

# Tackling Political Crisis in Nigeria: Lessons from Aba Women Crisis of 1929

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**Abstract** - There has been incessant political crisis in Nigeria since the colonial time and especially in the post independence era. Much has been noted about the destabilizing effects of the regional tripod on which the early Nigerian federation rested. This paper therefore is significant due to the ability to identify the causes of those crisis and much more prescribe the reasons that may lead to check the raised tension of political crisis in Nigeria. The paper historically examines the Aba Women Crisis of 1929 and presents the lessons from there which may help improve governance and political practice to usher in the desired expectation of political and economic development. It is observed that good governance, and responsible leadership, recognition of women, effective communication of government policies, and equitable distribution of national wealth, protection of life and property and adequate demonstration of sensibility to the needs of the populace will increase the expectations of Nigerians. The paper concludes that when ethnic hegemony, personality clashes, neglect of women are minimized or eliminated out of the way, that is, the absence of these challenges will reposition Nigeria for good.

**Keywords:** Colonialism, Ethnic Hegemony, Governance, Federalism, Equality.

## I. BACKGROUND

The Aba women riot of 1929 started with the British appointment of warrant chiefs in Eastern Nigeria by the British colonial administrators. According to Eleonu (2008), this singular policy decision faced open resistance which culminated to widespread crisis all over Eastern Nigeria. One of the Warrant Chiefs whose name was Chief Okwugo appointed by the colonial government in Olakwo near Aba proceeded to assess the taxable wealth of inhabitants in his domain by counting resources including men, women in his unit. Consequently, the exercise made women in the area to believe that the action means and expresses a process for the women to pay tax. So the women got raged, mobilized and attacked the warrant chiefs in the East, British officials, European trading stores and banks. The riot spread to other neighboring towns in Eastern region such as Owerri Division, Calabar, and Opobo. As observed, by December 17, 1929 the war as it were took 32 lives and many persons were wounded. The riot was provoked not only by the fear of taxation of women in Aba and Owerri Division but also by the low prices of farm products which affected the livelihood of women in Eastern Nigeria. After the 1929 Aba women war as some authorities describe it during the colonial era, the post-independence period and present day Nigeria witness series of incessant political crisis.

## II. SOME MAJOR POLITICAL CRISIS IN NIGERIA

There was the Action Group crisis in 1962 in western region. This crisis originated out of the sharp disagreement between Obafemi Awolowo and S.L. Akintola then deputy leader of the Action Group. With the hope of becoming the Prime Minister of Nigeria, Awolowo relinquished the Premiership of Western Nigeria to Akintola. Following Awolowo's failure he became the opposition leader in the central legislature. While at the center it was alleged that he wanted to exercise general control and supervision over the West and wanted to be consulted on changes of policy and appointments in the Western region. He was also alleged to disagree over federal coalition government of the Northern People's Congress and the National Council of Nigerian Citizens. In an attempt to finding a compromise and for the party to reassert its full control over the Western regional government, chief Akintola was dismissed from his party post. Consequently, the supporters of Akintola disrupted several meetings of the regional legislature. This caused the declaration of the state of emergency by the federal government over the western region till December 31, 1962. The Action Group crisis did not end but caused Awolowo Ten years imprisonment in June 1963.

There was also the Federal Election Crisis in 1964. Major political parties in Nigeria constituted themselves into two big alliances. In June 3, 1964, the NCNC, AG and the NPF formed an alliance known as the United Progressives Grand Alliance (UPGA). On August 20, 1964 another alliance known as the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) made up of the NPC, NNDP, MDF and the NDC was formed. Unhealthy rivalry then erupted during the electioneering campaigns of the parties and there were also irregular methods of nominating candidates for election. In the Northern parts of Nigeria, UPGA candidates were made to encounter problems in obtaining nomination papers from electoral officers and some UPGA candidates were kidnapped. As a result of reports sent to the president by UPGA, the President and the Prime Minister disagreed over the holding of the election and due to irregularities in the election in Northern Nigeria 3 members of the federal electoral commission resigned which made the body unable to perform its primary function creditably. On the election day December 30, 1964 the UPGA boycotted the election in protest but the Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa against the wish of the President Nnamdi Azikiwe went on to form the government without representatives of the Action Group.

