

Impact of Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Regime on the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Abstract: - This paper focused on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime and Nuclear Weapons Management in the Post-Cold War Era. The study was undertaken against the backdrop of subsisting nuclear proliferation issues, in spite of the existence of the nonproliferation regime. The paper aimed to present, analyze, and evaluate the nuclear non-proliferation regime of the post-Cold War era. The goal is to demonstrate whether this non-proliferation regime is not quite the same as what subsisted in the cold War time and to decide if it sufficiently addresses the multiplication of atomic weapons in the post-Cold War period, among other explicit targets. The paper sought to answer whether there is a difference between the global nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime of the Cold War era and the post-Cold War period, and whether there are conflicts between states around the acquisition of nuclear weapons. This work relied on secondary data and utilized a data matrix table to aid data collection. The study discovered that there was no distinction in the nonproliferation regime of the Cold War and the post-Cold War period.

Keywords: Nuclear weapons, proliferation, nonproliferation, post-cold war era.

I. INTRODUCTION

The clamour for the development, possession, and capacity to deploy nuclear weapons against real and perceived adversaries was the hallmark of the Cold war. Nations arranged on either side of the ideological gap under the administration of the now moribund USSR, on one viewpoint, and the USA, on the other. The development of partnership and shared safeguard associations along provincial and ideological lines like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) set up in 1949 and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, set up in 1955 was an impression of the disturbance of the Cold War.

Countries have an assortment of nuclear projects. Some tailor their programmes to serve the energy needs of their population, while others have nuclear programmes that aim at building nuclear weapons as a form of power projection to further the national security interests of their nations. Still, some nations have nuclear programmes that transcend diverse areas of national interests and serve varying purposes, including energy and security needs.

The international arena has a litany of regimes, rules, and regulations, which govern the conduct of states in various sectors. Atomic weapons advancement and ownership has been vigorously controlled by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is believed by many that, the fact that a

nuclear holocaust was not the case during the Cold War, is testamentary to the efforts of a strong nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime.

The main intellectual focus of this work stemmed from observed gaps in extant literature, not just with regard to the relationship of the nuclear nonproliferation regime on the actual resort to nuclear weapons development by countries that were hitherto, non-nuclear weapon states; but fundamentally on the idea of this nonproliferation regime in the post-Cold War time. Tens of years after the finish of the Cold War, the mission by countries to build up the atomic weapon is still genuine: the nearness of long-existing non-proliferation regimes, in any case. India and Pakistan built up their atomic weapons after the finish of the Cold War. Iraq was attacked by the United States of America and its partners on the supposed ownership of atomic weapons by that nation, regardless of whether the opposite was demonstrated. Iran has endured long stretches of approvals by the United Nations, the United States, and the European Union, in view of its atomic program, regardless of cases to an atomic program committed completely to quiet closures. North Korea has made self-proclaimed and corroborated claims to advances in nuclear weapons technology:

In 1994, the United States and North Korea agreed on a framework. North Korea consented to stop its atomic program in return for a U.S. package deal of energy supplies, light-water reactors, and security guarantees. The framework collapsed in 2002. North Korea announced it was pulling out of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in response to U.S. decision to halt shipments of fuel oil supporting North Korea's electric grid. In response to North Korea's resumption of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor used to process weapons-grade nuclear material, the United States and Japan halted aid shipments. Then in May 2003, North Korea publicly admitted that it was building a nuclear weapons programme, posing a serious threat to regional and international stability. Threatening nuclear proliferation as a coercive measure to secure aid creates an interesting new security twist (Mingst, 2004:223-224).

The world has witnessed a series of tests by that country. Different nations like France, China, India, Pakistan, and even the United States and Russia, have been associated with nuclear tests debate. This situation calls to question the

continued relevance of a non-proliferation regime that had its roots in the Cold War, especially in the face of new challenges occasioned by the presence of new and emerging states with nuclear capabilities and the death of the Bipolar balance of power equation.

It needs be stated, that beyond the traditional actors in international politics, other non-state actors have made their entrance into the scene. In fact, while inter-state conflict still occupies a prime place in international affairs, the activities of terrorists and the larger scourge of terrorism, pose a potent threat to world peace. The post-Cold War era, in the estimation of this researcher, is the age of terrorism. Nations seem to have more to fear from terrorism, domestic or international, than there are actual violent attacks by terrorists who could get hold of nuclear weapons – a possibility of huge proportions, though it is yet to happen at this time.

The issue of atomic weapons in this time is caught along these lines:

There is a perpetual threat of a nuclear holocaust, predicated upon the knowledge that nuclear weapons are in the armouries of nations. This dread is additionally increased with the chance of as far as anyone knows unsteady nations creating atomic weapons, and with it, the danger of psychological militants and other non-state actors, similar to terrorist groups, laying their hands on nuclear stockpiles (Shah, 2010).

