

# State Interventions on Social-Economic Wellbeing of IDPs in Non-Camp in Baringo County, Kenya

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## ABSTRACT

The number of Internally Displaced Population has been on rise in the recent past due to natural disasters, conflicts, and violence. IDPs encamp plight can easily be responded to by state and non-state actors. However, the nature of non-camp IDPs makes it difficult for state and non-state actors to respond to their plight. This study delve to examine the state interventions on social-economic wellbeing of IDPs in Non-Camp settlement in Baringo County, Kenya. This study was led by the following two objectives; to find out the effectiveness of assistance by state agents to non-camp IDPs, and to examine the effectiveness of the state assistance on social economic welfare of the non-camp IDPs in Baringo County, Kenya. The study adopted exploratory and explanatory research design. It utilized a mixed methodology where 167 response was from semi-structured questionnaires, 3 interviews, and 3 focused groups discussion. The data were analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively. The study findings were; on the effectiveness of State interventions, majority of the respondents (56.2%) felt that state agents were not effective, (22.2%) opined that state gents were slightly effective, (14.4%) effective, while (7.2%) felt that the state was effective. On the second objective; especially in areas that fall under its domain; particularly, security assistance rated at (9.5%) and education rated at (11.3%). The study concludes that the non-camp IDPs in Baringo County are still in dire need of government support. The study recommends that all stakeholders led by the government of Kenya should work together to ensure that the plight of IDPs is addressed.

**Keywords:** Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Encamp Internally Displaced Persons (EIDPs), Non-camp Internally Displaced Persons (NCIDP), State Intervention (SI), Social-economic welfare

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

The issue of human population displacement is a global phenomenon, which has reached an unprecedented magnitude in recent past. For instance, in 2023 alone, it is approximated that there were 75.9 million Displaced Persons (DPs) from 148/196 states globally (<https://api.internal-displacement.org/>). Out of this 58% are internally displaced population (IDPs) mostly of which are driven by disasters, conflicts and violence (<https://www.unhcr.org/about-unhcr>). Africa host half of global of IDPs population led by DR Congo 7million, Ethiopia 5.5million, Mozambique 1.7, Nigeria 7million, Somalia 5 million, Sudan 5 million and southern Sudan 4.5 (IDMC, 2024).

Globally, responses on forced displacement have tended to focus on IDPs living in encamped or gathered settings with much less attention devoted to the situation of those living outside of camps and formal settlements. While it is often assumed that encamped IDPs have the most pressing protection and assistance needs, a review of the limited literature available on this issue indicates that IDPs living outside of camps often face serious problems. For instance, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) reports that “in countries where IDPs were living in both gathered and dispersed settings, national authorities and humanitarian actors were twice as likely to provide assistance and protection to IDPs in gathered settings than to those in

dispersed settings (IDCM, 2010)." Yet, because they are dispersed and not as easily identifiable as those living in camps, the concerns of 'non-camp IDPs' often go under the radar and responses to their needs are generally ad hoc. This is particularly troubling because it is estimated that the majority of the world's 75.5 million IDPs currently live outside camps.

In recent years, national governments have devoted considerable attention to developing legal and policy frameworks to domesticate the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the Great Lakes IDP Protocol and/or the Kampala Convention, while international actors have worked to put into place institutional arrangements to ensure predictable response capacity for IDPs (<https://www.brookings.edu/about/projects/idp>). These responses have tended to focus on IDPs living in encamped or gathered settings with much less attention devoted to the situation of those living outside of camps and formal settlements. While it is often assumed that encamped IDPs have the most pressing protection and assistance needs, a review of the limited literature available on this issue indicates that IDPs living outside of camps often face serious problems. For instance, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) reports that "in countries where IDPs were living in both gathered and dispersed settings, national authorities and humanitarian actors were twice as likely to provide assistance and protection to IDPs in gathered settings than to those in dispersed settings (IDCM, 2024)."

Beyani (2013) states that even though national authorities bear the primary duty and responsibility for protecting and assisting IDPs, local authorities are "likely to be more directly in contact with displaced populations," and "also have a critically important role to play in ensuring that national responsibility is effectively discharged on the ground." They must address both the immediate, humanitarian aspects of an IDP influx as well as the longer term pressures related to prolonged displacement, including the provision of basic services to IDPs and the facilitation of durable solutions, including local integration.

Further Elizabeth, Erin , & Chareen (2011) argue that there is absence of political will to respond effectively to the needs of internally displaced populations. For instance, it may be that the state downplays the protection and assistance needs of IDPs, discriminates against particular groups of IDPs (including, for instance, by helping IDPs displaced by natural disasters but not those uprooted by conflict or by helping only those IDPs who are in camps), or even denies the existence of internal displacement altogether. In many cases, the authorities deliberately cause internal displacement or at least condone the circumstances and actions that compel people to flee through the imposition of political, security, or bureaucratic restrictions, they may prevent humanitarian and human rights organizations from safely accessing internally displaced and other civilian populations at risk. Or they may exhibit solidarity with the internally displaced but be single-minded in insisting, for political reasons, on a particular solution most often return of IDPs to their homes to end displacement.

Atrocities have led to mass conflicts in Africa, and in other parts of the world, a situation that has precipitated the process of reconciliation and collective intervention to protect civilians. In some of these conflicts, including Rwanda, African countries were forced to fend for themselves, due to delayed and politicized responses from the international community. Rwanda stands out as a stern rebuke for all of us having failed to address Africa's security problems. Mass internal displacement that rocked Rwanda presents the springboard and the basis of strategizing intervention measures in addressing the concerns, experiences of the IDPs (Lwabukuna, 2021).

