and parts

9.4

South Africa

Agricultural products

7.2

Ghana, South Africa, Kenya

Processed/manufactured goods

3.8

Mauritius, Eswatini

Others (chemicals, minerals, etc.)

2.7

Multiple

Source: Author (2025)

AGOA’s export composition remains heavily skewed toward oil and extractive sectors. Despite notable textile

performance in a few countries, industrial diversification remains shallow. This pattern indicates that while

AGOA offers short-term trade access, its developmental contribution is limited by Africa’s low manufacturing

base.

Table 4.3: AGOA Utilization Rates and Industrial Capacity Indicators (2023)

Country

AGOA

Utilization

Rate (%)

Manufacturing

Share of GDP

(%)

Intra-African

Export Share (%)

Key Challenge

Kenya

10.1

19.3

Infrastructure and logistics

Lesotho

12.8

14.5

Overdependence on textiles

Nigeria

7.2

9.1

Oil dependence and governance

South Africa

13.7

24.8

Labor and policy rigidity

Ethiopia

6.9

11.0

Political instability (post-2022)

Source: Author (2025)

One important variable in Table 4.3 is the utilization rate, which measures how effectively countries exploit

AGOA’s tariff preferences. Kenya and Lesotho exhibit strong engagement due to apparel exports, while

Nigeria’s and Ethiopia’s rates are constrained by structural and governance bottlenecks. Higher manufacturing

shares correlate with better AGOA participation, reinforcing the need for industrial upgrading across Africa.

The comparative evidence reveals that AGOA’s benefits have been largely national and sectoral, not regional.

Kenya’s apparel exports, for instance, are directed primarily to the U.S., not to neighboring EAC countries,

reflecting trade diversion rather than trade creation. On the other hand, AfCFTA aims to encourage intra-African

trade and industrial linkages, aligning with Balassa’s next stage of integration. From Balassa’s theoretical

lens,Africa remains between the Customs Union and Common Market stages and AGOA’s limited reciprocity

stalls further progression.

Agoa and African Trade Performance

Since its inception in 2000, AGOA has significantly shaped trade flows between the U.S. and sub-Saharan Africa.

U.S. imports under AGOA peaked at nearly $66 billion in 2008, but this figure has since fluctuated, largely due

to volatility in oil exports. By 2019, total imports under AGOA had dropped to about $8.4 billion, highlighting

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both the initial gains and the structural weaknesses of the program (Cook & Jones, 2020). While AGOA expanded

Africa’s access to the U.S. market, the concentration of exports in a few commodities and countries limited the

broader development impact (Kuhlmann, 2022).

AGOA’s trade flows have been dominated by crude oil and petroleum products, accounting for over 70% of

U.S. imports from Africa in its early years. This dependency on oil exporters such as Nigeria and Angola meant

that

AGOA reinforced Africa’s reliance on extractive industries rather than diversifying trade (Williams, 2015).

However, there were notable successes in non-oil sectors. The textile and apparel industry, particularly in

countries like Kenya, Lesotho, and Ethiopia, benefitted from duty-free access and special provisions for

lesserdeveloped beneficiaries. By 2019, Kenya had become the leading apparel exporter to the U.S. under

AGOA, with exports valued at over $400 million (Kasunsumo, 2023). Agriculture, though slower to respond,

has also shown growth in products like cut flowers, nuts, and wine from countries such as South Africa.

Country Case Studies

The impact of AGOA has varied widely across Africa, producing both success stories and missed opportunities.

In this section, the focus will be on few African countries inclusive of Kenya, Nigeria, Lesotho and Ethiopia.

1. Kenya: Kenya has been one of AGOA’s standout performers, leveraging the apparel and textile

provisions to become a hub for garment exports to the U.S. The sector has created thousands of jobs,

especially for women, and stimulated the growth of industrial parks and special economic zones.

According to Kasunsumo (2023), AGOA’s apparel provisions provided Kenya with a competitive

advantage over Asian producers in the early 2000s.

