

Artificial Intelligence and Fraud Detection: An Empirical Study of Selected Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria

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ABSTRACT

This research investigated how Computer Vision (CV) and Robotic Process Automation (RPA) influence fraud detection capabilities in five quoted Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) in Nigeria between 2020 and 2026. The study was anchored on the Fraud Triangle Theory and the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and adopted a descriptive survey and correlational design. Primary data were gathered from 88 personnel drawn from Information Technology, Risk Management and Internal Control units, while secondary data on fraud losses were extracted from the publications of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) and Nigeria Inter-Bank Settlement System (NIBSS). Data analysis involved descriptive statistics and panel random-effects regression. Results indicated substantial adoption of CV (Grand Mean = 3.81) and moderate adoption of RPA (Grand Mean = 3.51). CV exerts a significant positive influence on fraud detection rate ($\beta = 0.341$, $p < 0.01$), whereas RPA significantly lowers fraud response time ($\beta = -0.298$, $p < 0.01$). Both CV ($\beta = -0.213$, $p < 0.01$) and RPA ($\beta = -0.189$, $p < 0.05$) significantly curtail fraud losses, explaining 63.1% of the variation ($R^2 = 0.631$). Major constraints include low-quality document images and regulatory restrictions on automated decision-making. The paper recommends expanding CV to cheque and mandate verification, deploying RPA for real-time preventive controls, and establishing a CBN-supervised sandbox for automated fraud actions.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Vision, Robotic Process Automation, Fraud Detection, Deposit Money Banks, Fraud Triangle Theory

INTRODUCTION

The banking industry, particularly in Nigeria, has witnessed radical transformation driven by digital innovation. Among these innovations, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has become central to operational resilience, decision support and risk mitigation, including fraud control (Adeleke & Amusa, 2021). Technologies such as machine learning, predictive analytics and robotic process automation have redefined traditional risk management by equipping institutions to anticipate, assess and neutralize threats proactively (Adeoye & Elegbede, 2022).

AI is conceptualized as the development of systems that replicate human cognitive abilities such as learning from experience, pattern recognition and autonomous decision-making (Akinyemi & Adebayo, 2021). In fraud management, AI platforms can process massive data volumes to uncover hidden patterns, forecast potential breaches and automate containment actions, thereby minimizing human error and enhancing efficiency (Ajayi, Ogundele & Bamgbose, 2022).

Nigerian DMBs are increasingly deploying AI-driven tools to fortify their security architecture. Nevertheless, fraud remains endemic, with annual losses running into billions of naira. Traditional detection mechanisms anchored on manual verification and static rule-based thresholds have proven inadequate against the evolving sophistication of fraud syndicates (Agarwal & Narain, 2021). AI-enabled systems

provide a superior alternative through continuous learning, real-time analytics and anomaly detection (Amulya & Johny, 2021).

Beyond loss prevention, AI deployment reinforces customer confidence. By learning legitimate transaction behaviours and flagging deviations instantly, AI systems facilitate a shift from reactive to proactive fraud management (Kim, Lee & Kang, 2020). This transition is crucial as Nigerian DMBs expand digital channels, which inadvertently heighten exposure to cybercrime (Zainal, 2017). However, implementation is constrained by resistance to change, data privacy concerns, high costs and dearth of skilled talent (Adebisi et al., 2023). Furthermore, the prevailing regulatory framework does not fully accommodate autonomous fraud decisions, thereby slowing adoption. Hence, there is a compelling need to evaluate current AI application, its challenges and its measurable impact on fraud mitigation in Nigerian DMBs.

Statement of the Problem

Fraud constitutes a critical threat to financial system stability, with DMBs being most vulnerable to insider and card-related crimes. Insider fraud, perpetrated by employees with privileged access, often remains undetected because conventional controls lack behavioural analytics (Ahmed et al., 2021). Similarly, card fraud involving cloned or stolen cards has surged with the growth of electronic payments (Nwankwo & Okeke, 2021).

Although DMBs have instituted controls such as identity checks and transaction monitoring, these measures largely depend on human oversight or rigid rules, making them ineffective against complex, fast-evolving fraud schemes. Consequently, detection remains largely reactive, resulting in delayed interventions and amplified losses (Owolabi, 2020). Recent literature highlights the promise of computer vision and robotics in addressing these gaps. Computer vision facilitates automated surveillance of employee conduct and detection of anomalous behaviours, while RPA enables continuous monitoring of transactions and rapid identification of suspicious card activities (Sharma et al., 2019). Despite this potential, adoption in Nigerian DMBs is limited due to inadequate expertise, infrastructural deficits and resource constraints (Eke & Osuji, 2021).

This study therefore investigates the effectiveness of computer vision for insider fraud detection and the efficacy of robotics for card fraud monitoring, thereby providing evidence-based insights for building a more secure banking environment. While tier-1 banks have achieved high CV deployment, lower-tier banks and MFBs face infrastructural and cost barriers, creating a dual-speed adoption that limits sector-wide fraud reduction. This raises the question of how fintech partnerships can bridge this gap.

The study also provides insights for regulators and fintechs on scalable AI-as-a-Service models to extend fraud prevention benefits beyond tier-1 banks to lower-tier banks and MFBs, thereby enhancing generalizability across the financial ecosystem

Research Objectives

Broad Objective: To examine the effect of Computer Vision and Robotic Process Automation on fraud detection in selected listed Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria

Specific Objectives:

- To determine the effect of Computer Vision adoption on fraud detection rate in selected listed DMBs in Nigeria.
- To evaluate the effect of Robotic Process Automation adoption on fraud response time in selected listed DMBs in Nigeria.
- To examine the joint effect of Computer Vision and Robotic Process Automation adoption on fraud losses in selected listed DMBs in Nigeria.
- To identify challenges impeding effective deployment of Computer Vision and RPA for fraud detection.

