

# French Africa Policy and the Fight against Terrorism in Mali

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**Abstract:-**The study examined the French African policy and the fight against terrorism in Mali. The study was guided by the theoretical framework of post-colonial theory as propounded by Aime Cesaire and Frantz fanon. The study looked at conceptual clarifications like the concept of foreign policy and the concept of terrorism. The study adopted the ex post facto research design where by data was gathered through mainly secondary source. The study further found out that the government of Mali played some roles in the fight against terrorism in the areas of legislation, law enforcement, border security, countering violent extremism and Mali government international and regional cooperation. The study further found that some measure were also taken by France against terrorism in Mali which include; clear political direction, avoiding political traps, economy of means initiative and concentration of forces and France boots on ground. Based on the findings the study recommended among others that the Malian government should use the opportunity of the crisis and war to develop a new strategic vision and roadmap for the future direction of post-war Mali on inclusive democratic politics and political accountability and organize a national political dialogue that will lead to a final settlement of the tuareg separatist grievances through an inclusive, negotiated political framework.

**Keywords:** Foreign policy, terrorism, military, neocolonialism.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The historical backdrop of France and African states goes back to the mid seventeenth century. This is when France accessed African crude materials, executed forced work and spread French, language, civilization and Catholic religion (Bennyworth, 2011). In any case, Francophone Africa gained autonomy in the late 1950s and mid-1960s. From that point forward, Francophone Africa has remained *chasse gardée* (private chasing ground) of France. As indicated by Hounnikpo (2005) autonomy did not so much change uneven relations France built up with its previous settlements. This web of associations and understandings empowered France to concede autonomy that keeps on hunting these states. This suggests that freedom has failed to realize feasible improvement in a lot of West Africa. Rather, it enabled France to exploit its previous states. In such manner, Médard (2005) states that when France conceded autonomy to its African settlements, it did not imply that it was going to leave Africa. Post-expansionism has appeared as neo-imperialism. Touati (2007) is of the view that the colonial empire empowered France to guarantee a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It is significant that during the late 1950s and mid-1960s, at the time of official

decolonization, former France President General De Gaulle imposed a package which appropriated that France ought to give specialized, financial and military help to its previous settlements. Consequently, the nations involved would back France's global policies. This package attached France to recently established African states to guarantee that they would stay under Paris security. Consequently, previous colonies embraced to help France's global policy. France still needed Africa's natural assets, especially its oil. Conversely, Africa needs French investment. This reliance enabled France to position itself as the watchman of its previous colonies. The previous colonial power has gone as far as waging coups and assassinations to rigged elections and misappropriation of assets so as to fulfill its hunger for energy resources (Touati, 2007).

Geo-political occasions in Africa have required a realignment of French foreign policy from being too Afro-driven, yet old habits die hard when French interests are involved around energy assets and different types of crude materials. This circumstance can be owing to the way that France has tried to keep up its interests by influencing African internal issues. France's propensity to intercede in Africa's internal issues has earned that impression of being and going about as the *gendarme* (a cop) of Francophone Africa (Bennyworth, 2011). French permanent army bases are found in Ivory Coast, Chad, Senegal, Gabon, Cameroon, Djibouti and Central African Republic (CAR). During the Cold War, the obligation to capture communism in Africa dovetailed with French interests in keeping up a neo-colonial relationship. Accordingly, this investigation assumes that France has effectively utilized its security presence in Africa since the decolonization period to exert impact in nations where it has interests. Among others, such endeavors involved keeping up its vision of stability and order. Moreover, French policy towards Africa has never been driven by the journey to resolve African difficulties and issues. Rather, there is no uncertainty that French policy has consistently been dictated by narrowest and egotistical French national interests. These presumptions lead to an issue of what drives France's foreign policy towards African nations. All things considered, this investigation takes a view at the two picked case study to decide the key drivers of France's position in Africa. Williams (2009) affirms that France's vital interests request that it should downsize her exposure to the region. This is additionally necessitated by obnoxious French public supposition and activities by the African Union (AU). AU activities incorporate the African Standby Force (ASF),