In spite of the subsisting non-proliferation regime as encapsulated in the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), North Korea has conducted tests of nuclear weapons and its leaders have openly laid claims to possession of same. Reporting on the most recent test conducted by North Korea, Al Jazeera (Aljazeera, 2017) had this to say:

North Korea has done its 6th atomic test - the most remarkable impact to date - getting under the skin of the worldwide network as the stalemate with the United States keeps on escalating. The official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said the nuclear bomb test on Sunday morning, requested by their ruler Kim Jong-un, was an “immaculate achievement” (Aljazeera, 2017).

“Since 1984, North Korea has carried out more than 150 missile and nuclear tests. Over half have been since 2011, when Kim Jong-Un came into power” (Al Jazeera, 2017). The foregoing shows that well more than twenty years after the finish of the Cold War in 1991, one nation has directed more than 75 rocket and atomic tests; an unmistakable sign that the endeavors at non-proliferation of atomic weapons has not been absolutely effective.

Ostensibly, the most powerful and wonderful sign that the atomic non-proliferation regime is in danger at this date and time in global undertakings, is the ongoing comment by the United States President, Donald Trump, as a major aspect of

his State of the Union Address. In his speech, Donald Trump (2018) implied a purpose to fortifying American atomic weapons capacities and truth be told, expressed that collaboration to free the universe of atomic weapons could occur sometime in the not too distant future, and absolutely not as of now:

Consequently, I am requesting that Congress end the hazardous protection sequester and completely finance our incredible military. As a component of our safeguard, we should modernize and remake our atomic armory, ideally never utilizing it, yet making it so solid thus ground-breaking that it will stop any demonstrations of hostility by some other country or any other person. Maybe later on, there will be a mysterious second when the nations of the world will get together to wipe out their atomic weapons. Lamentably, we are not there yet, tragically (Trump, 2018).

Surveying the new turn by the American government concerning reinforcing its atomic weapons capacities, especially even with propels by the non-yielding North Korean regime in Pyongyang, Walt (2018) opines that it represents a threat to the remainder of the world and that it debilitates any contention to force different countries to hold their atomic weapons programs. In particular, he makes the accompanying statements:

Are different nations prone to be essentially progressively scared by US improvement of atomic bombs that are greater than the Massive Ordnance Air Blast yet littler than its current atomic weapons? Will rough radicals like Al Qaeda or the Islamic State abruptly stop their exercises after the United States updates its capacity to place an atomic weapon in more places all the more quickly? Will any of these new highlights help the US economy, slow environmental change, diminish disparity, make the United States increasingly mainstream around the globe, or reestablish the trust in US judgment that has been lost under Trump? The inquiries answer themselves (Walt, 2018).

Composing completely on his estimation of the United States government position, Walt (2018) further states:

The new Posture Review sends a clear intention to the remainder of the world. It says that regardless of whether you are a landmass estimated superpower with the world's biggest economy, the world's most remarkable traditional powers, no foes close by, and no ground-breaking enemies straightforwardly trying to topple your administration, you despite everything need parcels and heaps of profoundly refined and costly atomic weapons so as to be secure. Shockingly, that message will make it quite damn difficult to persuade far more vulnerable and progressively helpless nations like North Korea or

Iran that they don't require atomic weapons to be protected, and it will make it harder to persuade nations like China or Russia that they have no compelling reason to develop modern war-battling limits of their own (Walt, 2018).

In the light of the difficulties that the non-proliferation regime has looked from nations that have, as opposed to the arrangements of the non-proliferation bargain, proceeded to create atomic weapons; and in the light of the degree to which fear based oppressors can go to come to a meaningful conclusion; it becomes clear that nuclear weapons proliferation continue to be a concern for international security. The problem of this study therefore, is to identify the post-Cold War nuclear non-proliferation regime and determine to what extent, if any, it differs from the Cold War era non-proliferation regime; to assess whether the regime in the time of globalization and universal psychological warfare, adequately addresses the issue of atomic weapons proliferation, with the end goal of giving proposals that would add to the extending of worldwide harmony and security through less plan of action by countries the turn of events and ownership of atomic weapons.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The Concept of Nuclear Weapons

In their article on Nuclear Weapons, Thomas Cochran and Robert Norris described the Nuclear Weapon as:

“A gadget intended to discharge energy in an eruptive way because of atomic splitting, atomic combination, or a blend of the two procedures. Splitting weapons are regularly alluded to as nuclear bombs. Combination weapons are additionally alluded to as atomic bombs or, more normally, nuclear bombs; they are generally characterized as atomic weapons in which at any rate a segment of the energy is discharged by atomic combination” (Cochran and Norris, n.d).

The Nuclear Weapons Primer (2013), a publication of the Intercommunity Peace and Justice Centre, as part of its Nuclear Reduction/Disarmament Initiative, defines a nuclear weapon as “a dangerous gadget that transforms matter into energy”. It categorises nuclear weapons into two types: atomic bombs and hydrogen bombs.

Atomic weapons are exploded by parting particles of plutonium or exceptionally enhanced uranium, which discharges a colossal measure of energy. A hydrogen bomb, likewise alluded to as a "thermonuclear" or "combination" gadget, utilizes a nuclear blast to blend two hydrogen atoms into helium. Hydrogen bombs are more remarkable than atomic bombs. Both can incur huge and prompt demise and decimation, just as sickness and destruction of nature (Nuclear Weapons Primer, 2013).

