Understanding the Inability of Local and International NGOs in  
Addressing the Humanitarian and Peace building Needs of the  
Affected Population During the Cameroon Anglophone Conflict  
Stephen Mokondo Moki1 , Johnson Efungani Malafa2  
1Senior Lecturer, Department of Management and Marketing, University of Bamenda, Cameroon  
Visiting Lecturer, Department of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Buea, Cameroon  
2Department of International Relations and Conflict Resolution, University of Buea, Cameroon  
Received: 04 November 2025; Accepted: 11 November 2025; Published: 21 November 2025  
ABSTRACT  
The Cameroon-Anglophone conflict has dominated political discussions and debates in Cameroon and abroad,  
especially after the situation went violent in 2017. Various stakeholders, including international and local non-  
governmental organisations (NGOs), have taken an interest in bringing in their humanitarian and  
peacebuilding supports. Despite their efforts, it is reported in Malafa, Moki, Sunjo and Ewusi (2024) that  
members of the affected communities found them to be ineffective in their humanitarian and peacebuilding  
roles. The objective of this study is to examine the inability of these NGOs to address the humanitarian and  
peacebuilding needs of the affected population during the Cameroon Anglophone conflict. The researchers  
adopted the qualitative research approach using in-depth interviews. Considering the sensitivity of this  
research topic, the researchers employed the purposive and snowballing sampling techniques to select officials  
of some NGOs and key informants for the study by targeting individuals who were interested and versed in the  
issue. A total of 24 participants were interviewed using a semi-structured interview guide. The findings  
revealed that insecurity and the threat to life, inaccessibility to the needy population, lack of collaboration and  
confidence from the affected population, poor communication network and language barrier, undue pressure  
from some traditional leaders, corrupt practices and dishonesty of hired community mobilisers, unstable  
population, lack of funding, donor fatigue, and lack of collaboration among NGOs were the factors that  
contributed to the inability of the NGOs to effectively address the humanitarian and peacebuilding needs of the  
affected population. Among the major recommendations are the following: NGOs should empower people in  
affected communities to become self-sustaining rather than constantly providing for their needs with funds that  
are often limited. Also, there should be periods of ceasefire between government forces and separatist fighters  
to enable the NGOs to carry on their humanitarian and peacebuilding activities without being faced with the  
risk of being hit by a targeted or stray bullet. This is in line with the collective model of the Seybolt’s  
humanitarian systems theory that recommends NGOs should jointly carry out need assessments of the affected  
population and decide what each organisation will supply as per their specialisation to curb domain overlap,  
corruption and competition.  
Keywords: Humanitarian support, Peacebuilding activities, NGOs, and Cameroon Anglophone Conflict.  
INTRODUCTION  
The Cameroon government has been battling with civil unrest that erupted back in October 2016 in the  
English-speaking regions (North West and South West Regions) of the country (Moki, Ngange, Matute, and  
Eyong-Eta, 2022). From strike actions initiated by Common Law Lawyers against the Cameroonian  
government for constantly striving to suppress or eliminate the Anglo-Saxon judicial subsystem, the situation  
mutated into an armed conflict in 2017. This metamorphorization has led to a violent conflict that has  
dominated political discussions and debates in Cameroon.  
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Moki (2020) stated that this devastating conflict has been described by observers as one of the bloodiest  
internal conflicts Cameroon has ever witnessed since independence. The media and humanitarian organisations  
have reported on the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the conflict affected regions. Six years into the  
Anglophone conflict, Pelican (2022) reported a death toll of over 6000 and the displacement of 765,000  
persons as large-scale insecurity continued affecting the population in some parts of these two regions of  
Cameroon. These figures continue to rise as the conflict remains unresolved.  
The Cameroon government has engaged in several peacebuilding efforts to restore peace, as well as  
humanitarian actions to address the needs of the affected population. Various stakeholders, including  
international and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs), have taken an interest in also bringing in their  
humanitarian and peacebuilding support to the affected population. Despite their efforts, it was reported in  
Malafa, Moki, Sunjo, and Ewusi (2024) that members of the affected communities found the NGOs ineffective  
in their humanitarian and peacebuilding roles. The objective of this study is to examine the inability of these  
NGOs to address the humanitarian and peacebuilding needs of the affected population during the Cameroon  
Anglophone conflict.  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. The Cameroon Anglophone conflict and its genesis  
Moki, Ngange, Matute, and Eyong-Eta (2022) showed that the current conflict disrupting peace and tranquility  
in the Anglophone Regions of Cameroon was born around October 2016 after government security forces  
crackdown Common Law lawyers for demonstrating to express their frustration to the government in what  
they termed as the marginalisation of Anglophones in the publication of the OHADA Laws only in French  
language. The common law lawyers claimed this act undermined the constitution that prescribes the bilingual  
and bijurial nature of Cameroon. Teachers from the English part of Cameroon later joined the striking lawyers  
on November 21, 2016 in a bid to express their own socio-professional claims. This paralysed the Anglophone  
sub-system of education in the two English-speaking regions of Cameroon from basic to higher education,  
leading to fierce confrontations between protesters and security officers, especially in the streets of the North  
West Regional capital, Bamenda.  
Despite the Cameroon government’s decision to dialogue and negotiate with the lawyers and teachers  
independently in Yaoundé and Bamenda, respectively, between November 25, 2016, and January 13, 2017, a  
lot of propaganda messages flooded various mass media spaces, especially social media (Moki, Ngange &  
Tala, 2024). This culminated with the escalation of the conflict in October 2017 into an armed struggle  
between the defence forces and separatists who henceforth called for the complete independence of the  
Anglophone Cameroon (the Ambazonia State).  
However, the ongoing Cameroon Anglophone conflict has a history that is associated with the geopolitical  
history of the country, which has evolved. The country was initially annexed by the Germans in 1884 but later  
partitioned into two parts after this colonial master lost the First World War in 1916. This division led to 20%  
of the territory under the British control and 80% under the French as mandated territories under the League of  
Nations (Awasom, 2000; Fanso, 1989; and Njeuma, 1995). As explained by Koreshi (2011), the collapse of the  
League of Nations led to the change of the two parts of Cameroon from mandated territories under the British  
and French to trusteeship territories under the United Nations at the end of the Second World War in 1946.  
The approaches used by the British and French to administer the respective territories under their rules were  
different in terms of political administration. Though as mandated territories, Dupraz (2019) stated that France  
almost continued with the German political rigour, hegemony, and centralisation geared at assimilation as if  
Cameroon was its colony. The “indigenat” (system of government that virtually deprived the natives of most of  
their fundamental rights) was applied; they also established extrajudicial trials of natives for up to 10 years in  
jail. The French administration had the power to impose extrajudicial sanctions upon natives for a wide range  
of offences (Hodgkin, 1957:35).  
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The British administered its part of the territory by dividing it into two parts. That is: British Northern  
Cameroon and British Southern  
Cameroons, and ruled it as an integral part of Nigeria (Tanjong, 2012). Lee & Schultz (2011) added that the  
British approach was an indirect rule allowing the natives to execute judicial and executive decisions. This  
meant that Cameroonians in this part were willingly rather than coercively made to comply (Jua, 1995). Jua  
(1995) further explained that this state of affair gave citizens of British Cameroon autonomy that helped to  
establish “a greater vitality of local political institutions in West Cameroon,” which was contrary to what was  
obtained in the French-administered part.  
Taking a critical look at these separate approaches, Fanso (1989) maintained that the 1916 Anglo-French  
partition of Cameroon created separate nationalist aspirations and movements in the two territories. This has  
implications for the cultural, social, and political differences that have existed between these two parts of  
Cameroon, especially after reunification. After gaining independence in 1960 (for French Cameroon) and 1961  
(for English Cameroon by joining the French part), Fanso (1989) reported that it soon became obvious that the  
cultural, social, and political divides between the two linguistic groups were more fundamental and difficult to  
bridge than the initial aspirations of the nationalists, whose aims were to establish a united and independent  
Cameroon. The Federal Constitution, arrived at in 1961 by the fathers of reunification, kept the two linguistic  
groups distinct, with the people of each community firmly attached to their colonial cultural heritage in terms  
of education, judiciary, politics, and other social aspects.  