In 1965, the Western Regional Election generated crisis. The National Government was broad based because several parties joined it. In the regions, the unhealthy rivalry between the UPGA and the NNA persisted even as NNNDP, the party in power in the West represented and safeguarded the interest of NNA while the UPGA fielded both AG and NCNC candidates. The government in power in the region passed several electoral bills, later banned the holding of public meetings and then later imposed a curfew on the inhabitants of certain parts of western region. After the formal dissolution of the Western House of Assembly, selection of candidates began but was followed with serious allegations of irregularities in the conduct of nomination of candidates. Some returning officers were particularly against UPGA candidates who were either not allowed to file their nomination papers or unopposed just as they had political opponents.

The election took place on October 11, 1965 in a tense atmosphere. In the face of serious allegations of irregularities over counting of votes, smuggling of ballot papers and slotting of ballot papers into ballot boxes, the Secretary to the Regional Electoral Commission stated that NNNDP had won 88 out of the 98 seats contested. Later Alhaji D. S. Adegbenro who earlier had handed a protest letter to the regional government over the conduct of the election declared himself as Premier and appointed eight others as ministers. The interim administration of S.L. Akintola degenerated into chaos especially as there was demonstrations and protests calling for his removal. Adegbenro was then arrested and later released after trial. During the crisis about 1,000 people lost their lives and about 5,000 houses were burnt down and Akintola went into hiding. In spite of the attempts of the Federal Government to quell the crisis with the use of police and the army, the crisis continued until January 16, 1966 when a coup occurred and the federal government was overthrown.

There was a general election crisis in 1979. The Chairman of the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) Chief Michael Ani announced the qualifications for the registration of five out of 19 political parties proving seemingly ready for the 1979 election. These parties were the, Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP), National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP), Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) and the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN). The Presidential election was then held on August 11, 1979. The Federal Electoral Commission on August 17, 1979 declared Alhaji Shehu Shagari the winner of the election. The returning officer, Mr. Fredrick Menkiti said that Shagari satisfied the provision of section 34 (A) subsection (1) (C) (1) of the Electoral Decree No. 73 of 1977 by scoring the highest number of votes cast at the election and that Shagari also satisfied the provision of subsection (1) (C) (1) of the same section of the Electoral Decree.

The Nigeria People's Party rejected the declaration immediately the declaration was made by FEDECO. The NPP

described the declaration of the election as fraudulent. The PRP also described the declaration as outrageous. The NPN totally rejected the result of the presidential election and urged the federal government not to use it. Chief Obafemi Awolowo on August 19, 1979 petitioned against the result which was declared in favour of Shagari and contented that Shagari was not duly elected by a majority of lawful votes because he had not satisfied the section 34A subsection (1) (C) (11) of Electoral Decree 1978. Awolowo claimed the declaration of Shehu Shagari was invalid by reason of non-compliance with the provisions of that decree. The court however ruled in favour of Alhaji Shehu Shagari and who was given the mantle of leadership on October 1, 1979.

In 1981 the Kaduna State experienced the Executive and Legislative Crisis. The Kaduna State crisis of 1981 was prompted by a result of the rift between the executive and the legislature in the state. On record is that the NPN made impressive records in winning the Senate, House of Representatives and the house of Assembly elections but Alhaji Balarabe Musa of the PRP was declared winner of the Governorship election based on his personal credibility. The fact remains that the PRP was the minority party though it won the Governorship seat as the people voted on merit. Unfortunately, the NPN used its majority strength against the governor such that an impeachment process was commenced and on June 23, 1981 the Kaduna State House of Assembly removed Musa from office. Governor Balarabe Musa took the case to court but the Kaduna High Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to prohibit the House and its Speaker from performing their legislative duties. The general public however widely condemned the impeachment.

Another political crisis started on June 12, 1993. The military head of State of Nigeria in 1993, General Ibrahim Babangida called on Nigerians to hold conferences and debates so as to choose what political system, party system and political structure to move Nigeria forward. This call was received with joy and Nigerians responded accordingly. At the end of the exercise, it was agreed that multi party system will do the nation good. Unfortunately, Babangida personally floated 2 parties which he named National Republican Convention (NRC) and Social Democratic Party (SDP). He also prepared their symbols and constitutions. The transition programme took off successfully with local council elections, state and national assembly elections and then governorship elections conducted in the states. During the presidential election scheduled for June 12, 1993 there ensued crisis resulting from the pronouncement by the head of state, Babangida that the election believed to have been won by M. K.O. Abiola has been annulled.