The Concept of Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation

Nuclear weapons non-proliferation fits into the larger context of arms control and disarmament. This approach to limit the quantity of weapons available to warring parties to a dispute is not a new phenomenon.

In the book, *International Politics on the World Stage*, John Rourke (2009) writes that arms control is steeped in antiquity, as “attempts to control arms and other military systems extend almost to the beginning of written history. The earliest recorded example occurred in 431 B.C. when Sparta and Athens negotiated over the length of the latter’s defensive walls”.

Before the start of the twentieth century, be that as it may, arms control barely existed. From that point forward there has been a development of arms control movement. Technology, more than any single factor, spurred rising interest in arms control. Beginning about 1900, the escalating lethality of weapons left many increasingly appalled by the carnage they were causing on the battlefield and among non-combatants. Then in mid-century, the development of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) sparked a growing sense that an apocalyptic end of human life had literally become possible (Rourke, 2009:346).

The massacre that was left, in the wake of the atomic assaults on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States military over the span of the Second universal War, added to the atomic weapons contest between the outdated Eastern and Western coalitions vulnerable War period, made atomic weapons the deadliest military arms stockpiles in presence.

The idea of a nuclear non-proliferation and controls stems basically from the devastating effects of the weapons when detonated, whether by accident or when deployed with deliberate intent in situations of armed conflicts by warring parties. The aftermath of the United States besieging of the Japanese urban areas of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were inconceivable; and decades after the episode, life can't be said to have come back to ordinary.

The measures set up to hinder the spread of atomic weapons, all the more regularly known as the atomic weapons non-proliferation regime, involve a coordinated system of one-sided, reciprocal, territorial and multilateral bargains, and other standard-setting plans. By and large, these measures give an extensive system to the conduct of states, global associations, and different entertainers in the atomic territory. These measures comprise a worldwide regime which has been developing since the finish of the Second World War.

Baylis, et al. (2011) followed the advancement of worldwide enemy of proliferation and control of atomic weapons to the period following the finish of the Second World War in 1945. In particular, they express that the United Nations drove the

path in the endeavors at non-proliferation of atomic weapons with the goals setting up the UN Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) in 1946.

The transmit of the UNAEC was to make proposition for the disposal of atomic weapons and the utilization of atomic vitality for tranquil purposes under universal control. Because of differences between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, these proposition were rarely executed (Baylis, et. al., 2011:391).

Their work, *The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, indicated that following the Atoms for Peace speech of President Eisenhower in 1953, the issue of atomic energy control was restored to the front burner of international affairs. The President was not necessarily calling for nuclear weapons disarmament, but rather, "a policy to open the advantages of nuclear energy to the world network". The introduction of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was a consequence of arrangements to execute 'Atoms for Peace'.

The fundamental highlights of the proposition were to:

- Encourage a worldwide investigation of the most useful employments of nuclear energy for tranquil purposes;
- Foster the view that the spread of atomic weapons could be contained more suitably by worldwide collaboration in the serene employments of nuclear energy under a universal protections framework; and
- Reduce the damaging capability of the current atomic weapon reserves and advance positive discourse on the focal issues standing up to mankind.

Talks to actualize 'Atoms for Peace' led to the setup of the IAEA on 29 July 1957, in spite of the fact that it was not until the mid-1960s that this association had the option to execute a complete monitoring framework (or shields) to guarantee that materials in the nuclear energy programs were not re-channeled for military use (Baylis, et. al., 2011:391).

In more recent years, the threat of terrorist organizations taking possession of nuclear weapons, have heightened the threat posed by these weapons; and together with the Second World War and Cold War situations that were demonstrative of a way of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) for groups to savage threats indicted with atomic weapons – notwithstanding a large portion of the world – plainly required the need to advance and systematize a non-proliferation regime on atomic weapons.

'Atoms for Peace' had both a reciprocal and a multilateral measurement. Somewhere in the range of 1954 and 1962, when it was formally ended, the United States started a few respective specialized help programs including research reactors, atomic powers and gear. Global arrangement on actualizing the Atoms for Peace proposition started officially after the ninth UN General Assembly, when the United States had alleviated the Soviet Union's interests about the degree of

worldwide control conceived over national atomic establishments. These arrangements finished in a meeting on the sculpture of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – the name given to the new worldwide association – held at UN home office in New York during September – October 1956. Following understanding at this Conference of the IAEA Statute, the organization was set up on 29 July 1957.

The IAEA was made in light of the profound feelings of dread and extraordinary desires coming about because of the disclosure of atomic energy, fears and desires that have changed significantly since 1945 and keep on fluctuating. As a result, what the IAEA is asked to do about nuclear energy, and indeed, what it can do and does, are much affected by the vicissitudes of national moods, international policies, and technological change (Fischer, 1997).