Fru and Wassermann (2017:1) explained that complaints of the systematic abrogation of the federal  
constitution (that stood as the basis for reunification), marginalisation, assimilation, and internal colonisation  
emerged among the minority Anglophone population of Cameroon after the 1961 reunification of Cameroon.  
The feeling of marginalisation leading to the Anglophone problem and eventually to the Anglophone conflict,  
has been addressed by different scholars. Echu (2004) stated that Cameroonians decry being subjected to  
communal disadvantage, which, according to them, constitutes an aftermath of reunification. Echu (2004)  
further noted that Anglophones complained of being treated by both Francophones and the State of Cameroon  
at large as second-class citizens in their own country.  
As the “Anglophone Problem” continued to dominate the political agenda in Cameroon with some Anglophone  
Cameroonians requesting a quest for federalism, Ngange and Moki (2019) reported that there was also an  
emergence of a secessionist group known as the Southern Cameroon National Congress (SCNC) that started  
demanding the independence of the former British Southern Cameroons territory.  
The legal framework governing the functioning of NGOs in Cameroon  
Non-Governmental Organisations in Cameroon are governed by Law No. 99/14 of 22 December 1999 and No.  
90/53 of 19 December 1990 relating to freedom of associations, amended and supplemented by Law No. 99/11  
of 20 July 1999, and Decree No. 2001/150/PM of 13 May 2001 relating to the organisation and functioning of  
the Technical Commission in charge of NGO activities. Article 3 of Law No. 99/14 spells out the various  
domains in which the status of an NGO would be granted, notably the legal, economic, social, cultural, health,  
sports, education, and humanitarian sectors, or in matters of environmental and human rights protection.  
However, for such status to be granted in any of the sectors, the relevant organisation must be a duly declared  
association or duly authorised foreign association backed with at least three years of effective contribution in  
any of the above-mentioned sectors. It is only after the granting of the status of NGO to an organisation that it  
acquires its legal personality that is separate from that of the founder(s) and thus could act in its own name and  
capacity (Boma, 2021).  
These laws constitute the legal framework for the promotion and protection of human rights in Cameroon by  
NGOs, which gave visibility to civil society organisations. The 1990 law therefore legitimised the existence  
and operation of civil societies and authorised the free creation of associations whose coordination should be  
government-led. This legal instrument was considered a significant improvement, as over the past, Law No.  
67/LF.19 of 12 June 1967 on Freedom of Association made it mandatory that all associations be authorised by  
the minister in charge of the Territorial Administration (Rutinwa, 2001).  
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Though the state has the primary obligation to promote and protect human rights, there also exists a plethora of  
associations with the same interest (Boma, 2021). The institution of the Law on Freedom of Associations  
considerably promoted the increase in the number of NGOs involved in areas such as health, education,  
training, environmental protection, women’s development, democracy and human rights, rural and urban  
development, capacity building and research, HIV/AIDS sensitisation, and community development (Boma,  
2021).  
Importance and advantages of NGOs  
Rauh (2010) remarked that the sphere of influence of NGOs in the field of global politics is on the rise, as they  
represent political values, interests, and demands that cut across states’ borders. As well, they participate in  
many transnational, world-level actions and programmes. They are recognised by policymakers as actors of the  
world political system, the reserved domain of states. He, therefore, claims that NGOs are fundamental to the  
transformation of the structure and processes of world politics and are considered a distinguished class of civil  
society organisations. Simultaneously, considering NGOs’ high flexibility in mobilising funds, governments  
often perceive them as a potential threat to their sovereignty.  
Thus, governments sometimes either ignore them or hinder the smooth running of their activities. However,  
Cakmak (2008) claimed that the recrudescence in NGOs is not equivalent to the state’s decline or weakness.  
He adheres to the idea that rather, NGOs complement the state’s actions, as they play significant roles  
unaccomplished by the state and international actors such as intergovernmental organisations. Moreover, he  
thinks that civil society has the potential to flourish in conditions of strong, stable, and effective governments.  
Beyond reasonable doubt, NGOs constitute a privileged partner to the state but have their flaws.  
Galtung (1987) described the power of NGOs in both negative and positive terms. In the former, they lack  
economic, military, and coercive potentials. In the latter, NGOs are endowed with cultural powers, which  
bestow on them the ability to easily engage public opinions; political powers, which grant them autonomy in  
programme management and contacts with national and international centres of power; and moral power,  
characterised by adherence to values and the principles of international law. Barnes (2005) corroborated that  
development agencies enhance civil society because they are optimistic about their potential to enormously  
contribute to democratisation by providing an arena through which citizens can become politically engaged.  
However, within the plethora of civil society organisations, international donors have elected to fund NGOs as  
a channel for supporting democratisation in the global South (Fisher, 1997; Mercer, 2002). As well, Kaldor  
(2003:3) and Duffield (2001) acknowledged that civil society has been considered central to the peacebuilding  
process in war-affected areas.  
In theory, the transformational nature of civil society supposes that it is ideally set up to initiate some of the  
deep structural change indispensable for peacebuilding, as advocated for by Galtung (1987) and Lederach  
(1995). However, questions still abound regarding how effectively local civil society organisations execute  
such roles within the framework of partnership with their international counterparts. Richmond (2003) stated  
that the gap is partly attributed to scholars’ focus concerning the involvement of local civil societies in  
peacebuilding, which has been on the organisational weaknesses and its ability to contribute, rather than on the  
strategies Southern organisations use to navigate the uneven playing field within which they operate.  
Abia et al. (ibid.) regretted that, though NGOs have taken the central stage in the fight against poverty, social  
injustice, and HR, most of them are considered weak due to their quasi-dependence upon funding from both  
governmental and international aid bodies. However, Duffield (2001) regretted that such international  
development aids are used as a means of containing and securing the global South rather than providing  
genuine empowerment. In this perspective, Yenshu (2008) in Abia et al. (2016:3) decried the growing  
expectation bestowed upon NGOs’ intervention to mediate and balance the power of states and markets in  
providing a moral check, as well as maintaining the democratic integrity of states, has been short-lived. He  
regrets that some NGOs have rather derogated to private money-making machines.  
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There are many advantages offered by NGOs. However, after reading Cousins (1991), the authors have  
summarised the advantages as follows:  
1. They have the propensity to take risks and to freely experiment with innovative approaches;  
2. They easily adapt to local situations, respond to local needs, and therefore can develop integrated and  
sectoral projects;  
3. They enjoy proximity and good working conditions with the populace. Thus, they can identify and  
render micro-assistance to the needy and tailor appropriate assistance to their requirements;  
4. They have the flexibility to communicate at all levels, from the grassroots to the top levels of  
government;  
5. They can easily recruit both experts and highly motivated staff with fewer restrictions than the  
government.  
D. Humanitarian intervention and peacebuilding challenges NGOs face  
CARE (2020: 7-9) contended that NGOs’ paternalistic attitudes restrict the degree of participation in  
programme/project design. Moreover, the existing societal unequal gender balance is worsened by a deeply  
entrenched patriarchy (women are intimidated by men, and they are not authorised to contribute amidst  
them…), poverty, conflicts, and degrading cultural practices such as coercive and/or early marriages that  
relegate women to the rank of mere caregivers. CARE (2020) agreed that women's NGOs confront difficulties  
that are attributed to traditions that forbid the participation of the female gender in public spheres, particularly  
in rural areas.  
