

# The Crisis in Yemen and Security Implications in the Middle East

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**Abstract:**-This paper examined the Yemen crisis with a view to ascertaining its implication on the Middle East. The theory that was used for the study was the Institutional theory. The paper addressed issues that have to do with conceptual clarifications such as; the concept of security and regional crisis. The study adopted ex-post factor research design as the research design while data for the study was through secondary sources such as journal article, text books magazine newspapers and institutional documents and the content analysis method was adopted in the analysis. The findings of the paper among others revealed that the organized crime, corruption, terrorism and challenges of aid delivery have arisen as a result of the Yemen crisis and consequently it has affected the region in terms of humanitarian crisis which have made citizen of Yemen move to countries like Saudi Arabia, Oman and Djibouti. The finding of the paper further showed the security implications of the Yemen crisis on Iran and Saudi Arabia has for all intent brought about the proliferation of small arms, smuggling and piracy have affected the countries in the region. The paper recommended among others that the international community must make every effort to end the conflict in Yemen by developing mechanisms and strategies which would take into account the interests of all parties involved in this conflict and effective control of the circulation of small arms be ensured through the establishment of coherent legal and regulatory framework to control the circulation of small arms.

**Keywords:** Security, regional crisis, middle east, humanitarian crisis, terrorism

## I. INTRODUCTION

The current conflict in Yemen has roots dating back to 2004, but which greatly escalated in the autumn of 2014 when the rebel group known as the Houthis intensified attacks on the Yemeni government and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. This situation has made the Republic of Yemen faces various security challenges, persistently endangering its unity and stability. The Yemen is deeply divided across tribal confederations, Islamist movements, and economic as well as military interest groups. President Ali Abdullah Saleh skillfully employed a policy of divide-and-rule that included patronage to curry favor with individual tribes or the effective manipulation of tribal customs to turn them against each other when necessary. The former president Ali Abdullah Saleh once described his way of governing as “dancing on the head of snakes” (The Jerusalem post, 2011). This approach effectively determined and characterized politics and decision-making processes more than the formal governmental and administrative structures. It has contributed

to inefficient, underdeveloped, and corrupt state institutions and eroded the state’s capacity to fulfill its key tasks such as providing safety and security for its citizens, basic social welfare, or safeguarding the rule of law and political participation. The resulting crisis appears almost overwhelming; in 2011, the Failed State Index of the Fund for Peace ranks Yemen as 13th of 177 states. In addition to thousands of refugees from the Horn of Africa, almost half a million Yemenis have been displaced by fighting in the South and North of the country. The population faces chronic organized crime and corruption, terrorism challenges of aid delivery internally while the Yemen crisis has also affected the region in the aspect of humanitarian crisis which has affected Saudi Arabia, Djibouti and Oman as Yemeni’s citizens have moved to these places. The prospects of Yemen being able to tackle these security challenges look bleak as the institutions that are in the country remains weak. The security challenges in Yemen has also spread to different countries within the region, Saudi Arabia has been affected in terms of small arms, smuggling in narcotics and piracy. This is the problem that this paper tends to solve.

## II. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This paper addressed several objectives which includes; (1) analyze the security challenges that has arisen from the Yemen crisis; and, (2) determine how Yemen crisis has affected the Middle East security.

## III. LITERATURE REVIEW

### *Theoretical Review*

The theory that was used for this paper was the institutional theory. Institutional theory attends to the deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure. It considers the processes by which structures, including schemas, rules, norms, and routines, become established as authoritative guidelines for social behavior. It inquires into how these elements are created, diffused, adopted, and adapted over space and time; and how they fall into decline and disuse. Political institutional conditions might shape broad patterns of domestic politics. Overall authority in state political institutions might be centralized or decentralized. The legislative, executive, judicial, policing and other governmental functions within given political authorities might be located within sets of organizations or spread among different ones, each with their own autonomy and operating procedures. Politics might differ greatly in type, depending on the degree to which state rulers