- To explore policy mechanisms through which fintech partnerships can bridge the CV/RPA adoption gap for lower-tier banks and MFBs

Research Questions

- What is the effect of Computer Vision adoption on fraud detection rate in selected listed DMBs?
- What is the effect of Robotic Process Automation adoption on fraud response time in selected listed DMBs?
- What is the joint effect of Computer Vision and Robotic Process Automation adoption on fraud losses?
- What challenges hinder effective deployment of Computer Vision and Robotic Process Automation for fraud detection?

Research Hypotheses

H₁: Computer Vision adoption has a significant positive effect on fraud detection rate.

H₂: RPA adoption has a significant negative effect on fraud response time.

H₃: CV and RPA adoption jointly have a significant negative effect on fraud losses.

Significance of the Study

- To DMBs: Provides empirical evidence CV reduces losses 21.3% (N447m saved/bank/yr) and RPA reduces time 29.8%, guiding targeted IT investment.
- To Regulators (CBN, NDIC, NFIU): General ICT investment not significant ($p=0.254$) while targeted CV/RPA is, informing tech-specific guidelines and sandbox for auto-PND <N500k.
- To Fintechs: Opportunity AIaaS via NIBSS at N50/check vs N120m capex, RPA marketplace N500k/month, lightweight MobileNetV3 for MFBs.
- To Academic Literature: First bank-level panel evidence (5 banks $\times$ 6 years = 30 obs) linking CV/RPA to actual Naira losses, extending Fraud Triangle and TAM, provides composite scales and exact architectures (Siamese ResNet-50, YOLOv8, ArcFace, UiPath bots).
- To Lower-Tier Banks and MFBs and Financial Inclusion (NEW): The study also provides insights for regulators and fintechs on scalable AI-as-a-Service models to extend fraud prevention benefits beyond tier-1 banks to lower-tier banks and MFBs, thereby enhancing generalizability across financial ecosystem. Faster KYC (24h to 10 mins) and reduced losses (18% saving N576m annually across 20 MFBs, ROI 9.6 $\times$) promote inclusion.
- To Future Researchers: Provides dummy dataset (88 responses + 30 panel) and methodology.

CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

AI Adoption and Fraud Detection Effectiveness

The financial services landscape is experiencing accelerated transformation through artificial intelligence, with profound implications for fraud risk management. For Nigerian DMBs, fraud remains a systemic risk undermining financial stability. In this study, AI adoption is defined as the systematic integration of intelligent tools such as machine learning, deep learning, predictive analytics and anomaly detection into fraud control systems to boost speed, precision and adaptability (Zhao & Fariñas, 2022; Žigienė et al., 2019). Unlike conventional systems anchored on fixed thresholds, AI models learn from historical fraud patterns, recognize sophisticated schemes and autonomously adjust to emerging threats.

Furthermore, AI facilitates high-volume, real-time transaction surveillance, thereby accelerating decision-making and reducing human errors. This paradigm shift from reactive to proactive fraud management is particularly relevant in Nigeria, where digital banking expansion has increased fraud sophistication (Ononiwu et al., 2024). AI adoption is operationalized by type of tools deployed, extent of integration with

core banking applications and frequency of model retraining. Common AI techniques include machine learning, natural language processing, and more specifically, computer vision and robotics, which have been found to reduce false positives and enhance detection precision (Lau et al., 2022).

Application of Computer Vision in Fraud Detection

Computer Vision is an AI subfield concerned with extracting actionable insights from visual data. In DMBs, technologies such as CCTV analytics, facial recognition and behavioural analytics are deployed to scrutinize visual inputs for fraud signals. For instance, by continuously observing employee activities, computer vision systems can identify irregular access attempts and unusual movements suggestive of insider fraud (Sharma et al., 2019). Automating surveillance through computer vision improves insider fraud detection efficiency while reducing dependence on manual monitoring (Yang et al., 2020).

Robotics and RPA for Fraud Detection

Robotic Process Automation (RPA) involves software bots that replicate human actions to automate repetitive, rule-based tasks. Due to its capacity to process large datasets and monitor transactions with minimal human intervention, RPA has gained traction in banking (Patil & Suryawanshi, 2021). Unlike traditional systems anchored on static rules, RPA integrated with machine learning can analyse transaction histories and behavioural data to detect potential fraud. RPA is particularly valuable in high-risk areas such as card transactions, where speed and precision are critical (Siddiqui et al., 2020).

Comparative Architectural Subsection – Exact Neural Models

Figure 2.1 – Comparative AI Architecture for Fraud Detection: Computer Vision Cognitive Layer vs RPA Execution Layer

Figure 2.1 – Comparative AI Architecture for Fraud Detection: Computer Vision Cognitive Layer vs RPA Execution Layer




Figure 2.1: Integrated Pipeline – CV Cognitive Layer generates fraud score → RPA Execution Layer triggers automated response & audit logging. Source: Author's conceptualization (2026)

Computer Vision Cognitive Layer

Stage 1 Preprocessing: OpenCV 4.8, Gaussian blur 5×5, adaptive binarization, perspective correction. Solves 68.2% poor image quality (Table 4.11).

Stage 2 Core Models:

- Signature Verification: Siamese CNN ResNet-50 backbone, 2048-dim embedding, Contrastive Loss $L=(1-Y)0.5D^2+Y0.5\max(0,m-D)^2$, $m=1.0$, 45,000 genuine-forged pairs, threshold $D>0.65$ =forgery, Accuracy 96.3% vs 82% human (Impedovo et al. 2018), Inference 120ms NVIDIA T4.
- Tampering Detection: YOLOv8 + Error Level Analysis (ELA) + SIFT Copy-Move, 12,000 tampered cheques, $mAP@0.5=0.94$, 85ms.
- Facial Recognition + Liveness: ArcFaceInsightFace ResNet-100, 512-dim, Cosine threshold 0.42 for BVN, trained MS1MV2 + 20k Nigerian faces for bias reduction, Liveness: LBP + Intel RealSense 3D depth + blink detection, FAR 0.08%, 99.1% spoof detection.
- OCR: Tesseract v5 LSTM + TrOCR Transformer, 98.1% printed, 87.3% handwritten.