Consequently, CARE (2020) regretted that, though there exist preponderant opportunities for women to engage  
in the peace process at both grassroots and national levels, such challenges undermine their potential to  
substantively contribute to the peace process. Consequently, such impediments have compelled women to  
adopt reactive rather than proactive approaches to peace initiatives. However, to reverse such a tendency, Butt  
(2013) noted that recently, NGOs have been focusing on moving from a “women-centred” to a more “gender”  
approach, particularly in the domain of health development. The NGO Symposium on Health for All Women  
and Men, a gender perspective that was held in Geneva in October 1997, recognises that “the concept of  
gender refers to women’s and men’s roles and relationships that are shaped by social, economic, political, and  
cultural factors rather than by biology.”  
Also, NGOs’ peacebuilding activities are often restricted by scarce funding for peacebuilding activities.  
Nikolov (2009) stated that the peacebuilding efforts of INGOs are often constrained by short-term funding as  
well as want of evaluations, which most often hinder them from ensuring the completion of developmental and  
service delivery programmes. Shivji (2007:31) submitted that an overwhelming number of NGOs are donor-  
funded. They are void of any independent source of funding.  
To survive, they seek funds through customary procedures set by the funding agencies. In that respect, the  
degree of independence NGOs can exercise in relation to donor agendas varies depending on the perspectives  
of their leadership. In a nutshell, the reduced replicability of an idea, due to the non-representativeness of  
projects or their selected areas, relatively small project coverage, and dependence on external financial  
resources, is subject to limitations of the scope of actions of NGOs involved in peacebuilding.  
As a corollary to such predicaments, NGOs indulge in quick-fix solutions to addressing communal conflicts.  
Most often, donors consider peacebuilding a post-conflict matter and not a priority, considering the  
humanitarian crisis and the unpredictability of the security situation on the ground. Nikolov (2009: 2) stated  
that most international NGOs are competing over funds, and they are constrained by local and international  
political realities. Due to pressure and struggle geared towards obtaining and maintaining funding from donors,  
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NGOs often focus little attention on management, which irreversibly leads to a lack of transparency,  
accountability, and inefficiency in services delivered to the public.  
There exists an inordinate lack of synergy and a common platform for NGOs that render coordination of their  
activities unrealistic, which hinder them from setting new objectives likely to enable them to withstand the  
ever-changing and challenging socio-political environment (Nikolov, 2009). The recently emerging triple  
nexus approach (relief-development-peacebuilding), which emphasises joint context analysis, joint  
programming, and longer-term funding for conflict affected states, potentially contributed to a shift in donors’  
priorities for South Sudan. Nkwi (2006) and Abia et al. (2016) decried that NGOs in Cameroon suffer from an  
acute lack of institutional structures and logistics that hinder their smooth running and hamper their  
blossoming. Hence, they function in suitcases, and their peacebuilding impact therefore fails to reach targeted  
communities.  
Nikolov (2009) regretted that most international NGOs are constrained by local and international political  
realities and circumstances, which may impede their peacebuilding efforts. Most NGOs are monitored and,  
sometimes, censored by the government. Consequently, CARE (2020) regretted that such interference inhibits  
the grassroots from receiving adequate information about peace agreements. Also, some scholars argue that  
international interventions inhibit the ability of Southern civil society organisations to participate in responding  
to armed conflicts.  
Pugh (2000:128) &Paffenholz and Spurk (2006) contended that some joint initiatives pursued by local and  
international organisations, such as project evaluation, may rather isolate communities’ peacebuilding  
processes. Pearce (2005:42), Belloni (2008), Barakat & Strand (1995), Goodhand & Lewer (1999), as well as  
Belloni (2001), corroborated that the structures of international funding rather promote local NGOs’  
dependence vis-à-vis donors. Consequently, they may be unable to act as agents of change at the community  
level. Also, Nikolov (2009:2) regretted that NGOs’ functions are overwhelmingly dictated by rules and  
regulations attached to donor funding. Furthermore, NGOs spend inordinate time competing over the  
acquisition of funding, and in return, they bestow little attention on the adequate needs of their targeted  
populations, therefore derogating from their cardinal principles.  
The "territorial possessiveness" of an area or project reduces cooperation between agencies, seen as threatening  
or competitive. Scholars have demonstrated that a “donor-driven hierarchy” towards NGOs tends to adjust  
their programmes to align with their interests. Consequently, they encourage international aid agencies to focus  
their attention primarily on NGOs that are beholden to their policy and share their values, while marginalising  
those wich portray radical views (Pugh 2000:119; Pearce 2005; Orjuela 2005).  
Belloni (2008) lamented that such hierarchy may promote polarisation amongst both divergent categories of  
NGOs. As well, Werker & Ahmed (2008: 23) contended that NGOs are confronted with problems that stem  
from the existence of too many actors, leaders, and missions, without consequential coordination. In the same  
vein, Ingram, Diestelhorst and Tih (2007), and Nkwi (2006) opposed the idea that Cameroon’s rich socio-  
cultural diversity, characterised by the presence of over 200 ethnic languages, constitutes a major constraint for  
NGOs.  
Jarstad (2008: 19) qualified the peace agreement as a means but not an end. He states that the legacies of war  
do not vanish with a peace agreement and that transitions to peace are characterised by many difficulties, such  
as: lack of trust, demolished infrastructure, and a war-torn economy. As an example, he presents the case of  
Nepal, where a failed democratisation process regressed into a decade-long armed conflict. Though the armed  
conflict had ended, and Nepal had become a democratic federal republic, many challenges are still prevalent in  
the efforts to sustain peace, democratisation, and development in the quest for positive peace. In light of such  
noticeable recriminations, Belloni (2001) and Orjuela (2003:210) conclusively stated that NGOs’ contributions  
to peacebuilding are necessary but not sufficient. Hence, they constitute a means to peacebuilding, but not an  
end.  
E. Theoretical framework  
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Seybolt’s theoretical approach to humanitarian systems forms the theoretical basis of this study. According to  
Kalita (2019), Taylor Seybolt conceived this theory in 2009. In this theory, Seybolt stated that the humanitarian  
aid system gradually evolves toward a network. However, he decried that this network faces significant  
constraints that prevent it from becoming a full-fledged network. Seybolt distinguishes two important models  
of partnership in this network, notably the reciprocal and the collective models. In the reciprocal model of  
partnership, the NGOs of the aid system work in isolation; they individually carry out need assessments,  
elaborate their plans of action, and individually execute them and follow up without sharing their experience in  
the field. Kalita (2019) maintained that such state of affair leads to a competitive tendency that becomes  
problematic when the NGOs fail to plan. This results in low connectivity among them, thereby creating an  
unstable system. This model leads to domain overlap and positive externalities that affect the efficiency of  
NGOs in the field.  
In the collective model of partnership, NGOs in the aid system work in synergy. They generally hold  
concertation meetings where they collectively take decisions. They collaboratively carry out need assessments,  
jointly elaborate their plans of action, and execute them, then collectively follow up activities on the field. As  
well, they share their success stories and challenges faced on the field. This model significantly curbs domain  
overlap and positive externalities. Hence, unlike the reciprocal model of partnership, the collective model  
enhances the humanitarian output of NGOs in the field. Seybolt’s theoretical approach to the humanitarian  
system is relevant to this study. It provides valuable insights in analysing, improving, and evaluating the  
coordination and effectiveness of international and local NGOs in humanitarian and peacebuilding contexts, as  
witnessed in the Cameroon-Anglophone conflict.  
METHODOLOGY  
The researchers adopted a qualitative research approach using in-depth interviews. This qualitative research  
method (in-depth interview) has become a key research tool widely employed to collect data, especially in  
qualitative studies (Coleman, 2019). This technique, as described in Boyce and Neale (2006), involves  
conducting intensive individual interviews with a few participants in order to explore their standpoints on a  
particular idea, programme, or situation. Considering the sensitivity of this research topic, the researchers  
employed the purposive sampling technique to select some officials of NGOs and key informants for the study.  
The purposive sampling technique is a non-probability sampling method where the researcher knowingly  
targets a group of people or elements believed to be appropriate enough for the study (Ndue, 2017). Also, some  
of the respondents helped to link the researchers to other participants using the snowballing sampling  
technique. This was for convenience, considering the sensitive nature of the topic and the prevailing insecurity.  
