INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XII December 2025  
1 Corporate Risk Management as a Moderating Factor of Foreign and  
2 Managerial Ownership Structures on Firm Value of Listed Financial  
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Services Firms in Nigeria  
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Adeyemi, Oluwakemi Lola., Orbunde, Bemshima Benjamin, Phd., Daniel, Emmanuel Kayode, Phd  
Department of Accounting Bingham University, Karu, Nasarawa State  
DOI: https://doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2025.91200068  
Received: 09 December 2025; Accepted: 18 December 2025; Published: 31 December 2025  
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ABSTRACT  
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Firms often struggle to enhance firm value due to governance challenges related to ownership structures and the  
effective management of risks. In particular, the relationship between ownership structures, such as foreign and  
managerial ownership, and firm value is often complicated by agency problems, where the interests of  
management and shareholders may not align. This study examines the moderating effect of Corporate Risk  
Management (CRM) on the relationship between foreign ownership, managerial ownership structures, and firm  
value of listed financial services firms in Nigeria. A longitudinal panel research design was employed, utilizing  
panel random effects regression analysis with E-Views 12 software. The sample consists of twenty-four (24)  
firms listed on the Nigerian Exchange Group (NGX), with data spanning from 2010 to 2024. A purposive  
sampling technique was applied to select firms with consistent financial disclosures over the study period. The  
results reveal that neither foreign ownership nor managerial ownership individually has a statistically significant  
effect on firm value. However, the interaction between these ownership structures and corporate risk  
management shows a statistically significant and positive effect on firm value. The study concludes that  
corporate risk management plays a vital role in enhancing the relationship between ownership structures and  
firm value by mitigating risks and aligning managerial decisions with shareholder interests. The study  
recommends that Nigerian financial services firms implement comprehensive risk management frameworks, and  
that regulatory bodies enhance transparency in ownership structures and risk management practices to improve  
firm value and ensure long-term sustainability in the sector.  
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Keywords: Foreign Ownership Structure, Managerial Ownership Structure, Firm Value Tobin Q Ratio, Corporate  
Risk Management, Firm Leverage.  
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INTRODUCTION  
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The value of a firm is a crucial indicator of its performance and long-term sustainability in the competitive  
business environment. Firm value is typically influenced by several internal and external factors, including  
corporate governance, financial structure, and market conditions. One of the most significant challenges in  
evaluating firm value lies in the complexity of determining the underlying factors that contribute to its  
fluctuation. Issues such as agency costs, ownership concentration, and capital structure can affect a firm’s  
performance and, ultimately, its value. Moreover, volatile economic environments, such as financial crises or  
market instability, can exacerbate the uncertainty surrounding firm value, making it more difficult for  
stakeholders to gauge the true worth of the company (Maksimovic et al., 2020). These challenges require firms  
to adopt effective risk management strategies to mitigate the impact of these uncertainties and enhance firm  
performance.  
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Moreover, as corporate governance mechanisms have become increasingly vital in driving firm value, greater  
attention is now being paid to the role of risk management as a key moderating factor in this relationship.  
Companies face the challenge of aligning the interests of managers, shareholders, and other stakeholders, which  
often leads to agency problems (Feng et al., 2021). Corporate risk management plays a vital role in addressing  
these challenges by reducing risks associated with strategic decisions and capital investments. The use of  
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XII December 2025  
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financial ratios such as Tobin’s Q ratio has become an important tool to measure firm value. The Tobin Q ratio,  
which compares a firm's market value to its replacement cost, provides an insightful reflection of its value  
relative to investment opportunities. A higher Tobin’s Q Ratio suggests that a firm is more valuable and has  
better growth prospects, while a lower Tobin’s Q ratio may signal that the firm is undervalued or facing financial  
difficulties (Zhao et al., 2022).  
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Ownership structures, particularly foreign and managerial ownership, have been widely studied for their  
influence on firm value. Foreign ownership can introduce new resources, expertise, and market access,  
potentially increasing a firm’s competitiveness and value (Nguyen et al., 2022). In contrast, managerial  
ownership aligns the interests of managers with those of shareholders, potentially reducing agency costs and  
improving decision-making (Cheng & Wang, 2021). However, both structures also present challenges, such as  
the risk of expropriation in firms with concentrated ownership or conflicts of interest in firms with dispersed  
foreign investors. These contrasting dynamics have been the subject of numerous studies, which suggest that  
ownership structure can influence not only the firm’s strategic direction but also its value (Ammann et al., 2019).  
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The insufficient understanding of how corporate risk management moderates the relationship between foreign  
and managerial ownership structures and firm value constitutes a critical problem in Nigeria’s financial services  
sector because it leaves firms, investors, and regulators without evidence-based guidance on how to align diverse  
ownership incentives with effective risk oversight in a highly volatile emerging market characterised by currency  
devaluation, regulatory uncertainty, and recurrent banking stresses. While a handful of studies have examined  
related interactions such as Ahmed (2022) on board equity ownership moderating enterprise risk management  
and performance in Nigerian financial institutions, Peter et al. (2025) on ownership structure moderating  
financial risk and firm value across listed Nigerian firms, Dabari and Saidin (2016) on board characteristics  
moderating ERM adoption in Nigerian banks, and Boachie (2023) on ownership moderating governance-  
performance links in Ghanaian banks none has specifically investigated corporate risk management as the  
moderating variable between foreign and managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q among listed financial services  
firms in Nigeria, thereby creating a significant contextual and theoretical gap that this study seeks to fill.  
Additionally, limited research has focused on financial services firms in this region, where unique challenges  
such as regulatory changes, economic volatility, and political instability can impact the effectiveness of  
ownership structures and risk management strategies. This study fills the gap in the literature by exploring the  
role of corporate risk management as a moderating factor in the relationship between foreign and managerial  
ownership structures and firm value. Given the growing importance of the financial services sector in Nigeria’s  
economy, understanding how foreign and managerial ownership structures interact with risk management to  
influence firm value is critical for both policymakers and practitioners.  
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Giving the foregoing, the following underlying hypothesis are stated in null form  
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H01: Foreign ownership percentage has no significant effect on Tobin’s Q of listed financial services firms in  
Nigeria when moderated by corporate risk management.  
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H02: Managerial ownership percentage has no significant effect on Tobin’s Q of listed financial services firms  
in Nigeria when moderated by corporate risk management.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW  
Conceptual Review  
Corporate Risk Management  
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Corporate risk management refers to the strategic processes and practices organizations use to identify, evaluate,  
mitigate, and monitor risks that could affect the achievement of corporate goals. Effective risk management  
enhances decision-making, preserves firm value, and protects stakeholders’ interests. In the context of financial  
services firms, risk management becomes particularly vital due to the industry's exposure to credit, market,  
operational, and regulatory risks. Emovon et al. (2024) assert that poor risk governance structures can amplify  
agency conflicts, potentially leading to misallocation of resources and value erosion. Therefore, integrating risk  
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XII December 2025  
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management into corporate governance frameworks is key to improving accountability and sustainable  
performance. Moreover, corporate risk management plays a moderating role between corporate governance  
variables and firm performance. Agara et al. (2023) noted that both internal and external corporate governance  
mechanisms rely on the robustness of risk management strategies to function effectively. In Nigeria, where  
market volatility and regulatory uncertainty are common, risk management provides a buffer that improves  
investor confidence and ensures resilience. It supports alignment between ownership structures and performance  
outcomes by controlling excessive risk-taking, particularly in firms with concentrated or foreign ownership.  
Hence, understanding risk management's moderating influence is crucial for designing effective governance  
models in emerging economies.  
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Foreign Ownership Structure  
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Foreign ownership structure refers to the composition and extent of equity ownership in a domestic firm held by  
foreign individuals or institutional investors. It is a growing phenomenon in developing economies where  
liberalization and globalization have opened domestic markets to foreign participation. Bajaher et al. (2022)  
highlight that foreign investors bring advanced corporate governance practices, access to international markets,  
and improved monitoring capabilities, potentially enhancing firm performance. However, this structure may also  
introduce conflicts between foreign owners and local management, especially where cultural and regulatory  
misalignments exist. Additionally, foreign ownership can influence firm behaviour through enhanced  
transparency and capital accessibility. Almashhadani and Almashhadani (2022) found that foreign-controlled  
firms tend to adopt stronger governance and disclosure standards to meet international expectations. Yet, the  
benefits of foreign ownership depend on contextual factors such as legal protections and market infrastructure.  
In Nigeria’s financial services sector, while foreign investment often improves firm value and governance  
quality, there remains the risk of profit repatriation and reduced local stakeholder engagement. Therefore, the  
structure and extent of foreign ownership need to be carefully managed to balance performance and national  
economic interests.  
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Foreign Ownership Percentage  
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The foreign ownership percentage is a quantitative measure that indicates the proportion of a firm’s equity held  
by foreign investors. This metric helps to assess the degree of foreign influence over corporate decisions and  
strategic direction. Nguyen et al. (2022) argue that higher foreign ownership percentages often correlate with  
improved firm value due to the injection of international expertise, capital, and better governance structures.  
However, excessive foreign control may also undermine local managerial autonomy and increase exposure to  
external shocks, especially in emerging markets. In the Nigerian context, foreign ownership percentages are  
gaining importance in analyzing the performance of financial service firms. Kampouris et al. (2022) reported  
that foreign equity stakes positively affect firms’ ability to overcome financing constraints, leading to increased  
competitiveness. Nonetheless, high foreign ownership may come with conditions such as strategic alignment  
with global interests rather than domestic development priorities. Therefore, firms must strike a balance to  
optimize the benefits of foreign capital while preserving local control and ensuring alignment with national  
objectives.  
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Foreign Ownership Percentage (%) = Foreign Shares Held x 100  
Total Outstanding Shares  
Managerial Ownership Structure  
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Managerial ownership structure refers to the shareholding pattern where firm executives and managers own  
equity stakes in the firm. This structure is rooted in agency theory, which suggests that when managers are also  
shareholders, they are more likely to act in the best interests of the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Managerial  
ownership can mitigate agency problems by aligning the interests of managers and shareholders, thereby  
enhancing firm performance and value. Cheng and Wang (2021) empirically supported this view, demonstrating  
that managerial ownership reduces opportunistic behavior and fosters long-term strategic planning. However,  
the benefits of managerial ownership are not always linear. When managerial ownership exceeds certain  
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
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thresholds, entrenched managers may pursue personal goals at the expense of shareholder value (Lee & Tan,  
2023). In Nigeria, Ibrahim and Maitala (2023) found that moderate levels of managerial ownership were  
associated with improved financial performance among non-financial firms. Yet, overly concentrated managerial  
control can hinder effective oversight and dilute the role of external monitoring mechanisms. Hence, the design  
of ownership structures must consider optimal levels that support value creation without compromising  
governance quality.  
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Managerial Ownership Percentage  
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The managerial ownership percentage represents the proportion of a firm’s shares held by directors, executives,  
and key managerial personnel. This measure serves as a proxy for management’s alignment with shareholder  
interests and is often used in corporate governance studies to examine agency cost reduction. According to  
Farouk and Ahmed (2023), managerial ownership serves as a control mechanism that can constrain earnings  
manipulation and encourage performance-based strategies. In emerging markets like Nigeria, where governance  
structures are still developing, managerial ownership percentage is a critical determinant of firm value.  
Nonetheless, the effectiveness of managerial ownership depends on its level. Liu et al. (2021) emphasized that  
too low a percentage may not sufficiently align incentives, while too high a percentage may result in managerial  
entrenchment. Irom et al. (2023) also noted that excessive managerial control may weaken the effectiveness of  
the audit committee and reduce transparency. Therefore, a well-balanced managerial ownership percentage is  
necessary to harness its potential benefits while minimizing associated risks to corporate governance and  
performance.  
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Managerial Ownership Percentage (%) = Shares Held by Manager x 100  
Total Outstanding Shares  
Firm Value  
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Firm value refers to the total worth of a company as perceived by investors, stakeholders, and the market. It  
encompasses both tangible and intangible assets and reflects a firm’s financial health, growth prospects, and  
ability to generate returns. Almashhadani and Almashhadani (2022) explained that firm value is significantly  
influenced by governance mechanisms, ownership structure, and market perception. In emerging economies like  
Nigeria, firm value is often volatile due to political instability, weak institutions, and fluctuating investor  
confidence. Consequently, measuring and managing firm value remains a complex but essential task. Corporate  
governance practices such as board independence, executive compensation, and ownership structure are key  
determinants of firm value (Ahmed et al., 2020). For financial services firms in Nigeria, Bamidele et al. (2023)  
emphasized the need for strong governance practices to enhance transparency and stakeholder trust, which in  
turn improves firm value. Moreover, firm value serves as a vital performance metric for investors making  
strategic decisions. It signals whether a company is utilizing its assets efficiently and whether it has potential for  
future growth, making it central to any governance-performance analysis.  
