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Strikes have historically been one of the most visible instruments of collective action available to workers in
India, protected under the framework of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. However, their relevance and
effectiveness in the modern era—marked by globalization, automation, and the rise of service-led industries—
remains contested. This study critically examines the role of strikes across manufacturing, Information
Technology (IT), Fast-Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG), and electronics sectors in India. Using an empirical
framework, strike effectiveness is evaluated through three dimensions: concession magnitude, probability of
material concession, and time to settlement. Findings suggest that while strikes in traditional manufacturing and
core industrial sectors often secure tangible concessions due to strong unionization and direct impact on
production cycles, strikes in IT and electronics exhibit limited bargaining power, as managements rely on flexible
staffing, outsourcing, and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. FMCG industries display moderate
effectiveness, with strikes yielding partial concessions, especially when consumer supply chains are disrupted.
The analysis demonstrates that strike effectiveness has declined in terms of settlement time and overall impact,
yet retains symbolic and strategic value in industries with strong collective identities. The study concludes that
while strikes are losing ground as the primary negotiation tool in modern industries, they remain relevant when
integrated with broader industrial relations strategies, including dialogue, mediation, and institutional reforms.
Strike, Industrial Relations, Collective Bargaining, Labour Unions, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
Concession Magnitude, Settlement Time, Manufacturing Sector, Information Technology (IT) Sector,
Electronics Industry, Fast-Moving Consumer Healthcare (FMCH), Industrial Action, Employee Voice, Conflict
Resolution, Industrial Democracy, Worker Rights, Management Negotiation, Strike Effectiveness, Labour
Movement in India, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
Work stoppages—strikes, go-slows, work-to-rule—have shaped wages, safety and dignity at work. India’s
production landscape has diversified: organized manufacturing sits alongside IT/ITeS, electronics assembly
linked to global value chains, FMCG with unionized manufacturing but outsourced distribution, and app-
mediated “gig” work. The question is not whether strikes exist, but when they work—legally, economically,
reputationally—and what modern substitutes or complements have emerged.
Legal Architecture Governing Strikes in India
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (IDA)
Definition: “Strike” entails a concerted stoppage of work by a body of persons employed in any industry.
Notice & Procedure: Strikes in Public Utility Services (PUS) require 14-day prior notice within a
specified window; striking during conciliation or within 7 days after its conclusion is prohibited. General
prohibitions apply during the pendency of conciliation, adjudication, or settlement periods. Illegal strikes
draw penalties for workers and instigators.
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Courts have repeatedly held there is no fundamental right to strike, especially for government employees. In
T.K. Rangarajan v. State of Tamil Nadu (2003), the Supreme Court held public employees have no
constitutional/statutory right to strike. Earlier, Kameshwar Prasad (1962) distinguished peaceful demonstrations
(protected) from the right to strike (not). All India Bank Employees’ Association (1962) similarly declined to
elevate strike/collective bargaining to a fundamental right.
The IR Code consolidates IDA and related laws. Its strike chapter tightens notice regimes and extends
prohibitions around conciliation/adjudication. While centre and states framed rules, national rollout has been
staggered; nonetheless, the direction of reform is toward longer notice look-backs, wider applicability, and
stronger compliance expectations.
Official statistics show fluctuations by year and sphere (Central vs State). The Labour Bureau’s “Statistics on
Industrial Disputes – Review 2022” and Indian Labour Statistics 2022–23 summarize disputes, workers involved
and man-days lost; man-days lost in state-sphere disputes fell sharply in 2022 vs 2021, reflecting a post-
pandemic normalization and tighter compliance. (See tables in the cited Labour Bureau and Ministry annual
reports.)
Key pattern: across 1991–2019, man-days lost per lockout often exceed those per strike—lockouts tend to be
longer and costlier—shaping management strategy and union calculus.
Contextual signal: Globally, strike activity has surged in several countries post-2022, yet India’s formal sector
remains more procedure-bound and adjudication-prone; large, indefinite strikes are rarer than short, tactical
actions.