Consequently, all political structures that were put in place were disbanded. This caused all sections of the society to protest against the federal military government. As a result then there was impasse as the military held strong to political power. There was a serious confusion because different associations went to court especially the Association for

Better Nigeria (ABN). The Yoruba's felt humiliated and the Southerners interpreted the annulment to mean a northern hegemony while the center could not hold. The situation forced Babangida to step aside for Ernest Shonekan to head the Interim National Government (ING).

### III. POLITICAL CRISIS AND THE NIGERIAN NATION

The troublesome question is but why has unity, so clearly enunciated on the Nigerian coat of arms eluded our nation? Secondly, where did the rain begin to beat Nigerians? Again how may Nigeria find shelter from the blizzard of ethnic and religious sentiments that becloud every attempt at national transformation? To Nnamdi Azikiwe, there is the need for us to go for a terse essay on the travails that rocked the ship of state in those early years of nationhood. Azikiwe labeled his declamation on the march of Nigerian history at the time as the "Monument of Shame" In it, he captured the political naivety and greed, unbridled ambition and visionless leadership that led to the bloody collapse of the First Republic. It is instructive that the great Azikiwe does not condemn any ethnic or religious group, but lays the blame squarely on poor and inept leadership skills. In doing this, he accepted and supported the conclusion of Chinua Achebe that, the trouble with Nigeria is quite simply the problem of poor leadership. By this admission of Azikiwe, the failure of leadership sprang from greed, over reaching ambition, and lack of vision by political leaders.

Okute (2012) explains that half a century after the British gamely folded away the Union Jack and allowed the Green and White flag to grace the Nigerian skies in its place, a recalcitrant ghost continues to haunt the great Nigeria Project. The Partition of Africa, dream of the colonial masters to carve out spheres of influence including Nigeria's territories for unhindered exploitation, bred and nurtured political contraptions around Africa. Abaalkoro (2012) concludes that this is the wicked geographical structure which the British imposed on Nigerians. Looking back, there is only one compelling reason why the colonial administration failed to grant autonomy to the minority groups.

Political leaders in the North had proved to be more accommodating of the colonial mandate than those in the East and West. The colonial authorities could not, therefore, upset the balance of power which favoured the North by splitting the regions. Nor could they show their hands by carving up the other two regions without doing the same to the North. It benefitted the British instead of to play up the disagreements among the political parties and paper up the cracks with fine rhetoric. Consequently, the Willink Minority Commission of 1956 constituted a face-saving administrative ploy to dampen the agitations for autonomy by the minorities. It is a matter of utmost wonder to many Nigerians therefore, that the spirited responses by succeeding indigenous governments to the minorities problem in Nigeria, beginning with the Midwest region in 1964, the 12-state structure in 1967, and subsequent

state creation exercises in 1976, 1986 and 1996 have not assuaged the demands for autonomy around the country.

In his response to the recommendations of the Willink Minority Commission, Prime Minister Balewa boasted during a speech at the London Constitutional Conference in 1958 that Bauchi hilltop will become a separate state. After only 18 years Bauchi was a Province and in the First Republic, Bauchi transformed to a state by military fiat. Twenty years afterwards, the same Bauchi state produced Gombe state, whereas several other former provinces around the federation has remained part of larger political units within the current 36 state framework. Clearly therefore, perceived inequities in the distribution of political and economic benefits contribute greatly to the persistent demands for the restructuring of the political and economic foundations of Project Nigeria.

The British did not show interest to provide a level playing ground for the contending units of the federation. It suited their colonial interests to play a divide and rule game for the continued control of the native populations. Since 1960, the native elites who took over the battle of leadership have not fared better. Tragically the native elites are better even at the insidious game of creating ethnic and religious divides to bolster their grip on the economic and political sectors of the nation state. It is a measure too of the pervading strength of these cleavages that they have survived every transition, including the current six- zone geopolitical arrangement, crafted by the framers of the 1999 Constitution as the bedrock of a federal character principle for the sharing of political offices and infrastructure. Every minority harbours yet its own minorities, perceptive observers noted during the Willink investigations. It seems obvious then that the demand for states, local governments and other structures of governance may never come to an end.