had “despotic power,” to use Mann’s (1986) distinction or power “over” others (Lukes 1974). State political institutions were subject to different levels and paces of democratization and political rights among subjects and citizens. Once democratized polities were subject to different and consequential electoral rules governing the selection of political officials. States executive organizations were also subject to different levels and paces of bureaucratization and professionalization. Each of these processes might fundamentally influence political life. The other main line of argumentation, second in ultimate importance, was that states mattered as actors. State actors were understood organizationally, largely in a resource-dependence way. As organizations, different parts of states might have greater or lesser degrees of autonomy and different capacities. The autonomy of states or parts thereof was defined as their ability to define independent lines of action. State capacities were defined as the ability to carry out lines of action, along the lines of Mann’s (1986) “infrastructural power” (Skocpol 1985). The ideas of state autonomy and capacity brought into the discussion the “power to” do something, without neglecting “power over,” on which political scientists and sociologists had focused (Lukes, 1974). These differences in state autonomy and capacity in executive bureaucracies were argued as being important in explaining in the political outcomes across times and places. The initial state-centered theoretical program has evolved into a political-institutional one over the last decade or so (Amenta, 2005). Scholars have generally employed the Tocquevillian argument about states in an explanatory way and have added further argumentation concerning the construction of other large-scale political institutions, including political party systems. In the hands of some theorists, the arguments became more structural and systemic, with long-standing political institutions influencing all groups and having major influence over outcomes of interest. In the hands of others, political institutionalism has become more historical and focused on historical processes. Here, scholars continue to argue that political institutions fundamentally influence political life, but focus theoretical attention on the inter-action of actors at a medium-systemic, inter organizational level. These actors are seen as working within institutional constraints, as well as with constraints on resources and other means of action, and attempt to influence state policy. Changes in state policies in turn set processes in motion that influence the interests and strategies of actors that will determine whether programs will feed back in a way that strengthens the program or undermines it or leaves it open to changes at a later time. The relevance of the institutional theory to this paper is obvious, given that the theory makes it attainable for us to analyze the Yemen crisis and its security implications on the Middle East. Following Mann (1986) argument that state capacities were defined as the ability to carry out lines of action and the Yemen state has failed to out these lines of action as a result of institutions that has failed.

### *Conceptual review*

#### *Concept of Security*

Security needs to do with the procedure associated with alleviating any sort of risk to individuals and their valuable qualities. Buzan (1991) is of the view that security is about opportunity from risk and capacity of states to keep up free character and their practical trustworthiness against powers of progress, which they see as unfriendly while its primary concern is survival (Bodunde, 2014). From the prior, security is for the most part consented to be tied in with sentiment of being sheltered from mischief, fear, tension, mistreatment, peril, neediness, safeguard, assurance and protection of center qualities and danger to those qualities. William (2008) opines that security is most regularly connected with the easing of dangers to value esteems, particularly those dangers which undermine the survival of a specific reference question. In accordance with the abovementioned, Imobighe states that:

capacity to ensure and create itself, advance its treasured qualities and authentic premium and improve the prosperity of its kin. In this manner inward security could be viewed as the opportunity from or the nonappearance of those propensities, which could undermine interior attachment, and the corporate presence of a nation and its capacity to keep up its imperative organizations for the advancement of its center qualities and socio-political and monetary goals, and in addition meet the authentic desires of the general population (Ogaba, 2010).

It could consequently be induced that security, be it established, state-driven and conventionalist or non-conventionalist, is about assurance of advantages including living and non-living assets against misfortune or harm. There are two noteworthy Schools of Thought to the idea of security – Traditional and Non – Traditional. Customary School of Thought supports the upkeep of the Cold War origination of security. This school of thought characterizes security in this sense to mean wellbeing from risk and from outer assault or invasion. Conventional security worldview is a pragmatist build of security in which the referent protest is the state (Abolurin, 2011). It likens security with harmony and counteractive action of contention through military means i.e. discouragement arrangements, non-hostile protection and so forth. This is the reason Walt characterizes security as an investigation of risk, utilize, and control of military power (Walt, 1991). It investigates the circumstances that make utilization of power more probable, the ways the utilization of power influences people, states, social orders and the particular approaches that states utilize with the end goal to avert or participate in war. This school of thought is unequivocally fixing to the military and that is the reason Barry Buzan views security as immature and should have

been restored. Nwoli (2008) opines that the Cold War time frame gave the abnormal state mastery to the traditional security teaching to the degree that security lay on the trust that just a military framework can effectively discourage assault and risk of power. This additionally counts with Ken Booth position when he affirms that:

One of the topics of the new reasoning is the possibility that security arrangement ought to have political settlement as an essential and steady point. The negative impact of recognizing security only with military was apparent all through the chilly war. This methodology can be portrayed as key reductionism which is imagining security in a specialized and unthinking military path as showed in a fixation on military equalization and the utilization of best in class innovation (Nwoli, 2008).