Mali is a country with a burgeoning presence of IDPs due to the conflict that has been experienced in the Sahel region. A study conducted by Foltz and Shibuya (2022) revealed that consumption is high, with low poverty and inequality levels experienced. Further, the findings established that the experiences of hosting villages accommodating IDPs were less severe. This is because, the United Nations, NGOs, and the Malian government working with IDPs in non-camps in Mali have succeeded in providing resources to the IDPs and IDP hosting villages. This approach as well has lessened inequality and poverty within the hosting villages. It is also an entrenched culture in the Malian society that strangers should be accorded unconditional hospitality.

Somalia has a fairly well-established governmental structure for addressing IDP and humanitarian issues. The Ministry of Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction works on issues of internal displacement, refugee returns and migration issues. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) also mandated the Ministry of

Interior and Federalism to oversee policies affecting internal population displacement and humanitarian assistance. For effective operations, the Ministry created a section, the National Commissioner of Repatriation and Resettlement of Refugees and IDPs. Formed within the ministry is the Disaster Management Agency (DMA), to mainly focus on IDPs and help the government to develop strategies in finding durable solutions to the plight of IDPs (Drumtra, 2014).

According to government records, over 660,000 people became internally displaced during the 2007 political crisis, while over 640 families crossed the border into Uganda. Out of the more than 660,000 people displaced, the government considers that over 300,000 or around 47 percent have been 'integrated' in communities across the country. The use of the term 'integrated IDPs' is widespread in Kenya, referring to those who are living dispersed among communities – whether with relatives and friends or in rented accommodation usually in urban and peri-urban areas. In other words, the term 'integrated' IDPs in the Kenyan context refers to IDPs living outside of camps. While this study also uses the term in this way, it is important to point out that the Ministry of State for Special Programs (MOSSP) is the designated focal point on internal displacement in Kenya. Within the ministry, the Department of Mitigation and Resettlement and the National Humanitarian Advisory Board are responsible for resettling IDPs resulting from the 2007 post-election violence (PEV) and offering counseling and assistance to restore their lives and livelihoods. A cabinet sub-committee bringing together Permanent Secretaries from the Ministry of State for Provincial administration and Internal Security, Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs, Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Lands provide a forum through which the government responds to all matters relating to IDPs in all settings. The Ministry of Special Programs and the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs take the lead in the development of a legal framework for the protection of IDPs and communities that host them. Therefore, this study sought to explore whether the discussed government's agencies as State actors' and their initiatives have improved socioeconomic wellbeing of internally displaced persons in non-camps in Baringo County, Kenya.

This study used Exploratory research design and Explanatory research design. Exploratory research is conducted when enough is not known about a phenomenon and a problem that has not been clearly defined (Saunders et al., 2007). It does not aim to provide the final and conclusive answers to the research questions, but merely explores the research topic with varying levels of depth. Therefore, its theme is to tackle new problems on which little or no previous research has been done (Brown, 2006). On the other front, an explanatory study sets out to explain and account for the descriptive information. So, while descriptive studies may ask 'what' kinds of questions, explanatory studies seek to ask 'why' and 'how' questions (Grey, 2014). Mixed method approach is a rigorous use and integration of both qualitative and quantitative or collection of qualitative and quantitative data from different sources, such as quantitative test data along with qualitative interview data, to find out if findings from the two sources converge (Creswell, 2015; Springer, 2010). The qualitative method helped to reveal attitudes, feelings, experiences, valuations and true representation of the respondent point of view (Abedsaedi & Ameraliakbari, 2015). It provides a thorough and deep overview of a phenomenon through data collection and using a flexible method of research (Polit and Beck, 2010). This design was necessary in espousing how 'invisible' victims of displacement go through in their "new homes and families". The geographical scope of this study is the entire Baringo County, Kenya. Whereas contextual scope covers Non-Camp internally displaced persons in the stated county. Time scope covers the year 2023.

## 2.0 Effectiveness of Assistance Provided by State Agents

In relations with the effectiveness of assistance provided by state agents are shown in Table 1 below. The responses showed a slight below average (43.8%) effectiveness of state intervention on the vulnerabilities of IDPs. This shows that the state had challenges in addressing the vulnerabilities of IDPs.

**Table 1: Effectiveness of Assistance provided by state agents**

	Frequency	Percent
Very Effective	12	7.2
Effective	24	14.4
Slightly Effective	37	22.2
Not Effective	94	56.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Field Data (2023)

Table 1.,presents data regarding the effectiveness of assistance provided by state agents to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The majority of respondents (56.2%) stated that the assistance by state agents has not been effective. Among those who expressed an opinion, 7.2% considered the assistance to be very effective, 14.4% considered it effective, and 22.2% considered it slightly effective.

From the findings, the government is constrained in obtaining the real figures of IDPs in outside camps given the fluid nature of tracing and registering displaced people. Through the literature reviewed humanitarian agencies are also constrained by the same problem and calls upon all actors dealing with humanitarian intervention to devise appropriate criteria of identifying and documenting these category of IDPs. According to White (2015), finding IDPs was a very difficult task. This category overlaps with other marginalized groups, such as migrants and the urban poor, and there is no official database of IDPs (White 2015: 6–7). The application of the Guiding Principles calls for the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian actors in their everyday work, challenging the methods of identifying the population of IDPs and underscoring the need for the inclusion of different actors during this process (Crisp et al., 2012). Despite the progress, the numbers of displaced have been rising for decades, with some states resistant to fulfilling their responsibilities toward IDPs, and many humanitarian development and senior UN actors not sufficiently engaged (GP20, 2018).