The principal roles of the IAEA are, as specified by the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, are to:

energize and help exploration, advancement and down to earth use of nuclear vitality for quiet uses all through the world; set up and manage shields intended to guarantee that such movement helped by the office isn't utilized to promote any military reason; apply protections to significant exercises in line with part states; apply, under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other worldwide settlements, compulsory thorough defends in non-atomic weapon states (NNWS) gatherings to such bargains. In completing its capacities, the Agency directs its exercises as per the reasons and standards of the UN Charter to advance harmony and universal participation, and in congruity with strategies of the United Nations for facilitating the foundation of overall demilitarization through protections (James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 2017).

As indicated by distribution on the "IAEA" by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Research, the Agency carries out its activities in exacting agreement with the specified purposes and standards of the UN Charter so as to advance harmony and universal participation, and "in similarity with frameworks of the United Nations for encouraging the foundation of global disarmament via protections" (James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 2017).

Current Threats and Challenges of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

The atomic weapon nonproliferation endeavors began decades back with the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the ensuing foundation of the Nuclear Weapon Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since then, there have been varied efforts in the international scene at different levels to tackle the issue of proliferation of Nuclear weapons. These efforts have been at bilateral, multilateral, institutional and intergovernmental levels.

There have been notable successes in the efforts at nonproliferation.

Significant triumphs have included: South Africa destroying its atomic weapons and joining the NPT; Argentina and Brazil joining the NPT; Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine – which had atomic weapons on their domains on the disintegration of the USSR – joining the NPT; uncertain expansion of the NPT in 1995 – and close universalization of participation; Libya's choice to repudiate WMD. Various variables have added to this general achievement, including: the political responsibility by most states to respect their non-proliferation commitments, check of settlement recognition through IAEA shields ("trust yet confirm"), the constrained accessibility for most conditions of fissile materials and the way to create them (for example advancement and reprocessing) and until the 1990s, the steadiness of the Cold War time frame (Carlson, 2008).

Similarly as there have been triumphs, there as of now exists dangers and difficulties to the nonproliferation regime.

Be that as it may, today there are significant difficulties: a decreasing of promise to non-proliferation appeared by the rebelliousness cases – Iraq, Romania, DPRK, Libya and Iran – and now, it shows up, Syria; just as political indecision by numerous legislatures – or possibly their ambassadors; advantages of non-proliferation not generally perceived – over and over again observed as a "North-South" issue; the spread of touchy atomic innovations (advancement and reprocessing) especially through a functioning underground market – including even atomic weapon structures; down as far as possible to the IAEA's confirmation capacity – distinguishing undeclared atomic projects presents a significant test (Carlson, 2008).

Carlson (2008) further expresses that "Maybe the best test today – with significant ramifications for the future – is the manner by which to manage bargain infringement". He asserted that "Iran's infringement of the NPT and its protections understanding, and its rebellion of IAEA and Security Council goals, sabotage the standards based way to deal with universal relations".

Orlov (2016) records the issues for the atomic nonproliferation endeavors as follows:

1. Nuclear demobilization process is excessively moderate;
2. Multilateral discretion neglects to address key atomic demobilization and proliferation concerns;
3. India, Pakistan and Israel will not join the NPT;
4. No advancement with the Zone Free of Nuclear and different WMDs in the Middle East
5. Nuclear and rocket innovation proliferation systems turned into a piece of the real world;
6. Non-state on-screen characters look for access to atomic weapons and atomic materials (Orlov, 2016).

The present difficulties to the nonproliferation regime, Orlov (2016) demands, are:

1. Difficulties with the usage and universalization of the NPT;
2. Disturbance of vital security;
3. Decreasing of viability of the instruments of multilateral strategy;
4. Lack of progress towards setting up a sans wmd zone in the Middle East (Orlov, 2016).

In its report *The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime*, the International Institutions and Global Governance Program (2012), valued the advancement of the regime's endeavors at nonproliferation, however showed that key difficulties remain. Among these difficulties are:

Iran's obvious endeavors to obtain atomic weapons, what adds up to North Korean atomic shakedown, and the disclosure of the A.Q. Khan bootleg market atomic system all underscore the a long way from-distant chance that a fear based oppressor gathering or a supposed maverick state will secure weapons of mass devastation or materials for a grimy bomb (International Institutions and Global Governance Program, 2012).

The report showed among others that on forestalling proliferation by state on-screen characters: there is poor record on consistence and proceeded with danger of breakout, featuring the inadequacy of existing nonproliferation instruments to dissuade would-be atomic weapon states. On oversight of non-military personnel atomic projects and double use innovations, the report demonstrated insufficient observing and check instruments; and on demobilization, it found insufficient activity toward atomic demilitarization by NWS.

III. METHODOLOGY

The study utilized qualitative methods of data collection. Specifically, it involved intensive review of published materials as well as informative media commentaries in databases of dailies and magazines.

This was achieved scientifically with content analysis. This was on the grounds that the issue under scrutiny is one viewed as a considerable danger to worldwide harmony and security.

Content analysis, from a qualitative research perspective, enabled the researcher identify data on the basis of categories, themes, and codes, accordingly.

The choice of content analysis as a method of collection of data and for analysis, was partly because the collection of data was not field-based. Instead, it depended on documentary sources for which systematic analysis on the basis of identified codes, themes, and categories, was done.