The second school of thought on the conceptualization of security is non-conventional school. This school endeavors to enlarge and extend the meaning of security. It contends that different issues like condition, political, financial and social dangers imperils the lives and properties of individual as opposed to the fixation on the survival of the state. It does infer that a overwhelmingly military definition does not value the way that the best risk to state survival may not be military but rather natural, wellbeing, political, social and financial. The contemporary thoughts and conclusion about security are widely inclusive as properly sees as:

Security is more than military security or security from outer assaults. For some occupants in the creating nations, security is considered as the fundamental level of the battle for survival. In this way, with the end goal to give an incorporated African Security Assessment, the non-military measurement of security ought to be included. From this time forward, security as an idea ought to be connected in its more extensive sense to incorporate monetary security, government managed savings, natural security, nourishment security, uniformity of life security and innovative security (Ochoche, 1997).

Be that as it may, security in this sense is human liberation arranged. It implies that individuals/residents must be freed from those difficulties, troubles and limitations that may keep them from completing what uninhibitedly they would do which incorporates plagues, destitution, abuse, poor instruction, emergencies et cetera. Today, governmental issues, environmental issues, monetary and statistic issues which are non-military will in general posture genuine dangers to individuals' security. This brings forth the idea of human security. Moreover, Buzan (1991) gives a hypothetical

knowledge to the comprehension of the idea of security and he recognizes three levels of examination which are the individual level, national level and worldwide level. He is of the sentiment that singular security which different researchers called individual security includes those qualities individuals look to anchor which incorporate life, wellbeing, status, opportunity and riches (Buzan, 1991). A portion of the dangers which distinct individual undertaking to anchor themselves from is what is alluded to as standardized savings. This catches physical danger, financial risk and human rights misuse. Models of these are torment, damage, demise, seizure and annihilation of properties, unavailability to work or assets for human sustenance, bad form, uncalled for detainment and the forswearing of ordinary common freedoms and in addition dangers to human respect. The other two levels of Buzan's investigation; national and worldwide levels of security are talked about as national security and global security

#### *Concept of Regional Crisis*

Regions are much of the time characterized as gatherings of nations situated in the equivalent geographic space; however where one area closes and the following starts is now and then hazy. Besides, most analysts concur that a district suggests something other than physical nearness, despite the fact that the extra criteria that ought to be utilized have demonstrated dubious. Russett (1967) characterizes a region dependent on geographic vicinity, social and social homogeneity, shared political mentalities and political organizations, and monetary relationship. Deutsch et al. (1957) see large amounts of relationship over different measurements including monetary exchanges, correspondences, and political qualities as deciding if a gathering of nations creates an area. Thompson (1973) contends that districts incorporate states that are geologically proximate, collaborate widely, and have shared impression of different wonders. Despite the fact that topography lies at the core of the vast majority of these definitions, a few researchers characterize districts in nongeographic terms. Social definitions accentuate that political practice and association can change a district's arrangement. As Katzenstein (2005:9) puts it, that districts are politically made. Solingen (1998) is of the view an area's limits to the particular amazing methodologies of various local political alliances. The extent of a locale is consequently according to individuals from the overwhelming alliance. Subsequently, it is liable to persistent redefinition through venture into different locales or through household coalitional moves in fantastic methodology. Other non-geographic definitions that are ideational or social-constructivist push shared mutual characters of states inside a locale (Risse-Kappen 1995; Katzenstein 1997).