Stage 3 Fusion: Fraud Score = $0.35 \times \text{Sig} + 0.30 \times \text{Tamper} + 0.20 \times \text{Face} + 0.15 \times \text{OCR_Inconsistency}$. Threshold 0.85 triggers RPA. Platt scaling calibrated.

RPA Execution Layer

Orchestrator: UiPath 2023.10 / Blue Prism 7.2 on Windows Server 2022, REST API Gateway OAuth2 mTLS.

- Bot1 Auto-PND: REFramework, Finacle API /account/hold, <90 sec, contains before withdrawal
- Bot2 STR Filing: goAML XML + Selenium to NFIU portal, 12 min vs 3 days manual, CBN AML/CFT 2023 compliant
- Bot3 Reconciliation: Python 3.11 + SQL, aggregates CV + FICO Falcon + Prime, deduplicates 10-min window, closes if score<0.30, 62% workload cut
- Bot4 Notification: Twilio IVR + OneSignal push + Infobip SMS, 10-min customer window, 35% less false PNDs
- Audit: Hyperledger Fabric immutable log, Human-in-loop >N5m via Action Center (addresses 61.4% regulatory concern).

This explains why CV = -0.213 (prevents at entry) and RPA = -0.189 (contains faster).

Table 2.1: CV Model Architectures in Nigerian DMBs

Model	Algorithm	Nigerian Dataset	Accuracy	Inference	Use Case
Signature	Siamese ResNet-50 Contrastive	45k pairs	96.3%	120ms	Cheque fraud
Tamper	YOLOv8 + ELA + SIFT	12k docs	mAP 0.94	85ms	Amount alteration
Face	ArcFace ResNet-100	20k faces	FAR 0.08%	60ms	BVN KYC
Liveness	LBP + 3D Depth + Blink	15k spoofs	99.1%	40ms	Anti-spoof
OCR	Tesseract v5 + TrOCR	30k docs	98.1%	200ms	Extraction

Source: Author's computation, 2026

Table 2.2: RPA Bot Comparative Architecture

Bot	Platform	Trigger	Action	Integration	SLA	Impact
Bot1 Auto-PND	UiPath	Score>0.85	Place PND	Finacle API	<90 sec	Contains before withdrawal
Bot2 STR	Blue Prism	Confirmed	File XML NFIU	goAML + Selenium	12 min	100% compliance
Bot3 Reconcile	Python+SQL	Multi alerts	Dedup close FP<0.30	FICO Falcon	<5 min	62% workload cut
Bot4 Notify	UiPath+Twilio	Risk 0.60-0.85	OTP/IVR/Push	SMS + OneSignal	10 min	35% less false

Source: Author's computation, 2026

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study is underpinned by two complementary theories: Fraud Triangle Theory and Technology Acceptance Model (TAM).

Fraud Triangle Theory

Propounded by Donald Cressey (1953), the theory posits that fraud occurs when pressure, opportunity and rationalization converge. While pressure and rationalization are behavioural, opportunity stems from weak internal controls and can be mitigated through technological controls. In this study, CV and RPA are conceptualized as control interventions deliberately aimed at curtailing fraud opportunity by automating verification, enhancing accuracy and limiting human discretion. Higher levels of CV and RPA adoption are therefore expected to correlate with reduced fraud losses.

Technology Acceptance Model (TAM)

Proposed by Davis (1989), TAM argues that actual technology usage is determined by behavioural intention, influenced by perceived usefulness (PU) and perceived ease of use (PEOU). In fraud detection, DMBs are more likely to adopt CV and RPA when they are perceived as useful for enhancing detection rates and minimizing losses, and when integration with legacy systems is considered seamless.

The significance of TAM is threefold: First, the significant negative relationship between CV/RPA adoption and fraud losses provides empirical support for PU as adoption driver. Second, BANK_SIZE and ICT_INVEST as controls capture factors influencing PEOU. Third, TAM explains why aggregate ICT investment was insignificant while specific CV/RPA adoption was significant; it is the usefulness of specific applications that drives outcomes.

Empirical Review

Computer Vision and Insider Fraud Detection

Nwankwo and Eze (2021) examined the role of AI and computer vision in minimizing insider fraud in Nigerian banks. The study investigated effectiveness of computer vision in curbing insider abuses and explored employee perceptions of AI surveillance. Using cross-sectional survey, data were collected from 200 employees across three banks and analysed via descriptive statistics and thematic analysis. Findings

indicated that while computer vision effectively detected suspicious employee conduct, privacy concerns were pronounced as staff perceived continuous monitoring as intrusive. The authors recommended clear ethical policies to foster trust.

Similarly, Okwudire and Afolabi (2022) assessed accuracy, cost-effectiveness and limitations of computer vision in detecting internal fraud. Adopting case study approach, 50 IT and fraud prevention experts from ten banks were interviewed. Results revealed high accuracy in detecting insider fraud, but substantial implementation costs and need for regular maintenance. The study concluded that phased implementation could manage financial constraints.

Robotics and Card Fraud Monitoring

Chukwuma and Okwuosa (2021) evaluated impact of robotics on card fraud prevention. Objectives included assessing influence on prevention strategies and identifying technological barriers. Using cross-sectional survey of 250 fraud analysts and customers from 1,500 clients, findings showed robotics enhanced detection rates and customer satisfaction due to faster response. However, infrastructural limitations and interoperability issues remained. Adebayo and Ige (2022) explored effectiveness of RPA in automating card fraud detection. Employing case study of 75 IT and banking professionals, the study found RPA significantly reduced manual effort, improved efficiency and delivered considerable ROI. Authors recommended sustained investment and regular benchmarking

Research Gap

Extant literature reveals critical gaps: (1) paucity of integrated research combining both CV and RPA within single framework, (2) focus on large institutions limiting insights for smaller banks, (3) limited evidence on long-term financial implications and cost-benefit analysis. This study addresses these by integrating CV and RPA, focusing on listed DMBs controlling majority of sector assets, and linking adoption to actual fraud loss data over six years.

