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Governance and Corruption in Export Credit Agency-Backed Projects: Implications for Policy Autonomy in Africa

Chiemezie A Umeh[1], Ebi Ferdinand Ogar[2]

[1]Renaissance University, Ugbawka, Enugu State, Nigeria

[2]University of Abuja, Nigeria

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ABSTRACT

This is an informative article examining the role of Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) in African infrastructure development. It highlights their contribution to financing major projects while identifying significant challenges such as corruption, weak governance, reduced policy autonomy, and environmental and social costs. The paper relies on secondary data from credible sources, including journal articles, institutional reports, and news platforms, to provide insights into the implications of ECA-backed projects. The findings emphasize the need for enhanced oversight, transparency, and a commitment to aligning these investments with Africa's sustainable development goals

Keywords: Corruption, Debt Sustainability, Export Credit Agencies, Governance, Policy Autonomy,

INTRODUCTION

Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) are essential entities in the global financial system, offering government-supported loans, insurance, and guarantees to local firms involved in foreign trade [1]. These organizations strive to boost economic development in their native nations by encouraging exports. Despite primarily assisting their own domestic sectors, ECAs have increasingly emerged as a foreign finance source for developing countries, particularly in Africa. This dynamic has had a major influence on African economies, notably in the areas of debt accumulation, governance, and policy autonomy [2]. African states are increasingly relying on ECAs to finance significant infrastructure projects, ranging from transportation and electricity to telecommunications [3]. In numerous nations, ECA-backed projects now account for a large share of foreign debt. For instance, ECAs are responsible for 58% of Lesotho's debt, 55% of Gabon’s debt, and 21% of South Africa's debt [4]. Despite the expanding prominence of ECAs in the area, the lack of monitoring and openness around their activities has enabled governance challenges and corruption to emerge. Moreover, the presence of ECAs sometimes hinders African governments’ capacity to develop autonomous policies that address local concerns such as poverty, inequality, and environmental sustainability [4].

Corruption and Governance Challenges in Eca-Backed Projects

One of the most serious governance difficulties connected with Export Credit Agency (ECA)-backed projects is the prevalence of corruption [5]. Large infrastructure projects financed by ECAs are especially prone to corrupt practices because of their complexity and the participation of various parties, including foreign investors, local governments, contractors, and private enterprises [6]. In many African nations, governance systems are weak, and supervision mechanisms are inefficient, producing ideal ground for corruption. The lack of openness in procurement procedures and the involvement of political elites further heighten these dangers. ECAs, motivated by their goal to encourage exports from their own countries, sometimes ignore the governance shortcomings in recipient states [6]. Unlike multilateral development agencies such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), ECAs do not often attach restrictions relating to anti-corruption measures or institutional changes to their loan packages. This

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monitoring permits projects to continue in situations where corrupt practices are endemic, diminishing the developmental benefit of these investments.

A germane illustration of these governance issues, as reported by PremuimTimes.ng published on 14 August 2024, is the continuing disagreement between the Ogun State government and Zhongshan, a Chinese business, over the operation of an export processing zone. In 2010, Zhuhai Zhongfu Industrial Group Co. Ltd., the parent company of Zhongshan, agreed into a framework agreement to develop the Fucheng Industrial Park inside the Ogun Guangdong Free Trade Zone (OGFTZ). This deal awarded Zhongfu the rights to build and administer the industrial park. Subsequently, in 2011, the Nigeria Export Processing Zones Authority recognized Zhongfu International Investment (NIG) FZE, a subsidiary of Zhongshan, as a free trade zone firm.

However, tensions worsened in 2016 when Zhongfu stated that the Ogun State government sought to cancel its management contract, deciding instead to hire another manager for the free trade zone. This spurred Zhongfu to seek investment treaty arbitration against Nigeria, using the bilateral investment treaty between China and Nigeria [7]. This example demonstrates how governance flaws may lead to disagreements over commercial agreements and how political influence might imperil investments.