Deutsch (1957) is of the view that district building is established by alleged security networks, groupings of nations that share institutional frameworks to keep away from interior clashes and address regular outside dangers. In this vein, the presence of specific dangers (frequently as completely fledged clashes) has been instrumental to the formation of territorial

associations (Adler and Barnett 1998). The European coordination venture developed out of the fiery remains of the Second World War. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was made after the finish of expansionism while its successor, the AU, was set up to ensure harmony and improvement in a generally pained mainland. Essentially, ASEAN was established to restrict the progression of socialism in South-East Asia and reinforce the little nations of the district opposite their solid and great neighbors. The association between district (either in the propelled type of 'joining' or in the less created phase of collaboration) and emergencies is along these lines very close and cuts crosswise over generally hypotheses. For example, according to neo-functionalism, the simple procedure of territorial collaboration/joining is driven by a specific level of automacity, which appears as a persistent 'overflow' of capacities crosswise over approach divisions in this way expanding the forces of the provincial expert all the more adequately to address regular concerns (Haas and Schmitter, 1964). In this vein, emergencies can be quickening factors that speed up such an overflow impact and, in this way, fortify local collaboration and conceivably prompt combination. By differentiation, from an intergovernmental point, emergencies (particularly on the off chance that they are outside in nature) may all of a sudden decrease the scope of alternatives that states have available to them (e.g. free-riding or quitting) and create a combination of inclinations prompting some further developed types of regionalism. Since emergencies will in general modify the adjustments of political choices, coordinated effort (particularly at the provincial level) may out of the blue turned out to be more helpful for national strategy creators (Moravcsik, 1993). Additionally, from a federalist perspective, emergencies may comprise that risk that makes the federalist deal more tasteful while increasing the craving of taking an interest states for pertinence and power (Riker, 1964). At long last, in constructivist terms, it might be contended that emergencies are not given but rather should be translated and understood all things considered by every single pertinent partner. Since no inclinations or interests are settled, the social and political talk concerning emergencies can lead political on-screen characters towards a feeling of solidarity and reason, which is crucial during the time spent 'building areas' (Langenhove, 2011).

It appears, subsequently, as though regionalism and emergencies have dependably been personally associated, both observationally and hypothetically. However, albeit most hypothetical methodologies seem to examine emergencies as potential springboards for increasingly and better territorial collaboration/reconciliation, the inverse is similarly valid. For example, De Gaulle's basic position vis-à-vis the procedure of European incorporation (which prompted a drawn out institutional emergency during the 1960s) provoked Ernst Haas, the originator of the neo-functionalist approach, to infer that provincial combination hypothesis was out of date (Haas, 1975). The present sovereign obligation emergency (frequently named the euro emergency) is raising a

considerable measure of questions about the limit of the EU to climate the tempest and re-dispatch incorporation in the European landmass. Open talk in Europe, as well as in whatever remains of the world, appears to indicate the way that provincial participation/combination does not bargain well with "blustery days", when part states will in general turned out to be all the more internal looking and look for shelter in childish patriotism. Schmitter (2004) is of the view that mostly on account of this naturally undecided connection among district and emergencies that a decent hypothesis of local coordination ought not exclusively have the capacity to clarify what drives territorial incorporation forward, yet additionally what causes local breaking down.

#### IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Given, the problem of the paper, this paper adopted the Ex Post Facto (After the Fact) research design. Materials for this paper was sourced through secondary sources of data which included here are textbooks, journal articles, newspapers, magazines, official documents from the government, internet materials, among others. Content analysis was used to analyse data so generated. This is with a view to identify logical sequence of data as well as trends.

#### V. RESEARCH FINDINGS

*Security challenges as a result of the crisis in Yemen*

*Organized Crime and Corruption*

Yemen suffers from organized crime, a bi-product of nation-wide underdevelopment and emerging networks of patronage. The UNODC (2010) identifies the two predominant threats to Yemen's security, stability and development as illicit trafficking (particularly of drugs) and criminal networks (including terrorism and its financing). However, many of Yemen's weapons are left-overs of previous conflicts. Its primary source of narcotics consumption is also legal. Therefore, much of the evidence linking organized crime to mainstream criminogenic commodities in Yemen is circumstantial. Organized crime might be linked to the trafficking of specialized weaponry (such as valuable antique guns) and alcohol. While some alcohol, including *Baladi* (a vodka-like liqueur), is brewed in Yemen, most is smuggled into the country from Ethiopia and Djibouti (Murphy, 2010). Other forms of organized crime include banditry and kidnapping (CSO, 2009), whereby a relatively small group of people, or even an entire community, is able to win quick financial profits by harassing and intimidating other communities and individuals. With long roads, large desert and mountain terrains, and low levels of police and law enforcement outside the major cities, Yemen lends itself well to such criminal opportunism. Organized crime in Yemen is mainly linked to human smuggling and trafficking and to the smuggling of agricultural and fishing produce— including *qat*. Difficult mountainous terrain in the north is an obstacle to Government intervention and has encouraged local combatants and insurgents familiar with the landscape to