### IV. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The frame work of analysis adopted in this work is historical methodology. Historical methodology enables one to have the world of the past and the meaning of the present. It is the road to self knowledge and a means of understanding the attitudes, method and motives of peoples of disparate backgrounds. It informs, inspires and serves as an outlet to exhibit urge and deep feeling. Historical method is considered an indispensable background that allow for other forms of knowledge in humanities, social science and physical sciences. It serves the function of providing a cultural, social, and political context for every other intellectual discipline and branch of knowledge. History is needed to understand the development of literature, art, music, and philosophy. The historical method allows for the perception of how the world of today came into existence and makes one understand the historical process which has conditioned other peoples of the world. Historical method is the means to social emancipation and intellectual maturity. In this paper the historical method enables the Nigerian populace and the international

community to understand how Nigeria came to where it stands today.

Another useful theory used in this study is the participatory development paradigm. Development policy has aimed to involve communities in the development process by encouraging the active participation of communities in the design and implementation of projects or in the allocation of local resources. The World Bank alone has provided more than \$85 billion for participatory development since the early 2000s and the explanation is that participatory development (PD) seeks to engage local populations in development projects in their communities and localities.

The "Institutional Perspective" defines participation as the reach and inclusion of inputs by relevant groups in the community. Some of the reasons why crisis in Nigeria especially political crisis is incessant are because this perspective of participatory development which identifies the goal of participation as an empowering process for people to handle challenges and influence the direction of their own lives is neglected in Nigeria.

#### V. CAUSES OF POLITICAL CRISIS IN NIGERIA

Some of the reasons why crisis in Nigeria especially political crisis is incessant has been several and combined reasons. Beginning with the Action Group crisis of 1962, factors responsible for the crisis clearly stand out. The personality clash between Chief Awolowo and S. L. Akintola was the main cause of the Action Group (AG) crisis. Chief Awolowo became the leader of the opposition in the federal House of Representatives. He Awolowo was determined to have overall control in policies, programmes and decide key appointments in the Western Region. Akintola opposed this position of Awolowo. While Akintola saw Awolowo as a usurper, Awolowo saw him as an inordinately ambitious man, interested in total party leadership.

Furthermore, Awolowo had introduced an ideology of democratic socialism in the West. This policy which involved the state's participation in business enterprises was not acceptable to Akintola with other close capitalists. One other reason remains that while Akintola, Ayo Rosiji and some others favoured the Action Group working together with the NPC which controlled the federal government, Awolowo positioned himself differently and preferred to cooperate with the NCNC to remove the NPC from power. Another major cause of the crisis which accompanied the 1964 elections was the timing for preparation for elections. In December 1964, the Prime minister, Tafawa Balewa, advised the president, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe to dissolve parliament before elections slated to hold on December 30.

The Federal Electoral Commission could not prepare authentic voters list and failed to display them as well for lack of time. There were also irregularities and discrimination in nomination papers. Nomination papers were made available to the NNA but UPGA was denied and which led to thuggery

and breakdown of law and order in several areas. While the NNNDP announced her 94 candidates near close of nominations, the UPGA could not get nomination papers for some of its candidates and worse could not submit ready papers to electoral officials. The request by UPGA for an extension of nomination period was not granted. While the UPGA could not submit nomination papers in many instances, 15 NNNDP candidates were returned unopposed and declared winners including those personal candidates of the premier and his deputy. The UPGA protested to the governor, Sir Odeleye Fadahunsi to no comfortable result. Elections went on in October with massive malpractices like burning and disappearance of ballot boxes, seizing of ballot papers, unfair counting, thuggery and fighting.

Towards the end of counting of votes, conflicting results were announced and released. The confusion heightened when Adegbenro declared himself the Premier of the region where as Akintola was officially sworn in as Premier. This means that 2 Premiers emerged in the same region. Adegbenro and his supporters were arrested and detained. This did not go down well with UPGA members. Thus there were protests, arson, murder and general breakdown of law and order. Some people, mostly students, called on the Prime minister to declare a state of emergency, which he declined to do. He instead asked the aggrieved parties to seek redress in the law courts, which many people regarded as mere government organs. An elders peace meeting between leaders of the NNNDP and the UPGA also brought neither peace nor agreement. Thus the breakdown of law and order and massive destruction of lives and property went on unabated till Major Kaduna Nzeogwu took over power in January 1966, during which process the Western Region Premier, S.L. Akintola, was killed.