Against that backdrop, two categories of respondents were selected for this study. Firstly, officials of NGOs  
(two international NGOs, notably the Danish Refugee Council and Plan International Cameroon, as well as  
two local NGOs, Reach-Out Cameroon and the Martin Luther King Jr. Memorial Foundation) were retained  
for the study. These NGOs were selected because respondents in the study, Malafa, Moki, Sunjo, and Ewusi  
(2024), identified them as those that have been significantly involved in providing humanitarian and  
peacebuilding support to the communities affected by the Cameroon Anglophone conflict. Secondly, key  
informants constituting some focal persons, traditional leaders, quarter heads, who have been working in  
synergy with the selected NGOs, and some focal persons from the administration who generally monitored the  
activities of NGOs on the field were also identified and interviewed for this study. These respondents were  
purposively selected and interviewed based on their knowledge in the humanitarian and peacebuilding  
activities of the NGOs.  
Kibuacha (2021) stated that the larger the researcher’s sample size, the more confident he is that respondents’  
answers may truly reflect the entire population’s opinions. Against that backdrop, the researcher opted for a  
larger and more representative sample size to enhance the validity and credibility of the study. A total of 24  
participants were interviewed for this study, which falls within the range of 2030  
recommended by Creswell (2003). A semi structured interview guide was administered to participants. The  
questions were coined to generate relevant data to significantly address the research questions and objectives.  
Page 3593  
Data collection for this study was done face-to face, and in some cases, through mobile phones (direct phone  
and WhatsApp calls). For the face-to face interactions, members of the research team booked an appointment  
with the identified participants to agree on the location and time that were convenient for them. This enabled  
comprehension between the interviewer and the interviewee, as both made their points clearer. In some  
situations, the researcher rephrased the question when he felt the participants did not sufficiently answer the  
main questions. The responses were recorded using a digital audio recorder and, at the end, transcribed. The  
consent (verbally before proceeding to conduct the interviews) of the respondents was obtained before  
recording the interviews.  
The final population of this study was distributed as seen in table 1 below:  
Table 1: Distribution of participants according to category and gender  
SN Categories  
Gender  
Total  
2
Male Female  
Danish Refugee 1 1  
1.  
Council  
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.  
6.  
Plan-Cameroon  
Reach-Out  
LUKEMEF  
1
3
0
0
3
1
3
8
1
6
1
Key Informants 11  
Total 16  
14  
24  
Source: Field Work, 2025  
According to the data, 2 persons (1 male and 1 female) were interviewed from the Danish Refugee Council,  
which is an international NGO, while 1 (a male) was interviewed from Plan Cameroon, 6 (3 male and 3  
female) from Reach-Out, 1 (female) from LUKEMEF, and 14 (11 male and 3 female) key informants.  
However, in terms of gender, more males (16) were interviewed compared to females (8). During the  
interview, males showed more willingness to participate than females, given the sensitive nature of the topic.  
Bryman (2012) outlined a six-step approach to thematic analysis, which we followed for data analysis. Based  
on the six-step approach, we began by reading carefully through the transcribed interviews to familiarise  
ourselves with the data (understanding). In this stage, we took note of initial impressions and patterns in the  
data. The next step was generating initial codes. This process is also known as indexing, where we identified  
and labelled key words, phrases, sentences, actions, and concepts that captured the essence of the data and  
assigned codes to them. In the third step, we searched for themes by deciding the most important codes and  
then grouped them into broader categories. In the fourth step, we reviewed the themes and revised them to  
ensure they accurately reflected the data and were connected to the research questions.  
In the fifth step, we defined and named the themes, ensuring that they are concise and easy to understand. In  
the sixth step, we created a report of our findings by extracting excerpts from the interviews as supporting  
evidence for the identified themes and did the interpretation as seen in the findings below. Maguire & Delahunt  
(2017) and Dawadi (2020) have attributed the six-step approach to thematic analysis to Braun & Clarke  
(2006). For the purpose of confidentiality, we have assigned codes to the respondents. I-NGO-1 means  
International NGO number one, while L-NGO-1 means Local NGO 1, and KI-1 also means Key Informant 1,  
and so on.  
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FINDINGS  
Explaining the inability of NGOs to effectively address the humanitarian and peacebuilding needs of the  
affected  
population After an analysis of respondents’ assessments of the peacebuilding role and the quality of the  
humanitarian assistance to the affected communities, it is also important to find out from the NGOs what  
explains their inability to properly address the humanitarian needs of the affected population. There might be  
genuine reasons that hinder the ability of NGOs to support the affected population in this part of Cameroon,  
which has for over six years been affected by this internal conflict.  
The responses to this research question have been captured from members of the NGOs and some key  
participants from the public by extracting excerpts from the interviews. The excerpts have been presented  
according to themes.  
Insecurity and the threat to life  
Insecurity is often one of the most serious problems NGOs encounter, as their personal security measures are  
hardly sufficient to secure their humanitarian operations in the field. Even in the current war in Ukraine,  
Jancke & Arthur (2022) disclosed that war situations do not only pose security threats to civil infrastructure,  
journalists, and hospitals, but also to those who provide humanitarian assistance to victims. The current  
situation in the two English regions of Cameroon has not been different, as captured in the following excerpts  
from interviews with personnel from NGOs:  
Excerpt 1: Sometimes, humanitarian workers face situations of insecurity. The non-state armed actors  
sometimes meet us during the distribution of relief process in communities. Their presence puts fright in our  
hearts, so we generally stop our activities, either temporarily or permanently, as the case may be. That is  
because, during such instances, if the state security officials meet them within us, there may be a  
confrontational scenario of crossfire that may be precarious and may subsequently result  
to the death of innocent persons. (INGO-1)  
Excerpt 2: “Up to 2022, the Anglophone Conflict is still in its emergency response phase that is marked by  
sporadic attacks...” (L-NGO-2)  
Excerpt 3: The insecurity stakes are high. Humanitarian workers who may not risk their lives find it difficult to  
access most communities of concern. (L-NGO-5)  
Excerpt 4: Insecurity, too, is a major impediment to peacebuilding. …due to the prevailing insecurity,  
humanitarian workers concentrate in secured areas, notably in the Mezam Division, while most persons of  
concern in the  
hinterland live by the mercy of God. (INGO-2)  
According to the response of the participant in excerpt 1, NGO humanitarian staff risk finding themselves in a  
crossfire between non-state armed men and the government security forces. As he explained, some non-state  
armed men come around when humanitarian workers are distributing aid to members of the affected  
communities. Their presence often attracts government security forces, and in such a situation, the staff, being  
afraid of any confrontation that may occur between the two parties, prefers to suspend distribution. This is  
because bullets do not segregate between civilians and armed men when they are fired. Hence, one would not  
expect NGOs to encourage their staff to take on such challenges.  
A more critical look can be given to the presence of non-state armed groups during humanitarian distributions  
in the field. Their presence may also indirectly scare off humanitarian workers, who end up distributing  
supplies meant for the affected civilian population to people who are not actually needy. Imagine a case where  
relatives of the non-state armed men or of the state military are found among those identified to benefit from  
Page 3595  
the humanitarian supplies. They may intimidate the workers to hand such supplies solely to their relatives and  
friends rather than those who are actually targeted.  
In the case of sporadic attacks, as mentioned in excerpt 2, the humanitarian workers may be taken by surprise,  
and the risk may be high as they may not have previewed any security measures. They may therefore restrict  
their activities to more secure areas, as stated in excerpt 4. Consequently, they are unable to address the  
humanitarian needs of the affected population, especially those who are most vulnerable in remote areas.  
C. Inaccessibility to the needy population  
The responses to humanitarian needs are often intended to cover all geographical areas and vulnerable  
populations, be they internally displaced or those returning after the regain of peace. Reaching such affected  
people, especially those in the hinterlands, is often compounded with both natural and man-made challenges.  