which was established in 2003 to intercede in the internal affairs of any member nation so as to reestablish security and peace (Rannenyneni, 2009). As indicated by Benazeraf (2014), this loss of power in Africa by France prompted a few Africans calling it turn around colonization and others calling it independence. This is on the grounds that the focal point of African nations is moving and in this manner, may not require France's help as much as previously. In spite of the fact that France's authority over its previous colonies is debilitating, the previous colonies still need French investors. This dependence enables a few networks to proceed till today. Conversely, France certainly needs African nations for its own economic development and improvement. The French intervention in Mali has been the most huge in realizing a quick and conclusive end to the crisis in Mali. In defending the intervention, the former President Hollande expressed that France had no option however to intervene and avert the development of a terrorist nation that would have genuine security repercussions for France and the West. The breakdown of the Malian state and the powerlessness of the military to protect the nation and stop the military advances of the separatist dissidents and their Islamist partners, combined with the failure of the sending of troops from African nations, consequently forced France to act singularly, however with the endorsement of the global community, including China, Russia and African regional actors. The legitimacy of the French military intervention was never in doubt, since France had a historical commitment to react to a solicitation from the interim leader of Mali for French help and intervention to stop the crisis, however the interim president had no popularity based command. Moreover, UN Security Council resolution 2085, which was encouraged by France, had approved the deployment of the ECOWAS-led AFISMA intervention force. By all signs, the French intercession was a pre-emptive military strike mark against Islamist revolts in Mali.

## II. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This paper addressed several questions which includes to; (1) analyze the roles the government of Mali played in the fight against terrorism (2) investigate the measures taken by France against terrorism in Mali.

## III. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

### *Theoretical Review*

This study adopted the Post-Colonial theory; the proponents of the theory are Aime Cesaire and Frantz Fanon. Post-colonial theory additionally borrows from the works of Shrikant Sawant and Ganeshwar Rai. In general, their works investigate the methods of representations and method of discernments that are utilized as essential weapons of colonial power to keep colonized individuals subservient to the rules of colonialism. The principles of Post-Colonial theory incorporate the impacts of colonization on societies and social orders, matters of financial aspects, power, religion and politics. In addition, this theory takes a gander at the deconstruction of the supply route discourse of the West and

gives the foreground to the previous colonies to re-recognize themselves (Geng and Qixue, 2006). Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin (2007) note that Post-Colonial theory incorporates explanations about the abuse of the assets of the colonized, the political status accruing to colonizing powers, the significance to domestic politics of the advancement of an empire and the system of learning and convictions about the world within which acts of colonization happen. Post-Colonial theory censures the way that the world is dismembered into first, second, third and fourth world. This is on the grounds that this sort of system increases the predominant positions of the Western cultures and further propagating first world status (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 2007). Hamadi (2014) noticed that Edward Said in his book *Orientalism* believes that the results of imperialism are as yet enduring in a form of mayhem, overthrows, defilement, civil wars, bloodshed which saturates numerous previous colonies. Furthermore, ex-colonizers forced a language and culture while histories, standards and values of the previous colonies have been overlooked by the colonialists in their interest to enslave the colonies and adventure their riches for the sake of enlighten, civilizing and humanizing them (Hamadi, 2014). Seemingly, the ex-colonial powers keep on forcing their own standards and qualities on the previous colonies so they remain internalized. As indicated by Sawant (2012), in spite of the fact that the colonial nation accomplished political independence, the colonial values do not vanish with its freedom. This recommends when African nations gained freedom, the colonial powers guaranteed that they leave them financially disabled with the goal that the previous colonies can continue to be vigorously reliant on the previous colonial powers. Basically, Post-Colonial theory seeks liberation from a wide range of enslavement (Rai, 2005). Contextually, this theory is utilized in this examination since taking a gander at Africa and its substantial dependence on the previous colonial powers, it is clear that the landmass is in another aversion of colonial rule which is known as the “new scramble for Africa” (Velempini and Solomon, 2007). The pertinence of the Post-Colonial theory to this study is its capacity to dominate the constraints of the ordinary and state-driven theories of International Politics (Realism, Idealism and Marxism) and to rebrand the knowledge of reality about the colonial project from the viewpoint of the colonized.