#### VI. THE IMPLICATION OF POLITICAL CRISIS IN NIGERIA

The implication of the several political crises in Nigeria has been devastating and disappointing. The personality clashes between Awolowo and Akintola degenerated into a situation that tore the West Region apart. People were denied their electoral rights and discouraged from participation in political activities. It paved the way for military takeover of governance in Nigeria. There are the notable remote causes of the Nigerian civil war with implications. Several constitutions fashioned to govern Nigeria are unable to unite the various peoples of Nigeria. Political parties in Nigeria were often based on ethnic considerations till today. It has become impossible to conduct free and fair elections in Nigeria since the first republic. Census was used as a tool for political competition by politicians. Thus the exercise was always attended by malpractices and discrepancies. There was a competition between the various ethnic groups for wealth and power. The military had also been politicized and divided along ethnic lines.

The implications of the series of crisis especially the civil war is linked to the remote causes of the war. Several constitutions had been fashioned to govern Nigeria but none of these had been able to actually unite the various peoples of Nigeria. Political parties in Nigeria are usually based on ethnic considerations. It is difficult to conduct free and fair elections in Nigeria. Census has is still used as a tool for political domination by Nigerian politicians. So every census exercise was accompanied by malpractices and discrepancies. There is a continual competition between the various ethnic groups for wealth and power. The military had also been politicized and divided along ethnic lines. The immediate causes of the Nigerian civil war also carry implications for lessons. For instance, majority of the political and military leaders killed in the January 1966 coup were from the Western and Northern Regions. No prominent Eastern leader was killed. This prompted, ensued and raised distrust, disaffection and retaliation leading to the massacre of the Igbo in the North between September and October 1966.

Again those who organized and led the coup were forced to surrender. This prevented the initiators of the coup from implementing their policies. The coup of January 1966 was sectional because the leaders were mainly Igbo military officers. General Ironsi, himself an Igbo, was expected to bring the young officers to book for killing Northern and Western leaders, but he did not. The July counter-coup of 1966 was organized by military officers from Northern Region. General Ironsi, an Igbo and head of state was killed. Lt Colonel Gowon who took over government from Ironsi was not acceptable to Colonel Ojukwu since Gowon was not the most senior military officer as at the time. The creation of twelve states by Colonel Gowon on 27 May 1967 especially to break the East made Ojukwu announce the secession of the East three days after. After their massacre in the North, the indigenes of the Eastern Region were recalled home to their region because of their insecurity in other parts of Nigeria. The divergent interpretations given to the Aburi meeting held in Ghana early in 1967 and its non-implementation seriously hindered the move for peace and settlement.

## VII. POLITICAL CRISIS AND DEVELOPMENT APPROACH IN NIGERIA

The section of this paper examines the theory of participation and indicates its uses for overall development and concludes with suggestions for ways out of political crisis and ways forward for Nigeria. It is clearer today that the prime cause of most of all disorders that visit every society with the oppression of the citizens and the decay of nations is largely linked to the single and hierarchical centralization of authority (Proudhon, 1851). According to the communist manifesto of 1848, Marxism and Communism maintain, to have an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. Participation development approach has a history and it is believed that the rapid evolution and ‘participatory models of good practice’ would help Nigeria come out of the overwhelming negative

experience of political crisis. Brought to bear here is participatory development which is, a process through which associations, localities, communities and groups determine their development priorities and the design of solutions that address their priority needs through inclusive dialogue and consensus. This means however that the responsibility of implementation of a solution lies with the participants who must be majority of the citizens.

It is assumed that the most important step for participatory approaches to development in Africa and Nigeria in particular came in 1990 with an international conference in Arusha. The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (Arusha, 1990) expressed, popular participation is essentially, the empowerment of the people to effectively involve themselves in creating the required structures and in designing policies and programmes that will particularly serve the interests of the majority effectively and contribute to the development process share equitably in the benefits. The politics of participation indicates that in order to understand PA approaches to development it is necessary to examine the role that participation plays at all levels and its function.