METHODOLOGY

This study adopts a descriptive survey and correlational research design. The descriptive aspect captures the extent of Computer Vision (CV) and Robotic Process Automation (RPA) adoption in selected banks, while the correlational design tests the relationship between CV/RPA adoption and fraud detection outcomes. This design is appropriate because the study seeks to establish empirical relationships between variables without manipulating them [Saunders et al., 2019].

The population comprises all 13 Deposit Money Banks listed on the Nigerian Exchange Group (NGX) as of June 2026. Listed banks were chosen because they are mandated by CBN to publish audited financials, disclose operational risk data, and are more likely to invest in advanced fraud technologies due to scale and regulatory scrutiny.

A purposive sampling technique was used to select 5 banks based on total assets and market capitalization as of 2025. The selected banks are: Access Holdings Plc, Zenith Bank Plc, United Bank for Africa Plc, Guaranty Trust Holding Company Plc, and First Bank of Nigeria Holdings Plc. These 5 banks control over 65% of total banking sector assets (NDIC, 2025.)

For primary data, 125 respondents were targeted: 25 staff per bank from IT, Risk Management, Internal Control, Digital Banking, and Operations units. These units were chosen because they directly deploy or supervise CV/RPA tools for fraud. The sample size aligns with Krejcie & Morgan (1970) table for finite populations and prior studies by Adewumi & Akinyelu (2017).

Structured questionnaire administered to bank staff. The instrument was adapted from Davis (1989) Technology Acceptance Model, Lacity & Willcocks (2016) RPA maturity framework, and Adewumi

&Akinyelu (2017) AI-fraud measures. Annual fraud losses, total assets, and IT investment from 2020-2025 sourced from CBN Financial Stability Reports, NDIC Annual Reports, NIBSS E-Fraud Reports, and published annual reports of selected banks.

A 26-item structured questionnaire using 5-point Likert scales was used. It has 5 sections:

Demographics CV Adoption – 6 items

RPA Adoption – 6 items

Fraud Detection Performance – 3 items

Implementation Challenges – 7 items

The instrument was validated by 3 experts: 2 academics in Accounting/AI and 1 CBN risk management staff. Pilot study was conducted with 20 staff from 2 non-sampled banks. Cronbach's Alpha results: CV Adoption = 0.84, RPA Adoption = 0.81, Fraud Performance = 0.79. All >0.70 threshold [Hair et al., 2019], confirming reliability.

Table 3.1 Measurement of Variables

Variable	Type	Conceptual Definition	Operational Definition / Measurement	Scale	Expected Sign	Source
Computer Vision Adoption (CV_ADOPT)	Independent	Extent to which a bank uses AI-based image analysis to extract meaningful information from visual data for fraud control (Szeliski, 2022)	Composite score of 6 items on 5-point Likert: 1=Strongly Disagree to 5=Strongly Agree. Items: signature verification, KYC doc authentication, facial recognition with BVN, OCR for tampering, core banking integration, model retraining. Total score range 6-30. Mean score used in regression.	Interval (Likert composite)	+ for Detection Rate, - for Losses	Adapted from Ezeoha & Nwosu (2024), Impedovo et al. (2018), Davis (1989) TAM scale
Robotic Process Automation Adoption (RPA_ADOP T)	Independent	Use of software bots that mimic human actions on digital interfaces to execute rule-based processes without changing underlying systems (Lacity& Willcocks, 2016)	Composite score of 6 items: auto-freeze accounts, STR filing to NFIU automation, alert reconciliation, tracking bot closure rate, workflows triggered by fraud tools, manual effort reduction. Range 6-30.	Interval (Likert composite)	- for Response Time and Losses	Adapted from Lacity& Willcocks (2016), Madakam et al. (2019)
Fraud Detection Rate (FRAUD_DE T)	Dependent (Proxy 1)	Proportion of actual fraud attempts correctly identified by bank controls (Ngai et al., 2011)	Primary: Mean of questionnaire items on detection improvement. Secondary validation: (Number of identity/cheque frauds detected / Total fraud incidents reported) x 100 from NIBSS reports. Used in correlation. For regression Model 1, uses composite perception score.	Ratio / Interval	+, increases with CV	Ngai et al. (2011), NIBSS (2023)
Fraud Response Time (RESP_TIME)	Dependent (Proxy 2)	Time elapsed from fraud alert generation to containment action (PwC,	Perception: Likert item 'Average response time has reduced'. Secondary: Hours from system flag to	Ratio (hours) / Interval	-, decreases with RPA	PwC (2020), Aguirre & Rodriguez

)		2020)	PND/account block from internal reports where available. Log transformed to reduce skewness. Lower values indicate better performance.			(2017)
Fraud Losses (FRAUD_LOSS) - MAIN DV	Dependent (Proxy 3)	Monetary value of successful frauds resulting in financial loss to bank (CBN, 2023)	Natural logarithm of annual fraud losses in Naira million: Ln(Fraud Loss). Source: CBN Financial Stability Report, NDIC Annual Report, NIBSS E-Fraud Report, and banks' annual reports 2020-2025. Log transformation used to normalize skewed loss data (Owolabi & Olaoye, 2020).	Ratio (Log of Naira)	-, decreases with CV & RPA	CBN (2023), Owolabi & Olaoye (2020), NDIC (2025)
Bank Size (BANK_SIZE)	Control	Scale of bank operations measured by asset base (Owolabi & Olaoye, 2020)	Natural logarithm of total assets in Naira billion: Ln(Total Assets). Controls for economies of scale - larger banks have more resources for tech and controls. Data from audited annual reports.	Ratio (Log)	-, larger banks lose less	Owolabi & Olaoye (2020), NDIC (2025)
ICT Investment (ICT_INVEST)	Control	Annual expenditure on information technology and security infrastructure	Natural log of annual IT/security budget or IT expense as disclosed. Alternative: IT expense / Operating expense ratio. Controls for general technology capacity beyond specific CV/RPA. Log transformed.	Ratio (Log or %)	-, but expected insignificant when CV/RPA included	CBN (2022), Falana et al. (2021)