The choice of qualitative content analysis was based on the textual and narrative nature of the data needed to address the key questions of the study. It was used as a systematic analysis of texts on nuclear non-proliferation during the Cold

War and in the post-Cold War. It involved searching databases and texts published in the public domain in each of the periods (Cold War and post-Cold War on nuclear non-proliferation).

The researcher developed a code and content-analytical rules in order to engender a controlled process in the content analysis process. A crucial aspect of the application of content analysis in this study was the interpretation of content of text in relation to the context, in terms of origin and effect.

The study collected narrative data, based on media, scholarly and political meaning attached to the behavior of political leaders on the specific issue of nuclear non-proliferation regime compliance, in the post-Cold War era. One aspect of this data is meanings attached to regime performance, whether strong or weak. Data was additionally gotten from the perception of conduct of political leaders comparable to consistence with the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The researcher relied on a combination of historical analysis and content analysis of available text drawn from secondary sources. Logical deductions and inferences led to the conclusions reached.

IV. DISCUSSIONS

Indeed, the achievement of the NPT is from multiple points of view more amazing than its ongoing failures: for just about four decades, practically all states in the global system chose to forgo nuclear weapons, and in some cases, even surrendered them. Various reports during the 1960s cautioned that the quantity of new nuclear states could reach as high as 20 in a couple of decades (The Bomb 1965:53). Rather, the tally by 2008 was just four: India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea (Tetlock and Goldgeier, 2000). In 2004, the International Nuclear Energy Agency (IAEA) evaluated that more than 40 nations were "nuclear inert states".

More than seventy years after their turn of events and use during World War II, atomic weapons continue being the purpose behind a portion of states' national security procedures. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) denies non-atomic weapon state parties from creating atomic weapons. In any case, the NPT avoids five by law atomic weapon states (NWS) (France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States) from this blacklist. These five states had tried atomic weapons before the settlement was haggled in 1968. This "rejection" is, in any case, countered with a genuine responsibility in Article VI of the NPT for the five atomic weapon states to totally weaken. Three other atomic furnished states—India, Israel, and Pakistan—have never joined the NPT, yet have atomic weapons. North Korea also has atomic weapons, yet not in the least like India, Israel, and Pakistan, was in advance a person from the NPT obliged not to make atomic weapons. North Korea pulled once again from the NPT in 2003, and has given atomic gadgets a shot

various events since 2006 regardless of worldwide judgment and authorizations (nti.org)

Approximately 14,900 atomic warheads stay in the arms reserves of the nine states, around 4,000 of these warheads are adequately used (fas.org). Five European NATO countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey) in like manner have around 150 U.S. vital atomic weapons as a segment of NATO's comprehensive prevention crucial (and Hans, 2018). The United States has lessened its internationally sent key atomic weapons, yet strains among Russia and NATO make further close term diminishes outlandish (Nikolai and Miles, 2014). Tremendous stores of fissile material, including authentically weapons-useable uncommonly improved uranium and disconnected plutonium, moreover still exists comprehensively (International Panel on Fissile Material, 2011).

The vast majority of countries on the planet—the non-atomic weapon states (NNWS) — are centered around remaining liberated from atomic weapons, including a couple of countries that once had atomic weapons. South Africa announced in July 1993 that it had developed a little weapons store before obliterating it in 1991 in order to join the NPT as a NNWS. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine returned huge weapons stores of atomic warheads and related transport systems gained from the past Soviet Union to Russia in the mid-1990s, along these lines joining the NPT as NNWS.

Different countries, including Brazil and Argentina, contemplated getting atomic weapons, anyway surrendered their tasks before enduring confining confinements on atomic weapons headway. Brazil and Argentina decided to join the NPT in 1994 and 1995, independently, as NNWS.

Numerous NNWS are involved with nuclear sans weapon zones (NWFZs), and have subsequently acknowledged extra legitimate commitments not to create, fabricate, reserve, get, have, or control any nuclear unstable gadgets on their regions. Today, in excess of 110 nations have a place with NWFZ arrangements. Atomic sans weapon zones are in power in South America and the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, Africa, Central Asia, and Mongolia (un.org).

On 7 July 2017, a United Nations bunch got the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the essential overall settlement to disallow atomic weapons totally, including denying the headway, procurement, test, use, danger of use and responsibility for weapons. Although no nuclear weapons having states have marked the arrangement, the treaty's entry is a critical advancement in demilitarization politics (un.org).

The NPT blocks atomic weapon states from moving atomic weapons to, or helping NNWS in the improvement of atomic weapons. At the same time, NNWS are honestly required not to get, produce, or get atomic weapons, and to put all their serene use atomic materials and offices under IAEA shields (un.org).

Article VI requires most of its state gatherings to "look for after dealings in consistence with regular conventionality on fruitful measures relating to discontinuance of the atomic weapons challenge at an early date and to atomic demobilization, and on a deal on general and complete disarmament under extreme and practical overall control (un.org)." The article doesn't demonstrate a period range or affirmation framework for neutralization, anyway it puts an authentic responsibility on states with atomic weapons to stop the atomic weapons challenge and to over the long haul cripple. All things considered, this responsibility is one of the three basic "sections" of the deal, the other two being atomic limitation and the benefit to use atomic advancement for tranquil purposes.