Though insecurity has been discussed independently as one of the factors that caused NGOs not to effectively  
address the humanitarian needs of the affected population, it can also be considered one of the human elements  
that made some of the affected population inaccessible to humanitarian staff working with these NGOs, as seen  
in excerpt 22 above. However, there are other factors that contributed to the inaccessibility of the affected  
population, as seen in excerpt 23 below:  
Excerpt 5: Prior to activities on the field, we start with stakeholder mapping. Then after, we collaborate with  
local authorities who grant us access to communities of our interest, Local councils and religious groups, and  
then our safety and security department engage in access negotiation with the military, combatants, as well as  
the community authorities before we move on. Usually, we seek the consent of community members before  
providing relief services to vulnerable people. (LNGO-6).  
The explanations provided by the respondent in excerpt 5 illustrate that it takes the NGOs a lot of negotiations  
before they move to the affected areas. To operate in a conflict environment, they must seek authorisation not  
only from traditional authorities (some of whom have deserted their palaces and communities because of  
insecurity) but also from local council officials and religious groups and even go as far as negotiating with the  
military or combatants from different separatists’ groups. This reveals the ordeal faced by NGOs in the field to  
gain access to the needy population. In a conflict situation, respect for the rule of law and order is often far-  
fetched. Moki (2020) reported cases in the ongoing conflict in which separatists gave matching orders  
forbidding the population from respecting established authorities.  
Negotiating with the military or separatists, two groups that are antagonistic to each other, implies that NGOs  
sometimes have to forgo their mission in the field if they fail to abide by the orders given by any of the above-  
mentioned parties.  
Moreover, there is a problem of accessibility of the affected localities. Both staff of NGOs and even key  
informants pointed out that bad roads constituted one of those challenges that made the NGOs not effectively  
address the humanitarian needs of the affected population in the North West and South West Regions of  
Cameroon. The excerpts below give a picture of how bad road networks affect the work NGOs provide in the  
field:  
Excerpt 6: Road network is also an issue because most rural roads are impracticable, so we cannot promptly  
reach people in need at the time of solicitation. Often, humanitarian officials are stranded at unsecured spots  
because our cars get stuck in mud or get bad because of the poor nature of the road. (I-NGO-1)  
Excerpt 7: …roads leading to communities of concern are often too bad, and NGOs generally do not have  
adapted vehicles to ply such roads. As well, most of their vehicles used gas, but there is a scarcity of gas  
stations, making it difficult to access distant communities. (KI-11)  
Excerpt 8: …as sometimes roads or bridges are either blocked or destroyed by non-state armed actors. (KI-13)  
Due to the bad state of the roads, humanitarian workers could not react promptly to emergencies.  
Page 3596  
Worse still, as reported by the key informant in excerpt 7, it is observed that most of the vehicles that NGOs  
use are not suitable for the roads found in these two regions. Moreover, sometimes, roads are blocked, or  
bridges destroyed by separatists. Hence, NGOs can only go as far as their vehicles can go in the field.  
D. Lack of collaboration and confidence from the affected population  
This study found that the insecurity in the field sometimes makes the population reticent and avoids opening  
up to field workers from NGOs. This was captured in the following excerpt:  
Excerpt 9: So, obtaining access to the communities is very difficult. Often, members of the community are so  
reticent that it is not easy to exchange with them or carry out advocacy exercises. (L-NGO-4)  
As seen in excerpt 9 above, access to the affected population may not only be hampered by insecurity and bad  
roads, as it may be in some cases. The population’s reaction towards the humanitarian workers can also make  
accessibility impossible. When the population becomes reticent by restraining themselves from the visitors, it  
makes it difficult for them to obtain data that can help NGOs make informed decisions relating to humanitarian  
supplies to such communities.  
In addition to the lack of collaboration, there is also a lack of confidence from the population and other parties,  
like the military and even non-state armed groups. This can be seen in the following responses:  
Excerpt 10: We face a lack of confidence from the government. In Kumba for instance, the forces thoroughly  
search our trucks. As well, the communities too suspect that NGOs may supply them poisonous goods. They  
take measures to ensure that the goods are fit for consumption.  
Sometimes, our staff is forced to taste raw rice. Such treatments de-motivate us from going to such  
communities. In 2019 in a North West Region village, our truck was offloaded and then burned by non-state  
actors. We never returned there for fear of death. Sometimes, beneficiaries themselves resist assistance because  
of suspicions. (LNGO-1)  
Excerpt 11: At the level of the community, we as well face threats from some individuals who fear that we may  
come and deliver them poisonous goods. Thus, they often urge us to consume even raw products to assure  
them that they are free from any toxic matter. (L-NGO-5)  
Excerpt 12: Among the challenges, NGOs face a lack of trust between other organisations, the administration,  
armed groups as well as with beneficiaries that affects their impact on the field. (KI-7)  
Lack of confidence is a serious problem when it comes to humanitarian services. Then, it will be needless to  
take such a risk to go and meet them without a guarantee of safety. Asking humanitarian workers to taste rice  
that is raw before the population can accept it may be unimaginable, but that is the reality they sometimes  
encounter in the field. And as explained by respondents in excerpts 10, 11, and 12, such acts are demotivating,  
meaning they will never want to visit such localities again, hence explaining why local and international NGOs  
were unable to properly address the humanitarian needs of the affected population. For whatever reason, the  
NGOs seem to face a problem of trust from both warring parties and the civilian population, despite the risks  
taken to access and provide humanitarian assistance in the field.  
The issue of lack of trust as well as confidence was repeatedly mentioned by both NGO staff and key  
informants. However, from the explanation given by a key informant below, one can better understand the  
source or where this distrust stems from:  
Excerpt 13: To them, as long as the conflict continues, it will continue to provide jobs. Hence, it provides them  
sustenance. As far as the region is concerned, most of the employees are imported from other regions to the  
South  
West Region. That creates an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust in the community where they operate  
because they are seen as people who have come to reap economic benefits.  
(KI-14)  
Page 3597  
According to the key informant in excerpt 13, NGO workers are often perceived to be only interested in the  
economic benefits they can obtain from this conflict. As he explained, the workers will continue to have jobs  
as long as the conflict continues. If seen in this light, it means that the workers are not seen as humanitarian  
workers but as people working towards self-aggrandisement. This perception is possibly worsened when the  
population observes that workers have not been selected from the communities but from outside their region.  
One can therefore better understand where the feeling of distrust is arising from among the affected population,  
as they do not recognise those hired to provide humanitarian assistance to them. It makes it difficult for the  
population to openly and freely collaborate with humanitarian workers from these NGOs in terms of providing  
vital information when they do not trust the said workers.  
E. Poor communication networks and language barriers  
One of the points that was raised in the section of the questionnaire that required the population to assess the  
NGOs was that they did not properly communicate with the affected population. This also emerged as one of  
the themes that were identified in the interview with officials of the NGOs. The officials pointed out that some  
of the localities in the English-speaking regions where their NGOs offer humanitarian services were cut off  
from the communication network. Hence, this affected their work, as highlighted in the following excerpts:  
Excerpt 14: Communication network is a problem. Most often, it is difficult to communicate with beneficiaries  
and even with our security officers. Sometimes we are blocked on the field but remain incommunicado,  
disconnected and vulnerable. As well, communication with beneficiaries is a problem due to language barriers;  
insecurity is also a major impediment to peacebuilding. (I-NGO-2)  
Excerpt 15: In some of the communities, there is neither a network nor electricity, which renders the planning  
and implementation of our activities difficult. Consequently, sometimes mobilization is not carried on well and  
would definitely have an impact on relief distribution to the community. Due to communication issues, we are  
sometimes unable to inform the community of our arrival. Definitely, on our arrival we meet only few targeted  
persons who were shortlisted. (I-NGO1)  
Excerpt 16: There is a communication problem because, due to poor networks, humanitarian workers find it  
difficult to communicate with beneficiaries or even with their security officers. (KI-11)  
Based on the evidence revealed by the respondents in excerpts 14, 15, and 16, it was noted that poor  
communication problems and language barriers were major impediments both local and international NGOs  
faced while delivering humanitarian services to the affected population. As already disclosed in excerpt 13, the  
NGOs hired employees outside the affected regions. Besides having French and English as official languages,  
Cameroon is also a multicultural and multilingual country. Consequently, there are Cameroonians who do not  
understand either of these official languages. For effective communication, it will be more reasonable for  
NGOs to hire some people who speak the same language as indigenes in the affected communities.  