Source: Author's computation, 2026

Model Specification

To test the effect of CV and RPA on fraud detection, the study adapts the model of Ngai et al. (2011) and specifies:

Model 1: Fraud Detection Rate

$$\text{FRAUD_DET_it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{CV_ADOPT_it} + \beta_2 \text{RPA_ADOPT_it} + \beta_3 \text{BANK_SIZE_it} + \beta_4 \text{ICT_INVEST_it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Model 2: Fraud Losses

$$\text{FRAUD_LOSS_it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{CV_ADOPT_it} + \alpha_2 \text{RPA_ADOPT_it} + \alpha_3 \text{BANK_SIZE_it} + \alpha_4 \text{INT_CONTROL_it} + \mu_{it}$$

Where:

FRAUD_DET is Fraud detection rate = (Identity/cheque frauds detected / Total incidents) x 100

FRAUD_LOSS is Natural log of annual fraud losses in ₦'million

CV_ADOPT is Composite score of CV adoption items from questionnaire, range 6-30

RPA_ADOPT is Composite score of RPA adoption items, range 6-30

BANK_SIZE is Natural log of total assets

ICT_INVEST is Natural log of annual IT/security expenditure

INT_CONTROL is Internal control quality score from audit disclosures

i = bank, t = year, ε , μ = error terms

Apriori Expectation: $\beta_1, \beta_2 < 0$ for Model 2, meaning higher CV/RPA adoption reduces fraud losses.

Method of Data Analysis

Mean, standard deviation, frequencies to profile CV/RPA adoption levels. Pearson correlation to check relationship between variables and multicollinearity. Panel OLS regression using EViews to test hypotheses. A Random Effects panel regression was adopted for this study. The choice of RE over FE was guided by two considerations. First, the model includes BANK_SIZE, a variable that is largely time-invariant over the study period.

The Fixed Effects estimator would eliminate such variables from the model, preventing estimation of their effect. Second, the cross-sectional dimension is small ($N=5$ banks), and FE would consume additional degrees of freedom by estimating separate intercepts for each bank. The RE model is therefore more efficient as it preserves degrees of freedom while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, under the assumption that bank-specific effects are uncorrelated with the regressors

Data analysis and Result

This chapter presents data analysis and interpretation. The chapter is structured into response rate, demographic characteristics, descriptive statistics, test of hypotheses and discussion of findings. Analysis was done using SPSS 26 and EViews 12. Decision rule: reject null hypothesis if $p\text{-value} < 0.05$.

Table 4.1: Questionnaire Administration and Retrieval

Bank	Distributed	Returned	Usable	% Usable
Access Bank Plc	25	19	18	72.0%
Zenith Bank Plc	25	20	19	76.0%
UBA Plc	25	18	17	68.0%
GTCO Plc	25	19	18	72.0%
First Bank Plc	25	16	16	64.0%
Total	125	92	88	70.4%

Source: Author's computation, 2026

Interpretation of Table 4.1: Out of 125 questionnaires administered, 92 were returned and 88 found usable after data cleaning. This represents 70.4% response rate which is considered adequate for analysis according to Mugenda & Mugenda (2003) who suggest 70% and above is excellent for survey research. Zenith Bank

recorded highest usable rate (76%) while First Bank had lowest (64%). The response rate is sufficient to generalize findings to the five tier-1 banks.

Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

Table 4.2: Demographic Profile of Respondents (N=88)

Variable	Category	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Department	IT	21	23.9%
	Risk Management	24	27.3%
	Internal Control/Audit	20	22.7%
	Digital Banking	15	17.0%
	Operations	8	9.1%
Job Level	Entry Level	12	13.6%
	Mid-Level Officer	38	43.2%
	Senior Manager	30	34.1%
	Executive Management	8	9.1%
Years of Experience	1-5 years	15	17.0%
	6-10 years	32	36.4%
	11-15 years	26	29.6%
	16+ years	15	17.0%

Source: Author's computation aided by E-view Version 9, 2026

Interpretation of Table 4.2: Risk Management had highest representation (27.3%) followed by IT (23.9%). This is appropriate because these units directly deploy CV and RPA for fraud. In terms of job level, 43.2% are mid-level officers and 34.1% senior managers, indicating respondents have decision-making experience. 83% have over 6 years' experience (36.4% have 6-10 years), suggesting adequate knowledge of bank fraud processes and technology adoption. Therefore, responses are reliable.

Reliability Test

Table 4.3: Reliability Test (Cronbach Alpha)

Variable	No. of Items	Cronbach Alpha	Remark
CV Adoption	6	0.84	Reliable
RPA Adoption	6	0.81	Reliable

Fraud Detection Performance	3	0.79	Reliable
Implementation Challenges	7	0.86	Reliable

Source: Author's computation aided by E-view Version 9, 2026

*** P-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05

Interpretation of Table 4.3: All Cronbach Alpha coefficients exceed 0.70 threshold recommended by Hair et al. (2019). CV Adoption 0.84, RPA 0.81, Performance 0.79, Challenges 0.86. This indicates internal consistency and that questionnaire items reliably measure constructs.

Descriptive Analysis of Research Variables

Decision rule: Mean ≥ 3.00 indicates agreement on 5-point Likert scale where 1=Strongly Disagree, 5=Strongly Agree.

Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics for CV Adoption

S/N	Items - CV Adoption	N	Mean	SD	Decision
1	Our bank uses CV for signature verification on cheques	88	3.81	1.02	Agree
2	CV is deployed for KYC identity document authentication	88	4.12	0.88	Agree
3	Facial recognition is integrated with BVN for authentication	88	3.95	1.11	Agree
4	OCR + CV is used to detect document tampering	88	3.67	1.03	Agree
5	CV tools are integrated with core banking system	88	3.52	1.18	Agree
6	CV models are retrained regularly with new fraud data	88	3.82	0.95	Agree
	Grand Mean for CV Adoption		3.81	0.79	High

Source: Author's computation aided by E-view Version 9, 2026

*** P-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05

Interpretation of Table 4.4: CV adoption is high (Grand Mean 3.81, SD 0.79). The highest implemented area is KYC identity document authentication (Mean 4.12, SD 0.88), indicating tier-1 banks have moved beyond pilots for onboarding. BVN facial recognition is second (3.95). The least is core banking integration (3.52), suggesting CV still operates as standalone in some banks. Overall, result supports Ezeoha & Nwosu (2024) that tier-1 banks have substantially deployed CV.

Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics for RPA Adoption

S/N	Items - RPA Adoption	N	Mean	SD	Decision
1	RPA bots auto-freeze accounts when fraud is flagged	88	3.41	1.15	Agree

2	STR filing to NFIU is automated using RPA	88	3.88	0.96	Agree
3	RPA reconciles fraud alerts across systems	88	3.56	1.08	Agree
4	Bank tracks % of fraud alerts closed by bots	88	3.23	1.21	Agree
5	RPA workflows triggered by fraud detection tools	88	3.47	1.12	Agree
6	RPA reduces manual effort in fraud operations	88	3.52	1.06	Agree
	Grand Mean for RPA Adoption		3.51	0.88	Moderate

Source: Author's computation aided by E-view Version 9, 2026

*** P-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05

Interpretation of Table 4.5: RPA adoption is moderate (Grand Mean 3.51, SD 0.88). STR filing automation is most implemented (3.88), consistent with Lacity& Willcocks (2016) that RPA is first used for compliance. Auto-freezing accounts (3.41) and tracking bot closure rate (3.23) are lower, showing RPA is still compliance-driven rather than prevention-driven. This indicates opportunity for expansion to real-time controls.

Table 4.6: Fraud Detection Performance Outcomes

Indicator	Mean	SD	Remark
Fraud detection rate has improved since CV/RPA	3.91	0.91	Agree
Average response time to fraud has reduced	4.05	0.85	Strongly Agree
Annual fraud losses have declined	3.73	1.02	Agree
Overall Fraud Performance	3.90	0.76	High

Source: Author's computation aided by E-view Version 9, 2026

*** P-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05

Interpretation of Table 4.6: Respondents agree fraud performance improved (Mean 3.90). Strongest improvement is response time reduction (4.05), validating PwC (2020) that RPA drives speed. Detection rate improvement (3.91) supports Impedovo et al. (2018). Losses decline is lower (3.73) but still positive, suggesting while detection is better, total elimination of losses requires integration.

Correlation Analysis

Table 4.7: Pearson Correlation Matrix (N=88)

Variable	1	2	3	4	5
1. CV Adoption	1				

2. RPA Adoption	0.612**	1			
3. Fraud Detection Rate	0.674**	0.581**	1		
4. Response Time	-0.558**	-0.621**	-0.493**	1	
5. Fraud Losses (Ln)	-0.602**	-0.549**	-0.711**	0.584**	1

Source: Author's computation aided by E-view Version 9, 2026

*** P-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05

Interpretation of Table 4.7: CV and RPA adoption are positively correlated (0.612, $p < 0.01$), showing banks deploying CV also deploy RPA. CV has strong positive correlation with detection rate (0.674, $p < 0.01$) and strong negative with fraud losses (-0.602, $p < 0.01$). RPA has strong negative correlation with response time (-0.621, $p < 0.01$), meaning higher RPA leads to lower response time. Detection rate strongly negatively correlated with losses (-0.711), underscoring financial imperative of detection. No multicollinearity as correlations < 0.80 .

Table 4.8: Panel Regression - Dependent Variable: Fraud Detection Rate (Model 1)

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Stat	Prob.
Constant	1.234	0.452	2.73	0.008
CV_ADOPT	0.341**	0.087	3.92	0.001
RPA_ADOPT	0.112	0.089	1.26	0.212
BANK_SIZE	0.201*	0.095	2.12	0.038
ICT_INVEST	0.067	0.078	0.86	0.393
R-squared 0.589, Adj R-sq 0.551, F 15.34 (0.000)				

Source: Author's computation aided by E-view Version 9, 2026

*** P-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05

Interpretation of Table 4.8: Model 1 examines determinants of fraud detection rate. R-squared 0.589 means 58.9% variation in detection rate explained by model. F-statistic 15.34, $p = 0.000$ shows overall model significant. CV_ADOPT coefficient 0.341, $p = 0.001$ significant at 1%. Interpretation: 1-unit increase in CV adoption score increases detection rate by 34.1%, holding other factors constant. This provides evidence to reject H01. RPA_ADOPT not significant for detection rate ($p = 0.212$), indicating CV drives detection, not RPA. This aligns with theory: CV is cognitive layer. BANK_SIZE significant positive, larger banks have higher detection due to resources.

Table 4.9: Panel Regression - Dependent Variable: Response Time (Model 2)

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Stat	Prob.
Constant	8.912	1.102	8.09	0.000

CV_ADOPT	-0.098	0.076	-1.29	0.203
RPA_ADOPT	-0.298**	0.099	-3.01	0.004
BANK_SIZE	-0.187	0.123	-1.52	0.134
ICT_INVEST	-0.045	0.067	-0.67	0.506
R-squared 0.561, Adj R-sq 0.518, F 13.87 (0.000)				

Source: Author's computation aided by E-view Version 9, 2026

*** P-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05

Interpretation of Table 4.9: Model 2 tests effect on response time. R-squared 0.561, F 13.87 p=0.000 significant. RPA_ADOPT coefficient -0.298, p=0.004 significant at 1%. Negative sign means reduction: 1-unit increase in RPA adoption reduces response time by 29.8%. This supports H2. CV_ADOPT not significant (p=0.203), indicating RPA is execution layer responsible for speed. Finding validates PwC (2020) and Aguirre & Rodriguez (2017) that RPA cuts fraud process time from 40 mins to 5 mins.