adopt guerrilla tactics, so that conflict and banditry overlap in difficult-to-traverse areas. The challenges of organized crime and conflict in Yemen are connected to the predominance of corruption. For many Yemeni citizens, corruption is a daily reality (TI, 2010) that has resulted in the emergence of a highly contested parallel state, based on tribal affiliations and the entrenchment of patronage networks. This has acted as an important impediment for reform and is a leading cause of bureaucratic stalling in the dispersal of bilateral aid and the delivery of development projects. One explanation for the parallel state is that the Government's limited ability to exercise its authority has traditionally fostered reliance upon patronage systems and tribal allegiances (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010). Another reason is that Yemen's very poor law enforcement system allows for criminal opportunism, while the poor salaries of low-level public officials encourage bribery. Those communities unable to access benefits awarded through Government patronage are particularly likely to reject state authority, either falling into mainstream patterns of offending or contributing to on-going conflicts. Corruption facilitates the formation of the give-and-take relationships that are necessary for organized crime to flourish (Martínez, 2007).

#### *Terrorism*

Yemen has long been plagued by terrorism, and is home to one of the most dangerous terrorist networks Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Their Yemeni branch is especially feared for expert bomb-makers, and its several thousand fighters. AQAP has a decentralized hierarchical structure, which makes the group incredibly flexible and elusive. The group's primary objectives include overthrowing the government in Sana'a, targeting embassies and other foreign infrastructure in Yemen and the region, and carrying out attacks in Western countries. AQAP has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in the region and beyond, including attacks on the US, British and Italian embassies in Sana'a; suicide bombings targeting tourists; the bombing of a Japanese oil tanker in 2009; and training the perpetrators and allegedly orchestrating the attack on French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris in 2015. The current conflict has allowed AQAP to benefit from the resultant security vacuum. The distraction of the civil war has eased the pressure from government security forces, allowing increased militant presence in the country. Yemen's limited water resources have also allowed them to fill the void of the central government in regions south and east of Sana'a by providing villages with water, wells, and other important water infrastructure (The Guardian, 2015). However, clashes between the Houthi rebels and AQAP are taking place on an almost daily basis. There is now clear evidence that Islamic State has also expanded into the country. In March 2015, extremists affiliated to Islamic State carried out suicide bombings on two Shi'a mosques in the capital of Sana'a killing at least 137 people (The Guardian, 2015). It was the first attack attributed to Islamic State since the group gained a foothold in the country. On 2nd September,

a double suicide bomb attack in Sana'a killed at least 20 people in a mosque (BBC, 2015). Just days later, during the Muslim Eid al-Adha holiday, two suicide bombers attacked another Shi'a mosque, killing at least 25 people and leaving many more wounded (The Guardian, 2015). Prior to the Civil War, the United States worked with the Yemeni authorities in targeting terrorist groups operating in the country. The international and national counter-terrorism operation has now been partly halted, except for isolated US drone strikes. The long-time leader of AQAP, Nasser al-Wuhayshi, was killed in an US strike in June 2015. Al-Wuhayshi was AQ's second in command and the highest-ranking AQ leader assassinated since Osama Bin Laden in 2011. The growth of these organizations is a direct threat to the entire region and to Western states. Re-establishment of a central security apparatus and dedicated counter-terrorism efforts can only happen after the Civil War has ended. This factor should provide an impetus to the international community to increase the pressure on both parties to negotiate.

#### *Challenges of aid delivery*

The dangers to aid workers within the country are severe: on 28<sup>th</sup> September, two volunteers working with the Yemeni Red Crescent Society were killed along with other civilians during an airstrike in the Al-Swaida area of Taiz. Two ICRC staff members were killed on the 2nd of September in the Amran Governorate. ICRC's Offices in Aden were also attacked by armed gunmen on the 24<sup>th</sup> of August. Since the start of the crisis in March, a total of six Yemen Red Crescent volunteers have been killed while carrying out their humanitarian work. Medecins Sans Frontieres detail similar challenges, stating that as the frontline is constantly shifting, MSF constantly struggles to supply hospitals, or procure authorization to give medical supply to these hospitals. Mercy Corps state in their evidence that, "with regards to security, we would like to highlight the fact that lawlessness prevails in Aden, evidenced by an incident of looting of our office just this week." They also state that in some areas, "security is so bad (with the presence of snipers, shelling, airstrikes, and general criminality) that most of our staff can barely leave their homes, let alone their neighborhoods." NGOs and charities require safe, predictable, and unimpeded access to people across Yemen, and distribution free from interference or threats to staff. Humanitarian aid must be delivered across frontlines, and in particular into cut off areas under heavy fighting.