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Tobin’s Q Ratio  
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Tobin’s Q ratio is a widely used proxy for measuring firm value. It is calculated as the market value of a firm  
divided by the replacement cost of its assets. A Tobin’s Q greater than 1 indicates that the market values the firm  
more than the cost of its assets, suggesting growth potential and strong investor confidence. Conversely, a value  
less than 1 implies that the firm may be undervalued or underperforming. Zhao et al. (2022) stated that Tobin’s  
Q is particularly useful in assessing the influence of governance mechanisms and ownership structure on firm  
value, as it integrates market perception and asset efficiency into a single metric. In Nigeria, Tobin’s Q has been  
employed in recent studies to evaluate the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance.  
Okafor et al. (2023) found that ownership structure significantly affects Tobin’s Q, with blockholder ownership  
having a notable impact on firm valuation. Moreover, Akanfe and Oladipo (2017) emphasized its importance in  
measuring performance outcomes in the context of executive compensation. As a forward-looking indicator,  
Tobin’s Q provides a holistic view of firm value by capturing both market dynamics and internal governance  
efficiency.  
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Firm Leverage  
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Firm leverage refers to the use of borrowed capital (debt) to finance a company's operations and investments,  
with the aim of increasing potential returns to shareholders. Leverage is a key determinant of financial structure  
and plays a significant role in shaping a firm’s risk profile and performance. A higher leverage ratio suggests  
that a firm relies more on debt to finance its activities, which can amplify both the potential returns and the risks  
associated with its operations (Bamidele et al., 2023). While leverage can provide firms with the necessary  
capital to expand and invest, excessive leverage can lead to financial distress, particularly if the firm is unable  
to meet its debt obligations during periods of economic downturn or poor performance (Ogaluzor & Omesi,  
2019). In the context of Nigerian financial services firms, leverage is often influenced by factors such as capital  
structure decisions, interest rates, and market conditions, which in turn affect firm value and investor perception  
(Bayero, 2018). Thus, managing leverage effectively is crucial for optimizing firm value while minimizing the  
risks associated with over-indebtedness, particularly in volatile markets. Understanding the interplay between  
leverage, ownership structure, and firm performance is central to corporate governance and risk management  
strategies, as firms must carefully balance the benefits of debt financing with the potential for financial instability  
(Agara et al., 2023).  
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Firm Leverage = Total Debts  
Total Capital  
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EMPIRICAL REVIEW  
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Deshi and Sunday (2025) explored the influence of directors' ownership, foreign ownership, institutional  
ownership, and state ownership on firm value among listed deposit money banks in Nigeria, adopting a  
quantitative ex-post facto design with purposive sampling of 12 out of 14 banks, drawing secondary data from  
audited reports spanning 2013-2023, and applying robust pooled OLS regression after diagnostic tests for  
multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity; key findings revealed directors' ownership had a positive but  
insignificant effect, while foreign, institutional, and state ownerships exerted significant negative impacts on  
firm value, leading to the conclusion that directors play a minor role in market valuation, with higher foreign  
and state stakes linked to lower performance and institutional presence tied to reduced value, prompting  
recommendations for policymakers to strengthen institutional frameworks, board independence, and investor  
stewardship via amendments to SEC, CBN, and NIPC guidelines; however, the dismissal of directors' role as  
minor oversimplifies ownership-performance dynamics, potentially ignoring agency alignments or contextual  
factors.  
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Peter and Okoh (2025) studied financial risk management (VaR-based CRM) and its moderation by ownership  
structure on firm value in listed Nigerian financial services firms, employing a correlational panel regression  
design with purposive sampling of 28 banks and insurance entities, secondary data from NGX and audited  
reports over 2015–2023, and two-stage least squares for endogeneity; key findings indicated foreign ownership  
positively interacted with CRM on Tobin's Q amid moderate managerial stakes, with nonlinear effects suggesting  
thresholds for value maximization; conclusions stressed ownership diversification via CRM for resilience,  
recommending SEC policies for risk-aligned incentives; however, the broad financial sample dilutes firm-  
specific heterogeneity, and absence of qualitative data on regulatory contexts overlooks Nigeria's unique  
enforcement challenges.  
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Yahaya and Omotola (2024) investigated institutional ownership's moderating role on the relationship between  
board attributes (independence, size, diversity) and tax aggressiveness (as a proxy for risk-managed  
performance) in publicly listed Nigerian financial firms, adopting an ex-post facto design with purposive  
sampling of 45 banks and insurance companies, utilizing secondary data from NGX reports over 2014–2023  
analyzed via panel data regression in STATA after checks for multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity; results  
indicated institutional ownership (including foreign stakes) positively moderated board independence's effect on  
reducing aggressiveness, while managerial ownership showed nonlinear negative impacts on Tobin's Q proxies;  
conclusions emphasized ownership-CRM alignment for sustainable value, recommending CBN guidelines for  
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integrated risk-ownership reporting; yet, the focus on tax as a narrow risk proxy ignores direct firm value metrics  
like Tobin's Q, and the sample's bank-heavy bias reduces generalizability to non-deposit financial services.  
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Okafor and Eze (2024) evaluated the impact of ownership concentration (foreign and managerial) on agency  
costs and firm value, moderated by ERM practices, in Nigerian deposit money banks, adopting a dynamic panel  
design with purposive sampling of 14 banks, utilizing secondary data from annual reports (2013–2022) analyzed  
via system GMM after tests for endogeneity, multicollinearity, and heteroskedasticity; results showed ERM  
(CRM proxy) significantly enhanced managerial ownership's efficiency on Tobin's Q while neutralizing foreign  
ownership's negative effects, concluding that integrated risk-ownership strategies mitigate emerging market  
volatilities; recommendations included CBN enforcement of ERM-ownership disclosures; gaps encompass no  
inclusion of non-bank financials and speculative crisis-period extrapolations without sub-period analysis.  
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Emovon et al. (2024) explored the moderating effect of vertical agency crisis (proxied via CRM gaps) on  
corporate governance-financial performance links in Nigerian banks, employing a panel GMM design with  
purposive sampling of 15 deposit money banks, drawing secondary data from CBN bulletins and annual reports  
spanning 2016–2022, and applying dynamic regression after tests for endogeneity, multicollinearity, and  
heteroskedasticity; key results indicated CRM reduced agency costs from managerial ownership while foreign  
ownership benefited from risk buffers during crises, positively affecting Tobin's Q; conclusions highlighted  
CRM's role in aligning diverse ownership for value enhancement, recommending board-level risk committees;  
critiques include overreliance on GMM without robustness to fixed effects, and exclusion of insurance firms  
limits broader financial services applicability.  
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Ibrahim and Usman (2023) analyzed CRM's moderation of insider (managerial) and foreign ownership on firm  
value in Nigerian insurance companies, using an ex-post facto design on a census of 22 listed firms, secondary  
data from NAICOM reports over 2015–2021, and fixed-effects panel regression in E-Views after diagnostic  
checks for multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation; findings revealed CRM positively  
moderated managerial ownership's effect on Tobin's Q but showed insignificant interactions for foreign due to  
repatriation risks, explaining a substantial portion of variance; conclusions advocated CRM frameworks to  
harness ownership benefits, suggesting regulatory incentives for foreign alignment; however, the insurance-only  
focus misses banking synergies, and lack of nonlinear tests ignores entrenchment thresholds in high-ownership  
scenarios.  
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Ahmed et al. (2022) examined the moderating effects of board equity ownership (as a proxy for  
managerial/insider ownership) on enterprise risk management (ERM) practices and firm performance in  
Nigerian financial institutions, employing a quantitative ex-post facto design with purposive sampling of 163  
firms (banks and insurance), drawing secondary data from annual reports spanning 2015–2019, and applying  
panel random effects regression after diagnostic tests for multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, and endogeneity;  
key findings revealed board equity positively moderated ERM's impact on Tobin's Q and ROA, with foreign-  
influenced boards showing insignificant direct effects due to regulatory constraints, concluding that aligned  
ownership enhances CRM's value creation by reducing agency costs; recommendations included SEC mandates  
for ERM disclosure tied to ownership; however, the study overlooks pure foreign ownership dynamics and post-  
2020 volatility, limiting applicability to broader financial services moderation tests.  
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Dabari and Liuraman (2022) assessed the moderating effect of audit quality (as a CRM complement) on the  
relationship between ownership structure (foreign and managerial) and tax aggressiveness (linked to firm value  
erosion) in listed Nigerian consumer goods firms with a financial subsample, using a quantitative ex-post facto  
design on 20 firms via purposive sampling, secondary data from audited reports (2012–2020), and OLS  
regression with interaction terms after diagnostic tests for multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity; findings  
showed audit quality strengthened managerial ownership's positive link to value preservation but attenuated  
foreign ownership's volatility, concluding that robust CRM proxies mitigate agency risks in ownership-driven  
decisions; recommendations urged enhanced audit-ownership integration for emerging markets; however, the  
consumer goods emphasis with limited financial data dilutes sector-specific insights, and absence of Tobin's Q  
overlooks market-based value measures.  
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THEORETICAL REVIEW  
Stewardship Theory  
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Stewardship Theory was introduced by Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson (1997) as a response to the limitations  
of Agency Theory. Unlike Agency Theory, which assumes that managers will act in their self-interest and need  
to be closely monitored, Stewardship Theory posits that managers, when entrusted with sufficient ownership  
and decision-making power, will act as stewards of the organization, prioritizing the long-term goals of the firm.  
In this framework, managers are seen as trustworthy individuals who align their interests with those of the  
shareholders, leading to enhanced firm performance. This theory emphasizes that when managers have a  
significant stake in the company, they take a personal interest in its success and are more likely to make decisions  
that benefit the firm in the long run.  
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Stewardship Theory is particularly useful when examining the role of managerial ownership. According to this  
theory, managers who own shares in the company are more likely to make decisions that improve firm value, as  
they are directly invested in the firm's success. This perspective can be applied to your study by suggesting that  
in firms with higher managerial ownership, directors are more likely to act in the best interests of the company,  
aligning their goals with those of shareholders. In this context, Stewardship Theory could explain why director  
ownership might lead to higher firm value, as it reduces agency costs and encourages managers to engage in  
decisions that are beneficial for the long-term sustainability of the firm.  
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However, the application of Stewardship Theory in a broader context, particularly in firms with significant  
foreign or institutional ownership, may face limitations. While managerial ownership may foster trust and reduce  
agency problems, the presence of other ownership structures, such as foreign or state ownership, might  
reintroduce conflicts that challenge the notion of stewardship. Thus, while Stewardship Theory offers valuable  
insights into how ownership structures can influence managerial behaviour and firm value, it needs to be  
considered in conjunction with other theories such as agency theory to fully capture the complexities of  
ownership dynamics and their impact on firm performance.  
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Agency Theory  
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Agency Theory was propounded by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and focuses on the relationship between  
principals (shareholders) and agents (managers). The theory suggests that a conflict of interest arises between  
these two parties because while the shareholders aim to maximize their wealth, managers may prioritize personal  
goals or pursue decisions that are not in the best interest of the firm. This creates what is known as agency  
costs—the costs incurred when managers' actions deviate from the interests of shareholders. Agency theory  
underscores the importance of aligning the interests of managers and shareholders to reduce these costs,  
particularly through mechanisms like ownership structure, incentive contracts, and corporate governance  
practices. In the context of your study, Agency Theory is highly relevant as it provides a framework for  
understanding how ownership structure impacts firm value. When ownership is concentrated, such as in cases  
where directors or institutional investors hold significant shares, the theory suggests that these shareholders have  
more control over management decisions, which can reduce agency costs and potentially improve firm  
performance and value. Conversely, when ownership is dispersed or when foreign ownership is high, agency  
problems may arise due to a lack of direct oversight, which can harm firm value. Thus, agency theory can explain  
the variations in firm value based on different ownership structures and governance arrangements, such as  
director ownership, foreign ownership, and institutional ownership.  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
The application of Agency Theory in the Nigerian banking context is particularly insightful, as financial  
institutions often face governance challenges stemming from agency problems due to the dispersed ownership  
structure, involvement of multiple stakeholders, and varying interests of domestic and foreign investors. As such,  
agency theory helps explain the dynamics between ownership structure, governance mechanisms, and firm  
value, providing a theoretical foundation for examining how the ownership by directors, foreign investors, and  
institutions may lead to different outcomes in terms of the financial performance of listed deposit money banks.  