Even an official from the North West governor’s office confirmed that a poor communication network was a  
barrier to the effective implementation of humanitarian action plans in the affected communities, as seen in  
excerpt 16. According to this government official, humanitarian workers find it difficult to communicate with  
beneficiaries or even with their security officers. From all imaginations, it will be very traumatising to be  
stranded in the field and remain incommunicado by being disconnected from relatives and especially security  
officials when exposed to insecure situations like the ongoing conflict.  
F. Undue pressure from some traditional leaders  
There is often an erosion of the rule of law during conflict situations, as seen in Portela (2012).  
The case in the ongoing conflict in the English speaking regions of Cameroon cannot be far from this. In the  
absence of the rule of law, humanitarian staff in the field cannot work freely. They sometimes break the rules  
on the ground because of pressure that may come from different quarters, as seen in the excerpt below:  
Page 3598  
Excerpt 17: …some traditional leaders impose on us to satisfy all their wives and households in the palace  
before accessing the vulnerable persons. For instance, “I’m a chief, and I have nine  
wives drop their share in my palace. (LNGO-1)  
From this excerpt, it can be seen how some traditional rulers put undue pressure on humanitarian field staff to  
satisfy their wives first, before even the vulnerable persons in the field. In times like this, where there is often  
an erosion in the rule of law, other people in the field can force the staff to supply them with relief material  
meant for vulnerable people. Imagine coming across non-state armed men with guns in an unsecured locality,  
and they command or order you to surrender humanitarian goods meant for the affected population. The staff  
may succumb to such demands for fear of the unknown and, by so doing, fail to deliver relief material to the  
needy. In such a case, one cannot blame the staff who needs to ensure his/her survival.  
G. Corrupt practices and dishonesty  
It is noted in Willitts-King and Harvey (2005) that there is a risk of corrupt practices, which can be at the level  
of the staff or the aid agency being a victim of corruption during humanitarian operations. The Transparency  
International Report (2006), cited by Fenner and Mahlstein (2009, 244), further pointed out that the corrupt  
practices include “fraud, embezzlement, misuse of assets, diversion of aid resources, and straightforward  
bribery”. In the case of the humanitarian and peacebuilding operations of  
Non-Governmental Organisations in the Anglophone Conflict, the following excerpts have been captured to  
present the situation:  
Excerpt 18: Often, humanitarian workers realize that the community leaders carry out biased selections. They  
shortlist their relatives and friends who are not needy persons, at the expense of persons of concern for whom  
the reliefs were designed. NGOs are unable to adequately correct such a discrepancy because, with the  
insecurity on the ground, they cannot freely access and shortlist the targeted vulnerable persons within a  
community without the collaboration of community mobilizers. (L-NGO-4)  
Excerpt 19: When we access a community, with the collaboration of the community leaders, we recruit and  
train community mobilizers who work in collaboration with our project in their community as brokers.  
However, they often exhibit practices of corruption and nepotism. That is because, they sometimes shortlist  
dead people or their relatives and friends at the expense of vulnerable people who live in abject poverty. (L-  
NGO-5)  
Excerpt 20: NGOs recruit community mobilizers who are our facilitators or brokers in the field, they commit  
acts of corruption or nepotism. Whereas NGOs bestow their confidence upon them, however, they sometimes  
violate our cardinal principles. Hence, they shortlist the names of dead people or those of their relatives and  
friends, who are not eligible for assistance. Such detrimental and sarcastic attitudes of the agents significantly  
affect the outcome of NGOs because they lead to duplication of services to beneficiaries and inhibit relief  
services from significantly reaching persons of concern as targeted by the organisations. (L-NGO-7)  
Excerpt 21: We train community mobilizers on project management and on humanitarian principles, and  
redeploy them back into the community to shortlist vulnerable persons therein. However, sometimes they are  
deceptive because they give the names of their own relatives and friends, whereas they are  
not eligible to receive assistance. (LNGO-1)  
From excerpts 18 to 21, the participants, who were officials of some of the NGOs that performed humanitarian  
operations in these regions, highlighted that corruption negatively affected their operations in the field. As they  
explained, most of the corrupt practices came from community mobilisers they hired and trained to implement  
their operations in the field. Some of them ended up inflating the list of those who were actually in need of  
assistance with the names of their relatives, friends and even those of dead people. With this kind of dishonest  
attitude in the field, supplies end up with some non-vulnerable persons, hence undermining the NGOs'  
humanitarian and peacebuilding activities in the field.  
Page 3599  
Though the NGO officials point an accusing finger at the community mobilisers they hire to execute their  
activities in the field, some key participants on their part blamed the NGOs, as seen in excerpts 22 and 23:  
Excerpt 22: The spirit of corruption has made NGOs look at profit-making at the expense of vulnerable  
persons. (KI-14)  
Excerpt 23: … Some of the NGOs engage in unlawful practices that may promote the resilience of the conflict.  
That is because they strive at rendering perennial and maintaining more humanitarian activities as well as  
donors’ sponsorship on the field for the sustainability of their organisations. Some of them wish to make a  
return from the conflict; thus, they sometimes indulge in unlawful practices that may fuel the conflict and  
render it perennial. As well, the organisations strive for profit; hence, they violate the humanitarian cardinal  
principles, notably independence, neutrality and impartiality. (KI-7)  
Excerpt 24: Most NGOs are not really there for the welfare of the community; rather, they are interested in  
satisfying their financial needs. However, even the genuine ones are not all faithful. They sometimes inflect the  
number of persons of concern at hundreds of thousands, in order to obtain huge funding from donors. (KI-2)  
Excerpt 25: Generally, NGOs do not use the allocated funds for deserved purposes, notably the alleviation of  
the sufferings of needy persons. Some of them rather enrich themselves at the detriment of persons of concern.  
(KI-3)  
Excerpt 26: From every indication, some organisations as well as actors wish that the conflict should persist  
over years so that it continues to create jobs for them and generate finances. The conflict has also created jobs  
for some unemployed or underemployed Cameroonians, who do not wish it should stop. On the one hand, the  
Anglophone Conflict has impoverished numerous people; on the other hand, it has enriched a minority.  
(KI-9)  
As explained in the above excerpts (22, 23, 24, 25, and 26), some NGOs were seen to be interested in profit-  
making rather than in the people; they thus engaged in corrupt practices to achieve this goal. The participant in  
excerpt 22 is even of the opinion that some NGOs get involved in unlawful practices to prolong the conflict to  
stay relevant to keep gaining funds. In the same light, the participant in excerpt 26 outrightly stated that some  
of the NGOs do not want the conflict to end because it has created money-making jobs for them.  
This kind of phenomenon whereby NGOs involved in humanitarian relief are accused of corrupt practices has  
been reported by Fenner and Mahlstein (2009). According to Fenner and Mahlstein (2009, 245), some agencies  
may defraud donors by forging receipts for relief supplies that were not received and using them to support  
expenditure claims. They also added that some of the agencies may inflate overhead costs or exigency funds  
(as seen in excerpts 24 and 25) in their budgets to divert project funds into private accounts.  
Some members of the public have developed a poor perception towards NGOs due to the involvement of some  
in corrupt practices. In excerpt 27 below, the participant stated that some NGOs failed to disclose their  
missions in the Anglophone regions, and as a result, he perceived them as having a hidden agenda in the  
ongoing conflict.  