#### *Effect of the crises in Yemen which has led to movement of persons to other parts of the region*

##### *Saudi Arabia*

The Yemeni crisis, and especially its spillover effects, caused immediate concern within the Saudi government, which evacuated at least seventy-eight border villages to create an empty buffer zone and extended the network of fences it had begun building along the border several years earlier (Worth, 2010). These forced displacements and border reinforcements

affected the intense cross-border personal and commercial relationships between the two countries, as many villages on the border's western edge are half Yemeni, half Saudi (Worth, 2010). Saudi Arabia, which is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, argues that a visa-based model is preferable to refugee status as it preserves the dignity of displaced people by facilitating access to proper housing, freedom of movement, and rights to work, education, and healthcare. On the other hand, the "worker" status is costly and highly restricted, it excludes any kind of financial support, legal protection, and the path to potential citizenship that is afforded to those recognized as refugees, and it leaves holders vulnerable to deportation at any time.<sup>92</sup> Human rights organizations affirm that mass deportations of people on such visas, sometimes involving beatings and detainment in poor conditions, are fairly common (McKernan, 2017). Saudi Arabia temporarily suspended the deportation of Yemeni citizens in late March 2015 following the intensification of violent conflict in the country. However, the government is currently reviewing a proposal to deport an estimated 5 million undocumented or irregular migrants, leaving a ninety-day grace period to correct their legal status.

#### *Djibouti*

Djibouti faces unique migration challenges owing to its location at the crossroads between Europe, Asia, and Africa. Since 2009, the country has become a central point on the migration route from Africa toward the Gulf Arab countries. Thousands of migrants and refugees use it as a country of both destination and transit on their journey to the Arabian Peninsula. In addition to so-called economic migrants, Djibouti hosts long-term Somali, Ethiopian, Eritrean, and Yemeni refugees, as well as Djiboutian returnees from Yemen. People fleeing Yemen and south-central Somalia are granted refugee status *prima facie*, while Ethiopians are granted asylum-seeker status (UNHCR, 2016). Arrivals peaked following the escalation of conflict in March 2015, but the number of arrivals dwindled shortly thereafter. The sudden attention from authorities and international organizations brought much-needed investment to increase the capacity of local services in the Obock and Tadjoura regions. With the stabilization of the conflict in Yemen and tough living conditions in Djibouti, especially in the Markazi refugee camp, most Yemenis have returned home or have decided to continue their journey. As of January 2017, 5,212 persons of concern related to the Yemeni crisis were still officially registered with UNHCR in Djibouti, less than a third of whom (around 1,721) are still hosted in the Markazi camp. Those still in the camp are considered to be the most vulnerable, as they receive no local support and are unable to integrate into the Yemeni community in Djibouti.

#### *Oman*

According to available data, migrants and refugees made up 44 percent of Oman's total resident population in 2015, as the country relies heavily on foreign workers (GLMM,

2015). Among the Gulf Arab states, Oman is considered historically, ethnically, and linguistically closest to Yemen, especially in the western Dhofar governorate. Thanks to its location close to the richest countries in the region but farther from the front lines of the conflict in Yemen, Oman has received more migrants and refugees than its Gulf Arab neighbors but relatively few from Yemen (UNHCR, 2015). Oman, like most Gulf Arab countries, is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, nor to the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons or the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. It also has no specific national laws or administrative regulations governing asylum seekers or refugees. With the exception of nationals from the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, all foreign citizens in Oman, including those who register with UNHCR, fall under national immigration laws (UNHCR, 2015). Due to the crisis, Yemenis are currently only allowed to enter with a valid reason or invitation. Oman also accepts some carefully vetted Yemeni sons on a "humanitarian basis," and although it does not publicly report how many, about 2,500 are supposed to be hosted in the country (Shaibany, 2017). Visas for medical reasons are granted if the applicant can produce an official document from a physician, validated by both Yemeni and Omani customs authorities. Given the limited number of humanitarian organizations active there, the major concern for Yemeni migrant and refugee populations in Oman is the absence of protection activities and programs. Another area of concern is the fate of unaccompanied or undocumented minors and women, especially girls. Interviewees highlighted a growing trend of marriages involving foreign men from Gulf countries coming to Yemen to find a young wife because of the much smaller dowry. These arrangements, concluded under duress and because of the needs of the Yemeni family, are then formalized in front of an officer at the Omani border, allowing the husband to enter Oman with his new wife (Batha, 2017).