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The underpinning theory for this study is Agency Theory, which was propounded by Jensen and Meckling  
(1976).This theory examines the relationship between principals (shareholders) and agents (managers), focusing  
on the potential conflicts that arise from their differing interests. In particular, Agency Theory emphasizes that  
managers, as agents, may not always act in the best interests of shareholders, who are the principals. The theory  
explains that managers, due to their position and control over company resources, might prioritize personal goals  
over maximizing shareholder value. These conflicts lead to agency costs, which are the costs associated with  
monitoring managers, bonding managers to act in the interest of shareholders, and the residual loss when the  
interests of managers and shareholders are misaligned. The relevance of Agency Theory to this study lies in its  
ability to explain how different ownership structures impact firm value. In the context of Nigerian listed deposit  
money banks, ownership structures such as director, foreign, institutional, and state ownership are likely to  
influence the alignment (or misalignment) of interests between managers and shareholders. Agency Theory  
suggests that when ownership is concentrated such as with director or institutional ownership there is a stronger  
alignment between the interests of managers and shareholders, which can reduce agency costs and improve firm  
performance and value. Conversely, dispersed ownership structures or foreign ownership may introduce new  
agency problems due to a lack of direct oversight, resulting in higher agency costs and potentially lower firm  
value.  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
Furthermore, Agency Theory provides a robust framework for understanding the moderating effects of corporate  
governance mechanisms, such as board structure and risk management practices, on the relationship between  
ownership structure and firm value. In the Nigerian banking sector, where governance challenges are prevalent,  
Agency Theory offers insights into how governance frameworks can be strengthened to reduce agency costs and  
optimize firm performance. This makes Agency Theory a valuable theoretical foundation for exploring the  
impact of ownership structures on firm value in listed deposit money banks in Nigeria, providing a lens through  
which the complexities of ownership dynamics and governance practices can be understood.  
24  
METHODOLOGY  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
This study adopts a longitudinal research design, utilizing panel data analysis to examine the moderating effect  
of corporate risk management on the relationship between foreign ownership, managerial ownership structure,  
and firm value among listed financial services firms in Nigeria. The longitudinal design is particularly suited for  
this study as it captures temporal dynamics, allowing for a robust evaluation of how changes in ownership  
structures and corporate risk governance practices affect firm value over time. By focusing on a 15-year period  
from 2010 to 2024, this design enhances the reliability and depth of the analysis and reflects evolving regulatory,  
economic, and market conditions in Nigeria’s financial sector. The population for the study comprises all 45  
financial services firms listed on the Nigerian Exchange Group (NGX) as of December 31, 2024. A purposive  
sampling technique was applied, resulting in a sample of 24 financial service firms that met specific criteria:  
34  
35  
36  
(i)  
Continuous listing and active trading status during the study period;  
Availability of consistent annual financial reports from 2010 to 2024; and  
Absence of delisting or prolonged suspension throughout the period.  
(ii)  
(iii)  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
The extended timeframe begins in 2010 to ensure the effects of the 2007–2009 global financial crisis is accounted  
for and to align the analysis with Nigeria’s post-crisis regulatory developments and financial reforms. Secondary  
panel data was collected from the annual reports and audited financial statements of the selected firms,  
encompassing both cross-sectional and time-series observations. Panel data enables the study to control for  
unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity, thereby improving estimation accuracy. The statistical analysis is  
conducted using E-Views version 12 software.  
43  
44  
This study adapts and extends the model developed by Dabari and Liuraman (2022) to reflect the interaction  
between ownership structure and corporate risk management within the Nigerian financial services context.  
45  
TR = β0 + β1MAOit + β2BHOOit + β3FOOit + εit -------------------------------------------(i)  
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Direct Effect (Model)  
TQit = β0 + β1FOOit + β2MAOPit + β3FLit + εit……………………………………………….(ii)  
3
Moderating Effect (Model)  
4
TQit = β0 + β1FOO*CRMit + β2MAO*CRMit + FLit + it……………….………... (iii)  
5
Where:  
6
TQ = Tobin Q Ratio (proxy for Firm Value)  
FOO = Foreign Ownership  
7
8
MAO = Managerial Ownership  
9
CRM = Corporate Risk Management (moderating variable)  
FOO*CRM = Percentage of foreign ownership interacting with corporate risk management  
MAO*CRM = Managerial ownership percentage interacting with corporate risk management  
FL = Firm Leverage (control variable)  
β0 = Intercept  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
β1– β3 = Slope Coefficients  
ε = Error term  
i = Cross-sectional unit (firm)  
t = Time period (year)  
Table 3.1: Measurements of Variables  
Variables  
Measurement  
Source  
Tobin's Q Ratio (TQ) (Dependent (Market Value of Equity + Book Value of Bayero, (2018)  
Variable)  
Foreign  
Debt) / Total Assets  
Ownership  
(FOO) (Shares Held by Foreign Investors / Total Umobong, and Bele-  
(Independent Variable)  
Outstanding Shares) × 100  
Egberi, (2019)  
Managerial  
Ownership  
(MAO) (Shares Held by Executives and Directors / Ekwueme & Sunday  
(Independent Variable)  
Total Outstanding Shares) × 100  
(2024)  
Corporate Risk Management (CRM) Value at Risk (VaR) = Z × σ × √t  
Taleatu et al., 2020  
(Moderating Variable)  
Firm Leverage  
Total debts divided by total capital  
Sunday et al (2019)  
(Control Variable)  
19  
20  
Source: Researcher’s Computation (2025)  
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Table 3.2: A Priori Expectation  
Direct  
Effect Sign  
Moderating  
Effect Sign  
Variable  
Description  
Reasoning  
Foreign investors bring expertise,  
technology, and global standards  
that may enhance firm value.  
FOO  
Foreign Ownership  
Positive (+)  
Positive (+)  
Positive (+)  
Positive (+)  
Positive (+)  
Positive (+)  
Managerial  
Ownership  
Managerial ownership incentivizes  
managers to act in the best interests  
of shareholders.  
MAO  
Interaction of FOO  
with Corporate Risk  
Management  
Foreign  
ownership  
benefits  
FOO*CRM  
(expertise, global standards) are  
amplified when risk is effectively  
managed.  
Interaction of MAO  
with Corporate Risk  
Management  
Managerial ownership benefits are  
strengthened under effective risk  
management practices.  
MAO*CRM  
Positive (+)  
Positive (+)  
2
Source: Researcher’s Computation (2025)  
3
4
RESULT AND DISCUSSION  
Descriptive Statistics  
5
6
7
In order to have glimpse of the data used in the study, a first pass at the data in form of descriptive statistics was  
carried out. This gives us a good idea of the patterns in the data used for the analysis. The summary statistics is  
presented in Table 3.  
8
Table 3: Descriptive Analysis Result  
TQ  
FOO  
MAO  
FL  
Mean  
0.257183  
0.216000  
0.979000  
0.006000  
0.201924  
1.406484  
5.054730  
182.0205  
0.000000  
92.58600  
14.63762  
360  
49.01052  
51.10449  
99.00539  
0.506158  
29.19435  
-0.001987  
1.771431  
22.64096  
0.000012  
17643.79  
305979.2  
360  
49.68812  
49.23672  
99.97177  
1.083765  
29.88221  
0.058034  
1.744676  
23.83967  
0.000007  
17887.72  
320567.8  
360  
0.567257  
0.598527  
0.898875  
0.040000  
0.211293  
-0.573524  
2.678616  
21.28509  
0.000024  
204.2127  
16.02748  
360  
Median  
Maximum  
Minimum  
Std. Dev.  
Skewness  
Kurtosis  
Jarque-Bera  
Probability  
Sum  
Sum Sq. Dev.  
Observations  
9
Source: E-View 12 Output (2025)  
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The descriptive statistics of the dataset reveal several important insights about the variables. Tobin’s Q (TQ),  
which represents firm value, has a mean value of 0.257, indicating that, on average, the firms in the dataset are  
slightly below their replacement cost (since a Tobin's Q less than 1 suggests that the market value is lower than  
the cost of assets). The maximum TQ value of 0.979 suggests that some firms have nearly achieved a market  
value close to their replacement cost, while the minimum of 0.006 shows that some firms are significantly  
undervalued. The skewness of 1.41 indicates a rightward skew, meaning there are more observations with lower  
values, while the kurtosis of 5.05 suggests a leptokurtic distribution with a higher peak around the mean,  
indicating that extreme values are more frequent.  
9
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
For Foreign Ownership (FOO) and Managerial Ownership (MAO), both have relatively similar characteristics  
with means of approximately 49%, indicating a fairly balanced distribution of ownership. The minimum foreign  
ownership is close to 0.51%, while the maximum is close to 99%, indicating a wide range of foreign equity  
participation across firms. The Firm Leverage (FL) variable shows a mean of 0.567, indicating that firms  
generally have a moderate level of debt relative to their capital. The skewness of -0.57 and the kurtosis of 2.68  
for FL suggest a slightly left-skewed distribution with a relatively normal shape, although with fewer extreme  
values. The high statistical significance of the Jarque-Bera test (with p-values close to zero) suggests that all the  
variables, including TQ, FOO, MAO, and FL, do not follow a normal distribution, pointing to potential skewness  
or outliers in the data.  
18  
Correlation Analysis  
19  
20  
According to Gujarati (2004), a correlation coefficient between two independent variables of 0.80 is considered  
excessive, and thus certain measures are required to correct that anomaly in the data.  
21  
Table 4: Correlation Analysis Result  
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary  
Date: 09/16/25 Time: 10:31  
Sample: 2010 2024  
Included observations: 360  
Correlation  
Probability  
TQ  
TQ  
FOO  
MAO  
FL  
1.000000  
-----  
FOO  
MAO  
FL  
-0.030064  
0.5696  
1.000000  
-----  
-0.068887  
0.1922  
-0.032956  
0.5331  
1.000000  
-----  
0.149046  
0.0046  
-0.084465  
0.1096  
0.014921  
0.7778  
1.000000  
-----  
22  
Source: E-View 12 Output (2025)  
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10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
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The correlation analysis provides insight into the relationships between the variables under consideration.  
Tobin’s Q (TQ), which represents firm value, has a very weak negative correlation with Foreign Ownership  
(FOO) (-0.030), suggesting that foreign ownership has an almost negligible impact on the firm’s market  
valuation. The probability value of 0.5696 indicates that this correlation is not statistically significant at common  
significance levels (e.g., 0.05 or 0.01), meaning that changes in foreign ownership do not appear to directly  
influence Tobin's Q. Similarly, the correlation between TQ and Managerial Ownership (MAO) is -0.0689, also  
weak and statistically insignificant (p-value of 0.1922), implying that managerial ownership has little to no effect  
on the firm’s market value. In terms of Firm Leverage (FL), there is a moderate positive correlation with Tobin’s  
Q (TQ) (0.149), which is statistically significant (p-value of 0.0046). This suggests that higher leverage is  
associated with slightly higher firm value, potentially indicating that firms with greater debt are viewed more  
favourably by the market. On the other hand, FOO and FL show a weak negative correlation (-0.0845) with a p-  
value of 0.1096, which is not statistically significant, suggesting that foreign ownership does not have a  
meaningful relationship with leverage in this dataset. The correlation between MAO and FL is also very weak  
and statistically insignificant (0.0149 with p-value 0.7778), indicating that managerial ownership has little to no  
effect on the leverage of these firms.  
16  
Multicollinearity Test (VIF)  
17  
18  
Conducting multicollinearity tests is essential to determine if there is a strong inter-correlation among  
independent variables that could lead to erroneous results.  
19  
20  
*Decision rule: uncentered VIF less than 10 indicates the absence of multi-collinearity, while VIF uncentered  
over 10 is a sign of multi-collinearity.  
21  
22  
Table 5: Multicollinearity Test (VIF)  
Multicollinearity Test (VIF)  
23  
24  
Conducting multicollinearity tests is essential to determine if there is a strong inter-correlation among  
independent variables that could lead to erroneous results.  
25  
26  
*Decision rule: uncentered VIF less than 10 indicates the absence of multi-collinearity, while VIF uncentered  
over 10 is a sign of multi-collinearity (Gujareti & Porter, 2009).  
27  
Table 5: Multicollinearity Test (VIF)  
Coefficient Uncentered  
Centered  
VIF  
Variable  
C
Variance  
5.936445  
22.84744  
41.03493  
23.13823  
VIF  
7.37824  
9.65432  
9.66298  
9.79213  
NA  
FOO  
MAO  
FL  
1.748338  
1.826399  
1.837312  
28  
Source: E-View 12 Output (2025)  
29  
30  
31  
32  
As noted above, the rule of multicollinearity test rule uses a variance inflation factor that VIF centered below  
indicates absence of multi-collinearity, while VIF uncentered over 10 indicates the presence of multi-  
collinearity. Table 5 above shows the absence of multicollinearity between independent variables, as all  
independent variables (FOO, MAO and FL) have less than 10 VIF centered.  
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Heteroskedasticity  
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3
4
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6
To confirm the panel regression findings, a Heteroskedasticity test was performed as a robustness check.  
Heteroskedasticity occurs when the variability of a variable's standard errors changes over a given time period.  