2. Lesotho and Ethiopia: Similar to Kenya, Lesotho developed a thriving textile industry, becoming one

of the largest African exporters of apparel to the U.S. under AGOA. Ethiopia also attracted significant

foreign investment into its garment sector, though political instability and the suspension of its AGOA

benefits in 2022 undermined its progress (Cook & Jones, 2020).

3. Nigeria: In contrast, Nigeria, despite being one of Africa’s largest economies, failed to capitalize on

AGOA’s non-oil provisions. Its exports to the U.S. remained overwhelmingly oil-based, with negligible

growth in manufactured or agricultural goods. Structural barriers such as poor infrastructure, weak

governance, and lack of competitiveness hindered Nigeria’s ability to diversify its exports under AGOA

(Williams, 2015).

Although AGOA was designed to promote diversification, its outcomes have been uneven. On the one hand,

countries such as Kenya and Lesotho demonstrated that targeted sectors like textiles can benefit from preferential

access. On the other hand, the heavy reliance on oil exports in countries like Nigeria and Angola suggests that

AGOA has not fundamentally altered Africa’s trade patterns. Instead, its contribution to diversification has been

limited to a small number of countries and industries (Kuhlmann, 2022).

Moreover, AGOA’s non-reciprocal and temporary nature may have discouraged long-term investment in African

industries, as uncertainty about renewals undermined business confidence. While it succeeded in boosting certain

sectors, AGOA’s broader impact on trade diversification and industrialization across Africa remains modest.

Lessons Learned and Policy Recommendations

The launch of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) provides a unique opportunity to align AGOA

preferences with Africa’s continental integration strategy. While AGOA offers duty-free access to U.S. markets,

AfCFTA aims to eliminate intra-African trade barriers. Together, these frameworks could create a mutually

reinforcing agenda where AfCFTA builds supply chains across Africa that feed into AGOA exports (Talton,

2021). This synergy would shift African trade away from reliance on raw commodities toward processed goods

and manufactured products, strengthening both regional and global competitiveness.

AGOA’s future can benefit from lessons drawn from other trade frameworks. The EU’s Economic Partnership

Agreements (EPAs) with African states, though controversial, show the importance of reciprocity and long-term

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commitments in sustaining trade relationships. Similarly, the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement demonstrates

that lowering non-tariff barriers can be as impactful as reducing tariffs (Kuhlmann, 2022). For AGOA, adopting

such lessons would mean embedding support for capacity-building, trade logistics, and industrial policy within

the program itself.

Policy Recommendations for African States

For African countries, the future of AGOA should be leveraged to accelerate structural transformation. First,

diversifying exports beyond oil and apparel is essential. Expanding into agro-processing, pharmaceuticals, and

digital services would create more sustainable industries (Kasunsumo, 2023). Second, governments need to

strengthen industrial capacity by investing in infrastructure, energy reliability, and skills development. Third,

regional coordination through blocs such as ECOWAS and EAC could pool resources for export promotion,

helping smaller economies take advantage of AGOA’s opportunities. Finally, African policymakers should treat

AGOA not as an end in itself but as a stepping stone toward broader competitiveness in global value chains.

Policy Recommendations for the U.S.

On the American side, reforms are necessary to make AGOA more effective. Extending AGOA beyond its current

expiration in 2025 would provide the predictability required for long-term investment. U.S. policymakers could

also broaden product coverage to include more agricultural and manufactured goods where African states hold

competitive potential (Kuhlmann, 2022). Additionally, shifting from unilateral preferences toward more

reciprocal agreements could foster a partnership dynamic rather than dependency. This would align AGOA with

global trade norms while giving African producers the security of lasting access to U.S. markets.

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The discussion of findings in this section will focus on answering the key research questions asked in the first

section.

How has AGOA shaped U.S.–Africa trade relations since its inception?

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which started in 2000, has changed U.S.-Africa commercial

relations in a big way. Its goal is to bring sub-Saharan Africa into the global economy by giving it duty-free

access to the U.S. market. Imports from the U.S. under AGOA have changed over time, mostly because of oil

exports. The act has made it easier for businesses to get into new markets, but trade is still mostly about crude

oil. Some countries have seen success in fields other than oil, such as textiles and agriculture. Even with its

changes and renewals, AGOA's one-sided and short-term nature has not completely changed African economies

or made regional integration much better.