### *Conceptual Review*

#### *The concept of foreign policy*

To get a full comprehension of the concept of foreign policy, one needs to separate them into foreign and policy. Policy is a choice or a guide of picking actions to accomplish one's objectives. Foreign means anything beyond the nation, to regions where nation has no expert over territory and individuals. At the point when these words are joined, mean a guide of picking actions outside the nation boundary for accomplishing objectives. Foreign policy implies objectives, qualities and various instruments which the administration utilizes in making relations with various nations. A few things

are essential to consider like, environment (domestic and global), available decisions and assets before making foreign policy. Foreign policy comes out from the communication of domestic and global systems. Roscoe Pound clarifies that "domestic policy is social through law and foreign policy is the utilization of political impact so as to actuate other nations to practice their law-making power in a way wanted by the nation concerned" (Northedge, (1974) States utilize political power for changing law making power in favor of them. Foreign policy can never be in excess of an endeavor to negotiate with different nations. Force of eccentrics is there and does not generally accomplish or moves direct lines. Viability of policy relies on changes which happen internally and remotely in global relations. Foreign policy discussion is commonly about the interests whom are to be protected and which are relinquished if necessary dealing with different nations. Foreign policy is autonomous, implying that "the relative freedom of a nation from impedance in what it sees as its internal affairs and some level of power to express and actualize a free perspective on external issues". It is not subject to different nations view point in regards to foreign policy yet it is conceivable to change or regulate the conduct of different nations with the perspective on serving their national advantages. Hugh Gibson has characterized foreign policy as "a balanced, far reaching plan, in light of experience and knowledge, for conducting the matter of government with the rest of the world. It is aimed at advancing and ensuring the interests of the country." (Khana,2005). Essentially foreign policy is framed for the assurance and advancement of the national enthusiasm of a nation which depends on information, learning, experience and planning for making relations with different nations of the world. As indicated by Mahendra Kumar, "foreign policy is an idea course of action for accomplishing goals in foreign policy as dedicated by the philosophy of national interest" (Chandra and Arora, 2008). The National enthusiasm of a state guide its objectives and through making relations with different nations, the state accomplishes those planned objectives a few times in brief time or here and there in lengthy timespan. Each nation chooses its very own course of action in foreign policy in the light of its own methods. "The formulation of foreign policy is basically an activity in the choice of ends and means with respect to a nation-state in a global setting" (Shahid, 2006). The choice of means and ends fluctuates on issues of the specific state at specific timespans. It is additionally imperative to note where the state stands in the chain of importance of world politics. Cecil V Crab, Jr. characterized foreign policy as "diminished to its most crucial fixings, foreign policy comprises of two components: national objectives to be accomplished and implies for accomplishing them. The connection between national objectives and the assets for accomplishing them is the enduring subject of the state make. In its ingredients the foreign policy of all states, small or great, is the equivalent" (Khana, 2005). National goals can be accomplished through utilizing the fruitful methods. Large and small nations all work on foreign policy. Foreign policy is a nonstop changing procedure where states

co-operated with different states on its own grounds or in some cases adjusted policies in regards to the international environment or pressures. Hartman has depicted the foreign policy as "a precise articulation of intentionally chose national interests" (Khana, 2005). Foreign policy might be defined as a coordinated plan to verify and improve national enthusiasm of a state. Researchers like Rosenau (1969), Frankel (1970) and Sondermann (1977) accentuated the concept of national interest, as it is assuming its role in making policy decisions and choices. It is essential for every single state to pass judgment on the accomplishment in foreign policy as the accomplishments, prestige abroad and the security of its interests. Failures in foreign policy should likewise be defined. Foreign policy can accomplish its aims on the off chance that it depends on precise appraisal of the realities, also on the off chance that it is timely, thirdly on the off chance that it is self-consistent, fourthly whenever comprehended and sponsored by relevant domestic social forces and ultimately upheld by suitable assets (Northedge, 1974). Foreign Policy is the yield of the state into the global system, the result of whatever foreign policy procedure exists within that state. Foreign policy is to influence the conduct of another actor from how it traders, to how it cast a ballot, to how it utilizes its weapons" (Russet and Starr, 1981). It is a connection between what goes on inside a state and the world outside of that state. A state may connect with different nations for such a large number of reasons: for financial assets, national assets, military combat hardware, political, trade, cooperation or alliance, etc. Foreign policy finds the ways helpful to each state. It is likewise a persistent procedure; it didn't end with any administration, it's ceaseless. K.J. Holst clarifies foreign policy goals, as "a picture of a future state and future conditions that administrations through individual policy makers seek to bring by employing impact abroad and by changing or supporting the conduct to different nations" (Holsti, 1997). It's an immediate connection among domestic and global circumstances. He came up with of 3 classes of objectives, (1) Core targets (2) Middle range goals (3) Long run objectives. Core goals: - These must be accomplished all times. Sovereignty, self-governance, national interest, territorial integrity, prosperity of individuals. Each state needs full self-freedom and sovereignty of its own territory so as to plan out local and foreign policies. These destinations fend off a state from influence, intimidation and the rule by different nations. Obtaining of power gives influence on different states. Security and advancement of national interest is significant. These are progressively changeless in character. Compromise on any of them will lead towards debilitating of foreign policy. (2) Middle range goals: - These are less prompt and they require participation from different states like economic and social advancement. Economic conditions decide the status of a state in the global arena. Economically developed states assume increasingly powerful roles. Economic prosperity can be accomplished through a powerful foreign policy. Social advancement is likewise significant. Through an effective foreign policy, states procure economic prosperity and economic