Moreover, ECA-backed projects typically lack thorough supervision procedures that might guarantee monies are used for their intended objectives. Political elites may misuse their positions to acquire contracts for personal or political advantage, while the lack of effective regulatory structures enables these behaviors to go unchecked [8]. In the instance of Nigeria, numerous ECA-backed projects in the oil sector have been tied to corruption scandals, generating substantial questions about the accountability of such initiatives. The repercussions of these governance challenges extend beyond particular initiatives. They result in inefficiencies, cost overruns, and delays, diminishing the potential advantages of these programs for local residents. In addition to financial mismanagement, corruption affects faith in public organizations, thus undermining governance systems [9]. Addressing these difficulties requires a determined effort to promote openness and accountability in ECA-backed initiatives, ensuring that they actually fulfil the developmental objectives of African states.

Impacts on Policy Autonomy and Economic Sovereignty

The loss of policy autonomy is one of the less well-known but essential repercussions of ECA-supported projects for African governments. The power of governments to make decisions on their own, particularly when it comes to problems of social and economic progress, is known as policy autonomy [10]. ECAs typically impose restrictions that place the profitability of foreign investors ahead of the recipient country's developmental aspirations in order to serve the interests of exporters from their home countries [11]. As a consequence, African nations may find themselves driven to implement laws that are contradictory with their long-term development aspirations. A nation's potential to pursue other development routes is often hampered by the stringent terms and conditions connected with ECA aid. For example, local entrepreneurs rarely benefit from ECA-backed projects as they are mainly provided to businesses from the ECA's home countries [11]. Long-term economic growth relies on the development of local capacity and the limitation of technological transfer opportunities, both of which can be harmed by this method. Public finances are further stressed by the fact that debt from ECA-backed projects generally carries commercial interest rates. African governments might wind up placing debt repayment ahead of essential social expenditures in sectors like infrastructure, healthcare, and education. This limits their financial alternatives and makes it more difficult for them to deal with vital concerns like inequality and poverty reduction. For instance, Zambia's high levels of ECA-related debt have severely curtailed governmental expenditure on education, making the nation's difficulties with human development even worse [12].

Furthermore, environmental and social considerations are typically disregarded as ECAs focus on huge infrastructure projects. Significant environmental harm, including deforestation, pollution, and community displacement, has come from ECA-backed oil and gas projects in countries like Nigeria and Cameroon [13]. The ability of African governments to implement sustainable development plans may be further hampered by these detrimental impacts.

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Economic Vulnerability and Debt Sustainability in Africa

The growing dependence on Export Credit Agency (ECA) funding has raised worries about debt sustainability in Africa. Many countries have seen substantial increases in their debt-to-GDP ratios as a result of an inflow of ECA-backed loans, similar to the debt crises of the 1980s and 1990s [14]. ECAs have emerged as a key source of external funding, often outperforming established organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF in loan quantities. Unlike concessional loans from these international lenders, ECA funding is often offered at market rates, increasing the risk of financial distress [15].



As a consequence, African countries often devote a large amount of their earnings to repaying ECA-related debt, leaving little money for critical investments in social services and infrastructure. In countries like Lesotho and Gabon, ECA-backed loans account for more than 50% of total foreign debt, resulting in dangerous fiscal conditions [16]. Furthermore, ECA-related debt is usually linked to particular projects, restricting the government's ability to reallocate money in response to changing economic circumstances or to prioritize vital development sectors [17].

These vulnerabilities are worsened by Africa's reliance on commodity exports, which experience severe price changes, making it difficult for governments to establish consistent income sources. Such circumstances increase the probability of debt default, forcing governments to engage into debt restructuring agreements that often include onerous requirements, further limiting policy autonomy.

Also, the makeup of Africa's creditors is changing, with a strong trend toward private creditors. In 2010, private creditors owned 30% of African debt; by 2021, that percentage had risen to 44%. This transition involves several obstacles. First, restructuring African debt becomes complicated owing to creditors' differing interests and concerns. Unlike conventional concessional lenders, private creditors demand market-based returns, complicating the bargaining process. Furthermore, the lack of a legal structure for creditor coordination restricts collective action since various private players may have competing agendas [18, 19].