Maruti Suzuki, Manesar (2012): a wage/union recognition conflict escalated into violence; courts convicted 31
workers, 13 for murder (2017). The case illustrates how illegality shatters legitimacy, hardens employer
responses, and invites long lockouts—high losses, low worker gains.
Toyota Kirloskar, Bidadi (2020–21 episodes; also 2014 era): sit-in strike triggered lockout; eventual resumption
required undertakings on “good conduct”—showing management leverage through lawful lockouts and
staggered restarts
Textile machinery (Rieter, 2023): classic stoppage over alleged unfair labour practices; underscores continued
salience of lawful strikes in conventional shop-floor settings.
Takeaway: In organized manufacturing, strikes remain relevant but must stay lawful, time-bound, and evidence-
rich. Where protests turn violent, outcomes deteriorate sharply for labour and reputation.
Union density is low but growing via NITES, FITE, AIITEU. Strategic repertoire often blends legal complaints,
public petitions, and “digital pickets” more than classic plant-gates strikes. Examples include NITES’ complaints
over layoffs/delayed onboarding at Infosys and TCS, with threats of coordinated protests. The tactic foregrounds
compliance pressure (IDA, state shops & establishment laws) and reputational risk in a global services market.
Takeaway: Work stoppages are less frequent inside tech campuses; collective action shifts to regulatory channels,
media, and social platforms—but the strike option remains a credible last resort, especially in large campuses or
among support services.
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FMCG production is largely formal; distribution is fragmented. Plant-level disputes occur but are typically short
and resolved through conciliation (cost of downtime is high; brands are reputation-sensitive). While pan-India
FMCG strikes are rare, local stoppages on shifts, incentive grids, or contract regularization remain effective
when backed by legal notice and public communication. (Sectoral patterns reflected indirectly in Labour Bureau
tables.)
Electronics assembly (phones, components) is time-critical and globally benchmarked. Disruptions (e.g.,
Wistron Kolar 2020, Foxconn Sriperumbudur 2021 protests) highlighted how ESG scrutiny and brand pressure
accelerate settlement—lawful collective action plus media visibility produces faster remediation; violence or
vandalism backfires.
Workers are legally “partners” in many models, complicating IDA coverage. Yet coordinated log-offs affect
service continuity and consumer sentiment. Blinkit (2023) saw multi-day protests against payout changes; stores
shut temporarily and operations resumed after adjustments—demonstrating short, high-visibility actions in urban
clusters can be impactful. Parallelly, states are experimenting with gig-worker welfare statutes under pressure
from unions and strike threats.
The effectiveness of strikes as an instrument of industrial bargaining has been a subject of debate in
contemporary industrial relations. While historically, strikes have symbolized the ultimate assertion of labour’s
collective power, the empirical reality of modern industries reveals a more nuanced outcome. In India, the
incidence of strikes has steadily declined over the past two decades, particularly in organized sectors such as
Information Technology (IT), Electronics, and FMCG, where employment structures are increasingly contractual
and geographically dispersed. The Ministry of Labour and Employment data from the past ten years shows that
lockouts imposed by employers often outnumber strikes called by workers, reflecting a shift in power dynamics
favouring management.
From an economic standpoint, strikes impose costs on both sides. Workers suffer wage losses for the period of
the strike, while industries incur production stoppages and reputational risks. In the manufacturing and core
sectors, empirical evidence suggests that strikes tend to secure marginal improvements in wage settlements or
working conditions only when backed by strong union presence and political support. For instance, settlements
under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, indicate that while strike threats have led to conciliatory
agreements, actual prolonged strikes often result in diminished bargaining strength due to replacement labour,
automation, or relocation of production.
In contrast, in IT and service-based sectors, the strike is largely an ineffective strategy. The dispersed workforce,
client dependency, and the criticality of uninterrupted service delivery render strikes counterproductive, often
leading to job losses or transfer of contracts rather than concessions from management. The empirical
observation is that workers in these sectors increasingly rely on litigation, unionization through professional
associations, or digital activism rather than traditional work stoppages. Similarly, in FMCG and electronics,
where supply chains are highly integrated, strikes occasionally draw media and public attention but seldom yield
long-term structural changes.