improvement leads towards the advancement of society. Not permanent, at one-time co-operation with various states may not be co-operative for eternity. (3) Long run objectives: - These are least prompt; plans, dreams, political vision and philosophy. Leaders have sufficient opportunity to think and create and accomplish these goals. Time is no requirement, there is sufficient opportunity to think, plan and execute the policy.

#### *The concept of terrorism*

Terrorism is fundamentally symbolic, with its victims, not the crowd, which the culprit wishes to pass on a message to. Rather it is intended to change or encircle the activities of individuals other than the victims themselves. The concept of terrorism first emerged to depict the exercises of the French Revolutionaries during the revolution. The utilization of terror by the revolutionary leaders for them, 'worked as a rule, system and instrument of government intended to rebuff, retaliate for and educate as a major aspect of a journey to re-establish a solitary political and legitimate sovereignty (Mayer, 2000). Terror as initially considered in this manner alluded unequivocally to what might now be alluded to as 'state terror'. After some time, notwithstanding, the idea has been re-defined and the discourse encompassing terrorism for the most part alludes to groups that are not part of a state structure. It presently alludes to a strategy for brutality which is ill-conceived according to the 'global community'. The appointment of the term terrorism to de-legitimize sub-state groups outside of the West in their utilization of brutality, is not just truly erroneous however does not ask into the systematic utilization of terror by states, sub-state groups, Western and non-Western across space and time. The U S state department has defined terrorism as 'pre-meditated, politically motivated violence executed against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups (Blakely, 2007). Policy makers and Western pioneers have every now and again described the word to depict what they see to be ill-conceived groups who pose a danger.

Since September the eleventh 2001 there has been a slight move in Western political talk encompassing terrorism and states. Anyway regular reference is made to state backers of terrorism, as opposed to states as immediate culprits of terrorism themselves. For sure, the 'key narratives still center around non-state groups and activities as essential and states as auxiliary sponsors or supporters' (Jackson, 2008). There is an inclination that 'so as to gain official passage into the terrorist debate, one must check critical weapons at the door and join in the chorus of judgment, or risk doubt of having compassion toward the terrorist villain' (Der Derian, 2009). This sense has in actuality misshaped any important discussion around terrorism, its recorded use and the question of why (states) would utilize such detestable techniques for savagery. It is represented by boorishness, madness and burdens of pre-modernism. States who take part in acts of terrorism are de-cried as savage, failing or 'rogue' and not

having the legitimacy to make a case for any formal notion of sovereignty.

#### IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Given, the problem of the paper, this paper adopted the Ex Post Facto (After the Fact) research design. Materials for this paper was sourced through secondary sources of data which included here are textbooks, journal articles, newspapers, magazines, official documents from the government, internet materials, among others. Content analysis was used to analyze data so generated. This is with a view to identify logical sequence of data as well as trends.