At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, state bunches agreed to uncertainly expand the course of action subject to a heap of decisions that included Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament. This pack required a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), trades on an undeniable plan denying the production of fissile material for atomic weapons, and for "effective and dynamic undertakings to diminish atomic weapons all inclusive." The group furthermore consolidated the Resolution on the Middle East, which requires all states in the Middle East to assent to the NPT (i.e., Israel) and for move to be made towards the "foundation of an effectively certain Middle East zone liberated from weapons of mass demolition (NPT/CONF., 1995)." It is likely that it would not have been possible to uncertainly widen the NPT without the synchronous obligation to this program of action.

Further developing this action plan, the 2000 NPT Review Conference, spread out 13 valuable steps towards atomic disarmament, including an "unequivocal undertaking by the atomic weapons states to accomplish the supreme removal of their atomic reserves (NPT/CONF., 2000)." This "unequivocal undertaking" was basic in that it re-submitted NWS to their Article VI duties, and unprecedented for the NPT's history the NWS assented to "the total finish of their atomic weapons stores."

The accomplishments of the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences were not reiterated in 2005. State groups neglected to embrace further substantive proposals (Rebecca, 2005). The failure exemplified the decade's constrained advancement on nuclear restraint and disarmament. Not with standing, the choice of Barack Obama as President of the United States broadcasted another period for U.S. responsibility in multilateral demilitarization circumspection. In front of the get together to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the United States denoted the New START Treaty with Russia, diminished the activity of its atomic ordnance in its new Nuclear Posture Review, and held the first in a movement of Nuclear Security Summits. These exercises displayed a devotion by the United States to make progress toward a complete target of a "world liberated from atomic

weapons" as communicated in President Obama's April 2009 Prague Speech (Obama Remarks, 2009).

For the most part thought to be a triumph, the 2010 NPT Review Conference's definitive outcome report joined a 64-thing activity plan covering the NPT's three segments and a promise to execute the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. Various NNWS, and for the most part the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries, unequivocally reinforced organizing an atomic weapons show that would delegitimize atomic weapons and kill them inside an unquestionable timeframe. Notwithstanding the way that these musings were negated by the NWS, the last report saw the Secretary General's five-point recommendation for atomic neutralization, remembering thought of trades for an atomic weapons appear (NPT/CONF., 2010). The movement plan set away from for the use of Article VI.

The 2015 NPT Review Conference was pointless in conveying an extreme outcome record. The most pugnacious issues were atomic neutralization and discusses a Middle East WMD-Free Zone. The Review Conference included profound divisions between the NWS and NNWS. The trade on the sympathetic method to manage atomic demobilization drew a wide extent of help, however then again was a wellspring of strain and logical inconsistency. While demobilization issues prompted the most threatening conversations among states parties, finally, the distinction over gathering a gathering on a Middle East WMD-Free Zone shielded the Review Conference from grasping a last chronicle (Ray, 2015).

Estimating progress towards atomic demilitarization is confounded in light of the fact that developments both in amounts of weapons and in the general procedures managing these weapons are critical. As far as quantitative decreases, quantifiable advances have been attempted by key NWS both singularly and respectively. The NWS all things considered diminished the size of their atomic weapons stores from in excess of 70,000 warheads at the height of the Cold War to about 14,200 by 2018 (Federation of American Scientists, 2018). These reductions have been done uniquely by in any occasion four NWS, similarly as through corresponding genuinely confining plans between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation.

The United States has lessened its store by about 87% from a Cold War apex of 31,255 warheads in 1967, to the current save of around 4,000 operational and held warheads (U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2018). While France has decreased its munitions stockpile singularly, and the United Kingdom declared yearning decreases to its armory in 2010, the two states intend to maintain a trustworthy nuclear obstruction for a long time to come (The Strategic Defense and Security Review, 2010). China is the main NWS that has all the earmarks of being expanding its nuclear reserve, but gradually (Shannon and Hans, 2017). Researchers measure that India and Pakistan have been rapidly developing their atomic weapons stores and capacities (Shannon and Hans, 2017).

There is a broad point of reference for reciprocal U.S.-USSR/Russia arms control. Since 1969, the United States and Russia have been limiting/diminishing their essential atomic arms stores through two-sided treaties. These approaches began unassumingly with SALT I, which simply compelled the amount of ICBMs and SLBMs, leaving the two nations to extend amounts of the two planes and warheads. SALT I likewise delivered the ABM arrangement in 1972, which prohibited across the nation vital rocket guards (the U.S. pulled back from the ABM arrangement in 2002) (Daryl and Tom, 2003). Following the Cold War, START I (sanctioned in 1994), set constraints on the quantities of conveyed launchers and, just because, warheads. While both START II and III neglected to appear, the United States and Russia arranged the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in 2002. SORT accommodated a huge decrease of conveyed vital nuclear warheads in every munitions stockpile to 1,700 - 2,200. In any case, SORT was regularly scrutinized for having a feeble confirmation system that depended on the START I system. Fears that this treaty and the START understanding would terminate without anything to fill the void were alleviated with the marking of the New START Treaty in April 2010, and its ensuing passage into power in February 2011. New START restricts the United States and Russia to close to 1,550 conveyed nuclear warheads and 700 launchers by 2018 (Amy, 2010). Both the United States and Russia met those points of confinement on calendar, as indicated by a February 2018 information trade (U.S. Division of State, 2018).