#### *Yemen crisis and the security implication in the Middle East*

##### *Iran*

In the beginning of 2015 few months after the Houthi rebels and their ally, deposed president Ali Abdullah Saleh assumed power in the capital Sana, Iran signed joint economic agreements with the Houthi rebels in the fields of oil, electricity, aviation, and sea shipments. According to these agreements, Iran pledged to provide Yemen with petroleum products for one year and establish electricity plants in the provinces of Aden, Hodeida, and Taiz and to repair the electricity transmission line between Marib and Sana. In addition, Iran vowed to expand the port of Hodeida, set a line of credit to supply Yemen with its needs, dispatch Iranian experts in all fields of infrastructure to Yemen, and establish a direct air bridge to launch daily air flights between the two countries. These agreements were a turning point in Iran's role from being a covert marginal supporter into a declared ally to the Houthi rebels. However, the launch of the Decisive Storm Operation by the Saudi-led Arab coalition against the

Houthi rebels on March 26, 2015 deterred the practical implementation of these agreements and prevented any further penetration of the Iranian influence into Yemen. All in all, Iran's goals in Yemen do not differ from its role in the region or in other countries like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Bahrain. These goals lie under Iran's strategy and comprehensive plan of action for hegemony and expansion relying on the Iranian decision makers' views on the role Iran must take up on the regional and international level. Basically, these views stem from Iran's historical memory and its rooted national political culture that is remarkably inclined towards hegemony. In this regard, Iran's views reflect its history, where the trends of expansion, military hegemony, and the Persian Empire culture congregate with the foreign hegemony and domination of Iran by the Greeks, Arabs, Turks, Afghans, and Russians. This is, in addition to the historical heritage of Iran's Shiism -with all its sense of pain and injustice- in a way that creates a form of combination between glory and a sense of injustice. This results in a complicated view for the Iranian decision makers toward their neighbors and the world but one that catapults Iran into having an influential role at the regional and international levels. It seems that these views of Iran- taking into consideration all of Iran's revolutionary circumstances, the war with Iraq in the eighties of the last century, and Iran's regional and international isolation- contributed to creating an everlasting feeling of threat and insecurity, given that Iran is surrounded by ideological, historical and sectarian rivals. Based on these assumptions, Iran feels this geographic sphere is a constant source of threat and danger for its existence and national interests, which drives it to enforce its security and restrain all existing and potential threats. In fact, Iran believes its intervening role and activities in its regional neighbors- Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Bahrain- is a kind of self-defense either by mobilizing its supporters and loyalists from the same sect and ideology in these countries (within the framework of exporting Iran's revolutionary model outside its borders and supporting the oppressed people against tyrant forces and imperialism) or by expanding Iran's secure vital sphere at the expense of the other countries and transfer what it believes as its line of defense into its rivals' territories or their vital sphere (under the slogan of defending Iran and its ideology and the priority of confronting its enemies on their land instead of facing them inside Iran). This refers to the absence of mutual security with other countries in the Iranian psyche and Iran's inclination toward achieving its national security as a zero-sum game. This strategy is evident by the statements of some Iranian officials like Ali Akbar Velayati, the advisor of the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei when he said, "Iran's presence in Syria and Iraq is self-defense," and the statement of the IRGC Quds Division Commander, Qassem Suleimani when he said, "The goal of the Iranian intervention in Syria is to defend Islam and Iran," claiming that ISIS and Takfirist groups were not formed to face Syria, but to face Iran. In addition, the Iranian cleric and head of the so called, "Ammar Center" to confront soft power, Mahdi Ta'ib said, "Syria is Iran's 35th province." He added, "If the enemy attacks us to take Syria or Khuzestan (Ahwaz),

our priority will be defending Syria because if we keep Syria, we will go back to Ahwaz, but if we lose Syria, we cannot defend even Tehran."