Empirical studies also highlight a paradox: while the frequency of strikes has reduced, the intensity of industrial
conflict has not diminished. Instead, disputes are increasingly resolved through arbitration, wage boards, and
collective bargaining mechanisms, with strikes becoming the weapon of last resort. Econometric analysis of
wage settlements in select Indian states suggests that strike calls are positively correlated with short-term wage
gains, but negatively correlated with long-term employment stability, as firms adopt contract labour or capital-
intensive technologies to reduce vulnerability to future disruptions.
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Thus, empirically, the strike remains relevant as a symbolic tool of solidarity and as a bargaining chip to compel
management toward negotiation. However, its practical effectiveness in modern industries is increasingly
limited. The globalized nature of industries, legal restrictions under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the
rise of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms diminish the strike’s impact as a sustainable method of
contesting managerial authority. In the modern Indian industrial context, the strike is less of an economic weapon
and more of a political and symbolic act, often carrying more weight in the public and legal arena than in actual
workplace negotiations.
The effectiveness of strikes as a collective bargaining tool has long been debated within industrial relations
scholarship. While strikes are intended to compel management to accede to worker demands, their actual success
varies considerably across industries, depending upon the bargaining environment, union density, legal
framework, and the broader socio-economic climate. Three primary indicators are often used to empirically
assess strike effectiveness: concession magnitude, probability of a material concession, and time to settlement.
1. Concession Magnitude refers to the extent to which workers secure economic or non-economic gains
compared to their original demands. Empirical studies suggest that while wage-related strikes in
manufacturing industries often result in partial concessions, non-wage strikes (such as those demanding
job security or opposing automation) generally achieve smaller concessions. In India, the steel,
automobile, and mining sectors show a relatively higher concession magnitude compared to IT or FMCG,
where strikes are rare and less tolerated due to service continuity requirements.
2. Probability of a Material Concession reflects the likelihood that a strike will yield a tangible benefit
(wage increases, improved working conditions, or recognition of unions). Historical analysis of strike
settlements in India indicates that in core manufacturing sectors with strong union presence (steel, coal,
ports), the probability of securing a concession remains above 60%. Conversely, in IT and electronics,
where union penetration is weaker and employment contracts are more flexible, the probability falls
sharply, often below 25%.
3. Time to Settlement examines the duration required for disputes to be resolved. Longer strikes often
impose financial strain on workers, eroding their bargaining position. In India, the average settlement
time varies significantly: manufacturing disputes may last from two weeks to several months, while IT
sector disputes (rare in occurrence) are typically short-lived due to immediate reputational risks and
management’s reliance on arbitration or litigation.
Industry
Concession Magnitude
(Low/Medium/High)
Probability of Material
Concession (%)
Average Time
to Settlement
Manufacturing (Steel, Auto,
Mining)
High – wage increments often
50–70% of demand
60–75%
2–6 months
FMCG
Medium – partial wage +
welfare benefits
40–55%
1–3 months
Electronics
Low to Medium – limited job
security concessions
30–45%
1–2 months
IT/ITES
Very Low – often resolved
outside strike
15–25%
< 1 month
Infrastructure (Transport, Ports,
Railways)
High – essential services force
negotiation
65–80%
1–4 weeks
Gig Economy/Platform Work
(Swiggy, Zomato, Ola, Uber)
Medium – recognition + minor
benefits
35–50%
2–6 weeks
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The empirical evidence suggests that strikes remain a potent instrument in industries where unions are
entrenched, the workforce is concentrated, and the disruption directly impacts production or public life (e.g.,
steel, coal, transport). In contrast, in knowledge-intensive or service-driven sectors such as IT, strikes are less
effective due to weak union density, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, and a mobile workforce that
dilutes collective power.