#### V. DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS

*The roles the government of Mali has played in the fight against terrorism*

##### *Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security*

The Malian Gendarmerie Crisis Response Team, trained by the Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, reacted to the terrorist assault at Campement Kangaba and supported Malian forces in executing four attackers. At any rate 50 individuals were at the hotel at the time, and the fact that more patrons were not killed is proof of the improvement of Malian first responders at the tactical level since the November 2015 Radisson Blu Hotel assault, which murdered 20 individuals. In 2017, ATA gave extra advanced training and coaching to the Malian Gendarmerie Crisis Response Team. The Malian Armed Forces under the Ministry of Defense (MOD) remained the essential elements in charge of securing Mali against terrorist threats. The General Directorate of State Security under the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection (MOS) had the authority to investigate and detain people for terrorist offenses. Consolidated counterterrorism missions including law enforcement and military units needed delineation and coordination. In spite of the fact that Mali has fundamental border security, law enforcement units did not have the capacity, training, and essential equipment to secure Mali's borders that are porous, which expand roughly 4,500 miles and touch seven nations. The United States worked with Malian security forces at Bamako's Senou International Airport to extend the U.S.- funded Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System program (PISCES). The gendarmerie, which reports to both the MOD and the MOS and the national border police, which reports to the MOS both give paramilitary help to anticipate and deter crime at the border. Customs officials under the Ministry of Economy and Finance monitor the flow of products and authorize customs laws at borders and ports of section. Mali gets INTERPOL notices, yet the INTERPOL database is inaccessible at a portion of Mali's points of entry. The UN International Organization for Migration is dealing with a project with the Malian Border Patrol to provide convenient biometrics frameworks to scanning at essential border crossing zones to counter trafficking of people, yet this

framework needs connection with a central database. The information is not brought together or accessible and is to a great extent blocked off and unusable. Exit and passage stamps utilized by border authorities have conflicting size and shape, which undermines endeavors to confirm travel documents. Malian travel papers, including diplomatic and official forms, fuse safety efforts including ultraviolet features and a full-color computerized photograph. Lamentably, shams can get deceitful documents, for example, birth and marriage certificates, without any difficulty. In 2017, the legislature opened 69 terrorist related cases and confined 30 individuals for terrorism related wrongdoings. Resource constraints, an absence of training in insightful methods, and naiveté with trying terrorism cases plague a powerless legal framework. The Malian government has never investigated, indicted, and condemned any terrorist from the start to finish. Mali has found a way to improve its institutional ability to battle terrorism, passing laws that make new terrorist related offenses and consider the utilization of special investigative methods. This incorporates setting up a Special Judicial Interagency Work Group against terrorism and its equivalent for law enforcement the particular legal brigade and working with universal accomplices to build the capacity of these units, including the UN Office of Drugs and Crime. Mali worked agreeably with the United States to avert acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens. The Malian legal framework continued with its collaboration with U.S. law enforcement agencies in the investigation concerning the November 2015 Radisson Blu Hotel assault, which murdered one citizen of the US.

#### *Countering vicious extremism*

The Government of Mali adopted a national technique for the prevention of radicalization to savagery and terrorism. The Ministry of Religious Affairs is in charge of developing and observing the national strategy and for working with the High Islamic Council and different religious association to advance moderate Islam and keep up a secular state. Considerations to counter fierce extremism were incorporated into Mali's Program for Accelerated Development in the Northern Regions, just like a draft decentralization policy. Mali is a Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund recipient nation. The administration launched the Integrated Central Region Security Plan in August, which aims first to secure and afterward re-establish government services across the Mopti region and the neighboring Segou area, which additionally experienced increasing insecurity.

#### *Mali government International and Regional Cooperation*

Mali stayed dynamic in regional organizations and global bodies, including the Economic Community of West African States, UN, African Union, and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. Mali likewise took part in Global Counterterrorism Forum events. The Malian military took part in global border security activities under the G-5 Sahel mandate. Following a December U.S.-led Joint

Combined Exchange Training event, Malian units sent to the center sector of the G-5 Sahel Joint Force.