New START lapses in 2021, and pressures between the U.S. what's more, Russia entangle exchanges for further vital decreases (Nikolai, 2018). The two nations are seeking after new kinds of weapons: at a talk in March 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin revealed a couple of new atomic weapon movement systems, including an intercontinental journey rocket, while U.S. President Donald Trump's 2018 Nuclear Posture Review called for lower-yield warheads for submarine-moved ballistic rockets and submarine-impelled excursion rockets (Putin, 2018).

Endeavors at arranging lawfully restricting multilateral nuclear demilitarization arrangements have demonstrated testing. The United Nations set up the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the sole multilateral neutralization orchestrating bunch in 1979. The 65-section, accord governed body has quite recently masterminded one deal related to atomic demobilization over the span of late years, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. Broadly viewed as an achievement towards nuclear demilitarization, the CTBT would preclude all nuclear testing. Nineteen years after it opened for mark the CTBT despite everything can't go into power. Entry into intensity of the CTBT requires affirmation by all states with atomic force reactors just as exploration reactors (in 1996), known as Annex II states. Eight of these countries, including the United States and China, directly can't favor (ctbto.org).

Since the completion of CTBT trades in 1996, the CD has been made sure about an unending impasse. Trades on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) have not begun even 18 years after admission to the Shannon Mandate (a request grasped by the CD in 1995 that proposed the course of action of a settlement prohibiting the making of fissile material (Paul, 2007). Many consider a FMCT ready for exchange and the following coherent advance toward nuclear demilitarization. In 2009, CD part states settled upon a program of work, CD/1864, yet couldn't execute it as a result of procedural blockages (Ray, 2009). Over the span of late years Pakistan has ascended as the single spoiler, addressing dependent on national security and substance. Pakistan fears its national security will be in danger if its adversary and neighbor, India, is left with a greater existing fissile material store, and along these lines has the ability to continue conveying atomic weapons after the utilization of the course of action (Paul, 2011). Pakistan battles that a FMCT would not address existing stores of fissile materials, and would along these lines support constraint anyway not neutralization (The Shannon Mandate, 1995).

Pakistan's reasonable contention takes advantage of the longstanding encounter between the nuclear weapon "haves and the poor." Incomprehensibly, as Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) people, Pakistan and India vocally support atomic demilitarization while at the same time extending their atomic arsenals and transport systems. Various NAM people and different NNWS acknowledge that the NWS are not totally meeting their Article VI responsibility (John, 2010). Beside the two-sided game plans on New START, there have been no trades or attempts on neutralization measures since the completion of the CTBT dealings. Additionally, uneven and U.S.- Russia diminishes have been seen by various NNWS as just undertakings to smooth out existing atomic weapons stores, rather than adventures towards complete atomic demilitarization. Perhaps most very, all atomic weapon states are looking for after some degree of atomic modernization (Ray, 2009).

Certain national governments and people from regular society have facilitated on exercises to propel progression towards a world liberated from atomic weapons. A powerful method to manage advance atomic neutralization was taken by the New Agenda Coalition (NAC). In June 1998, remote ministers from Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Slovenia, and Sweden (the last two at long last pulling back), gave a declaration requiring another atomic neutralization plan, "Toward a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: Time for a New Agenda." The NAC accepted an instrumental activity in convincing the NWS to agree to the thirteen sensible steps towards atomic demilitarization in the last report of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

Around a comparable time, the Middle Powers Leadership was developed in favor of NNWS tries to reduce and kill overall atomic weapons arsenals. Following the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the Middle Powers Leadership

impelled the "Article VI Forum" in October 2005 to look at the legitimate, specialized, and political necessities to satisfy restraint and demilitarization commitments for a nuclear sans weapon world (MPI, 2011).

A few free global commissions have assumed a significant job by giving master proposals as nuclear disarmament activity plans. These commissions fuse the 1996 Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons upheld by the Australian Government, the 1998 Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament bolstered by the Japanese government, and the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission.

The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission was set up in 2003 amidst stagnation on atomic demobilization and certifiable challenges defying the atomic restriction framework. It gave a report that wrapped up "the atomic weapon communicates never again seem to focus on their obligation to atomic demobilization in spite of the way this was a major bit of the NPT bargain, both at the's first experience with the world in 1968 and when it was extended uncertainly in 1995 (Hans, 2006)." The report offered a couple of recommendations for multilateral pleasing exercises to counter this example, including a call to hold quick to disarmament responsibilities, support the CTBT and FMCT, and change atomic positions.