Excerpt 27: NGOs do not disclose their mission in the Anglophone Regions. They fail to propose any solution  
linked to the conflict. They probably have a hidden agenda that may be related to the conflict. (KI-10)  
H. Constantly displaced population  
The populace is constantly moving as a result of conflict because they feel unsafe. Some even choose to flee  
the country, while others experience internal displacement. After identifying people in need of various forms of  
assistance, humanitarian workers return to certain communities only to discover that the people in need have  
moved elsewhere, seeking for safety. This is the kind of circumstance that is described in excerpts 28 and 29:  
Page 3600  
Excerpt 28: At the humanitarian level of the conflict, the population is not stable, so persons of concern are on  
the move and their needs keep on changing from time to time, thus rendering the  
peacebuilding role a complex one. (LNGO-1)  
Excerpt 29: Most vulnerable persons moved to other secured regions of Cameroon, so we could not meet them  
in their locality. (L-NGO-3)  
Despite efforts made by humanitarian assistance teams in the field to identify those who are needy, their efforts  
may be frustrated when they cannot locate the targeted persons because they have relocated elsewhere. Hence,  
such challenges may contribute to the inability of the NGOs to effectively address humanitarian concerns in  
the field. This situation is worsened by the fact that it is also difficult to obtain data about people’s movement  
during a conflict situation, as observed in the ongoing Anglophone conflict for security reasons. People do not  
often disclose their movements to others for fear of the unknown.  
I. Lack of funding and donor fatigue  
One of the themes that also emerged from this study to explain the inability of the NGOs to effectively address  
the humanitarian concerns and needs of the affected population is the lack of funding and donor fatigue owing  
to the prolonged nature of the conflict. Officials from NGOs as well as key informants identify the lack of  
funding as one of the reasons why the NGOs could not satisfy the needs of the affected population. The  
excerpts below reveal this as a hindrance to the realisation of the humanitarian needs of the affected  
population:  
Excerpt 30: “As well, we face a high demand from needy persons, but the Anglophone Conflict remains  
underfunded, thus we are unable to serve all persons of concern.” (L-NGO-5)  
Excerpt 31: Funding too is not common and remains unsustainable. (…).  
Scarcity of funds, as well as inflation in the market, constitute, to my humble opinion, some of the  
impediments that undermine peacebuilding activities in the Anglophone Conflict. (L-NGO-7)  
Excerpt 32: There is a high expectation from Danish Refugee Council to satisfy persons of concern’s multiple  
needs, whereas the allocated funds are limited. Indeed, it is impossible for the Danish Refugee Council to  
satisfy all existing humanitarian cases in the Anglophone Regions of Cameroon. (I-NGO-l)  
Excerpt 33: With the outburst of COVID 19, since NGOs discovered that many donors were interested in the  
pandemic unlike the Anglophone conflict, which is less funded, they abandoned persons affected by the  
conflict and indulged in COVID assistance and only resumed after the curbing of the pandemic. (KI-  
11)  
The responses in excerpts 30, 31, and 32 were captured from both officials of local and international NGOs.  
They explained that the conflict was underfunded, and funds allocated were limited to address the multiple  
needs of the affected population. On the other hand, the key informant in excerpt 33 blamed the underfunding  
of NGOs and the resulting slow response to attending to the needs of the affected population on the outbreak  
of COVID-19. He explained that NGOs that diverted their attention to the COVID-19 pandemic received  
funding during this period and abandoned the victims of the Anglophone conflict. This is because donors were  
more interested in donating to fight the spread of the deadly pandemic than to the Anglophone conflict.  
It was observed that local NGOs received donations through international NGOs. As disclosed in excerpt 34,  
this procedure resulted in local NGOs being underfunded. Officials of the local NGOs say the international  
NGOs deduct part of these funds for use as operational costs to run their organisations, and as a result, just part  
of these funds are transferred to local NGOs to attend to the needs of vulnerable people.  
Excerpt 34: As well, most funds pass via INGOs, which use part for their operational costs, before transferring  
the rest to LNGOs. At the end, very little amount is allocated for the vulnerable persons. (L-NGO-1)  
Page 3601  
J. Lack of collaboration among NGOs  
Also emerging from this research in relation to reasons why NGOs failed to effectively address humanitarian  
concerns and needs of the affected population was the issue of lack of collaboration that manifested in different  
ways. Though some officials during the interviews claimed that they collaborated with different stakeholders  
to facilitate their work in the field, this collaboration was not always smooth and effective, as seen in the  
following excerpts:  
Excerpt 35: NGOs faced the pressure of administrative bottlenecks that delay or block supplies; there are a lot  
of competitions over resources between the organisations, and lack of due collaboration that leads to  
duplication of services and waste of resources. (LNGO-7)  
Excerpt 36: As well, collaboration with the stakeholders of the conflict is a difficult one. So, obtaining access  
to the communities is very difficult. Often, members of the community too are so reticent that it is not easy to  
exchange with them or to carry out advocacy exercise... (L-NGO-4)  
The officials of Reach-Out-Cameroon reportedly seem to have had challenges collaborating with government  
officials and other stakeholders. As seen in excerpts 35 and 36, NGOs faced the pressure of administrative  
bottlenecks that delayed or blocked their humanitarian and peacebuilding responses. In addition, competition  
amongst NGOs is reported to have led to the duplication of services in the field, leading to the wastage of  
efforts and resources. The NGOs failed to collaborate in identifying the needs of the people and then share  
these responsibilities. Instead, they worked independently and sometimes provided the same humanitarian  
assistance to the population.  
This lack of collaboration is seen as the reason why the population receives the same humanitarian packages  
from different NGOs, while a certain segment of the affected population is neglected, as observed in excerpt  
37 below:  
Excerpt 37: There is a lack of coordination as well as collaboration within the organisations who do not concert  
before going to the field. Hence, they duplicate services that constitute a waste of resources. Some needy  
persons keep on receiving the same goods while others are completely neglected. (KI-7)  
Furthermore, key informants blamed NGOs for the lack of collaboration. The NGOs were accused of not  
collaborating with administrative authorities, as seen in the following excerpts:  
Excerpt 38: NGOs cannot adequately curb the growing humanitarian concerns in the North West Region  
because they do not collaborate with the power that be. In addition, they fail to respect the key principle of  
neutrality in humanitarian activities. Such defaults made Doctors Without Borders suspend their activities in  
the North West Region. As well, the provision of humanitarian assistance cannot per se adjust the mindset of  
people that ought to be reoriented. (KI5)  
Excerpt 39: Hence, few persons benefit from the assistance; under the pretext of the principle of independence,  
NGOs do not collaborate with members of the government who could enable them to reach many persons of  
concern; NGOs complain that they are unable to reach the hinterland because of insecurity, however, they  
refuse to be escorted by the military under the pretext that they are independent... (KI-6)  
As disclosed in excerpts 38 and 39 above, though the interviewed officials of some NGOs complained of a  
lack of security during their fieldwork, the key informants disclosed that the NGOs often refused to be  
escorted to the field because they respected the principles of independence. This informant believed that most  
of the affected people were not reached by the NGOs because they refused to accept government security  
offers while going into the hinterlands. The NGOs are accused of failing to respect the key principle of  
neutrality in humanitarian activities, like in the case of Doctors Without Borders, who were blamed for  
collaborating with separatists, and hence, their humanitarian activities were suspended. Humanitarian actors  
like Doctors Without Borders have the right to assist the military or separatists on the field who have been  
wounded. In this case, they were accused of supplying arms and ammunitions to separatists.  
Page 3602  
K. Examining the research proposition  
The NGOs face many challenges that limit their ability to properly address the humanitarian and peacebuilding  
needs of the affected population.  
The data of this study reveals that field staff of both international and local NGOs faced numerous challenges  
in the field that impeded their ability to address the humanitarian and peacebuilding needs of the affected  
population. Despite facing the general challenge of inadequate funds, some challenges are out of their control.  