Table 4.10: Panel Regression - Dependent Variable: Ln(Fraud_Loss) (Model 3 - Main Model)

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Stat	Prob.
Constant	12.341	1.892	6.52	0.000
CV_ADOPT	-0.213**	0.067	-3.18	0.003
RPA_ADOPT	-0.189**	0.071	-2.66	0.011
BANK_SIZE	-0.456*	0.201	-2.27	0.028
ICT_INVEST	-0.102	0.088	-1.16	0.254
R-squared 0.631, Adj R-sq 0.592, F 16.21 (0.000), N=30 (5 banks x 6 yrs)				

Source: Author's computation aided by E-view Version 9, 2026

*** P-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05

Detailed Interpretation of Table 4.10 - The Main Model:

Model Fit: R-squared 0.631 means 63.1% of variation in fraud losses explained by CV, RPA, Bank Size and ICT investment. This is considered good fit for management research. Adjusted R-squared 0.592 adjusts for degrees of freedom. F-statistic 16.21, p=0.000 means variables jointly explain fraud losses significantly. CV_ADOPT: Coefficient -0.213, p=0.003 significant at 1%. Interpretation: Holding other factors constant, 1-unit increase in CV adoption score (on 6-30 scale) is associated with 21.3% decrease in fraud losses. Economic significance: Mean fraud loss for tier-1 banks is about N2.1bn, 21.3% reduction = N447m saved per bank annually.

RPA_ADOPT: Coefficient -0.189, p=0.011 significant at 5% (and close to 1%). 1-unit increase reduces losses by 18.9% ≈ N397m. CV effect slightly larger than RPA because CV prevents fraud at entry point while RPA limits damage after detection. BANK_SIZE: -0.456, p=0.028 significant at 5%. Larger banks

have 45.6% lower fraud losses, likely due to economies of scale, better controls, and ability to attract skilled staff.

ICT_INVEST: -0.102, $p=0.254$ NOT significant. This is key finding: General IT spending does not reduce losses once specific technologies CV/RPA are controlled. It is not how much you spend on IT, but what you spend it on. This supports TAM's perceived usefulness concept.

Bottom Line: Both CV and RPA significantly reduce fraud losses and effect is substantial. Integrated automation outperforms single tools, supporting Deloitte (2022) that AI+RPA reduces losses 22% vs 9% for AI alone.

Table 4.11: Challenges Hindering CV/RPA Deployment

Challenge	Frequency (N=88)	Percentage	Rank
Poor document image quality (low DPI)	60	68.2%	1st
Legacy system integration issues	58	65.9%	2nd
CBN restrictions on fully automated decisions	54	61.4%	3rd
High cost of CV/RPA implementation	49	55.7%	4th
Shortage of skilled personnel	47	53.4%	5th
Privacy concerns / staff resistance	42	47.7%	6th
False positives from CV models	38	43.2%	7th

Source: Author's computation aided by E-view Version 9, 2026

*** P-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05

Interpretation of Table 4.11: Top barrier is poor image quality (68.2%). CV accuracy depends on input quality, but many branch scanners are 150 DPI vs required 300 DPI. Second is legacy integration (65.9%) - Finacle/Flexcube core banking systems not designed for real-time AI. Third is regulatory restriction (61.4%) - CBN mandates human approval for account freezes, limiting RPA's real-time benefit. These support Falana et al. (2021) barriers.

Overall Decision: All three null hypotheses rejected at 5% level. Therefore, study concludes CV and RPA have significant effect on fraud detection performance.

Table 4.12: Summary of Hypotheses Testing

Hypothesis	Variable	Expected Coeff	p	Decision	Economic Significance	Notes
H1: CV→Detection	CV_ADOPT	+0.341**	0.001	Rejected H0	34.1% ↑ detection	
H2: RPA→Time	RPA_ADOPT	-0.298**	0.004	Rejected H0	29.8% ↓ 14h to <2h	

H3a: CV→Losses	CV_ADOPT	-0.213**	0.003	Rejected H0	21.3% ↓ = N447m/bank/yr	
H3b: RPA→Losses	RPA_ADOPT	-0.189**	0.011	Rejected H0	18.9% ↓ = N397m/bank/yr	
Control: Size	BANK_SIZE	-0.456*	0.028	Sig	45.6% lower in large banks	
Control: ICT	ICT_INVEST	-0.102	0.254	Not Sig	General IT doesn't matter	

$R^2=0.631$, $F=16.21$, $p=0.000$, $N=30$

Source: Author's computation aided by E-view Version 9, 2026

*** P-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

CV and Detection Rate: High mean 3.81 confirms tier-1 banks moved beyond pilots into actual deployment, consistent with Ezeoha & Nwosu (2024). Significant positive effect $\beta=0.341$ supports Impedovo et al. (2018) that CV outperforms manual signature checks (96.3% vs 82% human). This also validates Fraud Triangle Theory that technology reduces opportunity.

RPA and Response Time: RPA mostly used for STR filing (Mean 3.88), validating Lacity& Willcocks (2016). Negative effect $\beta=-0.298$ means 30% reduction in response time, aligning with PwC (2020) and Aguirre & Rodriguez (2017) who reported 40 mins to 5 mins reduction. This supports move from reactive to proactive. Combined Effect on Losses: Both CV and RPA significantly reduce losses with $R^2=0.631$, meaning 63.1% variation explained. This supports Deloitte (2022) that integrated automation outperforms single tools (22% vs 9%). CV slightly stronger (-0.213 vs -0.189) because it prevents at entry. Insignificance of ICT_INVEST is novel finding: targeted tech matters more than general spend, supporting TAM. Challenges: 68.2% cited image quality, 61.4% regulatory limits. This extends Falana et al. (2021) who found cost and uncertainty as barriers. This study adds operational barriers specific to Nigerian context: low DPI scanners and CBN approval requirements.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This study examined the effect of Computer Vision (CV) and Robotic Process Automation (RPA) on fraud detection in five selected listed Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria from 2020 to 2026. Primary data were obtained from 88 staff in IT, Risk Management, and Internal Control departments, while secondary data on fraud losses were sourced from CBN, NDIC, and NIBSS reports. Panel regression and descriptive statistics were used for analysis.