To what extent has AGOA contributed to or hindered regional economic integration in Africa?

AGOA has had a complicated effect on regional economic integration, creating both chances and problems.

Because it is an external, one-sided strategy, it can take emphasis away from African-led projects and make

benefits uneven, which could make inequality worse. Evidence indicates that AGOA has only slightly improved

trade inside Africa, with a preference for commerce with the U.S. market over regional supply chains. Structural

limitations, such as stringent rules of origin and conditional eligibility, have further impeded its role in regional

integration, frequently exacerbating reliance on external commerce instead of promoting intra-African economic

connections.

What are the main challenges and opportunities of AGOA in the context of AfCFTA and other African

regional blocs?

AGOA is a problem for the AfCFTA and other African regional blocs since it is one-sided and ephemeral, and it

makes people more dependent on primary goods. The unequal distribution of benefits also makes differences

across regions worse. AGOA, on the other hand, can be an external market gateway that works with the AfCFTA

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to make internal supply chains easier. This could lead to more trade in processed commodities. Targeted

successes in industries like textiles show that preferential access can lead to growth when capacity is built up.

What policy lessons can be drawn to better align external trade preferences with Africa’s integration

goals?

To reconcile Africa's integration ambitions with its foreign trade preferences, African countries should diversify

their exports, improve their industrial capability, and improve cooperation between regions. It is important to see

AGOA as a way to become more competitive on a global scale, which is in line with the goals of AfCFTA. It is

suggested that the U.S. prolong AGOA into 2025, cover more products, and possibly implement more reciprocal

agreements. Adding funding for capacity-building and trade logistics to these kinds of programs can help make

the U.S.-Africa trade cooperation stronger and more stable, which will help Africa's efforts to change its structure

and become more integrated.

CONCLUSION

This paper has examined the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) within the broader context of

regional economic integration and Africa’s engagement with the global economy. The analysis traced AGOA’s

origins as a U.S. initiative rooted in the “trade not aid” philosophy, highlighting its objectives to stimulate African

exports, create jobs, and promote governance reforms. The historical review showed how AGOA evolved across

its different phases (AGOA I–IV), expanding product coverage and extending its duration, while remaining

constrained by its unilateral and temporary nature.

The assessment of trade performance demonstrated that while AGOA has facilitated billions of dollars in exports

to the U.S., its benefits have been uneven. Oil and energy products have dominated trade flows, limiting

structural diversification. Nevertheless, success stories in textiles (e.g., Kenya and Lesotho) and agricultural

products point to the potential of targeted industries when African states invest in capacity and competitiveness.

At the same time, countries like Nigeria have struggled to move beyond oil exports, underscoring AGOA’s mixed

record in fostering industrial transformation.

When linked to Africa’s integration efforts, especially the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA),

AGOA emerges as both an opportunity and a challenge. On one hand, it offers African producers a gateway to

global markets; on the other, its strict eligibility criteria, rules of origin, and political conditionalities sometimes

undermine intra-African trade and investment certainty. The intersection of AGOA and AfCFTA suggests that

regional supply chains can be harnessed to take fuller advantage of preferential access, making AGOA a

complement rather than a substitute for Africa’s continental integration.

The challenges and criticisms highlighted, which include overreliance on oil, infrastructure and regulatory

bottlenecks, conditionalities tied to U.S. strategic interests, and the temporary nature of AGOA make clear that

the initiative alone cannot deliver sustained development.

However, with strategic reforms on both sides, AGOA can serve as a stepping stone toward deeper integration

and industrial transformation. African states must diversify exports, enhance industrial capacity, and align AGOA

strategies with AfCFTA goals, while the U.S. must move toward longer-term commitments, broaden product

coverage, and support Africa’s structural transformation efforts. Essentially, AGOA’s future relevance lies in its

ability to evolve from a unilateral trade preference program into a foundation for a stronger, reciprocal, and more

sustainable U.S.–Africa trade partnership. If reformed and aligned with continental integration, AGOA could not

only expand Africa’s role in global value chains but also strengthen U.S.–Africa relations in an increasingly

multipolar world.

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