#### *Saudi Arabia*

##### *Proliferation of Small Arms:*

Saudi Arabia has been affected by instability in Yemen which has created proliferation of small arms. The easy availability of arms in Yemen is a further complication with most of illegal weapons and explosives smuggled into Saudi Arabia coming from Yemen. This will intensify in a failed Yemen, making small arms and explosives more available in the Arabian Peninsula for terrorist groups and criminal networks in addition to pirates. Yemen's long porous border with Saudi Arabia is a frequent source of anxiety to the Saudi government, and the Saudis fear an influx of militants, contraband or refugees from its southern neighbor. Yemen is awash with small arms. They are easily available in both open and clandestine markets throughout the country. The estimated number of civilian small arms in circulation in Yemen is 6-17 million weapons. There are also many heavier weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades (Juneau, 2010). Smuggling small arms and explosives from Yemen to Saudi Arabia has been a big problem for the Saudis even before the deteriorating situation in Yemen. Between October and December 2007, the Saudi border authorities captured 100 kg of explosives, 400 weapons, 50,000 pieces of ammunitions, and 100 sticks of dynamite. Since the 1990s perpetrators of terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia have used explosives which originated from Yemen. Smugglers provide the weapons used by radical Islamists who operate inside Saudi Arabia. Thus, these smugglers are the source of the explosives used in attacks against civilian targets, such as the 2003 Riyadh compound bombings which killed 35 and injured over a hundred. There is a strong lack of trust in the Yemeni ability to arrest infiltrators before they make it into Saudi territory. This infiltration will only increase if Yemen continues its slide on the path of instability. The impact of smuggling on Saudi Arabia would not be limited to the smuggling of small arms.

##### *Smuggling:*

Narcotic smugglings across the Saudi southern border have been a problem for the Saudi authorities for a long time. This will only intensify as the situation in Yemen deteriorates. There is a substantial smuggling across the Yemeni-Saudi border, which enriches Yemenis. The associated press reported on February 6, 2011 that, between October and December 2007, Saudi authorities arrested 880 alleged smugglers, many of whom were Yemenis, along this border. During this period and in addition to small arms and explosives, the border authorities captured 2,000 kg of hashish, four kg of marijuana, and 40,000 pills. The Yemeni News Agency reported on January 25, 2011 that Yemeni Police seized around 600 kg of hashish in Amran governorate in Northern Yemen close to the Saudi border.

**Piracy:** Another security problem the instability of Yemen would create for Saudi Arabia is the piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. According to the UN group tasked with monitoring the 1992 arms embargo on Somalia, five Yemeni ports have been used by Somali pirates as resupply stations. The report also said that some of the arms and fuel used by the Somali pirates had come from Yemen (MGS,2010). In a failed Yemen, despondent fishermen, motivated by declining fish stocks and lack of authority, could imitate the Somalis and engage in piracy, increasing the threat in the Gulf of Aden.

## VI. CONCLUSION

The paper concluded that the security challenges that have arisen as a result Yemen crisis includes; Organized Crime and Corruption, challenges of aid delivery and terrorism this has deepen the security challenges in Yemen and also led to suffering of the citizens. The paper further concluded the crisis in Yemen has affected the Middle East in terms of security which has caused a humanitarian crisis and people have moved to places like Saudi Arabia, Djibouti and Oman. The paper also concluded that the Yemen crisis has also affected Saudi Arabia in terms of proliferation of small arms, smuggling in narcotic and piracy which has affected the countries involved.

## VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings of the study it was recommended that;

- 1) The international community must now make every effort to end the conflict in Yemen by developing mechanisms and strategies which would take into account the interests of all parties involved in this conflict.
- 2) There should be unconditional and safe access for humanitarian agencies, and allow them to work in an independent and impartial manner without excessive hurdles or political interference, including across frontlines.
- 3) The growth of terrorist groups in Yemen must be viewed with greater concern by the international community and identified as an additional motivating factor for a resolution of the conflict, to allow anti-terrorism operations to continue.
- 4) Effective control of the circulation of small arms be ensured through the establishment of coherent legal and regulatory framework to control the circulation of small arms.
- 5) There is need to enforce and to arrest pirates and they need serious punishment after legal procedure.

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