The cases of Angola, Zambia, and Mozambique illustrate how ECA-backed loans have not only elevated national debt burdens but also introduced strains on governance frameworks within borrowing nations. For instance, in Angola, the $20 billion oil-backed loans from China Exim Bank facilitated significant infrastructure projects, including energy and transportation [20]. Yet, these arrangements have intensified debt pressures, with Angola’s oil revenues vulnerable to global market shifts, thus affecting the country's ability to meet repayment schedules. The implication here is clear: reliance on ECA financing, especially in

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resource-linked loans, can constrain nations' policy autonomy by tying their economic futures to fluctuations in commodity markets and external debt obligations [21].

Similarly, Zambia's high debt dependency on ECA financing, largely through China Exim Bank, for projects such as railways and energy development has led to precarious fiscal outcomes, including its default in 2020 [22]. In cases where loan repayment difficulties arise, ECAs have pursued aggressive legal or quasi-legal measures, exerting pressure on governments and pushing countries toward concessionary restructuring or asset-for-debt agreements [23]. This pressure directly influences the governance dynamics within borrowing states, as governments prioritize debt repayment over domestic needs and strategic autonomy, leading to compromised national policies.

Mozambique's "hidden debt crisis" further shows the governance risks tied to ECA-backed financing. Here, non-transparent borrowing practices and excessive guarantees given to ECA-supported lenders contributed to one of Africa's most significant debt crises [24]. This situation shows a broader trend where ECA-financed projects occasionally circumvent rigorous accountability standards. When such cases emerge, they illuminate how governance standards may be weakened under ECA arrangements, with opaque debt transactions fostering conditions ripe for corruption and mismanagement within state institutions.



Source: UN Global Crisis Response Group calculations, based on World Bank International Debt Report 2022

Environmental and Social Costs of Eca-Backed Projects

Even though ECA-backed projects are often marketed as catalysts for economic expansion and advancement, they may have significant negative effects on the environment and society, especially in areas with lax regulation. ECA-funded infrastructure projects, such as pipelines, dams, and roads, have often resulted in environmental damage, community uprooting, and restricted access to natural resources. In the extractive sectors, where extensive environmental damage has been wrought by large-scale oil, gas, and mining operations, the environmental consequences of ECA-backed projects are especially noticeable. For example, the Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline, supported by many ECAs, has come under fire for harming ecosystems and indigenous populations. Concerns about the sustainability of such expenditures have been raised by the project's deforestation, water contamination, and human relocation [25]. Furthermore, projects supported by the ECA often go forward without sufficient community involvement or taking into account their rights. The long-term advantages of these initiatives sometimes bypass the impacted communities completely, and they frequently get little to no compensation for the loss of their livelihoods [26]. The administration of these enterprises has become even more complex as a result of the escalating conflicts between governments, international investors, and local communities.

CONCLSION

In conclusion, while Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) play an essential role in advancing global trade by financing international projects, their activities in Africa highlight the complexities and challenges of balancing financial assistance with sustainable development. The reliance on ECA financing reflects a need for accessible funding in African nations, particularly for large infrastructure and industrial projects. However, as these agencies support local businesses from their home countries, the disconnect between financial backing and developmental accountability poses a unique governance dilemma for African states. Addressing this issue calls for an emphasis on economic sovereignty, where African governments can implement policies that align more closely with national development needs rather than merely meeting the requirements of foreign credit agencies.

Moving forward, the influence of ECAs on African economies exemplifies the importance of embedding transparent and ethical practices within the financing structures of ECA-supported projects. Enhancing policy and operational transparency, aligning ECA-backed projects with the developmental priorities of African countries, and fostering accountability mechanisms are crucial steps toward ensuring that foreign-financed projects genuinely benefit African citizens. ECAs, African governments, and international regulatory bodies should collaborate to establish more sustainable financing models that promote equitable growth, environmental stewardship, and socio-economic progress. Such a shift would allow ECAs to serve as vehicles of meaningful, lasting development, ultimately empowering African states to navigate the global economic landscape with strengthened policy autonomy and enhanced resilience against financial vulnerabilities.

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