### 3.0 Assistance Provided by State on the Social-Economic Welfare of IDPs in Non-Camps

The previous section revealed that 43.8% and 56.2 of respondents stated that states were effective and ineffective in addressing the vulnerabilities of the IDP's, this section goes to examine those two sides of the coin of state intervention to bring about the positive aspects of that intervention and the weaknesses of that intervention.

**Table 2. Assistance Provided by Stated Agents**

Common Vulnerabilities	Frequency	Percent
Food insecurity	41	24.5
Insecure housing	18	10.7
Lack of stable income	12	7.1
Medical issues	26	15.5
Increased risk of rejection	18	10.7
Education burden	19	11.3
Increased rate of insecurity	16	9.5
Water scarcity	13	7.7
Psychological disturbance	5	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Field Data (2023).

The data presented in Table 2 indicates that state agents should play a crucial role in providing assistance to the IDPs, particularly in addressing food situations, medical assistance, education, accommodation, discrimination, security, water, employment and psychological problems.

Each state's intervention to combat vulnerabilities is discussed below. Food insecurity was cited as the major intervention provided by the state at 24.5%. At the onset of mass displacement in the year 2013, state apparatus both drawn from national government and county government intervened by distributing food to the displaced population. The nature of food that were given included: rice, maize, beans, cooking oil and powdered milk. The food was distributed to households depending on the size of the households and the level of vulnerability. The kind of food that were distributed included: maize flour, cooking oil, sugar, rice and beans. These food were being given on daily basis then changed to once a week, then changed to once a month and gradually

stopped. The intervention of the provision of food was effective at the onset of displacement but gradually declined to an abrupt end. One of the government official interviewed hinted that government funding in responses to disasters and emergencies was meager and therefore could not offer long-term relief assistance to the IDP population. The nature of response was reactive and only provided IDPs with opportunity to survive as they sought alternative means of livelihoods, as this was typical in government interventions in all intermittent periods of displacement. Indeed, with the changes in the rations that were given, a quite number of IDPs stopped relying on government and sought alternative means of survival to feed their households. They sought employment, engaged in business, farming and turned to 'kith and kin' for assistance. One of the respondent drawn from Kimorock, Baringo South displaced in the year 2023 pointed out this on food:

*"We were given food items by state agencies at the start of the displacement. The food items included: Maize flour, rice, beans, cooking oil among other items. This was the time we had nothing to sustain our families and we were new in the place of displacement. We only depended on well wishers and few humanitarian agencies. However, the food were meager to sustain our families especially those that had large household members"*

He further noted that:

*"As days became months this assistance declined and came to abrupt end without any communication or explanation that is when we started looking for other alternative means of survival and sustenance to obtain food for our households"*

The frequency of food intervention varied from the onset of displacement. At the initial stages of displacement the state was assisting the displaced on arrival. The assistance continued on daily basis for a week and after a week, then once a week from then the assistance was no longer consistent and finally came to a halt. At this point IDPs had no option but to look for other alternative means of securing food for their households that this study discusses in chapter seven as coping alternatives.

The states intervention on food insecurity was below average for its inconsistency in the provision and inability to keep statistics of IDPs displaced for follow up. Secondly, the nature of food that were given were not of balanced diet as it contained more of cereals thus compromised the nutrition of displaced children, the aged and the sick. Thirdly, due to lack of documentation, it was hard for the state to ascertain the genuine IDPs from the general population. Some IDPs presented impostors as part of their households members for a bigger consideration in the distribution. However, the intervention was of great help albeit in the short-term. According to a respondent; a father of six children drawn from Sandai in Baringo South , he had this to say:

*" My family was displaced in the year 2021 at a place known as Arabal in Baringo South. Before my family was displaced, we were living relatively well; we had enough food, we paid our children's school fees, we had enough cash to attend to any emergency that would arise. In September 2021, our village was attacked by bandits and all our livestock were confiscated and taken away. Houses, granaries and livestock shades were burnt by attackers. As the head of the family, I assembled all my family members and fled to the nearby thicket to seek refuge from imminent attack the whole night and in the morning when the attackers had left, we went back to our compound and found out that everything had been destroyed. Since the threats of second attack were likely to occur, we had to move to a safe place and that is our we found ourselves here hosted by a friend that I had known many years ago "*

### **The respondent further narrated that:**

*"When we got to this place, we had nothing to sustain ourselves; we had no food and other basic needs. Our friend hosted us for two weeks until when we were able to secure a rented house in the nearby center of Sandai through the same benefactor. At that point; rent, food and bedding materials were the major challenge. It was during this period that national government, county government and humanitarian agencies were intervening in providing urgent and basic needs to the displaced people in that area. I was advised to report to the chief's office for registration and assistance. After the registration, I was given a 3 blankets, 3 bed sheets, 3 cooking pans, and food items that comprised of: rice, beans, cooking fat, salt, maize flour and sugar and informed to attend a meeting on 30<sup>th</sup> October, 2021 that had been organized by government and other stakeholders concerning the plight of displaced people in the area. On the day of the meeting, government officials drawn from national government, county government and humanitarian agencies that comprised: Red Cross, World*