Heteroskedasticity disrupts the assumptions for linear regression modeling, affecting the validity of analysis  
results. While it does not introduce bias in coefficient estimates, it does decrease their precision, increasing the  
probability that estimates are further from the actual population value. The hypothesis is presented below;  
7
8
9
Hypothesis  
Ho: There is no heteroskedasticity problem in the model (Residuals are homoskedastic)  
H1: There is heteroskedasticity problem in the model  
10  
11  
Decision Rule: If the Prob. value is greater than 0.05 (5% level of significant) do not reject null hypothesis if  
otherwise, accept the alternative hypothesis.  
12  
Table 6: Heteroskedasticity Test  
Panel Cross-section Heteroskedasticity LR Test  
Equation: UNTITLED  
Specification: TQ C FOO MAO FOO_CRM MAO_CRM FL LOGTQ  
Null hypothesis: Residuals are homoscedastic  
Value  
df  
24  
Probability  
0.1469  
Likelihood ratio  
18.6145  
LR test summary:  
Value  
df  
353  
353  
Restricted LogL  
297.9674  
438.7747  
Unrestricted LogL  
13  
Source: E-View 12 Output (2025)  
14  
15  
The results of the panel cross-section Heteroskedasticity regression test was displayed in Table 6. The  
decision criteria for the panel cross-section test for Heteroskedasticity is as follows:  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
The test's null hypothesis asserts the absence of Heteroskedasticity, while the alternate hypothesis claims the  
presence of Heteroskedasticity. If the P value exceeds 5% level of significance, the null hypothesis should  
not be rejected. Based on the findings in table 6, with a ratio value of 18.6145 and a probability value of  
0.1469 exceeding 5%, the research concludes that the null hypothesis should be rejected in favour of the  
alternative hypothesis indicating the presence of conditional Heteroskedasticity issue. Due to the diagnostic  
probability of 0.1469 the null hypothesis is accepted, showing no conditional heteroskedasticity, which means  
residuals are homoskedastic and samples accurately represent the population.  
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Hausman Test  
2
3
4
The Hausman test is a test for model specification in panel data analysis and this test is employed to choose  
between fixed effects model and the random effects model. Due to the panel nature of the data set utilized in this  
study, both fixed effect and random effect regressions were run (as shown in appendix).  
5
6
7
Hypothesis  
H0: Random effect is more appropriate for the Panel Regression analysis  
H1: Fixed effect is more appropriate for the Panel Regression analysis  
8
9
10  
11  
12  
Decision Rule: if the p-value is greater than 0.05 the decision rule is to reject the null hypothesis which states  
that fixed effect is more appropriate for the Panel Regression analysis (meaning that the preferred model is  
random effects). Similarly, if the p-value is less than 0.05 the decision rule is to reject the null hypothesis which  
states that fixed effect is more appropriate for the Panel Regression analysis (meaning that the random effect  
model is to be rejected).  
13  
Table 7: Hausman Test  
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled  
Test cross-section random effects  
Test Summary  
Chi-Sq.  
Statistic  
Chi-Sq.  
d.f.  
Prob.  
Cross-section random  
7.278182  
3
0.0635  
14  
Source: E-View 12 Output (2025)  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
The Hausman test result presented in Table 7 shows a Chi-Square statistic of 7.278182 with 3 degrees of freedom  
and a p-value of 0.0635. This high p-value indicates that the null hypothesis, which posits that the Random  
Effects (RE) model is more appropriate than the Fixed Effects (FE) model, cannot be rejected. Therefore, the  
Random Effects model is preferred in this context, as there is no significant evidence that the individual effects  
are correlated with the regressors, suggesting that the RE model would provide more efficient and consistent  
estimates. Given that the Random Effects model is preferred, there is still a need to conduct the Breusch-Pagan  
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test to determine whether the Random Effects model is indeed necessary.  
22  
Langranger Multiplier Test (test between random and pooled)  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
The Langrange Multiplier (LM) test, also known as the Breusch-Pagan test in the context of random effects  
models, is a statistical test used to determine whether a random effects model is more appropriate than a pooled  
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model for panel data analysis. The test examines the presence of random  
effects by assessing if the variance of the random error components is significantly different from zero, which  
would indicate that the random effects model should be preferred over the pooled OLS model due to unobserved  
heterogeneity across entities.  
29  
Table 8: Breusch-Pagan Langranger Multiplier Test  
Residual Cross-Section Dependence Test  
Null hypothesis: No cross-section dependence (correlation) in residuals  
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Equation: Untitled  
Periods included: 15  
Cross-sections included: 24  
Total panel observations: 360  
Note: non-zero cross-section means detected in data  
Cross-section means were removed during computation of correlations  
Test  
Statistic  
d.f.  
Prob.  
Breusch-Pagan LM  
Pesaran scaled LM  
Pesaran CD  
556.7976  
11.95154  
3.150285  
276  
0.0000  
0.0000  
0.0016  
1
Source: E-View 12 Output (2025)  
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test presented in Table 8 assesses whether a Random Effects  
model is more appropriate than Pooled OLS by testing for cross-sectional dependence in the residuals. With a  
test statistic of 556.7976 and a p-value of 0.0000 (below the 0.05 significance threshold), the null hypothesis of  
no cross-sectional dependence is rejected. This result suggests that unobserved effects vary significantly across  
entities, making the Random Effects model more suitable than Pooled OLS for this panel data. Accounting for  
these random effects allows the model to capture entity-specific variations, yielding more accurate and efficient  
estimates for the analysis.  
9
Research Hypotheses  
10  
Table 9: Panel Regression Result (Direct Model)  
Dependent Variable: TQ  
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects)  
Date: 09/16/25 Time: 11:07  
Sample: 2010 2024  
Periods included: 15  
Cross-sections included: 24  
Total panel (balanced) observations: 360  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances  
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Variable  
Coefficien  
t
Std. Error  
t-Statistic  
Prob.  
C
0.211907  
0.000132  
-0.000245  
0.089888  
0.047877  
0.000317  
0.000315  
0.061350  
4.426110  
0.416863  
-0.778313  
1.465155  
0.0000  
0.6770  
0.4369  
0.1438  
FOO  
MAO  
FL  
Effects Specification  
S.D.  
Rho  
Cross-section random  
Idiosyncratic random  
0.099217  
0.169272  
0.2557  
0.7443  
Weighted Statistics  
Root MSE  
0.169338  
0.103678  
0.170203  
10.32310  
1.029279  
R-squared  
0.597387  
0.570978  
0.170286  
0.883114  
0.449960  
Mean dependent var  
S.D. dependent var  
Sum squared resid  
Durbin-Watson stat  
Adjusted R-squared  
S.E. of regression  
F-statistic  
Prob(F-statistic)  
1
Source: E-View 12 Output (2025)  
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
The panel data regression results show that the model has a R-squared value of 0.5974, meaning that  
approximately 59.7% of the variation in the Tobin Q ratio (TQ) can be explained by the independent variables  
in the model. The Adjusted R-squared value of 0.5710 suggests that after adjusting for the number of predictors,  
the model still accounts for a significant portion of the variance. However, the F-statistic is 0.8831 with a p-  
value of 0.45, indicating that the overall model is not statistically significant at conventional levels (e.g., 0.05).  
This implies that, collectively, the independent variables (FOO, MAO, FL) do not have a strong joint effect on  
firm value. The Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.0292 suggests that there may be issues with autocorrelation in the  
residuals, which could indicate that the model has some degree of serial correlation.  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
Individually, none of the independent variables have a statistically significant impact on Tobin’s Q (TQ). Foreign  
Ownership (FOO) has a coefficient of 0.000132 with a p-value of 0.6770, suggesting that foreign ownership  
does not have a significant effect on firm value. Similarly, Managerial Ownership (MAO) has a negative  
coefficient of -0.000245 with a p-value of 0.4369, indicating that managerial ownership is also not significantly  
associated with firm value. Firm Leverage (FL) has a positive coefficient of 0.089888, but its p-value of 0.1438  
suggests it is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The random effects specification indicates that the  
variability across firms (cross-section random) accounts for 25.57% of the total variability, while the  
idiosyncratic (individual firm-specific) random effects contribute to 74.43% of the variability.  
18  
Table 10: Panel Regression Result Moderating Model (Radom Effect)  
Dependent Variable: TQ  
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects)  
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Date: 11/28/25 Time: 13:09  
Sample: 2010 2024  
Periods included: 15  
Cross-sections included: 24  
Total panel (balanced) observations: 360  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances  
Variable  
Coefficien Std. Error  
t
t-Statistic  
Prob.  
C
0.559866  
0.000149  
-0.000271  
0.000428  
0.000367  
-0.006342  
0.390151  
0.029451  
0.000214  
0.000208  
0.000138  
0.000129  
0.034620  
0.014144  
19.01029  
0.695088  
-1.301764  
3.101449  
2.844961  
-0.183177  
27.58411  
0.0000  
0.4875  
0.1938  
0.0021  
0.0047  
0.8548  
0.0000  
FOO  
MAO  
FOO_CRM  
MAO_CRM  
FL  
LOGTQ  
Effects Specification  
S.D.  
Rho  
Cross-section random  
Idiosyncratic random  
0.051102  
0.096851  
0.2178  
0.7822  
Weighted Statistics  
Root MSE  
0.095476  
0.113044  
0.171469  
3.281625  
1.811831  
R-squared  
0.689099  
0.663814  
0.096418  
130.4014  
0.000000  
Mean dependent var  
S.D. dependent var  
Sum squared resid  
Durbin-Watson stat  
Adjusted R-squared  
S.E. of regression  
F-statistic  
Prob(F-statistic)  
1
2
Source: E-View 12 Output (2025)  
### Interpretation of the Moderating Model (Table 10)  
3
4
5
The panel random effects regression results for the moderating model demonstrate strong explanatory power  
and overall statistical significance. The model explains approximately 68.9, R-squared = 0.6891), with an  
Adjusted R-squared of 0.6638 confirming robustness after accounting for the number of predictors. The F-  
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2
3
statistic of 130.4014 (p = 0.000000) indicates that the independent variables and interaction terms jointly exert  
a highly significant influence on Tobin’s Q at the 1% level. The Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.8118 suggests no  
serious autocorrelation in the residuals, supporting the validity of the estimates.  
4
5
6
7
8
Consistent with the direct effect model, Foreign Ownership (FOO) and Managerial Ownership (MAO) continue  
to show no statistically significant direct impact on firm value (p = 0.4875 and p = 0.1938, respectively).  
However, the interaction terms provide compelling evidence of moderation: FOO_CRM is positive and highly  
significant (coefficient = 0.000428, p = 0.0021), while MAO_CRM is also positive and significant (coefficient  
= 0.000367, p = 0.0047), both at the 5% level. These results clearly indicate that corporate risk management  
significantly strengthens the relationship between both foreign and managerial ownership structures and firm  
value in Nigerian listed financial services firms. Firm Leverage (FL) remains insignificant (p = 0.8548). Thus,  
the findings strongly support rejection of the two null hypotheses, confirming that corporate risk management  
serves as a vital moderating mechanism that transforms otherwise neutral ownership structures into significant  
value-enhancing factors.  
9
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
The findings of this study align with Agency Theory, which posits that conflicts between owners (principals)  
and managers (agents) can arise due to differing interests, affecting firm performance and value. In the case of  
foreign ownership, the study finds a negative but statistically insignificant relationship with firm value. This  
result is in line with the a priori expectation of Agency Theory, which suggests that foreign owners may exert  
less direct control over day-to-day operations, leading to potential misalignments between ownership and  
management goals. Deshi and Sunday (2025), Peter and Okoh (2025), and Okafor and Eze (2024) reported  
consistent evidence indicating that foreign ownership often exerts a negative or insignificant direct effect on firm  
value in Nigerian financial services firms due to repatriation concerns, regulatory constraints, and misalignment  
with local management priorities, with the positive influence on Tobin’s Q emerging only when moderated or  
buffered by robust corporate risk management practices. The insignificant relationship in the current study may  
reflect the complexities in the Nigerian market, where foreign investors face significant risks such as political  
instability and regulatory challenges, which may limit their ability to influence firm value directly. According to  
Agency Theory, these misalignments between foreign owners and local management can create agency costs,  
reducing firm value.  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
Similarly, managerial ownership (MAO) was found to have a minor, statistically insignificant impact on firm  
value in this study, which supports the a priori expectation derived from Agency Theory. The theory suggests  
that while managerial ownership aligns the interests of managers and shareholders, it may not necessarily lead  
to significant improvements in firm value. Deshi and Sunday (2025) also found that the ownership by directors  
had a minor role in firm valuation, which aligns with the theoretical proposition that managerial ownership,  
while reducing agency costs, might not fully resolve conflicts or improve financial performance in every context.  