A movement grasped by four past high-situating U.S. specialists — George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn — made imperative power for a world liberated from atomic weapons. The four legislators at first disseminated their recommendation in a 4 January 2007 Wall Street Journal sentiment piece, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," sought after a year by another critique, "Toward a Nuclear Weapon Free World." This action came at an essential intersection, with the overall system defying new and advancing atomic dangers, when no new important arms control diminishes between the United States and Russia were being looked for after (George et al., 2008). The four legislators called for U.S. organization and worldwide interest on restriction.

In 2008, Japan and Australia set up the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) to rejuvenate widespread confinement and demilitarization attempts and to help shape an agreement at the then best in class 2010 NPT Review Conference. Japan and Australia joined again in September 2010 to make the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI). The gathering contained twelve countries (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates) that intended to support the utilization of the measures from the understanding report of the 2010 NPT Review Conference (NPDI, 2012). In April 2014, the NPDI grasped the "Hiroshima Declaration" that contained strong suggestions for both demobilization and nonproliferation, including calls to

arrange the FMCT, increment atomic wellbeing and protections, empower the area into intensity of the CTBT, and increment straightforwardness in neutralization detailing (dfat.gov.au). Notwithstanding, as the NPDI involves fundamentally of U.S. partners ensured by U.S. widened atomic prevention, its demobilization approach is often seen as more moderate than the ones of the NAC or NAM that call for delegitimizing atomic weapons.

After the disappointment of states gatherings to the 2015 NPT Review Conference to arrive at accord, various countries hoped to press forward the atomic disarmament plan in the United Nations General Assembly. Through the range of three meetings in 2016, an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) of states recommended that the UN General Assembly meet a gathering in 2017 to "orchestrate a legitimately confining instrument to block atomic weapons, heading toward their hard and fast removal (United Nations General Assembly, 2016)." On 27 October 2016, The First Committee of the UN General Assembly threw a voting form to get the objectives to meet the atomic blacklist gathering, and the full UN General Assembly made a move as needs be on 23 December 2016 (United Nations General Assembly, 2017).

On 7 July 2017 the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was grasped by a recorded vote of 122 in help to one against (the Netherlands), with one abstention (Singapore) (United Nations Press Release, 2017). Supporters of the bargain acknowledge that it can strengthen guidelines against atomic weapons and ridicule such weapons. Enemies, including atomic having states and states under widened atomic prevention, boycotted the dealings (aside from the Netherlands). NWS have been compellingly censorious of the bargain procedure; France, the UK, and the U.S. discharged a joint decree verifying that the bargain develops the division between atomic weapon states and non-atomic weapon states, and that they don't "expect to sign, sanction or ever progressed toward becoming a party to it (un.org)." Russia utilized comparable language, guaranteeing the treaty would "have a destabilizing impact on the limitation system (usun.state.gov)." In any case, the greater part of the worldwide network regarded the appropriation of the bargain as a tremendous achievement. In affirmation of the job of common society and grass-establishes activism in the bargain's section, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) was allowed the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize for its "pivotal endeavors to achieve a settlement based restriction of atomic weapons (Lavrov, 2018)." As a component of a push to construct connects between bunches with negating sees, the Japanese government set up the "Gathering of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament," and introduced its recommendations to the second meeting of the PrepCom for the 2020 NPT Review Conference (mofa.go.jp).

V. CONCLUSION

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This work examined the nuclear weapons nonproliferation regime in the epochs of the Cold War and the post-Cold War era, with a view to determining the nature of the regime during and after the Cold War; finding out if there is any difference in the regime on account of the end of the Cold War; and examining the impact of the post-Cold War nonproliferation regime on the actual and continued proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The following is a summary of the key findings:

1. The Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation regime came into being after the Second World War to address the nuclear arms race that soon characterized the end of the war and the quest for global dominance.
2. The Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation regime began in the period of the Cold War, and still subsists, decades after the end of the Cold War.
3. There are no changes to the Nuclear Nonproliferation regime to take into account the end of the Cold War.
4. The Nuclear Nonproliferation regime does not take into account the presence of ambiguous and undeclared nuclear states.
5. States have sought to develop the nuclear weapons, in spite of the end of the Cold War;
6. The existence of the nuclear weapons nonproliferation regime has slowed down proliferation of nuclear weapons but has not definitively put a stop to it.

From the analysed data, it is obvious that the fight against nuclear proliferation may continue for a long time to come. This is not to say that the non-proliferation regime has not recorded some successes. Indeed, the success of the NPT is in many ways more surprising than its failures: for almost four decades, almost all states in the international system chose to forgo nuclear weapons, and in some cases, even gave them up. Numerous reports in the 1960s warned that the number of new nuclear states could reach as high as 20 in a few decades. Instead, the count by 2008 was only four: India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. In 2004, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimated that over 40 countries were “nuclear latent states”. However, some changes and modifications need to be done to the regime to effectively dismantle nuclear weapons and ensure global peace.

Therefore, there is also the need to establish a much more aggressive policy of physically preventing proliferation, by turning the IAEA inspectorate into an international nuclear police force and by using force to destroy nuclear facilities.

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