Drawing Lessons from the Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia
- August 12, 2018
- Posted by: RSIS
- Category: Social Science
International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS) | Volume II, Issue VII, July 2018 | ISSN 2454–6186
Drawing Lessons from the Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia
Carl Jaison
South Asian University, New Delhi, India
The humanitarian intervention in Somalia is important in many respects. It was the first time that the United Nations passed a resolution invoking Chapter VII of Article 2 of the UN Charter – which allowed for a coalition of states to intervene militarily into another member state for purely humanitarian objectives. It was also the first instance where member states seemed to assess the normative value of the non-interventionist and sovereignty principles, based on which countries co-exist in the international system. Given the above two propositions, Somalia’s case was animated by the fact that there was no civilian government that could endorse the legitimacy of the resolution and therefore became the first instance where the UN came into negotiations with non-state actors.
Since it was the period following the end of the Cold War, Somalia was no longer important from a strategic perspective and the internal conflicts in the country rarely received attention from the UN, member states and even the media. However, the situation had deteriorated to calamitous levels with the civil war and the resultant famine impoverishing the country further. There were many challenges faced by the Somalian people including severe drought, lack of credit, multiple warlord influences, diminishing food stocks, failing agricultural sector, absence of functional central government and clan divisions. In such a scenario, the United Nations and the US knew of the impending consequences of failing to act, but like most military interventions of the past, the question was regarding what would be the best time to intervene.
Kenneth R Rutherford argues that the Bush administration send in troops in late 1992 when there was neither security nor international norms at stake. He points to some reasons for the lack of major international action in the initial stages of the civil war, including Somalia’s non-functioning governing system and that the UN humanitarian relief operations were in organizational disarray due to internal bureaucratic challenges. By April 1992, the UN said that close to 1.5 million people is at most risk, while 3.5 million required urgent assistance (Rutherford, 2008)