#### *Measures taken by the France government to fight terrorism in Mali*

##### *Clear political direction*

The jihadists chose to step up to the plate as pressure developed with the adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 2085 approving the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), which endorsed the taking of every single necessary measure to reestablish the territorial integrity of that nation. Two columns of around 80 and 30 vehicles, most with a weapon platform and 5–6 team members, moved towards Konna and Diabaly, following two parallel tomahawks. Realizing that the jihadists were within a day of Bamako, President Traoré officially requested help from France, which followed up on 11 January under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which provides the right of nations to take part in self-preservation including collective self-defense against an armed assault. It is conceivable that the “Dakar speech” of President Hollande, clarifying that France has finished with its intervention in African internal affairs and the inaction of French troops in Central Africa in December 2012 may have driven the jihadists to accept that France would not act (Discours-de-Dakar and Vincent, 2013). For quite a long time and notwithstanding questions from its partners France utilized diplomacy in an energetic exertion to build an African solution for an African issue (Lynch, 2012). This solution, despite the fact that causing worry about its military productivity since it depended distinctly on African powers, involved embracing a French ‘leading from behind methodology’ without committing fighting forces. In this manner, France would maintain a strategic distance from economic and political drawbacks since it was as yet seen as the previous colonial power in West Africa. Obviously, France wished to adhere to the underlying global arrangement with a couple of alterations. As indicated by President Hollande, the targets were to enable the Malian military forces to stop the jihadist push towards Bamako and repulse them, guaranteeing the security of the civilian populace; to enable Mali to recover its sovereignty and territorial integrity; and to encourage the execution of global resolutions by a snappy deployment of two integral missions: AFISMA and the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM). Thus, just like the case 30 years ago in Chad against Libyan forces, France planned distinctly to stop the jihadists and contain them in a first stage. At that point, when Malian military forces were completely trained by the EUTM, French forces would back a Malian counteroffensive upheld by AFISMA to repulse the jihadists (Michael, 2014). On 12 January, after the initial French counteroffensive, President Hollande chose to adjust the underlying strategy by holding onto the initiative. Consequently, in the wake of halting the jihadist hostile, French forces alongside the remaining parts of the Malian forces would free northern Mali without trusting that the

African alliance to develop. That political choice was far more riskier for France since losses could be heavier. Truth be told, considering the casualty-averse nature of popular assessment, a risky alternative that would place the operation in danger could rapidly lose both domestic and universal support. One element that weighed vigorously in this choice was the desire to pulverize the jihadists before they could stop the battlefield and slip out of reach. Without a doubt, "Hold onto the initiative and never decrease the pressure on the jihadists" was the French forces' motto. Within a couple of days, depending on 75 percent on its allies for the principal force projection, France would produce enough military capacity to finish that assignment by retaking the Niger loop.

#### *Avoiding political traps*

Unmistakably, France had received a custom fitted, adaptable methodology that contemplated the majority of the unique situation and troublesome local issues all through the operation. The primary snare to avoid was confinement and the apparition of colonialism. On the diplomatic stage, France picked up the support of each African nation in the territory, including Algeria, yet carefully. The AFISMA deployment process speeded up, Mauritanian borders were shut, and Chad sent more than 1,000 of its best troops for the operation in the desert. On 17 January, the initial a few hundred African officers from AFISMA touched base at Bamako. Consequently, France succeeded with regards to internationalizing this cross-border crisis, and African nations took on a lot of the pressure. Building an alliance is constantly a test, as reflected by the European Union's absence of agreement in regards to getting involved on the Malian front line (the significant European nations acted reciprocally to bring logistics backing to the French operation). France succeeded with regards to bringing the greater part of the Sahel's nations into an alliance. The fact that every nation brought its own plan, point of view, interests, strategy, command structures, guidelines of engagement, and provisos could have prompted pressures and debilitated the alliance. Indeed, notwithstanding, French authority stayed away from that old style trap by completely assuming the command and conduct of the operation and by forcing its procedure during the offensive stage on its African partners, who gave the French unconditional power. Subsequently, France delighted in solidarity of effort and had the option to adjust rapidly in a plainly changing environment when consultations among partners were not important to decide. French leaders additionally wished to keep away from the snare of losing domestic political support if the people did not accept that such an operation was of crucial interest. Except for a couple of people of little impact, members from every single political parties immediately communicated support for the French operation. Since that support could have collapsed, however, Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian assumed a key role by disclosing the military tasks to the media and forcefully naming jihadists as France's most noticeably terrible foe. Consequent opinion polls demonstrated that famous support