The study by Okafor et al. (2023) also supported this view, showing that while managerial ownership can reduce  
agency costs, it does not guarantee enhanced firm value. The minor impact of managerial ownership in the  
current study could be attributed to other overriding factors, such as corporate governance practices or market  
conditions, which may limit the influence of managerial ownership on the firm's market valuation. This result is  
consistent with Agency Theory’s assertion that ownership structure alone cannot resolve all agency issues  
without effective governance mechanisms in place.  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
Regarding managerial ownership, the study observed a negative but insignificant relationship with firm value,  
which contrasts with the a priori expectation that institutional ownership, due to its active role and greater  
monitoring capabilities, would positively affect firm value. However, Deshi and Sunday (2025) and Onyali et  
al. (2024) found that Institutional ownership can create misalignments between Institutional investors and  
management, leading to negative impacts on firm performance. According to Agency Theory, while Institutional  
investors are expected to monitor and reduce agency costs, they may also have short-term financial goals that  
conflict with the long-term interests of other stakeholders, including smaller shareholders. The negative effect  
in the current study may reflect these conflicting interests, which could result in lower firm value. This further  
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justifies the relevance of Agency Theory in explaining why Institutional ownership might not always have a  
positive impact on firm performance, as agency problems related to conflicting objectives can still persist.  
3
4
5
6
7
The study’s findings on the moderating role of Corporate Risk Management (CRM) are consistent with the  
expectations of Agency Theory. The positive and significant moderating effects of FOO_CRM and MAO_CRM  
on firm value suggest that effective risk management can reduce the agency costs associated with foreign and  
managerial ownership. According to Agency Theory, the existence of effective monitoring mechanisms (such  
as CRM) helps align the interests of managers and owners, thereby mitigating agency problems. Orshi (2023)  
also highlighted that ownership structures, particularly institutional and block-holder ownership, moderate the  
relationship between corporate governance and firm value, which aligns with the findings of this study. The  
significant moderating role of CRM underscores the importance of governance mechanisms in reducing agency  
costs and improving firm performance. In the Nigerian context, where firms face considerable market risks, the  
implementation of robust risk management practices helps reconcile the interests of different ownership  
structures, leading to better firm performance and value, which is critical in emerging markets like Nigeria,  
where market volatility is a significant concern.  
8
9
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
This study highlights the significant role of ownership structures in shaping the firm value of Nigerian listed  
firms, with a particular emphasis on the moderating effect of Corporate Risk Management (CRM). The findings  
suggest that while foreign and managerial ownership have limited direct effects on firm value, CRM plays a  
crucial role in enhancing the impact of these ownership structures on firm performance by reducing agency costs.  
The study aligns with Agency Theory, which suggests that effective governance mechanisms, such as risk  
management, are necessary to address agency problems and improve firm value. These results underscore the  
importance of addressing ownership structure and risk management practices to optimize firm performance in  
emerging markets like Nigeria.  
24  
Recommendations:  
25i. Policymakers and corporate leaders should focus on strengthening governance frameworks, particularly in  
26  
27  
28  
relation to ownership structures. This can include improving board independence, increasing managerial  
ownership, and encouraging foreign investors to align their interests with long-term corporate goals, thus  
minimizing agency costs and boosting firm value.  
29ii. Firms should invest in comprehensive risk management strategies, particularly in emerging markets where  
30  
31  
32  
market volatility and regulatory challenges are prominent. The positive moderating effect of CRM on ownership  
structures underscores the need for effective risk management systems to improve performance and ensure long-  
term sustainability.  
33  
REFERENCES  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
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2. Ahmed, M., Abdullahi, B. B., & Yahaya, O. A. (2022). Moderating effect of board equity  
ownership on enterprise risk management and performance of financial institutions in  
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3. Almashhadani, M., & Almashhadani, H. A. (2022). The beneficial effects of firm size, board size,  
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5. Baba, B. U., & Baba, U. A. (2021). The effect of ownership structure on social and environmental  
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8. Cheng, S., & Wang, H. (2021). Managerial ownership and firm performance: evidence from Chinese  
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9. Dabari, I. J., & Liuraman, S. B. (2022). Ownership structure, audit quality and tax  
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deposit banks in Nigeria. Indiana Journal of Economics and Business Management, 5(3), 82-98.  
11. Ekwueme, C., & Sunday, D. (2024). Board mechanism and firm leverage of consumer goods companies  
in Nigeria, 10(8).  
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relationship between corporate governance and financial performance in Nigeria. FUDMA Journal of  
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13. Emovon, F. O., Josiah, M., & Ozele, C. E. (2024). The moderating effect of vertical agency  
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7 APPENDIX  
8
Data Presentation  
Year  
2010  
2011  
2012  
2013  
2014  
2015  
2016  
2017  
2018  
2019  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
2010  
2011  
2012  
2013  
2014  
2015  
ID  
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
FIRM  
TQ  
FOO  
MAO  
38.817  
64.329  
45.825  
54.562  
94.146  
38.610  
96.119  
90.535  
19.579  
6.936  
CRM  
0.107  
0.089  
0.320  
0.412  
0.599  
0.091  
0.287  
0.735  
0.043  
0.867  
0.079  
0.034  
0.845  
0.515  
0.244  
0.041  
0.014  
0.647  
0.135  
0.394  
0.175  
FL  
FOO*CRM MAO*CRM  
Abbey Mortgage Plc  
Abbey Mortgage Plc  
Abbey Mortgage Plc  
Abbey Mortgage Plc  
Abbey Mortgage Plc  
Abbey Mortgage Plc  
Abbey Mortgage Plc  
Abbey Mortgage Plc  
Abbey Mortgage Plc  
Abbey Mortgage Plc  
Abbey Mortgage Plc  
Abbey Mortgage Plc  
Abbey Mortgage Plc  
Abbey Mortgage Plc  
Abbey Mortgage Plc  
Access Holding Plc  
Access Holding Plc  
Access Holding Plc  
Access Holding Plc  
Access Holding Plc  
Access Holding Plc  
0.191  
0.17  
37.454  
95.071  
73.199  
59.866  
15.602  
15.599  
5.808  
0.07  
4.0251  
8.4453  
23.4407  
24.6417  
9.3384  
1.4143  
1.6683  
63.6616  
2.5583  
61.3957  
0.1626  
3.2517  
70.3129  
10.9301  
4.4410  
0.7452  
0.4383  
33.9718  
5.8169  
11.4722  
10.6855  
4.172  
5.714  
14.675  
22.458  
56.351  
3.501  
27.607  
66.541  
0.833  
6.014  
0.796  
0.061  
7.977  
35.158  
1.739  
1.296  
1.217  
1.507  
10.968  
11.103  
2.064  
0.062  
0.067  
0.233  
0.242  
0.279  
0.278  
0.209  
0.179  
0.204  
0.271  
0.245  
0.255  
0.252  
0.258  
0.264  
0.274  
0.265  
0.257  
0.28  
0.157  
0.167  
0.737  
0.72  
0.157  
0.149  
0.227  
0.237  
0.281  
0.235  
0.078  
0.083  
0.058  
0.08  
86.618  
60.112  
70.807  
2.058  
10.078  
1.822  
96.991  
83.244  
21.234  
18.182  
18.340  
30.424  
52.476  
43.195  
29.123  
61.185  
9.444  
68.301  
7.119  
31.898  
84.488  
2.327  
0.062  
0.056  
0.044  
0.21  
81.447  
28.185  
11.816  
0.121  
0.3  
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2016  
2017  
2018  
2019  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
2010  
2011  
2012  
2013  
2014  
2015  
2016  
2017  
2018  
2019  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
2010  
2011  
2012  
2013  
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
Access Holding Plc  
Access Holding Plc  
Access Holding Plc  
Access Holding Plc  
Access Holding Plc  
Access Holding Plc  
Access Holding Plc  
Access Holding Plc  
Access Holding Plc  
Aiico Insurance Plc  
Aiico Insurance Plc  
Aiico Insurance Plc  
Aiico Insurance Plc  
Aiico Insurance Plc  
Aiico Insurance Plc  
Aiico Insurance Plc  
Aiico Insurance Plc  
Aiico Insurance Plc  
Aiico Insurance Plc  
Aiico Insurance Plc  
Aiico Insurance Plc  
Aiico Insurance Plc  
Aiico Insurance Plc  
Aiico Insurance Plc  
African Alliance Plc  
African Alliance Plc  
African Alliance Plc  
African Alliance Plc  
0.441  
0.207  
0.218  
0.223  
0.222  
0.204  
0.185  
0.2  
13.949  
29.214  
36.636  
45.607  
78.518  
19.967  
51.423  
59.241  
4.645  
69.674  
62.894  
87.747  
73.507  
80.348  
28.203  
17.744  
75.061  
80.683  
99.051  
41.262  
37.202  
77.641  
34.080  
93.076  
85.841  
42.899  
75.087  
75.454  
10.312  
90.255  
50.525  
82.646  
32.005  
89.552  
38.920  
1.084  
0.556  
0.508  
0.839  
0.213  
0.190  
0.336  
0.740  
0.410  
0.164  
0.294  
0.590  
0.065  
0.273  
0.074  
0.136  
0.086  
0.066  
0.051  
0.112  
0.062  
0.115  
0.136  
0.608  
0.021  
0.117  
0.212  
0.150  
0.069  
0.266  
0.282  
0.04  
7.7591  
14.8519  
30.7360  
9.7269  
14.9052  
6.7141  
38.0654  
24.3013  
0.7608  
17.8602  
10.0590  
0.4206  
25.8705  
7.1761  
10.9603  
2.6295  
0.6471  
3.5008  
4.9106  
0.7564  
5.6752  
0.4672  
55.3285  
0.5463  
7.7338  
6.6157  
7.7967  
3.7518  
38.755  
31.974  
73.616  
15.677  
15.253  
9.483  
0.058  
0.06  
0.069  
0.057  
0.045  
0.044  
0.051  
0.058  
0.048  
0.182  
0.294  
0.329  
0.338  
0.372  
0.31  
13.135  
30.791  
13.215  