Vision, Action Aid, ACTED had attended and the main agenda was their plan to provide food, medical assistance and other necessities to the displaced population. They gave a detailed plan on how they were going to distribute food items that had been assembled in one place. Clearly, it was a concerted effort among these agencies. The food were to be distributed once a week and the food ratio depended on the number of household members that were in a particular household. The chiefs agreed that every Thursday of the week was the ideal day as it coincides with weekly 'Baraza' meetings in the area. The food distribution went on as planned for about six months despite challenges of increasing number of displaced people that at times reduced the ratio that IDPs were getting to cater for new members of displaced families. After six months, the food ratio declined considerably and no information was given concerning the reason for the decline. The first agency to halt assistance was national government on December, 2021, followed by county government on March, 2022. At that point, humanitarian agencies that comprised of: Red Cross, World Vision and ACTED continued to offer assistance but the assistance was not enough for all displaced people. At that point, some IDPs opted to find alternative means of survival to feed their families. The provision of food items decreased in quantity and the number of items given. By June, 2021, the agencies were only providing maize, beans and cooking oil. It was at this time when the country was preparing for general election and politics were all over the place. The plight of IDPs featured prominently at this period despite no support from government. As elections were approaching even the humanitarian agencies halted the distribution of food without giving the reason for abandoning it. At that point, it was clear for every IDP household head that they were the only ones to provide for their families and many families sought alternative means of survival.

**According to one of the local government administrator interviewed at Marigat town, he pointed out that:**

*"At the onset of this conflict and the escalation in the 2012-2016, the displaced people were being assisted by government and other local NGOs by providing food and other necessities at a short-term basis as they sought to return, resettle or build their lives after displacement. However, the years 2013-2023 saw the escalation of attacks and massive displacement of high magnitude. The humanitarian crisis that was created resulted to massive appeal to the government and humanitarian agencies for intervention. It was at this point that government both at national and county drew a road map on how to help the displaced people living in host communities. The greatest challenge to the displaced people was food, accommodation and medical assistance. On the part of food assistance, we assembled all food items donated by government and NGOs at Marigat town and mobilized the displaced communities to register for provision depending on the number of household members in each household. The food were to be distributed once a week. The programme was intensified as displaced people were increasing in numbers especially during the years 2016, 2017, 2020, 2021 and 2023. However, the distribution had a number of challenges: first, the amount of food we mobilized were not enough to cater for the larger displaced population, secondly, registration of the displaced people was not properly done as new members kept enrolling as former beneficiaries absconded from seeking continuous assistance, making it difficult to track their well-being and lastly, the supply of food by government and humanitarian agencies was not consistent owing to administrative red-tapes, delay and organization's mandates on humanitarian assistance that differed from one organization to the other".*

**He further explained:**

*"On the part of the government, the greatest impediment is funding and general support of displaced people. Government funding is budgeted every financial year to every particular activity that is earmarked for funding. At county level, the funding is domiciled at department of disaster response at office of deputy governor and at national level, the funding is attached to the ministry of internal security under special programs department. However, this funding can at times be made at the time where threats of disasters and displacement are not rampant therefore leading to meager allocations and for the fact that government funding is characterized by competing interests within ministries and departments. This explains why such assistance is not sufficient, delay or inconsistent. This partly explains why IDPs can not fully rely on the supply of food and other assistance given by government. In addition, conflicts and displacements are nimble. They erupt at any time when the government is ill-prepared to deal with humanitarian assistance leading to unprepared response-conflicts are largely unforeseen. However, as a collaborative effort, NGOs and humanitarian agencies chip in to fill the gap in assisting IDPs during this periods"*

The respondents cited medical issues as the second most intervention by state at 15.5%. The intervention on the part of medical services was a collaborative effort between the national government and county governments. There were programs that were implemented by national government such as '*Linda mama*' initiatives that offered pregnant women services at no cost. '*Linda mama*' started as free Maternity Service Program, introduced by the government in June 2013 and administered by Ministry of Health (MoH). The initiative's goal is to achieve universal access to maternity and child health services, contributing to Kenya's progress towards universal health coverage. It ensured that pregnant women and infants can access healthcare services without having to pay user fees. Therefore, the program had been going on; thus allowed many displaced women and children to benefit. On the other hand, local dispensaries and hospitals offered medical interventions that favoured vulnerable members of the community especially women and children. Although these services were enjoyed by every member of the community, IDPs benefited from them at a great extent given the situation they found themselves. In one of the female-only FGD conducted, the respondent displaced in the year 2021 had this to say:

*“ As displaced women, we benefited a lot from government programs on healthcare especially ‘Linda mama’ and free vaccination of children. We had no money to offset bills during child deliveries and subsequent medical attention but the government gave us these services for free. In addition, local dispensaries offered us free mosquito nets to mitigate the causes of malaria in the area since we were living in semi-permanent house that are often porous to mosquitoes and other disease vectors”*

### **FGD interview conducted on 15/12/2023**

State intervention on medical issues helped to improve health for women and children who happen to be the most vulnerable group of IDPs. It helped reduce child mortality rates and maternal related illnesses. Although other non-IDP residents were benefiting from the same healthcare provision, there was no reported cases of misunderstanding between women drawn from the IDP families and the host community. This can relatively be understood to mean women in any society care for one another as problems they face are similar in any given situation. One of the weakness of this state intervention was that many IDPs were not aware of the availability of these services, programs and initiatives. IDPs that had been displaced in the far-flung areas of Kipele, Mao, Ratad, Moinonin still depended on Traditional Birth Attendance(TBA) when giving birth and also majority of the displaced population relied on traditional medicine. In addition, most of the government programs were in urban areas of Marigat town, c, Kimalel, Kiserian and Mochongoi thus required transportation fees which IDPs were not assured of getting at hour of need. According to one of the household head interviewed at Kiserian, Baringo South, he had the following to say on medical intervention:

*“ I was displaced in the year 2016 together with my 6 children and my aging parents. At the onset of our displacement, we were hosted by a relative at Marigat town for a month and after that we sought a rented house in town that would accommodate both my family and my aging parents. The challenge I had was providing medical care to my two children aged 2 and 4 years old together with my aging father who was ailing from chronic illness. Immediately we got accommodation that we were paying for ourselves, one of my younger child aged 2 years suffered from illness that would later be diagnosed by doctors as epilepsy. On the other hand, my father was undergoing treatment of hypertension and diabetes; a condition that he had developed before displacement. My relative had informed me of support that was being given by government to displaced people at Marigat Sub-District Hospital and local NGO called ACTED both situated at Marigat town. For the first time, I took my child to Marigat Sub-District hospital that is where the condition of epilepsy was diagnosed and treatment was administered. The doctors in the hospital recommended that I should be bringing the child for check-ups each an every week. The child was treated for free from October, 2016 to March, 2019. It was during this period that the attendants at the hospital told me that the child has attained the age of 6 and that the government can no longer support her through their cover called ‘Linda Mama’. At that time, I had challenges in paying for accommodation and food for the household and I could not be able to pay for her medical needs. Moreover, taking care of this particular child was time consuming and psychologically draining. That was the time one my friend who was also an IDP advised to me visit local NGO that supports vulnerable families in the area. That is how my child ended up enrolled at ACTED for medical support. This NGO helped a lot but sometimes the child would lack the drugs and therapy sessions owing to procurement and delay of supply by the organization and sometimes caregivers were not present that put a lot of strain on the finances that we had saved for emergencies given that I was also purchasing drugs for my ailing father.*

*Clearly, both government and the NGO were only helping women and children. In 2020, my father succumbed to complications related to COVID 19 pandemic and we were devastated and financially drained. From what we went through and given that we have a sick child that depends on lifelong-drugs, we are yet to recover as a family”*

According to one of the County government official in charge of directorate of disaster management interviewed, he had to say on matters medical intervention:

*“The greatest challenge in addressing the healthcare provision of IDPs in the host communities is funding and other resources like personnel. In the process of resource allocation and budgeting, the wards that host IDPs receive their normal share without taking cognizance of the fact that they host immigrants that require the same medical attention as the locals. Therefore, you find medical facilities in those areas are largely constrained especially in medical facilities such as Marigat County Sub-District Hospital, Kimalel Health Center, Mochogoi Health center, Endao dispensary, Loruk health center among others. In the same vein, the wards that saw their people displaced defend their budgets as well. This leaves medical facilities that hosts IDPs largely constrained in service delivery. It would have been prudent for county government of Baringo to earmark this wards and health facilities that host IDPs and increase their budgetary allocation in specific areas such as healthcare”* He further implored that:

*“Another greatest impediment in addressing the plight of IDPs in non-camps is the fact that funding for disasters and displacements may not have been factored in budgetary allocations for a given financial year because they occur at the time when budgets have already been done. Also, the equitable share to counties from national government delay thus constraining such emergencies of humanitarian response on the assistance of IDPs. However, Humanitarian agencies and local NGOs have always been helpful to IDPs in such circumstances and we recognize their role in interventions”*

Education burden was cited as an area the government intervened at 11.3%. At the start of the conflict, many schools were closed as the children of the IDPs accompanied their parents to their new homes in the host community. The government ensured that the displaced school going children are integrated in schools found in the host community. Those pupils and students who had registered for national examinations were integrated in the new schools and examination centers were changed to reflect the same. Prior to displacement, government gave maximum security to schools as they were targets of attacks. A case in point was Kapindasum Primary school situated in Mochongoi ward of Baringo South that had been held hostage by invaders for close to 8 hours. In addition, when normalcy returned that had been accessioned by mass displacement in the years 2014, 2016, 2020, 2022 and 2023 in some parts of Baringo South and North, government gave a directive of opening of school that had been closed due to insecurity and pledged to provide more security to schools. The schools that were re-opened included: Kagir primary school, Yatya primary, Sibilo primary school, Kosile primary school, Ng'aratuko primary school. The schools that were re-opened in Baringo South included: Kapindasum primary school, Arabal, primary school, Rugus Primary school, Kiserian Primary school, Nasukuro Primary school, Mukutani Primary school, Ng'elecha primary school, Kasiela primary school, Chebinyiny primary school, Ramacha Primary School, Tuiyotich Secondary school Lorumoru primary school and Simoni Primary school. This followed a directive given by the president in 2024 after a mass closure of schools in the conflict prone areas. The government further beefed up security arrangements. In insecurity prone areas, security personnel drawn from the affected areas popularly known as National Police Reservists (NPR) were recruit to protect schools from imminent attacks. More regular police were deployed to guard schools on daily basis; both day and night. Again, when schools were re-opened, pupils and students were accommodated in the school as boarders. The schools were turned to boarding schools and students used classrooms for learning during the day and as boarding facilities during the night. In other schools of Baringo North such as Kagir Primary school which their classrooms were destroyed by attackers, tents were erected and used as classrooms and boarding facilities. In the displaced schools of Baringo North such as Kagir, Kosile, Yatya, Ng'ratuko & Sibilo, pupils are the ones that returned to their schools leaving the parents in their host areas. The pupils reunite with their parents when the schools break for holidays. Tough government intervened in matter education, there were inherent weakness in providing the pupils with basic necessities such as food, sanitary pads for girls, teachers and learning materials. The provision was not sufficient that often prompted them to depend on well-wishers and the parents who were

already surviving displacement. According to a respondent interviewed at Yatya in Baringo North pointed out this:

*"I was displaced in the year 2021 at Kagir, Saimo-Soi ward and moved my family to Moinonin in the same ward. My greatest challenge was the school that my children were going to study given that they had enrolled for their KCPE in Kagir Primary school. At the onset of displacement, we used to send our children to the same school during the day as the government had provided security and return them back at evening to the area we were residing as IDPs. However, in the year 2023, the attacks escalated that resulted into a killing of one of the teachers in the school-Kagir primary school that led the government to intensify security and ordered that the pupils in school be allowed to be borders. My three children were accommodated as borders and would come to our new home during holiday breaks. However, this new arrangement came with a lot of challenges. As an household surviving displacement, we had lot of challenge paying fees and upkeep for these children as the cost of boarding them at the school was the sole responsibility of parents. Reprise was aided by the office of national affirmative fund under the auspice of the office of women representative in the national assembly that donated sanitary pads, socks and undergarments to pupils in the school and the ministry of education that provided maize, cooking oil and beans as food to the school. However, the distribution of these items were not consistent and more often parents were called out to chip in. On the other hand, area member of national assembly allocated funds for the reconstruction of class rooms that had been destroyed by attackers and occasionally paid bursaries to two of my children in secondary school. In many occasions I had to seek assistance from neighbors and well-wishers especially local churches in the area, notably; AIC, Loruk and AIC, Moinonin and Sibilo Catholic Mission. That is what we are doing to survive to date "*

**Table. 3 Schools Displaced in the Area and the Host Schools**

Wards	Displaced Schools	Population	Wards	Host Schools	No. of Pupils
Saimo-Soi	Yatya Pri. Sch.	90	Saimo-Soi	Moinonin Pri. Sch.	220
Saimo-Soi	Kosile Pri. Sch.	100	Saimo-Soi	Cheparsiat Pri. Sch.	300
Saimo-Soi	Sibilo Pri. Sch.	115	Marigat	Kimalel Pri. Sch.	280
Saimo-Soi	Kagir Pri. Sch.	100	Marigat	Endao Pri. Sch.	275
Saimo-Soi	Sibilo Sec. Sch.	105	Marigat	Kimalel Sec. sch.	400
Saimo-Soi	Ng'aratuko Pri. Sch.	130	Marigat	Marigat Pri. Sch.	420
Mochongoi	Nge'lecha Pri. Sch	300	Mochongoi	Nyimbei Pri. Sch.	500
Mochongoi	Kapindasum Pri. Sch	600	Mochongoi	Nyimbei Sec. Sch.	300
Mochongoi	Ramacha Pr. Sch.	130	Marigat	Sandai Pri. Sch.	600
Mochongoi	Arabal Pri. Sch.	450	Mochongoi	Kaburwo Pri. Sch.	500
Ilchamus	Nasukuro Pri. Sch.	200	Mochongoi	Mbechot Pri. Sch.	400
Ilchamus	Rugus Pri. Sch.	250	Mochonoi	Tendele Pri. Sch.	550
Ilchamus	Kiserian Pri. Sch.	400	Marigat	Marigat Pri. Sch.	700
Mochongoi	Simoni Pri. Sch.	450	Mochongoi	Tuiyobei Pri. Sch.	400
Mochongoi	Chebinyiny Pri. Sch.	260	Mochongoi	Sambaka Pri. Sch.	530
Mochongoi	Chemorong'ion Pri.	200	Mochongoi	Samaka Sec. Sch.	350
Mochongoi	Tuiyotich Sec. Sch.	230	Marigat	Kimorock Pri. Sch.	360
Mochongoi	Arabal Sec. Sch.	200	Mochongoi	Kabel Pri. Sch.	500

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Source: Field Data (2023)

The table 3 above shows the schools that were displaced and the schools they transferred to. It is important to note that the transfer of students and pupils were common in the same ward or outside the same ward depending on the proximity of the host family, host community or friends. The decision to migrate and where to seek refuge was an household decision and it differed from one household to another. Therefore, migration was not uniform in time and space; that is, when and where to seek refuge.

Through the National Government women affirmative action, various stuff were donated to girls that included sanitary towels, soaps, uniforms, books, pens and food. School feeding programs was introduced by government in the reopened schools that included milk, maize and beans. Teachers in the area received hardship allowance as the areas had not been considered in the past.

Insecure housing was considered one of the intervention provided by state to the IDPs in non-camps at 10.7%. Through the collaborative efforts of the IDPs, host community and the local administrators, semi-permanent houses were constructed to cater for the displaced population. The collaborative effort were done in areas of: Mochongoi, Mbechot, Kabel, Kimorock, Kibele, Kimalel, Kakibi, Muktani, Endao, Marigat of Baringo South and, Moinonin, Cheparsi, Loruk and Kosile of Baringo North. The chiefs in the area convinced the local population the need to assist land albeit temporarily to the IDPs. They further urged the host community to temporarily host them as they seek alternative means of accommodation especially at the onset of displacement. One of the local administrator drawn from Kimalel location had this to say:

*“As the local administrator of Kimalel location, I appealed to the local residents to accommodate the IDPs as they seek alternative means of accommodation and livelihoods. I further urged them to apportion some part of their land for temporary construction of semi-permanent houses and often solved conflicts that emerged. I appealed to the residents to live in peace with the displaced population, a task that I do to date in every ‘public*

*Baraza’ I attend and whenever the government offers a relief aid, IDPs are given the first priority”*

The building of semi-permanent houses was often a concerted effort between the IDP community, the host community and often overseen and supervised by the local administration. Local administration also mediated between the IDPs in non-camps and the host community and also mitigated cases of discrimination that emerged. This ensured peaceful coexistence between the IDPs and the host community. In a men-only FGD held on 10/12/2023, one respondent displaced in the year 2015 had this to say:

*“Our chief has been very instrumental in solving conflicts that arise between us and the host community. She has been able to firmly address cases of discrimination, land conflicts, domestic violence among the IDP community among others. She also established a committee within the IDP community who can voice our grievances on our behalf”* FGD interview contacted on 10/12/2023

The state intervened in aiding advocacy programmes on the need to assist IDPs secure housing and also reconciled conflicting interest in the processes of building shelters. However, it did not take part directly in building the houses for the displaced. This is treated as a weakness of the state since the United Nation’s Guiding Principle on Internal Displace stipulates housing as a fundamental right that should be accorded to internally displaced people; a role the government should take pivotal role. Again, the exercise of building house or providing secure housing to IDPs was not tied to any government program thus making this intervention were unsustainable in the long-run. In the end, there were no clear records of houses that were built and proper assessment of the initiative. Nevertheless, the intervention lessen the burden and uncertainty that IDPs were confronting in the face of displacement.

Increased risk of rejection was cited as a vulnerability that state intervened at 10.7%. The displaced population suffered rejection from the host community in accessing fundamental services for being labeled ‘outsiders’. According to the respondents that were interviewed, services that were critically affected by this vulnerability include: issuance of bursaries both by national government (NG-CDF) and county government (ward bursaries). The locals demanded that IDPs should be receive bursaries from constituencies of origin since they were also allocated the funds. Again, rejection was noted in the distribution of relief food that target the general

population. More often, the host perceptive IDPs as people who receive the upper hand in the distribution against the host who happen to be the bonifide members of the community. Lastly, the use of resources was an harbinger of increased rejection biting the two sides. The use of water, grazing lands, employment opportunities as teachers, security officers, IEBC officials or general manual jobs in companies operating in the area revealed discriminatory practices that often left IDPs at the receiving end. In mitigating this vulnerability, state undertook advocacy programs that created awareness on why IDPs were given priority owing to the challenges they faced. Again, the state was able to timely solve conflicts that arose on the use of natural and manpower resources in the host area.

Insecurity was cited as part of assistance provided by state at 9.5%. To thwart external attacks to the displaced population in parts of Mochongoi ward such as Mochongoi town, Mbechot, Nyimbei, Kiserian, Sambaka and parts of Baringo North such as Kagir, Ng'aratuko and Sibilo, state hired National Police Reservists(NPR) and deployed contingent of military and police officers to maintain law and order and to prevent the aggressor from advancing to areas that were inhabited by IDPs in non-camps. This relatively gave peace to the displaced IDPs. These security personnel were stationed in various parts to keep surveillance of any impending attack using modern technologies such as drones and geo-spatial techniques to locate and repulse or neutralize the attackers.

With the influx of IDPs in the area, insecurity surged and blame-games emerged between the IDP community and the host community. This concurs with the a study conducted by Ngokho (2015) among the non-camp IDPs and the local residents in Lodwar town, Turkana that observed that residents believed that presence of IDPs in non-camp was the sense of insecurity in the neighbourhood. Furthermore, presence on the streets bothered many of the residents since they occasionally engaged in petty and unlawful activities. There was rise in cases of theft, muggings, truancy, domestic violence, rape among other crimes. This let the local authorities to swiftly deal with such cases whenever they arise and to restore peace and tranquility. There was cases where conflict would escalate to a bigger proportion between the groups but local administration would arrest before it becomes a full scale conflict. Shared resources like pasture, water and boundaries would elicit tension and suspicion. A case in point is Chepkoriande water pan dam in Kimalel, Baringo South, Chemorong'ion waterpan in Mochongoi, Baringo South and Cheparsiati waterpan in Saimo-Soi, Baringo North. During dry season that span NovemberMay every year in the area, the host would deny the IDPs the right to graze their animals in their land arguing that the agreement they met only allowed them to live not to engage in any form of livelihood Heighten tension was reported in the years 2014, 2017 and 2023; these were the periods that the area was hit by prolonged drought. In a male-only FGD, one respondent displaced in the year 2018 retorted:

*"We always clash with the host community on the right to use resources especially land and water points. The locals are arguing that we were apportioned land to live but not to use for any economic activity like grazing animals or cultivating crops. Tension always rise but local administration usually comes to our aid"*

### **FGD interview contacted on 10/12/2023**

It is apparent that security situation is paramount among the IDPs in non camps given that they are surviving displacement and that they are underwent traumatic experience and any form of tension arising from insecurity is likely to rekindle memories of horror and despairs. Local administration has been instrumental in ensuring their well-being. The inherent weakness of state in response to security vulnerability was inability to respond promptly when insecurity problem arose. In addition, the state machinery was not able to keep records and exact figures of the crimes presented to them for a follow up. This led to the same cases emerging as new cases especially those related to host verses the IDPs on matters of communal use of water and pasture. Lastly, the state responded on the external attack in a reactionary manner. It is when the attackers invade is when the state increases security personnel in the areas prone to displacement or inhabited by IDPs In connection to insecurity is water scarcity that has often been a point of dispute. The table 4.10 below reveals reported cases of crime prevalent in the host area.