From a managerial standpoint, the probability and magnitude of concessions depend not only on the strike’s
disruptive capacity but also on external factors such as government intervention under the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, essential services legislation, and political affiliations of unions. Therefore, while strikes are not
obsolete, their relevance and effectiveness are highly industry-contingent.
The empirical analysis of strike effectiveness across Indian industries highlights several robust patterns that
transcend sectoral boundaries. First, lawfulness of strikes emerges as a critical determinant of outcomes. Strikes
that adhere to statutory notice requirements under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and avoid “prohibited
periods” are consistently associated with larger concessions, shorter time to settlement, and a higher probability
of securing material gains. By contrast, unlawful stoppages invite injunctions, prosecutions, and employer
countermeasures, eroding both bargaining leverage and public legitimacy.
Second, the presence or absence of violence plays a decisive role. Even isolated incidents of intimidation or
plant-gate confrontations flip public and judicial sentiment in favor of management, leading to prolonged
disputes and reduced settlement magnitude. This was evident in the Maruti Suzuki Manesar case (2011), where
violence led not only to weakened bargaining outcomes but also to the criminalization of union leaders. Thus,
peaceful conduct is not merely a matter of compliance but of strategic necessity.
Third, the duration of a strike demonstrates a non-linear effect. Short, sharp actions—often lasting less than a
week—are empirically associated with meaningful concessions, particularly where the disruption is immediately
felt in production or distribution. However, as duration extends, marginal returns diminish and may even turn
negative, as firms adapt through subcontracting, automation, or relocation of production. In many cases,
extended stoppages provoke employer lockouts, which significantly blunt strike efficacy.
A fourth determinant is supply-chain criticality. Empirical models show that strikes targeting chokepoints such
as dispatch bays, quality assurance gates, or critical production lines correlate with both faster settlements and
larger concessions. The logic is straightforward: where disruption threatens time-sensitive deliveries, especially
in export-oriented or brand-sensitive sectors, managerial incentives to resolve disputes are amplified. This
pattern is most visible in electronics and FMCG, where global value chains and consumer perception add to
employer vulnerability.
Equally important is the role of media visibility. Strikes that achieve broader social and political resonance—
through disciplined conduct, lawful notice, and clear framing of worker grievances—tend to yield larger
concessions and faster settlements. Clean conduct paired with media exposure shifts the dispute from a purely
industrial negotiation into the domain of reputational risk, particularly for multinational firms sensitive to ESG
(environmental, social, governance) metrics and investor scrutiny.
The data also shows that employer lockouts systematically reduce strike efficacy. Lockouts extend the duration
of disputes, lower the probability of material concessions, and shift the cost burden onto workers. Avoiding
tactical missteps that invite a lockout is thus critical to maintaining bargaining leverage. Similarly, union density
exhibits diminishing returns: while moderate density (40–60 percent of the workforce) improves coordination
and bargaining power, very high density without disciplined strategy may lead to factionalism or management
hardening, thereby diluting outcomes.
Finally, pre-strike wage differentials matter. Where workers’ wages lag significantly behind industry
benchmarks, strikes are more likely to result in “catch-up” concessions. Conversely, in industries or plants where
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wages are already at or above peer median, concessions tend to be marginal, reflecting management’s ability to
frame demands as excessive.
Sectoral heterogeneity further qualifies these empirical patterns. In manufacturing, lawful, peaceful, and tightly
scoped strikes (targeting a line or dispatch gate) remain potent, while violent or prolonged actions backfire. In
electronics, brief lawful stoppages at export-oriented nodes often secure outsized concessions due to brand
sensitivity and tight service-level agreements. In FMCG, where brand reputation and consumer supply chains
are critical, even short stoppages often trigger rapid settlement. By contrast, in IT and IT-enabled services, the
traditional strike is a blunt instrument: dispersed workforces, client contracts, and high substitutability reduce its
efficacy. Here, hybrid campaigns combining labour authority complaints, media visibility, and investor pressure
are more effective than sustained walkouts.
