Legal Personhood of Artificial Intelligence and the Liability Argument

Authors

Meera Patel

School of Law & Constitutional Studies, Shobhit Institute of Engineering & Technology (Deemed to be University), Meerut (UP) (India)

Mohd Imran

School of Law & Constitutional Studies, Shobhit Institute of Engineering & Technology (Deemed to be University), Meerut (UP) (India)

Article Information

DOI: 10.51584/IJRIAS.2025.100900040

Subject Category: Law

Volume/Issue: 10/9 | Page No: 402-412

Publication Timeline

Submitted: 2025-09-26

Accepted: 2025-10-02

Published: 2025-10-12

Abstract

Today, Artificial Intelligence enabled computers, devices, bots, robots etc. are much more sophisticated with enhanced capabilities, with features like machine learning and potential for deep learning, with patters similar to neural networks in human brains, and it is claimed that Artificial Intelligence far exceeds human intelligence in some specific tasks, especially the ones involving computations. The use of Artificial Intelligence has significantly increased in most sectors of the economy, e.g. industrial robots are commonly being used in manufacturing units. Skilled robots are rendering their services in hospitals and restaurants. Sophisticated technology is being used in medical and healthcare sector where Artificial Intelligence enabled robots or machines are performing surgeries. Significant financial trading is being carried out by use of Artificial Intelligence. The music industry is witnessing music being created by Artificial Intelligence. Weaponry is being enabled with Artificial Intelligence. Lawyers and law firms in some of the developed nations are using Artificial Intelligence enabled products to review voluminous documents for purposes of discovery and/or due diligence, filing taxes, etc. and there are several legal expert systems which have been developed to assist lawyers and judges.
The rapid advancement of technology, including drones, driverless and autonomous vehicles, has indeed transformed our world. However, the legal landscape in the world, particularly India, is still catching up with these developments. The legal systems need to evolve to address the concept of legal personhood of A.I. and determine the liability for harm or injury caused by A.I. enabled devices. In this paper, the author will attempt to explore some of the most important legal issues including but not limited to personhood/ autonomy/ agency or whether A.I. can be treated as a subject under the law. The author will also briefly discuss the question and nature of liability to be imposed in the event use of A.I. results in harm or injury to human beings.

Keywords

Artificial Intelligence, drones, driverless vehicles, legal personhood, liability, harm, injury, autonomy, agency

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