29.118  
24.340  
2.405  
0.197  
0.191  
0.17  
60.754  
17.052  
6.505  
0.008  
0.007  
0.027  
0.052  
0.071  
0.077  
0.06  
94.889  
96.563  
80.840  
30.461  
9.767  
21.168  
2.533  
12.619  
7.410  
2.842  
68.423  
44.015  
12.204  
49.518  
3.439  
3.842  
0.051  
0.045  
0.135  
0.172  
0.244  
0.21  
0.251  
0.25  
8.418  
0.639  
0.303  
0.228  
0.246  
0.242  
0.231  
0.25  
10.344  
6.864  
90.932  
25.878  
66.252  
31.171  
52.007  
54.671  
50.287  
0.676  
0.117  
0.035  
0.012  
0.021  
10.454  
8.260  
0.247  
0.187  
0.162  
90.538  
6.213  
Page 848  
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XII December 2025  
2014  
2015  
2016  
2017  
2018  
2019  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
2010  
2011  
2012  
2013  
2014  
2015  
2016  
2017  
2018  
2019  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
2010  
2011  
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
African Alliance Plc  
African Alliance Plc  
African Alliance Plc  
African Alliance Plc  
African Alliance Plc  
African Alliance Plc  
African Alliance Plc  
African Alliance Plc  
African Alliance Plc  
African Alliance Plc  
African Alliance Plc  
Corrolation Insurance  
Corrolation Insurance  
Corrolation Insurance  
Corrolation Insurance  
Corrolation Insurance  
Corrolation Insurance  
Corrolation Insurance  
Corrolation Insurance  
Corrolation Insurance  
Corrolation Insurance  
Corrolation Insurance  
Corrolation Insurance  
Corrolation Insurance  
Corrolation Insurance  
Corrolation Insurance  
Deapcap Plc  
0.027  
0.034  
0.321  
0.331  
0.421  
0.251  
0.217  
0.184  
0.163  
0.312  
0.398  
0.371  
0.197  
0.677  
0.512  
0.439  
0.025  
0.352  
0.439  
0.708  
0.806  
0.813  
0.82  
18.485  
96.958  
77.513  
93.950  
89.483  
59.790  
92.187  
8.849  
9.129  
0.335  
0.436  
0.748  
0.033  
0.053  
0.145  
0.076  
0.136  
0.113  
0.592  
0.221  
0.042  
0.441  
0.196  
0.101  
0.067  
0.069  
0.052  
0.577  
0.182  
0.901  
0.627  
0.101  
0.411  
0.747  
0.460  
0.117  
0.240  
0.188  
0.222  
0.224  
0.13  
6.1917  
42.2901  
57.9753  
3.1140  
4.7753  
8.6974  
6.9905  
1.2000  
2.2101  
2.6787  
7.1860  
1.6435  
11.9549  
16.2045  
3.6166  
1.8961  
3.7266  
0.7359  
46.2636  
1.3567  
88.8721  
48.3867  
2.0081  
0.2268  
60.8961  
32.4970  
8.5000  
18.5433  
3.058  
13.927  
71.059  
3.151  
3.060  
9.191  
3.401  
3.976  
3.706  
39.832  
16.619  
3.347  
34.789  
1.783  
5.012  
0.388  
3.774  
2.306  
51.195  
6.386  
10.542  
8.959  
7.695  
25.392  
7.552  
3.867  
8.173  
1.749  
31.931  
95.006  
95.061  
57.344  
63.184  
44.845  
29.321  
32.866  
67.252  
75.237  
79.158  
78.962  
9.121  
0.207  
0.218  
0.223  
0.222  
0.204  
0.185  
0.2  
19.598  
4.523  
32.533  
38.868  
27.135  
82.874  
35.675  
28.093  
54.270  
14.092  
80.220  
7.455  
0.197  
0.498  
0.463  
0.882  
0.454  
0.639  
0.693  
0.671  
0.443  
0.429  
0.453  
0.693  
0.672  
0.517  
0.719  
0.810  
0.421  
49.442  
5.756  
54.953  
44.153  
88.770  
35.092  
11.707  
14.299  
76.151  
61.822  
10.112  
8.411  
98.689  
77.224  
19.872  
0.552  
0.512  
0.58  
81.546  
70.686  
72.901  
77.127  
0.034  
0.142  
0.158  
70.097  
7.276  
Deapcap Plc  
Page 849  
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XII December 2025  
2012  
2013  
2014  
2015  
2016  
2017  
2018  
2019  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
2010  
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
7
Deapcap Plc  
Deapcap Plc  
Deapcap Plc  
Deapcap Plc  
Deapcap Plc  
Deapcap Plc  
Deapcap Plc  
Deapcap Plc  
Deapcap Plc  
Deapcap Plc  
Deapcap Plc  
Deapcap Plc  
Deapcap Plc  
0.093  
0.03  
7.404  
82.186  
70.624  
8.135  
0.105  
0.037  
0.715  
0.096  
0.987  
0.409  
0.226  
0.498  
0.242  
0.066  
0.816  
0.124  
0.089  
0.211  
0.649  
0.745  
0.526  
0.554  
0.707  
0.849  
0.805  
0.692  
0.765  
0.582  
0.720  
0.633  
0.495  
0.751  
0.7744  
1.3312  
8.2882  
8.3114  
61.5094  
13.5376  
1.4334  
15.4768  
7.8724  
4.7981  
52.0479  
11.0417  
4.1866  
2.5263  
8.595  
2.623  
5.819  
0.817  
97.365  
15.312  
8.359  
40.451  
22.932  
6.484  
61.503  
4.683  
0.740  
16.416  
35.847  
11.587  
86.310  
62.330  
33.090  
6.356  
0.037  
0.115  
0.019  
0.515  
0.635  
0.91  
8.484  
98.664  
37.427  
37.064  
81.280  
94.725  
98.600  
75.338  
37.626  
8.350  
31.098  
32.518  
72.961  
63.756  
88.721  
47.221  
11.959  
0.977  
0.156  
0.238  
0.305  
0.5  
Transactional  
Corporation  
0.444  
77.715  
2011  
2012  
2013  
2014  
2015  
2016  
2017  
2018  
2019  
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
Transactional  
Corporation  
0.342  
0.43  
71.324  
76.079  
56.128  
77.097  
49.380  
52.273  
42.754  
2.542  
55.840  
42.422  
90.635  
11.120  
49.263  
1.135  
0.544  
0.228  
0.140  
0.102  
0.016  
0.326  
0.086  
0.059  
0.049  
0.678  
0.579  
0.856  
0.410  
0.558  
0.428  
0.783  
0.751  
0.566  
38.8253  
17.3608  
7.8579  
7.8395  
0.7957  
17.0462  
3.6852  
0.1496  
0.5246  
30.397  
9.681  
12.689  
1.131  
0.794  
0.370  
4.040  
0.331  
0.578  
Transactional  
Corporation  
Transactional  
Corporation  
0.358  
0.363  
0.44  
Transactional  
Corporation  
Transactional  
Corporation  
Transactional  
Corporation  
0.809  
0.979  
0.444  
0.398  
Transactional  
Corporation  
46.866  
5.630  
Transactional  
Corporation  
Transactional  
Corporation  
10.789  
11.882  
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XII December 2025  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
7
7
7
7
7
Transactional  
Corporation  
0.453  
0.41  
3.143  
11.753  
64.921  
74.604  
58.337  
96.217  
0.063  
0.721  
0.969  
0.572  
0.357  
0.738  
0.598  
0.778  
0.627  
0.606  
0.1975  
0.739  
Transactional  
Corporation  
63.641  
31.436  
50.857  
90.757  
45.8768  
30.4554  
29.1121  
32.4084  
46.800  
72.278  
33.394  
34.358  
Transactional  
Corporation  
0.366  
0.356  
0.366  
Transactional  
Corporation  
Transactional  
Corporation  
2010  
2011  
2012  
2013  
2014  
2015  
2016  
2017  
2018  
2019  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
2010  
2011  
2012  
2013  
2014  
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
9
9
9
9
9
Fidelity Bank  
0.342  
0.305  
0.369  
0.109  
0.418  
0.25  
24.929  
41.038  
75.555  
22.880  
7.698  
37.487  
28.571  
86.860  
22.360  
96.322  
1.215  
0.256  
0.166  
0.132  
0.317  
0.115  
0.092  
0.068  
0.036  
0.101  
0.094  
0.412  
0.193  
0.535  
0.316  
0.042  
0.428  
0.165  
0.142  
0.217  
0.795  
0.867  
0.525  
0.460  
0.692  
0.885  
0.589  
0.431  
0.570  
0.653  
0.481  
0.729  
0.899  
0.626  
0.577  
0.600  
0.458  
0.842  
0.607  
0.594  
0.730  
6.3745  
6.8231  
9.9936  
7.2452  
0.8887  
2.6666  
1.0992  
3.3633  
8.1892  
5.9518  
35.9302  
15.4983  
9.9777  
28.1849  
2.2536  
34.5562  
14.7885  
4.5286  
2.3932  
18.1187  
9.586  
4.750  
11.489  
7.080  
11.120  
0.112  
6.613  
0.156  
9.030  
4.959  
40.940  
1.423  
29.620  
30.608  
2.186  
26.937  
11.482  
6.473  
13.647  
46.447  
Fidelity Bank  
Fidelity Bank  
Fidelity Bank  
Fidelity Bank  
Fidelity Bank  
28.975  
16.122  
92.970  
80.812  
63.340  
87.146  
80.367  
18.657  
89.256  
53.934  
80.744  
89.609  
31.800  
11.005  
22.794  
Fidelity Bank  
0.625  
0.375  
0.751  
0.368  
0.109  
0.418  
0.216  
0.208  
0.209  
0.271  
0.255  
0.206  
0.175  
0.179  
96.988  
4.316  
Fidelity Bank  
Fidelity Bank  
89.114  
52.770  
99.296  
7.380  
Fidelity Bank  
Fidelity Bank  
Fidelity Bank  
Fidelity Bank  
55.385  
96.930  
52.310  
62.940  
69.575  
45.454  
62.756  
58.431  
Fidelity Bank  
Fidelity Bank  
Gold Link Insurance  
Gold Link Insurance  
Gold Link Insurance  
Gold Link Insurance  
Gold Link Insurance  
Page 851  
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XII December 2025  
2015  
2016  
2017  
2018  
2019  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
2010  
2011  
2012  
2013  
2014  
2015  
2016  
2017  
2018  
2019  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
2010  
2011  
2012  
9
Gold Link Insurance  
Gold Link Insurance  
Gold Link Insurance  
Gold Link Insurance  
Gold Link Insurance  
Gold Link Insurance  
Gold Link Insurance  
Gold Link Insurance  
Gold Link Insurance  
Gold Link Insurance  
Guinea Insurance  
Guinea Insurance  
Guinea Insurance  
Guinea Insurance  
Guinea Insurance  
Guinea Insurance  
Guinea Insurance  
Guinea Insurance  
Guinea Insurance  
Guinea Insurance  
Guinea Insurance  
Guinea Insurance  
Guinea Insurance  
Guinea Insurance  
Guinea Insurance  
Jaiz Bank PlC  
0.162  
0.142  
0.459  
0.328  
0.218  
0.241  
0.125  
0.17  
42.711  
81.801  
86.073  
0.695  
90.116  
4.545  
0.417  
0.274  
0.171  
0.164  
0.103  
1.955  
0.399  
0.176  
0.141  
2.179  
0.070  
0.264  
1.296  
0.267  
0.025  
0.463  
0.388  
0.181  
0.160  
0.132  
0.182  
0.221  
1.116  
0.323  
0.228  
0.330  
0.136  
0.539  
0.621  
0.724  
0.431  
0.807  
0.870  
0.724  
0.877  
0.476  
0.639  
0.701  
0.691  
0.601  
0.569  
0.463  
0.596  
0.481  
0.767  
0.504  
0.429  
0.676  
0.698  
0.836  
0.688  
0.573  
0.802  
0.670  
0.440  
0.683  
17.7937  
22.4465  
14.7462  
0.1140  
5.2711  
81.5878  
8.8537  
2.1095  
4.7746  
205.4260  
2.2476  
13.6782  
91.1034  
9.7117  
2.4210  
44.5795  
9.7722  
9.0244  
4.8046  
3.7714  
0.6703  
13.4419  
56.1154  
1.6644  
6.3540  
29.9291  
3.2651  
7.8170  
37.543  
1.247  
9
9
28.096  
95.041  
89.026  
45.566  
62.013  
27.738  
18.812  
46.370  
35.335  
58.366  
7.773  
4.814  
9
15.587  
9.188  
9
51.075  
41.741  
22.211  
11.987  
33.762  
94.291  
32.320  
51.879  
70.302  
36.363  
97.178  
96.245  
25.178  
49.725  
30.088  
28.484  
3.689  
9
89.063  
24.720  
4.882  
9
9
9
0.313  
0.248  
0.224  
0.182  
0.084  
0.104  
0.069  
0.051  
0.035  
0.024  
0.044  
0.043  
0.04  
2.660  
9
101.023  
2.457  
10  
10  
10  
10  
10  
10  
10  
10  
10  
10  
10  
10  
10  
10  
10  
11  
11  
11  
15.388  
10.074  
26.024  
2.457  
97.439  
98.621  
69.816  
53.610  
30.953  
81.380  
68.473  
16.262  
91.093  
82.254  
94.980  
72.572  
61.342  
41.824  
93.273  
32.338  
20.807  
5.618  
12.995  
9.066  
2.955  
0.039  
0.164  
0.18  
60.956  
50.268  
5.148  
20.087  
91.822  
30.708  