was strong. Moreover, by utilizing a little footprint and depending on exceptionally productive methods specifically, extraordinary powers and air assets France kept its human misfortunes at a level adequate to people in general. Truth be told, the French had numerous advantages that improved their procedure's odds of success, including reasonable political goals, a favorable combat zone (tracking jihadists in open landscape was simpler than doing as such in a urban zone), support of natives who had experienced jihadist mishandles, the Malian armed force's knowledge of the environment, and long periods of gathering intelligence on jihadists, which demonstrated key significance in the targeting process. Mindful of the way that one of the serious issues which prompted the success of the jihadists in 2012 was the internal battle between some Tuaregs and the Malian government, the French maintained a strategic distance from the destructive snare of encouraging a local insurgency by turning Tuaregs against the forces of Operation Serval. Their first move was to acknowledge the support of the MLNA however tactfully in light of the fact that the number of inhabitants in southern Mali may decipher such action as treason. The subsequent move demonstrated to be the successful utilization of Colonel Gamou, who partook in the freedom of Tuareg urban cities. In the contested region where Tuaregs were settled, France prevented non-Tuareg Malian forces from attempting to free Tuareg urban communities, where they could have been viewed as trespassers as opposed to deliverers not to mention the fear of retaliation for Tuareg support of the jihadists. Thus, Chadian forces swapped Malian forces for the freedom of Menaka (alongside the Niger military) and Kidal (with French Special Forces). The presence of Tuaregs in the alliance implied that the jihadists were losing their primary support. Without a doubt, French troops and their partners improved their odds of accomplishment over the long run by implementing that strategy. Last, instead of participate in classic nation building; France tried to bring security to Mali by containing the threat of the jihadist. The idea was to give conditions that would enable Mali to reconstruct independent from anyone else on a reliable foundation. A long way from nation building, France basically needed to reestablish the present state of affairs. Between the overthrows of 1992 and 2012, Mali was close to a constitutional majority rule government in which presidents of the Malian Republic as well as mayors and representatives were fairly chosen. That key component, joined with an economy that could be encouraged by global support and the absence of justification for rebellion (aside from in the Tuareg region), discloses France's decision not to meddle in Malian internal issues. The main exemptions were (1) the pressure that France put on Traoré, the interim leader of Mali, to sort out presidential elections in July 2013 and (2) its counteractive action of Malian troops from freeing the Tuareg zones, the two of which were expected to plant the seeds for a long term political solution. Within that unique circumstance, France could focus on its counterterrorism mission and stay away from the loss of energy and political weight that would originate from meddling in Malian internal political battles.

*Economy of means, initiative and concentration of forces*

Given President Hollande's worry about an unexpected assault before the landing of AFISMA, planners went through weeks utilizing satellite imagery and intelligence gathered by French special operation forces to prepare 64 target folders to decimate jihadist command and logistics centers. Depending on its network of permanent abroad operations bases in Ivory Coast, Senegal, Chad, Niger, and Burkina-Faso, France utilized the speed and responsive capacity of airpower, joined with its daring special forces, to stop the hostile. After an underlying assault of two Malian Mi-24 helicopters on a gathering of jihadists inside Konna, two French Gazelle assault helicopters dashed towards that town and wrecked various pickups on the evening of 11 January 2013. This showing of full French responsibility shocked the jihadists and helped the assurance of Malian land forces. At night, fighter aircraft from N'Djamena demolished the Ansar Dine command center and some logistics centers in and around Konna. The mental impact demonstrated obliterating on the inadequately spurred soldiers of fortune battling for the jihadists. The air crusade proceeded with strikes on various logistics and armory stores in Gao and Tombouctou conducted by four Rafales on the way to N'Djamena. After arrival, they consolidated their capability with six Mirage 2000Ds to lead strikes everywhere throughout the region under jihadist occupation and any place support of the Special Forces was required. On 14 January, the second column of jihadist pickups came to Diabaly on the western area without being engaged because of the late landing of the two Mirage 2000Ds from Chad. A challenging mix of special operation forces' assault helicopters and fighter airplane connected with the pickups for two nights and succeeded with regards to stopping the second area of the assault, along these lines ending the underlying jihadist hostile. On 17 January, a combined force of 400 Malian fighters and 40 French Special Forces supported by French Mirages retook Konna. Without a doubt, the entrance of Malian forces at the leader of the column added to boosting the assurance of the whole country, as covered the TV news. Within seven days, that force retook the majority of the towns on the road towards Gao where a challenging joint assault defeated the last jihadists who did not escape. Leading his elite troops, the popular Malian colonel Hadj Ag Gamou, who had stayed faithful to the central government, was first to free the town. On 30 January, France chose to send 30 Special Forces commandos to secure MLNA-controlled Kidal, a key town where numerous previous warriors of Ansar Dine had recently made another development that they guaranteed was not a terrorist organization. A couple of days after the fact, Chadian forces joined in catching Kidal, along these lines respecting Tuareg affectability and freeing a significant community with couple of assets. In contrast to the plan for Afghanistan, the freed Malians would not build a Western-like majority rule government but rather reinstall an acceptable political system.