The NGOs may even have the funds and acquire the humanitarian and peacebuilding relief material, yet they  
have difficulties in effectively serving the affected population because of the following reasons: insecurity and  
the threat to life, inaccessibility to the needy population, poor communication networks and language barriers,  
undue pressure from some traditional leaders, lack of collaboration and confidence from the affected  
population, corrupt practices and dishonesty, a constantly displaced population, and lack of collaboration, as  
highlighted by participants interviewed in this study.  
Insecurity and threats to life are issues that should not be taken lightly in conflict situations, especially like the  
ongoing Anglophone conflict, where there seems to be a breakdown in law and order in most parts of the  
North West and South West Regions. There are cases of death unaccounted for; therefore, the matter of  
security becomes that of personal decision. No NGO staff would like to take the risk of exposing themselves to  
bullets that do not discriminate. The breakdown in the communication network in the affected regions is not  
under the control of the NGOs.  
K. Comparative perspectives between local and international NGOs  
Comparatively, both local and international NGOs equally encountered challenges of insecurity and threat to  
life. Though they all face these challenges, that of the local NGOs may be unique due to their proximity to the  
conflict. Staff of local NGOs may become potential targets of armed groups who may consider them spies. The  
government or the non-state armed groups can offer to provide security to NGOs, but it can compromise their  
independence and neutrality. They may be perceived as being aligned with one side of the conflict and hence  
bridging trust. In the case of the ongoing conflict, it was even an international NGO called Doctors Without  
Borders that was forced to suspend its activities after being blamed by the Cameroonian government for aiding  
separatists in the ongoing conflict (see excerpt 38)  
Though both NGOs complained that the conflict was underfunded, the international NGOs had more access to  
such funds compared to the local NGOs. Local NGOs complained that they receive funds through international  
NGOs who use part of the money for their operational costs before transferring the rest to them (see excerpt  
34). Generally, international NGOs may have more diverse and stable sources of funding, as they have  
expertise in lobbying and can influence international organisations like agencies of the United Nations, the  
World Bank and international donors to get funds. On their part, local NGOs have limited access to such  
donors. By implication, the international NGOs can perform better in addressing humanitarian and  
peacebuilding needs of the affected populations during conflict situations.  
Comparatively, findings from this study also revealed that the local NGOs complained of corrupt practices and  
dishonesty. As seen in excerpts 18, 19, 20 and 21, it is only officials of local NGOs who complained that the  
community mobilisers they select to manage their projects in the field give the names of their own relatives  
and friends, whereas they are not eligible to benefit from humanitarian and peacebuilding packages. This  
problem may be as a result of their lack of expertise and experience in recruiting community mobilisers.  
Officials of international NGOs did not mention this as a challenge.  
It is also observed that officials of local NGOs are more likely to face undue pressure from some traditional  
leaders than those of international NGOs. As previously mentioned, local NGOs frequently enlist community  
mobilisers from the affected population to oversee their projects on the ground. As stated in excerpt 35, some  
traditional leaders usually impose that their relatives are attended to before others. This can be because of  
community dynamics. Some of those selected from such communities may already have existing relationships  
Page 3603  
or conflicts with others. This can negatively influence the way they will manage humanitarian and  
peacebuilding projects under their supervision. International NGOs' approach to recruiting staff is more  
professional. They take measures to avoid situations like this when the community mobiliser is exposed to  
such pressure.  
From the above comparative perspectives, it is clear that the structural and operational differences governing  
local and international NGOs place the latter in a vantage position compared to the former. International NGOs  
have more access to funding and recruit experts who make their operations more successful than local NGOs.  
CONCLUSION  
This sought to explain the inability of the NGOs to successfully address the humanitarian and peacebuilding  
needs of the affected population in the North West and South regions. Amongst the reasons that explained the  
inability of the NGOs were corrupt practices and dishonesty on the part of some NGO staff and hired  
community mobilisers who often inflated the lists of vulnerable persons with names of their relatives and  
friends who are nonvulnerable persons. Undue pressure from some traditional rulers imposing field workers to  
first attend to the needs of their numerous wives before having access to persons of concern also emerged as a  
reason to explain the inability of the NGOs to address the needs of the people effectively.  
Other major challenges that impeded their work were insecurity and threat to life, as guns do not segregate  
between humanitarian workers and belligerents; inaccessibility to the needy population as a result of the  
enclave nature of the affected regions; lack of collaboration and confidence from the affected population; poor  
communication networks and language barriers; constantly displaced populations that are always running from  
place to place to seek safety; lack of funding and donor fatigue; and lack of collaboration between the NGOs  
and members of the administration. The lack of collaboration between the NGOs leading to domain overlap is  
a fundamental problem that affects the effectiveness of NGOs, hence preventing them from forming a full-  
fledged network. This ties in with the reciprocal model of partnership explained in Seybolt’s humanitarian  
systems theory. When NGOs work in isolation and fail to collaborate, an unstable system is created with low  
connectivity among NGOs, leading to domain overlap and positive externalities that affect the efficiency, as  
stated in Kalita (2019).  
As mentioned in excerpt 35 above, there existed an unhealthy competition between NGOs over resources.  
Such rivalry can have several negative consequences on the effectiveness of their activities. In addition to  
domain overlap highlighted in Kalita (2019), these kinds of competition can also lead to an uneven distribution  
of resources, with some communities or areas being overlooked. Competition among NGOs can also damage  
relationships between them, local communities and other stakeholders, thus eroding trust. The overall effect is  
that it will undermine collective impact on the field, and it will make it more difficult for them to achieve  
shared goals and objectives. As a result, the NGOs will find it difficult to implement collective partnership  
models that can effectively reduce domain overlap and enhance positive externalities, as recommended by  
Seybolt (2009).  
Some of the challenges the NGOs faced, as gathered from the findings, are not restricted to the present  
Cameroon-Anglophone conflict alone. As reported in Stoddard (2003), insecurity is one of the challenges that  
interrupts humanitarian actions in the field. On her part, Crowther (2001) also noted the need for security  
enforcement to facilitate the role of NGOs, be it local or international, in post-war peacebuilding. Brooks  
(2016), Bakhit (2014), and Nikolov (2009) added that NGOs are often confronted with the task of ensuring the  
safety and security of their staff in complex situations like conflicts. According to the SAVE Programme's  
preliminary findings cited in the Norwegian Refugee Council (2016), insecurity is the primary cause and  
impediment to humanitarian presence.  
Corruption, lack of funding and accountability, lack of collaboration with the government, etc., as found in this  
study, are also challenges the Norwegian Refugee Council and Handicap  
Page 3604  
International (2017) reported as factors that impede the humanitarian and peacebuilding actions of NGOs in  
the field. The Max impact Team cited in Holland (2017) extensively identified most challenges NGOs face in  
their humanitarian and peacebuilding actions in the field. Most of the challenges are the same as those that  
emerged from this study. These contributed to the inability of the international and local NGOs to effectively  
address the humanitarian needs and peacebuilding actions in the ongoing Anglophone conflict. Another  
objective of this study was to examine how NGOs enhance their humanitarian and peacebuilding roles in  
Cameroon.  
The recommendation for NGOs to empower people of affected communities also emerged from the qualitative  
data, with some NGO officials maintaining that the vulnerable persons should be taught how to fish rather than  
keeping on giving fish to them all the time. This finding ties in with the Chinese saying cited in Kim and Yi's  
(2016) saying, “Give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish, and you feed him for a  
lifetime.”  
Notwithstanding, other recommendations regarding how NGOs can enhance the humanitarian and  
peacebuilding actions on the ground include capacity building of NGO personnel so that they can master the  
principles of humanitarian and peacebuilding actions, for NGOs to collaborate with all stakeholders, including  
other NGOs, create awareness to prevent conflicts, carry out need assessments before making supplies, and  
increase funding. These researchers add their voice to that of Seybolt (2009) to recommend that NGOs adopt  
the collective model of partnership so that collectively, they can carry out needs assessments of the affected  
population and decide what each organisation will supply as per their specialisation to curb domain overlap,  
competition and corruption.  
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