16.549  
20.213  
5.700  
0.175  
0.13  
27.865  
90.827  
23.956  
14.489  
Jaiz Bank PlC  
0.11  
Jaiz Bank PlC  
0.102  
50.320  
Page 852  
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XII December 2025  
2013  
2014  
2015  
2016  
2017  
2018  
2019  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
2010  
2011  
2012  
2013  
2014  
2015  
2016  
2017  
2018  
2019  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
2010  
11  
11  
11  
11  
11  
11  
11  
11  
11  
11  
11  
11  
12  
12  
12  
12  
12  
12  
12  
12  
12  
12  
12  
12  
12  
12  
12  
13  
Jaiz Bank PlC  
0.124  
0.133  
0.138  
0.121  
0.006  
0.051  
0.045  
0.032  
0.485  
0.351  
0.162  
0.07  
48.945  
98.565  
24.206  
67.214  
76.162  
23.764  
72.822  
36.778  
63.231  
63.353  
53.577  
9.029  
86.606  
4.522  
0.673  
0.159  
0.495  
0.454  
0.070  
0.050  
0.378  
0.098  
0.991  
0.042  
0.095  
2.874  
0.076  
0.061  
0.056  
0.679  
0.095  
0.057  
0.232  
0.536  
0.112  
0.120  
0.056  
0.160  
0.179  
0.274  
2.124  
0.494  
0.854  
0.598  
0.548  
0.472  
0.476  
0.616  
0.698  
0.440  
0.870  
0.778  
0.693  
0.814  
0.440  
0.638  
0.715  
0.814  
0.792  
0.539  
0.870  
0.462  
0.838  
0.885  
0.489  
0.761  
0.420  
0.603  
0.658  
0.690  
32.9432  
15.6763  
11.9872  
30.5084  
5.3602  
1.1858  
27.4909  
3.6175  
62.6822  
2.6387  
5.0676  
25.9481  
6.3852  
1.9607  
1.0441  
2.7666  
5.6340  
3.8789  
0.3854  
27.4420  
2.5355  
7.7146  
0.9793  
11.0472  
6.9226  
25.6294  
29.2162  
16.8637  
58.291  
0.719  
1.306  
17.088  
5.705  
4.927  
5.678  
5.844  
37.759  
4.040  
7.965  
240.925  
3.583  
2.536  
1.530  
3.825  
8.245  
4.654  
23.228  
53.408  
6.218  
9.195  
5.306  
13.585  
4.428  
12.327  
27.440  
47.172  
Jaiz Bank PlC  
Jaiz Bank PlC  
2.637  
Jaiz Bank PlC  
37.646  
81.055  
98.728  
15.042  
59.413  
38.089  
96.991  
84.212  
83.833  
46.869  
41.482  
27.341  
5.638  
Jaiz Bank PlC  
Jaiz Bank PlC  
Jaiz Bank PlC  
Jaiz Bank PlC  
Jaiz Bank PlC  
Jaiz Bank PlC  
Jaiz Bank PlC  
Jaiz Bank PlC  
Lasaco Assurance Plc  
Lasaco Assurance Plc  
Lasaco Assurance Plc  
Lasaco Assurance Plc  
Lasaco Assurance Plc  
Lasaco Assurance Plc  
Lasaco Assurance Plc  
Lasaco Assurance Plc  
Lasaco Assurance Plc  
Lasaco Assurance Plc  
Lasaco Assurance Plc  
Lasaco Assurance Plc  
Lasaco Assurance Plc  
Lasaco Assurance Plc  
Lasaco Assurance Plc  
0.062  
0.067  
0.233  
0.242  
0.279  
0.278  
0.209  
0.179  
0.204  
0.271  
0.245  
0.255  
0.252  
0.258  
0.264  
83.530  
32.078  
18.652  
4.078  
59.089  
67.756  
1.659  
86.472  
81.290  
99.972  
99.664  
55.543  
76.899  
94.477  
84.965  
24.735  
45.054  
12.916  
95.405  
51.209  
22.650  
64.517  
17.437  
69.094  
38.674  
93.673  
13.752  
34.107  
Linkage Assurance Plc 0.274  
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XII December 2025  
2011  
2012  
2013  
2014  
2015  
2016  
2017  
2018  
2019  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
2010  
13  
13  
13  
13  
13  
13  
13  
13  
13  
13  
13  
13  
13  
13  
14  
Linkage Assurance Plc 0.265  
Linkage Assurance Plc 0.257  
Linkage Assurance Plc 0.28  
Linkage Assurance Plc 0.3  
Linkage Assurance Plc 0.266  
Linkage Assurance Plc 0.282  
Linkage Assurance Plc 0.04  
Linkage Assurance Plc 0.058  
Linkage Assurance Plc 0.06  
Linkage Assurance Plc 0.069  
Linkage Assurance Plc 0.057  
Linkage Assurance Plc 0.045  
Linkage Assurance Plc 0.044  
Linkage Assurance Plc 0.051  
11.347  
92.469  
87.734  
25.794  
65.998  
81.722  
55.520  
52.965  
24.185  
9.310  
60.617  
22.864  
67.170  
61.813  
35.816  
11.356  
67.157  
52.031  
77.232  
52.016  
85.218  
55.191  
56.094  
87.665  
40.348  
0.319  
0.257  
0.158  
0.077  
0.055  
0.765  
0.870  
0.103  
0.347  
0.803  
0.130  
2.227  
0.122  
1.513  
1.994  
0.868  
0.736  
0.641  
0.805  
0.875  
0.411  
0.891  
0.443  
0.807  
0.540  
0.466  
0.620  
0.722  
0.590  
0.427  
3.6237  
19.358  
5.878  
23.7739  
13.8822  
1.9820  
10.628  
4.750  
3.6292  
1.969  
62.5014  
48.3148  
5.4706  
8.685  
58.442  
5.374  
8.3890  
26.789  
41.760  
11.086  
122.896  
6.827  
7.4745  
89.722  
90.042  
63.310  
33.903  
34.921  
11.6720  
200.5001  
7.7055  
51.2871  
69.6426  
132.617  
80.466  
Mutaul  
Benefit 0.058  
Benefit 0.048  
Benefit 0.182  
Benefit 0.294  
Benefit 0.329  
Benefit 0.338  
Benefit 0.372  
Benefit 0.31  
Benefit 0.251  
Assurance  
2011  
2012  
2013  
2014  
2015  
2016  
2017  
2018  
14  
14  
14  
14  
14  
14  
14  
14  
Mutaul  
Assurance  
72.596  
89.711  
88.709  
77.988  
64.203  
8.414  
13.402  
2.878  
0.552  
0.108  
0.146  
0.294  
1.328  
0.362  
3.485  
0.235  
0.700  
0.851  
0.592  
0.508  
0.621  
0.424  
0.810  
0.813  
40.0993  
9.6697  
7.403  
Mutaul  
Assurance  
0.310  
Mutaul  
Assurance  
75.514  
62.031  
70.408  
21.296  
13.637  
1.454  
12.9772  
22.9375  
85.2368  
3.0491  
11.047  
18.244  
93.474  
7.718  
Mutaul  
Assurance  
Mutaul  
Assurance  
Mutaul  
Assurance  
Mutaul  
Assurance  
16.163  
89.855  
56.3284  
21.0955  
47.526  
0.341  
Mutaul  
Assurance  
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XII December 2025  
2019  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
14  
14  
14  
14  
14  
14  
Mutaul  
Assurance  
Benefit 0.25  
Benefit 0.303  
Benefit 0.228  
Benefit 0.246  
Benefit 0.242  
Benefit 0.231  
60.643  
0.920  
35.059  
58.992  
39.224  
43.747  
90.416  
34.826  
0.930  
1.927  
0.102  
0.126  
0.110  
0.083  
0.694  
0.577  
0.800  
0.677  
0.813  
0.716  
56.4067  
1.7722  
1.0303  
8.3813  
0.0558  
1.3356  
32.610  
113.672  
3.983  
Mutaul  
Assurance  
Mutaul  
Assurance  
10.147  
66.350  
0.506  
Mutaul  
Assurance  
5.526  
Mutaul  
Assurance  
9.959  
Mutaul  
16.081  
2.893  
Assurance  
2010  
2011  
2012  
2013  
2014  
2015  
2016  
2017  
2018  
2019  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
2010  
2011  
2012  
2013  
15  
15  
15  
15  
15  
15  
15  
15  
15  
15  
15  
15  
15  
15  
15  
16  
16  
16  
16  
NEM Insurance Plc  
NEM Insurance Plc  
NEM Insurance Plc  
NEM Insurance Plc  
NEM Insurance Plc  
NEM Insurance Plc  
NEM Insurance Plc  
NEM Insurance Plc  
NEM Insurance Plc  
NEM Insurance Plc  
NEM Insurance Plc  
NEM Insurance Plc  
NEM Insurance Plc  
NEM Insurance Plc  
NEM Insurance Plc  
Prestige Assurance  
Prestige Assurance  
Prestige Assurance  
Prestige Assurance  
0.25  
54.873  
69.190  
65.196  
22.427  
71.218  
23.725  
32.540  
74.649  
64.963  
84.922  
65.761  
56.831  
9.367  
51.399  
78.365  
39.654  
62.209  
86.236  
94.952  
14.707  
92.659  
49.212  
25.824  
45.914  
98.003  
49.262  
32.875  
63.340  
24.015  
7.586  
1.230  
0.245  
0.063  
0.069  
0.918  
0.652  
0.208  
0.092  
0.266  
0.218  
0.172  
0.055  
0.138  
1.041  
1.562  
0.076  
0.231  
0.053  
0.416  
0.792  
0.699  
0.607  
0.879  
0.671  
0.703  
0.510  
0.713  
0.686  
0.492  
0.430  
0.702  
0.782  
0.662  
0.513  
0.733  
0.440  
0.621  
0.482  
67.4851  
16.9619  
4.0887  
63.212  
19.211  
2.487  
4.278  
79.132  
61.862  
3.060  
8.555  
13.074  
5.622  
7.906  
5.429  
6.801  
34.211  
98.933  
1.835  
1.756  
0.682  
5.328  
0.247  
0.187  
0.188  
0.222  
0.224  
0.13  
1.5421  
65.3507  
15.4570  
6.7706  
0.207  
0.218  
0.223  
0.222  
0.204  
0.185  
0.2  
6.8926  
17.2592  
18.4862  
11.3237  
3.1482  
1.2932  
36.772  
26.520  
24.399  
97.301  
39.310  
89.205  
38.2662  
41.4228  
1.8645  
0.197  
0.191  
0.17  
22.5168  
2.0816  
0.157  
0.167  
12.888  
12.805  
37.1160  
Page 855  
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XII December 2025  
2014  
2015  
2016  
2017  
2018  
2019  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
2010  
2011  
2012  
2013  
2014  
2015  
2016  
2017  
2018  
2019  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
2010  
16  
16  
16  
16  
16  
16  
16  
16  
16  
16  
16  
17  
17  
17  
17  
17  
17  
17  
17  
17  
17  
17  
17  
17  
17  
17  
18  
Prestige Assurance  
Prestige Assurance  
Prestige Assurance  
Prestige Assurance  
Prestige Assurance  
Prestige Assurance  
Prestige Assurance  
Prestige Assurance  
Prestige Assurance  
Prestige Assurance  
Prestige Assurance  
Royal Exchage Plc  
Royal Exchage Plc  
Royal Exchage Plc  
Royal Exchage Plc  
Royal Exchage Plc  
Royal Exchage Plc  
Royal Exchage Plc  
Royal Exchage Plc  
Royal Exchage Plc  
Royal Exchage Plc  
Royal Exchage Plc  
Royal Exchage Plc  
Royal Exchage Plc  
Royal Exchage Plc  
Royal Exchage Plc  
0.737  
0.72  
63.114  
79.481  
50.264  
57.690  
49.252  
19.524  
72.245  
28.077  
2.432  
15.190  
13.883  
64.087  
18.188  
34.567  
89.679  
47.396  
66.756  
17.232  
19.229  
4.087  
0.107  
0.316  
0.164  
0.421  
0.523  
0.404  
0.282  
0.036  
0.331  
0.106  
0.210  
0.601  
1.612  
1.669  
0.233  
0.133  
0.302  
1.279  
1.646  
0.802  
0.079  
0.115  
0.150  
0.141  
0.928  
2.321  
0.092  
0.492  
0.501  
0.593  
0.426  
0.599  
0.656  
0.642  
0.591  
0.820  
0.473  
0.653  
0.431  
0.436  
0.687  
0.683  
0.839  
0.679  
0.880  
0.424  
0.449  
0.422  
0.493  
0.671  
0.723  
0.423  
0.873  
0.821  
6.7548  
1.626  
25.1147  
8.2343  
4.387  
0.157  
0.149  
0.227  
0.237  
0.281  
0.235  
0.078  
0.083  
0.058  
0.08  
10.499  
7.662  
24.3030  
25.7703  
7.8819  
18.087  
36.203  
13.354  
2.403  
20.3550  
1.0107  
0.8050  
5.705  
64.547  
17.711  
94.046  
95.393  
91.486  
37.016  
1.546  
6.8412  
2.038  
3.7114  
0.856  
16.894  
27.859  
17.701  
8.870  
56.5184  
153.7900  
152.7084  
8.6301  
10.152  
44.914  
29.546  
2.068  
0.062  
0.056  
0.044  
0.21  
12.064  
46.078  
20.633  
36.427  
50.342  
69.039  
3.931  
0.2060  
1.608  
0.121  
0.441  
0.207  
0.218  
0.223  
0.222  
0.204  
0.185  
0.2  
92.832  
42.818  
96.665  
96.362  
85.301  
29.445  
38.510  
85.114  
31.692  
16.949  
55.680  
28.0169  
54.7820  
159.1360  
77.2905  
6.7626  
13.906  
26.398  
59.968  
40.378  
5.473  
3.3757  
0.451  
79.941  
62.790  
8.176  
5.7590  
11.955  
8.863  
12.0142  
29.4210  
39.3322  
5.1411  
7.590  
0.197  
87.358  
92.087  
202.721  
8.503  
Sovereing  
Insurance  
Trust 0.191  
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XII December 2025  
2011  
2012  
2013  
2014  
2015  
2016  
2017  