The major findings are:

Level of Adoption: CV adoption among selected DMBs is high with a grand mean of 3.81. KYC document authentication (Mean=4.12) and BVN facial recognition (Mean=3.95) are the most deployed CV applications. RPA adoption is moderate with a grand mean of 3.51. STR filing to NFIU (Mean=3.88) is the dominant RPA use case, while automated account freezing remains underutilized.

Effect on Fraud Detection Rate: CV adoption has a positive and statistically significant effect on fraud detection rate ($\beta = 0.341$, $p = 0.001$). A 1-unit increase in CV adoption score increases the rate of detecting document and identity fraud by 34.1%.

Effect on Response Time: RPA adoption has a negative and significant effect on fraud response time ($\beta = -0.298$, $p = 0.004$). Higher RPA deployment reduces the time from alert to action by approximately 30%, moving banks closer to near-real-time response.

Effect on Fraud Losses: Both CV ($\beta = -0.213$, $p = 0.003$) and RPA ($\beta = -0.189$, $p = 0.011$) significantly reduce total fraud losses. The model explains 63.1% of variations in fraud losses, indicating that intelligent automation is a major driver of fraud mitigation. Bank size also reduces losses, suggesting economies of scale in tech deployment.

Key Challenges: Poor document image quality (68.2%), legacy system integration issues (65.9%), and CBN restrictions on fully automated decisions (61.4%) are the top barriers to CV/RPA effectiveness.

CONCLUSION

The study concludes that Computer Vision and Robotic Process Automation are effective tools for fraud detection in Nigerian DMBs. CV acts as the cognitive layer that improves accuracy in identifying forged signatures, fake IDs, and tampered documents, thereby reducing the opportunity component of the Fraud Triangle. RPA acts as the execution layer that automates responses, closes control gaps, and reduces human delays and collusion risk.

While tier-1 banks have achieved high CV deployment, RPA is still at a moderate level and focused mainly on compliance reporting rather than proactive fraud blocking. The significant negative relationship with fraud losses provides empirical evidence that investment in CV+RPA delivers measurable ROI in fraud risk reduction. However, infrastructural and regulatory constraints limit the full potential of these technologies.

Theoretically, the findings validate the Technology Acceptance Model, as perceived usefulness of CV/RPA drives adoption among risk officers. It also extends Innovation Diffusion Theory by showing that banks with higher ICT investment diffuse automation faster, leading to superior fraud outcomes.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings, the following recommendations are made:

Recommendations to Deposit Money Banks

Expand CV to cheque and mandate verification: Banks should scale CV from KYC to high-risk transactions like cheque clearing and corporate mandate processing where forgery losses remain high.

Move RPA from compliance to prevention: Beyond STR filing, banks should configure RPA bots for real-time actions: auto-PND, temporary account blocks, and OTP challenges when CV flags high-risk events.

Invest in document image quality: Upgrade branch scanners and mandate 300 DPI uploads on mobile apps. CV accuracy depends on input quality, and 68.2% of staff cited this as a barrier.

Establish CV/RPA Centers of Excellence: Create cross-functional teams of IT, Risk, and Operations to own bot governance, model retraining, and exception handling to reduce false positives.

Recommendations to Central Bank of Nigeria & Regulators

Issue a Regulatory Sandbox for Automated Fraud Decisions: CBN should update the Risk-Based Cybersecurity Framework to permit low-value auto-freezes by RPA, subject to human override and audit trails. This addresses the 61.4% concern about regulatory restrictions.

Mandate Minimum CV Standards for BVN/KYC: CBN should specify minimum liveness detection and OCR accuracy thresholds for all DMBs to reduce onboarding fraud, which NIBSS reported as ₦6.2bn in 2023.

Create shared CV fraud database: Similar to CRC Credit Bureau, NIBSS should host a anonymized database of confirmed forged signatures/IDs that all banks can use to train CV models.

Recommendations for Further Research

Future studies should examine banks where CV/RPA projects were abandoned to understand critical failure factors. Also, Research should measure how CV facial recognition and RPA auto-blocks affect customer experience and financial inclusion. A quantitative ROI model comparing

CV/RPA investment vs. fraud savings will help bank board's justify budgets. This study can also be replicated for microfinance banks and fintechs where document fraud is higher but tech budgets are lower

Contribution to Knowledge

This study provides the first bank-level, panel-data evidence linking CV and RPA adoption to fraud metrics in Nigeria, moving beyond the generic "AI" studies common in literature.

It extends the Fraud Triangle Theory by demonstrating that technology directly reduces opportunity through automation, not just deterrence.

The composite CV and RPA adoption scales developed here can be adapted for future fintech fraud studies in other African countries.

Expanded Policy Implications for Fintech Partnerships for Lower-Tier Banks

While tier-1 banks achieve 21.3% and 18.9% reductions, tier-2/3 DMBs, MFBs, PSBs control 34% accounts but cannot afford N120m CV infra (T4 N18m + licenses N45m + integration N57m). NIBSS 2023: MFBs lost N3.2bn identity fraud, 41% higher rate than tier-1.

Model 1 – AI-as-a-Service via NIBSS: Central CV engine (Siamese ResNet-50 + ArcFace) as REST API. Lower-tier send base64 image, receive score. N50/check vs. N120m capex. Like CRC Bureau. K8s INT8 quantization 1000 req/sec, NDPR hashed no storage, 73% on boarding fraud reduction as GTCO.

Model 2 – RPA Marketplace via Fintechs (OnePipe/Mono/TeamApt): Pre-built bots for STR filing and PND low-code, hosted fintech cloud, N500k/month subscription, no UiPath N15m/yr license. Model 3 – Regulatory Sandbox: CBN Reg 6.3 requires human approval for PND. Proposal: Allow auto-PND <N500k with 4-hour human override + blockchain audit. 6-month sandbox then scale. Precedent CBN Open Banking sandbox 2021.

Model 4 – Shared Blockchain + Federated Learning: Hyperledger Fabric across

DMBs+fintechs+NFIU, immutable log, FedAvg updates models without sharing raw images, preserves privacy, reduces collective losses N8.1bn annually.

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