Rahnema (1996) says participation has four functions: Cognitive, where participation is aimed at finding new knowledge systems and creating a new role and image for development. Development as conceived here and designed by expatriate professionals use western scientific knowledge systems which is often inappropriate. Local Knowledge Systems (LKS) have been ignored or rejected. Political, explains that the objective of participation is to legitimize development as an avenue for helping the poor, empowering the powerless and thereby leading to equitable societies. The instrumental function explains simply that participation is meant to projects to work by providing new avenues and techniques. Finally, social participation has given development discourse a new legitimacy and lease of life.

Participation was the approach to bring development to the many and fulfill basic needs. Participation, as an approach to development, began in the first instance, as an approach intended to subvert development orthodoxy (Richards, 1995). It is not as modern a concept as most people think, having first appeared in the development literature in the 1950s. This, and later developments of participation, were the logical direction to take with respect to so many failed, wasted and damaging top-down projects and programmes. Participation became known as being synonymous with democracy, equity and popular success.

More recently, participation has been formalized into a development approach. It was first named in a Rapid Rural Appraisal workshop, held in the Institute of Development Studies at Sussex in 1980, where the concept and name were introduced to address the problems associated with RRA (Chambers, 1994). Participation lends a completely different perspective to the traditional development approach and

therefore it is a challenge to traditional, top down, bureaucratic development. Although there has been widespread adoption of participation in many aspects of development by a wide range of actors dominated by NGOs and academic institutions, it is still fundamentally a threat to many nations.

For such nations and organizations, the concept of empowerment of individuals and communities in order that they can prioritize, implement and solve their own problems, in addition to challenges of wider political causes of such problems is unrealistic. Using participatory approaches does not guarantee that everyone get a say. What is important however, is to recognize that there are existing power structures where PA will be located which allows space for negotiation. There are also those that believe that participation may have led to a replacement of indigenous power structures. This means that Projects using Participatory Approach may have contributed to a dis-valuing of the traditional and vernacular forms of power (Rahnema, 1996).

#### VIII. LESSONS FROM ABA WOMEN RIOT OF 1929

The several ways identified to help avert the repeat of 1929 political crisis and other forms of crisis in Nigeria emphasize the lessons Nigeria could learn from the historical 1929 crisis decades ago. These are:

##### 1. Recognition of Women

The colonial administration denied women relevant training and education, and political participation at all levels. It was the women who mobilized themselves and went on rampage. Recognition of women in the society therefore is essentially needful especially in governance. Women are expected to be consulted and be included in the structure of governance. Today we have educated women who are also exposed. Internationally women are becoming leaders of countries such as Britain, Germany, Liberia, Philippines among others. Nigeria should learn to be like other nations now accommodating women so the nation may have political crisis checked.

##### 2. Effective Communication of Government Policies

The colonial administration appointed a warrant Chief Okwugo of Olakwo community did not explain to the subjects the reason for the action, the essence of the population census he conducted. Effective communication of government policies is pertinent in governance and the purposes of government policies or programmers need to be made clear to the people. After all, the response of the people will explain whether the people welcome the decision of government or not. If Nigeria today must forestall the reoccurrence of political crisis in Nigeria, the purposes of government policies or programmers need to be clearly spelt out and thoroughly made transparent to the people.

##### 3. Equitable Distribution of National Wealth and Amenities

When national wealth and amenities are equitably distributed, political crisis will be checked or at least reduced. During the colonial period, the indigenes lived in squalors and local remote areas where as the colonial officers lived in secluded preserved, furnished Government Reservation Areas GRA.

##### 4. Protection of life and Property

The colonial government did not care about the security and property of the indigenous people. They were interested in how to acquire the raw materials that serviced their industries in Europe. The raw materials mattered to them most, so they paid less attention to the welfare of the people.

##### 5. Sensibility to the Needs of the Populace

There was discrimination in the colonial period against the indigenes people. The indigenes lived in undeveloped and unattended squalors, shanties and local remote areas where as the colonial officers lived in secluded preserved, furnished Government Reservation Areas GRA. The government did not show adequate demonstration of sensibility to the needs of the people. It is believed that when demonstrate sensibility to the needs of the generality of the people, it will do good to Nigeria.

#### IX. CONCLUSION

Generally, change of attitude terminating in elimination of personality clashes, ethnic hegemony and other discriminatory steps against other ethnic groups will help check political crisis in Nigeria. In conclusion when neglect of women and ethnic hegemony, including political greed are out of the way of Nigerian polity, the absence of these challenges it expected will reposition Nigeria for good.

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