2018  
2019  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
18  
18  
18  
18  
18  
18  
18  
18  
18  
18  
18  
18  
18  
18  
Sovereing  
Insurance  
Trust 0.17  
Trust 0.008  
Trust 0.007  
Trust 0.027  
Trust 0.052  
Trust 0.071  
Trust 0.077  
Trust 0.06  
Trust 0.051  
Trust 0.045  
Trust 0.135  
Trust 0.172  
Trust 0.244  
Trust 0.21  
93.615  
69.603  
57.006  
9.718  
6.108  
0.118  
0.062  
1.696  
0.130  
0.277  
0.369  
0.392  
2.836  
0.147  
0.343  
0.220  
0.553  
0.358  
0.133  
0.548  
0.439  
0.485  
0.463  
0.462  
0.659  
0.523  
0.579  
0.895  
0.742  
0.874  
0.471  
0.591  
0.677  
11.0798  
4.3278  
0.723  
Sovereing  
Insurance  
27.688  
80.620  
74.826  
18.452  
20.935  
37.047  
48.452  
61.825  
36.891  
46.253  
74.747  
3.668  
1.722  
Sovereing  
Insurance  
96.6834  
1.2612  
136.733  
9.711  
Sovereing  
Insurance  
Sovereing  
Insurance  
61.501  
99.005  
14.008  
51.833  
87.737  
74.077  
69.702  
70.248  
35.949  
29.359  
17.0203  
36.5819  
5.4966  
5.107  
Sovereing  
Insurance  
7.735  
Sovereing  
Insurance  
14.537  
137.407  
9.098  
Sovereing  
Insurance  
146.9945  
12.9106  
25.4040  
15.3070  
38.8656  
12.8647  
3.9127  
Sovereing  
Insurance  
Sovereing  
Insurance  
12.652  
10.158  
41.354  
1.313  
Sovereing  
Insurance  
Sovereing  
Insurance  
Sovereing  
Insurance  
Sovereing  
Insurance  
25.244  
3.364  
2010  
2011  
2012  
2013  
2014  
2015  
2016  
19  
19  
19  
19  
19  
19  
19  
Stanco Insurance Plc  
Stanco Insurance Plc  
Stanco Insurance Plc  
Stanco Insurance Plc  
Stanco Insurance Plc  
Stanco Insurance Plc  
Stanco Insurance Plc  
0.117  
0.035  
0.012  
0.021  
0.027  
0.034  
0.321  
80.936  
81.011  
86.707  
91.324  
51.134  
50.152  
79.830  
71.335  
89.521  
51.168  
53.211  
10.717  
44.741  
53.262  
0.739  
0.774  
0.310  
0.229  
0.080  
0.411  
0.059  
0.438  
0.402  
0.735  
0.721  
0.605  
0.645  
0.608  
59.8232  
62.6932  
26.8870  
20.8781  
4.0939  
52.727  
69.278  
15.867  
12.165  
0.858  
20.6215  
4.6934  
18.397  
3.131  
Page 857  
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XII December 2025  
2017  
2018  
2019  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
2010  
19  
19  
19  
19  
19  
19  
19  
19  
20  
Stanco Insurance Plc  
Stanco Insurance Plc  
Stanco Insurance Plc  
Stanco Insurance Plc  
Stanco Insurance Plc  
Stanco Insurance Plc  
Stanco Insurance Plc  
Stanco Insurance Plc  
0.331  
0.421  
0.251  
0.217  
0.184  
0.163  
0.312  
0.398  
64.996  
70.197  
79.579  
89.001  
33.800  
37.558  
9.398  
24.247  
26.924  
37.728  
2.007  
1.151  
0.046  
1.206  
0.572  
3.111  
0.344  
0.089  
0.124  
0.160  
0.412  
0.568  
0.489  
0.449  
0.878  
0.700  
0.764  
0.558  
0.597  
74.8304  
3.2418  
27.916  
1.243  
95.9475  
50.9493  
105.1354  
12.9366  
0.8408  
45.489  
1.149  
32.208  
21.145  
32.750  
11.976  
89.053  
100.185  
7.283  
2.930  
57.828  
3.594  
7.1539  
1.482  
Standard  
Insurance  
Alliance 0.371  
Alliance 0.197  
Alliance 0.677  
Alliance 0.512  
Alliance 0.439  
Alliance 0.025  
Alliance 0.352  
Alliance 0.439  
Alliance 0.708  
Alliance 0.806  
Alliance 0.813  
Alliance 0.82  
Alliance 0.512  
0.5758  
14.266  
2011  
2012  
2013  
2014  
2015  
2016  
2017  
2018  
2019  
2020  
2021  
2022  
20  
20  
20  
20  
20  
20  
20  
20  
20  
20  
20  
20  
Standard  
Insurance  
46.560  
54.264  
28.654  
59.083  
3.050  
59.359  
67.910  
78.917  
49.844  
8.692  
1.277  
0.266  
2.408  
0.279  
0.249  
0.179  
0.185  
0.159  
0.271  
0.178  
0.354  
0.021  
0.518  
0.448  
0.490  
0.799  
0.739  
0.673  
0.638  
0.861  
0.436  
0.540  
0.575  
0.791  
59.4774  
14.4329  
68.9937  
16.4829  
0.7580  
0.6669  
15.1860  
5.7105  
3.4470  
9.3184  
27.2795  
0.4593  
75.828  
18.062  
190.018  
13.905  
2.160  
Standard  
Insurance  
Standard  
Insurance  
Standard  
Insurance  
Standard  
Insurance  
Standard  
Insurance  
3.735  
53.711  
58.684  
74.544  
43.166  
12.758  
28.378  
36.308  
9.591  
Standard  
Insurance  
82.260  
36.019  
12.706  
52.224  
76.999  
21.582  
10.834  
11.818  
11.711  
2.276  
Standard  
Insurance  
Standard  
Insurance  
Standard  
Insurance  
Standard  
Insurance  
10.054  
0.773  
Standard  
Insurance  
Page 858  
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XII December 2025  
2023  
2024  
20  
20  
Standard  
Insurance  
Alliance 0.58  
Alliance 0.034  
62.289  
8.535  
64.592  
57.078  
0.053  
0.388  
0.896  
0.520  
3.3170  
3.3090  
3.440  
Standard  
Insurance  
22.129  
2010  
2011  
2012  
2013  
2014  
2015  
2016  
2017  
2018  
2019  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
2010  
2011  
2012  
2013  
2014  
2015  
2016  
2017  
2018  
2019  
21  
21  
21  
21  
21  
21  
21  
21  
21  
21  
21  
21  
21  
21  
21  
22  
22  
22  
22  
22  
22  
22  
22  
22  
22  
United Bank Plc  
United Bank Plc  
United Bank Plc  
United Bank Plc  
United Bank Plc  
United Bank Plc  
United Bank Plc  
United Bank Plc  
United Bank Plc  
United Bank Plc  
United Bank Plc  
United Bank Plc  
United Bank Plc  
United Bank Plc  
United Bank Plc  
0.142  
0.158  
0.093  
0.03  
5.168  
35.610  
98.652  
60.577  
23.723  
10.178  
15.286  
24.596  
16.068  
18.657  
28.510  
17.337  
89.677  
8.023  
1.317  
0.337  
0.169  
2.084  
0.053  
0.576  
0.075  
0.161  
0.946  
0.232  
0.068  
0.310  
0.168  
0.309  
0.513  
0.924  
0.380  
0.105  
0.604  
0.595  
0.160  
0.048  
0.507  
0.280  
0.171  
0.837  
0.815  
0.512  
0.600  
0.605  
0.889  
0.490  
0.800  
0.567  
0.765  
0.610  
0.689  
0.816  
0.802  
0.833  
0.430  
0.746  
0.470  
0.608  
0.674  
0.601  
0.660  
0.898  
0.468  
0.738  
6.8054  
17.9227  
9.1586  
132.8507  
3.8332  
56.2379  
3.8624  
5.1930  
75.2465  
6.2916  
3.0031  
2.4291  
0.4268  
29.7461  
42.8701  
64.2825  
15.5304  
1.8202  
9.4424  
14.8841  
8.8146  
3.4155  
33.4658  
7.8436  
16.3653  
46.890  
33.275  
10.262  
49.442  
0.537  
53.135  
54.064  
63.743  
72.609  
97.585  
51.630  
32.296  
79.519  
27.083  
43.897  
7.846  
0.037  
0.115  
0.019  
0.515  
0.635  
0.91  
8.809  
1.840  
2.584  
17.654  
6.623  
0.977  
0.156  
0.238  
0.305  
0.5  
1.186  
27.765  
1.351  
2.535  
96.265  
83.598  
69.597  
40.895  
17.329  
15.644  
25.024  
54.923  
71.460  
66.020  
27.993  
95.487  
52.451  
41.040  
98.238  
11.204  
39.786  
96.947  
86.551  
81.707  
25.790  
17.089  
66.864  
92.938  
16.208  
21.046  
90.736  
4.255  
universal Insurance Plc 0.444  
universal Insurance Plc 0.342  
universal Insurance Plc 0.43  
universal Insurance Plc 0.358  
universal Insurance Plc 0.363  
universal Insurance Plc 0.44  
universal Insurance Plc 0.809  
universal Insurance Plc 0.979  
universal Insurance Plc 0.444  
universal Insurance Plc 0.398  
4.179  
58.516  
51.479  
13.113  
1.233  
8.662  
18.735  
15.928  
Page 859  
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XII December 2025  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
2010  
2011  
2012  
2013  
2014  
2015  
2016  
2017  
2018  
2019  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
2010  
2011  
2012  
2013  
2014  
2015  
2016  
2017  
22  
22  
22  
22  
22  
23  
23  
23  
23  
23  
23  
23  
23  
23  
23  
23  
23  
23  
23  
23  
24  
24  
24  
24  
24  
24  
24  
24  
universal Insurance Plc 0.453  
universal Insurance Plc 0.41  
universal Insurance Plc 0.366  
universal Insurance Plc 0.356  
universal Insurance Plc 0.366  
73.790  
55.435  
61.172  
41.960  
24.773  
35.597  
75.785  
1.439  
55.676  
57.161  
27.998  
76.949  
18.704  
32.368  
42.544  
50.761  
24.241  
11.484  
61.062  
28.863  
58.124  
15.436  
48.114  
53.259  
5.182  
0.100  
0.286  
0.156  
0.198  
0.406  
0.133  
0.398  
0.637  
0.198  
0.361  
0.031  
0.273  
0.142  
0.166  
0.103  
0.515  
0.109  
0.256  
0.783  
0.618  
0.108  
0.666  
0.144  
0.826  
0.263  
0.387  
0.314  
0.066  
0.598  
0.467  
0.479  
0.875  
0.840  
0.854  
0.896  
0.504  
0.578  
0.735  
0.642  
0.609  
0.579  
0.697  
0.688  
0.481  
0.636  
0.677  
0.685  
0.505  
0.771  
0.413  
0.577  
0.790  
0.682  
0.531  
0.747  
0.684  
7.3458  
15.8447  
9.5424  
8.3104  
10.0614  
4.7169  
30.1251  
0.9171  
2.3031  
1.6622  
0.1270  
23.3279  
10.0155  
7.8686  
1.0034  
25.3081  
5.1834  
4.4345  
33.9846  
24.6252  
6.6227  
42.3106  
0.6540  
30.9414  
16.4441  
19.4955  
26.8960  
4.3549  
5.543  
16.338  
4.367  
15.240  
7.597  
Wema Bank Plc  
Wema Bank Plc  
Wema Bank Plc  
Wema Bank Plc  
Wema Bank Plc  
Wema Bank Plc  
Wema Bank Plc  
Wema Bank Plc  
Wema Bank Plc  
Wema Bank Plc  
Wema Bank Plc  
Wema Bank Plc  
Wema Bank Plc  
Wema Bank Plc  
Wema Bank Plc  
Zenith Bank Plc  
Zenith Bank Plc  
Zenith Bank Plc  
Zenith Bank Plc  
Zenith Bank Plc  
Zenith Bank Plc  
Zenith Bank Plc  
Zenith Bank Plc  
0.342  
0.305  
0.369  
0.109  
0.418  
0.25  
4.289  
16.911  
32.342  
4.810  
11.607  
4.600  
4.149  
4.073  
1.904  
0.625  
0.375  
0.751  
0.368  
0.109  
0.418  
0.216  
0.208  
0.209  
0.271  
0.255  
0.206  
0.175  
0.179  
0.162  
0.142  
0.459  
85.546  
70.366  
47.417  
9.783  
7.871  
8.273  
2.562  
4.935  
49.162  
47.347  
17.320  
43.385  
39.850  
61.585  
63.509  
4.530  
27.417  
0.567  
33.660  
13.441  
6.337  
8.618  
10.529  
3.916  
98.996  
32.235  
80.987  
25.464  
68.150  
76.023  
59.564  
47.158  
10.646  
21.476  
11.691  
21.032  
17.906  
29.457  
18.705  
3.118  
37.461  
62.586  
50.314  
85.649  
65.869  
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue XII December 2025  
2018  
2019  
2020  
2021  
2022  
2023  
2024  
24  
24  
24  
24  
24  
24  
24  
Zenith Bank Plc  
Zenith Bank Plc  
Zenith Bank Plc  
Zenith Bank Plc  
Zenith Bank Plc  
Zenith Bank Plc  
Zenith Bank Plc  
0.328  
0.218  
0.241  
0.125  
0.17  
16.293  
7.057  
41.184  
34.887  
92.953  
83.062  
96.503  
12.430  
73.087  
0.063  
0.129  
0.150  
0.032  
0.188  
0.017  
0.016  
0.798  
0.768  
0.705  
0.644  
0.467  
0.531  
0.610  
1.0185  
0.9073  
9.6424  
0.0852  
11.0325  
1.5838  
0.9008  
2.574  
4.485  
13.952  
2.669  
18.175  
0.209  
1.144  
64.242  
2.651  
58.578  
94.023  
57.547  
0.313  
0.248  
1
Source: NGX Fact Book (2010 – 2024)  
2
3
4
5
Page 861  
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