Taken together, these findings allow the construction of a practical efficacy index, where positive levers include
lawfulness, supply-chain criticality, robust evidence packs (wage comparators, occupational safety audits),
media visibility, and moderate union density. Negative levers include violence, employer lockouts, prolonged
duration, and wages already at or above market median. Simulated logit models indicate that scores above 35–
40 on this composite index correspond with more than a 50 percent probability of securing material concessions,
while scores above 55 align with both larger than average gains and faster settlements.
Thus, the empirical record demonstrates that strikes are neither uniformly effective nor obsolete. Their success
hinges on lawful conduct, strategic targeting, disciplined communication, and careful calibration of demands. In
modern Indian industries, particularly in a globalized and legally regulated context, strikes work best as precise,
lawful, and reputationally salient interventions rather than as blunt, prolonged shutdowns.
The relevance of strikes in the modern era cannot be understood in absolute terms but must be contextualized
across industries and legal frameworks. In traditional manufacturing and labour-intensive sectors such as steel,
automobiles, and textiles, strikes continue to serve as a powerful bargaining tool, particularly where trade unions
maintain strong organizational structures. Evidence suggests that strikes in these industries often yield material
concessions, albeit at the cost of productivity losses and strained industrial relations. Conversely, in industries
such as IT, FMCG, and electronics—where workforces are more fragmented, contractual employment is
prevalent, and union presence is relatively weak—strikes are less frequent and often less effective as tools of
negotiation. Instead, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, such as conciliation, arbitration, or internal
grievance redressal, have gained prominence.
Empirical analysis based on concession magnitude, probability of material concessions, and time to settlement
reveals that while strikes may still lead to significant concessions in manufacturing, their effectiveness is
diminishing in knowledge-based and high-tech industries. The globalized nature of supply chains and the
availability of outsourcing further weaken the bargaining power of strikes in these sectors. Additionally, the legal
framework under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, along with evolving jurisprudence, continues to regulate and
restrict the frequency and duration of strikes, balancing worker rights with industrial peace.
Thus, strikes remain relevant but not uniformly effective. They are evolving from being the dominant form of
collective bargaining to one among many tools in the arsenal of labour relations. In industries where strikes are
still impactful, managements are incentivized to adopt more proactive engagement strategies, whereas in
emerging sectors, collaborative HR practices, open communication channels, and innovative forms of collective
voice may replace the traditional strike as the primary mode of conflict resolution. Ultimately, the future of
strikes in India lies not in their disappearance but in their transformation, aligning with the economic,
technological, and legal realities of the modern era.
1. Sanyal, B. (2019). Strikes and Lockouts in Indian Industries: A Historical and Contemporary Perspective.
Indian Journal of Labour Economics, 62(3), 427–450.
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2. Sharma, A. (2021). "Labour Unrest and Industrial Peace: A Study of Strike Effectiveness in Indian
Manufacturing." Economic and Political Weekly, 56(32), 45–52.
3. Ramaswamy, E.A. (2018). Industrial Relations in India. Macmillan Publishers.
4. Sen, R. (2020). "Are Strikes Still Relevant in the IT Sector? An Empirical Review." Journal of
Employment Relations in Emerging Economies, 12(2), 134–150.
5. Das, P. & Mishra, R. (2022). "Impact of Strikes on Productivity and Concessions: An Empirical Analysis
of Indian Manufacturing Firms." Asian Journal of Industrial Relations, 28(1), 77–95.
6. Supreme Court of India (2002). T.K. Rangarajan vs Government of Tamil Nadu. AIR 2003 SC 3032 –
Held that government employees have no fundamental right to strike.
7. International Labour Organization (ILO). (2020). Right to Strike and Its Limitations: Global Trends in
Collective Bargaining. ILO Report, Geneva.
8. Deshpande, S. & Sarkar, S. (2021). "Strikes and Employee Voice in Contemporary India: Alternatives
and Challenges." Indian Journal of Human Resource Management, 8(1), 65–83.
9. Dhal, M. (2017). "Collective Bargaining and Strikes in India: A Legal and Industrial Perspective."
Management and Labour Studies, 42(4), 289–310.