**Table 4 Nature and Magnitude of Crimes in the host area**

Area(Locations)	Crime	Year (s)	Rate
Marigat/Mochongoi	Rape	2013-2023	Sporadic
Marigat/Kimalel	Burglary	2012-2023	High
Marigat/Mochongoi/Kibele	Truancy	2012-2023	High
Marigat/Mochongoi	GBV	2007-2023	High
Marigat/Kimalel/Sambaka	Theft	2007-2023	High
Marigat/Endo/Cheparsiat	Clashes(over water& pasture)	2013-2023	High

Source: Field Data (2023)

State intervention in addressing water scarcity and was cited by respondents at 7.7%. In the host area as tabulated in the table 5 below, state intervened by assisting the locals with water through drilling of boreholes and digging of dams. The IDP community acknowledges the role of state in the provision of this service and also ensuring that discrimination against use is mitigated. The water provision was a collaboration between the national government, county government and the humanitarian agencies operating in the area. For instance, the NGOs would drill boreholes, then county government aid in the distribution and national government would provide security in the process. A case in point was Kimalel boreholes that was shared by both IDP community and the host community. Table 5, below shows the table of dams and boreholes situated in the host area.

**Table. 5. Dams and Boreholes operating in the Host area**

Wards	Dam/Borehole	Year established	No. Of Households
Marigat	Kibele Borehole	2020	300
Marigat	Kinyach Pandam	1983	500
Marigat	Sirinyo Borehole	2022	600
Marigat	Chepkoriande Pandam	2016	500
Marigat	Kimorock Borehole	2016	600
Marigat	Endao Borehole	2012	300
.Saimo-Soi	Cheparsiat Pandam	2018	600
Saimo-Soi	Cheparsiat Borehole	2020	600
Saimo-Soi	Kosile Borehole	1988	400
Saimo-Soi	Kapzekeiwo damdddadddamPandam	2015	300
Mochongoi	Ramacha Borehole	2016	300

Source: Field Data (2023)

Lack of stable income was cited as an area state intervened at 7.1% by the respondents. When the IDPs in noncamps integrated in the host community, they engaged in income generating activities to provide for their households. They needed money to buy food, pay rent, pay for their healthcare and school fees among other needs. Tough obtaining employment was hard, many IDPs sought manual job, others who were educated and had a skill tried their hand in formal employment while others engaged in self-employment. The government intervened in several ways. In 2013 the government created programs aimed at creating jobs for the young people by introducing '*Kaji Kwa Vijana*' program. The program gave them opportunity to clean urban areas, construct feeder roads, clear bushes along the roads among other responsibilities with a weekly stipend to be paid by national government. The program recruited many young people drawn from IDP community which came as source of sustenance in the short term. The state also ensured that IDPs that qualified for any formal employment were given consideration without risk of rejection in the host area. These jobs included: teaching, police service, military service, recruitment of electoral officials among others. The county government on the

other hand gave a favourable environment to IDPs that engaged in businesses as a form of self-employment. They were given grace-periods to pay their taxes upon the expiry of their business licenses. However, the greatest weakness in addressing this vulnerability is that government never kept records of IDPs that were in need of employment for follow up and further assistance. In addition, most of these opportunities were short term in nature. Once those jobs were over majority of the IDPs found themselves in the same cycle of unemployment. Lastly, many IDPs had no trained skills therefore were only able to attract manual jobs other than the formal jobs that were secured and well paying. Nonetheless, the state was able to address the challenge albeit in the on short-term basis.

Psychological disturbances was mentioned as a vulnerability that state intervened at 3%. Local dispensaries, health centers and churches would help to address the issues of psychological counselling to the affected IDP population especially when they report other cases of illness. These facilities had social workers who would be called in to help on a need basis by nurses or clinical officers. Women, young girls, the aged, critically ill patients, reported cases of domestic violence many of which were drawn from IDP community would benefit from this service. Marigat Sub-County hospital was able to deal with such cases to a greater extent. However, the intervention was not sufficient owing to the fact that most IDPs resided in the far-flung areas like Kibele, Kakibi, Maoi, Mbechot with no facilities or institutions such as churches and health facilities and those that existed never kept exact records and figure for follow up for complete session of counselling and treatment. In addition, there was lack of adequately trained personnel to intervene on mental health related issues in the facilities that offered the service. Lastly, IDP community and government do not always prioritize mental health as one of the serious vulnerability that require urgent intervention. The table 6, below details center that provided counselling services to the traumatized IDPs in non-camps.

**Table. 6. Major Counselling and Trauma Diagnostic Centers**

Area (Wards)	Counselling Centers	Year (s)	No. Clients (Approx.)
Marigat	Marigat Sub-county Hosp.	2012-2023	300
Marigat	Kimalel Dispensary	2014-2023	100
Marigat	Endao Health Center	2007-2023	180
Marigat	Lake Baringo Health Center	2007-2023	350
Mochongoi	Mochongoi Health Center	2013-2023	200
Ilchamus	Kiserian Health Center	2007-2023	250

#### Source: Field Data (2023)

The state has intervened in these areas and IDP community appreciates tough to a greater extent demand more services from the state. Furthermore, they demand frequent presence of state not just when displacement occurs or when disputes occur. They detest the reactionary nature of government in responding to their plight and calls for more engagement with the state.

#### 4.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study covers the role of state actors in socioeconomic interventions of IDPs in non-camps. The study established that the state as played a role in the intervention although the assistance is minimal as compared with what the state ought to do as per the law. The state being the primary actor in intervention has been slow and ineffective. State actors have been non-committal, only respond at the onset of displacement and gradually abandon the IDPs to be the masters of their own predicaments. However, interventions were visible in addressing food insecurity, medical issues, education burden, insecure housing and insecurity security among others. The state actors cited lack of documentation as the greatest impediment in addressing the plight of IDPs in noncamps. The study recommends that the national and county government and other stakeholders should work hand in hand to ensure that social-economic welfare of non-camp IDPs are addressed and the circumstances which led to their displacement are addressed to avoid similar eventualities recurring.

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