*France boots on the ground*

As expected in all great vital planning, in the event that the underlying containment did not succeed, snappy response forces in Chad and Ivory Coast were sent to Bamako on the evening of 11 January to plan for a conceivable emergency evacuation of all French and European citizens. In any case, before the buildup of African forces that would counterattack, the mission changed from securing Bamako and containing the jihadist offensive to rapidly liberating the Niger loop. Two components provoked that advancement of the underlying plan: the achievement of the air strikes and the consequences of the thrust of the French Special Forces and the remains of the Malian elite forces. Subsequently, on 16 January a column of Malian and French troops that assembled at Bamako started its advance without battling towards Tombouctou. Notwithstanding the early achievement, President Hollande, mindful that the French media would before long describe the circumstance as a mess, pushed the military to expand the beat of activity and rapidly retake one of the significant northern towns. After time-compressed planning for D-day had been advanced on various events, an airborne operation retook Tombouctou on 26 January with no resistance from jihadists, who had fled earlier. By early February, just a little rugged region area remained of the jihadists. Be that as it may, it before long turned into their fortification where, after those retreats, they found shelter. In spite of small battling, regular land forces that had progressed even with logistics issues would right away go up against the foe. During a visit to the Emirates, President Hollande said that he expected to "crush [the jihadists] or hold them hostage if possible" (Alain, 2013). The system gave some opportunity to the military and after a substantial air strike on the evening of 2 February; forces continued towards the Adrar des Ifoghas. This decisive fight would demonstrate that extreme jihadists were resolved to battle until the very end. A consolidated power of the French Brigade Serval, including 800 Chadians and Tuaregs from the Malian armed force (Gamou's men) bolstered by fighter aircraft and assault helicopters, would pulverize the jihadists' stronghold about fourteen days. This achievement depended on a simple joint tactic of utilizing foot patrols to force the foe to break cover and expose himself to the capability of fighter planes or artillery. Just three French soldiers kicked the bucket during heavy fights involving close battle. Firepower, concentration of exertion, and enormous power demonstrated basic to vanquishing an incredibly spurred adversary. In spite of a couple of urgent assaults before the official end of Operation Serval on 31 July 2014, no more major fights occurred, and France adapted its technique to improve security within the freed territories. Land forces demonstrated essential by carrying out stabilization missions to keep jihadists from coming back to these regions. During that time, Special Forces and air assets observed, tracked, and destroyed the last jihadists in Mali. As portrayed already, France used a productive military strategy that prompted success, however mindful of the likelihood of acquiring tactical accomplishment

without strategic triumph, it settled on achievable objectives almost from the earliest starting point of Operation Serval.

## VI. CONCLUSION

The study concluded that the government of Mali has played vital roles in the fight against terrorism in the areas of Legislation, law enforcement and border security. The Malian government employed other means like countering violent extremism, international and regional Cooperation. The study further concluded that France as one of the super power nation and the colonial master of Malians has assisted the Malian government by taken some measures against terrorism in Mali in giving them clear political direction, avoiding political traps, economy of means, initiative and concentration of forces and France boot on ground. The study further concluded that even though measures have been taken these measures have not been far reaching of bringing terrorism to a standstill.

## VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Use the opportunity given by the crisis and war to build up new strategic vision and guide for the future direction of post-war Mali dependent on comprehensive majority rule governmental politics and political accountability.
2. Organize a national political dialogue that will prompt a lasting political settlement of the Tuareg nonconformist grievances through a comprehensive, negotiated political framework of devolved regional government for the Tuaregs within a new federal political framework
3. Reform the country's military and security agencies and national governance institutions for proficient economic and political administration of the state;
4. Learn the lesson that military intervention in a foreign nation ought to quickly be trailed by non-military political, socioeconomic and diplomatic improvement programmers explicitly aim at nation-building.

5. Facilitate the formation of an International Contact Group on Mali (companions of Mali) to assemble global resources for long term post-war peace building, state reconstruction and advancement.

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